

FILE # 985

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
WASHINGTON



February 5, 1944

Mr. John F. Embree  
Department of Anthropology  
University of Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear John:

I am very disappointed in your write-up on the development of the Community Analysis Section in WRA, but so far I have not had time to put down in detail the places where I feel it should be corrected or expanded.

I do not feel you have given quite enough attention to the many discussions that preceded the establishment of the section and I think perhaps you have not dwelt sufficiently upon some of the problems of communication, such as the use of personal letters, objective reporting, etc.

I frankly feel that it deserves a more thorough-going appraisal than you have given it, and I believe that were the present document to appear in print, it would give some wrong impressions about the problem of establishing this type of administrative research assistance.

I will attempt to document my reaction much more specifically as soon as I can get time from other duties to go through the manuscript more carefully. Possibly we will have a chance to discuss it personally, which would probably be more desirable.

Bob Redfield was in town last week and reported that you were busy as usual.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John".

John H. Provinse, Chief  
Community Management Division

REFER IN REPLY TO THE FOLLOWING:

ADDRESS ONLY THE  
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

File # 985

UNITED STATES  
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR  
OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS  
WASHINGTON 25  
2042 New Interior Depart. Bldg.

February 9, 1944


Dr. John F. Embree  
Civil Affairs Military Training School  
University of Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear John:

I have held up sending these comments on your article partly through indolence and partly through the desire to consider the matter rather thoroughly. I have been talking with John Provinse about it and he is in "rather complete agreement with every question raised" by me. I therefore send it now for whatever you may think it is worth.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,



A. H. Leighton  
Lt. (MC) U S N R

AHL/fm  
Enclosures

Comments on COMMUNITY ANALYSIS - An Example of Anthropology in  
Government

Page 3, lines 12 - 17

It would be interesting to know who had these ideas.

Page 3, Line 22

There were two Centers on Indian land in Arizona, but only one of these was directly administered by the Indian Service. The conditions of this arrangement are stated in a memo from Eisenhower to Collier, March 21, 1942, and a summary of it would do much to clear the relationship of War Relocation Authority and the Indian Service. Admittedly, it is an obscure subject, but it could be made less confusing than as it now stands in the article. This has some importance in clarifying the relationship between the research at Poston and War Relocation Authority's community analysis.

Page 3, Line 24 thru' page 4, Line 7

It was more than "encouragement" - it was organization and the securing of funds, and the thought behind it was approximately that which you so well express on page 3, line 18, and which you say did not exist in WRA initially.

The objectives of our research unit were recorded in a letter on August 14, 1942, and are as follows:

"The research which I am shaping is directed at a close and scientific study of ..... a community. We plan to follow closely administrative acts and their effects, noting what works and what doesn't work and drawing practical conclusions that can be applied toward greater efficiency. We want to know not only what things affect people, but also why, and we want to make this knowledge available as we go along. ....

"In addition to meeting the needs of the moment, the administration foresees a post-war world in which many relocations will occur all over the earth and it regards Poston in some sense as a proving ground where optimal methods for dealing with relocated or disintegrated communities may be developed. The research staff considers the study and understanding of this aspect of the problem its most important objective. We are trying to acquire knowledge, to develop techniques, and to train personnel so that when the time comes to organize and administer retaken lands, we shall be in a position to be helpful. What we learn about community building under adverse conditions here, may one day be very pertinent to dealing with social organization under even more adverse conditions. Furthermore, the fact that these people are Japanese may make the experience of particular value in reconstruction work in the parts of the Pacific."

The form which the Navy seems to prefer in refering to officers of my type is "Lt. A. H. Leighton, Medical Corps, USNR." I was detailed to the Indian Office by the Navy in order to do the work.

I am puzzled to know what you mean by "isolated" from the administration.

Do you mean our status in the first few months as compared with six months later? Do you mean we were isolated from some parts of the Administration as compared with others? Do you mean that we had to go through a period of adjustment such as you describe in the last line on page 22? If something of this sort is what you wished to convey, I agree, but feel you should make it clear.

If, on the other hand, you mean we suffered isolation over and above these considerations, I disagree. Committee memberships, clique charts kept at the time and other data fairly well document our position and we were not isolated. During the first two months I was Chief of Public Health and for a lesser time, Director of the Hospital, as well as a consultant in education and welfare. Both Ned and I were consistently in close touch with the top administrative group and were aware of most local administrative plans as they developed. Many other specific points could be made.

It is true, however, that about September we had to establish ourselves as non-operational, as having closed files and as having closed staff meetings except on invitation. This annoyed some people outside the top administrative group who for a time interpreted our insistence on these points as a kind of isolationism. However, our position was understood by those to whom we were responsible ~~to~~ and backed by memos from the Project Director, etc. It was because we had good informal relationships with the Administration that we were able to exert influence during and after the strike.

I don't like the expression, "quite cut off from the WRA." That WRA paid no attention to us at the start is of course true and as you know, there were several reasons for it, one being the kind of relationship that existed between the WRA and the Indian Service. I don't see why the subject has to be mentioned at all, but if you do mention it, I believe it would be more accurate to say that in the early days WRA was not interested in the social research as was the Indian office and only became so later under circumstances which you will describe in the article.

Page 4, Line 18

Saying the Indian Office was "well informed," gives, I think a false picture. We who were right on the spot had every reason

to doubt that we were well informed. However, such facts as we had and such social analysis as we could make were passed on to the Indian Office and were part of the basis for the decision to keep the soldiers out and negotiate with the strikers. The Indian Office says it passed on the information to Mr. Rowalt. Some of the breakdown in communications may have been due to the fact that many important WRA men were going to or were at Salt Lake City during most of the week of the strike. I know that John Evans tried in vain to reach Dillon Myer by phone during the first three days.

Page 5, Line 10

It would be wise to make it clear that this is your own evaluation of the underlying causes. As it stands, it sounds as if it were a condensation of our analysis, which, of course, it is not.

*you have  
misleading  
copy*

In regard to item (c) it would be well to mention that WRA's policy of permitting only Nisei to hold elective office was an important contributing factor. There were members of the Poston Administration, especially the Director, who, as early as July 1942, desired to see the WRA ruling in this matter changed, or at least they said so in conversations at Poston. Head's grasp of the importance of constructive leadership from older Japanese was one of the things which made him willing and able to negotiate with the strikers and to turn the leadership manifest there to good account.

✓  
*had my  
Poston*

Page 5, Last two lines

This is an exaggeration. I think most of the issues had been realized, but up to that point had not been sufficiently emphasized.

Page 8, section on begging of Community Analysis

This section as it is at present written and as it stands in relationship to the rest of the article gives a total impression which in my opinion is skewed. You have said several times that the contributing factors were the Arensberg report, the research at Poston, the contrast between incidents at Poston and Manzanar and your own work educating the people in the Washington office. If you stated this plainly in your article, I believe it would clarify the relationship of facts. I would also suspect that the pre-existence of social analysis over a decade in the government, particularly in the Indian Office and in the Department of Agriculture under M. L. Wilson had some influence on the WRA administrators. John Provinse's presence in WRA in my opinion should be mentioned more fully and in conjunction with these other factors.

Page 9, last paragraph

This problem was worked out in Poston during the summer of 1942 and after hesitating on the brink of becoming part of what was then called Community Services, we became answerable only to the Project Director. It might be of interest to make a critical comparison of this position in administrative structure with that of the community analyst.

Page 12, latter part of 1st paragraph

This is an excellent statement of the analyst's functions.

Page 12, footnote 2

Is this inconsistent with your statement on page 3, line 18? It seems to me that the fact that John Provinse was the person he was, with the experience he had had was the most cogent reason of all for placing community analysis in Community Management and should be mentioned.

Page 19, footnote

I had no previous Indian Office experience. I had made some community studies of Navajos and Eskimos while on a Social Science Research Council Fellowship and the Indian Office had been interested in the practical application of some of the results.

"Soon afterwards," might give the impression that the reorganization occurred soon after the Poston research was set up, rather than soon after August, 1943.

(AHL)

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS - AN EXAMPLE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN GOVERNMENT

J F Gubner

Revised Copy  
Jan 12 1944

To replace any  
previous  
drafts  
J.F.G.

Initial Organization of the War Relocation Authority

The War Relocation Authority, a government agency charged with the duty of caring for persons forced to leave restricted military areas, was set up by Presidential edict on March 18, 1942. As a result of General De Witt's Exclusion Order concerning persons of Japanese ancestry, the chief duty of the WRA has been with these people: Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans resident in the United States. By the summer of 1942, it became necessary to provide food and shelter for over a hundred thousand such evacuees from the West Coast restricted area. In addition to food and shelter, circumstances such as state governors' attitudes made it necessary to provide armed guards and barbed wire fences for the protective custody of these people, two-thirds of whom happened to be American citizens. Ten relocation centers were established housing from seven to over <sup>Eighteen</sup> seventeen thousand people each.

The situation created by the evacuation raised a great many special problems in human relations for the War Relocation Authority. The initial staff of the Authority was drawn largely from other governmental agencies such as the Farm Security Administration, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Indian Service -- <sup>administrated</sup> people who had had some experience in dealing with community organization. However, when it came to staffing the relocation centers themselves, centers which were virtually

small towns and cities in-themselves, the problems in human relations became more complex and difficult. Men had to be found to take charge of such specialized matters as feeding, housing, health and a public hospital, internal security, social welfare work - in fact all of the services necessary in any community of ten thousand people.

The evacuees themselves had very little in common with one another beyond their ancestry, some coming from well-to-do families, some from poor families, some being professional people, businessmen, others farmers or dock workers. The communities in their initial organization were thus highly artificial - simply a gathering of refugees thrown together as a result of the war. Since many of the civil service staff members were not experienced in dealing with social groups of this nature and since the evacuees themselves came from such varied backgrounds and were, in addition, subject to many worries and anxieties, it was inevitable that there should be many local administrative crises of one sort or another. Problems arose almost immediately in regard to housing, food and medical attention. The chief steward, a civil service appointee in a rather critical position, frequently was at odds with his evacuee chefs who in turn developed into virtual kings within their own mess halls. Friction frequently arose between the various evacuee doctors in the hospital and also between one or another of



them and the civil service appointed doctor. Rumor of one sort or another, usually alarmist, was rampant in this situation.

Frequently social problems would arise and reach the point of explosion before anyone on the staff realized there was anything wrong. The administrators, being concerned with immediate physical problems such as getting in lumber, getting the plumbing into operation, and insuring shipments of food had little time to devote to what they regarded as secondary problems in social relations. They were usually surprised and often shocked when something went wrong in human relations within their own centers.

At the time when the Authority was first set up, some consideration was given to the idea that since the agency would be dealing with people, many of whom had a Japanese cultural background, it would be a good idea to employ one or two men with special knowledge and background who might aid in administration by giving advice concerning matters of Japanese culture. However, the idea that advisers also might be needed in connection with the problems of human relations as such in a cross-cultural, anxiety-ridden situation does not seem to have been considered *by more than one or two men.*

In the initial establishment of the Authority, one of the relocation centers in Arizona was established on Indian land and was staffed largely with Indian Service personnel. At this one center, with the encouragement of Commissioner Collier, a special research unit was established in part to determine

some of the effects of evacuation and in part to give the results of their findings to the project administrator in order to aid him in understanding local developments. This sociological research unit, set up by <sup>Dr.</sup> Lt. Alexander Leighton, <sup>assistant in internal research</sup> was at first pretty well <sup>(?)</sup> isolated from the other administrative divisions on the project and was quite cut off from the War Relocation Authority in Washington.

#### The Boston and Manzanar Crises

In November 1942, shortly after the last evacuees had left the assembly centers and taken up residence in the relocation centers and when the center of gravity in the administration of the Authority was gradually swinging from San Francisco to Washington and the Director was beginning to give less attention to problems of center construction and more to such problems as public relations, the first serious internal crisis in a center arose. This was a week long strike at the Boston center. During the entire duration of the strike, very little information on it came to the Washington office of War Relocation Authority, although the office of Indian Affairs was <sup>(7)</sup> well-informed. It was difficult to know at the time what the causes were that lay behind the strike and even more difficult to determine just what was happening from day to day. This ignorance created not only an administrative problem but one in public relations as well.

<sup>10.2.42</sup>  
The WRA Reports Officer, whose duty it was to keep

Washington informed on such matters, became tied up on the one hand with local public relations and on the other with a self assigned job as "Intelligence Officer" searching for "plots". Sometime after the strike was settled, information of a rather conflicting nature did come in from the reports officer, from the project director and from the sociological research unit at the center.

The report of the research unit proved to be the most useful in throwing light upon the underlying causes of the trouble. Basically, they seem to have been associated with such things as (a) a general settling down process in the center with some struggle for power among the community leaders; (b) a number of grievances which had become more or less chronic such as the government's "broken promises" concerning just what a relocation center would be like; and (c) the administration in its earliest days had attempted to <sup>work?</sup> administrate the center pretty largely through the use of young Japanese-Americans, a procedure which ran counter to the established order of the Japanese community whereby older people held positions of authority over younger people.

The strike itself was not accompanied by any violence and its results were in some ways beneficial to the local community organization and the administration thereof. It brought to light many issues which the administration had not even realized <sup>(?)</sup> existed and resulted in a more realistic approach to the

problems of center administration. It is notable also that while some of the administrators were worried during the crisis and wished the project head to call in soldiers, the top administrators very wisely refrained from such precipitous action which might well have created irreparable damage in terms of the development of Poston as a relocation center with some semblance of self-government rather than as a concentration camp with none.

Not long after the Poston strike, on December 6 to be exact, another crisis arose, this time at the Manzanar center in California. It was of a more critical nature and resulted in the calling in of soldiers by the project administrator. While the Army Captain did not actually order anyone to shoot, at one critical juncture one or two of the soldiers became rattled and did shoot, resulting in two deaths and a number of other casualties. As might be expected, those who were killed had very little to do with the events leading up to the riot. The Reports Officer, again, was more concerned with local public relations and amateur detective work than with keeping Washington advised of events and social developments leading up to and resulting from the crisis.

News of the Manzanar riot created great apprehension in the Washington office as well as in the local administrations of various other centers. It is no exaggeration to say that it caused the Authority to look itself over very critically in

an attempt to find out what was wrong. There were some who feared that events at Poston and Manzanar were symptoms of what might be expected at all other centers in turn as they settled down and became organized as new communities. There were some who felt that there was an organized group attempting to create such trouble in every center so as to bring in army control and thus give themselves glory in the eyes of the Japanese government.

There were still others, however, including many project directors, who felt that the events at both Poston and Manzanar, while they could occur easily enough at the other centers since in other centers many of the same conditions of living existed, the problem was primarily one of local administration and what was needed was not so much an increase in military control but rather an improvement of the administrative organization, on the one hand, and a better understanding of attitudes and social developments within the center population on the other. The background of the Manzanar riot, for instance, turned out on investigation to be due to a number of things which, if there had been better understanding of them earlier in the history of Manzanar, might well have never developed to the fatal point of the riot. <sup>As at Poston</sup> ~~At Manzanar~~, there were chronic housing grievances such as extreme overcrowding and lack of privacy, the project staff had also given undue power to young and inexperienced citizens at the expense of older and more mature men, there were problems of complete misunderstanding between several elements of the

community population and the project administrators, <sup>and</sup> there were a few individuals who had become soured as a result of evacuation and were attempting to stir up trouble, persons who should, of course, have been removed from the center sooner than they were. Manzanar also had certain special handicaps such as having been originally a <sup>Temporary</sup> "assembly center" which was simply turned into a relocation center by a paper change. It had a very small area, 1 square mile, in which 9,000 people had to live with surrounding community attitudes very hostile towards the inhabitants of the center. All these things tended to create anxieties and frequently aggressive reactions on the part of individual residents of Manzanar.

#### Beginnings of Community Analysis

One constructive result of the Manzanar incident, coming as it did on the heels of the Poston strike, was the realization on the part of the Authority that it needed a better understanding of the people with whom it was concerned and that it needed this knowledge currently, rather than in the form of post-mortems. In January 1943 the writer, who was at that time Documentarian, in the Reports Office, was authorized to go ahead with a plan he had drawn up for the establishment of a section of community analysis as a means of gaining this improved understanding. Toward the end of January some meetings of project directors


were called in San Francisco, Denver and Little Rock, for the purpose of talking over relocation center administration problems and to discuss in a preliminary sort of way the army's recent decision to establish a combat team of Japanese-American soldiers. (Incidentally, it was also decided to conduct at the center a general registration of all people in connection with the army program in order to facilitate leave clearance procedures which had become rather a bottle neck at the Washington office.) At these meetings the idea of establishing community analysis at the project level was also presented. At the San Francisco meeting the project director of Poston testified that the work of the Sociological Research Unit at his project had proved to be most valuable to him in his administrative work. Other project directors were also favorably disposed toward the idea partly perhaps because of the Manzanar riot which served as an example of something that could have been avoided.

#### Place in Administrative Structure

An important administrative problem to be solved in establishing Community Analysis was its place in the administrative organization. Ideally, perhaps, Community Analysis should be a separate unit with a field analyst reporting directly to the project director and a Washington analyst reporting to the national director. Such an arrangement had certain practical drawbacks. First of all, the basic organizational structure of the Authority had been set up and in operation for almost a year.

Furthermore, as the chief administrative officer justly pointed out, practically every professional person - internal security officer, chief doctor, chief steward - had shown a desire to report directly to the project director and if everyone of these men had had his wish, the whole administrative structure would have become chaos and the energies of the Director hopelessly dissipated. For an entirely new function such as Community Analysis to be added to an existing organizational structure presented enough practical problems in staff relations without the sponsor of the new function insisting that the analysts be privileged to report directly to project directors.

The problem then became one of deciding to which division the analyst should be attached. The main project divisions as of January 1943 were somewhat as follows:





As a reporter of evacuee attitudes, the analyst might be attached to the Reports Office, and this idea was seriously considered as a possibility. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that the writer, who inaugurated Community Analysis in WRA, was previously head of the Documents Section of the Reports Office in Washington. The Reports Office was largely concerned with three things: maintaining a project newspaper, looking after project public relations, and reporting events as they occurred. The office was also concerned with presenting to evacuees, mostly through the newspaper, news of WRA policies. The Reports Officers were mostly men qualified for such work through previous newspaper and public relations work. It was suggested that the project analysts could perhaps come in as "documentarians" and develop this work into that of Community Analysis. On the other hand, it was also believed that an analyst would work under certain handicaps if he were a part of the Reports Office. These handicaps would be: (a) that evacuees would regard him as a public relations man trying to sell the virtues of W.R.A.; (b) he would be rather far removed from the operations units of administration and so fail to grasp fully some of the factors leading to certain actions and reactions in Center administration; and (c) the previous history of the Reports Office at certain of the projects had built up an attitude of suspicion on the part of evacuees that would be difficult for a new analyst to overcome.

Another possibility was that Community Analysis could be set up as a section of the Community Management Division. Here the section would be in fairly close touch with welfare, education, public health and internal security - all vital aspects of project administration. The only serious drawback was that of being in the same division as Internal Security and possibly becoming identified with it in the eyes of wary evacuees. However, there was a sharp distinction in function between Internal Security and the proposed Community Analysis section. Internal Security was concerned with administering law enforcement and with apprehending specific individual offenders; Community Analysis would be concerned with investigating and analyzing the causes of social upsets and not with apprehending individual law breakers. The analyst would be interested in why, not who. (From the analyst's point of view, one could continually arrest individuals and nothing would be gained until the situation that gave rise to the continual arrests was in some way modified. His function in relation to Internal Security would be to find out (a) the causes of the recurrent trouble and, (b) suggest changes in the local situation that might overcome the difficulty)

In view of the above considerations, it was finally decided that Community Analysis should be set up as a section in the Community Management Division with the analyst reporting to the Community Management chief. However, it was specifically

provided that (a) he should be free to consult records of other divisions in connection with his work and (b) that he would not be required to divulge individual sources of information among the residents of the center. Furthermore, since Community Analysis was in a sense an out-growth of Documents, a clear division of function between history - the what of events - and Community Analysis - the why of events - had to be made. A special letter<sup>1</sup> to reports officers from the Chief of the Reports Office was written clarifying this point. Administrative instruction No. 58 on documentation was also amended transferring from Documents to Community Analysis those functions concerned with social organization and evacuee attitudes which were to become part of the new analysis section. Special credit should go to Mr. John Baker, Chief of the Office of Reports in this connection for his generous cooperation with his former documentarian in setting up the new section in a division other than Reports. It is not every one in government who puts the good of the total organization before the size and prestige of his own division. ~~Soon afterwards~~ Mr. John Provinse as head of Community Management in the Washington office sent out a memorandum to project Community Services chiefs explaining the nature of the new section.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Reports Round Table No. 4, March 17, 1943.

<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of April 1, 1943. Mr. Provinse had realized from the beginning the need for community analysis in WRA, but it was not until after the Poston and Manzanar incidents that his advice in this regard bore fruit.

Name

It was necessary to decide upon a name for the new section. Originally, the function was discussed in terms of Social Analysis and was so presented at the January Project Directors meetings. However, the national director felt that a title with the word "social" in it might give rise to unnecessary criticisms and that furthermore it was not very descriptive to a layman. The term Community Analysis was then suggested, ~~this title~~ <sup>and</sup> adopted and as the section developed in practice, ~~it~~ <sup>this name</sup> turned out to be ~~much~~ better and more appropriate than the original one.

#### Analyst's Civil Service Rating

The matter of the rating of the analyst had to be settled. It was felt that for the man to have the requisite degree of prestige and authority on the project to carry out his work successfully, he would need a reasonably high rating. In government, the Civil Service classification and the salary of a job indicates its social value and that of the man who holds it. Civil service rating corresponds to rank in a military organization. For these reasons it was decided that the field analyst should be classified as P-4 which was similar to the rating of the Project Reports Officer. This rating carried an annual salary of \$3800 (plus

overtime during the war time 48 hour week schedule). Such a rating was also necessary if the Authority was to obtain in wartime men with the desired qualifications for the job.

#### Job Descriptions

When a new job is set up, it is also necessary to write out a job description for the approval of the Civil Service Commission. With the aid of the chief of Community Services, job descriptions were now made for the positions of head and assistant head of the Washington section and for the field analyst positions.

Finally there had to be defined the role of the analyst on the project and in the Washington office. The quotation of the field analyst's job description may serve to describe the field function.

"

Position #TX-1109

....

#### Social Science Analyst (P-4)

Under the administrative supervision of the Chief of Community Services, CAF-15, on the Center level, receiving technical advice and supervision from the Social Analysis Section in Washington, initiates and carries on scientific studies of social groups and over-all sociological problems on the project Center.

Analyzes the social structure of Center population by discovering the various groups that exist, their characteristics, their role in community life, their relationships with one another

and with the administrative staff and the effects of Center life on family and community organization. Such analysis includes study of aliens, Kibei, repatriates, neighborhood gangs, and such other organizations of evacuees as may have significance for administration. This study includes the patterns of parental influence, religious affiliation, general cultural adjustment and will be directed particularly to degrees of Americanization and assimilation among various groups of evacuees.

Studies and analyzes such social attitudes as may develop in relation to the various social groups, with particular reference to attitudes toward the administration. On the basis of such knowledge, analyzes the various administrative policies in order to advise on the probable effects on Center administration of changes in policy.

Studies any special sociological problems which either the Project Director or the Director of the Authority may request.

Directs a staff of evacuees in research and assembly of data required for various studies."

There was also an outline of possible techniques for getting at the problems involved prepared in the Washington office and sent out to the analysts in March. Its headings included: ecological analysis, history of evacuation, main social groupings (family, sex, age, occupation), formal institutions (church, school), social stratification and individual personality development.

The functions of the Washington office staff were principally:

1. To coordinate reports from the field and find ways and means of making such material as was of value to various divisions useful to them in their program planning.
2. To coordinate work in the field in such a way that reports would be more or less comparable and to see that the analysts' functions as analysts would be kept distinct from administrator's operations functions.

3. Personnel procurement and training. This was a constant problem requiring during the first months a large portion of the time of the Washington office. Whenever possible, new analysts were given a few days orientation in Washington before going to the field and also, where practical, one of the Washington office analysts visited the project before a new field analyst arrived in order to prepare the way for him.

#### Initial Establishment of Community Analysis Section

Finally, on February 26, 1943, a letter signed by the national director and based on proposals made by the Community analyst in Washington was sent out to all project directors authorizing the establishment of Community Analysis sections within the division of Community Management with community analysts to be appointed at P-4 rating and with such evacuee assistants in the new section as might be found necessary.

#### Locating Personnel

With job descriptions approved by Civil Service and with the authorizing letter from the Director to the projects, the next problem was to locate properly qualified personnel for the new section - no easy task in the face of a national manpower shortage. In general, it was thought that first of all, the analyst should have training in one or more fields of the social sciences preferably anthropology and sociology in order to be capable of making, in a relatively short period, useful social analyses; secondly, that he should have had at least a year's experience in field work, preferably in a culture different

from that of contemporary United States, in order to know in advance some of the problems of a field situation and to appreciate the fact that similar objects and acts might have different meanings and functions in different social contexts; and, finally, government experience was considered desirable in order that the analyst should know something of the problems of getting the findings of his work into proper administrative channels.

The search for such unusual men was first begun when the community analyst from Washington went on a field trip in connection with and following the Project Directors meetings in January. He interviewed possible candidates in the Middle West and Far West, both at universities and in government agencies. In addition, the services of the civil service procurement section were called upon, as well as those of the Ethnogeographic Board in Washington. By August of 1943 the staffing of the section was finally completed with two analysts and an assistant in the Washington office and one analyst in each of the nine WRA projects (not counting Poston). Of the eleven analysts all but three had previous government experience - in the Office of Strategic Services (3), in the Office of Indian Affairs (2), (1) in the War Department, or some other national or state agency. Six were trained anthropologists and five sociologists.\*

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\*J. Embree and F. Sweetser (Washington), John deYoung (Minidoka), Morris Opler (Manzanar), E. McVoy (Jerome), Marvin Opler (Tule Lake), J. Hademaker (Granada), F. LaViolette (Heart Mountain), O. Hoffman (Topaz), Gordon Brown (Gila), and Charles Wiedom (Rohwer). At Poston under Indian Office Supervision was



Most of the analysts held doctors degrees in anthropology or sociology. However, in government it is expedient to emphasize not training or intellectual capacity, but "experience" and "common sense". Thus, the fact that the writer as head of the Community Analysis Section had had "experience" with Japanese people counted more heavily in giving weight to his words than the fact that he was a specialist in the field of human relations. As a corollary of all this the term "Dr." is something to be avoided among government administrative officials since "experts" on the whole tend to be resented and distrusted.

#### Early Activities of the Community Analysis Section

The first big job to land in the lap of the section was that of finding out why the combined Army-W.R.A. registration program caused so much trouble. On the basis of an analysis of the events surrounding registration, it was discovered that the problems involved concerned (1) the need for knowledge<sup>of</sup> and reckoning with evacuee attitudes, (2) the need for giving better advance information on the procedures and purposes of a new program both to the project staffs and to the evacuees, (3) better communication between the evacuees and project staffs as to the motives and aims of the program and the procedural problems, (4)

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the Social Research Unit under the direction of Lt. Leighton, psychiatrist with previous Indian Office experience and Edward Spicer, anthropologist. Soon afterwards Poston reorganized under direct WRA administration and Spicer came to Washington to replace Frank Sweetser who resigned to join the Navy.

the need for some evacuee participation in and responsibility for carrying out a program successfully. Partly as a result of a special report on registration plus a constant oral hammering of its conclusions on the ears of the administrators by the analysts in Washington, the Authority managed to avoid most of the shortcomings of its registration program when it carried out its next major operation, namely, segregation.

A second job of the Community Analysis section both in Washington and in the field was in connection with evacuee resistances to the relocation program with an analysis of the reasons - largely personal insecurity - for such reluctance to relocate together with suggestions for overcoming these difficulties.<sup>1</sup>

A third job was active participation in the planning of ways and means of carrying out the unpleasant task of segregation in such a way as to avoid crises at the centers in connection with it. As events turned out, the mechanics of segregation went remarkably smoothly at all but one Center, Tule Lake, (where, it may be noted, most of the conclusions of the registration report were ignored in regard to the incoming segregees.)

Numerous special requests came to the section from the Director's office and the Office of Reports in connection with

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<sup>1</sup>*A general analysis of this problem*  
The substance of this analysis, minus the suggestions which were frequently made to fit specific administrative proposals, appeared in Applied Anthropology for April - June, 1943, Vol. 2, Number 3, under the title, "Resistance to Freedom - an Administrative Problem".

Congressional Investigations, from the Employment Division and the Solicitor's Office concerning problems connected with relocation and leave clearances and from various other administrative divisions and sections in the Washington office. The section was expected not only to be informed on social conditions in relocation centers but also with the social organization of the West Coast Japanese before the war, and with that abstruse phenomenon called "Japanese psychology". Recommendations on labor relations, mess operations, etc. to be accepted, usually had to be made in terms of Japanese psychology rather than of prosaic labor-management relations.

During the first six months of its existence, a number of special reports were also prepared. There was a general Community Analysis reports series on such problems as causes of unrest in relocation centers, resistances to relocation and assimilability of Nisei. In all, six such reports were prepared as of August 1. These reports, usually less than ten pages in length, were written in general terms in an attempt to present for the use of administrative officials the social causes behind some of the problems they were running up against in their daily work. They were given wide circulation among the W.R.A. staff at projects, at relocation offices and in the Washington office.<sup>1</sup> A second series of reports, a project analysis series,

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<sup>1</sup>The first such general report, "Dealing With Japanese-Americans", was reproduced verbatim in Applied Anthropology for January - March, 1943, Vol. 2, Number 2.

was also established consisting of special reports from field analysts on important administrative problems in their own centers such as the effects of the registration program, the evaluation of the resettlement program, problems in connection with adult education. As of August 1, ten reports of the project analysis series had been prepared. These were given a more restricted circulation within the Community Management Division and to such staff members as might be concerned with the particular subjects treated. The Washington office also established a Community Analysis letter series in order to keep the project analysts in touch with developments in the section at other projects than their own and in the Washington office.

Together with carrying out the above special assignments and regular duties at the Washington level, similar functions were being carried out at the project level by project analysts in response to requests from the project directors and from various staff members.

Perhaps more important than any formal written reports, were the duties analysts carried out through personal contacts and discussion with both evacuees and appointed staff members. Once administrators gained confidence in the analyst and in his ability and judgment, his influence and practical value in administration became such that it could not be measured in terms of so and so many reports or such and such a civil service rating. It was only after a period of months that a good analyst could

*Conclusions*

*judgment*

create the degree of confidence in his <sup>judgment</sup> work that made it possible for his work to be valuable to the organization. (On the other hand, it was all too easy for an analyst to commit errors in his initial relations with the rest of the staff that would take weeks to overcome.)

### Final Official Establishment

Final establishment of the Community Analysis section on an official basis may be considered to have occurred when rules and regulations concerning its functions were laid down in the Administration Manual on September 8, 1943. The relevant sections from this manual are as follows:

#### 30.8.1

.1 It is the intention of the War Relocation Authority to analyze the cultural patterns existing in the community at each relocation center, and to observe social trends and study their underlying causes in order to,

- A. Increase understanding of the factors governing social development within the center;
- B. Facilitate the program of resettlement and reassimilation of evacuees into American life; and
- C. Provide a guide for dealing with any comparable social situation that may become the responsibility of a federal agency.

Purposes  
of  
Community  
Analysis

.2 To carry out the functions in 30.8.1, a Community Analysis Section shall be established in the Community Management Division at each center. The work of the Section will be under direction of a Community Analyst reporting to the Project Director through the Assistant Director in charge of Community Manage-

Community  
Analysis  
Section

ment. Evacuee workers may be assigned to the Section at the Centers, within budgetary limitations.

- .3 The Community Analysis Section at a Center shall make an intensive study of the community there, including all significant formal and informal social groups, with special emphasis upon the degree of assimilation of the various groups, their social roles in the community, their attitudes toward one another and toward the War Relocation Authority, the effect of the evacuation upon family controls and group social controls, and the effect of administrative policies and decisions upon the evacuee community. It should further observe and analyze all social trends within the center, with special attention to the development of new social groupings and to developments that may improve social relations within the center, or that might lead to crises.

Community  
Analysis  
Program

- .4 All administrative personnel at the Center shall cooperate with the program by making available to the Community Analysis Section such records and personal information as may be of value to it. The Community Analysis staff shall not be required or expected to divulge such information received nor the individual sources of its records and reports.

Relations  
with  
Other Staff  
Units

- .5 At least monthly, the Section at each Center shall report on its activities to the Project Director, through the Assistant Director in charge of Community Management.

(.5) From time to time other reports

shall be made as deemed advisable by the Section, or as the Project Director may request. One copy of each regular or occasional report must be sent to the Director in Washington."<sup>1</sup>

#### Conclusions and Lessons

The first and ever recurrent problem in a new administrative organization, especially one involving large numbers of "administered people", is that of communication from the top administration to the field or branch administration, and from the field administrations to the people administered - then from the people administered upward.

Many of the difficulties and crises of administration in industry, in colonial government, and in the War Relocation Authority are due to clogs or gaps or perversions of the information that should be communicated up and down within the structure. Once this problem is recognized - and it always is, eventually, after time, tempers, and lives have been lost - some form of Community Analysis is established. It may take the shortsighted form of a spy system as in some industrial situations and some colonial governmental situations, or it may take the more enlightened and in the long run more practical and efficient form of open and scientific attempts to

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<sup>1</sup>These reports, of course, were routed to the Community Analysis Section. In one center, where the analyst had the confidence of the Project Director, only letters of transmittal went through "channels" while the documents and reports came direct from the field analyst to the Community Analysis section in Washington.

provide administrators with a knowledge of the complexities of human relations as they develop and change in the organization. Examples of this latter solution are, for industry, the Western Electric Company; for colonial government, the British in New Guinea and parts of Africa; and finally in our American parallel to Colonial administration, the War Relocation Authority.

From the experience in W.R.A. in establishing such an analysis, a number of special administrative problems have arisen within the section itself. (a) Men who have had no previous field experience are definitely less useful than those who have had it. To send such inexperienced men to the field, even though they are well trained professionally, may be costly and make the job of their successor in the field doubly difficult. (b) Also of real value to an analyst's effectiveness is previous experience in working in government and having learned to use rather than chafe at the "administrative channels". Chafing leads to frustration and ineffectiveness regardless of the brilliance of a man's analysis. A knowledge of the ins and outs of governmental organization and a willingness to use it for what it is meant, i.e. as an aid to successful administration, can help bring the results of analysis into effective use. (c) Communication between the analyst in the field and the analysis section in Washington is a constant problem. Close coordination between Washington and the field is essential, but project personnel tend to be defensive about their administrative problems, vis a vis



Washington, and hence tend to frown on any objective analysis or even mention of local trouble. One of the analyst's first job is thus to gain the confidence of the local administrators in his integrity and good judgment as well as in the value of his work, only then can most project administrators be convinced of the desirability of maintaining communication between the administered and the project staff and of keeping Washington aware of local developments which may be parallel to other projects and hence part of a general administrative problem rather than simply a local headache. (d) In first establishing the analysts in the field, a system of personal letters on how they were getting along in their work was instituted. These did not go through administrative channels and were not intended to contain any information or remarks calling for administrative action, but they did serve to show how the men were faring in their respective projects in lieu of frequent visits to the men. However, these letters created a number of administrative problems, especially when the project director did not have full confidence in the analyst and tended to regard him as something of a Washington spy. The letter system is probably not to be recommended in comparable situations and is gradually disappearing from the analysis section in W.R.A. In general, there is no substitute for frequent personal contact between the Washington section and the field men.

A basic requirement for successful and objective community analysis is that the analyst keep out of direct adminis-

trative work himself. There is a constant temptation for a man to step in and help do some job that needs doing and so to identify his interests with those of the specific operations job. There is also a tendency for project directors to assign operations functions to an analyst, especially if they think he is any good.<sup>1</sup> Such actions cause the analyst to lose his own ability to analyze the total picture and also create the very attitudes toward him on the part of the administered and other administrators that make it difficult for him to gain the rapport necessary for valuable analysis work. The analyst's job is thus a difficult one. He must be able to gain the respect of his fellow staff members while not himself performing operations functions and at the same time gain the confidence of the administered. The respect of the administrators in the long run depends on (a) the accuracy of his analyses and, (b) his ability to translate them into terms useful to the administrators in carrying out their functions. The confidence of the administered depends on (a) the analyst's ability in human relations as a field worker and, (b) on his care in avoiding identification with internal security investigations and in protecting at all times the confidence of his sources of information.

Military government programs today are being planned with no specific provision beyond a traditional negative spy system

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<sup>1</sup>One analyst threatened to resign because he became overloaded with operations functions by a project Director who admired his abilities; another drifted into operations on his own initiative and eventually transferred from Community Analysis into an operations unit.

for learning the community attitudes and social developments among an administered population. As with Industry, Colonial Government and the War Relocation Authority, American military government will undoubtedly lose many a life in subduing riots which will be blamed not on poor or inept administration but on "agitators", "organizers", etc. The Army and Navy could save themselves both manpower and eventual public criticism by providing before, rather than after, a series of crises, for special Community Analysis Officers - men free from administrative duties and charged specifically with keeping in touch with the functional structure and changing attitudes of the people within their jurisdiction in order to aid in civil administrative planning and operations.

AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST

ORGAN OF  
THE AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION  
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON  
THE AMERICAN ETHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF NEW YORK  
THE PHILADELPHIA ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOCIETY

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NEW YORK 27, N.Y.


February 17, 1944

Dr. John F. Embree  
Department of Anthropology  
University of Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear Embree:

Your wire came last night. Fortunately the manuscript had not yet gone to the printer and I am, therefore, able to return it to you for revision.

Cordially,



Ralph Linton

RL:b  
Encl.

## WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON



February 26, 1944

Dr. John F. Embree  
Department of Anthropology  
University of Chicago  
Chicago, Illinois

Dear John:

I am returning the Community Analysis manuscript on which are penciled some marginal notes and questions and concerning which I would raise questions further as listed below. ✓

1) Actually F.S.A. and B.A.W. furnished many fewer than did S.C.S. and C.I.U.C. Why not just say "Department of Agriculture"? ✓

2) This is much too sweeping a statement. It is not true that administrators generally were oblivious to human relations until Community Analysis came along. ✓

3) There are at least two memoranda on the subject - one by Redfield, one by me - written in May-June of 1942, and there were several conversations with Eisenhower, Dillon Myer, and others contemplating a broader program. ✓

4) WRA was aware of whatever came into the Indian Office in Washington. ✓

5) Is this necessary?

6) Actually these had little bearing upon the establishment of Community Analysis in the Community Management Division. It was set up in Community Management largely because the Director did not want it directly under him, John Baker felt it would compromise his primary responsibility as a news reporting service and he didn't understand it anyhow, and because the head of the Community Management Division was the only one in the organization with either the interest or background to give it support or supervision. This is not any horn-tooting for JHP--just what was actually the case. The personal element was almost the determining factor in where it landed and how it developed.

7) Much more than any thing else it was an outgrowth of your own personal contribution and specific knowledge of the Japanese. To retain what you want to say, I think the wording of the conditional opening clause should be "since the Analyst scheduled to organize the work of the new section had been previously associated with the Reports Division as documentarian." a clear division etc.

8) I feel decidedly dragged in here as an afterthought. Why not omit?

9) This displays a cynicism that does not seem warranted, either from your own experience or mine. To set off training or intellectual capacity from "experience" and "common sense" is to eliminate experience from training and judgment from intellectual capacity in a way that belies some of your earlier discussion of the job to be done and the qualifications for the personnel. If this paragraph is necessary at all, I think it should be treated less flippantly than now occurs.


The rest of the document is good and will be helpful to administrators contemplating similar organizational problems. I am sorry my comments could not have come earlier and am sorry if they are critical in places. I am as anxious as you to advance the practical contributions of anthropology and to get it before interested people at this time, but I felt your presentation was so hurried as to be pretty thin. Plus some unnecessary slaps at both government work and government people that seem gratuitous for your purposes and probably do no good for anthropology.

In conclusion, congratulations on getting it out. I envy you your productive capacity and energy.

Spicer and de Young are now grinding out much good stuff here.

Hope to see you soon.

Sincerely,



John H. Provinse, Chief  
Community Management Division

## WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

215 Spring St., Ch/Ch.  
Sunday, 5/12/44

Dear John: (Embree)

I am returning the revised manuscript which I think is an excellent job and which of course makes me feel a bit contrite for my earlier carping. My contrition is tempered by the feeling that it is actually a better article than it was before, and for this reason will be more effective. I appreciate your courteousness and apologize for my own show of temper and any delays I have caused.

The past weeks have been tense ones for the Authority and most everyone from the Director down, particularly the Director in fact, ~~was~~ <sup>would</sup> just what our movement into Interior would mean. Frayed nerves and tired minds and bodies didn't make the adjustment any easier, but it now appears to have been an excellent shift. The Secretary has been most cordial, has usurped practically none of DSA's authority, and Dillon himself has come thru with only minor wounds and greater confidence than before. We have just finished a week of project directors' meetings here/in Washington and most of the time was spent on cleaning up tag ends of policy, procedure, and discord between Washington and the field, many of the latter of which were not cleaned up. Mr. Ernst wanted to see you today in Chicago if he could - I hope he was able to get your home address from information at the University.

Ned has been at Tule trying to decide Marvin's fate. John DeYoung has been here a month, but reports tomorrow to his new job with OSS, a real loss to us and particularly to Stafford, who tried to get him to come back to Minidoka. Ralph Merritt thinks Morris Opler is a complete loss so far as Manzanar is concerned, despite the fact that from our end here in Washington Morris's material is the best we receive and is read seriously by the Director and others. We need an analyst or two badly, and at the moment are negotiating with Elmer Smith of the U. of Utah for the Minidoka job. Armbruster, who succeeded John there, pulled a "Barnett" on us, though the sickness was his wife's rather than his own. We are also seriously considering H. Luomala for the Washington office. Gordon Brown has become indispensable at Gila, now one of our better projects. Jerome is scheduled for closing by the end of June. There is much other news, but too much to write,

Sincerely,

John (Provine)



COMMUNITY ANALYSIS - AN EXAMPLE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN GOVERNMENT

Initial Organization of the War Relocation Authority

- 1 -

The War Relocation Authority, a government agency charged with the duty of caring for persons forced to leave restricted military areas, was set up by Presidential edict on March 18, 1942. As a result of General De Witt's Exclusion Order concerning persons of Japanese ancestry, the chief duty of the WRA has been with these people: Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans resident in the United States. By the summer of 1942, it became necessary to provide food and shelter for over a hundred thousand such evacuees from the West Coast restricted area. In addition to shelter, circumstances such as state governors' attitudes, made it necessary to provide armed guards and barbed wire fences for the protective custody of these people, two-thirds of whom happened to be American citizens. Ten relocation centers were established housing from seven to over seventeen thousand people each.

The situation created by the evacuation raised a great many special problems in human relations for the War Relocation Authority. The initial staff of the Authority was drawn largely from other governmental agencies such as the *Department of Agriculture* Farm Security Administration, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Indian Service -- people who had had some experience in dealing with community organization. However, when it came to staffing the relocation centers themselves, centers which were virtually small towns and cities in themselves, the problems in human relations become more complex and difficult. Men had to be found to take charge of such specialized matters as



feeding, housing, health and a public hospital, internal security, social welfare work - in fact all of the services that are necessary in any community of ten thousand people. ¶ The evacuees themselves had very little in common with one another besides their ancestry, some coming from well-to-do families, some from poor families, some being professional people, some being businessmen, others racketeers or prostitutes. The communities in their initial organization were thus highly artificial - simply a gathering of refugees thrown together as a result of the war. Since many of the civil service staff members were not experienced in dealing with social groups of this nature and since the evacuees themselves came from such varied backgrounds and were, in addition, subject to many worries and anxieties, it was inevitable that there should be many local administrative crises of one sort or another. Problems arose almost immediately in regard to housing, food and medical attention.


The A chief steward, a civil service appointee in a rather critical position, frequently was at odds with his evacuee chefs who in turn developed into virtual kings within their own mess halls. Friction frequently arose between the various evacuee doctors in the hospital and also between one or another of them and the civil service appointed doctor. Rumor of one sort or another, usually alarmist, was rampant in this situation. ¶ Frequently social problems would arise and reach the point of explosion before anyone on the staff realized there was anything wrong. The administrators, being concerned with immediate physical problems such as getting in lumber, getting the plumbing into operation, and insuring shipments of food had little time to devote to [what they regarded as secondary] problems in social relations. [They were usually surprised and often shocked when something went wrong in human relations within their own centers.]

2

At the time when the Authority was first set up, some consideration was given to the idea that since the agency would be dealing with people, many of whom had a Japanese cultural background, it would be a good idea to employ one or two men with special knowledge and background who might aid in administration by giving advice concerning matters of Japanese culture. However, the idea that advisers also might be needed in connection with the problems of human relations as such in a cross-cultural, anxiety-ridden situation does not seem to have been considered. ¶ In the initial establishment of the Authority, one of the relocation centers in Arizona was established on Indian land and was staffed largely with Indian Service personnel. At this one center, with the encouragement of Commissioner Collier, a special research unit was established in part to determine some of the effects of evacuation and in part to give the results of their findings to the project administrator in order to aid him in understanding local developments. This sociological research unit, set up by Lt. Alexander Leighton, was at first pretty well isolated from the other administrative divisions on the project and was quite cut off from the War Relocation Authority in Washington.

*Not true*

3



The Poston and Manzanar Crises

In November 1942, shortly after the last evacuees had left the assembly centers and taken up residence in the relocation centers and when the center of gravity in the administration of the Authority was gradually swinging from San Francisco to Washington and the Director was beginning to give less attention to problems of center construction and more to such problems as public relations, the first serious internal crisis in a center arose. This was a week long strike at the Poston center. During the entire duration of the strike, very little information on it came to the Washington office of <sup>The</sup> War Relocation Authority, although the Office of Indian Affairs was well-informed. It was difficult to know at the time what the causes were that lay behind the strike and even more difficult to determine just what was happening from day to day. The W.R.A. Reports Officer, whose duty it was to keep Washington informed on such matters, became tied up on the one hand with local public relations and on the other with a self assigned job as "Intelligence Officer" searching for "plots." Sometime after the strike was settled, information of a rather conflicting nature did come in, from the reports officer, from the project director and from the sociological research unit at the center. <sup>of the research unit</sup> This ~~last~~ report proved to be the most useful in throwing light upon the underlying

*ignores  
the central  
not only an  
administrative  
problem but  
one in public  
relations as  
well.*

14

7


*2 this  
meaning?*

3

causes of the trouble. Basically, they seem to have been associated with such things as (a) a general settling down process in the center with some struggle for power among the community leaders; (b) a number of grievances which had become more or less chronic such as the government's "broken promises" concerning just what a relocation center would be like; and (c) the administration in its earliest days had attempted to ~~administrate~~ the center pretty largely through the use of young Japanese-Americans, a procedure which ran counter to the established order of the Japanese community whereby older people held positions of authority over younger people.

In this  
A. H. or  
JFE

The strike itself was not accompanied by any violence and its results were in some ways beneficial to the local community organization and the administration thereof. It brought to light many issues which the administration had not even realized existed and resulted in a more realistic approach to the problems of center administration. It is notable also that while some of the administrators were worried during the crisis and wished the project head to call in <sup>the military police,</sup> [soldiers] the top administrators very wisely refrained from such precipitous action which might well have created irreparable damage in terms of the develop-




ment of Poston as a relocation center <sup>with some semblance of</sup> administered ~~along as democratic lines as possible under the cir-~~  
<sup>self government rather than as a concentration</sup>  
<sup>camp with none.</sup>  
 cumstances.

Not long after the Poston strike, on December 6 to be exact, another crisis arose, this time at the Manzanar center in California. It was of a more critical nature and resulted in the calling in of soldiers by the project administrator, [While the Army Captain did not actually order anyone to shoot, at one critical juncture one or two of the soldiers became rattled and did shoot,] resulting in two deaths and a number of other casualties. [As might be expected,] those who were killed had very little to do with the events leading up to the riot. The Reports Officer, again, was more concerned with local public relations [and] [amateur detective work] than with keeping Washington advised of events and social developments leading up to and resulting from the crisis.

*irrelevant  
extraneous*

*Is this necessary?  
J.H.P.*

News of the Manzanar riot created [great] apprehension in the Washington office as well as in the local administrations of various other centers. It ~~is~~ [no] exaggeration to say that [it] caused the Authority to look itself over very critically in an attempt to find out what was wrong. There were some who feared that events at Poston and Manzanar were symptoms of



what might be expected at all other centers in turn as they settled down and became organized as new communities. There were some who felt that there was an organized group attempting to create such trouble in every center so as to bring in army control and thus give themselves glory in the eyes of the Japanese government.

There were still others, however, including many project directors, who felt that the events at both Poston and Manzanar, while they could occur easily enough at the other centers since in other centers many of the same conditions of living existed, the problem was primarily one of local administration and what was needed was not so much an increase in military control but rather an improvement of the administrative organization, on the one hand, and a better understanding of attitudes and social developments within the center population on the other. The background of the Manzanar riot, for instance, turned out on investigation to be due to a number of things which, if there had been better understanding of them earlier in the history of Manzanar, might well have never developed to the fatal point of the riot on ~~December 6~~. At Manzanar, there were <sup>housing</sup> chronic grievances such as extreme overcrowding and lack of privacy, the project staff had

also given undue power to young and unexperienced citizens at the expense of older, more mature men, there were problems of complete misunderstanding between several elements of the community population and the project administrators, there were a few individuals who had become soured as a result of evacuation and were attempting to stir up trouble, persons who should, of course, have been removed from the center sooner than they were. Manzanar also had certain special handicaps such as having been originally an assembly center which was simply turned into a relocation center by a paper change. It had a very small area, 1 square mile, in which 9,000 people had to live with surrounding community attitudes very hostile towards the inhabitants of the center. All these things tended to create anxieties and frequently aggressive reactions on the part of individual residents of Manzanar.

#### Beginnings of Community Analysis

One constructive result of the Manzanar incident, coming as it did on the heels of the Poston strike, was the realization on the part of the Authority that it needed a better understanding of the people with whom it was concerned and that it needed this knowledge ~~quickly~~ *carefully*

*rather than in the form of post mortems.*

In January 1943, the writer, who was at that time Documentarian in the Reports Office, was authorized to go ahead with a plan [he had drawn up] for the establishment of a section of community analysis as a means of gaining this improved understanding. Toward the end of January ~~some~~ meetings of project directors were called in San Francisco, Denver and Little Rock, for the purpose of talking over relocation center administration problems and to discuss in a preliminary sort of way the army's recent decision to establish a combat team of Japanese-American soldiers.

(Incidentally, it was also decided to conduct at the center a general registration of all people in connection with the army program in order to facilitate leave clearance procedures which had become rather a bottle neck at the Washington office.) At these meetings the idea of establishing community analysis at the project level was also presented. At the San Francisco meeting the project director of Boston testified that the work of the sociological research unit at his project had proved to be most valuable to him in his administrative work. Other project directors were also favorably disposed toward the idea partly, perhaps, because ~~of the Manzanar riot had been used as an example~~ <sup>which served as a vivid</sup> of something that could have been avoided.

#### Place in Administrative Structure


An important administrative problem to be solved in establishing Community Analysis was its place in the adminis-




trative organization. Ideally, perhaps, Community Analysis should be a separate unit with a field analyst reporting directly to the project director and a Washington analyst reporting to the national director. Such an arrangement had certain practical drawbacks. First of all, the basic organizational structure of the Authority had been set up and in operation for almost a year. Furthermore, as ~~the~~<sup>was</sup> ~~chief administrative officer~~ justly pointed out, practically every professional person - internal security officer, chief doctor, chief steward - had shown a desire to report directly to the project director and if everyone of these men had had his wish, the whole administrative structure } would have become chaos and the energies of the Director }  
hopelessly dissipated. For an entirely new function such as Community Analysis to be added to an existing organizational structure presented enough practical problems in staff relations without the sponsor of the new function insisting that the analysts be privileged to report directly to project directors.

*does not necessarily follow*

The problem then became one of deciding to which division the analyst should be attached. The main project divisions as of January 1943 were somewhat as follows:





As a reporter of evacuee attitudes, the analyst might be attached to the Reports Office, and this idea was seriously considered as a possibility. In this connection it is perhaps worth noting that the writer, who inaugurated Community Analysis in W.R.A., was previously head of the Documents Section of the Reports Office in Washington. The Reports Office was largely concerned with three things: maintaining a project newspaper, looking after project public relations, and reporting events as they occurred. The office was also concerned with presenting to evacuees, mostly through the newspaper, news of W.R.A. policies. The Reports Officers were mostly men qualified for such work through previous newspaper and public relations work. It was <sup>suggested</sup> thought

that the project analysts could perhaps come in as "documentarians" and develop this work into that of Community Analysis. On the other hand, it was also believed that an analyst would work under certain handicaps if he were a part of the Reports Office. These handicaps would be: (a) that evacuees would regard him as a public relations man trying to sell the virtues of W.R.A.; (b) he would rather far removed from the operations units of administration and so fail to grasp fully some of the factors leading to certain actions and reactions in Center administration; and (c) the previous history of the Reports Office at certain of the projects had built up an attitude of suspicion on the part of evacuees that would be difficult for/<sup>a</sup>new analyst to overcome.

Another possibility was that Community Analysis could be set up as a section of the Community Management Division. Here the section would be in fairly close touch with welfare, education, public health and internal security - all vital aspects of project administration. The only serious drawback was that of being in the same division as Internal Security and possibly becoming identified with it in the eyes of wary evacuees. However, there was a sharp distinction in function between Internal Security and the proposed Community Analysis section. Internal Security was concerned with administering law enforcement and with apprehending specific individual offenders; Community Analysis would be concerned with <sup>group</sup>investigating and analyzing the causes of social upsets and not with apprehending individual law breakers. The analyst would be interested in why, not who <sup>in an individual sense.</sup> (From the analyst's point of view, one could continually arrest individuals and nothing would be gained until the situation that gave rise to the continual arrests was in some way modified. His function in relation to Internal Security would be to find out (a) the causes of the recurrent trouble and, (b) suggest changes in the local situation

that might overcome the difficulty.)

In view of the above considerations, it was finally decided that Community Analysis should be set up as a section in the Community Management Division with the analyst reporting to the Community Management Chief. However, it was specifically provided that (a) he should be free to consult records of other divisions in connection with his work and (b) that he would not be required to divulge individual sources of information among the residents of the center. Furthermore, since Community Analysis was in a sense an out-growth of Documents, a clear division of function between history - the what of events - and Community Analysis - the why of events - had to be made. A special letter <sup>1</sup> to Reports officers from the Chief of the Reports Office was written clarifying this point. Administrative Instruction No. 56 on documentation was also amended transferring from Documents to Community Analysis those functions concerned with social organization and evacuee attitudes which were to become part of the new analysis section. Special credit should go to Mr. John Baker, Chief of the Office of Reports in this connection for his generous cooperation with his former documentarian in setting up the new section in a division other than Reports. It is not every one in government who puts the good of the total organization before the


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<sup>1</sup> Reports Round Table No. 4, March 17, 1943.

(6)

(7)

*Account  
John did not  
want  
C.A. this  
was  
easy  
JHB*



size and prestige of his own division. Soon afterwards Mr. John Province as head of Community Management in the Washington office sent out a memorandum to project Community Services chiefs explaining the nature of the new section.<sup>2</sup>

Name

It was necessary to decide upon a name for the new section. Originally, the function was discussed in terms of Social Analysis and was so presented at the January Project Directors meetings. However, the national

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Memorandum of April 1, 1943. Mr. Province had realized from the beginning the need for community analysis in W.R.A., but it was not until after the Boston and Manzanar incidents that his advice in this regard bore fruit.

(5)



director felt that a title with the word "social" in it might give rise to unnecessary criticism and that furthermore it was not very descriptive to a layman. He suggested instead the term Community Analysis as ~~being~~ a more appropriate <sup>and</sup> ~~title and this was adopted. As the section developed in practice,~~ this title turned out to be much better than the original one.

#### Analyst's Civil Service Rating

The matter of the rating of the analyst had to be settled. It was felt that for the man to have the requisite degree of prestige and authority on the project to carry out his work successfully, he would need a reasonably high rating. In government, the Civil Service classification and the salary of a job indicates its social value and that of the man who holds it. Civil service rating corresponds to rank in a military organization. For these reasons it was decided that the field analyst should be classified as P-4 which was similar to the rating of the Project Reports Officer. This rating carried an annual salary of \$3800 (plus overtime during the war time 48 hour week schedule). Such a rating was also necessary if the Authority was to obtain in wartime men with the desired qualifications for the job.

?  
This is not true  
Paragraph should be revised to indicate not prestige but caliber of work required.

#### Job Descriptions

When a new job is set up, it is also necessary to write out a job description for the approval of the Civil Service Commission. With the aid of the chief of <sup>Management</sup> Community Services, job descriptions were now made for the positions of head and assistant head of the Washington section and for the field analyst positions.

Finally there had to be defined the role of the analyst on the project and in the Washington office. The quotation of the field analyst's

job description may serve to describe the field function.

"

Position #TX-1109

....

Social Science Analyst (P-4)

Under the administrative supervision of the Chief of Community Services, CAF-15, on the Center level, receiving technical advice and supervision from the ~~Social~~ *Community* Analysis Section in Washington, initiates and carries on scientific studies of social groups and over-all sociological problems on the project Center.

Analyzes the social structure of Center population by discovering the various groups that exist, their characteristics, their role in community life, their relationships with one another and with the administrative staff and the affects of Center life on family and community organization. Such analysis includes study of aliens, kibeis, repatriates, neighborhood gangs, and such other organizations of evacuees as may have significance for administration. This study includes the patterns of parental influence, religious affiliation, general cultural adjustment and will be directed particularly to degrees of Americanization and assimilation among various groups of evacuees.

Studies and analyzes such social attitudes as may develop in relation to the various social groups, with particular reference to attitudes toward the administration. On the basis of such knowledge, analyzes the various administrative policies in order to advise on the probable effects on Center administration of changes in policy.

Studies any special sociological problems which either the Project Director or the Director of the Authority may request.

Directs a staff of evacuees in research and assembly of data required for various studies."

There was also an outline of possible techniques for getting at the problems involved prepared in the Washington office and sent out to the analysts in March. Its headings included: ecological analysis, history of evacuation, main social groupings (family, sex, age, occupation), formal

institutions (church, school), social stratification and individual personality development.

The functions of the Washington office staff were principally:

1. To coordinate reports from the field and find ways and means of making such material as was of value to various divisions useful to them in their program planning.
2. To coordinate work in the field in such a way that reports would be more or less comparable and to see that the analysts' functions as analysts would be kept distinct from administrator's operations functions.
3. Personnel procurement and training. This was a constant problem requiring during the first months a large portion of the time of the Washington office. Whenever possible, new analysts were given a few days orientation in Washington before going to the field and also, where practical, one of the Washington office analysts visited the project before a new field analyst arrived in order to prepare the way for him.

#### Initial Establishment of Community Analysis Section

Finally, on February 26, 1943, a letter signed by the national director and based on proposals made by the Community analyst in Washington was sent out to all project directors authorizing the establishment of Community Analysis sections within the division of Community Management with community analysts to be appointed at P-4 rating and with such evacuee assistants in the new section as might be found necessary.

#### Locating Personnel

With job descriptions approved by Civil Service and with the authorizing letter from the Director to the projects, the next problem was to locate properly qualified personnel for the new section - no easy task in the face of a national manpower shortage. In general, it was thought that first of all, the analyst should have training in one or more fields of the social sciences preferably anthropology and sociology in order to be capable of making, in a



relatively short period, useful social analyses; secondly, that he should have had at least a year's experience in field work, preferably in a culture different from that of contemporary United States, in order to know in advance some of the problems of a field situation and to appreciate the fact that similar objects and acts might have different meanings and functions in different social contexts; and, finally, government experience was considered desirable in order that the analyst should know something of the problems of getting the findings of his work into proper administrative channels.

The search for such unusual men was first begun when the community analyst from Washington went on a field trip in connection with and following the Project Directors meetings in January. He interviewed possible candidates in the Middle West and Far West, both at universities and in government agencies. In addition, the services of the civil service procurement section were called upon, as well as those of the Ethnogeographic Board in Washington. As of August 1943, by which time the staffing was finally completed, the Community Analysis personnel picture stood as follows:

<u>Place</u>	<u>Functional Title</u>	<u>Civil Service Classification</u>	<u>Training and Background</u>	<u>Personal Name</u>
Washington Office	Head, C.A. Section	Principal Social Science Analyst P6	Ph.D. in Anthropology. Field work in Japan. Gov't. experience in Office of Strategic Services.	J. Embree
	Asst. Head, C.A. Section	Senior Social Science Analyst P5	Ph.D. in Sociology. Field work in American Community Studies. Gov't. experience in Office of Strategic Services.	F. Sweetser
	Research Assistant	Research Asst. P 2	MSS in Social Work. Field work in psychiatric social work.	Anne Freed
Minidoka (Idaho)	Community Analyst	Social Science Analyst P4	M.A. in Anthropology. Field work in Hawaii and Illinois. Gov't. experience in Office of Strategic Services.	John deYoung

<u>Place</u>	<u>Functional Title</u>	<u>Civil Service Classification</u>	<u>Training and Background</u>	<u>Personal Name</u>
Manzanar (Calif.)	Community Analyst	Social Science Analyst P4	Ph.D. in Anthropology. Field work among Apache and other Indian groups.  Government experience in Office of Indian Affairs	Morris Opler
Jerome (Arkansas)	"	"	Ph.D. in Sociology. Field work in Southern and New England communities.  Gov't. experience in War Department and Far Security Administration.	E. McVoy
Tule Lake (Calif.)	"	"	Ph.D. in Anthropology. Field work among Ute and other Indian Groups.  No previous Gov't. experience.	Marvin Opler
Granada (Colorado)	"	"	Ph.D. in Sociology. Field work among Japanese of Washington state.  Gov't experience with Washington State Emergency Relief Administration.	J. Rademaker
Heart Mountain (Wyoming)	"	"	Ph.D. in Sociology. Field work among Japanese of Washington state.  No previous gov't experience.	F. LaViolette
Topaz (Utah)	"	"	Ph.D. in Sociology. Field work among German ethnic groups in Wisconsin.  Gov't. experience with Bureau of Agriculture and Economics.	O. Hoffman (Succeeding W. LaBarre, (Anthropologist) who resigned to join the Navy)
Gila (Ariz.)	"	"	Ph.D. in Anthropology. Field work in Samoa and Africa.  Gov't. experience in British Colonial Gov't. (Territory of Tanganyika)	Gordon Brown (Succeeding J. Barnett, (Sociologist) who resigned due to illness)


<u>Place</u>	<u>Functional Title</u>	<u>Civil Service Classification</u>	<u>Training and Background</u>	<u>Personal Name</u>
Rohwer (Ark.)	Community Analyst	Social Science Analyst P4	Ph.D. in Anthropology. field work in Central America and among Mexicans of Chicago.  Gov't. experience in Census Bureau and in Office of Indian Affairs.	Charles Wisdom

At Poston the Sociological Research Bureau as set up under the Department of the Interior was under the direction of:

Alexander Leighton      USNR . . . (Coordinator) on detail from the Navy.  
(Doctors degree in Psychiatry. field work among Navajo and Southwest Indians. Gov't. experience in Office of Indian Affairs.)

Edward Spicer - Assistant Director  
(Ph.D. in Anthropology. Field work among Southwest Indian and Mexican Groups. In September, Spicer replaced Sweetser in Washington when the latter joined the Navy.)

Most of the analysts held doctors degrees in anthropology or sociology. However, in government it is expedient to emphasize not training or intellectual capacity, but "experience" and "common sense". Thus, the fact that the writer as head of the Community Analysis section had had "experience" with Japanese people counted more heavily in giving weight to his words than the fact that he was a specialist in the field of human relations. As a corollary of all this the term "Dr." is something to be avoided among



government administrative officials since "experts" on the whole are both resented and distrusted. The sign that a man has achieved rapport with his civil service colleagues, in spite of professional training, is when he is addressed by his first name. To be addressed as Mr. or Dr. is an indication that relations are on a stiff and formal basis.

#### Early Activities of the Community Analysis Section

The first big job to land in the lap of the section was that of finding out why the combined Army-W.R.A. registration program caused so much trouble. On the basis of an analysis of the events surrounding registration, it was discovered that the problems involved concerned (1) the need for knowledge/<sup>of</sup>and reckoning with evacuee attitudes, (2) the need for better advance information on the procedures and purposes of a new program both to the project staffs and to the evacuees, (3) better communication between the evacuees and project staffs as to the motives and aims of the program and the procedural problems, (4) the need for some evacuee participation in and responsibility for carrying out a program successfully. Partly as a result of a special report on registration plus a constant oral hammering of its conclusions on the ears of the administrators by the analysts in Washington, the Authority managed to avoid most of the shortcomings of its registration program when it carried out its

next major operation, namely, segregation.

A second job of the Community Analysis section both in Washington and in the field was in connection with evacuee resistances to the relocation program with an analysis of the reasons - largely personal insecurity - for such reluctance to relocate together with suggestions for overcoming these difficulties.<sup>1</sup>

A third job was active participation in the planning of ways and means of carrying out the unpleasant task of segregation in such a way as to avoid crises at the centers in connection with it. As events turned out, the mechanics of segregation went remarkably smoothly at all but one Center, Tule Lake, (where, it may be noted, most of the conclusions of the registration report were ignored in regard to the incoming segregees.)

Numerous special requests came to the section from the Director's office and the Office of Reports in connection with Congressional Investigations, from the Employment Division and the Solicitor's Office concerning problems connected with relocation and leave clearances and from various other administrative divisions and sections in the Washington office. The section was expected not only to be informed on social conditions in relocation centers

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<sup>1</sup> The substance of this analysis, minus the suggestions which were frequently made to fit specific administrative proposals, appeared in Applied Anthropology for April - June 1943 Vol. 2, Number 3 under the title "Resistance to Freedom - an Administrative Problem."

but also with the social organization of the West Coast Japanese before the war, and with that <sup>2</sup>obstruse phenomenon called "Japanese psychology." Recommendations on labor relations, mess operations, etc., to be accepted, usually had to be made in terms of Japanese psychology rather than of prosaic labor-management relations.

During the first six months of its existence, a number of special reports were also prepared. There was a general Community Analysis reports series on such problems as causes of unrest in relocation centers, resistances to relocation and assimilability of Nisei. In all, six such reports were prepared as of August 1. These reports, usually less than ten pages in length, were written in general terms in an attempt to present for the use of administrative officials the social causes behind some of the problems they were running up against in their daily work. They were given wide circulation among the W.R.A. staff at projects, at relocation offices and in the Washington office.<sup>1</sup> A second series of reports, a project analysis series, was also established consisting of special reports from field analysts on important administrative problems in their own centers such as the effects of the registration program, the evaluation of the resettlement program, problems in connection with adult education. As of August 1, ten reports of the project analysis series

1. The first such general report, *Dealing With Japanese Anxieties*, was reproduced verbatim in *Applied Anthropology*, February-March, 1943, vol. 2, no. 2.

had been prepared. These were given a more restricted circulation within the Community Management Division and to such staff members as might be concerned with the particular subjects treated. The Washington office also established a Community Analysis letter series in order to keep the project analysts in touch with developments in the section at other projects than their own and in the Washington office.

Together with carrying out the above special assignments and regular duties at the Washington level, similar functions were being carried out at the project level by project analysts in response to requests from the project directors and from various staff members. Perhaps ~~as~~ ~~important as~~ - if not more important than ~~the~~ any formal written reports, were the duties analysts carried out through personal contacts and discussion with both evacuees and appointed staff members. Once administrators gained confidence in the analyst and in his ability and judgment, his influence and practical value in administration became such that it could not be measured in terms of so and so many reports or such and such a civil service rating. It was only after a period of months that a good analyst could create the degree of confidence in his work that made it possible for his work to be valuable to the organization. (On the other hand, it was all too easy for an analyst to

commit errors in his initial relations with the rest of the staff that would take weeks to overcome.)

#### Final Official Establishment

Final establishment of the Community Analysis section on an official basis may be considered to have occurred when rules and regulations concerning its functions were laid down in the Administration Manual on September 6, 1943. The relevant sections from this manual are as follows:

##### "30.8.1

.1 It is the intention of the War Relocation Authority





to analyze the cultural patterns existing in the community at each relocation center, and to observe social trends and study their underlying cases in order to,

- A. Increase understanding of the factors governing social development within the center;
- B. Facilitate the program of resettlement and re-assimilation of evacuees into American life; and
- C. Provide a guide for dealing with any comparable social situation that may become the responsibility of a federal agency.

Purposes  
of  
Community  
Analysis

- .2 To carry out the functions in 30.8.1, a Community Analysis Section shall be established in the Community Management Division at each center. The work of the Section will be under direction of a Community Analyst reporting to the Project Director through the Assistant Director in charge of Community Management. Evacuee workers may be assigned to the Section at the Centers, within budgetary limitations.

Community  
Analysis  
Section

- .3 The Community Analysis Section at a Center shall make an intensive study of the community there, including all significant formal and informal social groups, with special emphasis upon the degree of assimilation of the various groups, their social roles in the community, their attitudes toward one another and toward the War Relocation Authority, the effect of the evacuation upon family controls and group social controls, and the effect of administrative policies and decisions upon the evacuee community. It should further observe and analyze all social trends within the center, with special attention to the development of new social groupings and to developments that may improve social relations within the center, or that might lead to crises.

Community  
Analysis  
Program

- .4 All administrative personnel at the Center shall cooperate with the program by making available to the Community Analysis Section such records and personal information as may be of value to it. The Community Analysis staff shall not be required or expected to divulge such information received nor the individual sources of its records and reports.

Relations  
with  
Other Staff  
Units

- .5 At least monthly, the Section at each Center shall report on its activities to the Project Director, through the Assistant Director in charge of Community Management.
- (.5) From time to time other reports shall be made as deemed advisable by the Section, or as the Project Director may request. One copy of each regular or occasional report must be sent to the Director in Washington." <sup>1</sup>

#### Conclusions and Lessons

The first and ever recurrent problem in a new administrative organization, especially one involving large numbers of "administered people," is that of communication from the top administration to the field or branch administration, and from the field administrations to the people administered - then from the people administered upward.

Many of the difficulties and crises of administration in industry, in colonial <sup>government</sup> administration, and in the War Relocation Authority are due to clogs or gaps or perversions of the information that should be communicated up and down within the structure. Once this problem is recognized - and it always is, eventually, after time, tempers, and lives have been lost - some form of Community Analysis is established. It may take the shortsighted form of a spy system as in some industrial situations and some colonial governmental situations, or it may take the more enlightened and in the long run more practical <sup>and efficient</sup> form of open and scientific attempts to provide administrators with a knowledge of the complexities of human relations as they develop and change in the organization. Examples of this latter solution are, for

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These reports, of course, were routed to the Community Analysis Section. In one center, where the analyst had the confidence of the Project Director, only letters of transmission went through "channels" which the documents and reports came direct from the field analyst to the Community Analysis section in Washington.

industry, the Western Electric Company; for colonial government, the British in New Guinea and parts of Africa; and finally in our American parallel to Colonial administration, the War Relocation Authority.

From the experience in W.R.A. in establishing such an analysis, a number of special administrative problems have arisen within the section itself. (a) Men who have had no previous field experience are definitely less useful than those who have had it. To send such inexperienced men to the field, even though they are well trained professionally, may be costly and make the job of their successor in the field doubly difficult. (b) Also of real value to an analyst's effectiveness is previous experience in working in government and having learned to use rather than chafe at the "administrative channels." Chafing leads to frustration and ineffectiveness regardless of the brilliance of a man's analysis. A knowledge of the ins and outs of governmental organization and a willingness to use it for what it is meant, i.e. as an aid to successful administration, can help bring the results of analysis into effective use. (c) Communication between the analyst in the field and the analysis section in Washington is a constant problem. Close coordination between Washington and the field is essential, but project personnel tend to be defensive about their administrative problems, vis a vis Washington, and hence tend to frown on any objective analysis or even mention of local trouble. One of the analyst's first jobs is thus to gain the confidence of the local administrators in his integrity and good judgment as well as in the value of his work, <sup>only then can the</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>project administrators be convinced of</sup> the desirability of maintaining communication between <sup>the</sup> administered and <sup>the</sup> project staff and of keeping Washington aware of local developments which may be parallel to other projects and hence part of a general administrative problem rather than simply a local headache. (d) In first

establishing the analysts in the field, a system of personal letters on how they were getting along in their work was instituted. These did not go through administrative channels and were not intended to contain any information or remarks calling for administrative action, but they did serve to show how the men were faring in their respective projects in lieu of frequent visits to the men. However, these letters created a number of administrative problems, especially when the project director did not have full confidence in the analyst and tended to regard him as something of a Washington spy. The letter system is probably not to be recommended in comparable situations and is gradually disappearing from the analysis section in W.R.A. In general, there is no substitute for frequent personal contact between the Washington section and the field men.

A basic requirement for successful and objective community analysis is that the analyst keep out of direct administrative work himself. There is a constant temptation for a man to step in and help do some job that needs doing and so to identify his interests with those of the specific operations job. There is also a tendency for project directors to assign operations functions to an analyst, especially if they think he is any good.<sup>1</sup> Such actions cause the analyst to lose his own ability to analyze the total picture and also create the very attitudes toward him on the part of the administered and other administrators that make it difficult for him to gain the rapport necessary for valuable analysis work. The analyst's job is thus a difficult one. He must be able to gain the respect of his fellow staff members

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<sup>1</sup> One analyst threatened to resign because he became overloaded with operations functions by a Project Director who admired his abilities; another drifted into operations on his own initiative and eventually transferred from Community Analysis to ~~relocation work~~. *on operations unit.*

while not himself performing operations functions and at the same time gain the confidence of the administered. The respect of the administrators in the long run depends on (a) the accuracy of his analyses and, (b) his ability to translate them into terms useful to the administrators in carrying out their functions. The confidence of the administered depends on (a) the analyst's ability in human relations as a field worker and, (b) on his care in avoiding identification with internal security investigations and in protecting at all times the confidence of his sources of information.

Military government programs today are being planned with no specific provision beyond a traditional negative spy system for learning the community attitudes and social developments among an administered population. As with Industry, Colonial Government and the War Relocation Authority, American military government will undoubtedly lose many a life in subduing riots which will be blamed not on poor or inept administration but on "agitators," "organizers," etc. The Army and Navy could save themselves both manpower and eventual public criticism by providing before, rather than after, a series of crises, for special Community Analysis Officers - men free from administrative duties and charged specifically with keeping in touch with the functional structure and changing attitudes of the people within their jurisdiction in order to aid in civil administrative planning and operations.

John F. Embree

HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN THE WAR

John F. Embree

Coordinator of Information (later Office of Strategic Services)  
December 1941-August 1942

In December, 1941, soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, I was asked by the office of the Coordinator of Information to participate as a consultant in a project concerned with drawing up and outline for the guidance of research workers in organizing reports on the social organization and culture of various foreign countries. This was a project of the Psychology Division, one of a number of "functional" divisions in the organization in contrast to "area" divisions. The head of the Psychology Division, Dr. Robert Tryon, was a psychologist from the University of California. Mr. Buford Junker, an anthropologist in the Division, was the man immediately responsible for bringing together the social scientists in connection with the project under discussion. These men included the following: Conrad Arensberg, John Embree, W. Lloyd Warner, and Joseph Weckler.

This roster of names indicates that Mr. Junker drew on people who were primarily social anthropologists. Having received his training at Chicago, it is not surprising to find a heavy representation of people from Chicago (Embree, Warner, Weckler).

The job was strictly in the field of social anthropology and turned out to be rather difficult. Three full days of work around a conference table were spent in the compiling of what we regarded as an adequate and proper outline. After we dispersed, the job of editing this draft outline was left in the hands of Mr. Junker.

This job was done during the initial days of the war, when many of us experienced a certain thrill in doing what we regarded as important war work by contributing from our special professional skills. This sense of importance was heightened by the great "security" which surrounded our activities. We all had to be fingerprinted and wear special identification badges while on duty. Outside the window of our conference room a soldier with rifle and fixed bayonet marched back and forth, giving visible evidence of wartime protection of government buildings and government activities.

We worked with a high degree of interaction from the time we met in the morning until we separated at night; (we ate lunches together as a group.) When the job was finished there is little doubt that most of us, if not all, felt we had done a good job and laid the groundwork for a pioneer and eminently useful series of books on national social structures--books to be drawn on by all federal workers in dealing with these various foreign areas. And, for some of us fresh from academic halls, there was an ulterior thought that these projected great works would make a fine addition to the monograph literature in social anthropology and so be useful to universities; also that in working out the details of the outline a generous number of graduate students could be employed.

While in Washington as consultant on this project I was interviewed by the head of the Branch of Research and Analysis and as a result received a telegram after my return to Toronto asking me to join the staff of the organization as research analyst in the Psychology Division. Here I saw the gradual disappearance of the famous outline. When I showed a copy to a political scientist from the Far Eastern Section, he cast a fishy eye on it and remarked that

it contained no provision for education. He also intimated that much of the outline was nothing new. And so, as a neophyte in government I learned my first lesson, namely, that a project or an idea is of little value unless it can be "implemented"--i.e., sold to other groups and so adopted for action by the organization in which one is working. Presumably the head of the Psychology Division ran into similar difficulty for the outline in its original form (dated January 2, 1942) was never, so far as I know, used as the organizational framework of any C.O.I. report. A few assignments for sections on a projected Japanese report were farmed out to two young anthropologists in universities, but little came of their work.

While the outline itself was never put into effect, some of the ideas embodied in it bore fruit in the form of reports on the social organization and attitudes of various countries to be used as background reports for the use of radio script writers for programs aimed at those countries. Thus, a series of twenty to thirty-page reports on such areas as Thailand and Manchuria were prepared, and finally a rather extensive one on Japan. These projects being more modest and more specific than the grand outline met with a better reception from people outside the Division. The reports were based primarily on book knowledge, but where feasible interviews with people from the subject areas were undertaken and some of the results incorporated in the background reports.

These reports and other occasional "spot" assignments were carried out by assigning one man as responsible for their completion by a certain date, and authorizing him to make use of the



services of three or four other men. Such a research group included, as a rule, men trained in anthropology or sociology.

With such an organization and adequate stenographic assistance, it was possible to turn out a twenty-page report based on considerable research in a week's time. It was impressive to see what could be done given (a) adequate intelligent trained researchers and (b) adequate expert typists.

Some spot projects which came up in the Division in early 1942 included the psychology of the Japanese soldier, an analysis of the symbolism used in English cartoons, background information on the peoples of North Africa, data for the peoples and customs section of a revised Army strategic survey of Japan. In most of this work anthropology per se was not necessary, but training in social organization and field work abroad helped greatly. We found it almost essential to have at least one man of such experience in any group assigned to carry out a Psychology Division project. On the basis of such training and knowledge, it was often possible to make suggestions, which were accepted, for revision of outlines of Army surveys so far as information about peoples and cultures in foreign areas was concerned.

On the negative side, the social scientist in common with almost all government research workers suffered the frustrations of seeing his work revised and then tabled after rushing to complete a project to meet some hard and fast deadline. The piece work and anonymity in preparing reports made speed possible, but inevitably lowered standards of scholarship. But then, the purpose of hiring professionally trained men was so that they could apply their training and turn out material of reasonable

quality and reliability in a hurry, not to maintain a laboratory for research in the social sciences. The frustrations of shifting from scholarship to government report writing were inevitable, but not necessarily to be blamed wholly on bureaucracy.

A special project of the Division which was pretty much the brainchild of Robert Tryon, the chief of the Division, was the preparation of a series of pocket guides for U. S. soldiers going abroad. When he first made the suggestion, the Military were not impressed, but later the Special Services Branch of the Army became interested and asked C.O. I. to prepare a number of guides. Here, again, the spirit of the original outline exerted its influence and the Psychology Division became responsible for organizing the form the guides should take and editing the final products whether prepared in the division or by various area sections of the organization.

The first guide was one on Great Britain and the first boner in an early draft was a casual reference to <sup>Northern</sup> executives in Washington having accent difficulty with their stenographers from the South. This would be no offense to an Englishman but was a naive expression of a C.O.I. man's view of Washington in 1942 that could cause a good deal of resentment among Southern soldier readers of the Pocket Guide.

In general, the problem in preparing the guides was to present the social life and etiquette of the peoples in the area to be entered by the soldier. It should be presented simply but accurately in such a way as to aid him in getting along in the foreign area with a minimum of friction. To this end a series of do's and don'ts was included in a number of the guides. In one

of the Near Eastern Guides the whole first printing was withdrawn because some reader decided at the last minute that the recommendation to the soldier not to urinate in public (because of strong local taboos on the subject) could be used by German propagandists to malign the U. S. in broadcasts to foreign countries by saying that American soldiers were so barbaric that their own government had to tell them not to urinate in public.

Occasionally a clash would arise between the Division and an area section on the writing of the guides. This was especially acute in the case of the China guide where the area people stressed classic Chinese Confucian culture and ethics whereas the Psychology Division stressed the culture and etiquette of the peasantry. In the end neither draft was used but Special Services produced a third quite different one in its printed Guide. It also included a series of cartoons by Canif on "How to Tell a Chinese from a Japanese" largely on the basis of physical characteristics. The writer, who at the time the guide was issued, was no longer with C.S.S.<sup>1</sup> wrote a memorandum pointing out the dangers of such over

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<sup>1</sup> In mid 1942 the Office of the Coordinator of Information was reorganized and became the Office of Strategic Services.

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simplified advice and so probably did some other people so that in a later edition the cartoons with their bad anthropology were omitted. (On the subject of Pocket Guides see also Anthropology and the War in the Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors, \_\_\_\_\_ 1946.)

A number of anthropologists were employed in other sections, divisions and branches of O.S.S.--e.g., Felix M. Keesing in the Far Eastern Section for a few months before he went to Stanford

in connection with the Civil Affairs Training School. William Bason in the African Section (?) and in overseas outposts Mischa Titiev, David Mandelbaum, and Gora DuBois. John de Young and Fred Hulse both joined the Psychology Division in the summer of 1942 about the time I left.

On the basis of my field work in Japan I also participated in certain activities of the Far Eastern Section. Here it was purely area knowledge that was wanted, but I feel that the value of much of this area knowledge was enhanced by the anthropological nature of the field work and interpretation of data. I also think that it is fair to say that the field study Suye Mura stood the test of intensive use during the war where some of the more general books proved of little value. If social anthropological studies of Japanese towns and cities had been made prior to the war they would doubtless have been of even greater value. In other fields it was those books which stressed Japanese culture and social organization which proved most valuable in many government programs--e.g., Sanson's Japan a Short Cultural History; Allen's Japan the Hungry Guest; and Mears' Year of the Wild Boar.

The Psychology division as a separate unit disappeared in a reorganization in the fall of 1942, but most of its personnel remained in the organization and a body of anthropologists was to be found in both the Washington and the overseas offices of OSS until the end of the war.

The War Relocation Authority, August 1942-August 1943

Toward the end of August 1942, I left OSS and joined the staff of the War Relocation Authority as Senior Archivist in the

Reports Division. John Provinse had something to do with the transfer but my immediate supervisor was John Baker, Chief of the Reports Division. My duties were to (1) organize a means of maintaining a record of the activities of the WRA; (2) organize and supervise a library; (3) serve as advisor on miscellaneous matters concerning Japanese culture. Obviously there was little immediate scope here for anthropology as such.

However, John Provinse, whose position as Chief of the Community management division was administrative, evidently hoped that I would be able to develop some sort of social analysis in connection with the work. After a trip to some of the Relocation Centers in September, 1942, I made a report in a staff meeting on some of the attitudes prevailing among the evacuees--attitudes which were not all as Pollyanna as some of the administrators in Washington had thought. I also pointed out some of the more obvious social causes for these attitudes and indicated that some of the most American of the evacuees were likely to be among the resentful ones. John Provinse remarked to me later that the material I had presented was good but that it should be repeated frequently in the future. The need for repetition turned out to be very true. This brought home to me one of the basic differences between academic research and applied anthropology. In the academic grove we have a custom that once a thing is said in published form that is the end of the originator's responsibility; other scientists can go to the printed source and if they do not, so much the stupider they

But in government work, the stating of a proposition is only the first step. If the information or the idea is to have any effect, if it is to find its way into operations, it must be repeated in varied forms and contexts many times over.

While setting up a system of record keeping and establishing a library, I gradually put more and more emphasis on the evacuee side of the story--social developments in the centers, evacuee attitudes and reactions.

Poston Relocation Center had an actual Sociological Research Center under the sponsorship of John Collier. (Poston was on Indian Land and during its first year of operation was staffed largely by Indian service personnel but according to WRA policy directives--a situation which was bound to end in conflict. Eventually Poston was made an integral part of the WRA program with Poston personnel responsible to WRA, not to the Indian Service.) Dorothy Thomas of the University of California was also conducting some social research in a few of the centers--notably, Gila River, Poston, and Tule Lake.

Then came the crises in Poston and Manzanar in November and December, 1942, and shortly thereafter the organization of a community analysis section in the Community Management Division. This has been described in "Community Analysis--An Example of Anthropology in Government" in the American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, No. 3, July-September, 1944. A new and more orthodox archivist was brought in to maintain the historical record for the Reports Office.

On the whole, the experience in Community Analysis was good in bringing anthropological techniques to bear on problems of

administration. Although field analysts sometimes felt like lone wolves, their reports were invaluable in Washington and I was in a position to see the recommendations of the section incorporated into national policy not once but many times. The time between an observation of a trouble spot in the field and a remedy for it being incorporated in policy was often dishearteningly long from the point of view of the field analyst--but as government agencies go it was often rapid. For example, the first recommendations for an analysis section with field analysts in every section were made in December of 1942. They were approved in January and by August all centers had the beginnings of community analysis. But even earlier the reports from the centers first staffed were being used.

The function of the Community Analysis Section was only partially social research--it was also partially the communication of the results of this research in a form acceptable to and usable by the administration, a process that involved frequent repetition in written and oral form both in Washington and in the field.

On the whole, anthropologists with previous field experience in some non-western culture did the best jobs--but there were exceptions. Relatively little true anthropological research was accomplished--except possibly, in the field of cross cultural administration.

Anthropologists who served at one time or other in the Community Analysis Section were as follows:

John de Young

Gordon Brown

Morris Opler  
Charles Wisdom  
Marvin Opler  
Weston LeBarre  
David French  
E. Adamson Hoebel  
Asaal Hansen  
Ned Spicer  
Katherine Luomala

Ned Spicer replaced me as head of the Community Analysis Section in Washington. Weston LeBarre was only with the program a few weeks before he left to join the Navy.

Other anthropologists associated with the WRA program included the following:

John Provinse, Chief of the Community Management Division. His job was administrative, but his anthropological training and previous experience in the Bureau of Agricultural Economics made him sensitive to the need for applied social science as an integral part of such a program as WRA. His influence, sponsorship, and advice had much to do with making community analysis a success.

Solon T. Kimball, Community Government. His chief work was acting as midwife to community government in each of the centers. He also served, for a time, as acting director of Manzanar Relocation Center.



Far Eastern Civil Affairs Training Program

(September 1943-April 1945)

As of September 1, 1943, I joined the staff of the newly organized Far Eastern Civil Affairs Training School at the University of Chicago. This school was organized to train army (and later naval) officers for occupation duties in Japan. The Chicago School served as a pilot organization, the program being, later expanded to include five other universities--Michigan, Northwestern, Yale, Harvard, and Stanford.

At Chicago the school was set up in the Social Science Division with Robert Redfield as general supervisor and Fred Eggan as Director. (Eggan had received three months training in Military Government at Charlottesville to qualify for the position of Director.) Later Redfield dropped out and all relations with the army were directly with Eggan. His position was administrative but his background as an anthropologist, like that of Provine in WRA, gave moral support to methods of teaching of the social scientists on his staff. Abe Halpern was in charge of language instruction, and I was in charge of area studies. Some of the problems we met with have been outlined in my article "Military Government" in the volume Culture and Conflict in Colonial Administration, edited by Solon T. Kimball.

On the whole, anthropology as such played little direct part in the Civil Affairs Training Programs, but the fact that the Director and the chief language and area men were anthropologists inevitably put on emphasis on problems of human relations in military government. This in turn affected the curricula of

the other five schools since the army drew up a single basic curriculum to cover all six schools on the basis of the program worked out at Chicago--a program which laid emphasis on social organization, economics and religion as basic knowledge for a Civil Affairs Officer together with a general thesis that culturally determined behavior patterns are important subjects of study for a prospective Civil Affairs Officer. In language, the emphasis was on oral drill in basic linguistic structure--not on etymology and ability to write and read characters, the bane of most beginners in oriental languages.

Among visiting lecturers some anthropologists were also included, e.g., G. Gordon Brown for lectures on Colonial Government, E. Adamson Hoebel for lectures on Law, Alexander Leighton, a psychologist with anthropological interest, also gave some lectures on administration on the basis of his studies at Poston Relocation Center. On the whole, it must be admitted that we were not always successful in gaining emotional acceptance of these comparative lectures on the part of officers who wanted to see the direct immediate application of every sentence to Japan.

Anthropology made itself felt through staff members in some of the other schools--e.g., Lauriston Ward and Douglas Haring at Harvard, F. M. Keesing at Stanford, Herskovits at Northwestern. (At the Navy Columbia school which anteceded the Army Far East Civil Affairs schools, Linton and Keesing both took an active part, and Murdock of Yale was commissioned Lt. Commander and together with Whiting and Ford compiled

the Civil Affairs Handbooks on Micronesia.)

In the Area Training Programs the most significant development was probably that of combining a number of disciplines into a single instructional program on an area. At Chicago the Economists Henry Bloch and D. H. Buchanan worked very closely with each other and with me. Later we worked closely with a political scientist--Chitoshi Yanaga--when he gave a series of visiting lectures at Chicago. At Michigan and Harvard, where I gave a number of visiting lectures, my contribution was coordinated with that of resident lecturers of other disciplines.

In the Civil Affairs Program, as in the WRA program, I think those anthropologists who participated learned a good deal which helped give them perspective on their own subject, especially in the field of government.

#### Office of War Information

(April-November 1945)

My last government war work was in the OWI which I joined in April 1945 after giving basic area lectures to the fifth and last class at Chicago. I came into the organization at the suggestion of George Taylor, head of the Far Eastern (Area III) Section of the Overseas Branch, on the condition that I would be assigned to overseas duty. When first discussing the idea we talked in terms of Burma and Assam, but when I finally got processed and arrived in Washington, the war picture had changed. But more significant, despite the fact that I had been requested to come for months, there was no provision for me in any overseas post and I spent over two

frustrated months in Washington, to be followed by more of the same in Hawaii. Eventually in August I got to the field (Saipan) just in time to celebrate the end of the war. In other words, my impression of OWI is of a large rather disorganized institution, one hand of which rarely if ever knew what the other was doing.

There was a small research unit called the Foreign Morale Analysis Division which was housed partly in the Social Security Building (with the rest of OWI) and partly in the Pentagon (where it was coordinated with an Army Morale Survey unit in the Sociological Branch of MIS.) This was organized in late 1944 and headed by Alex Leighton; the staff included a number of anthropologists--Clyde Klackhohn, Katherine Spencer, Morris Opler and Dorothea Leighton. So far as OWI and the Social Security Building were concerned, FMAD was a late and not very much wanted addition--but in the Pentagon its services were much in demand and it fulfilled a useful function. One reason for this difference is, I think, that in the Army as in WRA or the Department of Agriculture, men in agencies dealing with definite operating programs dealing with direct administration and treatment of people, soon came to realize the importance of attitude and reaction analysis.<sup>1</sup> But in a propaganda program,

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<sup>1</sup> But not always--the U. S. Navy in Micronesia has felt little official need as yet.

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made up of radio and newspaper men, engaged in sending programs into thin air with little opportunity to check results, the quiet words of an analyst are not given much weight. An analyst

in a propaganda organization is equated with summarizers of domestic and foreign news and propaganda programs, and the difference between such news analysts and the work of FMAD did not appear great to most people in OWI, nor could they see the relevance of the FMAD data to their programming. Just as the unit was a fifth wheel in Washington, I felt my own activities to be superfluous in the Hawaiian Outpost office. What little field work I did in attitude analysis in Saipan was too brief and close to the end of the war to be of any value to OWI.

Of course, if the war had lasted longer or FMAD had got under way sooner the results might have been different--but I'm not sure. One thing notably lacking in the Overseas Branch of OWI was a leavening of men trained in the social sciences on the administrative and radio script writing side of the organization. There was no John Provinse or Fred Eggan to aid in implementing research findings and in giving the analyst a feeling of being understood and backed up. I had the impression that OWI liked to call in a variety of names for its roster of employees but often did not know what to do with the bodies when it got them.

#### Other Activities

Like most anthropologists with foreign field experience, I was called in for interviews or as a consultant by a number of agencies for my area knowledge. (Army, Navy, OSS, FEA) This activity was similar to that of businessmen or missionaries with area knowledge, the anthropological aspect of the knowledge

being rarely called for in such work. But there were exceptions--e.g., the work of an FEA committee on a food program for Japan in which light on the Japanese cultural context was needed for number of questions, such as, food habits, farm custom, local forms of distribution, types of sanctions, ~~and~~<sup>used</sup> to promote food production.

Of my own experience in war work, I should say that my activity in WRA could most accurately be termed applied anthropology. The Civil Affairs teaching program was more a matter of passing on area knowledge with just a glaze of anthropology. The work in OWI was futile--it produced little in the line of original research and very few of its findings were carried out in the field in psychological warfare programs. By contrast, the work of anthropologists in OSS was constantly finding its way--along with that of other people--into the basic documents of other agencies--e.g., MIS Strategic Surveys, Civil Affairs Guides, etc.

At the same time, I think that many anthropologists, including myself, learned a great deal about how to apply our knowledge, about working with men of other disciplines, and about government organizations which should help give a new perspective on both teaching and research in anthropology and, perhaps, lend to new interests and new methods.

It is true that, as many anthropologists in war work have contended, that they were not wanted for professional training but simply for area knowledge--but it is also true that those who brought their professional training to bear on problems of human relations found there was a real need for it--

a need recognized through the placing of such persons in positions of importance and responsibility in programs involving a knowledge of culture and human relations.

#### The Future

On the basis of my own experience and observation of that of others, I should say that the anthropologist was in much greater demand during World War II than in World War I. This may be due in part to the fact that anthropology had advanced to the point where it had more to offer in 1944 than in 1914. Another more obvious reason was that the theaters of war demanded specific knowledge of remote Pacific and Asiatic areas and the anthropologists were among the few people who could contribute such knowledge. In this respect, missionaries, travelers, and businessmen were just as valuable except, perhaps, that the knowledge of local peoples was less among businessmen and travelers than among anthropologists and missionaries.

There were several examples, however, of anthropologists being called into government work <sup>preferably</sup> on the basis of their professional training--e.g., Clyde Kluckhohn, Morris Opler, E. Adamson Hoebel, Katherine Luomala.

One of the first problems many anthropologists found was one of readjustment from academic or field research conditions of work to those of the civil service or the military. They also had to contend with the usual suspicion on the part of the administrator of the practicality of the specialists. Anthropologists had much to learn about applying their knowledge and

techniques in such a way as to be effective.

In the future, two complementary developments appear likely and desirable: (1) The greater recognition in civil service of social science analysts. Such positions already exist, but most anthropologists were hired as something else-- "psychologist," "archivist," "economist," etc. (2) A recognition in academic circles of applied anthropology as a legitimate activity. This would involve some provision for graduate training and experience in the subject--e.g., a graduate course or seminar in applied anthropology, the sort of work done in the field, the problems involved, etc., together with a brief internship or practical training in some private or government organization. This would aid in producing graduates who are better able to succeed in applied fields and, at the same time, give those who go out to teaching and "pre" research work a better perspective on the relation of ~~the~~ profession to the rest of contemporary society.



Published Materials Stemming from War Activities

## Office of Strategic Services

No published material directly based on OSS work, but the Smithsonian War Background Studies, No. 7, The Japanese owes some of its organization to work on area surveys in the Psychology Division.

## War Relocation Authority

<sup>Relocation</sup> "The ~~Evacuation~~ <sup>Evacuation</sup> of Persons of Japanese Ancestry ~~from~~ <sup>in the United States:</sup> the ~~West Coast~~ <sup>Some Causes and Effects,</sup>" Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, Vol. 33, No. 8 <sup>August 15 1943</sup>

"Dealing with Japanese Americans," Applied Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 2 <sup>1</sup> (A reprint of a Community Analysis Report.)

<sup>Journal 1943</sup> "Resistance to Freedom--An Administrative Problem," Applied Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 4, September, 1943. (A rewrite of a Community Analysis Report.)

"Community Analysis--An Example of Anthropology in Government," American Anthropologist, Vol. 46, No. 3, July-September, 1944.

## Far Eastern Civil Affairs Training School, University of Chicago

"Sanitation and Health in a Japanese Village," Journal of the Washington Academy of Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 4, April 15, 1944.

<sup>Civil Affairs Guide (OPNAV 13-18) Far Eastern Mutual Relief (Japan)</sup> "Military Occupation of Japan," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 13, No. 19, September 20, 1944. <sup>First draft written with M. P. Joan.</sup>

"Japanese Administration at the Local Level," Applied Anthropology, Vol. 3, No. 4, September, 1944.

The Japanese Nation, Fayal and Rinehart, 1945.

"How to Treat the Japanese--<sup>Complete Issue</sup> A ~~Difficult Problem~~," New York Times Magazine, September 9, 1945.

"Military Government," article in Culture and Conflict in Colonial Administration, ed. by Selton T. Kimball, 1946.

## Office of War Information

"Military Government in Saipan and Tinian," Applied Anthropology, Vol. No. , 1945(?) Rewrite of a memorandum.