

John deYoung  
Thesis Topic  
April 18, 1946

The Development of the Social Organization of a Relocation Center

The WRA relocation center provides the social scientist with a unique opportunity for observing and analyzing the adaptation of the social structure of an old community to a new situation characterized by a rigid framework of government regulations and a prescribed physical environment.

Situation:

Minidoka Relocation Center was such a center where 9,000 people with a similar cultural background formed a new community under these imposed conditions. In addition to possessing a common cultural background, the majority of these 9,000 people had been part of an integrated Japanese community in Seattle. They had experienced the shock of evacuation as a group and had lived together several months as a unit in a temporary assembly center.

The pre-war Japanese community of Seattle was a well-defined, highly integrated group within the larger community and as such was typical of other Northwest urban Japanese groups. The outstanding characteristic of these "Little Tokyos" was the strong internal solidarity which had been built up on a foundation of traditional Japanese customs and practises. The rural Japanese though geographically set apart were tightly bound in spirit to the Japanese communities of the large cities.

The outbreak of war with Japan in December 1941 and the resulting restrictive orders on persons of Japanese ancestry suddenly decapitated these highly integrated communities. Overnight the leaders of the group were lifted from the scene. Uncertainty and confusion spread. In Seattle during this chaotic period, the Japanese American Citizen League, a political and social organization representing the young citizen group attempted to assume leadership. The result was even more confusion.

When evacuation was finally ordered, permanent relocation centers had not been set up and temporary quarters for the evacuees were established in makeshift camps. The Wartime Civilian Control Administration had been formed to take charge of the evacuation and to operate these temporary camps which were known as assembly centers. The majority of the future Minidoka residents were quartered for several months in the Puyallup County fairgrounds which was designated as the Puyallup Assembly Center or as it was known locally 'Camp Harmony'. At Puyallup Center the internal management of the camp was turned over by the Wartime Civilian Control Administration authorities

I. S. Miyamoto's "Social Solidarity Among the Japanese in Seattle" (1939) and F.L. Violette's "Americans of Japanese Ancestry" (1945) give a picture of what these Japanese communities were like.

to the leaders of the JACL group. Then began a regime of several months by a group of young, inexperienced Japanese American citizens. This regime rode roughshod over previous leadership and old culture patterns and soon incurred the enmity of the community. Friction and cleavages developed and Camp Harmony became known as Camp Disharmony.

The strife of the assembly center reached such a pitch of intensity that, even before the first vanguard of evacuees left for Minidoka Relocation Center, opposition groups had resolved that the mistakes of Camp Harmony were not to be repeated. Word of inner-community strife of the assembly center had penetrated to the top relocation center officials and they also were not eager to inherit factional strife. The result was the retirement of the JACL leadership and with it to a large extent active citizenship participation in community affairs. Thus the moving in period at Minidoka center got off to a fairly smooth start and for the first year there was relatively smooth sailing.

But as the relocation center settled down and began to take shape as an integrated community, conflicts both within the community and with the administration began to show up in ever increasing frequency. The development of community government and leadership in the center marked a period during which the community and administration frequently were at odds.

Problem:

It was soon apparent that the relocation center was to be more than a temporary shelter in which the life of thousands of evacuees revolved around government regulations. With somewhat of a shock government administrators discovered that the relocation centers rapidly became integrated communities with a pattern of life that in many instances developed outside the framework which had been laid down for the creation and control of the centers.

A hypothesis can be set up to the effect that when a group is faced with a new environment and the need for adaptation of social patterns to this environment, the social structure that develops will follow the familiar cultural patterns and social relationships of the group. There will be adaptation to changes in the environment but this adaptation whenever possible will follow patterns already familiar to the group.

A corollary hypothesis to be tested by the relocation center is:<sup>2</sup>

In the developing social structure of a group, if the familiar patterns are prohibited by an imposed framework; cleavage, social disorganization, and friction results in the group. If successful adaptation of old patterns to the new environment (the imposed framework) occurs, similar disorganization and friction results if the new patterns are prohibited or ignored.

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2. Excellent comparative material for testing certain aspects of this hypothesis (ie, leadership patterns) is found in the writings of Whyte (Settlement house) McKeel (Indian Service) and E. Hughes (French-Canadian group)

This generalization will be tested through an analysis of the social structure of Minidoka relocation center and by comparative material from other relocation centers.<sup>3</sup>

It will be shown that where old patterns were prohibited or ignored, disorganization resulted. In those centers where attempt was made to adopt the imposed framework without reference to the old social structure of the group, strife and disorganization resulted within the community. The reverse was true where the old patterns were taken into consideration. The same holds true for the new adaptations that developed.

The real test of the generalization will lie in an examination and analysis of the conflict situations both real and potential<sup>4</sup> that arose in Minidoka Relocation Center. If it can be demonstrated that these conflict situations developed as a result of non-recognition or prohibition of the old patterns or of the new adaptation, the generalization will stand. Similarly the solution of these conflict situations should revolve around recognition of these patterns.

3. The field work for this analysis was done during a year's period (1943-44) as the initial community analyst at Minidoka Center and a return trip of 2½ months as visiting analyst in 1945. Other experience with the problem was gained from a two-month detail as analyst in another center and from work as community analyst in the Washington office of the War Relocation Authority.

4. By 'potential' conflict situations are meant those situations where factors were present for development but which for various reasons did not. Such potential conflict situations can be checked at other centers where the same operating factors produced actual conflict.

*John de Young*

COPY OF LETTER FROM FRED EGGAN RE THESIS TOPIC

May 8, 1946

"

The Department has considered your Ph.D. thesis proposal. In general we feel that while the material you propose to work with sounds interesting and important the particular hypothesis which you set out to test is of too general a character to be much value. The proposition that adaptation to changes in environment whenever possible will follow patterns already familiar to the group has by now become a common sense proposition.

Much more important would be the detailed analysis of the adaptive changes as they occur in defined situations, preferably with the comparative testing against materials from other relocation centers or from materials listed in your footnote on page 2. Now that you have gained a greater familiarity with the possibilities of the relocation materials, will you redefine your thesis problem, either along the lines here suggested or along other lines which you may prefer."

THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

On February 19, 1942, Executive Order 9066, expelling the Japanese from the West Coast military defense areas and to exclude any and all people of Japanese ancestry.

THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

... pressure from groups on the west coast... Japan as a direct target to military security. This government policy was to completely remove the lives of 110,000 people solely upon an assumed basis without regard to citizenship, social relations, or past records. It violated completely the United States Constitution, allowed no appeals, and was morally reprehensible. In the Japanese perspective, it would only be seen as a consolidation of the racial walls and to build their own land within as a state labor force in the future. To the west coast natives white radicals on the west coast it was their "political opportunity" to be rid completely of the "Japs" and were supporting the west coast. In the people's perspective for Japanese the side policy was given the American thinking that just what it is to give their rights, large groups of people. On the other hand, regarding situation was created the War Relocation Authority, a government body whose function was to rehabilitate the lives of these people and to provide for their well-being.

Mark Vedder  
Anthropology 190  
30 November, 1972

## THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, empowering the Secretary of War to designate military defense areas and to exclude any and all people of Japanese ancestry from them. This Order was the direct result of pressure from groups on the west Coast who saw the resident Japanese as a direct threat to national security. This government policy was to completely affect the lives of 110,000 people solely upon an ancestral basis without regard to citizenship, actual behavior, or past record. It violated completely the United States Constitution, allowed no appeals, and was morally insupportable. To the Japanese themselves, it could only be seen as a continuation of the racism which had followed their original welcome as a cheap labor force in the 1890s.<sup>1</sup> To the more extreme white racists on the west Coast it was their "golden opportunity" to be rid completely of the "Japs" who were overrunning the West Coast. To the people responsible for instituting this policy was given the problem of figuring out just what to do with this rather large group of people. Out of this fairly confusing situation was created the War Relocation Authority, a government body whose sole function was to administer the fate of these people in a way amenable to the war effort. The real problem lay basically in deciding how, where, and what should be done with these people, and, most importantly, for how long? As the war progressed it became apparent that a tremendous wrong had been done to these people, and that every effort should be

made to see these people out of the Relocation Centers and into areas outside of the West Coast Region where they could join communities and begin rebuilding their lives. The Japanese reaction to this benevolent gesture was one of resistance that was not to be completely resolved until the end of the war. This resistance and the reasons for its development reveal many lessons vital to an understanding of the people. These lessons will also explain some basic faults in the methods of the WRA that could have been avoided by having a more accurate picture of the situation.

The initial months of the War Relocation Authority were confusing and hectic for all involved; relocation centers had to be built, the evacuees had to be sorted, categorized, cared for, and finally located in a center. Even in these early stages the evacuees were forming the opinions and feelings that were to stay with them for the duration of their incarceration:

They were thinking soberly of what the future of Japanese-Americans might be, and their conclusions for the most part were that the future depended heavily on the course of the war and its ultimate outcome with respect to the relations of the United States and Japan. In short, they were very far removed from thinking of the relocation centers as a 2 meaningless interlude in the life of their people....

The theory behind the relocation project was to relocate the evacuees to centers in areas of non-strategic importance. The actual construction and design of the centers was an Army project, and the end result was a compound containing rows of hastily-partitioned barracks suited for Army trainees. Unfortunately, these compounds were expected to shelter entire families in a situation

where they ~~may~~<sup>might</sup> raise their children and give them the moral and cultural guidelines they wished. This <sup>was</sup> a fairly difficult project when one must share a mess hall with 250-300 people, and the only facilities were public ones.

Gradually, however, the blocks, as these 250-person living units were called, began to emerge as homes, and slowly the people in the blocks began to take on a mutual character themselves as they began to interact with each other. The common factor of Japanese ancestry combined with the mutual experience of relocation formed the foundation upon which mutual beliefs and attitudes were to develop.

We are all in the same boat, young and old, Japanese citizens and American citizens. Regardless of birth, our fate in the United States has turned out to be the same. Therefore, we must stick together and seek with determination to harmonize whatever differences we may have felt or even continue to feel. This means working together on everything to make life satisfactory as possible here in the relocation centers. 3

The first months in the centers were very busy as the evacuees worked together to transform their drab quarters into homes and neighborhoods. As the blocks slowly began to show the fruits of this united effort, one could also see the gradual development of a block attitude. These directions developed rather rapidly, due to the general lack of privacy, the public institutions of latrines and mess~~halls~~, and the strong need for some secure base upon which to center one's life.

The relocation experience was a constant topic of conversation amongst the evacuees as they attempted to establish some



kind of a philosophy that could explain their fears and doubts. As a result of conversations like this, some of the older men developed the idea of the "ideal city", a concept which has been defined as:

Communities organized by evacuees in accordance with their own political orientations and cultural values--that is, the ideal communities in process of realization--become symbols of the worth of the Japanese as a people. 4

This ideal was a source of much strength in the early stages of the experience, and remained a viable force until the resettlement program began draining off the most vigorous manpower.

The WRA had instituted a program of self government in the centers through which the basic workings of the physical plant could be maintained and democratic decisions could be honestly reached. This was an admirable idea which unfortunately had not been researched too well, and as a result was to cause problems. The real problem lay in a WRA directive of June, 1942, which stated that only U.S. citizens could serve in the elected councils. To understand the impact of this policy it is necessary to look at the peculiar status of the Japanese as interpreted by the U.S. government. The basis of this problem is rooted in the original Japanese immigration to the U.S. as cheap farm labor in the 1890s. As a result of various factors, the immigrant Japanese were included amongst those nationalities who were excluded from the right to become naturalized citizens by the Naturalization Statute of 1870. Oddly enough, this statute did not forbid the aliens from working, marrying, and raising families. The effect of this

situation was to create families in which the immigrant parents, commonly known as the Issei, were excluded from citizenship, while their children, called Nisei, were given native-born status. The ramifications of this situation has plagued the Japanese in California since their arrival, because anti-Oriental factions had created, using the 1870 statute as the base, a series of interlocking laws aimed at excluding the Orientals from owning agricultural land.

The relevance of this situation within the confines of the centers is unique because it gives the right to run for public office solely to the Nisei. To understand the impact of this one must understand that the traditional Japanese family order is patrilocally oriented with great importance placed upon the role of the father as the decision maker. As well, one must also remember that there was a generation gap between Issei and Nisei that was further heightened by the complete acculturation of the Nisei as opposed to the generally limited Issei acculturation. Bearing these factors in mind one may readily see the obvious areas of difference between the two, and the reason for the resentment by the Issei.

But Issei generally did not feel that they could rely on the Nisei leadership, which was so interested in relating itself to the American war effort, to uphold the interests of the Issei who were not, and had never been permitted to be American citizens. 5

In actuality, the Nisei did not have the real capabilities to handle the responsibilities of representing the people. The true direction of feeling amongst the evacuees was something the Issei could recognize, and as is seen by the ideal city concept,

was often formulated by them for the rest to follow.

The reality of this situation may be seen in the problems that the Poston, Arizona center experienced in June, 1942. The WRA administrators had urged the formation of a community plan, and both Issei and Nisei leaders had met and subsequently produced one. At this point, the WRA policy became known for the first time and the Issei withdrew angrily from the council. The project attorney arranged an election, and the representatives of each block were duly elected--they were all Nisei and only one was over 40. The Nisei assumed their roles and within a very short time had managed to antagonize both the administrators and the Issei. Public opinion was upset with the Nisei ineffecualities as a whole. The project attorney suggested that an Issei Advisory Board be formed to help the Nisei. This was done, but the council did not really use them for fear of losing control. The situation grew worse, in October and early November, gang elements had been creating trouble. The crisis occurred on November 18th when a councilman was beaten, and FBI investigators had arrested two young men they suspected. Public opinion was in an uproar because it was generally believed that the men were innocent, but the FBI refused to release them. On the night of November 21st, the block managers went on strike, and shortly thereafter the entire community was on strike. Community leaders met with the Issei, heard their demands for representation, and gradually  
6  
agreed to a modification of the current system.

One may see from this particular situation that the entire basis for the trouble was centered around a lack of knowledge of existing and traditional relationships. The incident could have been averted had there been a cohesive force of unified community

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sentiment.

The fall of 1942 saw the beginnings of great change for the centers which were based upon the WRA decision that the evacuees must be relocated to cities throughout the country as soon as possible so that they may begin the process of resettlement. The beginnings of this program were the release of workers on temporary leave to harvest the cotton and sugar beet crops, and the program by which college students could leave the centers to attend school. However, the effect of these programs was minimal in comparison to policies begun in February, 1943. Earlier in the year, the War Department, interested church organizations, and the WRA had agreed to allow the evacuees to prove their loyalty. This was to be accomplished through a joint program which was commonly known as registration.

The WRA had announced in October, 1942, that it was going to pursue an active program of resettlement, and had begun establishing offices in cities like Chicago, St. Louis, and Salt Lake City to act as liaison for those relocating in their search for jobs, housing, etc. By February, 1943, the Army and the WRA were ready to begin their program which consisted mainly of requiring all personnel to fill out a questionnaire. These questionnaires were of two kinds, one especially designed for the Issei and the Nisei women, and one for the Nisei males eligible for the draft. The only real difference between these questionnaires and any of the others was a special section of two questions aimed at determining one's loyalty.

Evidently this program had not been screened very carefully because the response of the evacuees was generally not very positive. It seemed that each segment of the population had some kind of a problem with their questionnaires. These problems were not insurmountable, but they required modification before they <sup>questionnaires</sup> could be completed. In the case of the Issei, for example, the title read: Application for Relocation. The Issei interpretation of this was to assume that the WRA would immediately consider this questionnaire to be a real application. As such, there was no way that ~~they~~ could sign it. In addition, the wording on one of the Issei loyalty questions asked him to foreswear allegiance to the Emperor of Japan--the only status an Issei has is his Japanese <sup>citizenship</sup> and if he were to renounce the Emperor, then he would have no country at all.

The Army's approach to the Nisei met with varying degrees of acceptance and rejection, but its largest response was to ask for some kind of assurance that the Nisei and the Issei would have their rights restored to them. Through continued efforts the Army was able to convince many of the Nisei that the War Department was indeed serious in its promises to try to get their status changed. The attitudes of the evacuees could be summarized in this fashion:

In general most Nisei wanted a positive move from the Government in the restoration of real citizenship status; the majority were willing once they had registered their protests, to accept the re-opening of the Army as such a move. In general most Issei wanted to be left alone until the war was over and they could see their way to new starts in the country in which they had their roots of family and property--the United States. 7

Upon close investigation of their findings, the WRA officials soon realized that statistics were not an accurate measure of the responses. At first glance, out of 75,000 responses some 8500 of these had failed to prove their loyalty--yet their investigations revealed, for example, that less than 3% of the Minidoka and Granada answers were NO, <sup>i</sup>over 50% of the Manzanar answers were NO. It had become obvious that many factors were at play in the determination of the answers, and that the issue of loyalty to one side or another was not really the issue, but rather the degree of one's disillusionment with the system. The appearance of the registration program obviously meant a change, and so did the offers from the Army. Again the occupants of the centers were suspicious of hidden motives of the WRA. This sudden appearance of yet more uncertainties was a harsh blow to those who had just recently resigned themselves to making the best of the center. The entire idea of relocation must mean that there would be divisions of the groups, and this to the Issei was a particularly disturbing possibility. The entire situation presented a rather sad paradox in that the supposed purpose of the registration procedure was to pave the way for evacuee relocation and re-entry into American society, yet the actual effect was to solidify and <sup>to</sup> strengthen the desire to maintain the centers as living communities.

The spring of 1943 was a period of watchful waiting and ever increasing hysteria. The tension within the centers was kept at a fever pitch by highly inflammatory newspaper accounts of the proceedings of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and the

House Committee on Un-American Activities investigations into the number of "disloyal" evacuees. During this same period, there was a great deal of interest in the progress of the WRA's resettlement program. By June 1, 1943, nearly 9000 evacuees had left the centers to get jobs in the Mountain States, but these people were in general quite young, they didn't have extensive ties with the centers or the people in them, so their movement does not really say much for the bulk of the evacuees.

In July the WRA officials announced its segregation policy. This policy stipulated that all who had requested repatriation and all those who had voted NO would be moved to the Tule Lake center in California. In an attempt to soften the impact of this, a provision had been attached which allowed one's family to move with them under the status of "voluntary segregant." The WRA tried to minimize the "disloyal" aspect of the order by declaring the Tule Lake center to be one in which the segregants could "live like Japanese," instead of in the American fashion of the other centers.

To some evacuees this trip would be a pleasant one because it would mean a step in the right direction in their efforts to return to Japan. To those attempting to evade the draft it was also a good sign in that it virtually guaranteed their success. However, for many this trip would be nothing but a sad time because for these people the trip meant inevitable family separation. Conditions at Tule Lake were much less than had been described, and the camp was a hotbed of militant feelings. The presence of the Kibei--these are people of U.S. origin with educations and social customs learned in Japan--was felt heavily because they



were for the first time in center life in a strong enough position to be able to make their derogatory remarks about Nisei and America in general. For some reason the evacuees at the Tule Lake center were that segment of evacuee society that had been unable to succeed in the United States and were taking advantage of a free trip back to Japan.

The WRA staff felt that this center was noticeably different from the others in the relatively large numbers of such people, less well off economically, less courageous, less confident in their ability to make a living for themselves than the average evacuee. 8

The Tule Lake Center was to become quite prominent as a result of a riot in early November; its actual function as a segregation center was disrupted as the Army took control of the center for about two months. <sup>NEW</sup> Its activities were normal until its final closing.

The beginning of 1944 saw the remaining 9 centers holding the core of the West Coast residents. By this time the WRA had begun to call the centers "relocation" centers with increased emphasis on ~~on~~ relocation before the end of the war. The Relocation Division was established to perform liaison work on the West Coast for these people. In the winter of 1944, relocation teams met with every family to explain directly the situation. However, these people were still, in many cases, awaiting the end of the war. The basic natures of the centers were not affected by the departures of 1943 because these people were not usually active members in the formation of community sentiment.

By May, 1944, some 20,000 people had left the centers on indefinite leave. The departure of these people was significant in that most of them had been voices in the community. However, for all intents and purposes the centers were still virtually the same in late 1944. There were inroads being cut into the structure of these communities by increased contact with others who had already relocated, by a gradual realization that Japan wasn't going to win the war.

Finally on December 17, 1944, the War Department announced the opening of the West Coast effective January 2, 1945. The WRA policy was not far behind stating that no center would be open longer than a year after January 2nd, 1945. To many of the remaining evacuees the knowledge that the West Coast was now open to them was enough to start them packing immediately. There were others who were still waiting for something to catalize their departure. People began going to their home areas to look around and see what their prospects were--having completed their visits they would return to the centers and pass their findings along. Slowly the fears of racial repercussions began to die out. By the end of May, the attitudes towards the West Coast had changed drastically and the WRA was able to fill carloads with evacuees going to the Coast.

There was still a portion of the evacuees who could not see leaving the centers. For these people, time was beginning to run out. The WRA was maintaining its schedule, and these people could see the centers crumbling around them. In early August the announcement was made that those people who did not have definite depart-

ure dates would have them made for them by the project directors. The announcement of the end of the war removed one of the last reasons for remaining in the centers. The centers began to close down on schedule, and by mid-December only Tule Lake remained. The final days at Tule Lake were spent in mitigation of the status of some 1300 Nisei renunciants. Of this number some 400 renunciants were taken into internment and the camp was closed.

When looking in retrospect at something it is always easier to choose the right course than it was at the time. In the case of the WRA, there are many examples of this, but the questions that should be asked about the WRA should be concerned with something more than requests for an explanation of why the WRA bought, for example, so many boxes of Corn Flakes. What should be questioned, perhaps, is why there ever was such an organization as the WRA. When one considers the origins of the drive to form the WRA, it seems that there must have been a mistake made somewhere that enabled this to happen. The actual physical task involved was enormous and it required intelligent thinking to make it work. The puzzle here is that the thinking that created the need for this organization could not have been extremely intelligent, yet it managed to involve thousands of people and millions of dollars. The real problem was, I think, expressed nicely by Dr. Spicer in the classroom when he said the real importance of this experience is not whether it could happen again, but rather would you allow it to happen?

*good history  
well-written  
but little author  
perspective.*

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FOOTNOTES

1. Morton Grodzins, Americans Betrayed (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1949), p. 3.
2. E.H. Spicer, A.T. Hansen, K. Luomala, M.K. Opler, Impounded People (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1969), p. 9.
3. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 13.
5. Ibid., p. 119.
6. Ibid., p. 129-135.
7. Ibid., p. 154.
8. Ibid., p. 179.

NOTE: I found out much to my surprise that the Impounded People was much more useful to me in my research than the manuscripts in the sense that much of the information available in the manuscripts has been rewritten in more concise terms in the book.

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Boxes 1-20.

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Spicer U.S. War Relocation

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COMMUNITY ANALYSIS:  
APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE  
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

R. L. Graninger  
Anth. 399L Seminar  
May 18, 1972

E. H. Spicer  
Professor  
Dept. of Anthropology

The War Relocation Authority, established by Executive Order #9102, was charged with the responsibility of assisting those persons evacuated from the West Coast of the United States under Executive Order #9066. Organized in March, 1942, only four months after the bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese, the WRA was immediately embroiled in the relocation of 110,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans from assembly centers directed by the Army to one of the ten WRA centers set up outside of the West Coast Defense Command. By November 3, the transfer to the centers was complete although many of the centers were still being constructed. These centers, modelled on Army "theater of war" designs, were basically bachelors' quarters barracks built on a block plan, each block containing separate mess, bathroom, and toilet facilities, and accommodating from 250 to 300 men, women, and children. Remodelling of the barracks consisted of their partitioning by allotting a certain number of rafters according to the size of the family unit.

From the inception of the WRA, the Washington office had employed a trained anthropologist, John Provinse, as Chief of Community Management in charge of evacuee services such as schools, health care, law and order, and recreation (Spicer 1946). This fortuitous placement of a social scientist was determined by administrative background and friendships rather than by a conscious decision to incorporate anthropological training and input into the WRA. According to Embree (1944), some consideration (with impetus probably



from Provinse) was given to employment of one or two men with special knowledge or background who might aid the administration by giving advice on problems concerning Japanese culture. No action was taken until Provinse formalized his recommendation at which time Robert Redfield was approached to consult with administrators to aid in determining basic policies vis a vis the centers. (Note: Redfield had no specific background knowledge of the Japanese.) Somewhat later, John Embree (who had extensive knowledge of the Japanese in Hawaii and in Japan), another anthropologist, joined the Washington staff as archivist to document the story of the WRA.

Poston, one of the WRA centers in Arizona, was unique in that it had been set up and was operated by the Indian Service and was guided by WRA policy rather than run by it. John Collier, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, had used social scientists before as aides to administration and found them to be of real value so he included this type of scientific analysis as an integral part of the center (Leighton 1946). Dr. Alexander Leighton was detailed from the Navy to head this function of the center in June of 1942. Leighton, a psychiatrist who had studied Navajo and Eskimo communities, was joined in August of 1942 by Dr. Edward Spicer, an anthropologist with field experience in Yaqui Indian studies. Collier also hired Conrad Arensburg as a temporary consultant to begin a preliminary study of the Poston Center. By November, the permanent staff of Leighton and Spicer was augmented by Elizabeth Colson, an anthropologist with experience

NW Court  
among ~~Southwestern~~ Indians. Laura Thompson supplanted Adrens-  
burg as consultant to the center. ✓

The Poston unit, to be known as the Bureau of Sociological Research, became the model for the eventual establishment of a Community Analysis division within the framework of the WRA bureaucracy. Even though Provinse, Redfield, and Embree continued to proselytize for such a unit, it was an entirely unrelated set of events which eventually caused the administration to found the section -- the Poston strike and the Manzanar riot. Because of the able work of the Poston ESR in reporting and analyzing the strike, Washington moved Embree from its Reports office into a slot within Provinse's Office of Community Management and empowered him to recruit social scientists for eventual placement in each of the WRA centers. Embree (1944) lists four specific events leading up to the final creation of the Community Analysis Section: (1) earlier conversations with Provinse and other WRA staff, (2) Adrens-  
burg's earlier analysis of Poston, (3) conversations with Leighton and Spicer in connection with documentation, and (4) the peaceful resolution of the strike at Poston, which had such a unit, in contrast to the Manzanar crisis which resulted in armed force and bloodshed. Embree also felt that general acceptance of the section at the project level was due to the fact that many of the administrators were familiar with this form of social analysis from prior association with the Indian Service or Department of Agriculture.

Although Embree was empowered to act in February of 1943,

official codification of the section did not occur until September when Manual Section 30.8 was included in the WRA Manual - Administrative Handbook for the first time. This section follows:

30.8.1 It is the intention of the WRA to analyze the cultural patterns existing in the community at each relocation center, and to observe social trends and study their underlying causes in order to:

- |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |                                                   |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| <p>A. Increase understanding of the factors governing social development within the center;</p> <p>B. Facilitate the program of resettlement and reassimilation of evacuees into American life; and</p> <p>C. Provide a guide for dealing with any comparable social situation that may become the responsibility of a federal agency.</p> | <p>Purposes<br/>of<br/>Community<br/>Analysis</p> |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|

<p>30.8.2 To carry out the functions of 30.8.1, a Community Analysis Section shall be established in the Community Management Division at each center. The work of the Section will be under direction of a Community Analyst reporting to the Project Director in charge of Community Management. Evacuee workers may be assigned to the Section at the center within budgetary limitations.</p>	<p>Community Analysis Section</p>
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30.8.3 The Community Analysis Section at a Center shall make an intensive study of the community there, including all significant formal and informal social groups, with special emphasis upon the degree of assimilation of the various groups, their social roles in the community, their

attitudes toward one another and toward the WRA, the effect of the evacuation upon family controls and social group controls, and the effect of administrative policies and decisions upon the evacuee community. It should further observe and analyze all social trends within the center, with special attention to the development of new social groupings and to developments that may improve social relations within the center, or that might lead to crises.

Community  
Analysis  
Program

30.8.4 All administrative personnel at the Center shall cooperate with the program by making available to the Community Analysis Section such records and personal information as may be of value to it.

Relations  
with other  
staff units

The Community Analysis staff shall not be required or expected to divulge such information received nor the individual sources of its records and reports.

30.8.5 At least monthly, the Section at each center shall report on its activities to the Project Director, through the Assistant Project Director in charge of Community Management. From time to time other reports shall be made as deemed advisable by the section, or as the Project Director may request. One copy of each regular or occasional report must be sent to the Director in Washington.

Reports

30.8.6 The function of Community Analysis is to provide objective analysis of Center life. No Community Analyst should be required to assume operating responsibilities, or to make investigations of such occur-

rences as disputes between individual evacuees where it is within the sphere of the Internal Security or Welfare Sections to collect the facts. The Community Analyst is also to serve as general advisor and to aid in all phases of Center administration. Limitations

Embree left Washington to recruit social scientists armed with a Government Standard Position Description which stated the organization title as Community Analyst, class title as social science analyst (P-4), and listed as minimum qualifications: must be a college graduate with training in anthropology, sociology, or social psychology. The position carried an annual salary of \$3800. It was not until March of 1943 that the first social scientist was placed (note: Exception was of course the BSR at Poston.) and not until June of 1944 that analysts were at all ten centers. (see Appendix I) Staff continued to fluctuate both in the field and in Washington throughout the existence of the Section, and evacuee staff at both levels remained continually in a state of flux due to budget limitations and pressures for evacuee assistants to relocate away from the centers. By the middle of 1945, twenty-two persons had filled the fourteen analyst positions in Washington and the centers; of the twenty-two, fourteen were anthropologists and eight were sociologists.

I have structured my assessment of the use of social scientists by the WRA in terms of the eight questions posed during the course of the seminar this term.

1. What were the natures of the roles filled by the social

scientist?

2. What was expected of the social scientist by the client agency?
3. What was the input of social science to the project?
4. What were the recurrent problems in making contributions or achieving objectives in the project, from a social scientist viewpoint and from the viewpoint of the client?
5. What problems were incurred by the structure of the situation?
6. What training of the social scientist could have solved the inherent as well as actual problems of the project?
7. What profits has social science gained from participation in the project?
8. What are the ethical positions the social scientist took - explicit or implicit?

An obvious role dichotomy is apparent from the first in the WRA structure, found in the positions of John Provinse and John Embree. Provinse was originally hired because of his administrative ability, not his anthropological expertise, and Embree was initially the project historian, then the head of the Community Analysis Section. While not denying Provinse's role as progenitor of the idea of using social scientists in the WRA, I have not dealt with him except referentially; likewise, Embree's role is assessed from the inception of the Section.

The most important role of the analyst evolved as diachronic, consisting in large part of providing an ongoing situational analysis of each center with the Washington Section as the synthesizing agency and ultimate unit of

dispersal back to the projects. The analysts had to provide data regarding events in three time sequences: immediate past, present, and immediate future, simultaneously. This was not, however, the original intent of the role as described by Manual Section 30.8 or as imagined by the analysts themselves.

Prior to this period most ethnographic training had approached the study of society with synchronic methodology, slicing and segmenting studies at convenient times in the ongoing history of the group under study rather than viewing the evolution of change. In the WRA situation, cultural background was only a single component of a history that had changed markedly since arrival in the United States and again drastically with relocation.

Perhaps the original expectations of the social scientist are best expressed by Leighton and Spicer in the Appendix to Governing of Men (Leighton 1946):

1. aid administration by analyzing evacuee attitudes with regard to administrative acts and draw conclusions as to the reasons for success or failure,
2. gather data of general interest in administering communities in occupied areas, and
3. train evacuee field workers in social analysis for aid in occupied areas.

Specific roles evolved from the pursuit of these objectives. Leighton and Spicer arranged with Robert Redfield that academic credit would be received by members of the BSR; a seminar approach and periods of field experience were instituted in the training of the evacuees. (Role 1: the

analyst as teacher, an extension of his own training) A variety of methods was used by the BSR in obtaining initial information re the evacuees: casual observation, intensive interviews, record collection (i.e., census forms), public opinion polls, and personality studies. (Role 2: the analyst as data collector) Leighton and Spicer (Leighton 1946) summarize the accomplishments of the BSR in four areas. One of those areas, contributions to the immediate needs of center administration, creates an additional role for the analyst which was relevant to all the centers: Role 3: the analyst as advisor. This single role best defines the analysts' position in the WRA structure as a staff position rather than a line position. A handwritten manuscript attributed to John Embree (n.d.), found in the Special Collections Section of the University of Arizona Library, catalogs the various roles of the analysts as they saw them. To avoid being redundant, I will mention only those roles not discussed above. LeBarre discusses the analyst as trouble-shooter (Role 4) as turning up problems for other departments to handle. All analysts were reports officers (Role 5), responsible for a variety of required and evolved reports; the former were generated on a regular bureaucratic basis, monthly, quarterly, annually, etc., while the latter, weekly trend reports or special studies, appeared as necessary. The analyst often served as a pivotal point in information dissemination up and down the line of command, Role 6, the analyst as go-between. Marvin Opler evidently felt he had a unique role supplementing his advisory capacity,



Role 7, the analyst as ghost writer for the project director's "best" speeches. Bailey (1971)<sup>notes</sup> a role for the analyst in connection with the problem of group control in a constrained situation: Role 8, the analyst as "potential stress monitor" (with reference to the roles of Leighton and Spicer during the period of the Poston strike). Role 9, the analyst as cross-cultural interpreter, was initially the preeminent one but with a bias for ethnic information. The role modified as synchronic information re cultural background became less important and diachronic analysis vis a vis the ongoing situation became more important.

The WRA had originally hired the analysts to provide ethnic information to aid in forming policy for the centers. The information gleaned from these professionals would facilitate implementation of the WRA policy at the program level. Where did the analyst fit in as a potential policy maker, given the three functions of the policy maker: (1) goal setting, (2) allocation <sup>of</sup> decisions, and (3) coordinating ~~of~~ decisions? With the possible exception of Provinse's role as an administrator, the social scientist held only a coordinating role in policy making. All of the major policy decisions regarding the evacuees had been made prior to the hiring of the first analyst; the exception was segregation and it was almost a foregone conclusion. When a closing date had been set for the centers, the analyst again entered the picture as a low-level policy maker to coordinate, with more ethnic information, the dispersal of the evacuees from the camps.

I have spoken about ethnic information at some length,

but how was this anthropological specialty viewed by the WRA and the analyst? To the social scientist, such information was unique and of critical value, while to the administrator the information formed part of a battery of data with which he was provided so that decisions could be implemented. This information, to him, was no more unique than reports from the hospital or internal security and often less attentively treated because of its incomprehensible style and structure. At some centers the analyst was viewed as provider of esoteric information with little bearing on the mechanical operation of the project.

Three types of social science input correlating with distinct time periods in the history of the project can be considered. Initially, the analyst provided simply ethnographic and historical information, but he soon learned to fall back on his training in order to supply a holistic overview of the continually changing situations in the projects. The final input of the analyst was to furnish information regarding the redistribution of the evacuees to their former areas of residence. To gain this knowledge, analysts left the centers and made studies in those areas concerning attitudes to the evacuees' returns.

Two types of recurring problems plagued the smooth co-existence of analysts and administrators: (1) frictions between them based on non-acceptance by the administrators of the analysts as experts, the analysts' lack of awareness of the roles of the administrators (thus having inappropriate role models and expectations), and a social science bias

causing the analyst to have an unsympathetic view of agency domination (the analyst often becoming an advocate for the community against the agency), and (2) the social scientists' ignorance of the recent past history of the local community (WRA and evacuee), lack of focus in ethnic information, and an absence of models in development and change to deal with the WRA situation. The professional role of the analyst often dictated his manner of dealing with the rest of the center, and he was rightly accused of being supercilious and pedantic while he felt the other staff to be made up of boobs and anti-intellectuals. The analysts' job description was in fact the only one which required a college education as a prerequisite to hiring. Early relationships were often very strained and only a few were founded on mutual respect. The Washington Section probably enjoyed the best situation, at least at the top level, of all the analysts due to the closeness of Provinse and the upper echelon administrators. However, all was not perfect even at this level. A manuscript attributed to Rachel Sady (n.d.) in the form of a personal narrative recounts her views of the Washington C.A.S. She suggests that the earliest criticism of the C.A. by other WRA personnel was its readiness to criticize without offering the answers. Sady saw the Washington role as one of funnel for information from the centers to the high level policy makers. She notes that recommendations may not be valuable but to fit in with other sources of data in the bureaucracy } they are indispensable. The analyst must, in bureaucratic terms, "go on record". A central Washington coordinating

staff was necessary, but Sady expressed recurrent "fifth wheel" feeling of lack of confidence in what she did. She offers the following explanations for her opinion. The attitudes of other WRA staff to the C.A. at the project level were only important at times but were particularly acute when coupled with the isolation of the top Washington staff. Information did not travel down to the C.A. with reference as to "slant" from other offices. The head of the C.A.S. alone had entree to staff meetings, etc., and Sady and associates felt "left out". (note: I feel this is an over-inflated view based on little understanding of the structure of the WRA or, for that matter, of any government agency.) Sady mentions finally a sense of personal frustration as part of her general feeling due to project dead ends and other intangibles. She felt that often a report written and circulated brought personal satisfaction far beyond its actual worth. Her closing statement reflects what I would call a definite anthropological bias: "In my own judgment the field analysts were doing all the worthwhile work and having the fun."

I feel that the most serious problem in the Community Analysis program was the apparent difficulty in obtaining qualified analysts who would remain in the jobs, whether field or Washington. Referring to Appendix I, it is evident that the centers were often without analysts for some long period of time. Not reflected on this chart are the innumerable times the section head was absent doing another type of study or on consultation to Washington or another project.

I am sure that the analysts' cavail would be that they left the section in the hands of an eminently qualified evacuee staff; I am equally certain this opinion would not be shared by the rest of the project staff. No matter how long the analyst remained in the WRA structure, he was viewed by most of the career bureaucrats as transitory and of little lasting value.

In the area of training re the better incorporation of the social scientist role into the structure of the WRA, it is patently clear that some form of information regarding the model of the administrator and his function within a bureaucracy should have been presented. It has been suggested that some knowledge of the legal framework of the WRA should have been acquired by the analysts in order to appreciate the changing complexities of the lack of decision by the Supreme Court on the various laws and executive orders promulgated to enforce the evacuation. Along this line, some general training might have been useful to help evaluate the law briefs of the J.A.C.L. and other evacuee organizations. Training as a two-way street would have obviated many initial adjustments between the WFA and the social scientist.

One area of benefit to the field of social science was the mass of documentary data gleaned from the project. Literally reams of anthropological and sociological papers were churned out (many of lasting value) during and after the WRA program. Social science profited immensely from the projects as field schools for testing hypotheses and evaluating methods of data collection, etc. Leighton produced a book,

Governing of Men, a popular effort dealing with problems of stress in dislocated communities using Poston as an example. His principles and recommendations were often incorporated into policy for dealing with occupied zones after the war. Impounded People by Spicer et.al., first written in 1946 and expanded in 1969, provides an in depth study of the entire program by the principal officer of the C.A.S. and some of his staff, both Washington and field. The list of works by social scientists goes on and on, covering a variety of aspects from Grodzins'(1949) study of the period leading up to evacuation through the body of reports prepared by the C.A.S. shortly before the centers were closed to Luomala's (1947) work concerning the attitudes of communities outside of the WRA to the return of the evacuees.

The final question, regarding the ethical position of the analysts, is the most difficult to quantify. It must be assessed from two time dimensions -- (1) the early 1940's and the war and (2) today's perspective. Again drawing from the BSR, Leighton and Spicer's position (Leighton 1946), at least implicitly, is summed up in their approach to the matter of confidentiality of data. The policies were set forth as follows:

1. All confidential material must be safely guarded and prevented from falling into the hands of persons who might misuse it for personal gain or to harm others.
2. The files are our own and no other division or branch has authority over them.
3. No data relative to subversive activities will

be kept in our files.

4. Individual members of the Bureau of Sociological Research will refrain from divulging any of the material that they collect or that they learn from other workers. They will not express publicly individual opinion on any subject when such opinion is based on data in the Bureau.
5. From time to time the Bureau will give out statements of opinion and fact, but these must come only from the Head of the Bureau or someone acting in his place. As a rule those statements will be carefully discussed by the entire group and a general agreement reached. No name will be attached to the statements other than that of the Bureau.
6. All requests from outside persons for information should be referred to the Head of the Bureau.
7. In giving statements, the Bureau must attempt to avoid getting involved in controversy, or taking sides. Above all, it must refrain from any attempt to propagandize or maintain the correctness of its own stand.
8. The Bureau must avoid becoming a competitor with any group or persons in any issue whatever. It must not take pride in the acceptance of its suggestions. The point for attention is whether or not in the long run the suggestions turn out to be correct, not whether or not they are accepted.

The question of ethics as far as working for an agency such as the WRA must be looked at in terms of the times. The United States was at war and at that time under some threat of invasion. Personal motives aside, assisting the war effort was the thing to do, and I am certain most

analysts were not initially concerned with the legal aspects of the evacuation order. With the advent of the Dies Committee and the continued agitation of West Coast pressure groups, the analyst became more concerned with the end to which his information might be used. Spicer in conversation relates an incident regarding the concealment of files from the Dies Committee by members of the BSR. He recalls that at the time the question of ethics did not have a bearing on the group's decision; it was more a question of professional confidentiality. All of the field analysts shared the ethic of confidentiality of records but little else is known, particularly concerning personal ethics.

The WRA and the C.A.S. examined in the light of anthropology's current ethical crisis are even more difficult to evaluate. Parallels are hard to draw given the contexts of both eras. Let it suffice to say that personally I would not question the ethics of the analysts vis a vis employment by the WRA. Although personal ethics are often difficult to separate from reportorial expertise or analysis, I would question the ethics of documenting personal opinion within a center such as the note by G. Brown concerning personnel problems at the Gila River Center (Brown 1943). To my knowledge, there has been no specific statement made by any of the analysts regarding the question of ethics and the WRA.

Spicer (1946) in his seminal paper regarding the use of social scientists by the WRA says: "(social science's) most important contribution was in keeping a focus on the hopes, fears, and points of view of the people whose problems the program was designed to solve."



		1943												1944										
		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL				
WASH. OFF. C.A.S.	EMPREE	→							SPICER	→														
	SWEETSER	→							MCCOY	→					de YOUNG	LUCMALA								
	FREED	→												→					SADY	→				
MANZANAR				OPLER	→																			
MINIDOKA				de YOUNG	→												ARMBRUSTER SMITH							
GILA RV.				BARNETT	BROWN				→															
JEROME						MCCOY	→																	
CENT. UT.						LEBARRE	HOPPMAN													→				
HRT. MT.					LAVIOLETTE	→												HANSEN						
GRANADA					RADEMAIER	→																		
TULE LR.					OPLER	→																		
ROHWER									WISDOM												→			
POSTON	LEIGHTON	→							FRENCH															
	SPICER	→																						

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION - VIRA

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