

ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

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EVACUATION OF THE JAPANESE AMERICANS

Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of the Yale Law School, denounced the evacuation of Americans of Japanese ancestry at the beginning of World War II as America's "worst wartime mistake" (Rostow 1945a). He also referred to the legal cases arising out of the evacuation as "disasters," viewed from the standpoint of civil rights (Rostow 1945b). Rostow regarded the evacuation and subsequent incarceration of Japanese Americans as a serious threat to fundamental citizenship rights. He understood the attack to be based on considerations of race and regarded it as indistinguishable, in the legal view, from the position of the Nazis with respect to the Jews in Germany. Rostow was one of the few public figures who did not shrink from stating this point of view in the midst of war in a country deeply hostile to Japan and the Japanese. Yet his position was precisely that taken by United States Attorney General Biddle up until a few weeks before the evacuation order (Grodzins 1949: 242, 258-259).

Denunciation of the action taken in March 1942 by President Roosevelt, ordering the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the West Coast has been vigorous ever since the event (ten Broek 1954; Daniels 1971). Although the Supreme Court upheld the evacuation as constitutional on the grounds of "military necessity," the decision was by majority vote and the dissenting justices stated strong opinions against the singling out of the more than 80,000 citizens of the United States on the basis of their racial origins (Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214: 233-242, 242-248). The fact is that the governmental action took place in the face of vigorous opposition by the Department of Justice and cannot in any way be regarded as the result either of consensus among high government officials or concerted, widespread public demand. The evacuation was rather a response to limited special interest groups on the West Coast, such as the Shipper-Growers' Association in business competition with Japanese Americans, and constituted a hasty concession in government circles to the implacable prejudice of a single army general who happened to command the strategic west coast military area (Grodzins 1949: 362-365).

Nevertheless in March 1942, the evacuation was ordered and there was no rescinding it. The consequences directly and immediately affected some 110,000 people and had to be dealt with promptly. What has since

been generally judged as a very bad decision led to a determined effort by the United States government to undo the effects of that decision. The undoing of the evils has been paid far less attention than it merits. Within a few days of the evacuation order, President Roosevelt created a civilian agency—the War Relocation Authority—and appointed as its director Milton K. Eisenhower, who was soon replaced by Dillon S. Myer, both experienced in the administration of agricultural programs growing out of the New Deal. It became clear early, as these men sought to deal with the problems of 110,000 men, women, and children suddenly made homeless and excluded from the coastal states, that the policy pursued would proceed on wholly different assumptions from those that prompted evacuation. It must be emphasized that the War Relocation Authority immediately saw the issue in terms of the restoration of human rights (Myer 1971).

THE CONCENTRATION CAMP ISSUE

During the 35 years since the evacuation, the label "concentration camp" has repeatedly been loosely applied to the communities which were established for the Japanese Americans. To do so obscures the issue which the policymakers in the WRA recognized as fundamental. As might have been expected as one effect of the decision to evacuate, organizations and individuals immediately appeared who sought to bring about complete imprisonment of all the evacuees, both citizens and noncitizens. Pressures to move in this direction were very strong in a country at war with the Japanese and in a phase of that war, during early 1942, which was going steadily against the United States. There were individuals and groups who assumed that evacuation had been ordered as a result of real evidence that all persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States were a serious threat to the country's security. The facts that very little evidence was ever presented, that that which was offered was extremely flimsy, and that even this was not applicable to the overwhelming majority of the evacuees were not known to the public at large. The influential columnist, Westbrook Pegler, wrote regularly but without solid information that the Japanese Americans were extremely dangerous. The American Legion passed a resolution in convention calling for the total imprisonment of all persons of Japanese ancestry (Spicer 1945). Such influences continued strongly during 1942 and led the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives to institute a noisy investigation. The pressures mounted steadily for making concentration camps out of the temporary communities which the Army had built and for which the WRA had taken the administrative responsibility. A segment of Americans had rapidly become convinced as a result of the misleading action of evacuation that the U.S. citizens and their parents were dangerous enemies who should be deprived of all human liberties. This resulted in the urging of real concentration camps, that is, places where the men, women, and children were to be imprisoned indefinitely with no possibility of getting out. The demand for this kind of treatment reached as far as both the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. It was in this

situation of intensifying demand for repressive measures against the evacuees that the War Relocation Authority had to forge its policy for fulfilling the mandate given by President Roosevelt, namely, to provide for the welfare of the evacuees (Tozier 1946).

WRA POLICY AND ITS VALUE FOUNDATIONS

It would have been an easy course to pursue at the time to accede to the demand for concentration camps. This was not, however, the path that the WRA took. On the contrary, its policymakers struggled to look at the situation from the view of law and civil rights, of the long-term cultural adjustment of the Japanese Americans in the United States, and of the effects of arbitrary confinement on a racial basis of young American citizens, in short, in the broadest possible framework of human problems of an uprooted segment of the population of the United States. Consideration of the problems from the standpoint that the evacuees were human beings and most of them citizens of the United States required the formulation of a set of principles for shaping policy. The values adopted as the basis of WRA action might be summed up as anti-concentration camp values resulting in nonrepressive policy. More positively, the WRA policymakers chose to open up the whole of the United States apart from the newly restricted West Coast to resettlement by the Japanese Americans. This resulted in a conception of the camps which the Army had built for the reception of the evacuees as "way-stations" on the path back into normal American society. This basis of policy was fundamentally opposed to the concentration camp policy advocated by the various groups and individuals who had been misled into believing that the evacuees were dangerous people. It was a difficult policy to pursue, one that required courage on the part of the policymakers in a nation actively tooling itself for all-out war with the Japanese. Nevertheless the WRA formulated its policy position with great clarity in the course of its first year of existence and, ultimately with the help of the War Department and always supported strongly by the Department of Justice, followed through to execute the policy with great consistency and finally liquidated itself as the war came to an end (Myer 1971). It is ironic that the way-stations into American life which the WRA called relocation centers are still often spoken of by commentators on the evacuation and its aftermath as "concentration camps" (Bosworth 1967; Daniels 1971). It was precisely to forestall the appearance of such institutions in American life that the WRA devoted itself.

The WRA approach to achieving its policy goals was many-sided. It maintained constant, close liaison with representatives of the Justice Department which had not essentially changed its position that mass evacuation of American citizens could not be justified on any grounds and which fully expected that forced detention of the Nisei citizens would quickly be declared unconstitutional as Nisei proceeded to bring suit. The top officials of the WRA encouraged the War Department to learn what the Office of Naval Intelligence (Ringle 1942) already knew before evacuation, namely, that there was reason to assume that Nisei were the most actively loyal among American citizens; Army teams were encouraged

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to visit relocation centers and interview Nisei for service in Army Intelligence units; and in 1943 the WRA cooperated fully with the Army in developing its plan for reopening Selective Service to Nisei and urging them to volunteer for military service. From the summer of 1942 the WRA arranged for Nisei to leave the camps for seasonal agricultural labor in the mountain states. Thus the WRA moved rapidly on several fronts for establishing the relocation centers as temporary way-stations, not permanent prisons, from which those evacuees who were able and willing could move out even while war with Japan was in progress. It was this broad approach to the problems created by the evacuation which the WRA initiated early and which it pursued through the four and one-half years of its existence, ultimately resettling some 25,000 evacuees before the end of the war and closing out all the centers and the agency itself by the summer of 1946.

SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN THE WRA

As an integral part of its program to reintegrate the evacuees into normal American life and to forestall efforts on the part of some Americans to create concentration camps, the WRA enlisted the aid of social scientists. This was carried out in a novel manner not theretofore employed in attempts to bring social science knowledge to bear on administrative problems. It was assumed that there would be difficult problems confronting administrators as a result of the fact of sharply differing cultural backgrounds between themselves and the evacuees and that these problems would be constantly recurrent in the day-to-day operation of the relocation centers. In order to resolve such problems it would be necessary to retain as part of the working staff individuals who would learn the nature of the motivations and the cultural influences affecting the behavior of the administered people; this called for social scientists who would constantly, through observation and interview, be in touch with the population of the relocation centers. The approach also called for frequent contact between the social scientists and the administrators, so that problems small and large could be freely discussed; moreover, since there were various levels of administrators involved from the relocation centers to the several levels of administration in Washington, it would be necessary to maintain the working contacts between social scientists and administrators at all levels. This kind of structure was eventually achieved, so that at least three levels of administrators had available informed social scientists as staff advisers. What was novel about this arrangement was, first, that it constituted an employment of social science not on the assumption that it consisted of already completed bodies of knowledge, but rather that it was a developing understanding of human phenomena and, second, that social scientists could be employed effectively within the administrative organization, not only as occasional consultants outside the structure.

THE BUREAU OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

This conception of the use of social science was applied first in one of the relocation centers which had been established on an Indian Reservation and over which the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had retained some

jurisdiction. The Commissioner at that time was John Collier, who had earlier made an effort to employ anthropologists in an Applied Anthropology Unit in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (McKeel 1944). With the establishment of a relocation center called Poston on the Colorado Indian Reservation, John Collier conceived the idea of setting up an applied social science unit to assist in the administration. He placed the unit under the direction of Alexander H. Leighton, who named it the Bureau of Sociological Research and proceeded to hire as his assistants two anthropologists, Edward H. Spicer and later Elizabeth Colson. Leighton was a psychiatrist who had been associated with the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn and who had carried out field research among the Navajos and the Eskimos. The Bureau of Sociological Research (Leighton and Spicer 1945) set a pattern of procedure which influenced the later development of social science utilization in all the other relocation centers. It relied heavily on a staff of evacuees, both Nisei and Issei, for its knowledge of evacuee attitudes, viewpoints, and ways of behavior. Leighton, as head of the Bureau, established constant working contacts, both informal and formal, as an adviser with the Director of the center.

John Collier, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, had demonstrated much interest in the application of anthropology to problems of Indian administration. He advocated the view that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ought to be employed as a laboratory for the better understanding of problems of administration (Collier 1945). He had hired Leighton with this approach in mind and gave him a free hand to develop it in the relocation center at Poston. While the first focus of attention in the Bureau of Sociological Research was on the evacuees and how they saw their problems and sought to solve them, the Bureau rapidly found itself studying the administrators as intensively as the evacuees. Bureau staff frequently attended administrative staff meetings of various kinds and quickly found themselves viewing each problem situation in terms not only of evacuees' but also of administrators' attitudes and behavior. Each problem and each solution was studied as a compound of both.

In October 1942, when the Bureau of Sociological Research was just beginning to function adequately, a series of beatings of evacuees by other evacuees and related disturbances broke out in Poston, culminating in a general refusal of the evacuees to carry on any but the most necessary work for the maintenance of the center. The strike was accompanied by withdrawal of evacuees from the administrative offices and by demonstrations with Japanese music and speeches. The administrators were isolated from the community for several days, the military police (supposed to confine their guard duty to the perimeter of the camp) entered the center with armed vehicles, and there was thus immediate threat of the breakdown of the peaceful conditions which had prevailed. Negotiations were arranged and, at first tense and difficult, they resulted in increased understanding and new forms of organization with more evacuee participation in management. The head of the Bureau of Sociological Research took an active role in advising the administrators who effected the settlement and prevented the taking over of the camp by the military police.

This crisis, which was a result on the one hand of the cross-currents

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of conflict among the Japanese Americans and on the other of fear and mishandling of situations by some administrators, was analyzed and described in a book published by Leighton in 1945, *The Governing of Men*. The study effectively presented the approach which had been developed in the Poston research unit by Leighton and Spicer and their evacuee assistants. It was quite clear that the work of the Bureau was not conceived as a study of the evacuees to be packaged for the better understanding of their ways by the administrators. It was rather an ongoing analysis of the interaction of administrators, at first quite ignorant of evacuee attitudes growing out of recent and earlier experience with American prejudice and discriminatory laws, with Japanese Americans wracked by internal conflicts in their communities and without clear clues as to what their future would be in the United States. This analysis of the successive administrative situations in which evacuees and administrators participated was interpreted by Bureau staff for evacuee leaders who developed in the center as well as for the WRA personnel. Leighton's published account shifted the focus from Japanese Americans as persons with a unique and unfamiliar cultural background to human beings under a variety of stresses in a process of mutual adaptation with administrators also under stress in an unfamiliar setting. The book contributed to both a broader understanding of the Japanese-American experience in the United States and of administration as a process involving administrators and administered people.

THE COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

While the Poston strike and some other relocation center disturbances were in progress, an effort was being made in the WRA in Washington to bring social scientists into the agency's program on a larger scale. When the WRA was first organized, it included among its top administrators an anthropologist-turned-administrator, John H. Provinse, who had worked in the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Provinse had taken a prominent part in the formulation of the value principles on which the nonrepressive WRA policy was based. Together with Dillon S. Myer, former director of the United States Conservation Service, and Philip M. Glick, government attorney of varied experience, Provinse, as Chief of the Division of Community Management, had participated in forging the policy. He also had as early as May 1942 conceived the idea of employing social scientists with knowledge of Japanese cultural background. He had been able to hire only one by the fall of 1942, John F. Embree, who was employed at first as historian in the Reports Division. Embree and Provinse were engaged in persuading the director of the WRA that Japanese experts could help the administration of the agency when the Poston and other disturbances broke out. These crises in relocation center affairs had a prompt impact on the general public and on Congress, whose members began to wonder whether after all concentration camps might not be the solution. Both the House and the Senate instituted investigations, which ultimately vindicated the WRA approach, but which in late 1942 were ominous for the WRA open-door policy. Embree had already moved far

in convincing the top administration that scientists familiar with Japanese background could be useful. Now with reports coming in that the staff of the Bureau of Sociological Research had played a helpful role in a constructive outcome of the Poston crisis, the director of WRA became convinced that Provinse's plan for more social scientists should be acted on immediately. The hope was that it would help to forestall any further disruption of the relocation centers. Two outside consultants—Robert Redfield and Conrad Arensberg, anthropologists who had visited the centers briefly during the summer of 1942—both supported Provinse and Embree's proposal that a social science unit be created.

The result was the formation of the Community Analysis Section within Provinse's Division of Community Management (Embree 1944). Embree became the head of the section and proceeded to hire as his assistant a sociologist, Frank Sweetser. Their plan, following the objective of locating social scientists at all levels in addition to the Washington office staff of two, called for placing an analyst in each of the ten relocation centers. Within three months they had filled the nine field posts, other than Poston, with seven anthropologists: Weston La Barre, E. Adamson Hoebel, Morris Opler, Marvin K. Opler, John DeYoung, Charles Wisdom, and G. Gordon Brown, and two sociologists: John Rademaker and Forrest Laviolette. Thus by the late spring of 1943, one year after the formation of the WRA, a working team of social scientists had been established, linking all the centers with the Washington office.

Meanwhile a difference in policy thinking had developed between John Collier and Dillon Myer resulting in the withdrawal of Collier from administrative responsibility for the Poston center. The Bureau of Sociological Research was eliminated, and Leighton and Colson resigned. About the same time Embree and his assistant Sweetser also left the WRA to take other war-related jobs, and Spicer took Embree's place in Washington. Another anthropologist, David French, became Community Analyst at Poston. The Washington office staff was increased by the addition of two anthropologists, Katharine Luomala and Rachel Sady; later they were joined by another anthropologist, Margaret Lantis. Two of the sociologists first hired, Laviolette and Rademaker, resigned after only short tours of duty, as did two anthropologists, La Barre and Hoebel. They were eventually replaced by Asael Hansen, Charles Hoffman, and Edgar McVoy, sociologists, and Elmer Smith, anthropologist. Thus reorganized with some turnover in personnel, the later addition of sociologist J. R. McFarling, and leaving two of the centers without analysts for extended periods, the Community Analysis Section continued operation until the liquidation of the agency in June, 1946. In all it employed 21 social scientists, 13 anthropologists, and 8 sociologists.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY ANALYSTS

Administrative Relations. The basic formal relationship of the community analysts, at both the Washington and the relocation center levels, was that of staff advisers. The head of the section in Washington met in regular staff meetings with the division heads and the director of the agency. In some cases community analysts in the relocation centers par-

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ticipated similarly in staff meetings, but more often the relationship between analyst and director of a center was informal. Some analysts never developed any regular sort of communication with administrators. The fact is that with only two exceptions, Morris Opler who had been a member of John Collier's Applied Anthropology unit in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Mekeel 1944) and G. Gordon Brown who had worked with a British colonial administrator in Africa (Brown and Hutt 1935), none of the social scientists had had prior experience in applied situations. Moreover, none of the administrators had had any experience in the utilization of social scientists as members of their staffs in daily operations. No well-understood model for a working relationship existed. The result was much variation, and the communication which developed depended heavily on the personalities of both analysts and camp directors.

Whatever communication did develop with respect to daily operations was chiefly oral rather than written. Some memoranda were written, but the WRA program was fast-moving, making constant demands on administrators' time, so that oral communication was better adapted to getting relevant information into the administrative process. In Washington the head of the section, drawing on the flow of reports to him from the centers and on his own frequent trips to the centers, reported regularly in staff meetings on evacuee attitudes, reactions to programs and regulations, the activities of evacuees in the centers, and the growth of organization among them. What he said was for most Washington division heads an important source of comprehensive knowledge about the currents of thought and trends of reaction in the evacuee communities, as opposed to the bits of information about specific matters connected with their particular operations. At the relocation center level analysts were faced with a different situation. Here the administrators were all in close touch with many evacuees in the course of carrying out their responsibilities and were not isolated from evacuee contacts; reporting that filled the administrators' needs was thus more difficult. One of the most successful roles was as participant in meetings between the camp director and his assistants and various evacuee administrative groups, such as the block managers, and evacuee committees organized for particular purposes. Here the role was not simply reporter of information but participant in decisions affecting operations. The analyst in such a role combined an awareness of the viewpoints of both administrators and evacuees and often was able to bring about adjustment of differences simply by stating the differences clearly. An analyst who demonstrated this sort of capacity usually gained the confidence of evacuees and was relied on for aid in getting fair consideration by them. Not all analysts had such negotiating ability or interest, and those who did not tended to withdraw from operating participation and spent more time in the preparation of written reports which the Washington Community Analysis office constantly requested.

Community Analysis Reports. From the beginning the Community Analysis Section undertook as a major responsibility the preparation of reports which were mimeographed in quantity and distributed throughout the

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agency (Spicer 1946). The first of these by John Embree treated such matters as "Dealing with Japanese Americans" (which contained a discussion of race and culture and the institution of the go-between, among other things), "Japanese Groups and Associations in the United States," and "Notes on Japanese Holidays." While short reports on special Japanese customs continued to appear occasionally throughout the program, the subjects of the reports quickly changed character, beginning in February 1943. "Causes of Unrest in Relocation Centers," "Army Registration at Granada," "Preliminary Survey of Resistances to Resettlement at the Tule Lake Relocation Center," "An Analysis of the Segregation Program," and "The Tule Lake Incident" were the subjects of reports, for example, during 1943 and early 1944. Such reports indicated the shift of focus to urgent immediate problems of center administration as they became more complex, with the Army's decision to reopen Selective Service to Nisei, the WRA initiation of its all-out resettlement program from the centers, and the creation of the "segregation center" at Tule Lake. The reports ranged from five to a dozen or more pages and were circulated among all WRA personnel. More than 50 such reports were issued (see Spicer et al. 1969 for complete list).

By November 1944 the Community Analysis Section decided that there was need for a regular and frequent reporting of the effects of the WRA programs for resettlement and center closing on evacuee attitudes and organization. A series of trend reports was initiated, collating information from all the centers, which shortly became weekly. Thirty of these were prepared and distributed and were widely read by evacuees and WRA staff. They were issued throughout 1945, until the closing of all the centers at the end of that year, as the Supreme Court decided that Japanese Americans could no longer be excluded from the West Coast. At the same time a series of studies of attitudes of West Coast communities to which Japanese Americans were returning or expected to return were initiated: "Prejudice in Hood River Valley—A Case Study in Race Relations," "West Coast Localities: Sacramento County and City," "West Coast Localities: Imperial Valley," and others.

The most influential of the Community Analysis written reports among the agency personnel were probably those that reported directly the results of analysts' interviews with evacuees of various viewpoints. Notable among these were Morris Edward Opler's "From a Nisei Who Said 'No'" and "A Nisei Requests Expatriation." These were products of the Army's registration program which required evacuees to fill out a registration form containing a question that came to be labelled the "loyalty question." Many Nisei gave replies of "no" for various reasons ranging from deep anger at the whole evacuation program to wild and careless defiance of what they felt was arbitrary government power. Some Nisei then sought to renounce their U.S. citizenship and ask for expatriation to Japan. The "morass," as some WRA staff called it, of conflicting attitudes and loyalties among the Nisei was only slowly realized by the administrators. The direct reporting of interviews which were then circulated among administrators at all levels was a major influence in the steady growth of understanding on the part of administrators, most of whom had begun

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their service in WRA with no knowledge whatever of the background of Japanese Americans or of the real nature of the impact of the evacuation on them.

Relations with Evacuees. In the job descriptions for the position of "Social Science Analyst" (the Civil Service name for what WRA called Community Analyst) there was no mention of any responsibility to the people administered by the agency for whom the analyst was to work. The position was described entirely in terms of responsibility in reporting and other matters upward to administrators in the line organization. The community analysts nevertheless found themselves immediately in situations in which it appeared that there were additional responsibilities, namely, to the evacuees from whom most of the materials with which they worked were derived. The Bureau of Sociological Research staff, first in the field, came promptly up against some problems. The first was a result of a complete misunderstanding by administrators of the nature of social science research. This lack of understanding was not surprising, in view of the absence of prior experience with staff social scientists. It had to be made clear by the director of the Bureau that his staff was not aiming at the collection of information on individuals, even though individuals were the source of all the knowledge which the research was developing. In short, the sources of information were not to be made available to the administrators, only the results of interview and observation on an anonymous basis. This procedure had to be learned by the administrators and was eventually accepted. They ceased to look to the Bureau for information about any particular individual and realized that they had to rely on other members of their staff for that, such as Internal Security officers and welfare workers, whose work depended on the identification of individuals. The limitation on what was made available came up again when investigators of the House Un-American Activities Committee appeared in the relocation center. The BSR staff decided to make portions of their materials completely unavailable because the handling of hearings in Los Angeles had made it apparent that the investigators could not be relied on for fair and reasonable handling of evidence. The decision of the Bureau would probably have forced its staff into illegal actions if the investigators had pushed the matter, but they did not, and so the problem was avoided rather than solved.

These experiences made it clear that there was a responsibility to evacuees which was not at first accepted by the administrators or the agency as an arm of government. The problem was dealt with both formally and informally by the Community Analysis Section. The responsibilities of analysts were defined in terms of providing to administrators only information about group processes and structure and attitudes and viewpoints anonymously reported. This was finally fully accepted as policy by the WRA, although to some administrators it raised questions about any real utility the analysts might have. In practice it meant that analysts maintained confidential, as well as other, file material. In all analysts' reports the confidentiality of "key informants," through whom they worked constantly, was scrupulously maintained. The question of the availability of confidential file material is of course still a controversial matter being

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decided by the courts in connection with government supported research. No case of breach of confidence was ever complained of by any evacuee.

Despite the absence of obligation to report to the administered people as provided in the analysts' job descriptions, probably every analyst chose to assume some kind of such responsibility. All the Community Analysis offices in the centers had staffs of evacuees who provided information for the analysts' reports, oral and written. Every analyst knew that what was done in his office was known eventually in some form in the evacuee community. No system of classified reporting was developed. The work of the analysts was, in short, common knowledge among the evacuees. Moreover, the mimeographed reports that emanated from the Washington office were available equally to evacuees and "appointed personnel," as the WRA employees were called. In addition most, if not all, the analysts became intimate with a number of older Japanese with whom they frequently discussed the problems of relocation life from the social scientist's point of view. Reports prepared for the Washington office of the Section were often worked out jointly with such close associates of the analysts. In these relationships the influences undoubtedly worked both ways, so that in some degree the analysts' viewpoints and analyses became known in various levels of leadership in the evacuee communities. This did not mean, of course, that the analyses were accepted as the basis for evacuee cooperation or opposition any more than the Community Analysis reports were accepted as the basis for action by the administrators. In both contexts they were part of the situation, sometimes exerting strong influence, sometimes merely providing knowledge of alternatives not incorporated into policy or program of either evacuees or administrators. There is no question, however, that in two or three centers the intimate relations between influential Japanese and Community Analysts affected the course of events.

It should be pointed out that both the final reports of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section devoted considerable space to the history of interethnic relations of the Japanese Americans in the United States. The social scientists apparently regarded it as impossible to prepare reports for their scientific colleagues wholly apart from their obligation to the people studied. While the background material may be regarded as merely necessary for an understanding of the analysis of, in the case of *The Governing of Men*, a particular crisis in one relocation center and, in the case of *Impounded People*, the dynamics of community development under the relocation center conditions, the character of the introductions to the two reports suggests a great deal more. The social scientists were in both instances concerned to present what may be called a vindicating picture of the Japanese Americans for a general reading public by clearing away the misleading implications of the action of evacuation.

Scientific Obligations. A third kind of responsibility, which is to be regarded as an imperative in all instances of applied social science, was also recognized and acted on by some individuals and by the Community Analysis Section as a whole. This is the obligation to colleagues in the social sciences to interpret the results of the experience in application.

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The responsibility as fulfilled by individuals is best and most fully represented by Leighton's study focussed around the Poston general strike (Leighton 1945). In the published book Leighton makes an analysis of the particular relocation center situation in terms of general ideas about the nature of human psychological types—stereotype-minded and people-minded—and provides a hypothesis regarding their behavior in a specific type of administrative situation. This idea might be applied further in, for example, the selection of personnel for particular administrative assignments. Leighton, however, went further in his book and developed an elaborate theory regarding the behavior of individuals and of communities under different forms of "stress." The book was widely read by social scientists as well as by a general reading public and constituted a contribution of some influence in the fields of both administrative management and psychology.

Individual community analysts also made some contributions in the special fields of their interests. For example, Morris Opler (1944), Marvin Opler (1950, 1958), John Embree (1943, 1944), K. Luomala (1947), E. C. McVoy (1943), G. Gordon Brown (1945), E. R. Smith (1948), and E. H. Spicer (1945, 1946, 1952, 1969) published in various journals, ranging from the *American Anthropologist* to the *Utah Humanities Review*, analyses of different aspects of the relocation program. It was true also that the Community Analysis Section as a whole made an effort to meet this sort of obligation. The final report of the Section, prepared by four of the analysts, was obviously aimed at social science colleagues (Spicer et al. 1969). The report focuses on the Japanese Americans as uprooted people seeking to build a new kind of community life after extreme disruption. It analyzes the processes of reorientation of the generations in relation to each other and to the United States. Lacking the explicit formulation of theory that characterized *The Governing of Men, Impounded People* presents a concrete account of life in the relocation centers organized on an implicit framework of processual analysis.

The work of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section is hardly to be understood apart from the total activity of the War Relocation Authority. A striking characteristic of these applied science units was their thorough integration into the total program. They served the overall goals of the agency just as did the other specialized structures of the WRA, as organs of the whole. Hence any evaluation of what the social scientists contributed is best carried out in the light of an understanding of the whole accomplishment of the wartime agency.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE WRA

Oriental in the U.S. The WRA program played a decisive role in the interplay of opposing processes which came into operation in the United States beginning with the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants in the 1840s, following the Taiping Rebellion and during the California gold rush. On the one hand, prejudice against the Orientals grew rapidly in the western states, culminating during a first cycle in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1887 (Lee 1960). One effect of this legislation was the stimulation of new immigration from Asia, specifically from Japan. A new cycle of

anti-Oriental prejudice developed, as thousands of Japanese entered the United States. Novelists such as Peter B. Kyne wrote romances rooted in the belief that a "Yellow Peril" threatened California and that Japanese were everywhere infiltrating the defenses of the country. New efforts to stop Oriental immigration, this time directed at the Japanese, were successful. Surges of anti-Oriental feeling repeatedly swept California and the western states (McWilliams 1944: 14-72). By the 1920s discriminatory legislation of several kinds was enacted. The intermarriage of Orientals and "Caucasians" was prohibited; Alien Land Laws kept first generation Orientals from owning land (Millis 1915: 316-319; Kawakami 1921: 103-122); and, far-reaching in its adverse effect on the adaptation of Japanese to American life, U. S. citizenship was denied to persons of Asiatic birth. These laws sanctioned and confirmed the various local discriminations stimulated by the widespread prejudice and gave rise to new suspicion toward the Japanese, both first generation immigrants and their children who were American citizens by virtue of birth in this country.

On the other hand, at the same time that hostility toward the Japanese grew, the immigrants and their children were making a notably successful adaptation to American life. The outbursts of popular feeling against them led to their becoming the special subject of investigation. The United States Immigration Commission carried out studies as early as 1910 to determine whether they were actually as popularly depicted. The reports of the Commission revealed that among all the immigrants from Asia and Europe, the Japanese were making an outstandingly rapid and successful adaptation (Millis 1915: 251-275). They were surprisingly quickly adopting American ways. They were keeping their children in school, and they were moving up in the economic and occupational scale. Later studies showed that the educational achievements of the second generation in the public schools and universities were exceptional (Strong 1934). Thus despite the persistent hostility and attempts to exclude Japanese Americans from participation in American society, they continued to exhibit all the signs of good adjustment. The processes of cultural assimilation and economic adaptation produced results in marked contrast with the negative beliefs about Orientals. These beliefs nevertheless continued to be held in some segments of the West Coast population as late as the 1940s.

WRA Policy in Perspective. The evacuation order in February 1942, was a drastic move by the federal government in support of the restrictive actions against Orientals which had begun in the 1880s and continued through the 1920s. The action came as a result of the power suddenly conferred in wartime on a particular commander of the Western Defense Command—General John L. DeWitt, whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice (McWilliams 1944: 251; Grodzins 1949: 262-267). The order establishing the WRA which immediately followed resulted, however, in action directly contrary to that initiated by evacuation. The Presidential decree did not in itself define the nature of that action; it merely created the new caretaking agency for the Japanese Americans. It was the men who took control of policy in the WRA who initiated the action counter to the older repressive trend against Orientals in American life.

Results of the WRA Program. As the WRA moved toward the elimination of restrictions on the evacuees, it did so in close collaboration with the Department of Justice, which had strongly opposed mass evacuation from the first. Within a year the WRA found itself working closely with the War Department, which in its upper levels was flexible and open to consideration of facts about the Japanese Americans, in contrast with the lower level of the Western Defense Command. The efforts of the WRA were directed primarily to undoing the effects of the evacuation order, that is, to opening up the relocation centers promptly to resettlement by both first generation and Nisei Japanese Americans, the reopening of Selective Service and the armed services to the Nisei, and finally the restoration of the evacuees to their land and homes on the West Coast. In addition the WRA accomplished other results which worked to the advantage of the Japanese Americans. The resettlement program brought about a much wider distribution of the Japanese Americans over the United States than had characterized them before World War II, thus eliminating the concentrations in west coast slum areas. Working in close conjunction, the War Department and the WRA succeeded, through a program of publicizing the active part by Nisei in both the European and Pacific theatres of war, once the armed services were reopened, in dispelling the suspicion about Nisei loyalty which evacuation had raised to a high pitch. Finally the WRA, through its resettlement program and other positive measures, contributed greatly to the diffusion through the United States of a broad and sympathetic understanding of the Japanese American experience. The growth of this understanding bore continuing fruit after the WRA ceased to exist; in 1952, for example, the United States Congress removed the fundamental prohibition on the naturalization of Japanese and other Orientals (Kitano 1969). Thus the whole restrictive trend nurtured by anti-Oriental prejudices was reversed and Japanese assumed a legal status in American society like that of all other peoples. The essence of the WRA accomplishment was the giving of a new and decisive impetus to the positive acceptance of Japanese in American life. It is as a part of that total effort that the contribution of the social scientists in the WRA is to be understood.

CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS

Influence on Policy. The social scientists in the WRA played a part both in policymaking and in day-to-day operations. With respect to policy the major figure was the anthropologist John H. Provinse, who was from the beginning of the agency's life prominent in the highest level of policy decision. He was one of the original of the President's appointees along with Milton Eisenhower and continued in his same role after Dillon Myer succeeded Eisenhower as director. Provinse held the position of chief of the Community Management Division throughout the agency's existence. He participated with Myer, former director of the Soil Conservation Service in the Department of Agriculture, and Philip Glick, government attorney with wide experience in various agencies, in the first policy decisions which moved WRA decisively in the direction of nonrestrictive

policy. His influence continued along the same lines. In this role he sought the aid of other anthropologists. In the summer of 1942 he employed Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago as a consultant who recommended that an open-door policy be maintained, that social scientists be included among the working staff, and that in general the processes of adaptation to American life be continued rather than reversed. In addition, Provinse set up in the Division of Community Management, a section of Community Government and employed Solon T. Kimball, anthropologist, as head of the section. Kimball's job consisted of encouraging and advising evacuees in all the centers with regard to establishing Community Councils (Kimball 1946). He regularly travelled to the centers and advised Provinse of developments in community organization, thus contributing to Provinse's understanding of developing structure and sentiments in the relocation centers. In addition, the Community Analysis Section was a part of the Community Management Division and its head regularly reported individually to Provinse as well as to the director's top staff group in Washington. Thus Provinse, more than any other Washington official, had available the fullest information on developments within the relocation centers and was able to make use of this in fulfilling his responsibilities as a top policymaker and head of the Division of Community Management. While the community analysts worked only in advisory roles, they nevertheless channelled their findings directly to a WRA official who functioned in the top level of policymaking. Their specific influence cannot be measured, but it is reasonable to presume it was important in view of the close working relationship between the Community Analysis Section and the Chief of Community Management.

The earliest policy decisions, which determined the WRA fundamental position, were made before either the Bureau of Sociological Research (BSR) or the Community Analysis Section was in effective operation. One of these was, however, in process of formulation as the BSR was beginning its reports. This was the decision to open up the centers as soon as possible, beginning in some degree in the autumn of 1942. The BSR, taking its lead from the Collier policy, tended to emphasize the importance of establishing the relocation centers as places of real security in the midst of the host of insecurities which had developed in evacuees' lives and to hold back with respect to such matters as encouraging Nisei employment in agricultural labor during the early fall of 1942. The WRA decision to push the opening of the centers came into full force by November 1942, and became a point of difference with Collier. As this decision was developed into specific programming, it ultimately took the form of a nationwide (except for the West Coast states) resettlement program. Called the "Relocation Program," it became a major focus of WRA activity. The agency set as a goal the emptying of all the centers if possible before the war should end, a very bold program; it was justified by the WRA policymakers on two primary grounds: (1) the need to prevent what it was assumed would be the demoralizing effect on the evacuees of living in government-administered communities for any length of time, and (2) the importance of moving evacuees back into the mainstream of American life before the end of the war so that there would be the least possible

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discontinuity in their long-term adjustment in American society. In the development of this policy the community analysts (CA) played what might be called an indirect role.

The CA reports from an early period in the beginning of 1943 described what took definite form as "resistance to relocation." Evacuees were not ready to give up the relative security of the centers for the uncertainties of life in wartime America far from their familiar West Coast. A vigorous leadership within the center communities came into existence promptly which took the position that the Japanese Americans should not let themselves be "pushed around" any further. This leadership continued to be strong for the duration of the centers. The community analysts learned a great deal about the values and the attitudes connected with this evacuee position, which one analyst called "resistance to freedom" (Embree 1943). Living intimately with the people who maintained these attitudes and gathering details regarding the position, analysts tended to conclude that the all-out effort at resettlement during the war was an impossible goal. They tended therefore to be at odds with the WRA employees, who were charged with getting the evacuees to resettle promptly. The analysts saw those activities as a "hard sell" approach which was likely to encourage increasing opposition. They did not recommend against the relocation program, but they did continue to report constantly the negative developments in the centers. In a sense the view which their investigations led the analysts to favor was correct. The WRA did not succeed in resettling from the centers quite 25,000 evacuees after two and one-half years of the relocation program. The maximum goal was not attained. However, the fact that relocation outside the centers was a very active part of the WRA program was in itself an important indication of government policy regardless of achievement of the declared goal, and moreover, the resettlement of thousands of evacuees in Chicago, for example, established a new and highly favorable condition for the future of the Japanese Americans. The Community Analysis Section's pessimism was vindicated, but the relocation policy had wider implications to which the policymakers were paying attention and that fell outside the purview of the analysts' circumscribed operations.

The community analysts played a somewhat similar role in connection with the second major policy decision during their period of effective operation. In order to open the way to the all-out resettlement program, the suspicion that evacuation had engendered among the American public and that had invaded the national Congress by the winter of 1942-43 had to be dealt with. The policymakers of WRA believed that in order to open the centers for the evacuees it would be necessary to give concrete evidence that they were not dangerous. This decision called for a screening of evacuees so that the WRA could give official approval of "leave clearance" for each one who chose to resettle. Working with the War Department, the WRA developed a plan for "separating the loyal from the disloyal." This involved submitting what was called a loyalty question, differently phrased for Nisei and Issei. The theory was that the answers would serve as the basis for classifying all the evacuees into two groups, those who could be vouched for as loyal to the United States and therefore safe for resettlement and those who could not. The latter group would

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then be denied leave clearance and held in what was designated a "segregation center" for the duration of the war, while the "loyal" would be encouraged to resettle out of the nine remaining relocation centers.

The screening did indeed result in two groupings, but the community analysts were intensely aware that the classification was faulty. Hundreds of young men and women, citizens of the United States, believed that they had not been treated as citizens from the moment of evacuation; they refused to answer the loyalty question at all or answered it negatively in a spirit of deep criticism of the United States government for having dealt with them as it had. Others had already decided that they could feel no loyalty to the United States, even though they had been among the most devoted to the country before the evacuation, and sought somehow to renounce their citizenship and go to Japan. It was clear, even though the questions were modified in accordance with suggestions by Nisei and Issei for making them more realistic, that what the screening did was simply to demonstrate that the evacuation had roused complex feeling in the evacuees about their place in the United States and about the relations of citizen children and noncitizen parents. The community analysts played a leading part in recording and describing these attitudes and viewpoints and diffusing knowledge of them throughout the WRA personnel. Their reports, together with those of the Army and WRA interviewers, gave solid evidence that the projected segregation of the "disloyal" in the segregation center of Tule Lake could not be a neat separation of evacuees potentially dangerous to the United States from those who could be safely given leave clearance. The screening simply was not accomplishing that. The community analysts, along with many other WRA staff, knew, in short, that the segregation program was not what it purported to be. They were not asked for a recommendation; but the top policymakers had been made as aware as they of the true situation. Nevertheless they proceeded with the plan for segregating all those who answered "no" to the loyalty questions in the segregation center apart from the "yes" answerers in the other nine centers. The justification for following through with the segregation policy remained what it had been, namely, that only in this way could the overwhelming majority of evacuees be given leave clearance for resettlement. A screening had been carried out and this could be made known to the general American public. The several thousand sent to the segregation center consisted of some who definitely were or had become anti-United States; the majority did not share such sentiments. They, however, in the eyes of the policymakers had to be regarded as a sacrifice for the great majority.¹ Once segregation was carried out, the WRA proceeded with its full-scale relocation program.

The third major policy decision made after Community Analysis came into operation was that to close down the centers completely at the end of 1945 before the war was over. This was a result of the termination of mass exclusion in December 1944, in response to which the WRA set closing dates for all centers except Tule Lake before the end of 1945 (ten Broek 1954: 173-174). The immediate evacuee reaction in the centers was that, despite complete freedom to return to their homes or wherever they wished on the West Coast, there would remain in the centers an unrelocatable "residue." Community analysts, again, deeply involved in the

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relocation center perspective for the most part, appeared to believe this for several months of the new program as they reported in detail the evacuee reactions. The WRA, however, proceeded on the assumption that all evacuees would be out of the centers except Tule Lake by January 1946. Analysts found themselves predicting that the program could not be accomplished and again found themselves wrong. The closing was accomplished more speedily than the WRA expected after the end of the war in August 1945, even though at the beginning of the year 60,000 evacuees were still present in the relocation centers.

In each of these instances regarding major policy decisions during the period of activity of the Community Analysis Section, it is significant that the findings of the analysts led them to doubt the feasibility of the new WRA programs. What seems to be demonstrated is that the social scientists were so deeply involved with their own special field of competence, namely, the attitudes and viewpoints of the administered people, that they were not in a position to develop views fully relevant to overall policy. The data with which they were deeply familiar constituted only one of the several elements that had to be taken into consideration by those who made the broad policy decisions. Nevertheless it may be said that, as a result of the Community Analysis work, each of the new directions in policy was decided on in full awareness of the impact on evacuees, even though that factor was not deemed the most decisive in making top policy.

Cross-Cultural Interpreters. It was as cross-cultural interpreters that the social scientists in the WRA were hired. That is, recognition by the administrators in charge that their staff would be working with Japanese Americans of very different cultural background from themselves led to the view that assistance would be needed from specialists with knowledge of the unfamiliar ethnic ways. The expectation of problems arising out of the cultural differences played a part in the establishment of both the BSR and the CAS. In both instances, within a very short time the conception of "cross-cultural problems" was widened to include not only those stemming from Oriental in contrast with Western customs and beliefs, but also those resulting from differences of viewpoint and objectives between minority and dominant peoples, and ultimately between administrators and administered. In short, the idea that help would be needed in something thought of as a "cross-cultural" situation was adopted and continued throughout the life of the WRA, but the realization that the situation was complicated by more than one factor came later and steadily broadened the approach. The social scientists employed were by no means all specialists in Japanese culture. Only three of the first hired—Embree, Laviolette, and Rademaker—could be so characterized. All the others qualified simply on the basis of other kinds of cross-cultural or community study experience.

The WRA experience contributed to the definition of a type of role in which anthropologists have practical usefulness. The community analysts demonstrated both techniques of investigation and reporting and the nature of needs created in situations in which bureaucratic administration impinges on administered people who are not part of the bureau formal

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structure. In the relocation center situation, the reporting by the analysts made clear to administrators the nature of the aims of evacuees and pointed out the relation between those aims and their recent experience during and before evacuation. The WRA administrators, for the most part, exhibited a steady growth in awareness of evacuee problems from the evacuee point of view. In the light of such knowledge the adaptation became mutual; that is, most of the administrators in their operations increasingly accepted advice and assistance from the whole range of evacuees, old and strongly Japanese as well as young and strongly Americanized individuals. Increasingly they also learned that they could give far more responsibility to evacuees of the older age group in the management of the centers than they had at first thought possible or desirable. In this sense there was as much adaptation by administrators of their behavior as there was by the administered people to the situation in which all were involved.

It was by no means true that the only source of awareness of the evacuee viewpoints, aims, and capabilities consisted of the knowledge which the community analysts accumulated and made meaningful to administrators. The top administrators and others in the agency kept in close touch personally with a variety of Japanese Americans, especially the Nisei leaders in and out of the centers (Hosokawa 1969). The Reports Division of the WRA carried out some important research into the circumstances of Japanese American life leading up to the crisis of evacuation, made summaries of their findings, and distributed them to the WRA personnel as well as to the general public. A great many of the employees of the agency developed close relations with individuals and families and constantly learned in deeper and deeper ways how the evacuees felt and how they viewed themselves in relation to the agency's goals and their own. The Community Analysis Section was one of the several means through which a significant diffusion of knowledge about the Japanese Americans took place, both inside the agency and more widely in the United States. However, the community analysts were more than gatherers and disseminators of information. They had been employed to study the evacuees and explicitly to assist the men and women in charge of the WRA in gaining an understanding. The existence of the Community Analysis Section constituted a formal recognition by the bureaucratic agency of the importance of knowing the administered people on their own terms. Community analysis became a symbol of administrative concern for unprejudiced understanding of the people under governmental jurisdiction.

NOTES

¹For accounts of the heartbreak and turmoil which characterized the segregation center, see Spicer et al., *Impounded People*, Pp. 178-186, 229-241, 267-276, and Rosalie H. Wax *Doing Fieldwork*, Pp. 59-174. The vivid portrayal of effects of the WRA "sacrifice" by Rosalie Wax was a product of a study of the evacuees carried out by another group of social scientists including the anthropologists Rosalie Hanke (later Wax), Robert Spencer, and Tami Tsuchiyama under the direction of the sociologist Dorothy Swaine Thomas. This study, the University of California Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Project, continued for the duration of the centers. It was an academic investigation not designed to provide assistance to the WRA administrators. It resulted in two major monographs among

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other products (Thomas and Nishimoto, *The Spoilage and The Salvage*) dealing with the evacuees in the relocation and segregation centers.

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THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY AS A CASE IN THE
APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

By

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The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the work of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority as attempts to apply social science in the approach to and solution of a complex social problem which arose during World War II.

The Social and Cultural Processes Giving Rise to the "Problem." The WRA was created as a government agency to attend to the results of an executive Order issued by President F. D. Roosevelt on ^{Feb. 19} ~~March 29~~, 1942. This order (No. 9066) ^{opened the way to} ~~directed~~ the removal of all "persons of Japanese ancestry" from an area of the west coast of the United States sharply bounded and designated as the Western Defense Command. Approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were eventually included as those to be evacuated. They were removed from all or portions of the states of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, and the territory of Alaska. The removal was placed in the hands of the War Department with the Western Defense Command's General DeWitt in charge. The removal was carried out in two stages, both in the hands of the War Department: (1) immediate removal from homes following the March date of ^{a subsequent} the Executive Order to "Assembly Centers"

consisting of race track and fairgrounds areas within the Western Defense Command and (2) later transfer which was not completed until November, 1942, to specially constructed "Relocation Centers" in "wilderness areas" between the West Coast and the Mississippi River. With completion of the second stage, beginning as early as June, 1942, the new civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, assumed responsibility for the welfare of the evacuated Japanese Americans.

The evacuation was a decisive event in a series which began in the 1840's with the exodus of thousands of south Chinese after the Taiping Rebellion. These Chinese migrated to the United States at the time settlers were moving from the eastern states to the western territories. The immigrants filled important needs of the expanding Anglo-American society as laborers and menial servants. At the same time they became the object of racial prejudice, and the foundations for antagonistic interethnic relations were laid. Anti-Chinese attitudes grew strong among some segments of the west coast population and these groups were successful in getting national legislation passed, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1887. Later, immigration from Japan began and the Japanese immigrants were met with similar hostile attitudes. Nevertheless Japanese immigrants continued to enter the United States, especially the west coast states.

As they did so, prejudice at the level of face to face relations spread among Anglos, and legislation at both the state and national levels were promoted and enacted. During the 1920's, when the United States was beginning to be generally concerned to restrict immigration

from southern and eastern Europe, California and the western states were swept frequently with surges of anti-Oriental feeling. Novels such as those of Peter B. Kyne were written based on beliefs that there was a "Yellow Peril." Japanese became the special target of efforts to cut off immigration and to restrict intensively those who had already settled in the United States. Legislation was passed by California and other Western states sharply limiting participation of persons of Oriental background in American life. Aliens of Oriental descent were prohibited from intermarrying with "Caucasians," from owning land, and--the fundamental restriction--from becoming naturalized citizens of the United States. The laws were designed to cut off the increase of immigrants from the Oriental countries and to prevent those already in the United States from acquiring voting or property rights. Back of all the legislation lay the basic belief that Orientals had sinister and unfathomable purposes. Yet no limitations were established on the citizenship rights of individuals born in the United States of Oriental aliens. There were thus sharp differences in the degree of participation in American life between, for example, the first generation of immigrants called Issei among the Japanese and the second generation called Nisei. The latter had full citizen rights, although popular prejudice and discrimination was as strong against them as against their parents.

At the same time that anti-Oriental prejudice and legislation were developing, the Japanese immigrants and their children were moving into fuller participation in American economic and educational life.

Hard work, traditional interest in intensive agriculture, and high achievement orientations resulted in their moving into particular economic areas with great success. By the 1930's they had become important producers of celery, strawberries, and other specialized crops. The necessary land was legally owned by Nisei while management was often in the hands of Issei. They were also successful in small businesses, such as restaurants. The Nisei in general adapted quickly to the United States school system and a high proportion graduated from universities. Studies indicated that their adaptation to American society involved a great deal of cultural assimilation, that they were indeed outstanding among immigrants in record of school achievement and also in extent of acceptance of American cultural traits such as dress, language, and occupation. Nevertheless in the atmosphere of widespread prejudice, a high proportion of Japanese of both generations were forced to concentrate together in "Little Tokyos" in the west coast cities and in particular farm industries in which they were able to gain footholds. They, therefore, remained highly "visible" to prejudiced and unprejudiced Anglos.

The ^{Army} evacuation order in March, 1942, was a decisive event in a long series of government actions discriminating specifically against the Japanese immigrants. It was now extended to their children, since all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to be evacuated. This action can then be regarded as an extreme move in a direction continuing the legislation of the 1920's when the Alien Land Laws were passed. It was a throwback in this sense, reversing a trend away

from officially sanctioned discrimination, especially with respect to the Nisei. It was an action based solidly in the attitudes of a particular general of the Western Defense Command whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice.

The evacuation order was moreover a result of political pressures by such organizations as the California Shipper-Grower Association. These wanted to reduce competition from Japanese in the agricultural production fields where they had been most successful. Pressure from this and similar organizations and from newspapers and politicians supporting anti-Japanese feeling built up steadily beginning a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. "Popular" clamor for evacuation of Japanese Americans however did not as a matter of fact grow strong until late February, 1942, three months after Pearl Harbor and two months after the various organizations of agricultural producers and patriotic associations (such as the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West) had established pressures on politicians such as Attorney General Earl Warren of California. The evacuation order thus had roots in the past interethnic relations of the West Coast, elements of which could be re-stimulated by special interest groups under the conditions of Japanese success in the war in the western Pacific.

The practical problem which the WRA was created to find solutions for was a complex one involving racial prejudices of high intensity re-stimulated by a recently declared war, the economic displacement of

a small but highly productive and culturally well-adapted ethnic minority, and a nation attempting to tool itself rapidly to carry on a war on a global scale. The problems arising from the sudden displacement of the 100,000 people, it became immediately apparent, could not be solved on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. The evacuees were definitely excluded by the Executive Order from free movement in the three west coast states. Represented as dangerous, or potentially so, they could not, according to the terms of the executive order, be introduced into the population in any way in the states of the Western Defense Command. Moreover, meetings of the governors of states immediately to the east rejected any plan for feeding the evacuees into their populations as free-moving new residents and workers. While the WRA was still recruiting its upper levels of administrators it was perfectly clear that the evacuees would have to be concentrated somewhere and their immediate physical needs taken care of, while the policy makers of the new agency cast about for longer term solutions.

The policy questions which the WRA had to decide, once the physical locations and facilities of places of concentration were determined, required answers concerning the legal status of the United States citizens who constituted two-thirds (65,000) of the whole group, the probable legal status of any program of detention in the light of immanent decisions by the Supreme Court on suits brought by evacuees, industrial needs which the adult working members of the evacuee group might fill in a wartime nation, the trends of congressional and public opinion with respect to evacuees moving out of the relocation centers

during the war or after, the probable reactions of evacuees to confinement in the centers for the duration of the war, to mention only those issues of fundamental importance. These questions were taken up during the months between April, when Milton Eisenhower the new Director of the agency took charge, and October, 1942, when the evacuees had nearly all been moved into the relocation centers and Dillon S. Myer had replaced Eisenhower.

The three men who played probably the greatest part in the making of the long term policy decision were Myer, whose experience was in agricultural extension and as Director of the Soil Conservation Service; Philip Glick, a lawyer with wide experience in government; and Dr. John H. Provinse, an anthropologist whose interests were the application of social science and who had served in the Soil Conservation Service and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The policy framework which they constructed and became the persisting structure within which WRA operated for some four years rested on the following assumptions: (1) any sort of detention of United States citizens without individual charges would be declared illegal and hence the Nisei could not be kept in the relocation centers; (2) life in the centers under bureaucratic supervision would be destructive of individual initiative and hence was generally undesirable and should be as brief as possible; (3) resettlement under conditions of ordinary free life in the United States should be the immediate aim; (4) this should be done during wartime, because it would be much more difficult afterwards if evacuees

had spent years under the administered conditions. The decisions, in short, led to a policy which called for as quick as possible emptying of the relocation centers and the prompt re-establishment of the evacuees in the general society.

An alternative policy proposed by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs who had encouraged the setting up of two of the centers on Indian Reservations was as follows. Plans should be made for making the relocation centers good places to live in for the duration of the war, whatever length of time that turned out to be. Resources should be devoted to developing the best possible living conditions; opportunities should be developed for agricultural production which would be helpful to the nation in wartime and would give Japanese Americans scope in their most successful economic field. Communities of this sort would provide security which could not be hoped for on the outside in a nation at war with Japan. Schools, hospitals, and community government should be developed for highest quality and the evacuees should take important parts in managing them. This proposed policy was rejected out of hand by the top administrators of the WRA and at that point Collier withdrew from any further administrative involvement.

The general policy adopted recognized some of the basic features of the sociocultural processes in which the Japanese Americans had been involved. The evacuation was conceived as an event which had resulted in the creation of institutions, the relocation centers, which defied constitutional legality; the WRA as a government agency could not therefore encourage

their maintenance, except as places of voluntary residence by evacuees in their re-adjustment back into the general society. Once this legal basis of policy was clearly defined, then certain responsibilities had to be accepted by the WRA. The first was the maintenance of the centers, not as quasi-permanent communities for economic and social development, but as reasonably comfortable places to and from which evacuees could move according to their circumstances. The second basic responsibility was to facilitate in every way possible the movement of evacuees out of the centers into the general stream of American society, this movement to be contingent on no events in the war or elsewhere; every individual or family who chose to move out must be assisted immediately in every way possible. These were the foundations of WRA policy; they clearly rested on a value position with reference to the past and future of the Japanese Americans. This was that it was desirable to eliminate every restriction on the movement and participation of Nisei in American life.

The WRA proceeded to dedicate its activities to this goal. The main outlines of its policy were maintained until the agency was liquidated in June, 1946. In response to Congressional pressures certain modifications of the policy, primarily a program for the separation of the "loyal and the disloyal" and the permanent detention of the latter whether Nisei or Issei, took place. The extreme conception of the goal, that is, the emptying of the centers before the end of the war, was actually achieved, as a result of the timing of Supreme court decisions, reformulation of War Department policy, and the Japanese and German surrenders.

Objectives in Establishing the Social Science Units. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs in initially taking the responsibility for the Poston relocation center--on an Indian Reservation in Arizona--put into operation a Bureau of Sociological Research directed by Dr. Alexander H. Leighton. The purpose of this unit within the center administration was to carry on a study of the behavior of the human beings involved, both evacuees and administrators; it was believed such study would be useful in understanding the kind of human relations involved in administered communities of the general type which the Commissioner expected this relocation center to become in the course of the war. An equally important goal, as conceived by its director, was an immediate contribution to the practical administration of the developing community which would result in informed and intelligent administration. Leighton assembled a small staff and was at work in the Poston Relocation Center, in late June, 1942. Leighton was a psychiatrist much influenced by contacts with Clyde Kluckhohn, anthropologist, and John Collier, social activist and administrator. After nearly a year the administration of the BSR along with the Poston Relocation Center was taken over by the WRA, when John Collier withdrew from administrative responsibility. At the same time Dr. Leighton, who had been lent by the Navy in which he held the rank of Lieutenant Commander, left the BSR for other wartime service.

The BSR had been strongly encouraged by Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief of Community Management in the WRA. Meanwhile he had begun in the autumn of 1942 to work with an anthropologist, Dr. John F. Embree,

towards the setting up of a social science unit in the WRA. He had been encouraged in this by Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago. The efforts of Provinse and Embree, who had been hired to work on the maintenance of an historical record of the WRA, resulted in the establishment of a Community Analysis Section of the Division of Community Management in February, 1943. The conception was similar in some ways to that of the BSR. However, the emphasis was strongly on immediate aid to administration through the constant analysis of the relocation centers as communities, the development of social organization within them and the processes of change in human relations. There was less emphasis on the maintenance of a record of what happened, although it was implicit that this would be done inevitably in the course of ongoing community analysis. There was also emphasis on interpreting the customs and ways of thought of the Japanese Americans to the administrators who were unfamiliar with them. This in fact had to be emphasized in persuading the director of the WRA to agree to the establishment of the Community Analysis Section. The unit was much easier to justify in his eyes on the basis of interpreting strange customs than on the basis of simply reporting and analyzing a human community, which presumably an experienced administrator would be able to carry on as well as a social scientist unfamiliar with administration.

The objectives in common with the BSR carried on by the CA Section were the analysis and interpretation, for the benefit of administrators, of the developing human relations under the peculiar conditions of

The first part of the report deals with the general situation of the country and the progress of the work done during the year. It is followed by a detailed account of the various projects and the results achieved. The report concludes with a summary of the work done and a list of the names of the staff members who have been engaged in the work.

The second part of the report deals with the financial statement of the year. It shows the total income and expenditure and the balance carried over to the next year. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure.

The third part of the report deals with the accounts of the various projects. It shows the progress of each project and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each project.

The fourth part of the report deals with the accounts of the various departments. It shows the progress of each department and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each department.

The fifth part of the report deals with the accounts of the various committees. It shows the progress of each committee and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each committee.

The sixth part of the report deals with the accounts of the various societies. It shows the progress of each society and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each society.

The seventh part of the report deals with the accounts of the various clubs. It shows the progress of each club and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each club.

The eighth part of the report deals with the accounts of the various associations. It shows the progress of each association and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each association.

The ninth part of the report deals with the accounts of the various unions. It shows the progress of each union and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each union.

The tenth part of the report deals with the accounts of the various organizations. It shows the progress of each organization and the results achieved. It also shows the details of the various items of income and expenditure for each organization.

involuntary residence in isolated and bureaucratically controlled local groups. The fact that the cultural backgrounds of evacuees and administrators were different was given more emphasis by the CAS but was not the fundamental focus in either case. The background of the people to man the units was not defined as necessarily that of "Japanese experts." The primary qualification was background in social science training which equipped one for analysis of total communities, that is, not simply in political science, or economics, or history. The decision was made that sociology and anthropology training would be the best background and accordingly recruitment was in those fields. Ultimately, 20 individuals were recruited for 10 field and three Washington positions, seven of these with background in sociology, 13 in anthropology. Only two, both sociologists, had any previous experience in the study of Japanese persons or communities. Only two, both anthropologists, had had any previous experience in the application of social science--M. E. Opler who had worked for a time in the Applied Anthropology Unit of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and G. Gordon Brown who had worked in an experimental program in the application of anthropology in an African colonial situation. All the others had been trained purely in academic social science and had no experience that could be called application.

The work accomplished with reference to the objectives for which the social science units had been set up was strongly influenced by the lack of training in practical action programs. It should be pointed out, however, that the administrators with whom the analysts

worked most closely also lacked background experience which equipped them to make use of staff social scientists. The situation, therefore, were ²⁵ fluid and experimental. A conception of suitable and effective roles within the organization had to be worked out as the working situation developed.

Working Roles and Relationships. a. Relations with administrators.

The fundamental role for analysts as conceived in establishing the social science units was that of staff serving the administrators in charge of policy formulation and of programming for policy execution. This meant that the Community Analysts were conceived as working in purely advisory capacities. However, to whom they were to channel information and analysis was not clearly defined and remained to be worked out by administrators and analysts in contact with one another. The initial conception seems to have been very general, namely, that analysts would develop a stockpile of information which might be drawn on by any members of the WRA staff. It was planned that this would be done at the relocation center ⁿ (local) level and that information prepared there would be channeled to the central (Washington) office and made available for administrators there. Circulation of information beyond any one local unit would be the function of the Washington Community Analysis office.

The working out of this staff advisory role took various forms and slowly crystallized in different ways at local and Washington levels. In the BSR there was a very early, within two months, establishment of

a pattern of reporting relationship. This consisted of the attendance of the director of the BSR at all general top staff meetings, in which he participated freely, reporting orally on information which the unit had gathered and responding to questions of all the administrators (division heads) present. This was supplemented by much informal contact between the BSR director and the Project Director (the chief administrator) and also by the submission of written reports to him. There came to be, in the course of a year, a ready flow of information and results of analysis which the top administration could use or not as they chose. Communication channels were well established at the top level. The pattern of the BSR director's regular participation with division heads became fully accepted in the course of a major crisis, the Poston strike, four months after the establishment of the unit--a situation fully reported on by Leighton (1945).

At other relocation centers somewhat different communication lines were set up and became the rule during the four years of existence of the relocation centers. In at least three there were never any patterned arrangements. The Community Analyst worked largely in isolation from other parts of the administration, irregularly talking with various members of the administration and with evacuees in administrative positions in the center, passing on selected information and discussing issues as they arose. In such centers the only formal and regular channels of communication were those which were required by the Washington office of the Community Analysis Section in its periodic reporting system on assigned topics.

At the other extreme were arrangements like those of the BSR during its existence at Poston, namely, regular attendance at top staff meetings with encouragement to participate on the same basis as the administrators present. In only two centers did this sort of communication become established. In the remaining five centers no clear patterns were established for local communication; they varied from intermittent participation in staff meetings, on request, with informal contacts with various administrators at other times to regular requests for written reports by the local center director on matters which he was specially interested in and no formal participation with any other administrators.

In general, it probably can be said that communication channels tended to be informal and that they tended to be as much with all levels of staff as with top administration. What actually developed depended heavily on the personalities of the Community Analysts and the administrators whom they were supposed to advise. There were Analysts who never became focused on any of the practical problems in the centers and spent their time gathering materials for ethnographic descriptions of center life; at the same time there were others who became so concerned with and involved in certain selected practical problems that they never succeeded in preparing on paper systematic analyses of any of them.

The staff advisory role was developed in the Washington office very much as it had been at Poston by the BSR. The head of the CA section participated in top staff meetings regularly along with the

chiefs of division--Community Management, Solicitors' Office, Operations, Administration, Reports (Public Relations), Statistics, and Relocation, the Director, and selected section heads (as occasion called for their special knowledge). The CA head was accepted as having a special area of information and knowledge--evacuee attitudes, reactions, and interests--and was frequently called on for comments on proposed or operating plans and programs. His information went into the mill along with that on United States public opinion, legal developments on evacuee status, budget prospects, evacuee reception in places of resettlement, etc. as the basis for decisions by the director. This participation was all oral. Only very rarely was a written report on any specific subject asked for by the top administration for use in policy meetings. However, requests did come for particular written reports from the Community Management, Statistics, and Relocation chiefs of division. The majority of written reports prepared were decided on by the Community Analysis staff on the basis of their knowledge of areas of special concern, ignorance, or unconcern on the part of the administrators locally or in Washington; perhaps fewer than twenty-five percent were prepared in response to requests from Washington top administrators.

The other side of the Washington CA role in communication of advisory information consisted in the preparation and dissemination of mimeographed reports. These dealt with a great variety of information and analysis (listed below). As indicated, the majority were prepared on the basis of estimation of needs by CA personnel. This depended on contact with the ongoing programs in all their phases. The head of the

section spent time with a few Washington administrators keeping in touch with program development and frustration; he also called for, and in most cases received, CA letters from the centers reporting on program progress as well as evacuee reactions and attitudes. On the basis of these materials topics were selected for more extended treatment and reports were prepared and disseminated throughout the WRA administration, local and Washington levels. The early reports were occasional and often extended, amounting to more than 20 pages. The later generally disseminated reports were brief and frequent, such as the "Weekly Trend Reports" summarizing current reactions at the centers to the rapidly developing WRA program of center closure in its final phase.

b. Relations with Evacuees. The social science units were not conceived as relating their findings directly to the administered people, but rather as indirectly serving their welfare through the administrative structure. This was essentially a "colonial" situation. The social scientists agreed to accept pay from the agency which had almost total power over the evacuees in the relocation center communities. They agreed to advise the power-holding agency about the nature of the evacuee community, its structure and orientations, and leave the decision as to how to use such information in the hands of the policy makers and program administrators of the agency. This was the basis of the relationship with the people who were the primary object of study by the analysts.

All the analysts sought personal relations with evacuees in the usual manner of the field anthropologist. They selected relationships

on a basis of their own personalities and those of the assistants they chose, the assistants being in all cases evacuees. The usual principles of representativeness were attempted but not systematically achieved. Selection followed the usual key informant techniques of anthropologists in the field. Every analyst was subject to open scrutiny by members of the evacuee community, the purposes of CA not being kept secret. Besides assistants, both Nisei and Issei, who became paid staff members and participated freely in data-gathering and staff discussions, there was in each center unsolicited (but usually encouraged, once begun) contact with responsible members of the community who sought to find out the nature of the CA work and what uses the information was put to.

Each analyst kept confidential files of information which came to them about individuals, files which were not open for general use in their offices. The contents of such files were used in advising the administrators according to the discretion of the analyst. The Washington office urged that no information about any individuals be given to the administration and particularly nothing that might be in any way incriminating. The gathering of such information was defined as strictly the business of Internal Security, not of CA.

The channels of communication of findings to evacuees were not very systematically developed. Although it was recognized that analysis and information could be helpful to the Community Councils and Block Managers and individuals in leadership positions, no formal channels with them were established, but informal relations did develop in a variety of ways.

The Product: The Nature of the Reporting. The reports produced fall into four different categories: (1) ethnographic description, (2) current trend reporting, (3) situational analysis, and (4) evacuee viewpoints (Spicer 1946). All the types were focused on defining situations in connection with which the administrators recognized problems; this was the criterion for reporting. Special emphasis was placed in the CA reports on making clear those factors in the situations which arose from the evacuees' cultural and situational backgrounds; this was regarded as the ^{major} responsibility of the CAS ⁱⁿ ^{nealy} all its work. However, it must not be concluded that reports dealt only with evacuee viewpoints and characteristics; they dealt also, although the emphasis was rarely there, with the viewpoints and characteristics of the administrators. The book by Leighton, The Governing of Men, reported explicitly on administrators' behavior and analyzed it in relation to WRA program objectives. Leighton described and illustrated two general types of behavior--"people-minded" and "thing-minded" ^{and} presented detailed analyses of the consequences of administrative behavior ~~based on~~ ^{of} the contrasting types. At the time Leighton published this study (1945) he was not a member of the WRA staff. The CAS never made such explicit written analyses for presentation to administrators in the regular channels. However, it should be pointed out that analysts in several centers and in the Washington office frequently discussed informally with administrators the consequences of different kinds of administrative

approaches. No collation of analysts' conclusions on this topic was ever made. Nor were recommendations in writing ever made in terms of alternative administrative approaches possible in given situations and the related probable consequences.

In general the written reports of analysts, in contrast with the oral reporting of many of them, were descriptive and analytical. A technique of recommendation was never developed; in fact, it is difficult to discover in any of the written reports the development of viewpoints which generated, or might have generated, systematic recommendation in terms of alternatives. The overwhelming impression is that analysts were too preoccupied with becoming familiar with and describing the situations which confronted them. One senses that (and this confirms the head of the section's impressions) the analysts uniformly accepted and concurred in the general value position adopted by the top policy makers of the WRA--which we may call "non-restrictive policy"--and that they were sensitive to actions by individual administrators and policies adopted in particular centers which they regarded as inconsistent with the general objectives, but there developed no leadership by CA in systematic policy guidance to the WRA administration either at the Washington or the local level. Reporting remained devoted, when it was not purely descriptive, to implicit, rather than explicit, criticism of departures from the general policy. By hindsight it appears that training sessions could have been devoted to explicitly analyzing the tenets of general policy and developing through interaction among the analysts a set of principles for evaluating any given situation

with reference to the general policy. This was not done. The general conferences of analysts called by the Washington office were devoted to consideration of techniques of data gathering and reporting and exchange of information about the different situations in the several centers.

One type of report which was more common at the beginning of the program, but appeared sporadically throughout was simple description of strange (to Anglos) customs of the Japanese Americans. These reports consisted of short notes on Japanese language usage, courtesy customs, folk beliefs and other miscellaneous matters which appeared to analysts to be interesting, usually as bases of misunderstanding between Anglo administrators and evacuees. These were popular with administrators generally. Longer reports were prepared dealing with more complex and deeply misunderstood matters such as status and cultural position of the Kibeis educated in Japan. A long report of 30 pages on this subject was widely circulated and, presumably, cleared up many misapprehensions.

A second type of report sought to increase understanding of particular situations which disturbed administrators or appeared to administrators and analysts as potential sources of misunderstanding. These were ordinarily fairly long and contained implied recommendations, but did not become explicit on recommended action. Examples are "A Report on an Unorganized Relocation Center" which dealt with the situation in the early stages of community organization in a single center; it attempted to point out factors leading towards evacuees organizing themselves to oppose paternalistic tendencies in the administration of the center. Another CA report, "The Tule Lake Incident," in the wake of

a rebellion against WRA administration at what became the segregation center tried to point out the major factors, such as for example, the concentration in a single center of dissident elements and some pro-Japanese leadership following the "sorting for loyalty." Such reports were not widely read. They were long; they were essentially academic in approach, tending to summarize past events and circulated at times when the fast-moving events of the program made them obsolete in the context of newly developing administrative problems.

Closely related to the "situational" analyses were reports which simply reported evacuee viewpoints and were essentially records of interviews with evacuees of various ages and backgrounds. The most notable of these were a result of the "registration program" in the spring of 1943 when the WRA was forced, against the better judgement of its top administrators, to carry out a program of separation of "loyal and disloyal." The complex set of factors which made it impossible to carry out any realistic separation of this sort became evident as soon as the interview program on which the separation was to be based was inaugurated. The simple record of interviews revealed more clearly for the WRA staff than any formal description the nature of the problems for evacuees. Such reports were widely circulated and widely used in conjunction with the program. Similar reporting, although not in the same verbatim way, was also carried out by the CA section in connection with surveys and interviews of areas of the West Coast to which evacuees began returning as the program for center closure was inaugurated in 1945.

These were interviews with non-Japanese in communities to which Japanese Americans were returning. These were used in limited ways in planning specific strategy for particular evacuees in their return.

In the final phase of the WRA program the CA section produced a long series of hastily prepared weekly trend reports, attempting to report to Washington and center staff and evacuee groups in the centers the reactions of evacuees to what had finally become an involuntary movement geared to a deadline for closing the agency. The trend reports were focused on the evacuee reactions and tended to give much less attention to the administrators' attitudes. There was little detectable influence of these reports on administrative action, although they were sometimes used by evacuee groups in their efforts to slow down the program for closure and make it less decisive.

Finally, one may gain insight into the assumptions in terms of which the CA section was guided by examining its final report, Impounded People (1969), edited by the head of the section. This sums up from his point of view the important findings of the CA section during its period of existence. The general form is that of an academic report, descriptive and analytical, without any conceptual guidance from social science except as it is purely implicit in the organization. There are no recommendations; there is no framework of processual analysis related to the action goals of the WRA as administrative agency. The only relationship which the report seems to bear to the agency operation is that its subject matter is very definitely the

nature of the changing communities of Japanese Americans under the relocation center conditions. The focus is, in fact, although it remains implicit in the report, the dynamics of human relations under administered community conditions. The report recounts the growth of the different social structures which developed in the centers, those among the various segments of the evacuee population and also those involving the Anglo administrators and the Japanese Americans. The cultural products of these relations, such as orientations towards "a day's work" in the centers, evacuee opposition to and acceptance of the WRA resettlement program, motivations behind declarations of loyalty and disloyalty, and finally the reactions to center closure are described and their manifestations in center life are analyzed. In general this summarizes the approach of the CA staff, but there were individuals among the analysts who did not accept this academic approach and who as individuals advocated the evacuee causes in connection with one aspect or another of the WRA program. These did not dominate CA policy.

Ethical Issues and Responsibilities. The CAS, and the BSR before it, accepted as primary responsibility the obligation to serve the WRA agency as its client. This meant the obligation to report to the WRA administrators research which they were paid to carry out. There was however a definition of obligation here which both BSR and CA personnel participated in. This involved a distinction between information about individuals and about group behavior; the former was

defined as not available to WRA administrators. Any use of such information was disguised and individuals were rendered unidentifiable. It required some adjustment of administrators to accept this distinction, but in general it was accepted after some resistance, even though it made CA appear as largely useless in the eyes of some administrators. Other distinctions such as that information bearing on internal security of the centers and espionage activities were completely outside the province of CA ^{etc} was eventually accepted but had to be made explicit by the CA section. Thus CA participated in aspects of the definition of its role, but accepted the general role as advisory to the WRA administration.

Generally the analysts expressed obligations to what the WRA defined as the object of investigation, the evacuees. This was not expressed consistently in formal arrangements to make CA information and general understanding available to evacuees. However, in some centers analysts developed close working relationships with various individuals and groups among the evacuees who were taking community leadership roles, and this was encouraged from the Washington office. The evacuee staffs of the analysts served in these cases as channels of communication with the evacuee community at large, but also there were arrangements through individuals who were information sources but not as paid members of the CA staff. The latter were probably the most effective channels of communication. Precisely what sorts of information were effectively used by the evacuee community was never recorded and nothing can be reported about the impact. It is true that individual evacuees found assistance in terms of morale, information, and specific

support through various analyst friends. No channels with formal organizations of Japanese Americans were opened through the Washington office of CA. Thus it may be said that the sense of obligation to serve the interests of evacuees, who were the primary object of study, was never formalized, although it was constantly on the tongues of analysts and led most of them as private individuals to be constant critics of WRA programs. Awareness of this in some centers led to distrust of CA on the part of administrators.

In only a general way was responsibility to social science colleagues accepted and recognized. The reports of the CAS were prepared more often than not from an academic point of view, as descriptive records of the whole WRA relocation center experience. The final report of the section epitomizes this. Leighton went farther in his report on the BSR work presenting it in the form of a body of conceptualized and theoretically interpreted data with recommendations. Other published reports, by CA analysts, fell far short of being related to any body of theory in the social sciences. In view of the absence of materials prepared in the framework of social science, it may be said the CAS generally placed responsibility to colleagues at a third priority level, below that to client and to people studied. All three kinds of responsibility were recognized, and the priorities were clear: 1. Client (WRA), 2. People studied (evacuees), 3. Colleagues. However, it should be emphasized that the responsibility to the client was recognized and fulfilled in a very limited way; the emphasis was overwhelmingly on provision of selected

kinds of information with very little attention given to formulating policy recommendations and program alternatives. The social scientists did not, in short, emerge as informed critics of the WRA program; they were severely limited, apparently, by their training, and their reports tended to be wholly academic in approach. On the other hand, although definitely academically oriented, the social scientists, with the exception of the director of the BSR, produced only a body of descriptive data; they never fulfilled in a significant way the obligation to colleagues by preparing, either during or after the program, a conceptualized study of the relocation center phenomena aimed at contributing to any body of academic knowledge. Finally, aside from many services as individuals to evacuees, the analysts did not with the exception of the analyst at Tule Lake Segregation Center attempt to make their knowledge or reports useful in any way to organizations or spokesmen for evacuees.

Evaluation. For comparative analysis of cases in any effort to promote general understanding of practice and possibilities in the uses of applied social science, we need answers to the following questions:

1. How did the program served relate to processes of social and cultural change which it was designed to encourage or discourage?
2. What goals was the use of social science designed to further?
3. What roles were established specifically for the application of social science?
4. Were these consistent with the proposed application?
5. What alternative goals and uses were possible in the given situation?

6. What contribution did the application make to the goals of the program?

1. The WRA program was built on the principle that the citizen members of a minority group ought to be removed from restrictions which a wartime action had imposed on them. WRA policy based itself on the principle that Japanese American Nisei be restored to full and equal participation with other citizens in United States society and that Issei be returned to their former, alien status. This policy placed the WRA in direct opposition to the restrictive position taken at first in 1942 by the War Department and lined the WRA up with the Justice Department which had opposed evacuation. In general, the WRA position was in support of what after the war became a trend towards extension of full civil rights to Orientals in the United States. This position had to be maintained by the WRA in the face of active opposition from citizen groups such as the American Legion, the House Unamerican Activities Committee, individual Congressmen and Senators, influential columnists such as Westbrook Pegler, and many others.

2. The basic policy of WRA had been decided on before social scientists were brought in as such to the agency. There were however three other ^{high} basic policy decisions which had to be made after the establishment of the social science units. These were the decisions to sort out the loyal from the disloyal and segregate and maintain complete restriction of movement on the "disloyal," to establish a large "Relocation" Division of the WRA with an aggressive program for immediate resettling of evacuees outside the relocation centers, and to close the centers during 1945 before the

end of the war. Formal participation of the social scientists was not sought in the processes of making these decisions; they were not admitted to the top policy circle which decided them.

The immediate problems which gave rise to the hiring of social scientists were demonstrations in the relocation centers by evacuees against specific features of relocation center management. The issues involved in these demonstrations came to be recognized generally by the administrators as deeper than the complaints over inadequate housing and hospital facilities which were voiced by evacuees. It was recognized in a general way that conflict among evacuees stemming from factional and generational splits in the pre-war communities were intensified by the experience of evacuation and the conditions of involuntary concentration in the relocation centers. WRA administration came to the conclusion that social scientists could help in informing the administrators concerning the many causes of conflict, both within the evacuee communities and between them and the administrators. The scientists were therefore hired to study the evacuee attitudes and reactions under the relocation center circumstances and report them to the administrators. This, it was thought, would make for administration in the better interests of both evacuees and administrators and would prevent conditions arising in the centers which would obstruct the program for removal of restrictions. The goals, then, which social science was to serve were those of bringing about the most peaceful possible arrangements in the centers with the least possible restriction on the evacuees.

3. The social scientists were established as staff advisers to the WRA administrators. They were regarded as facilitators of the policy already and to be established. Their responsibilities were wholly advisory and they were permitted to fulfill these in a variety of ways. No rigid structuring of their relations with the administrators or evacuees was required; in general they functioned in the following way. They set up offices in the centers and hired evacuees as research assistants. They planned their own research topics and operations with direction from the Washington CAS office rather than from the local administrators. Some operated almost entirely as data gathering organizations oriented toward academic interests rather than the immediate practical problems of administration. Most operated as informal advisers to the top administration on current problems and as contributors to analysis of the problem situations identified by the Washington CAS staff. At the Washington level there was regular participation in top staff meetings, where the CA representative was recognized as having a kind of specialty information along with that of division heads. This kind of information was presented when called for with reference to particular problems. This specialized knowledge concerned evacuee attitudes, reactions, and viewpoints relevant to aspects of the ongoing programs. It was treated by the Director of the agency (who made the ultimate decisions) as one type of factor that required to be taken into consideration for any program formulation or evaluation. In short, information about evacuees was considered along with budget considerations, personnel capabilities, intergovernmental

relations, public opinion, and international relations as necessary for most decisions of importance. In some instances it had the highest priority, in others very low priority.

In connection with the three high policy decisions made after the social scientists were hired, the kind of information in which the analysts became specialists was regarded as important but not of overweaning importance. Thus in connection with the segregation policy and program, the factors of primary importance were decided by top administration to be (1) dominant attitudes in the United States Congress and (2) maintenance of the non-restrictive policy with regard to a majority ^{but not all} of the evacuees. The CAS collected information which made it clear along with information gathered by United States Army Intelligence and other means that a simple separation of evacuees into "loyal" and "disloyal" was not possible. The process of interviewing itself altered people's attitudes moment by moment; most Nisei were in a state of doubt about their loyalty, whether to parents or to a country which flouted their citizenship rights. Dozens of factors which made the categorization irrelevant to actual danger to the United States were uncovered and led to conviction by WRA administration that the segregation policy demanded by various groups in the United States could never accomplish its ostensible goals. Nevertheless, WRA decided that if it conceded and set up the program, this would make possible the carrying out of the policy for lifting all restriction on evacuees who did not declare themselves "disloyal." WRA therefore proceeded with segregation, the knowledge that it had, partly as a result of CAS research, not being given the greatest weight in the decision.

The CAS was also through its interviews and surveys instrumental in making clear the nature of "resistance to freedom," in connection with the WRA efforts to open the relocation centers wide and encourage the evacuees to resettle somewhere in the United States while the war was still in progress. Most analysts inclined to regard the resettlement program as unworkable. However, WRA did not scale down their efforts to resettle as many as possible; on the contrary they steadily intensified efforts. Ultimately it was demonstrated that only a small percentage, about one-fifth of the evacuees were interested in resettlement. The rest remained in the centers despite the aggressive resettlement program. In this sense the CA analysis was demonstrated to be sound. Yet the CA reports were used as the basis for devising techniques which were aimed at, and to some extent worked towards, breaking down the evacuee leadership who opposed immediate ~~resettlement~~. In general analysts, and certainly this was true of the author, did not approve the policy, regarding it as unrealistic in the sense that it turned out to be and also as working against the policy principle of maintaining the centers as places of some security. However, CAS never made the analysis which could have been decisive in this policy decision, namely, one which would have included a study of the relations between relocated evacuees and those remaining in the centers and projections regarding effects on the center life of alternative volumes of resettled evacuees over different periods. Here alternative programs could have been assessed, but the method was not employed and hence a kind of unstated conflict persisted between CAS and the personnel of the Relocation Division.

"forced"

Something similar to the resettlement program developed in connection with the final program of center closure. Here again with their attention fixed on evacuee attitudes in the centers, analysts generally regarded the closure program as unworkable and believed that if it were made to work, it would in some degree do so in the face of a principle of maximum humane treatment of evacuees which WRA was thought to stand for. As in the case of resettlement, it appears in hindsight that the nature of the conception of their work which the analysts maintained did not lead them to make long term predictions. They were completely absorbed in understanding the immediate situations in front of them, which called for much close attention and the constant gathering of new data in the ever-changing situation. The head of the section did not arrange to remove himself ^{and other analysts} far enough from the demands of analyzing the immediate scene to allow time for developing a longer term view of the whole and of the processes which were in operation.

4. The advisory role was not wholly consistent as it was developed with a goal of long term analysis and advise^c. This inconsistency has ^{above} ~~just~~ been considered with respect to major policy decisions that came late in the WRA program. It appears now that the top administrators, chiefly those who made the first basic policy decisions, were the ones who made the long term analyses, not the social scientists. I believe that this kind of role was not understood by the head of the section, who tended to work on close range problems in the same way that the relocation center analysts did. It was in the end not the social science analysts who guided the administrators into those decisions which led to the long range solution of the problems of lifting restrictions

on the Japanese Americans; the administrators themselves without social science staff were responsible for their formulation.

5. The alternatives not taken which would have been more or less consistent with the basic original policy decision would have been (1) to maintain the centers with no active resettlement program and consequently probably only a tiny trickle of evacuees, if any, into the larger society during the war and (2) to develop the centers as Collier proposed into vigorous communities engaged in agricultural production and a variety of creative community activities. So long as no restraints were imposed on evacuee movement out of the centers these would have been possible even after the Supreme Court decisions in the Endo and other cases on the unconstitutionality of detaining Nisei. Centers without WRA taking responsibility for obtaining jobs and acceptance outside them would have been a rather negative policy; it could have been done, but would have been a sort of fence-sitting, neutral program which probably would have resulted in fewer and fewer WRA personnel being ~~kept~~^{retained} and much dissatisfaction among evacuees. If the center development program had been adopted there are interesting possibilities, providing Congress were willing to appropriate funds throughout the war for this sort of development. In certain ways such a policy would have been unacceptable to the Issei, who would have asked for whom they were developing the center land: For Indians? For whom other than themselves? They would have had in some way to have been assured of a developing stake in the centers commensurate

with the effort they put into it. There is a great chance that this program would have failed for lack of cooperation, especially judging from the limitations on work which the Issei and many Nisei imposed from the beginning. If it had been successful, then there would have come the problem of resettlement after the war with no active program relating them to the United States public having been carried on in the meantime. Such considerations as these would have to be gone into in detail as to the possibilities if we are to assess the administrative wisdom involved in the alternative which the WRA took.

Other alternatives urged by various segments of the United States population were in complete opposition to the basic value premise on which the WRA worked and cannot be imagined or explored from the WRA basis. These would have required the maintenance of such restriction as developed in the months immediately following the evacuation order-- all families held under total surveillance, Nisei already in the armed services forced out and put with their families in the restricted communities. Administration probably would have developed on a basis of increasing restriction, increasingly repressive and the effects would have been negative with regard to maintaining and stimulating loyalty to the United States of Nisei. The effects of increasingly repressive, or even ordinary restrictive administration, on family life as well as on national loyalty would have been destructive. There is no space to go further in this analysis here. The fact that this alternative had strong advocates in United States society should be emphasized, however, because that fact makes clear the great significance of the choice which the WRA administrators made.

A third general sort of alternative is one which was on the minds of some of the analysts from the beginning of their service. This is the greater participation of Japanese Americans in the policy decisions of the WRA. This was advocated almost immediately by various Japanese organizations after the evacuation. Several organizations were formed at different times for the purpose of "helping the WRA solve our problems." The Japanese American Citizens League which expressed no opposition to evacuation at the beginning and therefore earned the hostility of most Issei and many Nisei maintained an informal advisory relationship with the top administration of the WRA throughout the war period until the dissolution of the agency. Without ever taking time to work out all the consequences of participation of Japanese Americans outside and inside the centers in policy determination most analysts were advocates of greater participation. Again however they succumbed to the "urgency" of the moment and spent their time making analyses of relocation center situations in relocation center context rather than in the context of the total Japanese American society. They did not therefore contribute to the understanding of this alternative or provide any basis for the rejection of it; the WRA administrators did, however, decide against formal Japanese-American participation in any way. The effects need further analysis.

6. The social scientists made an as-yet unmeasured contribution to clearer understanding of Japanese American viewpoints and cultural orientations by WRA administrators. This was applied by the administrators in the organization of community institutions in the centers by placing evacuees in charge of various operations and by asking evacuees for advice.

The important differences in life orientations of Nisei and Issei came to be understood by top administrators with some aid at least of the BSR and CA reports oral and written. It is a question whether the social scientists added much of importance to the understanding which developed among the more sensitive of the administrators in the course of trying to do their jobs. What the analysts contributed cannot now be measured. They were in most centers and in the Washington office definitely a part of the process of getting acquainted and in the process of changing attitudes to permit good working relations. They assisted administrators, and in some instances evacuees, in becoming aware of the factors stemming from minority group experience and from bureaucratic administration which gave rise to strain and sometimes conflict in various center situations.

It does not appear that the social scientists took much responsibility in any major policy decisions; they did ^{not} define their role in terms of helping administration chart courses ^{among the} ~~through~~ possible alternatives and their probable effects.

THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY AS A CASE IN THE
APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE*

By

Edward H. Spicer

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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the work of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority as attempts to apply social science in the solution of a complex social problem which arose in the United States during World War II.

Background

~~The Social and Cultural Processes Giving Rise to the Problem~~

The WRA was created as a government agency to attend to the results of an executive Order issued by President F. D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942 (U.S. Department of Interior 1946: VIII-IX). This order (No. 9066) opened the way to the removal of all "persons of Japanese ancestry" from an area of the west coast of the United States sharply bounded and designated as the Western Defense Command. Approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were eventually included as those to be evacuated. ~~They were removed~~ from all or portions of the states of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, and the territory of Alaska, ~~The removal was placed in the hands of~~ the War Department with

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the Western Defense Command's General DeWitt in charge (U.S. Department of War 1943). The removal was carried out in two stages, both in the hands of the War Department: (1) immediate removal from homes, following the March date of a subsequent Executive Order, to "Assembly Centers" consisting of race track and fairgrounds areas within the Western Defense Command and (2) later transfer which was not completed until November, 1942, to specially constructed "Relocation Centers" in "wilderness areas" between the West Coast and the Mississippi River. With completion of the second stage for some evacuees, beginning as early as June, 1942, the new civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, assumed responsibility for the welfare of the evacuated population.

The evacuation was a decisive event in a series which began in the 1840's with the exodus of hundreds of south Chinese after the Taiping Rebellion and during the California gold rush. These Chinese migrated to the United States at the time settlers were moving from the eastern states to the western territories (Lee 1960). The immigrants filled important needs of the expanding Anglo-American society as laborers and menial servants. At the same time they became the object of racial prejudice, and the foundations for antagonistic interethnic relations were laid. Anti-Chinese attitudes grew strong among some segments of the west coast population and these groups were successful in getting national legislation passed, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1887. Later, immigration from Japan began and the Japanese immigrants were met with similar hostile attitudes. Nevertheless Japanese immigrants continued to enter the United States, especially the west coast states.

As they did so, prejudice at the level of face to face relations spread among Anglos, and legislation at both the state and national levels was promoted and enacted. During the 1920's, when the United States was beginning to be generally concerned to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe, California and the western states were swept frequently with surges of anti-Oriental feeling (McWilliams 1944: 14-72). Novelists such as Peter B. Kyne wrote romances based on beliefs that a "Yellow Peril" threatened California. Japanese became the special target of efforts to cut off immigration and to restrict closely those who had already settled in the United States. Legislation was passed by California and other Western states sharply limiting participation of persons of Oriental background in American life. Aliens of Oriental descent were prohibited from intermarrying with "Caucasians," from owning land, and--the fundamental restriction--from becoming naturalized citizens of the United States. The laws were designed to cut off the increase of immigrants from Oriental countries and to prevent those already in the United States from acquiring voting or property rights. Underlying the passage of restrictive legislation lay the popular belief that Orientals had sinister and unfathomable purposes. Nevertheless no limitations were established on the citizenship rights of individuals born in the United States of Oriental aliens. Thus sharp differences in the degree of participation in American life existed between the first generation of immigrants, called Issei, among the Japanese and the second generation, called Nisei. The Nisei had full citizen rights, although popular prejudice and discrimination were often as strong against them as against their parents.

At the same time that anti-Oriental prejudice and legislation were developing, the Japanese immigrants and their children moved into fuller participation in American economic and educational life (Strong 1934). Hard work, traditional interest in intensive agriculture, and high achievement orientations resulted in their moving into particular economic areas with great success. By the 1930's they had become important producers of celery, strawberries, and other specialized crops. The necessary land was legally owned by Nisei while management was often in the hands of Issei. They were also successful in small businesses, such as restaurants. The Nisei in general adapted quickly to the United States school system and a high proportion graduated from universities. Studies indicated that their adaptation to American society involved a great deal of cultural assimilation, that they were indeed outstanding among immigrants in record of school achievement and also in extent of acceptance of American cultural traits such as dress, language, and occupation. Nevertheless in the atmosphere of widespread prejudice, a high proportion of Japanese of both generations were forced to concentrate together in "Little Tokyos" in the west coast cities and in particular farm industries in which they were able to gain footholds. They, therefore, remained highly visible to prejudiced and unprejudiced Anglos.

The Army evacuation order in March, 1942, was a decisive event in the long series of government actions discriminating specifically against the Japanese immigrants. Government action now extended to their children, since all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to be evacuated. This action can be regarded as an extreme move in the direction pointed by the legislation of the 1920's when the Alien Land Laws were passed. In

this sense, it was a throwback reversing a developing trend away from officially sanctioned discrimination, especially with respect to the Nisei. The action was based solidly in the attitudes of a particular general of the Western Defense Command--General J. L. DeWitt--whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice (McWilliams 1944: 251).

The evacuation order was moreover a result of political pressures by such organizations as the California Shipper-Grower Association, which wanted to reduce competition from Japanese in the agricultural production fields where they had been most successful. Pressure from this and similar organizations and from newspapers and politicians supporting anti-Japanese feeling built up steadily beginning a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941 (Grodzins 1949: 19-61). "Popular" clamor for evacuation of Japanese Americans, however, did not as a matter of fact grow strong until late February, 1942, three months after Pearl Harbor and two months after the various organizations of agricultural producers and patriotic associations (such as the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West) had put pressure on politicians such as Attorney General Earl Warren of California. The evacuation order thus had roots in the past interethnic relations of the West Coast, elements of which were re-stimulated in 1942 by special interest groups. The anti-Japanese activities gained new intensity as Japanese military victories followed in rapid succession in the Pacific theatre of war during 1942.

B.G. — WRA

FILE # 797

Issues —

1. Staff not capable — turnover

2. Analysts failed to prepare
documented reports —

3. Three critical time periods } should combine all
 ~~past~~ fact
 Present
 Prediction

— trained for reports not analysis

4. Failed to understand sub-cultural void
 Btw ad + analysts

Failed to understand policy from selection officer

5. Whom did they serve?
 Ethics fundamental

J 6 — Ind. Personality Study

Lacks —
 material for admin. change
 Only Hopi meetings good

Benefits —
 Monographs
 morale

From adm. pt. of view

Project not established in
 context of trends

L. Thompson —

Misconceptions

@ Low income in Chicago

Local dev. threatened
 by bureaucracy

THE CORNELLIAN REPUBLIC: THE VICOS CASE

by B. R. Bainton

1. The Cornell-Peru Project has failed to provide a documentary record for the social science experiments it proposed to test in the Vicos context.
2. The project fails to draw a clear distinction between its "pure" science and "applied" component and the manner these were integrated to facilitate program goal maximization.
3. The ethical issue(s) has never been adequately dealt with by Project spokesmen. Specifically, given the complex network of social relationships established by the Project staff during the project, no guide is given to the ethical priorities governing the staff.
4. The Cornell-Peru Project failed in its efforts to train applied social scientists.
5. The transferability of the Vicos experiment to other developmental contexts owing to the total lack of documentation required by standard tests of validity and reliability.
6. The roles(s) of the anthropologist have not been clearly defined for the project.

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July 21, 1973

FILE # 797

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Center head (do not underline)

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 efforts to cut off immigration and to restrict ^{intensively} ~~intensively~~ those who
 had already settled in the United States. Legislation was passed by
 California and other Western states sharply limiting participation
 of persons of Oriental background in American life. Aliens of Oriental
 descent were prohibited from intermarrying with "Caucasians," from
 owning land, and--the fundamental restriction--from becoming naturalized
 citizens of the United States. The laws were designed to cut off the
 increase of immigrants from ~~the~~ Oriental countries and to prevent those
 already in the United States from acquiring voting or property rights.
^{Underlying the passage of restrictive} Back of all ~~the~~ legislation lay the ^{popular} ~~basic~~ belief that Orientals had
 sinister and unfathomable purposes. ^{Nevertheless} ~~Yet~~ no limitations were established
 on the citizenship rights of individuals born in the United States of
 Oriental aliens. ^{There were} ~~There were~~ thus sharp differences in the degree of
 participation in American life ^{existed} between ~~for example,~~ the first generation
 of immigrants, called Issei, among the Japanese and the second generation,
 called Nisei. ^{Nisei} ~~The latter~~ had full citizen rights, although popular
 prejudice and discrimination ^{were often} ~~was~~ as strong against them as against their
 parents.

Alvin
Lind
Rowe

At the same time that anti-Oriental prejudice and legislation were
 developing, the Japanese immigrants and their children ^{moved} ~~were moving~~
 into fuller participation in American economic and educational life. ^(Strong 1934)

Hard work, traditional interest in intensive agriculture, and high achievement orientations resulted in their moving into particular economic areas with great success. By the 1930's they had become important producers of celery, strawberries, and other specialized crops. The necessary land was legally owned by Nisei while management was often in the hands of Issei. They were also successful in small businesses, such as restaurants. The Nisei in general adapted quickly to the United States school system and a high proportion graduated from universities. Studies indicated that their adaptation to American society involved a great deal of cultural assimilation, that they were indeed outstanding among immigrants in record of school achievement and also in extent of acceptance of American cultural traits such as dress, language, and occupation. Nevertheless in the atmosphere of widespread prejudice, a high proportion of Japanese of both generations were forced to concentrate together in "Little Tokyos" in the west coast cities and in particular farm industries in which they were able to gain footholds. They, therefore, remained highly ~~visible~~ to prejudiced and unprejudiced Anglos.

The ^{Army} evacuation order in March, 1942, was a decisive event in ~~the~~ long series of government actions discriminating specifically against the Japanese immigrants. ^{Government action} ~~It was~~ now extended to their children, since all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to be evacuated. This action can ~~not~~ be regarded as an extreme move in ^{the} a direction ^{pointed} ~~continuing~~ ^{by} the legislation of the 1920's when the Alien Land Laws were passed. It was a throwback ^I in this sense, reversing a ^{developing} trend away

from officially sanctioned discrimination, especially with respect to the Nisei. ^{The} ~~It was an~~ ^{was} action based solidly in the attitudes of a particular general of the Western Defense Command whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice.
 - General J. L. DeWitt -
 (McWilliams 1944:251)

The evacuation order was moreover a result of political pressures by such organizations as the California Shipper-Grower Association, which ~~These~~ wanted to reduce competition from Japanese in the agricultural production fields where they had been most successful. Pressure from this and similar organizations and from newspapers and politicians supporting anti-Japanese feeling built up steadily beginning a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941. ^(Grodzins 1949:19-61) "Popular"

clamor for evacuation of Japanese Americans, however, did not as a matter of fact grow strong until late February, 1942, three months after Pearl Harbor and two months after the various organizations of agricultural producers and patriotic associations (such as the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West) had ~~established~~ put pressure on politicians such as Attorney General Earl Warren of California. The evacuation order thus had roots in the past interethnic

relations of the West Coast, elements of which ^{were} could be re-stimulated in 1942 by special interest groups. ^{The anti-Japanese activities gained new intensity as} ~~under the conditions of~~ Japanese ~~success~~ military victories followed in rapid succession in ^{theatre of war during 1942.} ~~in the war in the western Pacific~~

The Policy of the War Relocation Authority.

The practical problem ^{rooted in intense} which the WRA was created to find solutions for was a complex one involving racial prejudices ~~of high intensity~~ re-stimulated by a recently declared war, the economic displacement of

Center head (do not underline)

a small but highly productive and culturally well-adapted ethnic minority, and a nation attempting to ~~train~~^{equip} itself rapidly to carry on a war on a global scale. The problems arising from the sudden displacement of the 100,000 people, it became immediately apparent, could not be solved on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis. ^(U.S. Dept of Interior 1946: 24-43) The evacuees were definitely excluded by the Executive Order from free movement in the ~~three~~^{four} west coast states. Represented as dangerous, or potentially so, they could not, according to the terms of the executive order, be introduced into the population in any way in the states of the Western Defense Command. Moreover, meetings of the governors of states immediately to the east rejected any plan for feeding the evacuees into their populations as free-moving new residents and workers. While the WRA was still recruiting its upper levels of administrators, it ~~was~~^{became} perfectly clear that the evacuees would have to be concentrated, ~~somewhere~~^{in locations where} and their immediate physical needs ~~taken care of~~^{could be}, while the policy makers of the new agency cast about for longer term solutions.

The policy questions which the WRA had to decide, once the physical locations and facilities of places of concentration were determined, required answers concerning the legal status of the United States citizens who constituted two-thirds (65,000) of the whole group, the probable legal status of any program of detention in the light of immanent decisions by the Supreme Court on suits brought by evacuees, industrial needs which the adult working members of the evacuee group might fill in a ~~wartime~~^{at war} nation, the trends of congressional and public opinion with respect to evacuees moving out of ~~the relocation~~^{temporary} centers

during the war or after, the probable ^{effects on} ~~reactions~~ of evacuees ~~to~~ ^{of} ~~the~~ ^{government managed communities} confinement in ~~the centers~~ for the duration of the war, to mention only those issues of fundamental importance. These questions were taken up during the months between April, when Milton Eisenhower the new ^{Director} of the agency took charge, and October, 1942, when the evacuees had nearly all been moved into ^{what were called} ~~the~~ "relocation centers"; and Dillon S. Myer had replaced Eisenhower ^{as director.}

The three men who played probably the greatest part in the making of the long term policy decision^s were Myer, whose experience was in agricultural extension and as Director of the Soil Conservation Service; Philip Glick, a lawyer with wide experience in government; and Dr. John H. Provinse, an anthropologist whose interests ^{was} ~~were~~ the application of social science and who had served in the Soil Conservation Service and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The policy framework which they constructed and ^{which} ~~became~~ the persisting structure within which WRA operated for some four years rested on the following assumptions: (1) any sort of detention of United States citizens without individual charges ^(Myer 1971: 276-79) ^{was sure to} ~~would~~ be declared illegal and hence the Nisei could not be kept in the relocation centers; (2) life in the centers under bureaucratic supervision would be destructive of individual initiative and hence was generally undesirable and should be as brief as possible; (3) resettlement under conditions of ordinary free life in the United States should be the immediate aim; (4) this should be done during wartime, because it would be much more difficult afterwards if evacuees

had spent years under the administered conditions. The decisions, in short, led to a policy which called for as quick as possible emptying of the relocation centers and the prompt re-establishment of the evacuees in the general society.

An alternative policy proposed by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs who had encouraged ~~the~~ setting up ~~of~~ two of the centers on Indian Reservations was as follows. Plans should be made for ~~making~~ ^{maintaining all} the relocation centers ~~good places to live in~~ ^{evacuees in} for the duration of the war, whatever length of time that turned out to be. Resources should be devoted to ^{establishing} developing the best possible living conditions; ~~opportunities should be developed for~~ ^{should be promptly established} agricultural production, which would ~~be helpful to~~ ^{both} the nation in wartime and ~~would~~ ^{what had been} give Japanese Americans scope in their most successful economic field. Communities ^{built on this basis} ~~of this sort~~ would provide security which could not be hoped for ~~anywhere~~ ^{elsewhere} ~~the outside~~ in a nation at war with Japan. Schools, hospitals, and community government should be developed for highest quality and the evacuees should take important parts in managing them. This proposed policy was rejected ~~out of hand~~ by the top administrators of the WRA and at that point Collier withdrew from any further administrative involvement.

The general policy adopted ^{furthered certain of the processes, such as cultural assimilation, which} ~~recognized some of the basic features of the~~ socio-cultural processes ^{had shaped} ~~to which~~ the Japanese Americans ^{adaptation to pre-war United States} had been involved. ^{policy was based on the view that} ~~The evacuation was conceived as an event which had resulted in the creation~~ ~~of institutions,~~ the relocation centers, ~~which~~ defied constitutional legality; the WRA as a government agency could not therefore encourage

their maintenance, except as places of voluntary residence, ^{for} evacuees —
"way stations" ^{on the evacuees' path} in their re-adjustment, back into the general society. Once this legal
basis of policy was ^{in these terms} clearly defined, then certain responsibilities had
to be accepted by the WRA. The first was the maintenance of the centers,
not as quasi-permanent communities for economic and social development,
but as ^{merely} reasonably comfortable places to and from which evacuees could
move according to their circumstances. The second basic responsibility
was to facilitate in every way possible the movement of evacuees out
of the centers into the general stream of American society, this movement
to be contingent on no events in the war or elsewhere; every individual
or family who chose to move out must be assisted immediately in every
way possible. These were the foundations of WRA policy; they clearly
rested on a value position with reference to the past and future of the
Japanese Americans. This was that it was desirable to eliminate every
restriction on the movement and participation of Nisei in American life.

The WRA proceeded to dedicate its activities to this goal. The
main outlines of ~~its~~ policy were maintained until the agency was
liquidated in June, 1946. In response to Congressional pressures
certain ^{Some} modifications ^{took place} of the policy, primarily a program for the separation
of the "loyal and the disloyal" ^{which resulted in} and the permanent ^{those designated "disloyal,"} detention of the latter
whether Nisei or Issei, ^{for the duration of the war,} ~~took place~~. The ~~extreme~~ ^{ultimate} conception of the
goal, that is, the emptying of the ^{relocation} centers before the end of the war,
was actually achieved, as a result of the timing of Supreme court decisions,
reformulation of War Department policy, and the Japanese and German
surrenders.

Center

Analysis Section

The Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community

Objectives in Establishing the Social Science Units, The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, ^{John Collier,} in initially taking the responsibility for the Poston relocation center--on ^{the Colorado} an Indian Reservation in Arizona--put into operation a Bureau of Sociological Research directed by Dr. Alexander H. Leighton. The purpose of this unit within the center administration was to carry on a study of the behavior of the human beings involved, both evacuees and administrators; it was believed such study would be useful in understanding ~~the kind of~~ human relations ~~involved~~ in administered communities ~~of the general type which the Commissioner expected this~~ relocation center to become in the course of the war. An ~~equally~~ ^{equally} immediate important goal, as conceived by its director, was an ~~immediate~~ contribution to the practical ^{solution of problems in} ~~administration~~ of the developing community ^{aiding the growth of} which would result in informed and intelligent administration. Leighton assembled a small staff ^{went to} and was at work in the Poston Relocation Center in late June, 1942. ^{He} Leighton was a psychiatrist much influenced by contacts with Clyde Kluckhohn, anthropologist, and John Collier, social activist and administrator. ^{Leighton organized an applied research unit called the Bureau of Sociological Research.} After nearly a year the administration of the BSR along with the Poston Relocation Center was taken over by the WRA, when John Collier withdrew from administrative responsibility. At the same time ~~Dr.~~ Leighton, who had been lent by the Navy in which he held the rank of Lieutenant Commander, left the BSR for other wartime service.

The BSR had been strongly encouraged by Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief of Community Management in the WRA. Meanwhile he had begun in the autumn of 1942 to work with an anthropologist, ~~Dr.~~ John F. Embree,

towards the setting up of a social science unit in the WRA. He had
 been encouraged in this by Robert Redfield of the University of
 Chicago. The efforts of Provinse and Embree, who had been hired
 as Historian of the agency, first
 work on the maintenance of an historical record of the WRA, resulted
 in the establishment of a Community Analysis Section of the Division
 of Community Management in February, 1943. The conception was
 (Leighton 1945: 1374)
 (Embree 1944)

similar in some ways to that of the BSR. However, the emphasis was
 strongly on immediate aid to administration through the constant
 analysis of the relocation centers as communities, the development
 of social organization within them and the processes of change in
 human relations. There was less emphasis on the maintenance of a

record of what happened, although it was implicit that this would
 be done inevitably in the course of ongoing community analysis. There
 was also emphasis on interpreting the customs and ways of thought of
 the Japanese Americans to the administrators who were unfamiliar with
 them. This in fact had to be emphasized in persuading the director
 of the WRA to agree to the establishment of the Community Analysis
 Section. The unit was much easier to justify in his eyes on the basis
 of interpreting strange customs than on the basis of simply reporting on
 and analyzing a human community, which presumably an experienced
 administrator would be able to carry on as well as a social scientist.

rested on a sense of urgent need for explanation of disturbances that
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 The objectives in common with the BSR carried on by the CA Section
 were the analysis and interpretation, for the benefit of administrators,
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However, the decision to include the
 Community Analysis Section in the WRA organization ultimately
 rested on a sense of urgent need for explanation of disturbances that
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These disturbances were serious threats to the whole program of the WRA because of the public hostility aroused. The need for better understanding and control of the forces which had been stimulated in the new evacuee communities was recognized involuntarily residence in isolated and bureaucratically controlled local groups. The fact that the cultural backgrounds of evacuees and administrators were different was given more emphasis by the CAS but the growth of more peaceful communities. Thus the qualifications was not the fundamental focus in either case. The background of the people to man the units was not defined as necessarily that of "Japanese experts." The primary qualification was background in defined as social science training which equipped one for analysis of ^{in the analysis of human communities} ~~as wholes, and accordingly the decision was made to recruit communities, that is, not simply in political science, or economics, or history.~~ ^{persons with background in} sociology and anthropology. training would be the best background and accordingly recruitment was in those fields. Ultimately, ²¹ individuals were recruited for 10 field and three ⁴ Washington positions, seven of these ⁴ ~~with background~~ ^{trained} in sociology, 1⁴ in anthropology. Only two, both sociologists, had ~~any~~ previous experience in the study of Japanese persons or communities. Only two, both anthropologists, had had any previous experience in the application of social science--M. E. Opler who had worked for a time in the Applied Anthropology Unit of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, ^(McKeel 1944) and G. Gordon Brown who had worked in an experimental program in the application of anthropology in an African colonial situation. ^(Brown and Hutt 1935) ~~All~~ the others had been trained purely in academic social science, and had no experience that could be called application.

^{inexperience of the social scientists in applied fields was}
The work accomplished with reference to the objectives for which an influence ^{on} and a source of limitation in the work accomplished. ~~the social science units had been set up was strongly influenced by~~
~~the lack of training in practical action programs. It should be~~
^{It was true also}
~~pointed out, however,~~ that the administrators with whom the analysts

worked most closely also lacked ~~background~~ experience which equipped them to make use of staff social scientists. The situation, therefore, were fluid and experimental. A conception of suitable and effective roles within the organization ^{did not exist ready-made, but had to be defined} ~~had to be worked out~~ as the working situation developed.

Working Roles and Relationships. Relations with administrators.

(indent, subhead, no underline)

The ^{general} ~~fundamental~~ role for analysts ^{was} ~~as~~ conceived in establishing the social science units ^{as} ~~was~~ that of staff ^{advisors to} ~~servicing~~ the administrators. ^{concerned with} ~~charge of~~ policy formulation and ~~of programming for policy execution.~~

This meant that the Community Analysts were conceived as working in purely advisory capacities. However, ^{just how and to whom} ~~to whom~~ they were to channel information and analysis was ^{far from} ~~not~~ clearly defined and remained to be worked out by administrators and analysts ^{as they come into} ~~in~~ contact with one another.

The initial conception ^{was} ~~seems to have been~~ very general, namely, that analysts would develop a stockpile of information which might be drawn on by any members of the WRA staff. It was planned that this would be done at the relocation center ⁿ ~~(local)~~ level and that information prepared there would be channeled to the central (Washington) office and made available ^{to upper level!} ~~for~~ administrators, ~~there~~. Circulation of information beyond any one local unit would be the function of the Washington Community Analysis office.

The ~~working out of this~~ staff advisory role took various forms and slowly crystallized in different ways at local and Washington levels. In the BSR there was a very early (within two months) establishment of

a pattern of reporting relationship. This consisted of the attendance of the director of the BSR at all general top staff meetings, in which he participated freely, reporting orally on information which the unit had gathered and responding to questions of ~~all the~~ administrators (division heads) present. This was supplemented by much informal contact between the BSR director and the Project Director (the chief administrator) and also by the submission of ^{some} written reports to him.

comment was established, probably most effectively through informal contacts rather than in formal staff meetings, as they chose.
~~There came to be, in the course of a year, a steady flow of information and results of analysis which the top administration could use or not as they chose. Communication channels were well established at the~~

~~top level. The pattern of the BSR director's regular participation with division heads became fully accepted in the course of a major crisis, of~~

During the
~~the Poston strike, four months after the establishment of the unit, the pattern of regular participation of the director of the BSR with division heads in top policy meetings became fully accepted.~~

At other relocation centers somewhat different communication ~~lines~~ were set up and became the rule during the four years of existence of the relocation centers. In at least three there were never any patterned arrangements.

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~~At other relocation centers somewhat different communication lines were set up and became the rule during the four years of existence of the relocation centers. In at least three there were never any patterned arrangements. The Community Analyst worked largely in isolation from other parts of the administration, irregularly talking with various members of the administration and with evacuees in administrative positions in the center, passing on selected information and discussing issues as they arose. In such centers the only formal and regular channels of communication were those which were required by the Washington office of the Community Analysis Section in its periodic reporting system on assigned topics.~~

At the other extreme were arrangements like those of the BSR during its existence at Poston, namely, regular attendance at top ^{level} staff meetings with ^{freedom} ~~encouragement~~ to participate on the same basis as the administrators present. In only two centers did this sort of communication become established. In the remaining five centers no clear patterns were established for local communication; they varied from intermittent participation in staff meetings, on request, ^{to} ~~with~~ informal contacts with various administrators at other times. ^{three or four centers there were} ~~in~~ regular requests for written reports by the local center director on matters ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ which he was especially interested ~~in~~ and no formal participation with any other administrators.

In general, it ~~probably~~ can be said that communication channels tended to be informal and that they tended to be as much with all levels of staff as with top administration. What actually developed depended heavily on the personalities of the Community Analysts and ^{of} the administrators whom they were supposed to advise. There were Analysts who never became focused on any of the practical problems in the centers and spent their time gathering materials for ethnographic descriptions of center life; at the same time there were others who became so concerned with and ^{personally} ~~and~~ involved in certain selected practical problems that they never succeeded in preparing on paper systematic analyses of any of them.

The staff advisory role was developed in the Washington office very much as it had been at Poston by the BSR. The head of the CA section participated in top staff meetings regularly along with the

chiefs of division--Community Management, Solicitors' Office, Operations, Administration, Reports (Public Relations), Statistics, and Relocation, ~~under the chairmanship of the Director of the agency.~~ ~~the Director, and selected section heads (as occasion called for their special knowledge).~~ The CA head ^{came to be} was accepted as having a ^{fund} ~~special area~~ of ^{specialized} information and knowledge--evacuee attitudes, reactions, and interests-- and was frequently called on ^{to relate} for ~~comments on~~ proposed or operating plans and programs. ^{to this body of information} His ~~information~~ ^{what he offered, based on reports from the centers,} went into the mill along with ~~that~~ ^{the current information} on United States public opinion, legal developments on evacuee status, budget prospects, evacuee reception in places of resettlement, ~~etc.~~ ^{and other matters} as the basis for decisions by the director. This participation was ^{entirely} oral. Only very rarely was a written report on any specific subject asked for by the top administration for use in policy meetings. However, ^{some} requests did come for particular written reports from the Community Management, Statistics, and Relocation chiefs of division. The ^{subject matter of most} ~~majority~~ of written reports prepared ^{were} ~~were~~ decided on by the Community Analysis staff on the basis of their knowledge of areas of special concern, ignorance, or unconcern on the part of the administrators locally or in Washington; perhaps fewer than twenty ~~five~~ percent were prepared in response to requests from Washington top administrators.

The other side of the Washington CA role in communication of advisory information consisted in the preparation and dissemination of ~~mimeographed reports.~~ ^{written reports of the CA section} ~~The~~ ^{subjects.} ~~deal~~ with a great variety of information and analysis (listed below). As indicated, the majority were prepared ^{the Section head's own} on the basis of estimation of needs ^{in the agency} by CA personnel. ~~This depended on~~ ^{and his staff} contact with the ongoing programs in all their phases. The head of the

THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY AS A CASE IN THE
APPLICATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE*

By

Edward H. Spicer

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the work of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority as attempts to apply social science in the solution of a complex social problem which arose in the United States during World War II.

The Social and Cultural Processes Giving Rise to the Problem

The WRA was created as a government agency to attend to the results of an executive Order issued by President F. D. Roosevelt on February 19, 1942 (U.S. Department of Interior 1946: VIII-IX). This order (No. 9066) opened the way to the removal of all "persons of Japanese ancestry" from an area of the west coast of the United States sharply bounded and designated as the Western Defense Command. Approximately 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were eventually included as those to be evacuated. They were removed from all or portions of the states of Arizona, California, Oregon, and Washington, and the territory of Alaska. The removal was placed in the hands of the War Department with

*This chapter is based on a paper prepared for a symposium called "Across Generations" coordinated by Barry Bainton and presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Applied Anthropology at Tucson, Arizona, April, 1972.

the Western Defense Command's General DeWitt in charge (U.S. Department of War 1943). The removal was carried out in two stages, both in the hands of the War Department: (1) immediate removal from homes, following the March date of a subsequent Executive Order, to "Assembly Centers" consisting of race track and fairgrounds areas within the Western Defense Command and (2) later transfer which was not completed until November, 1942, to specially constructed "Relocation Centers" in "wilderness areas" between the West Coast and the Mississippi River. With completion of the second stage for some evacuees, beginning as early as June, 1942, the new civilian agency, the War Relocation Authority, assumed responsibility for the welfare of the evacuated population.

The evacuation was a decisive event in a series which began in the 1840's with the exodus of hundreds of south Chinese after the Taiping Rebellion and during the California gold rush. These Chinese migrated to the United States at the time settlers were moving from the eastern states to the western territories (Lee 1960). The immigrants filled important needs of the expanding Anglo-American society as laborers and menial servants. At the same time they became the object of racial prejudice, and the foundations for antagonistic interethnic relations were laid. Anti-Chinese attitudes grew strong among some segments of the west coast population and these groups were successful in getting national legislation passed, such as the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1887. Later, immigration from Japan began and the Japanese immigrants were met with similar hostile attitudes. Nevertheless Japanese immigrants continued to enter the United States, especially the west coast states.

As they did so, prejudice at the level of face to face relations spread among Anglos, and legislation at both the state and national levels was promoted and enacted. During the 1920's, when the United States was beginning to be generally concerned to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe, California and the western states were swept frequently with surges of anti-Oriental feeling (McWilliams 1944: 14-72). Novelists such as Peter B. Kyne wrote romances based on beliefs that a "Yellow Peril" threatened California. Japanese became the special target of efforts to cut off immigration and to restrict closely those who had already settled in the United States. Legislation was passed by California and other Western states sharply limiting participation of persons of Oriental background in American life. Aliens of Oriental descent were prohibited from intermarrying with "Caucasians," from owning land, and--the fundamental restriction--from becoming naturalized citizens of the United States. The laws were designed to cut off the increase of immigrants from Oriental countries and to prevent those already in the United States from acquiring voting or property rights. Underlying the passage of restrictive legislation lay the popular belief that Orientals had sinister and unfathomable purposes. Nevertheless no limitations were established on the citizenship rights of individuals born in the United States of Oriental aliens. Thus sharp differences in the degree of participation in American life existed between the first generation of immigrants, called Issei, among the Japanese and the second generation, called Nisei. The Nisei had full citizen rights, although popular prejudice and discrimination were often as strong against them as against their parents.

At the same time that anti-Oriental prejudice and legislation were developing, the Japanese immigrants and their children moved into fuller participation in American economic and educational life (Strong 1934). Hard work, traditional interest in intensive agriculture, and high achievement orientations resulted in their moving into particular economic areas with great success. By the 1930's they had become important producers of celery, strawberries, and other specialized crops. The necessary land was legally owned by Nisei while management was often in the hands of Issei. They were also successful in small businesses, such as restaurants. The Nisei in general adapted quickly to the United States school system and a high proportion graduated from universities. Studies indicated that their adaptation to American society involved a great deal of cultural assimilation, that they were indeed outstanding among immigrants in record of school achievement and also in extent of acceptance of American cultural traits such as dress, language, and occupation. Nevertheless in the atmosphere of widespread prejudice, a high proportion of Japanese of both generations were forced to concentrate together in "Little Tokyos" in the west coast cities and in particular farm industries in which they were able to gain footholds. They, therefore, remained highly visible to prejudiced and unprejudiced Anglos.

The Army evacuation order in March, 1942, was a decisive event in the long series of government actions discriminating specifically against the Japanese immigrants. Government action now extended to their children, since all persons of Japanese ancestry were required to be evacuated. This action can be regarded as an extreme move in the direction pointed by the legislation of the 1920's when the Alien Land Laws were passed. In

this sense, it was a throwback reversing a developing trend away from officially sanctioned discrimination, especially with respect to the Nisei. The action was based solidly in the attitudes of a particular general of the Western Defense Command--General J. L. DeWitt--whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice (McWilliams 1944: 251).

The evacuation order was moreover a result of political pressures by such organizations as the California Shipper-Grower Association, which wanted to reduce competition from Japanese in the agricultural production fields where they had been most successful. Pressure from this and similar organizations and from newspapers and politicians supporting anti-Japanese feeling built up steadily beginning a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December, 1941 (Grodzins 1949: 19-61). "Popular" clamor for evacuation of Japanese Americans, however, did not as a matter of fact grow strong until late February, 1942, three months after Pearl Harbor and two months after the various organizations of agricultural producers and patriotic associations (such as the American Legion and the Native Sons of the Golden West) had put pressure on politicians such as Attorney General Earl Warren of California. The evacuation order thus had roots in the past interethnic relations of the West Coast, elements of which were re-stimulated in 1942 by special interest groups. The anti-Japanese activities gained new intensity as Japanese military victories followed in rapid succession in the Pacific theatre of war during 1942.

The Policy of the War Relocation Authority

The practical problems which the WRA was created to find solutions for was a complex one rooted in intense racial prejudices re-stimulated by a recently declared war, the economic displacement of a small but highly productive and culturally well-adapted ethnic minority, and a nation attempting to equip itself rapidly to carry on a war on a global scale. The problems arising from the sudden displacement of the 110,000 people, it became immediately apparent, could not be solved on a piecemeal, ad hoc basis (U.S. Department of Interior 1946: 24-43). The evacuees were definitely excluded by the Executive Order from free movement in the four west coast states. Represented as dangerous, or potentially so, they could not, according to the terms of the executive order, be introduced into the population in any way in the states of the Western Defense Command. Moreover, meetings of the governors of states immediately to the east rejected any plan for feeding the evacuees into their populations as free-moving new residents and workers. While the WRA was still recruiting its upper levels of administrators, it became perfectly clear that the evacuees would have to be concentrated in locations where their immediate physical needs could be taken care of, while the policy makers of the new agency cast about for longer term solutions.

The policy questions which the WRA had to decide, once the physical locations and facilities of places of concentration were determined, required answers concerning the legal status of the United States citizens who constituted two-thirds (65,000) of the whole group, the probable legal status of any program of detention in the light of imminent decisions by the Supreme Court on suits brought by evacuees, industrial needs which the

adult working members of the evacuee group might fill in a nation at war, the trends of congressional and public opinion with respect to evacuees moving out of temporary centers during the war or after, the probable effects on evacuees of confinement in government managed communities for the duration of the war, to mention only those issues of fundamental importance. These questions were taken up during the months between April, when Milton Eisenhower the new director of the agency took charge, and October, 1942, when the evacuees had nearly all been moved into what were called "relocation centers," and Dillon S. Myer had replaced Eisenhower as director.

The three men who played probably the greatest part in the making of the long term policy decisions were Myer, whose experience was in agricultural extension and as Director of the Soil Conservation Service; Philip Glick, a lawyer with wide experience in government; and Dr. John H. Provinse, an anthropologist whose interest was the application of social science and who had served in the Soil Conservation Service and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. The policy framework which they constructed and which became the persisting structure within which WRA operated for some four years rested on the following assumptions (Myer 1971: 276-99): (1) any sort of detention of United States citizens without individual charges was sure to be declared illegal and hence the Nisei could not be kept in the relocation centers; (2) life in the centers under bureaucratic supervision would be destructive of individual initiative and hence was generally undesirable and should be as brief as possible; (3) resettlement under conditions of ordinary free life in the United States should be the immediate aim; (4) this should be done during wartime, because it would be

much more difficult afterwards if evacuees had spent years under the administered conditions. The decisions, in short, led to a policy which called for as quick as possible emptying of the relocation centers and the prompt re-establishment of the evacuees in the general society.

An alternative policy proposed by John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs who had encouraged setting up two of the centers on Indian Reservations, was as follows. Plans should be made for maintaining all evacuees in the relocation centers for the duration of the war, whatever length of time that turned out to be. Resources should be devoted to establishing the best possible living conditions; agricultural production should be promptly established which would both help the nation in wartime and give Japanese Americans scope in what had been their most successful economic field. Communities built on this basis would provide security which could not be hoped for elsewhere in a nation at war with Japan. Schools, hospitals, and community government should be developed for highest quality and the evacuees should take important parts in managing them. This proposed policy was rejected by the top administrators of the WRA and at that point Collier withdrew from any further administrative involvement.

The general policy adopted furthered certain of the processes, such as cultural assimilation, which had shaped Japanese American adaptation to pre-war United States. The policy was posited on the view that the relocation centers defied constitutional legality; the WRA as a government agency could not therefore encourage their maintenance, except as places of voluntary residence for evacuees--"way stations" on the evacuees' path back into the general society. Once the legal basis of policy was defined

in these terms, then certain responsibilities had to be accepted by the WRA. The first was the maintenance of the centers, not as quasi-permanent communities for economic and social development, but merely as reasonably comfortable places to and from which evacuees could move according to their circumstances. The second basic responsibility was to facilitate in every way possible the movement of evacuees out of the centers into the general stream of American society, this movement to be contingent on no events in the war or elsewhere; every individual or family who chose to move out must be assisted immediately in every way possible. These were the foundations of WRA policy; they clearly rested on a value position with reference to the past and future of the Japanese Americans. This was that it was desirable to eliminate every restriction on the movement and participation of Nisei in American life.

The WRA proceeded to dedicate its activities to this goal. The main outlines of policy were maintained until the agency was liquidated in June, 1946. In response to Congressional pressures some modification took place, primarily a program for the separation of the "loyal and the disloyal" which resulted in detention of those designated "disloyal," whether Nisei or Issei, for the duration of the war. The ultimate goal, that is, the emptying of the relocation centers before the end of the war, was actually achieved, as a result of the timing of Supreme Court decisions, reformulation of War Department policy, and the Japanese and German surrenders.

The Bureau of Sociological Research and the
Community Analysis Section

The Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, in initially taking the responsibility for the Poston relocation center--on the Colorado

Indian Reservation in Arizona--put into operation a Bureau of Sociological Research directed by Dr. Alexander H. Leighton. The purpose of this unit within the center administration was to carry on a study of the behavior of the human beings involved, both evacuees and administrators (Leighton and Spicer 1945: 71-97); it was believed such study would be useful in understanding human relations in administered communities in general. An immediate important goal, as conceived by its director, was contribution to solution of the practical problems in the developing community aiding the growth of informed and intelligent administration. Leighton went to work in the Poston Relocation Center in late June, 1942. He was a psychiatrist much influenced by contacts with Clyde Kluckhohn, anthropologist, and John Collier, social activist and administrator. Leighton organized an applied research unit called the Bureau of Sociological Research. After nearly a year the administration of the BSR along with the Poston Relocation Center was taken over by the WRA, when John Collier withdrew from administrative responsibility. At the same time Leighton, who had been lent by the Navy in which he held the rank of Lieutenant Commander, left the BSR for other wartime service.

The BSR had been strongly encouraged by Dr. John H. Provinse, Chief of Community Management in the WRA. Meanwhile he had begun in the autumn of 1942 to work with an anthropologist, John F. Embree, towards setting up a social science unit in the WRA. He had been assisted in planning by Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago (Leighton 1945: 374). The efforts of Provinse and of Embree, who had first been hired as Historian of the agency, resulted in the formation of a Community Analysis Section in the Division of Community Management in February, 1943 (Embree

1944). The conception was similar in some ways to that of the BSR. The emphasis was strongly on immediate aid to administration through the constant analysis of the relocation centers as working communities. There was less emphasis on the maintenance of a record of what happened, although it was implicit that this would be a result of the ongoing community analysis. There was also emphasis on interpreting the customs and ways of thought of the Japanese Americans concerning which the administrators were unfamiliar. This had been emphasized in persuading the director of the WRA that a Community Analysis Section would be useful. The unit was much easier to justify to administrators on the basis of interpreting Japanese ways than of reporting on and analyzing a human community. However, the decision to include the Community Analysis Section in the WRA organization ultimately rested on a sense of urgent need for explanation of disturbances that took place in the relocation centers in the autumn of 1942--an evacuee demonstration against the administration of the Manzahar Center and a general strike at Poston (U.S. Department of Interior 1946: 46-50; Leighton 1945: 162-210).

These disturbances were serious threats to the whole program of the WRA because of the public hostility aroused. The need for better understanding and control of the forces which had been stimulated in the new evacuee communities was recognized by the upper level of administration in the WRA. Community Analysts, it was decided, might provide this understanding and contribute to the growth of more peaceful communities. Thus the qualifications of those hired to work in the Community Analysis Section were defined not so much as those of "Japanese experts" as of persons with knowledge of community organization. The primary qualification was defined

as social science training in the analysis of human communities as wholes, and accordingly the decision was made to recruit persons with backgrounds in sociology and anthropology. Ultimately, 21 individuals were recruited for 10 field and 4 Washington positions, seven of these trained in sociology, 4 in anthropology. Only two, both sociologists, had previous experience in the study of Japanese persons or communities. Only two, both anthropologists, had had any previous experience in the application of social science--M. E. Opler who had worked for a time in the Applied Anthropology Unit of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (McKeel 1944) and G. Gordon Brown who had worked in an experimental program in the application of anthropology in an African colonial situation (Brown and Hutt 1935). The others had been trained purely in academic social science.

The inexperience of the social scientists in applied fields was an influence on and a source of limitation in the work accomplished. It was true also that the administrators with whom the analysts worked most closely also lacked experience which equipped them to make use of staff social scientists. The situation, therefore, was fluid and experimental. A conception of suitable and effective roles within the organization did not exist ready-made, but had to be defined as the working situation developed.

Working Roles and Relationships

Relations with administrators. The general role for analysts was conceived as staff advisers to the administrators. However, just how and to whom they were to channel information and analysis was far from clearly defined and remained to be worked out by administrators and analysts as they came into contact with one another. The initial conception was very

general, namely, that analysts would develop a stockpile of information which might be drawn on by any members of the WRA staff. It was planned that this would be done at the relocation center level and that information prepared there would be channeled to the central (Washington) office and made available to upper level administrators. Circulation of information beyond any one local unit would be the function of the Washington Community Analysis Office.

The staff advisory role took various forms and slowly crystallized in different ways at local and Washington levels. In the BSR there was a very early (within two months) establishment of a pattern of reporting relationship. This consisted of the attendance of the director of the BSR at all general top staff meetings, in which he participated freely, reporting orally on information which the unit had gathered and responding to questions of administrators (division heads) present. This was supplemented by much informal contact between the BSR director and the Project Director (the chief administrator) and also by the submission of some written reports to him. During the major crisis of the Poston strike, four months after the establishment of the unit, the pattern of regular participation of the director of the BSR with division heads in top policy meetings became fully accepted. In the course of a year a flow of information and comment was established, probably most effectively through informal contacts rather than in formal staff meetings.

At the WRA relocation centers similar lines of communication were set up and became the rule at some centers, but there was no one pattern. In four there were never any patterned arrangements. The Community Analyst worked largely in isolation from other parts of the administration, talking informally with various members of the administration and with evacuees

in administrative positions in the center, passing on selected information and commenting on issues as they arose. In such centers the only formal and regular channels of communication were those required by the Washington office of the Community Analysis Section in a periodic reporting system on assigned topics.

At the other extreme were arrangements like those of the BSR during its existence at Poston, namely, regular attendance at top level staff meetings with freedom to participate on the same basis as the administrators present. In only two centers did this sort of communication become established. In the remaining five centers no clear patterns were established for local communication; they varied from intermittent participation in staff meetings, on request, to informal contacts with various administrators at other times. In three or four centers there were regular requests for written reports by the local center director on matters in which he was especially interested and no formal participation with any other administrators.

In general, it can be said that communication channels tended to be informal and that they tended to be as much with all levels of staff as with top administration. What actually developed depended heavily on the personalities of the Community Analysts and of the administrators whom they were supposed to advise. There were analysts who never became focused on any of the practical problems in the centers and spent their time gathering materials for ethnographic descriptions of center life; at the same time there were others who became so concerned with and personally involved in certain selected practical problems that they never succeeded in preparing on paper systematic analyses of any of them.

The staff advisory role was developed in the Washington office very much as it had been at Poston by the BSR. The head of the CA section participated in top staff meetings regularly along with the chiefs of division--Community Management, Solicitor's Office, Operations, Administration, Reports (Public Relations), Statistics, and Relocation--under the chairmanship of the Director of the agency. The CA head came to be accepted as having a fund of specialized information and knowledge--evacuee attitudes, reactions, and interests--and was frequently called on to relate proposed or operating plans and programs to this body of information. What he offered, based on reports from the centers, went into the mill along with the current information on United States public opinion, legal developments on evacuee status, budget prospects, evacuee reception in places of resettlement, and other matters as the basis for decisions by the Director. This participation was entirely oral. Only very rarely was a written report on any specific subject asked for by the top administration for use in policy meetings. However, some requests did come for particular written reports from the Community Management, Statistics, and Relocation chiefs of division. The subject matter of most written reports prepared was decided on by the Community Analysis staff on the basis of their knowledge of areas of special concern, ignorance, or unconcern on the part of the administrators locally or in Washington; perhaps fewer than twenty percent were prepared in response to requests from Washington top administrators.

The written reports of the CA section dealt with a great variety of subjects. As indicated, the majority were prepared on the basis of the Section head's own estimation of needs in the agency. The head and his staff spent time with a few Washington administrators keeping in touch

with program development and frustration at that level; also letters from the centers (both through and outside formal channels) reported evacuee reactions and attitudes and other matters. On this basis topics were selected for more extended treatment and mimeographed reports were prepared and disseminated throughout the WRA administration, at local and Washington levels. The early reports were occasional and often amounted to more than 20 pages. The later reports were brief and frequent, such as the 2-3 page "Weekly Trend Reports" during the last year of WRA's existence.

Relations with the Administered People. The BSR at Poston and the CA units at all the centers maintained staffs of evacuees. The evacuees were paid at the nominal relocation center wage rates, the CA offices averaging perhaps three or four staff members in addition to typists and clerks. Nisei predominated, but there were also Issei in all the CA units. In some centers the evacuee staff acted as somewhat informal advisers to the Community Analyst, in others there was formal organization with regular staff meetings and written report assignments. The evacuee staff performed in the role of key informants constituting important channels of communication with each evacuee community as a whole, and in addition many evacuee staff members maintained their own informal key informants. These networks were the bases on which understanding of the nature of the communities was built. In the CA offices the view of the communities derived from evacuee relations was combined with the administrative view as a result of the Analysts' role in the administrative organization.

The inclusion of evacuees in the CA staffs resulted in the work of the Community Analysts becoming fairly well known widely in the evacuee communities. What went on in each CA office was relayed back into the communities, so that there was two way communication through the lines established. The extent to which a given community was informed of CA activities naturally depended on the relations of the CA evacuee personnel within their communities. A few CA offices were in close touch with the communities as a result of the establishment of effective working relations with influential persons among the evacuees, usually Issei, or older persons. Others remained somewhat isolated from the total relocation center life as a result of limitation of the Community Analyst's relations to Nisei who were not them-

selves closely involved with any but a segment of Nisei. The reporting of community trends and developments varied, also on the same basis, so that some CA offices reported from a base deep in the total community and others did not. It can be said that fullest understanding of the nature of the communities in terms of evacuee viewpoints was derived from only three or four of the centers.

In addition to the regular operations nearly all Community Analysts maintained confidential files of material, not open to all the employees of the section. These contained notes on individuals, information which came to the attention of the Analyst in the course of his work, even though unsolicited. The contents of such files were used in connection with advising administrators at the discretion of the Analyst and inevitably colored reports, although the specific information was not communicated. Confidential files also contained materials which evacuees volunteered, but on the basis that the source not be revealed.

The Washington office of the CA section urged that communication be established with representatives of the evacuee formal organizations in the centers, such as the members of the Community Councils and the Block Managers, as well as influential persons who did not hold offices. No formal relations of this kind were reported as having been established by the Community Analysts. That is, the Analysts did not maintain regular meetings with the Councils or Managers at which their analyses of trends and current conditions were presented. Nevertheless active and influential persons in the communities, both men and women, did establish informal contacts with members of the CA staffs. In such contacts they were interested in both learning what they could about members of the administration and their policies and also in communicating what they thought important about evacuee

positions and policies. CA offices thus sometimes became links in the political networks which developed in the centers and through which the evacuees attempted to influence relocation center administration. This contributed another dimension to the understanding the Analysts gained of the centers.

Initially with regard to both the BSR and in the CA sections deep suspicion was present among evacuees. The offices were regarded as part of a spying system maintained by the administration for close surveillance of the evacuees. It was assumed that the research activities were designed to cover the hidden objective of collecting information on subversive activities among Japanese Americans. Fear that information would be used for this purpose led at first to hostility. However, during the first few months of operation, as evacuees went to work in the offices and confidence in the particular analysts grew, the work of the Community Analysis Section, and the BSR before it, became accepted on its face value.

The Product: The Nature of the Reporting

The reports produced fall into four categories: (1) ethnographic description, (2) current trend reporting, (3) situational analysis, and (4) evacuee viewpoints (Spicer 1946). All the types were focused on defining situations in which the administrators recognized problems; the administrators' concern was the criterion for selection. Special emphasis was placed on making clear those factors in the situations which arose from the evacuees' cultural background and/or current situational dilemmas. The CA section regarded as its major responsibility the analysis of the evacuees' behavior. However, reports did not deal exclusively with evacuee viewpoints and characteristics; they dealt also, although the emphasis was much less

frequently there, with the viewpoints and characteristics of the administrators. The book by Leighton, The Governing of Men, reported explicitly on administrators' behavior and analyzed it in relation to WRA program objectives. Leighton described and illustrated two general types of behavior--"people-minded" and "thing-minded"--and presented detailed analyses of the consequences of administrative behavior of the contrasting types. At the time Leighton published this study he was not a member of the WRA staff. The CAs never made such explicit written analyses for presentation through the regular channels to administrators. However, it should be pointed out that analysts in several centers and in the Washington office frequently discussed informally with administrators the consequences of different kinds of administrative approaches. No collation of analysts' conclusions on this topic was ever made.

In general the Analysts' written reports were descriptive and analytical. A technique of recommendation, of assessment of current programs in the light of possible alternatives, was never developed. The overwhelming impression is that analysts were too preoccupied with becoming familiar with and describing the situations which confronted them. One senses that the Analysts generally accepted and concurred in the value position adopted by the top policy makers of the WRA--which we have called "non-restrictive policy." They were also sensitive to actions by individual administrators and to policies adopted in particular centers which they regarded as inconsistent with the general objectives. However, the CA section did not assume a role in the systematic guidance of policy either at the Washington or the local level. The conferences of Analysts called by the Washington office were devoted to consideration of techniques of data gathering, forms of reporting, and exchange of information about situations in the several centers.

One type of report more common at the beginning of the program, but appearing sporadically throughout was simple description of customs of Japanese origin which appeared strange to the administrators. These consisted of short notes on Japanese language usage, courtesy customs, folk beliefs, and other miscellaneous matters which appeared to analysts often to be causes of misunderstanding between administrators and evacuees. These were popular with a certain segment of administrators, but were not generally regarded as important by top administrators. Longer reports were prepared dealing with more complex and deeply misunderstood matters such as the status and cultural position of the Kibeis, Nisei educated in Japan. A long report, ultimately boiled down to 14 pages, on this subject was widely circulated and was rebuted to have cleared up many misapprehensions.

A second type of report sought to increase understanding of particular situations which disturbed administrators or appeared to administrators and analysts as potential sources of misunderstanding. These were ordinarily fairly long and contained implied recommendations, but did not become explicit on recommended action. Examples are "A Report on an Unorganized Relocation Center" which dealt with the situation in the early stages of community organization in a single center; it attempted to point out factors influencing evacuees to organize themselves to oppose paternalistic tendencies in the administration of the center. Another CA report, "The Tule Lake Incident," in the wake of a rebellion against WRA administration at what became the segregation center, tried to point out causes, such as for example, the concentration in a single center of dissident elements and pro-Japan leadership following the "sorting of the loyal from the disloyal." Such reports were not widely read. They were long; they were essentially academic in approach, tending to summarize past events and circulated at times when the fast-moving events of the program quickly made them obsolete in the context

of newly developing administrative problems.

Closely related to the "situational" analyses were reports which simply reported evacuee viewpoints and were essentially records of interviews with evacuees of various ages and backgrounds. The most notable of these were a result of the "registration program" in the spring of 1943 when the WRA was forced, to carry out a program of separation of "loyal and dis-loyal." The complex set of factors which made it impossible to carry out any realistic separation of this sort became evident as soon as the interview program on which the separation was to be based was inaugurated. The simple record of interviews revealed more clearly for the WRA staff than any formal description the nature of the problems for evacuees. Such reports as "The Significant Factors in Requests for Repatriation and Expatriation" conjunction with the program. Similar reporting, although not in the same verbatim way, was also carried out by the CA section in surveys and interviews in West Coast areas to which evacuees began returning as the program for center closure was inaugurated in 1945. These contained interviews with non-Japanese in communities to which Japanese Americans were returning. They were used in planning specific strategy for particular groups of evacuees on their return.

In the final phase of the WRA program the CA section produced a long series of rapidly prepared weekly trend reports, attempting to report to Washington, to center staff, and to evacuee groups in the centers the reactions of evacuees to what finally became an involuntary movement geared to a deadline for ending the WRA. The trend reports were focused on the effects on evacuee and tended to give much less attention to the administrators' attitudes. There was little detectable influence of these reports on ad-

ministrative action, although they were sometimes used by evacuee groups in their efforts to slow down the program for closure.

Finally, one may gain insight into the assumptions in terms of which the CA section was guided by examining its final report, Impounded People, edited by the head of the section (Spicer et al 1969). This sums up the important findings of the CA section during its period of existence. The general form is that of an academic report, descriptive and analytical; there is a conceptual framework in social science, but it is purely implicit in the organization. There are no recommendations; there is no framework of processual analysis related to the action goals of the WRA as an administrative agency. The only relationship which the report bears to agency operation is that it details the changes in the communities of Japanese Americans as they responded to WRA management. The focus, implicit in the report, is indeed the dynamics of human relations under administered community conditions. The reports describes the growth of the different social structures which developed in the centers, those among the various segments of the evacuee population and also those which linked the administrators and the Japanese Americans. The cultural products of these social relations, such as the concept of "a day's work" in the centers, evacuee opposition to and acceptance of the WRA resettlement program, motivations behind declarations of loyalty and disloyalty, and finally reactions to center closure are described and their manifestations in the lives of the evacuees analyzed. This final report of the section tends to summarize the approach of the CA staff, but some individual Analysts did not wholly accept the academic approach and became advocates of evacuee causes, notably on behalf of the "expatriates."

Ethical Issues and Responsibilities.

The CAS, and the BSR before it, accepted as primary responsibility the obligation to serve the WRA agency as employees. This meant reporting to the WRA administrators the results of research which they were paid to carry out. The obligation included recognition of a distinction between information about individuals and about group behavior. What Analysts learned about individuals was not made available to WRA administrators. Any use of such information was carried out only after the individual references and sources were rendered unidentifiable. Administrators were not ready at first to accept this distinction, and acceptance came only after some resistance. The refusal to report on individuals made CA appear as largely useless in the eyes of some administrators. A further definition of role had to be insisted on the CAS: information bearing on internal security of the centers and on espionage activities were designated as completely outside the province of CA. It was clear at the beginning that administrators were wholly unfamiliar with the functions of a social science analyst. The analysts had to themselves define the role in the light of a conception of ethical responsibilities at that time not yet clearly developed in their own profession.

Generally the analysts saw themselves as having clear obligations to the objects of their investigations, the evacuees. These were expressed in the general statement of WRA regarding "non-restrictive" policy. Acceptance of the general obligation to promote evacuee welfare did not, however, include any arrangement for reporting results of research to the administered people. Only the WRA was recognized as formal client. Analysts generally accepted the role of promoting evacuee welfare only indirectly - through the agency of

the WRA. The evacuee staffs of the Analysts nevertheless served as channels of communication with the evacuee community at large and transmitted, as did some Analysts themselves, the insights and understandings gained through CA work of the nature of the communities as wholes. All the Analysts maintained some sense of reciprocal obligation and differed only in their degree of effectiveness in realizing it. Individual evacuees often also found assistance in maintaining morale, securing information, and other support through contacts with various Analyst. Thus it may be said that the sense of obligation to serve the interests of evacuees, who were the primary object of study, was never formalized, although it was constantly on the tongues of analysts and led most of them as private individuals to become identified with evacuee viewpoints. Awareness of this tendency in some centers led to distrust of CA on the part of some administrators.

In only a general way was responsibility to social science colleagues accepted and recognized. The reports of the CAS were often prepared more from an academic than an administrators' point of view, largely as result of the Analysts' training, but fell short of relating findings to any body of concept and theory. Alexander Leighton in his report on the Poston relocation center presented conceptualized and theoretically interpreted data as well as a descriptive account with recommendations (Leighton 1945:247-367). A few published reports, by CA analysts, following their tour of duty with WRA, did relate to the body of knowledge in the social science (e.g. Opler, M.K. 1958; Spicer 1952).

Evaluation

For comparative analysis of cases in any effort to promote general understanding in the application of social science, we ought to have answers to the following questions:

1. How did the program served relate to processes of social and cultural change which it was designed to encourage or discourage?
2. What goals was the use of social science designed to further?
3. What roles were established specifically for the application of social science?
4. Were these consistent with the proposed application?
5. What alternative goals and uses were possible in the given situation?
6. What contribution did the application make to the goals of the program?

1. The WRA program was built on the principle that the citizen members of a minority group ought to be removed as rapidly as possible from restrictions which a wartime action had imposed on the. WRA policy set as goal that the Nisei be restored to full and equal participation with other citizens in United States society and that Issei be returned to their former, peaceful alien status. This policy placed the WRA in direct opposition to the restrictive position taken at first in 1942 by the War Department and allied the WRA with the Justice Department which had opposed evacuation (Grodzins 1949:231-73). In general, the WRA position was in support of what after the war became a trend towards extension of full civil rights to Orientals in the United States. The goals set by the WRA had to be worked for in the face of active opposition from citizen groups such as the American Legion, the House Unamerican Activities Commiettee, individual Congressmen

and Senators, influential columnists such as Westbrook Pegler, and many others (Myer 1971:157-84).

2. The basic policy of WRA had been decided on before social scientists as such were brought in to the agency. One anthropologist-turned-administrator played an active role in the basic policy determination. Three later high policy decisions had to be made after the establishment of the social science units. These were the decisions that resulted in (a) sorting the loyal from the disloyal and segregating and maintaining complete restriction of movement on the "disloyal," (U.S. Dept of Interior 1946:50-74) (b) establishing a large "Relocation" Division of the WRA with an aggressive program for immediate resettling of evacuees outside the relocation centers (ibid.: 132-42), and (c) closing the centers out completely during 1945 before the end of the war (ibid.:143-51). Formal participation of the social scientists was not directly sought in the making of these decisions; they were not invited into the top policy circle which decided them.

The immediate problems which gave rise to the hiring of social scientists were demonstrations in the relocation centers by evacuees against specific features of relocation center management. The issues involved in these demonstrations came to be regarded by administrators as deeper than the complaints over, for example, inadequate housing and hospital facilities commonly voiced by evacuees. It was recognized in a general way that conflict among evacuees stemming from factional and generational splits in the pre-war communities were intensified by the experience of evacuation and the conditions of involuntary concentration in the relocation centers. WRA administrators concluded that social scientists could help in informing the administration concerning the many causes of conflict, both within the evacuee population and between them and the administrators (Embree 1944:280-281). The scientists

were therefore hired to study the evacuee attitudes and reactions under the relocation center circumstances and report them to the administrators. This, it was thought, would make for administration in the better interests of both evacuees and administrators and would prevent conditions arising in the centers which would obstruct the program for removal of restrictions. The goals, then, which social science was to serve were those of bringing about the most peaceful possible arrangements in the centers with the least possible restriction on the evacuees.

3. The social scientists were established as staff advisers to the WRA administrators at the level of operations, not of policy formulation. They were regarded as facilitators of the programs already and to be established. Their responsibilities were wholly advisory and they were permitted to fulfill these in a variety of ways. No rigid structuring of their relations with the administrators or evacuees was required; in general they functioned in the following way. They set up offices in the centers and hired evacuees as research assistants. They planned their own research topics and operations with direction from the Washington CAS office rather than from the local administrators. Some operated almost entirely as data gathering organizations oriented toward academic interests rather than the immediate practical problems of administration. Most operated as informal advisers to the top administration on current problems and as contributors to analysis of the problem situations identified by the Washington CAS staff. At the Washington level there was regular participation in top staff meetings, where the CA representative was recognized as having specialized information along with that of division heads. This specialized knowledge concerned evacuee attitudes, reactions, and viewpoints relevant to aspects of the ongoing programs. It was treated by the

Director of the agency (who made the ultimate decisions) as one type of factor that should be taken into consideration in any program formulation or evaluation. In short, information about evacuees was considered along with budget considerations, personnel capabilities, intergovernmental relations, public opinion, and international relations as necessary for most decisions of importance. In some instances it had the highest priority, in others very low priority.

In connection with the three high policy decisions made after the social scientists were hired, the kind of information in which the analysts became specialists was regarded as important but not of overriding importance. Thus in connection with the segregation policy and program, the factors of primary importance were decided by top administration to be (1) dominant attitudes in the United States Congress and (2) maintenance of the non-restrictive policy with regard to a majority but not all of the evacuees. The CAS collected information which made it clear along with information gathered by United States Army Intelligence and other means that a simple separation of evacuees into "loyal" and "disloyal" was not possible. The process of interviewing itself altered people's attitudes moment by moment; most Nisei were in a state of doubt about their loyalty, whether to parents or to a country which flouted their citizenship rights. Dozens of factors which made the categorization irrelevant to actual danger to the United States were uncovered and led to conviction by WRA administrators that the segregation policy demanded by various groups in the United States could never accomplish its ostensible goals. Nevertheless, WRA decided that if it conceded and set up the program, this would make possible the carrying out of the policy for lifting all restriction on evacuees who did not declare themselves "disloyal." WRA therefore proceeded with segregation, the knowledge that it had of evacuee

attitudes, initially as a result of CAS research, not being given the greatest weight in the decision.

The CAS was also through its interviews and surveys instrumental in making clear the nature of what was called "resistance to freedom," that is, relectance to leave the centers in response to WRA efforts to open them and encourage the evacuees to resettle somewhere in the United States while the war was still in progress. Most Analysts inclined to regard the resettlement program as unworkable. However, WRA did not scale down the program to resettle as many evacuees as possible; on the contrary they steadily intensified efforts. Ultimately it was demonstrated that only a small percentage, about one-fifth of the evacuees were interested in resettlement. The rest remained in the centers despite the aggressive resettlement. The rest remained in the centers despite the aggressive resettlement program. In this sense the CA analysis was demonstrated to be sound. Yet CA reports were used as a basis for devising techniques aimed at breaking down evacuee leadership which opposed immediate "forced" resettlement.

In general Analysts (and certainly this was true of the author) did not approve the relocation program as it was developed. They regarded it as unrealistic, in the sense that it turned out to be and also as working against the policy of maintaining the centers as places of some security. However, CAS never made the analysis which could have been decisive in this policy decision, namely, one which would have included a study of the relations between relocated evacuees and those remaining in the centers and projections regarding effects on the center life of alternative volumes of resettled evacuees over different periods. Here alternative programs could have been assessed, but the method was not employed and hence a kind of unstated conflict

persisted between CAS and the Relocation Division program.

Something similar to the resettlement program developed in connection with the final program of center closure. Here again with their attention fixed on evacuee attitudes in the centers, Analysts generally regarded the closure program as unworkable and believed that if it were made to work, it would in some degree do so in the face of a principle of maximum humane treatment of evacuees which WRA was thought to stand for. Nevertheless WRA did make early closure work.

As in the case of resettlement, it appears in hindsight that the conception of their work which the Analysts maintained was not conducive to making long term predictions. They were completely absorbed in understanding the immediate situations in front of them, which called for much close attention and the constant gathering of new data in the ever-changing situation. The head of the section might have arranged to remove himself with other Analysts far enough from the demands of analyzing the immediate scene to allow time for developing a longer term view of the whole and of the processes which were in operation. This was carried out by Leighton as part of the BSR program, and probably contributed to the effectiveness of The Governing of Men. However CAS did not adopt the technique.

4. The advisory role as developed was consistent with advising on short term problems, but not on long range policy. The top administrators, chiefly those who made the first basic policy decisions, made the long term analyses, not the social scientists. It was not the Analysts who guided the administrators into those decisions which led to the lifting of restrictions on the Japanese Americans; the top level administrators with some assistance from information supplied by the social science staff were responsible for all basic policy.

5. Alternatives not adopted which would have been more or less consistent with the original basic polity decisions would have been (1) to maintain the centers with no active resettlement program and consequently probably only a tiny trickle of evacuees, if any, into the larger society during the war and (2) to develop the centers of John Collier proposed into vigorous communities engaged in agricultural production and a variety of creative community activities. So long as no restraints were imposed on evacuee movement out of the centers these would have been possible even after the Supreme Court decisions in the Endo and other cases declaring the detention of Nisei unconstitutional (Myer 1971:261-71). Maintaining the centers but without WRA taking responsibility for obtaining jobs and acceptance outside them would have been a negative policy, a sort of fence-sitting, neutral program. It very probably would have resulted in growing dissatisfaction among both WRA personnel and evacuees. If, on the other hand, a policy of making the centers the best possible communities there would have been interesting, perhaps creative possibilities, but only if Congress were willing to appropriate funds throughout the war for this sort of development. Moreover certain respects such a policy would have been unacceptable to the Issei, who would have asked for whom they were developing the center land: who would ultimately benefit from their labor? They would have had to be assured, if that were possible, of a developing stake in the centers commensurate with the effort put into them. There is a great chance that this program would have failed for lack of cooperation, especially judging from the limitations on work within the centers which the Issei and many Nisei imposed from the beginning. Even if successful, there would ultimately have come the problem of resettlement after the war with no active program relating them to the United States public having been carried on in the meantime. Such considera-

tions as these would have to be analyzed, if the social and administrative wisdom of the actual WRA program is to be fully assessed.

Other alternatives urged by various segments of the United States population were in complete opposition to the basic value premise on which the WRA worked and cannot be imagined or explored from the WRA basis. These required the maintenance of such restriction as developed in the months immediately following the evacuation order--all families held under total surveillance, Nisei already in the armed services forced out the put with their families in the restricted communities. Administration with such goals probably would have developed on a basis of increasing restriction; increasingly repressive measures would have been required, and the effects would have been deeply negative with regard to maintaining and stimulating Nisei loyalty to the United States. The effects of repressive, or even ordinary restrictive, administration on family life as well as on national loyalty would have been destructive. The fact that this alternative had strong advocates in United States society could be emphasized (Grodzins 1949:361-74; Myer 1941:91-107) because that fact makes clearer the significance of the choice which the WRA administrators made.

A third sort of alternative was on the minds of some of the Analysts from the beginning of their service. This called for the greater participation of Japanese Americans in the policy decisions of the WRA. This was advocated almost immediately by various Japanese organizations after the evacuation (Hosokawa 1969). Several organizations were formed at different times for the purpose of "helping the WRA solve our problems." The Japanese American Citizens League which voted to cooperate with evacuation at the

beginning and therefore earned the hostility of most Issei and many Nisei maintained an informal advisory relationship with the top administration of the WRA throughout the war period until the dissolution of the agency (Myer 1971:XVIII). Without ever analyzing all the consequences of participation of Japanese Americans outside and inside the centers in policy determination most Analysts were advocates of greater participation. Again, however, they succumbed to the "urgency" of the moment and spent their time making analyses of relocation center situations in relocation center context rather than in the context of the total Japanese American society. They did not therefore contribute to the understanding of this alternative or provide any basis for the rejection of it; the WRA administrators did, however, decide against formal Japanese-American participation, except in very limited ways in the Community Councils in the centers (Kimball 1946). The effects need further analysis.

6. The social scientists made an as-yet unmeasured contribution to clearer understanding of Japanese American viewpoints and cultural orientations by WRA administrators. This was applied by the administrators in the organization of community institutions in the centers by placing evacuees in charge of various operations and by asking evacuees for advice. The important differences in life orientations of Nisei and Issei came to be understood by top administrators with some aid from the BSR and CA reports oral and written. It is a question how much the social scientists added to the understanding which developed among the more sensitive of the administrators in the course of trying to do their jobs. What the Analysts contributed cannot now be measured. They were in most centers and in the Washington office an important part of the process of administrators getting acquainted with the administered and in the process of changing stereotypes and attitudes to permit good working relations.

They assisted administrators, and in some instances evacuees, in becoming aware of the factors stemming from ethnic group experience and from bureaucratic administration which gave rise to strain and sometimes conflict in various center situations.

The reporting by the Analysts contributed to an awareness of the problems of the evacuees as seen from their own viewpoint. It was by no means the only source of such knowledge. We have mentioned the fact that the Director of the WRA and other employees of the agency kept in close touch personally with especially Nisei leaders. A broad understanding of the nature of Japanese American life before, during, and after the evacuation diffused rather generally through the WRA staff in the course of the intensive contacts among individuals in the relocation centers. The Reports Division of the WRA carried on considerable research into the circumstances of Japanese American life leading up to the crisis of evacuation and made summaries of their findings which were widely read by WRA personnel. The Community Analysis Section was one of the several means through which this diffusion of information took place, but it was more than that. It had been established explicitly to study and make known the characteristics of evacuees. It constituted a formal recognition by the bureaucratic agency of the importance of knowing the administered people on their own terms. Community Analysis became a symbol of administrative concern for unprejudiced understanding of the Japanese American people.

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ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

by

Edward H. Spicer

Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of the Yale Law School, denounced the evacuation of Americans of Japanese ancestry at the beginning of World War II as America's "worst wartime mistake" (Rostow 1945a). He also referred to the legal cases arising out of the evacuation as "disasters," viewed from the standpoint of civil rights (Rostow 1945b). Rostow regarded the evacuation and subsequent incarceration of Japanese Americans as a serious threat to fundamental citizenship rights. He understood the attack as based on considerations of race and regarded it as indistinguishable, in the legal view, from the position of the Nazis with respect to the Jews in Germany. Rostow was one of the few public figures who did not shrink from stating this point of view in the midst of war in a United States deeply hostile to Japan and the Japanese. Yet his position was precisely that taken by United States Attorney General Biddle up until a few weeks before the evacuation order (Grodzins 1949: 242, 258-9).

Denunciation of the action taken in March, 1942, by President Roosevelt ordering the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the west coast has been vigorous ever since the event (ten Broek 1954; Daniels 1971). Although the Supreme Court upheld the evacuation as constitutional on the grounds of "military necessity," the decision was by majority vote and the dissenting justices stated strong opinions against the singling out of the more than 80,000 citizens of the United States on the basis of their racial origins (Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214: 233-42, 242-48). The fact

is that the governmental action took place in the face of vigorous opposition by the Department of Justice and cannot in any way be regarded as the result either of consensus among high government officials or concerted, widespread public demand. The evacuation was rather a response to limited special interest groups on the west coast, such as the Shipper-Growers' Association in business competition with Japanese Americans, and constituted a hasty concession in government circles to the implacable prejudice of a single army general who happened to command the strategic west coast military area (Grodzins 1949: 362-5).

Nevertheless in March, 1942, the evacuation was ordered and there was no rescinding it. The consequences directly and immediately affected some 110,000 people and had to be dealt with promptly. What has since been generally judged as a very bad decision led to a determined effort by the United States government to undo the effects of that decision. The undoing of the evils has been paid far less attention than it merits. Within a few days of the evacuation order President Roosevelt created a civilian agency--the War Relocation Authority--and appointed as its director Milton K. Eisenhower, who was soon replaced by Dillon S. Myer, both experienced in the administration of agricultural programs growing out of the New Deal. It became clear early, as these men sought to deal with the problems of 110,000 men, women, and children suddenly made homeless and excluded from the coastal states that the policy pursued would proceed on wholly different assumptions from those that prompted evacuation. It must be emphasized that the War Relocation Authority immediately saw the issue in terms of the restoration of human rights (Myer 1971).

During the thirty-five years since the evacuation the label "concentration camp" has repeatedly been loosely applied to the communities which

were established for the Japanese Americans. To do so obscures the issue which the policy-makers in the WRA recognized as fundamental. As might have been expected as one effect of the decision to evacuate, organizations and individuals immediately appeared who sought to bring about complete imprisonment of all the evacuees, both citizens and non-citizens. Pressures to move in this direction were very strong in a country at war with the Japanese and in a phase of that war, during early 1942, which was going steadily against the United States. There were individuals and groups who assumed that evacuation had been ordered as a result of real evidence that all persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States were a serious threat to the country's security. The facts that very little evidence was ever presented, that that which was offered was extremely flimsy, and that even this was not applicable to the overwhelming majority of the evacuees were not known to the public at large. The influential columnist, Westbrook Pegler, wrote regularly but without solid information that the Japanese Americans were extremely dangerous. The American Legion passed a resolution in convention calling for the total imprisonment of all persons of Japanese ancestry (Spicer 1945). Such influences continued strong during 1942 and led the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives to institute a noisy investigation. The pressures mounted steadily for making concentration camps out of the temporary communities which the Army had built and for which the WRA had taken the administrative responsibility. A segment of Americans had rapidly become convinced as a result of the misleading action of evacuation that the U.S. citizens and their parents were dangerous enemies who should be deprived of all human liberties. This resulted in the urging of real concentration camps, that is, places where the men, women, and children were to be imprisoned indefinitely with no possibility of getting out. The demand for this kind of treatment reached as far as both the House of Representatives

and the United States Senate. It was in this situation of intensifying demand for repressive measures against the evacuees that the War Relocation Authority had to forge its policy for fulfilling the mandate given by President Roosevelt, namely, to provide for the welfare of the evacuees (Tozier 1946).

It would have been an easy course to pursue at the time to accede to the demand for concentration camps. This was not, however, the path which the WRA took. On the contrary, its policy-makers struggled to look at the situation from the point of view of law and civil rights, of the long term cultural adjustment of the Japanese Americans in the United States, and of the effects of arbitrary confinement on a racial basis of young American citizens, in short in the broadest possible framework of human problems of an uprooted segment of the population of the United States. Consideration of the problems from the standpoint that the evacuees were human beings and most of them citizens of the United States required the formulation of a set of principles for shaping policy. The values adopted as the basis of WRA action might be summed up as anti-concentration camp values resulting in non-repressive policy. More positively, the WRA policy-makers chose to open up the whole of the United States apart from the newly restricted west coast to resettlement by the Japanese Americans. This resulted in a conception of the camps which the Army had built for the reception of the evacuees as "way-stations" on the path back into normal American society. This basis of policy was fundamentally opposed to the concentration camp policy advocated by the various groups and individuals who had been misled into believing that the evacuees were dangerous people. It was a difficult policy to pursue, one that required courage on the part of the policy-makers in a nation actively tooling itself for all-out war with the Japanese. Nevertheless the

WRA formulated its policy position with great clarity in the course of its first year of existence and, ultimately with the help of the War Department and always supported strongly by the Department of Justice, followed through to execute the policy with great consistency and finally liquidating itself as the war came to an end (Myer 1971). It is ironic that the way-stations into American life which the WRA called relocation centers are still often spoken of by commentators on the evacuation and its aftermath as "concentration camps" (Bosworth 1967; Daniels 1971). It was precisely to forestalling the appearance of such institutions in American life that the WRA devoted itself.

The WRA approach to achieving its policy goals was many-sided. It maintained constant, close liaison with representatives of the Justice Department which had not essentially changed its position that mass evacuation of American citizens could not be justified on any grounds and which fully expected that forced detention of the Nisei citizens would quickly be declared unconstitutional as Nisei proceeded to bring suit. The top officials of the WRA encouraged the War Department to learn what the Office of Naval Intelligence (Ringle 1942) already knew before evacuation, namely, that there was reason to assume that Nisei were the most actively loyal among American citizens; Army teams were encouraged to visit relocation centers and interview Nisei for service in Army Intelligence units; and in 1943 the WRA cooperated fully with the Army in developing its plan for re-opening Selective Service to Nisei and urging them to volunteer for military service. From the summer of 1942 the WRA arranged for Nisei to leave the camps for seasonal agricultural labor in the mountain states. Thus the WRA moved rapidly on several fronts for establishing the relocation centers as tem-

porary way-stations, not permanent prisons, from which those evacuees who were able and willing could move out even while war with Japan was in progress. It was this broad approach to the problems created by the evacuation which the WRA initiated early and which it pursued through the four and one-half years of its existence, ultimately resettling some 25,000 evacuees before the end of the war and closing out all the centers and the agency itself by the summer of 1946.

As an integral part of its program to re-integrate the evacuees into normal American life and to forestall efforts on the part of some Americans to create concentration camps, the WRA enlisted the aid of social scientists. This was carried out in a novel manner not theretofore employed in attempts to bring social science knowledge to bear on administrative problems. It was assumed that there would be difficult problems confronting administrators as a result of the fact of sharply differing cultural backgrounds between themselves and the evacuees and that these problems would be constantly recurrent in the day to day operation of the relocation centers. In order to resolve such problems it would be necessary to retain as part of the working staff individuals who would learn the nature of the motivations and the cultural influences affecting the behavior of the administered people; this called for social scientists who would constantly, through observation and interview, be in touch with the population of the relocation centers. The approach also called for frequent contact between the social scientists and the administrators, so that problems small and large could be freely discussed; moreover since there were various levels of administrators involved, from the relocation centers to the several levels of administration in Washington, it would be necessary to maintain the work-

ing contacts between social scientists and administrators at all levels. This kind of structure was eventually achieved, so that at least three levels of administrators had available informed social scientists as staff advisers. What was novel about this arrangement was, first, that it constituted an employment of social science not on the assumption that it consists of already completed bodies of knowledge, but rather that it is a developing understanding of human phenomena and, second, that social scientists may be employed effectively within the administrative organization, not only as occasional consultants outside the structure.

This conception of the use of social science was applied first in one of the relocation centers which had been established on an Indian Reservation and over which the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had retained some jurisdiction. The Commissioner at that time was John Collier, who had earlier made an effort to employ anthropologists in an Applied Anthropology Unit in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (McKeel 1944). With the establishment of a relocation center, called Poston, on the Colorado Indian Reservation, John Collier conceived the idea of setting up an applied social science unit to assist in the administration. He placed the unit under the direction of Alexander H. Leighton, who named it the Bureau of Sociological Research and proceeded to hire as his assistants two anthropologists, Edward H. Spicer and later Elizabeth Colson. Leighton was a psychiatrist who had been associated with the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn and who had carried out field research among the Navajos and the Eskimos. The Bureau of Sociological Research (Leighton and Spicer 1945) set a pattern of procedure which influenced the later development of social science utilization in all the other relocation centers. It relied heavily on a staff of evacuees, both Nisei and Issei, for

its knowledge of evacuee attitudes, viewpoints, and ways of behaviour. Leighton, as head of the Bureau, established constant working contacts, both informal and formal, as an adviser with the Director of the center.

John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs had demonstrated much interest in the application of anthropology to problems of Indian administration. He advocated the view that the Bureau of Indian Affairs ought to be employed as a laboratory for the better understanding of problems of administration (Collier 1945). He had hired Leighton with this approach in mind and gave him a free hand to develop it in the relocation center at Poston. While the first focus of attention in the Bureau of Sociological Research was on the evacuees and how they saw their problems and sought to solve them, the Bureau rapidly found itself studying the administrators as intensively as the evacuees. Bureau staff frequently attended administrative staff meetings of various kinds and quickly found themselves viewing each problem situation in terms not only of evacuees' but also of administrators' attitudes and behavior. Each problem and each solution was studied as a compound of both.

In October 1942, when the Bureau of Sociological Research was just beginning to function adequately, a series of beatings of evacuees by other evacuees and related disturbances broke out in Poston, culminating in a general refusal of the evacuees to carry on any but the most necessary work for the maintenance of the center. The strike was accompanied by withdrawal of evacuees from the administrative offices and by demonstrations with Japanese music and speeches. The administrators were isolated from the community for several days, the military police (supposed to confine their guard duty to the perimeter of the camp) entered the center with armed vehicles, and

there was thus immediate threat of the breakdown of the peaceful conditions which had prevailed. Negotiations were arranged and, at first tense and difficult, they resulted in increased understanding and new forms of organization with more evacuee participation in management. The head of the Bureau of Sociological Research took an active role in advising the administrators who effected the settlement and prevented the taking over of the camp by the Military Police.

This crisis which was a result on the one hand of the cross-currents of conflict among the Japanese Americans and on the other of fear and mishandling of situations by some administrators, was analyzed and described in a book published by Leighton in 1945, The Governing of Men. The study effectively presented the approach which had been developed in the Poston research unit by Leighton and Spicer and their evacuee assistants. It was quite clear that the work of the Bureau was conceived not as a study of the evacuees to be packaged for the better understanding of their ways by the administrators. It was rather an ongoing analysis of the interaction of administrators, at first quite ignorant of evacuee attitudes growing out of recent and earlier experience with American prejudice and discriminatory laws, with Japanese Americans wracked by internal conflicts in their communities and without clear clues as to what their future would be in the United States. This analysis of the successive administrative situations in which evacuees and administrators participated was interpreted by Bureau staff for evacuee leaders who developed in the center as well as for the WRA personnel. Leighton's published account shifted the focus from Japanese Americans as persons with a unique and unfamiliar cultural background to human beings under a variety of stresses in a process of mutual adaptation with administrators also under

stress in an unfamiliar setting. The book contributed to both a broader understanding of the Japanese American experience in the United States and of administration as a process involving administrators and administered people.

While the Poston strike and some other relocation center disturbances were in progress, an effort was being made in the WRA in Washington to bring social scientists into the agency's program on a larger scale. When the WRA was first organized it included among its top administrators an anthropologist-turned-administrator, John H. Provinse, who had worked in the Soil Conservation Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Provinse had taken a prominent part in the formulation of the value principles on which the non-repressive WRA policy was based. Together with Dillon S. Myer, former director of the United States Conservation Service, and Philip M. Glick, government attorney of varied experience, Provinse, as Chief of the Division of Community Management, had participated in forging the policy. He also had as early as May, 1942, conceived the idea of employing social scientists with knowledge of Japanese cultural background. He had been able to hire only one by the fall of 1942, namely, John F. Embree, who was employed at first as Historian in the Reports Division. Embree and Provinse were engaged in persuading the Director of the WRA that Japanese experts could help the administration of the agency when the Poston and other disturbances broke out. These crises in relocation center affairs had a prompt impact on the general public and on Congress, members of which began to wonder whether after all concentration camps might not be the solution. Both the House and the Senate instituted investigations, which ultimately vindicated the WRA approach, but which in late 1942 were ominous for the WRA open-door policy. Embree had already moved far in convincing the top ad-

ministration that scientists familiar with Japanese background could be useful. Now with reports coming in that the staff of the Bureau of Sociological Research had played a helpful role in a constructive outcome of the Poston crisis, the Director of WRA became convinced that Provinse's plan for more social scientists should be acted on immediately. The hope was that it would help to forestall any further disruption of the relocation centers. Two outside consultants--Robert Redfield and Conrad Arensberg, anthropologists who had visited the centers briefly during the summer of 1942--both supported Provinse and Embree's proposal that a social science unit be created.

The result was the formation of the Community Analysis Section within Provinse's Division of Community Management (Embree 1944). Embree became the Head of the Section and proceeded to hire as his assistant a sociologist, Frank Sweetser. Their plan, following the objective of locating social scientists at all levels in addition to the Washington office staff of two, called for placing an analyst in each of the ten relocation centers. Within some three months they had filled the nine field posts other than Poston, with seven anthropologists: Weston LaBarre, E. Adamson Hoebel, Morris Opler, Marvin K. Opler, John DeYoung, Charles Wisdom, and G. Gordon Brown and two sociologists: John Rademaker and Forrest Laviolette. Thus by the late spring of 1943, one year after the formation of the WRA, a working team of social scientists had been established, linking all the centers with the Washington office.

Meanwhile a difference in policy thinking had developed between John Collier and Dillon Myer resulting in the withdrawal of Collier from administrative responsibility for the Poston center. The Bureau of Sociological Re-

search was eliminated, and Leighton and Colson resigned. Embree and his assistant Sweetser also ^{left} ~~resigned from~~ the WRA, and Spicer took Embree's place in Washington. Another anthropologist, David French, became Community Analyst at Poston. The Washington office staff was increased by the addition of two anthropologists, Katharine Luomala and Margaret Lantis, as Rachel Sady ^{and later another anthropologist, Margaret Lantis was} ~~took the place of Sweetser there~~. Two of the sociologists first hired, Laviolette and Rademaker resigned after only short tours of duty, as did two anthropologists, Labarre and Hoebel. They were eventually replaced by Asael Hansen, Charles Hoffman, and Edgar McVoy, sociologists, and Elmer Smith, anthropologist. Thus reorganized, with some turnover in personnel, the later addition of sociologist J. R. McFarling, and leaving two of the centers without analysts for extended periods, the Community Analysis Section continued operation until the liquidation of the agency in June, 1946. In all it employed 21 social scientists, 13 anthropologists and 8 sociologists.

The basic formal relationship of the Community Analysts, at both the Washington and the relocation center levels, was that of staff advisers. The Head of the section in Washington met in regular staff meetings with the Division Heads and the Director of the agency. In some cases Community Analysts in the relocation centers participated similarly in staff meetings, but more often the relationship between Analyst and Director of a center was informal. Some Analysts never developed any regular sort of communication with administrators. The fact is that with only two exceptions, Morris Opler who had been a member of John Collier's Applied Anthropology unit in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Mekeel 1944) and G. Gordon Brown who had worked with a British colonial administrator in Africa (Brown and Hutt 1935), none

of the social scientists had had prior experience in applied situations. Moreover, none of the administrators had had any experience in the utilization of social scientists as members of their staffs in daily operations. No well-understood model for a working relationship existed. The result was much variation and the communication which developed depended heavily on the personalities of both Analysts and camp Directors.

Whatever communication did develop with respect to daily operations was chiefly oral rather than written. Some memoranda were written, but the WRA program was fast-moving, making constant demands on administrators' time, so that oral communication was better adapted to getting relevant information into the administrative process. In Washington the Head of the Section, drawing on the flow of reports to him from the centers and on his own frequent trips to the centers, reported regularly in staff meetings on evacuee attitudes, reactions to programs and regulations, the activities of evacuees in the centers, and the growth of organization among them. What he said was for most Washington Division Heads an important source of comprehensive knowledge about the currents of thought and trends of reaction in the evacuee communities, as opposed to the bits of information about specific matters connected with their particular operations. At the relocation center level Analysts were faced with a different situation. Here the administrators were all in close touch with many evacuees in the course of carrying out their responsibilities and were not isolated from evacuee contacts; reporting that filled the administrators' needs was thus more difficult. One of the most successful roles was as participant in meetings between the camp director and his assistants and various evacuee

administrative groups, such as the Block Managers, and evacuee committees organized for particular purposes. Here the role was not simply reporter of information but participant in decisions affecting operations. The Analyst in such a role combined an awareness of the viewpoints of both administrators and evacuees and often was able to bring about adjustment of differences simply by stating the differences clearly. An Analyst who demonstrated this sort of capacity usually gained the confidence of evacuees and was relied on for aid in getting fair consideration by them. Not all Analysts had such negotiating ability, or interest, and those who did not tended to withdraw from operating participation and spent more time in the preparation of written reports which the Washington Community Analysis office constantly requested.

From the beginning the Community Analysis Section undertook as a major responsibility the preparation of reports which were mimeographed in quantity and distributed throughout the agency (Spicer 1946). The first of these by John Embree treated such matters as "Dealing with Japanese Americans" (which contained a discussion of race and culture and the institution of the go-between, among other things), "Japanese Groups and Associations in the United States," and "Notes on Japanese Holidays." While short reports on special Japanese customs continued to appear occasionally throughout the program, the subjects of the reports quickly changed character, beginning in February, 1943. "Causes of Unrest at Relocation Centers," "Army Registration at Granada," "Preliminary Survey of Resistances to Resettlement at the Tule Lake Relocation Center," "An Analysis of the Segregation Program," and "The Tule Lake Incident" were the subjects of reports, for example, during 1943 and early 1944. Such reports indicated the shift of focus to urgent immediate problems of center administration, as they became

more complex with the Army's decision to re-open Selective Service to Nisei, the WRA initiation of its all-out resettlement program from the centers, and the creation of the "segregation center" at Tule Lake. The reports ranged from 5 to a dozen or more pages and were circulated among all WRA personnel. More than fifty such reports were issued (see Spicer et al. 1969 for complete list).

By November 1944 the Community Analysis Section decided that there was need for a regular and frequent reporting of the effects of the WRA programs for resettlement and center closing on evacuee attitudes and organization. A series of trend reports was initiated, collating information from all the centers, which shortly became weekly. Thirty of these were prepared and distributed and were widely read by evacuees and WRA staff. They were issued throughout 1945, until the closing of all the centers at the end of that year, as the Supreme Court decided that Japanese Americans could no longer be excluded from the west coast. At the same time a series of studies of attitudes of west coast communities to which Japanese Americans were returning or expected to return were initiated: "Prejudice in Hood River Valley--A Case Study in Race Relations," "West Coast Localities: Sacramento County and City," "West Coast Localities: Imperial Valley," and others.

The most influential of the Community Analysis written reports among the agency personnel were probably those that reported directly the results of Analysts' interviews with evacuees of various viewpoints. Notable among these were Morris Edward Opler's "From a Nisei Who Said 'No'" and "A Nisei Requests Expatriation." These were products of the Army's registration program which required evacuees to fill out a registration form containing a question that came to be labelled the "loyalty question." Many Nisei gave

replies of "no" for various reasons ranging from deep anger at the whole evacuation program to wild and careless defiance of what they felt was arbitrary government power. Some Nisei then ^{sought} ~~proceeded~~ to renounce their U.S. citizenship and ask for expatriation to Japan. The "morass", as some WRA staff called it, of conflicting attitudes and loyalties among the Nisei was only slowly realized by the administrators. The direct reporting of interviews which were then circulated among administrators at all levels was a major influence in the steady growth of understanding on the part of administrators, most of whom had begun their service in WRA with no ~~under-~~ ^{knowledge} ~~standing~~ whatever of the background of Japanese Americans or of the real nature of the impact of the evacuation on them.

In the job descriptions for the position of "Social Science Analyst" (the Civil Service name for what WRA called Community Analyst) there was no mention of any responsibility to the people administered by the agency for whom the analyst was to work. The position was described entirely in terms of responsibility in reporting and other matters upward to administrators in the line organization. The Community Analysts nevertheless found themselves immediately in situations in which it appeared that there were additional responsibilities, namely, to the evacuees from whom most of the materials with which they worked were derived. The Bureau of Sociological Research staff, first in the field, came promptly up against some problems. The first was a result of a complete misunderstanding by administrators of the nature of social science research. This lack of understanding was not surprising, in view of the absence of prior experience with staff social scientists. It had to be made clear by the Director of the Bureau that his staff was not aiming at the collection of information on individuals, even though individuals were the source of all the knowledge which the research was developing. In short, the sources of information

were not to be made available to the administrators, only the results of interview and observation on an anonymous basis. This procedure had to be learned by the administrators and was eventually accepted. They ceased to look to the Bureau for information about any particular individual and realized that they had to rely on other members of their staff for that, such as Internal Security officers and welfare workers, whose work depended on the identification of individuals. The limitation on what was made available came up again when investigators of the House Un-American Activities Committee appeared in the relocation center. The BSR staff decided to make portions of their materials completely unavailable because the handling of hearings in Los Angeles had made it apparent that the investigators could not be relied on for fair and reasonable handling of evidence. The decision of the Bureau would probably have forced its staff into illegal actions, if the investigators had pushed the matter, but they did not, and so the problem was avoided rather than solved.

These experiences made it clear that there was a responsibility to evacuees which was not at first accepted by the administrators or the agency as an arm of government. The problem was dealt with both formally and informally by the Community Analysis Section. The responsibilities of Analysts were defined in terms of providing to administrators only information about group processes and structure and attitudes and viewpoints anonymously reported. This was finally fully accepted as policy by the WRA, although to some administrators it raised questions about any real utility the Analysts might have. In practice it meant that Analysts maintained confidential, as well as other, file material. In all Analysts' reports the confidentiality of "key informants," through whom they worked constantly, was scrupulously

maintained. The question of the availability of confidential file material is of course still a controversial matter being decided by the courts in connection with government supported research. No case of breach of confidence was ever complained of by any evacuee.

Despite the absence of obligation to report to the administered people as provided in the Analysts' job descriptions, probably every Analyst chose to assume some kind of such responsibility. All the Community Analysis offices in the centers had staffs of evacuees who provided information for the Analysts' reports, oral and written. Every Analyst knew that what was done in his office was known eventually in some form in the evacuee community. No system of classified reporting was developed. The work of the Analysts was, in short, common knowledge among the evacuees. Moreover, the mimeographed reports that emanated from the Washington office were available equally to evacuees and "appointed personnel," as the WRA employees were called. In addition most, if not all, the Analysts became intimate with a number of older Japanese with whom they discussed frequently the problems of relocation life from the social scientist's point of view. Reports prepared for the Washington office of the Section were often worked out jointly with such close associates of the Analysts. In these relationships the influences undoubtedly worked both ways, so that in some degree the Analysts' viewpoints and analyses became known in various levels of leadership in the evacuee communities. This did not mean, of course, that the analyses were accepted as the basis for evacuee cooperation or opposition any more than the Community Analysis reports were accepted as the basis for action by the administrators. In both contexts they were part of the situation, sometimes exerting strong influence, sometimes merely providing knowledge of alternatives not incorporated into policy or program of either evacuees or administrators.

There is no question, however, that in two or three centers the intimate relations between influential Japanese and Community Analysts affected the course of events.

It should be pointed out that both the final reports of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section devoted considerable space to the history of interethnic relations of the Japanese Americans in the United States. The social scientists apparently regarded it as impossible to prepare reports for their scientific colleagues wholly apart from their obligation to the people studied. While the background material may be regarded as merely necessary for an understanding of the analysis of, in the case of The Governing of Men, a particular crisis in one relocation center and, in the case of Impounded People, the dynamics of community development under the relocation center conditions, the character of the introductions to the two reports suggests a great deal more. The social scientists were in both instances concerned to present what may be called a vindicating picture of the Japanese Americans for a general reading public by clearing away the misleading implications of the action of evacuation.

A third kind of responsibility, which is to be regarded as an imperative in all instances of applied social science, was also recognized and acted on by some individuals and by the Community Analysis Section as a whole. This is the obligation to colleagues in the social sciences to interpret the results of the experience in application. The responsibility as fulfilled by individuals is best and most fully represented by Leighton's study focussed around the Poston general strike (Leighton 1945). In the published book Leighton makes an analysis of the particular relocation center situation in terms of general ideas about the nature of human psychological types--stereotype-minded and people-minded--and provides a hypothesis regarding their behavior

in a specific type of administrative situation. This idea might be applied further in, for example, the selection of personnel for particular administrative assignments. Leighton, however, went further in his book and developed an elaborate theory regarding the behavior of individuals and of communities under different forms of "stress." The book was widely read by social scientists as well as by a general reading public and constituted a contribution of some influence in the fields of both administrative management and psychology.

Individual Community Analysts also made some contributions in the special fields of their interests. For example, Morris Opler (1944), Marvin Opler (1950, 1958), John Embree (1943, 1944), K. Luomala (1947), E. C. McVoy (1943), G. Gordon Brown (1945), E. R. Smith (1948), and E. H. Spicer (1945, 1946, 1952, 1969) published in various journals, ranging from the American Anthropologist to the Utah Humanities Review, analyses of different aspects of the relocation program. It was true also that the Community Analysis Section as a whole made an effort to meet this sort of obligation. The final report of the Section, prepared by four of the Analysts, was obviously aimed at social science colleagues (Spicer, et al. 1969). The report focusses on the Japanese Americans as uprooted people seeking to build a new kind of community life after extreme disruption. It analyzes the processes of reorientation of the generations in relation to each other and to the United States. Lacking the explicit formulation of theory that characterized The Governing of Men, Impounded People presents a concrete account of life in the relocation centers organized on an implicit framework of processual analysis.

The work of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section is hardly to be understood apart from the total activity of the War Re-

location Authority. A striking characteristic of these applied science units was their thorough integration into the total program. They served the overall goals of the agency just as did the other specialized structures of the WRA, as organs of the whole. Hence any evaluation of what the social scientists contributed is best carried out in the light of an understanding of the whole accomplishment of the wartime agency.

The WRA program played a decisive role in the interplay of opposing processes which came into operation in the United States beginning with the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants in the 1840s, following the Taiping Rebellion and during the California gold rush. On the one hand, prejudice against the Orientals grew rapidly in the western states, culminating during a first cycle in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1887 (Lee 1960). One effect of this legislation was the stimulation of new immigration from Asia, specifically from Japan. A new cycle of anti-Oriental prejudice developed, as thousands of Japanese entered the United States. Novelists such as Peter B. Kyne wrote romances rooted in the belief that a "Yellow Peril" threatened California and that Japanese were everywhere infiltrating the defenses of the country. New efforts to stop Oriental immigration, this time directed at the Japanese, were successful. Surges of anti-Oriental feeling repeatedly swept California and the western states (McWilliams 1944: 14-72). By the 1920s discriminatory legislation of several kinds was enacted. The intermarriage of Orientals and "Caucasians" was prohibited; Alien Land Laws kept first generation Orientals from owning land (Millis 1915: 316-19; Kawakami 1921: 103-122); and, far-reaching in its adverse effect on the adaptation of Japanese to American life, U.S. citizenship was denied to persons of Asiatic birth. These laws sanctioned and confirmed the various local discriminations stimulated by the

widespread prejudice and gave rise to new suspicion toward the Japanese, both first generation immigrants and their children who were American citizens by virtue of birth in this country.

On the other hand, at the same time that hostility towards the Japanese grew, the immigrants and their children were making a notably successful adaptation to American life. The outbursts of popular feeling against them led to their becoming the special subject of investigation. The United States Immigration Commission carried out studies as early as 1910 to determine whether they were actually as popularly depicted. The reports of the Commission revealed that among all the immigrants from Asia and Europe, the Japanese were making an outstandingly rapid and successful adaptation (Millis 1915: 251-75). They were surprisingly quickly adopting American ways. They were keeping their children in school, and they were moving up in the economic and occupational scale. Later studies showed that the educational achievements of the second generation in the public schools and universities were exceptional (Strong 1934). Thus despite the persistent hostility and attempts to exclude Japanese Americans from participation in American society, they continued to exhibit all the signs of good adjustment. The processes of cultural assimilation and economic adaptation produced results in marked contrast with the negative beliefs about Orientals. These beliefs nevertheless continued to be held in some segments of the west coast population as late as the 1940s.

The evacuation order in February, 1942, was a drastic move by the federal government in support of the restrictive actions against Orientals which had begun in the 1880s and continued through the 1920s. The action came as a result of the power suddenly conferred in wartime on a particular

commander of the Western Defense Command--General John L. Dewitt whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice (McWilliams 1944: 251; Grodzins 1949: 262-67). The order establishing the WRA which immediately followed resulted, however, in action directly contrary to that initiated by evacuation. The Presidential decree did not in itself define the nature of that action; it merely created the new caretaking agency for the Japanese Americans. It was the men who took control of policy in the WRA who initiated the action counter to the older repressive trend against Orientals in American life.

As the WRA moved towards the elimination of restrictions on the evacuees, it did so in close collaboration with the Department of Justice which had strongly opposed mass evacuation from the first. Within a year the WRA found itself working closely with the War Department, which in its upper levels was flexible and open to consideration of facts about the Japanese Americans, in contrast with the lower level of the Western Defense Command. The efforts of the WRA were directed primarily to undoing the effects of the evacuation order, that is, to opening up the relocation centers promptly to resettlement by both first generation and Nisei Japanese Americans, the reopening of Selective Service and the armed services to the Nisei, and finally the restoration of the evacuees to their land and homes on the west coast. In addition the WRA accomplished other results which worked to the advantage of the Japanese Americans. The resettlement program brought about a much wider distribution of the Japanese Americans over the United States than had characterized them before World War II, thus eliminating the concentrations in west coast slum areas. Working in close conjunction, the War Department and the WRA succeeded, through a program of publicizing the active part taken by Nisei in both the European and Pacific theatres of war,

once the armed services were reopened, in dispelling the suspicion about Nisei loyalty which evacuation had raised to a high pitch. Finally the WRA through its resettlement program and other positive measures contributed greatly to the diffusion through the United States of a broad and sympathetic understanding of the Japanese American experience. The growth of this understanding bore continuing fruit after the WRA ceased to exist; in 1952, for example, the United States Congress removed the fundamental prohibition on the naturalization of Japanese and other Orientals/. Thus the whole restrictive trend nurtured by anti-Oriental prejudices was reversed and Japanese assumed a legal status in American society like that of all other peoples. The essence of the WRA accomplishment was the giving of a new and decisive impetus to the positive acceptance of Japanese in American life. It is as a part of that total effort that the contribution of the social scientists in the WRA is to be understood.

The social scientists in the WRA played a part both in policy-making and in day-to-day operations. With respect to policy the major figure was the anthropologist, John H. Provine, who was from the beginning of the agency's life prominent in the highest level of policy decision. He was one of the original of the President's appointees along with Milton Eisenhower and continued in his same role after Dillon Myer succeeded Eisenhower as Director. Provine held the position of chief of the Community Management Division throughout the agency's existence. He participated with Myer, former Director of the Soil Conservation Service in the Department of Agriculture, and Philip Glick, government attorney with wide experience in various agencies, in the first policy decisions which moved WRA decisively in the direction of non-restrictive policy. His influence continued along the same lines.

In this role he sought the aid of other anthropologists. In the summer of 1942 he employed Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago as a consultant who recommended that an open-door policy be maintained, that social scientists be included among the working staff, and that in general the processes of adaptation to American life be continued rather than reversed. In addition Provinse set up in the Division of Community Management a section of Community Government and employed Solon T. Kimball, anthropologist, as Head of the Section. Kimball's job consisted in encouraging and advising evacuees in all the centers with regard to establishing Community Councils/. He regularly travelled to the centers and advised Provinse of developments in community organization, thus contributing to Provinse's understanding of developing structure and sentiments in the relocation centers. In addition the Community Analysis Section was a part of the Community Management Division and its head regularly reported individually to Provinse as well as to the Director's top staff group in Washington. Thus Provinse, more than any other Washington official, had available the fullest information on developments within the relocation centers and was able to make use of this in fulfilling his responsibilities as a top policy-maker and Head of the Division of Community Management. While the Community Analysts worked only in advisory roles, they nevertheless channelled their findings directly to a WRA official who functioned in the top level of policy-making. Their specific influence cannot be measured, but it is reasonable to presume it was important in view of the close working relationship between the Community Analysis Section and the Chief of Community Management.

The earliest policy decisions, which determined the WRA fundamental position, were made before either the Bureau of Sociological Research or the Community Analysis Section were in effective operation. One of these was,

however, in process of formulation as the BSR was beginning its reports. This was the decision to open up the centers as soon as possible, beginning in some degree in the autumn of 1942. The BSR taking its lead from the Collier policy tended to emphasize the importance of establishing the relocation centers as places of real security in the midst of the host of insecurities which had developed in evacuees' lives and to hold back with respect to such matters as encouraging Nisei employment in agricultural labor during the early fall of 1942. The WRA decision to push the opening of the centers came into full force by November, 1942, and became a point of difference with Collier. As this decision was developed into specific programming, it ultimately took the form of a nationwide (except for the west coast states) resettlement program. Called the "Relocation Program", it became a major focus of WRA activity. The agency set as a goal the emptying of all the centers if possible before the war should end, a very bold program; it was justified by the WRA policy makers on two primary grounds: (1) the need to prevent what it was assumed would be the demoralizing effect on the evacuees of living in government-administered communities for any length of time and (2) the importance of moving evacuees back into the mainstream of American life before the end of the war so that there would be the least possible discontinuity in their longterm adjustment in American society. In the development of this policy the Community Analysts played what might be called an indirect role.

The CA reports from an early period in the beginning of 1943 described what took definite form as "resistance to relocation." Evacuees were not ready to give up the relative security of the centers for the uncertainties of life in wartime America far from their familiar west coast. A vigorous

leadership within the center communities came into existence promptly which took the position that the Japanese Americans should not let themselves be "pushed around" any further. This leadership continued strong for the duration of the centers. The Community Analysts learned a great deal about the values and the attitudes connected with this evacuee position, which one Analyst called "resistance to freedom" (Embree 1943). Living intimately with the people who maintained these attitudes and gathering details regarding the position, Analysts tended to conclude that the all-out effort at resettlement during the war was an impossible goal. They tended therefore to be at odds with the WRA employees who were charged with getting the evacuees to resettle promptly. The Analysts saw those activities as a "hard sell" approach which was likely to encourage increasing opposition. They did not recommend against the relocation program, but they did continue to report constantly the negative developments in the centers. In a sense the view which their investigations led the Analysts to favor was correct. The WRA did not succeed in resettling from the centers quite 25,000 evacuees after two and one half years of the relocation program. The maximum goal was not attained. However, the fact that relocation outside the centers was a very active part of the WRA program was in itself an important indication of government policy regardless of achievement of the declared goal, and moreover the resettlement of thousands of evacuees in Chicago, for example, established a new and highly favorable condition for the future of the Japanese Americans. The Community Analysis Section's pessimism was vindicated, but the relocation policy had wider implications to which the policy-makers were paying attention and which fell outside the purview of the Analysts' circumscribed operations.

The Community Analysts played a somewhat similar role in connection with the second major policy decision during their period of effective operation. In order to open the way to the all-out resettlement program, the suspicion that evacuation had engendered among the American public and which had invaded the national Congress by the winter of 1942-43 had to be dealt with. The policy makers of WRA believed that in order to open the centers for the evacuees it would be necessary to give concrete evidence that they were not dangerous. This decision called for a screening of evacuees so that the WRA could give official approval of "leave clearance" for each one who chose to resettle. Working with the War Department, the WRA developed a plan for "separating the loyal from the disloyal." This involved submitting what was called a loyalty question, differently phrased for Nisei and Issei. The theory was that the answers would serve as the basis for classifying all the evacuees into two groups, those who could be vouched for as loyal to the United States and therefore safe for resettlement and those who could not. The latter group would then be denied leave clearance and held in what was designated a "segregation center" for the duration of the war, while the "loyal" would be encouraged to resettle out of the nine remaining relocation centers.

The screening did indeed result in two groupings, but the Community Analysts were intensely aware that the classification was faulty. Hundreds of young men and women, citizens of the United States, believed that they had not been treated as citizens from the moment of evacuation; they refused to answer the "loyalty question" at all or answered it negatively in a spirit of deep criticism of the United States government for having dealt with them as it had. Others had already decided that they could feel no loyalty to the

United States, even though they had been among the most devoted to the country before the evacuation, and sought somehow to renounce their citizenship and go to Japan. It was clear, even though the questions were modified in accordance with suggestions by Nisei and Issei for making them more realistic, that what the screening did was simply to demonstrate that the evacuation had roused complex feeling in the evacuees about their place in the United States and about the relations of citizen children and non-citizen parents. The Community Analysts played a leading part in recording and describing these attitudes and viewpoints and diffusing knowledge of them throughout the WRA personnel. Their reports, together with those of the Army and WRA interviewers, gave solid evidence that the projected segregation of the "disloyal" in the segregation center of Tule Lake could not be a neat separation of evacuees potentially dangerous to the United States from those who could be safely given leave clearance. The screening simply was not accomplishing that. The Community Analysts, along with many other WRA staff, knew, in short, that the segregation program was not what it purported to be. They were not asked for a recommendation; but the top policy makers had been made as aware as they of the true situation. Nevertheless they proceeded with the plan for segregating all those who answered "no" to the "loyalty questions" in the segregation center apart from the "Yes" answerers in the other nine centers. The justification for following through with the segregation policy remained what it had been, namely, that only in this way could the overwhelming majority of evacuees be given leave clearance for resettlement. A screening had been carried out and this could be made known to the general American public. The several thousand sent to the segregation center consisted of some who definitely were or had become anti-United States; the

majority did not share such sentiments. They, however, in the eyes of the policy-makers had to be regarded as a sacrifice for the great majority.¹ Once segregation was carried out, the WRA proceeded with its full scale relocation program.

The third major policy decision made after Community Analysis came into operation was that to close down the centers completely at the end of 1945 before the war was over. This was a result of the termination of mass exclusion in December 1944, in response to which the WRA set closing dates for all centers except Tule Lake before the end of 1945 (ten Broek 1954: 173-4). The immediate evacuee reaction in the centers was that, despite complete freedom to return to their homes or wherever they wished on the west coast, there would remain in the centers an unrelatable "residue." Community Analysts, again, deeply involved in the relocation center perspective for the most part appeared to believe this for several months of the new program as they reported in detail the evacuee reactions. The WRA, however, proceeded on the assumption that all evacuees would be out of the centers except Tule Lake by January 1946. Analysts found themselves predicting that the program could not be accomplished and again found themselves

¹For accounts of the heartbreak and turmoil which characterized the segregation center, see Spicer et al., Impounded People, pp. 178-86, 229-41, 267-76 and Rosalie H. Wax, Doing Fieldwork, pp. 59-174. The vivid portrayal of effects of the WRA "sacrifice" by Rosalie Wax was a product of a study of the evacuees carried out by another group of social scientists including the anthropologists Rosalie Hanke (later Wax), Robert Spencer, and Tami Tsuchiyama under the direction of the sociologist, Dorothy Swaine Thomas. This study, the University of California Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Project, continued for the duration of the centers. It was an academic investigation not designed to provide assistance to the WRA administrators. It resulted in two major monographs among other products (Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage and The Salvage) dealing with the evacuees in the relocation and segregation centers.

wrong. The closing was accomplished more speedily than the WRA expected after the end of the war in August 1945, even though at the beginning of the year 60,000 evacuees were still present in the relocation centers.

In each of these instances regarding major policy decisions during the period of activity of the Community Analysis Section, it is significant that the findings of the Analysts led them to doubt the feasibility of the new WRA programs. What seems to be demonstrated is that the social scientists were so deeply involved with their own special field of competence, namely, the attitudes and viewpoints of the administered people, that they were not in a position to develop views fully relevant to overall policy. The data with which they were deeply familiar constituted only one of the several elements that had to be taken into consideration by those who made the broad policy decisions. Nevertheless it may be said that, as a result of the Community Analysis work, each of the new directions in policy was decided on in full awareness of the impact on evacuees, even though that factor was not deemed the most decisive in making top policy.

It was as cross-cultural interpreters that the social scientists in the WRA were hired. That is, recognition by the administrators in charge that their staff would be working with Japanese Americans of very different cultural background from themselves, led to the view that assistance would be needed from specialists with knowledge of the unfamiliar ethnic ways. The expectation of problems arising out of the cultural differences played a part in the establishment of both the BSR and the CAS. In both instances within a very short time the conception of "cross-cultural problems" was widened to include not only those stemming from Oriental in contrast with Western customs and beliefs, but also those resulting from differences of viewpoint and objectives between minority and dominant peoples and ultimately between

administrators and administered. In short, the idea that help would be needed in something thought of as a "cross-cultural" situation was adopted and continued throughout the life of the WRA, but the realization that the situation was complicated by more than one factor came later and steadily broadened the approach. The social scientists employed were by no means all specialists in Japanese culture^s. Only three of the first hired--Embree, Laviolette, and Rademaker--could be so characterized. All the others qualified simply on the basis of other kinds of cross-cultural or community study experience.

The WRA experience contributed to the definition of a type of role in which anthropologists have practical usefulness. The Community Analysts demonstrated both techniques of investigation and reporting and the nature of needs created in situations in which bureaucratic administration impinges on administered people who are not part of the bureau formal structure. In the relocation center situation the reporting by the Analysts made clear to administrators the nature of the aims of evacuees and pointed out the relation between those aims and their recent experience during and before evacuation. The WRA administrators, for the most part, exhibited a steady growth in awareness of evacuee problems from the evacuee point of view. In the light of such knowledge the adaptation became mutual; that is, most of the administrators in their operations increasingly accepted advice and assistance from the whole range of evacuees, old and strongly Japanese as well as young and strongly Americanized individuals. Increasingly they also learned that they could give far more responsibility to evacuees of the older age group in the management of the centers than they had at first thought possible or desirable. In this sense there was as much adaptation by administrators of their behavior as there was by the administered people to the situation in which all were involved.

It was by no means true that the only source of awareness of the evacuee viewpoints, aims, and capabilities consisted of the knowledge which the Community Analysts accumulated and made meaningful to administrators. The top administrators and others in the agency kept in close touch personally with a variety of Japanese Americans, especially the Nisei leaders (Hosokawa 1969) in and out of the centers/. The Reports Division of the WRA carried out some important research into the circumstances of Japanese American life leading up to the crisis of evacuation, made summaries of their findings, and distributed them to the WRA personnel as well as to the general public. A great many of the employees of the agency developed close relations with individuals and families and constantly learned in deeper and deeper ways how the evacuees felt and how they viewed themselves in relation to the agency's goals and their own. The Community Analysis Section was one of the several means through which a significant diffusion of knowledge about the Japanese Americans took place, both inside the agency and more widely in the United States. However, the Community Analysts were more than gatherers and disseminators of information. They had been employed to study the evacuees and explicitly to assist the men and women in charge of the WRA in gaining an understanding. The existence of the Community Analysis Section constituted a formal recognition by the bureaucratic agency of the importance of knowing the administered people on their own terms. Community Analysis became a symbol of administrative concern for unprejudiced understanding of the people under governmental jurisdiction.

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ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

by

Edward H. Spicer

Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of the Yale Law School, denounced the evacuation of Americans of Japanese ancestry at the beginning of World War II as America's "worst wartime " (Rostow 1945a). He also referred to the legal cases arising out of the evacuation as "disasters," viewed from the standpoint of civil rights (Rostow 1945b). Rostow regarded the evacuation and subsequent incarceration of Japanese Americans as a serious threat to fundamental citizenship rights. He understood the attack as based on considerations of race and regarded it as indistinguishable, in the legal view, from the position of the Nazis with respect to the Jews in Germany. Rostow was one of the few public figures who did not shrink from stating this point of view in the midst of war in a United States deeply hostile to Japan and the Japanese. Yet his position was precisely that taken by United States Attorney General Biddle up until a few weeks before the evacuation order (Grodzinski 1949: 242, 258-9).

Denunciation of the action taken in March, 1942, by President Roosevelt ordering the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry from their homes on the west coast has been vigorous ever since the event (Ten Broek 1954; Daniels 1971). Although the Supreme Court upheld the evacuation as constitutional on the grounds of "military necessity," the decision was by majority vote and the dissenting justices stated strong opinions against the singling out of the more than 80,000 citizens of the United States on the basis of their racial origins (Korematsu ^{U.} United States 323 U.S. 214: 233-42, 242-48). The fact

were established for the Japanese Americans. To do so obscures the issue which the policy-makers in the WRA recognized as fundamental. As might have been expected as one effect of the decision to evacuate, organizations and individuals immediately appeared who sought to bring about complete imprisonment of all the evacuees, both citizens and non-citizens. Pressures to move in this direction were very strong in a country at war with the Japanese and in a phase of that war, during early 1942, which was going steadily against the United States. There were individuals and groups who assumed that evacuation had been ordered as a result of real evidence that all persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States were a serious threat to the country's security. The facts, ^{that} that very little evidence was ever presented, ^{that} which was offered was extremely flimsy, and that even this was not applicable to the overwhelming majority of the evacuees, ^{which} were not known to the public at large. The influential columnist, Westbrook Pegler, wrote regularly but without solid information that the Japanese Americans were extremely dangerous. The American Legion passed a resolution in convention calling for the total imprisonment of all persons of Japanese ancestry (Spicer 1945). Such influences continued strong during 1942 and led the Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives to institute a noisy investigation. The pressures mounted steadily for making concentration camps out of the temporary communities which the Army had built and for which the WRA had taken the administrative responsibility. A segment of Americans had rapidly become convinced as a result of the misleading action of evacuation that the U.S. citizens and their parents were dangerous enemies who should be deprived of all human liberties. This resulted in the urging of real concentration camps, that is, places where the men, women, and children were to be imprisoned indefinitely with no possibility of getting out. The demand for this kind of treatment reached as far as both the House of Representatives

WRA formulated its policy position with great clarity in the course of its first year of existence and, ultimately with the help of the War Department and always supported strongly by the Department of Justice, followed through to execute the policy with great consistency, ^{finally} ~~ultimately~~ liquidating itself as the war came to an end (Myer 1971). It is ironic that the way-stations into American life which the WRA called relocation centers are still often spoken of by commentators on the evacuation and its aftermath as "concentration camps" (Bosworth 1967[;] Daniels 1971). It was precisely to forestall the appearance of such institutions in American life that the WRA devoted itself.

The WRA approach to achieving its policy goals was many-sided. It maintained constant, close liaison with representatives of the Justice Department which had not essentially changed its position that mass evacuation of American citizens could not be justified on any grounds and fully expected that forced detention of the Nisei citizens would quickly be declared unconstitutional as Nisei proceeded to bring suit. The top officials of the WRA encouraged the War Department to learn what the Office of Naval Intelligence (Ringle 1942) already knew before evacuation, namely, that there was reason to assume that Nisei were the most actively loyal among American citizens; Army teams were encouraged to visit relocation centers and interview Nisei for service in Army Intelligence units; and in 1943 the WRA cooperated fully with the Army in developing its plan for re-opening Selective Service to Nisei and urging them to volunteer for military service. From the summer of 1942 the WRA arranged for Nisei to leave the camps for seasonal agricultural labor in the mountain states. Thus the WRA moved rapidly on several fronts for establishing the relocation centers as tem-

ing contacts between social scientists and administrators at all levels. This kind of structure was eventually achieved, so that at least three levels of administrators had available informed social scientists as staff advisers. What was novel about this arrangement was, first, that it constituted an employment of social science not on the assumption that it consists of already completed bodies of knowledge, but rather that it is a developing understanding of human phenomena and, second, that social scientists may be employed effectively within the administrative organization, not only as occasional consultants outside the structure.

This conception of the use of social science was applied first in one of the relocation centers which had been established on an Indian Reservation and over which the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had retained some jurisdiction. The Commissioner at that time was John Collier, who had earlier made an effort to employ anthropologists in an Applied Anthropology Unit in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. ^(Mekeel 1944) With the establishment of a relocation center, called Poston, on the Colorado Indian Reservation, John Collier conceived the idea of setting up an applied social science unit to assist in the administration. He placed the unit under the direction of Alexander H. Leighton, who named it the Bureau of Sociological Research and proceeded to hire as his assistants two anthropologists, Edward H. Spicer and later Elizabeth Colson. Leighton was a psychiatrist who had been associated with the anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn and who had carried out field research among the Navajos and the Eskimos. The Bureau of Sociological Research (Leighton and Spicer 1945) set a pattern of procedure which influenced the later development of social science utilization in all the other relocation centers. It relied heavily on a staff of evacuees, both Nisei and Issei, for

its knowledge of evacuee attitudes, viewpoints, and ways of behaviour. Leighton, as head of the Bureau, established constant working contacts, both informal and formal, as an adviser with the Director of the center.

John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs had demonstrated much interest in the application of anthropology to problems of Indian administration. He advocated the view that the ^{Bureau of Affairs} Indian ^{reservations} ought to be employed as ^{a laboratory} ~~laboratories~~ for the better understanding of ^{problems of} ~~cross-~~ cultural administration (Collier 1945). He had hired Leighton with this approach in mind and gave him a free hand to develop it in the relocation center at Poston. While the first focus of attention in the Bureau of Sociological Research was on the evacuees and how they saw their problems and sought to solve them, the Bureau rapidly found itself studying the administrators as intensively as the evacuees. Bureau staff frequently attended administrative staff meetings of various kinds and quickly found themselves viewing each problem situation in terms not only of evacuees' but also of administrators' attitudes and behavior. Each problem and each solution was studied as a compound of both.

In October 1942, when the Bureau of Sociological Research was just beginning to function adequately, a series of beatings of evacuees by other evacuees and related disturbances broke out in Poston, culminating in a general refusal of the evacuees to carry on any but the most necessary work for the maintenance of the center. The strike was accompanied by withdrawal of evacuees from the administrative offices and by demonstrations with Japanese music and speeches. The administrators were isolated from the community for several days, the military police (supposed to confine their guard duty to the perimeter of the camp) entered the center with armed vehicles, and

there was thus immediate threat of the breakdown of the peaceful conditions which had prevailed. Negotiations were arranged and, at first tense and difficult, they resulted in increased understanding and new forms of organization with more evacuee participation in management. The head of the Bureau of Sociological Research took an active role in advising the administrators who effected the settlement and prevented the taking over of the camp by the Military Police.

This crisis which was a result on the one hand of the cross-currents of conflict among the Japanese Americans and on the other of fear and mishandling of situations by some administrators, was analyzed and described in a book ~~later~~ published by Leighton in 1945, The Governing of Man^e. The study effectively presented the approach which had been developed in the Poston research unit by Leighton and Spicer and their evacuee assistants. It was quite clear that the work of the Bureau was conceived not as a study of the evacuees to be packaged for the better understanding of their ways by the administrators. It was rather an ongoing analysis of the interaction of administrators, at first quite ignorant of evacuee attitudes ^{growing out of} ~~based on recent~~ and earlier experience with American prejudice and discriminatory laws, with Japanese Americans wracked by internal conflicts in their communities and without clear clues as to what their future would be in the United States. This analysis of the successive administrative situations in which evacuees and administrators participated was interpreted by Bureau staff for evacuee leaders who developed in the center as well as for the WRA personnel. Leighton's published account shifted the focus from Japanese Americans as persons with a unique and unfamiliar cultural background to human beings under a variety of stresses in a process of mutual adaptation with administrators also under

of the social scientists had had prior experience in applied situations. Moreover, none of the administrators had had any experience in the utilization of social scientists as members of their staffs in daily operations. No well-understood model for a working relationship existed. The result was much variation and the communication which developed depended heavily on the personalities of both Analysts and camp directors.

Whatever communication did develop with respect to daily operations was chiefly oral rather than written. Some memoranda were written, but the WRA program was a fast-moving one ^{making constant demands on administrators} ~~responding to rapidly changing circumstances as the Supreme Court rendered decisions regarding evacuee status, relevant information into the administrative process.~~ ^{time, so that oral communication was better adapted to getting} ~~the Army revised its policy regarding Nisei combat and intelligence service,~~ public opinion in the country at large shifted, and the Japanese American adaptation to the changing circumstances took unexpected directions. In Washington the Head of the Section, drawing on the flow of reports to him from the centers and on his own frequent trips to the centers, reported regularly in staff meetings on evacuee attitudes, reactions to programs and regulations, the activities of evacuees in the centers, and the growth of organization among them. What he said was for most Washington Division Heads an important source of comprehensive knowledge about the currents of thought and trends of reaction in the evacuee communities, as opposed to the bits of information about specific matters connected with their particular operations. At the relocation center level Analysts were faced with a different situation. Here the administrators were all in close touch with many evacuees in the course of carrying out their responsibilities and were not isolated from evacuee contacts; ~~In the centers,~~ reporting that filled the administrators' needs was ^{thus} more difficult. One of the most successful roles was as participant in meetings between the camp director and his assistants and various evacuee

maintained. The question of the availability of confidential file material is of course still a controversial matter being decided by the courts in connection with government supported research. No case of breach of confidence was ever complained of by any evacuee.

Despite the absence of obligation to report to the administered people as provided in the Analysts' job descriptions, probably every Analyst chose to assume some kind of such responsibility. All the Community Analysis offices in the centers had staffs of evacuees who provided information for the Analysts' reports, oral and written. Every Analyst knew that what was done in his office was known eventually in some form in the evacuee community. No system of classified reporting was developed. The work of the Analysts was, in short, common knowledge among the evacuees. Moreover, the mimeographed reports that emanated from the Washington office were available equally to evacuees and "appointed personnel," as the WRA employees were called. In addition most, if not all, the Analysts became intimate with a number of older Japanese with whom they discussed frequently the problems of relocation life from the social scientist's point of view. Reports prepared for the Washington office of the Section were often worked out jointly with such close associates of the Analysts. In these relationships the influences undoubtedly worked both ways, so that in some degree the Analysts' viewpoints and analyses became known in ^{various} the levels of leadership in the evacuee communities. This did not mean, of course, that the analyses were accepted as the basis for evacuee cooperation or opposition any more than the Community Analysis reports were accepted as the basis for action by the administrators. In both contexts they were part of the situation, sometimes exerting strong influence, sometimes merely providing knowledge of alternatives not incorporated into policy or program of either evacuees or administrators.

There is no question, however, that in two or three centers the intimate relations between influential Japanese and Community Analysts affected the course of events.

*Insert
(see following
page)*

A third kind of responsibility, which is to be regarded as an imperative in all instances of applied social science, was also recognized and acted on by some individuals and by the Community Analysis Section as a whole. This is the obligation to colleagues in the social sciences to interpret the results of the experience in application. The responsibility as fulfilled by individuals is best and most fully represented by Leighton's study focussed around the Poston general strike (Leighton 1945). In the published book Leighton makes an analysis of the particular ~~relocation~~ *relocation center* situation in terms of general ideas about the nature of human psychological ~~types--thing-minded~~ *stereotype* and people-minded--and provides a hypothesis regarding their behavior in a specific type of administrative situation. This idea might be applied further in, for example, the selection of personnel for particular administrative assignments. Leighton, however, went further in his book and developed an elaborate theory regarding the behavior of individuals and of communities under different forms of "stress." The book was widely read by social scientists as well as by a general reading public and constituted a contribution of some influence in the fields of both administrative management and psychology.

Individual Community Analysts also made some contributions in the special fields of their interests. For example, Morris Opler (1944), Marvin Opler (~~1945~~, 1950~~a~~, ~~1950b~~, 1958), John Embree (1943, 1944), K. Luomala (1947), E. C. McVoy (1943), G. Gordon Brown (1945), E. R. Smith (1948), and E. H. Spicer (~~1946~~, 1952~~a~~, ~~1952b~~) published in various journals, ranging from

*1945
1969*

(Insert on p. 19)

It should be pointed out that both the final reports of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section devoted considerable space to the ^{history of} ~~background~~ ^{of} the Japanese Americans in terms of their interethnic ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ relations in the United States. The social scientists apparently ~~did not~~ ^{ad} regard it as ^{im} possible to prepare reports for their scientific colleagues wholly apart from ~~a~~ ^{their} sense of obligation to the people studied. While the background material may be regarded merely as necessary for an understanding of the analysis of, in the case of The Governing of Men, a particular ~~crucial~~ ^{crisis} situation in one relocation center and, in the case of Impounded People, the dynamics of community development under the relocation center conditions, the character of the ~~two~~ ^{to the + two reports} introductions suggests a great deal more. The social scientists ~~seem~~ ^{were} in both instances to be concerned to present what may be called a vindicating picture of the Japanese Americans ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ for a general reading public by clearing away ~~the~~ ^{the} misleading implications of the ~~governmental~~ action of evacuation.

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the American Anthropologist to the Utah Humanities Review, analyses of different aspects of the relocation program. It was true also that the Community Analysis Section as a whole made an effort to meet this sort of obligation. The final report of the Section, prepared by four of the Analysts, was obviously aimed at social science colleagues (Spicer, et al. ~~1946 and~~ 1969). ~~Although it avoided an explicit framework of formulated theory, it is clear nevertheless that it sought to provide an overall analysis of the processes of restructuralization of community and reorientation of collective values.~~ The report

focuses on the Japanese Americans as uprooted people seeking to build a new kind of community life after extreme disruption. It analyzes the processes of reorientation of the generations in relation to each other and to the United States. Lacking the explicit formulation of theory that characterized The Governing of Men, Impounded People presents a concrete account of life in the relocation centers organized on an implicit framework of processual analysis.

The work of the Bureau of Sociological Research and the Community Analysis Section is hardly to be understood apart from the total activity of the War Relocation Authority. A striking characteristic of these applied science units ~~ix~~ was their thorough integration into the total ~~program~~ program. They ~~social scientists~~ served the ~~overall~~ overall goals of the agency just as did the other specialized structures of the WRA, as organs of the whole. Hence any evaluation of what the social scientists contributed is best carried out in the light of ^{an understanding of} the whole accomplishment of the wartime agency.

The WRA program played a decisive role in the interplay of opposing processes which came into operation in the United States ^{beginning with} ever since the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants in the 1840s, following the Taiping Rebellion and during the California gold rush. On the one hand, prejudice against the Orientals grew rapidly in the western states, culminating ^{during} in a first cycle in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1887. One effect of ^{this} the ~~act~~ legislation was the stimulation of new immigration from ASIA, specifically from Japan. A new cycle of anti-Oriental ^e prejudice developed, as thousands of Japanese entered the United States. Novelists such as Peter B. Kyne wrote romances rooted in the belief that a "Yellow Peril" threatened California and that Japanese were ~~everywhere~~ everywhere infiltrating the ^e defenses of the country. ~~New efforts to stop Oriental immigration, this time directed at the Japanese, were successful.~~ Surges of anti-Oriental feeling repeatedly swept California and the western states (McWilliams 1944: 14-72). By the 1920s ~~discriminatory~~ discriminatory legislation of several kinds was enacted. The intermarriage of Orientals and "Caucasians" was ^o prohibited; Alien Land Laws ^{kept} prohibited first generation Orientals from owning land; and, far-reaching in its ^{U.S.} adverse effects on the adaptation of Japanese to American life, citizenship was denied to persons of

(Mill) 5 (915:316-317) Kawakami 1921: 103-122

Asiatic birth. These laws ~~enacted~~ ~~sanctioned~~ ~~and~~ ~~confirmed~~ the various local discriminations that had ^{stimulated by} grown out of the widespread prejudice and gave rise to new suspicion ^{toward} against the Japanese, ~~whether~~ ^{both} first generation immigrants ^{and} of their ~~American citizen~~ children who were American citizens by virtue of ~~their~~ birth in this country.

On the other hand, at the same time that hostility ~~against~~ towards the Japanese grew, the immigrants and their children were making a notably successful adaptation to American life. The outbursts of popular feeling against them led to their becoming the special subject of ^{investigation} research. The United States Immigration Commission carried out studies as early as 1910 to determine ^{whether they were actually as popularly depicted.} ~~what sort of adjustment they were making~~. The reports of the Commission revealed that among all the immigrants from Asia and Europe, the Japanese were making an outstandingly rapid and successful adaptation. ^(Mills 1915:251-75) They were surprisingly quickly adopting American ways. They were keeping their children in school, and they were moving up in the economic and occupational scale. Later studies showed that the educational achievements of the second generation in the public schools and universities ~~was~~ ^{were} exceptional (Strong 1934). Thus despite the persistent hostility and attempts to ~~exclude~~ Japanese Americans from participation in American society, they continued to exhibit all the signs of good adjustment. The processes of cultural assimilation and ~~economic~~ economic adaptation produced results in marked contrast with the ^{negative} beliefs about Orientals. ~~which seemed not to have abated by the 1940s.~~ ^{These beliefs nevertheless continued to be held in some segments of the west coast population as late as the 1940s.}

The evacuation order in February, 1942, ~~was~~ ² was a drastic move by the federal government in support of the restrictive actions against Orientals which had begun in the 1880s and continued through the 1920s. The action came as a result of the power suddenly conferred in wartime ^{on} ~~by~~ a particular ~~commander~~ ^{commander} of the Western Defense Command -- General John L. Dewitt whose ideas about Japanese expressed the extreme in anti-Oriental prejudice (McWilliams 1944: 251; Grozins 1949: 262-67). The order ^d ~~which~~ ^{however} ~~immediately~~ ^{establishing the WRA} followed resulted in action directly contrary to that initiated by evacuation. The Presidential decree did not, in itself define the nature of that action; it merely ^{created} ~~provided for~~ the new ~~caretaking~~ ^{agency} for the Japanese Americans. It was the men who took control of policy in the WRA who initiated the action counter to the old ^{repressive} ~~trend~~ trend against Orientals in American life.

As the WRA moved towards the elimination of restrictions on the evacuees, it did so in close collaboration with the Department of Justice which had strongly opposed mass evacuation from the first. Within a year the WRA found itself working closely with the War Department, which in its upper levels was flexible and open to consideration of facts about the Japanese Americans, in contrast with the lower level ~~xxxxxxx~~ of the Western Defense Command. The efforts of the WRA were directed primarily to undoing the effects of the evacuation order, that is, to opening up the relocation centers promptly to resettlement by both first generation and Nisei Japanese Americans, the reopening of Selective Service and the armed services to the Nisei, and finally the restoration of the evacuees to their land and homes on the west coast. In addition the WRA accomplished ~~a number of~~ other results which worked to the advantage of the Japanese Americans. The resettlement program brought about a much wider distribution of the Japanese Americans over the United States than had characterized them before World War II, thus eliminating the concentrations in west coast slum areas. Working in close conjunction with the War Department ~~xxxxxxx~~ and the WRA succeeded, through a program of publicizing the active part taken by Nisei in both the European and Pacific theatres of war, once the armed services were reopened, in dispelling the suspicion about Nisei loyalty which evacuation had raised to a high ~~degree~~ ^{bitch} degree. Finally the WRA ~~in addition~~ through its resettlement program and ~~all its other~~ ^{positive measures} activities contributed greatly to the diffusion through the United States of a broad and sympathetic understanding of the Japanese ^{American} experience. The growth of this understanding bore continuing ^{via} fruits after the WRA ceased to exist; in 1952, ^{for example,} the United States Congress removed the fundamental ~~restriction~~ ^{prohibition} on the naturalization of Japanese and other Orientals. Thus the whole ^{restrictive} trend nurtured by ~~the~~ ~~anti-Oriental~~ ~~prejudices~~ was reversed and Japanese assumed a ^{legal status} place in American society like that of all other ^{peoples}. ~~This~~ ~~contribution~~ ~~to~~ ~~this~~ ~~program~~ was the essence of the WRA ^{giving of a new and decisive impetus to the positive acceptance of Japanese} accomplishment. It is as a part of that total effort that the contribution of the social scientists in the WRA is to be understood.

was the

in American life.

The social scientists in the WRA played a part both in policy-making and in day-to-day operations. With respect to policy the major figure was the anthropologist, John H. Provinse, who was from the beginning of the agency's life prominent in the highest level of policy decision. He was one of the original of the President's appointees along with Milton Eisenhower and continued in his same role after Dillon Myer succeeded Eisenhower as Director. Provinse held the position of ~~head~~^{Chief} of the Community Management Division throughout the agency's existence. He participated with Myer, ~~and~~^{and} Philip ~~Glick~~^{Glick} former Director of the Soil Conservation Service in the Department of Agriculture, and Philip Glick, government attorney with wide experience in various agencies, in the first policy decisions which moved WRA decisively in the direction of non-restrictive policy. His influence continued ~~in the same lines~~ along the same lines. In ~~this~~ this role he sought the aid of ^{other} anthropologists. ~~In the summer of 1942 he employed Robert Redfield of the University of Chicago as a consultant who recommended that an open-door policy be maintained, that social scientists be included among~~ the working staff, and that in general the processes of adaptation to American life ~~be~~ continued rather than reversed. In addition Provinse set up in the Division of Community Management a section of Community Government and employed Solon T. Kimball, anthropologist, as Head of the Section. Kimball's job consisted in encouraging and advising evacuees in all the centers with regard to establishing Community Councils. He regularly travelled to ~~the~~ the centers and advised Provinse of developments in community organization, thus contributing to Provinse's understanding of developing structure and sentiments in the relocation centers. In addition the Community Analysis Section was a part of the Community Management Division and ~~its~~ its head regularly reported individually to Provinse as well as to the Director's top staff group in Washington. Thus Provinse, more than any other Washington official, had available the fullest information on developments ~~among~~ within the relocation centers and was able to ~~make~~^{2 top policy maker and} use of this in fulfilling his responsibilities as [^]Head of the Division of Community Management. While the Community Analysts worked only in advisory roles, they nevertheless channelled their findings directly to a WRA official who functioned in the top level of policy-making. Their specific influence cannot be measured, but ^{it is reasonable to presume it was important} ~~the presumption of its importance~~.

is reasonable in view of the ^{close working relationship between} consistency of policy direction with ~~departmental evacuee aims and interests from their point of view~~ ^{the} Section and the Chief of ~~the~~ Community Management. ^{Community Analysis reports regularly described them}

The earliest policy decisions, which determined the WRA fundamental position, were made ~~before~~ before either the Bureau of Sociological Research or the Community Analysis Section were in effective operation. One of these was, however, in process of formulation as the BSR was beginning its reports. This was the decision to open up the centers as soon as possible, beginning in some degree in ~~the~~ autumn of 1942. The BSR taking its lead from the Collier policy tended to emphasize the importance of establishing the relocation centers as places of real security in the midst of the host^{of} insecurities which had developed in evacuees' lives and to ~~wait with~~ hold back with respect to such matters as encouraging ~~temporary~~ ^{employment} ~~employment~~ for Nisei, in agricultural labor during the early fall of 1942. The WRA decision to push the opening of the centers came in ^{to} full force by November, 1942, and became a point of difference with Collier. As this decision was developed into specific programming, it ultimately took the form of a nationwide ~~program~~ (except for the west coast states) resettlement program. Called the "Relocation Program", it became a major focus of WRA activity. The agency ~~set~~ ^{it possible} as a goal the emptying of all the centers ^{if possible} before the war should end, ~~possible~~ a very bold program; it was justified by the WRA policy makers on two primary grounds: (1) the need to prevent ~~what~~ ^{the} it was assumed would be a demoralizing effect on the ~~evacuees~~ of living in government-administ^{er}ered communities for any length of time and (2) the importance of moving evacuees back into the mainstream of American life before the end of the war so that there would be the least possible discontinuity in their longterm adjustment in American society. In the development of this policy the Community Analysts played what might be called an indirect role.

The CA reports from an early period ^{is} the beginning of 1943 described what took definite form as "resistance to relocation." Evacuees were not ready to give up the relative security ~~promptly~~ of the centers for the uncertainties of life in wartime America far from their familiar west coast. A vigorous leadership within the center communities came into existence promptly which took the position that the Japanese Americans should not let themselves be "pushed around" any further. This leadership continued strong for the duration of the

centers. The Community Analysts learned a great deal about the values and the attitudes connected with ^{this evacuee position, which one Analyst} ~~resistance to relocation, to~~ ^(Emberce 1943) ~~one of them~~ called "resistance to freedom." Living intimately with the people who maintained these attitudes and gathering details regarding the position, analysts tended to conclude that the all-out effort at resettlement during the war was an impossible goal. They tended therefore to be at odds with especially the WRA employees who were charged with getting the evacuees to resettle promptly. The Analysts saw ^{these} their activities ~~somehow~~ as a "hard sell" approach which was likely to ~~encourage~~ encourage increasing opposition. ~~xxxx~~ They did not recommend against the relocation program, but they did continue to report constantly the ~~negative~~ negative developments in the centers. In ~~xxxx~~ ² sense the view which their investigations led ~~them~~ the Analysts to favor was correct. The WRA did not succeed in resettling from the centers quite 25,000 evacuees after two and one half years of the relocation program. The maximum goal ^{was} ~~had~~ not ~~been~~ attained. However, the fact that ~~the~~ relocation ^{outside the} ~~program~~ ^{centers} was a very active part of the WRA program was ^{in itself an} ~~important~~ ^{regardless of} ~~an~~ indication of government policy ^{and} ~~the~~ achievement of the declared goal, and moreover the resettlement of thousands of evacuees in Chicago, for example, established a new and highly favorable condition for the future of the Japanese Americans. The Community Analysis Section's pessimism was vindicated, but the relocation policy had wider implications to which the policy-makers were paying attention ^{and} which fell outside the purview of the Analysts' circumscribed operations.

~~Similarly~~ The Community Analysts played a somewhat similar role in connection with the second major policy decision ~~that took place~~ during their period of effective operation. In order to open the way to the all-out resettlement program, the suspicion that evacuation had ^engendered among the American public and which had invaded the national Congress by the winter of 1942-43 had to be dealt with. The policy makers of WRA believed that in order to open the centers for the evacuees it would be necessary to give concrete evidence that they were not dangerous, ~~as the evacuation had indicated that they were.~~ This decision called for a screening of evacuees so that the WRA could give official approval of "leave clearance" for each one who chose to resettle. Working with the War Department, ^{the WRA developed} a plan for "separating the ^{submitting what was} ~~loyal from the disloyal~~, ^{called} ~~was conceived~~ This involved ¹ a loyalty question, differently phrased for Nisei and Issei. The

Nevertheless they proceeded with the plan for segregating all those who answered "no" to the "loyalty questions" in the segregation center apart from the "Yes" answerers in the other nine centers. The justification for following through with the ~~plan~~ segregation policy ~~was~~ remained what it had been, namely, that only in this way could the overwhelming majority of evacuees be given leave clearance for re-settlement. A screening ~~of the evacuees~~ had been carried out and this could be made known to the general American public. The several thousand sent to the segregation center consisted of some who definitely were or had become anti-United States; the majority did not share such sentiments. They, however, in the eyes of the policy-makers had to be regarded as a sacrifice for the great majority.¹ Once segregation was carried out, the WRA proceeded with its full scale relocation program.

¹ For accounts of the heartbreak and turmoil which characterized the segregation center, see Spicer et al., Impounded People, pp. 178-86, 229-41, 267-76 and Rosalie H. Wax, Doing Fieldwork, pp. 59-174. The vivid portrayal of effects of the WRA "sacrifice" by Rosalie Wax was a product of a study of the ~~evacuees~~ carried out by another group of social scientists including the anthropologists Rosalie Hanke (later Wax), Robert Spencer, and Tami Tsuchiyama under the direction of the sociologist, Dorothy Swaine Thomas. This study, the University of California Japanese American Evacuation and Resettlement Project, ~~continued for the whole period of the~~ duration of the centers. It was an academic investigation not designed to provide assistance to the WRA administrators. It resulted in two major ~~monographs~~ monographs among other products (Thomas and Nishimoto, The Spoilage and The Salvage) dealing with the evacuees in the relocation ~~centers.~~ *and segregation*

The third major policy decision made after ~~the~~ Community Analysis came into operation was that ~~to~~ to close down the centers completely at the end of 1945 before the war was over. This was a result of the ~~termination of mass exclusion in December 1944, in response to~~ which the WRA set closing dates for all centers except Tule Lake before the end of 1945 (ten Broek 1954: 173-4). The immediate evacuee reaction in the centers ~~was~~ was that, despite complete freedom to return to their homes or wherever they wished on the west coast, there would remain in the centers an unrelocatable "residue." Community Analysts, again, deeply involved in the relocation center perspective for the most part appeared to believe this for several months of the new program as they reported in detail the evacuee reactions. The WRA, however, proceeded on the assumption that all evacuees would be out of the centers except Tule Lake by January 1946. ~~IRXTRXFR~~ Analysts *themselves* found [^]

predicting that the program could not be accomplished and again found themselves wrong. The closing was accomplished ~~xxxx~~ more speedily than the WRA expected after the end of the war in August 1945, even though at the beginning of the year ~~xxxxxxx~~ 60,000 evacuees were still present in the relocation centers. In each of these ⁿ instances regarding major policy ^{fe} decisions during the period of activity of the Community Analysis Section, it is significant that the findings of the Analysts led them to doubt the feasibility of the ^{new} WRA programs. What seems to be demonstrated is that the social scientists were so deeply involved with their own special ~~field~~ field of competence, namely, the attitudes and viewpoints of the administered people, that they were not in a position ~~to make~~ ^{to develop views fully relevant to} sound recommendations ~~to make~~ overall policy. The data with which they were deeply familiar constituted only one ^{of the several} elements ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{that had to be} taken into consideration by those who made the broad policy decisions. Nevertheless it may be said that ^{as a result of the Community Analysis work,} each of the new directions in policy ~~xxxxxxx~~ was decided on in full awareness of the impact on evacuees, even though that factor was not deemed the most decisive ^{in making top policy.} ~~by the policy maker.~~

~~It was as interpreters of~~

It was as cross-cultural interpreters that the social scientists in the WRA were hired. That is, ~~xxxxxx~~ recognition by the administrators in charge that ~~xxxx~~ their staff would be working with ^{Japanese Americans} ~~people~~ of very different cultural backgrounds from themselves, ^{led to the view that assistance would be needed from} ~~xxxxxx~~ specialists with knowledge of the unfamiliar ~~xxxx~~ ethnic ways. ~~This~~ The expectation of problems arising out of the cultural differences played a part in the establishment of both the BSR and the CAS. In both instances within a very short time the conception of "cross-cultural problems" was widened to include not only those stemming from Oriental in contrast with Western customs and beliefs, but also those resulting from differences of viewpoint and objectives between minority and ^{dominant} ~~majority~~ peoples and ultimately ~~simply~~ as between administrators and administered. In short, the idea that help would be needed in something thought of as a "cross-cultural" situation was adopted and continued throughout the life of the WRA, but ^{one} the realization that the situation was complicated by more than ^{the approach} ~~one~~ factor ~~of~~ came later and steadily broadened. The social scientists employed were by no means all specialists in Japanese ~~xxxxxx~~ cultures. Only ~~xxxxxx~~ three of the first hired --- Embree, Laviolette, and Rademaker --- could be so characterized. All the others qualified simply on the basis of ^{other kinds of} ~~xxxxxx~~ cross-cultural ~~xxxxxx~~ or community study experience.

The WRA experience ~~xxxxxx~~ contributed to the definition of a type of role in which anthropologists have practical usefulness. The Community Analysts demonstrated both techniques ~~and~~ of investigation and reporting and the nature of ~~administrative~~ needs created in ~~all~~ situations in which bureaucratic ~~administration~~ impinges on administered people who are not part of the bureau ^{formal} structure. In the relocation ~~xxxxxx~~ center situation the reporting by the Analysts made clear to administrators the nature of the aims of evacuees and pointed out the relation between those aims and their recent experience during and before evacuation. The WRA administrators, for the most part, exhibited a steady growth in awareness of evacuee problems from the evacuee point of view. In the light of such knowledge the adaptation became mutual; that is, ~~xxxxxx~~ ^{most of the} ~~xxxxxx~~ administrators in their operations ~~xxxxxx~~ increasingly accepted advice and assistance from the whole range of evacuees, old and strongly Japanese as well as young and strongly Americanized individuals. Increasingly they also learned that they could give

far more responsibility to evacuees of ^{the older age group} ~~the older age group~~ in the management of the centers than they had at first thought ~~inxxxxxxx~~ possible or desirable. In this sense there was as much adaptation ~~by~~ by administrators of their behavior as there was ~~by~~ by the administered people to the situation in which all were involved.

It was by no means true that the only source of awareness of the evacuee viewpoints, ~~their~~ aims, and capabilities consisted of the knowledge which the Community Analysts accumulated and made meaningful to administrators. The top administrators and others in the agency kept in close touch personally with a variety of Japanese Americans, especially the Nisei leaders in and out of the centers. The Reports Division of the WRA carried out some important research into the ~~xxxxxxx~~ circumstances of Japanese American life leading up to the crisis of evacuation, made summaries of their findings, and distributed them to the WRA personnel as well as to the general public. A great many of the employees of the agency developed close relations with individuals and families and constantly learned in deeper and deeper ways how the evacuees felt and how they viewed themselves in relation to the agency's goals and their own. The Community Analysis Section was one of the several means through which a significant diffusion of knowledge about the Japanese Americans took place, both inside the agency and ~~much~~ more widely in the United States. However, the Community Analysts were more than gatherers and disseminators of information. They had been employed ~~to study~~ explicitly to study ~~and~~ ~~the~~ ~~evacuees~~ and ~~to~~ explicitly to assist the men and women in charge of the WRA in gaining an understanding. The existence of the Community Analysis Section constituted a formal recognition by the bureaucratic agency of the importance of knowing the administered people on their own terms. Community Analysis became a symbol of administrative concern for unprejudiced understanding of the ~~Japanese American~~ people, under governmental jurisdiction.

The reporting contributed to an awareness of the ~~viewpoints~~ problems of the evacuees as seen from their own viewpoint. It was by no means the only source of such knowledge. The Director of the WRA kept in close touch personally with Nisei leaders & at all levels of WRA staff there were contacts which played a part in the growth of knowledge within the WRA of the nature of ^{the problems of} J-A life before, during, & following the evacuation. Nevertheless the CA section constituted a formal emphasis & recognition of the importance of such understanding by the bureaucratic agency itself. CA was in a sense a symbol of administrative concern for ~~the~~ ^{the} impartial understanding of the J-A people.

The CA section was, however, more than a symbol. It was also a source of real appreciation of the J-A problems. Some of the mimeographed reports of interviews with Nisei & Issei at the time of army registration, for example, were very widely disseminated among WRA staff in Wash + at the centers.

Carefully reported in the words of the persons interviewed, these probably contributed more than anything else to contact with the reality of the personal turmoil to which the evacuees gave rise. For some WRA staff the reports were meaningless & regarded as calling attention to what should be forgotten, but for most of those who started with the agency through to the end they were a major ~~source~~ basis for sympathetic understanding.

While the author turned administrative Province Chief of City Inquest played a major role ~~directly~~ in the primary policy-making of the WRA, the CA section on the other hand did not assume any such role directly. It is not possible to estimate its influence on basic policy decisions after its formation. It is clear that the information it collected & organized threw light on the human realities which the ^{Province} segregation decision matched. There is also no doubt that this important policy decision was made with full understanding of the human ~~realities~~ contents in which it was made. CA contributed to that. It is also clear that CA was not supportive of the strict attitude for relocation & pointed out its inadequacies.

look at WRA as a total effort
WRA hires were recruited
because JHP was
high in adm. #15 (?)

Begun by Collier + BSR
Culminating in AHL - total
adm. sit.

Then CA by Embree

~~John~~ Intertel J's

Immediate distractions
+ resistance to change
the total adm. office
way of work

Staff advisory
Informal ^{to} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ
all levels

Hit or miss
Kinds + reports + list
CA + policy + list

MEG primary How affected
JHP

Responsibilities

no evacs

no admin

no colleagues

Imp. Def. =

description in-

tegration of

the interests

Theory =

process of mutual

adaptation required

for coop.

Ethics

draw toward an

equal without loss

of program - are

(2)

Evaluation -

Rewrite outline

Include processes of
Osmosis & plasmolysis,
etc.

Further adaptations
without absorption

alternatives as in

The Role of Anthropologists in
the WRA

THE REVERSAL OF A RACIST GOVERNMENTAL DECISION
DURING World War II:
The War Relocation Authority

One of the most significant developments in domestic policy during World War II in the United States was the program of evacuation and resettlement of the Japanese Americans from the west coast. The importance of this action by the government can be summed up in the following way. The initial action of evacuation demonstrated how, in the relative chaos of wartime, policy based solidly in racial prejudice can be put into operation despite an abundance of information pointing to its non-feasibility or justification.

The evacuation of the Japanese ~~of~~ Americans from the ~~west~~ coast of the United States during World War II has been discussed and condemned at length ever since it ~~happ~~ took place. The Dean of the Yale Law School, ^{W. W. Rostow} ~~Leo~~ Rostow, during the war called it "America's Worst War~~time~~ Mistake." The evacuation ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ decision ~~nevertheless~~ has been supported by the Supreme Court of the United States on the grounds of military necessity despite the definition of the group to be evacuated in purely racial terms.

A reading of the literature that has resulted from the evacuation and its aftermath gives the impression that

ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

by
Edward H. Spicer

Eugene V. Rostow, Dean of the Yale Law School, denounced the evacuation of Americans of Japanese ancestry at the beginning of World War II as "America's" worst wartime mistake." He also ^(Rostow 1945a) ~~also~~ ^{referred to} the legal cases arising out of the evacuation ²⁵ "disasters" ^(Rostow 1945 b) ~~viewed~~ ^{regarded} from the standpoint of civil rights. Rostow ~~was concerned~~ ^{the} the evacuation and ~~the~~ subsequent incarceration of Japanese Americans as a serious ~~threat to~~ ^{threat to} fundamental citizenship rights. He understood the attack as based on considerations of race and ~~rightly~~ regarded it as indistinguishable, ~~in the~~ ^{in the} legal ~~point of~~ ^{view}, from the position of the Nazis with respect to the Jews in Germany. Rostow was one of the few public figures ~~in the United States~~ who did not shrink from stating this point of view in the ~~midst of~~ ^{was} ~~the~~ ^{preparations} ~~for war~~ in a United States ~~suddenly~~ deeply hostile to Japan and the Japanese. Yet his position was precisely that taken by ~~the~~ United States Department of Justice ~~under~~ Attorney General Biddle up until ~~a~~ ^{the} ~~week~~ ^{before} ~~preceding~~ ^(Grodzins 1949; 242, 258-9) the evacuation order.

Denunciation of the action taken in March, 1942, by President Roosevelt ordering the evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry ¹⁹⁵⁰ from their homes on the west coast has ^{been vigorous} ~~continued~~ ^{the event (Ten Broek)} ever since. Al- ^{Daniels 1971} though the Supreme Court upheld the evacuation as constitutional on the grounds of "military necessity," the decision was ^{by majority vote} ~~by a bare majority~~ and the dissenting ^{justices} ~~opinions~~ ^{stated strong} ~~opinions~~ against the singling out of the more than 80,000 citizens of the United States on the ~~basis~~ ^{of} their racial origins. ^(Korematsu v. United States 323 U.S. 214; 233-42, 242-48) The fact is that the governmental action took place in the ~~midst of~~ face of vigorous opposition by the Department of Justice and can not in any way be regarded as the result either of consensus among high government officials or ~~a~~ concerted, widespread public demand. The evacuation was rather a response to limited special interest groups on the west coast, such as the Shipper-Growers' Association, in ~~business~~ ^{business} competition with Japanese Americans, and constituted a hasty ^{concession} ~~concession~~ in government circles ~~with~~ ^{to} the implacable prejudice of a single ^{Army} general who happened to command the strategic west coast military area. ^(Grodzins 1949: 362-5)

Nevertheless in March, 1942, the evacuation ^{was} had been ordered and there was no rescinding it. The consequences ^{directly and immediately} were immediate and since they affected some 110,000 people ^{and} had to be dealt with promptly. What has since been ^{generally} almost universally judged as a very bad decision led to a series of actions which can be interpreted only as a determined effort by the United States government to undo the ^{effects} evils to which ^{of that} decision led. This aspect ^{The undoing of the evils} of the governmental actions has been ^{paid} far less attention ~~than~~ ^{it merits} than the racially based evacuation. Within a few days of the evacuation order President Roosevelt created a civilian agency --- the War Relocation Authority --- and appointed as its director ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Milton K. Eisenhower ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ who was soon replaced by Dillon S. Myer, both experienced in the administration of agricultural programs growing out of the New Deal. It became clear early, as these men sought to deal with the problems of 110,000 men, women, and children suddenly made homeless and excluded from the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ coastal states that the policy pursued would ^{proceed on} be non-repressive. That is, the United States government would not seek to hold the evacuees in concentration camps. It must be ^{emphasized} pointed out that ^{the} this was ~~the~~ recognized as the immediate central issue in War Relocation Authority ^{immediately saw} policy the issue ^{of} in terms of the restoration of human rights (Myer 1971), ~~concentration camps.~~

Repeatedly ^{During} in the thirty-five years since the ~~WRA~~ ^{evacuation} came into existence the ~~concept~~ ^{label} of "concentration camp" has been ^{repeatedly} loosely applied to the communities which were established for the Japanese Americans, following ~~the~~ ^{obscures} evacuation. To do so ~~confuses~~ ^{as fundamental} the fundamental and significant ~~policy~~ issue which the policy-makers in the WRA recognized and chose their programs with respect to. ^{appeared} These ~~pressures~~ ^{decision to} as might have been expected as one effect of the ~~racially based~~ ^{immediately appeared who} evacuation orders on the American public, organizations and individuals who sought to bring about complete imprisonment of all the evacuees, both citizens and non-citizens, among them. ^{had been ordered as} The pressures to move in this direction were very strong in a country at war with the Japanese and in a phase of that war, during early 1942, which was going steadily against the United States. There were individuals and groups who assumed that evacuation ^{was} a result of real evidence that all persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States were a serious threat to the country's security. The fact ^{was ever} that ~~there~~ was very little evidence presented, ^{that} and that this ^{extremely} was most flimsy, ^{and that even this} most of what ~~there~~ was not being applicable to the overwhelming majority of the evacuees ^{were} was not known to the

public at large. The influential columnist, Westbrook Pegler, wrote regularly ~~about the Japanese~~ ^{but} without solid information that the Japanese Americans were extremely dangerous. The American Legion passed a resolution in convention calling for the ~~right~~ total imprisonment of all persons of Japanese ancestry. ^(Spicer 1945) Such influences continued strong during 1942 and were ~~taken up by~~ ^{led} the ~~House~~ Un-American Activities Committee of the House of Representatives. The pressures ^{to} mounted steadily ^{for} to make ^{ing} concentration camps out of the temporary communities which the Army had built and ^{for which} the WRA had taken the administrative responsibility. ~~For~~. There was ^{to} a segment of Americans ^{who} had suddenly become convinced as a result of the misleading action of evacuation that the U. S. citizens and their parents ~~selected on the basis of~~ ^{who should} racial origin were dangerous enemies, ^{to} be deprived of all human liberties. This ^{resulted in the urging of} amounted to the advocacy of real concentration camps, that is, places where the men, women, and children ^{were to} be imprisoned ~~with~~ indefinitely with no possibility of getting out. The demand for this kind of treatment reached as far as both the House of Representatives and the United States Senate. It was in this situation of intensifying demand for repressive measures against the evacuees that the War Relocation Authority had to forge its policy in fulfilling the mandate given ~~it~~ ^(Tozier 1946) by President Roosevelt, namely, to provide for the welfare of the evacuees.

It would have been an easy course to pursue at the time to ~~decide~~ ~~to~~ accede to the demand for concentration camps. This was not, however, the path which the WRA took. On the contrary, ~~its~~ its policy-makers struggled to look at the situation from the point of view of law and civil rights, ~~from the standpoint~~ of the long term cultural adjustment of the Japanese Americans in the United States, ^{and of the} with respect to the effects of arbitrary confinement on a racial basis of young American citizens, in short in the broadest possible framework of human problems of an uprooted segment of the population of the United States. Consideration of the problems from the standpoint that the evacuees were human beings and most of them citizens of the United States required the formulation of a set of ~~value~~ principles for shaping policy. The values adopted as the basis of WRA action might be summed up as anti-concentration camp values, ^{resulting in} or ~~essentially~~ as non-repressive policy. More positively, the WRA policy-makers chose to open up the whole of the United States ^{newly} apart from the restricted west coast to ~~the~~ resettlement ^{by} of the Japanese Americans. This resulted in a conception of the camps which the Army had built for the reception of the evacuees as

"way-stations" on the path back into normal American society. This basis of policy was fundamentally ~~in opposition~~ ^{opposed} to the concentration camp policy ~~being~~ ^{being} advocated ~~in 1942~~ ^{by} the various groups and individuals who had been misled ~~by~~ ^{into} ~~unbased~~ ^{believing that} ~~evacuation~~ ^{of} the evacuees ~~as~~ ^{were} dangerous people. It was a difficult policy to pursue, one that required courage on the part of the policymakers in a nation ~~actively~~ ^{actively} tooling itself ~~for~~ for all-out war with the Japanese. Nevertheless the WRA formulated its policy position with great clarity in the course of its first year of existence and, ultimately with the help of the War Department and always supported strongly by the Department of Justice, followed through ~~in~~ ^{to} executing the policy with great consistency ultimately liquidating itself as the war came to an end. ^(Myer 1971) It is ironic that the way-stations into American life which the WRA called relocation centers are still ^{often} spoken of by commentators on the evacuation ~~and~~ ^{and} its aftermath as "concentration camps." ^(Bosworth 1967) It was precisely to forestalling the appearance of such institutions in American life that the WRA devoted itself.

~~The WRA approach to the realization of its policy goals was many-sided.~~

The WRA approach to achieving its policy goals was many-sided. It maintained constant, close liaison with representatives of the Justice Department which had not essentially changed its position that ^{mass} evacuation of American citizens could not be justified on any grounds and fully expected that forced detention of the Nisei citizens would quickly be declared unconstitutional as Nisei proceeded to bring suit. The top officials of the WRA encouraged the ~~Department of War~~ ^(Ringle 1942) to learn what the Office of Naval Intelligence ^{already} knew before evacuation, namely, that there was reason to assume that Nisei were the most actively loyal among American citizens; Army teams were encouraged to visit relocation centers and interview Nisei for service in Army Intelligence units; and ~~mainly~~ in 1943 the WRA cooperated fully with the Army in developing ~~its~~ ^{its} plan for re-opening Selective Service to Nisei and urging them to volunteer for military service. From the summer of 1942 the WRA arranged for Nisei to leave the camps for seasonal agricultural labor in the mountain states. Thus the WRA moved rapidly on several fronts for establishing the relocation centers as temporary way-stations, not permanent prisons, from which those evacuees who were able and willing could move out even while war with Japan was in progress. It was this broad approach to the problems created by the evacuation ~~order~~ which the WRA initiated early and which it pursued through the four and one-half years of its existence, ultimately resettling some 25,000 evacuees before the end of the war and closing ~~its~~ ^{out} all the centers and the agency itself by the summer of 1946.

As an integral part of its program to re-integrate the evacuees into normal American life and ~~to~~ ^{to} forestall ~~ing~~ ^{ing} efforts on the part of some Americans to create concentration camps, the WRA enlisted the aid of social scientists. This was carried out in a novel manner not ~~theretofore~~ ^{theretofore} employed in ~~bringing~~ ^{bringing} ~~social~~ ^{social} science knowledge to bear on administrative problems. It was assumed that there would be difficult problems confronting administrators as a result of the fact of sharply differing cultural backgrounds between themselves and the evacuees and that these problems would be constantly recurrent in the day to day operation of the relocation centers. In order to resolve such problems it would be necessary to ~~retain~~ ^{retain} as part of the working staff individuals who ~~would be enabled to learn~~ ^{would be enabled to learn} ~~constantly~~ ^{constantly} the ~~nature~~ ^{nature} of the motivations and the cultural influences affecting the behavior of the administered people; this called for social scientists who would con-

stantly through observation and interview be in touch with the population of the relocation centers. The approach also called for frequent contact between the social scientists and the administrators, so that problems small and large could be freely discussed; ~~with the social scientists;~~ moreover since there were various levels of administrators involved from the ~~local communities,~~ the relocation centers, to the several levels of administration in Washington, it would be necessary to maintain the working contacts between social scientists and administrators at all levels. This kind of structure was eventually achieved, ~~if not altogether perfectly,~~ so that at least three levels of ~~the~~ administrators had available informed social scientists as staff advisers. What was novel about this arrangement was, first, that it constituted an employment of social science not on the assumption that it consists of already completed bodies of knowledge, but rather that it is a developing understanding of human phenomena and, second, that social science ~~consultants~~ ^{may be employed} can operate ~~effectively~~ within the administrative organization, ~~not only as occasional~~ ^{consultants} ~~advisers~~ outside the structure.

This conception of the use of social science was applied first in one of the relocation centers which had been established on an Indian Reservation and over which the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had retained some jurisdiction. The Commissioner at that time was John Collier, who had earlier ~~had~~ made an effort to employ anthropologists in an Applied Anthropology Unit in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. With the establishment of a relocation center, called Poston, on the Colorado Indian Reservation, John Collier conceived the idea of setting up an applied social science unit to assist in the administration. He placed the unit under the direction of Alexander H. Leighton, who named it the Bureau of Sociological Research and proceeded to hire as his ~~assistants~~ ^{two anthropologists,} Edward H. Spicer and ^{later} Elizabeth Colson. Leighton was a psychiatrist ~~who had been~~ ^{associated} with ~~anthropologist~~ ^{the} Clyde Kluckhohn and who had carried out field research among the Navajos and the Eskimos. ^(Leighton and Spicer - 1945) The Bureau of Sociological Research set a pattern of procedure which influenced the later development of social science utilization in all the other relocation centers. It relied heavily on a staff of evacuees, both Nisei and Issei, for its knowledge of evacuee attitudes, viewpoints, and ways of behaviour. Leighton, as head of the Bureau, established constant working contacts ^{both internal and external} as ^{with} adviser ~~to~~ the Director of the center, ~~both~~

~~informal and formal~~

John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs had demonstrated much interest in the application of anthropology to problems of Indian administration. He advocated the view that the Indian reservations ought to be employed as laboratories for the better understanding of cross-cultural administration. He had hired Leighton with the same approach in mind and gave ^(Collier) Leighton a free hand to develop ^{this} ~~the laboratory approach~~ in the relocation center at Poston. While the first focus of attention in the Bureau of Sociological Research was on the evacuees and how they saw their problems and sought to solve them, the Bureau rapidly found itself studying the administrators as intensively as the evacuees. Bureau staff frequently attended (staff) administrative meetings of various kinds and quickly found themselves viewing each problem situation in terms not only of evacuees ~~but also of administrators' attitudes and behavior~~ but also of administrators' attitudes and behavior. Each problem and each solution was ^{studied as} a compound of both.

In October 1942, ~~before the Bureau~~ when the Bureau of Sociological Research was just beginning ^{to} function adequately, a series of beatings of evacuees by other evacuees and ^{related} other disturbances broke out, ^{in Poston} culminating in a general ~~strike~~ refusal of the evacuees to carry on any but the most necessary work for the maintenance of the center. The strike was accompanied by ~~widespread~~ withdrawal of evacuees from the administrative offices and ^{by} demonstrations with Japanese music and speeches. The administrators were isolated from the community for ^{several days} ~~twenty-four~~ hours or more, the military police (supposed to confine their guard duty to the perimeter of the camp) entered ~~with~~ the center with armed vehicles, and there was thus immediate threat of the breakdown of the peaceful conditions which had prevailed. Negotiations were arranged and, at first tense and difficult, they resulted in increased understanding and new forms of organization with more ~~Japanese~~ evacuee participation in management. ~~The head of the Bureau of Sociological Research~~ The head of the Bureau of Sociological Research took an active role in advising the administrators who effected the settlement and prevented the taking over of the camp by the Military Police.

This crisis which was a result on the one hand of the cross-currents of conflict among the Japanese Americans and on the other of fear and mishandling of situations by some administrators, was analyzed and described in a book ^{later} published by Leighton in 1945, The Governing of Man. The study effectively presented the approach which

of the WRA that Japanese experts could help the administration of ~~WRA~~ the agency when the Poston and other disturbances broke out. These crises in relocation ~~center~~ ^{center} affairs ~~with their~~ ^{had a prompt} impact on the general public and on Congress, who began to wonder whether after all concentration camps might not be the solution. Both the House and the Senate instituted investigations, which ultimately vindicated the WRA approach, but which in late 1942 were ominous for the WRA open-door policy. Embree had already moved far in convincing the top administration that scientists familiar with Japanese background could be useful. Now with reports coming in that the staff of the Bureau of Sociological Research ~~xxxxxxxx~~ had played a helpful role in ~~xxxxxxxx~~ a constructive outcome of the Poston crisis, the Director of WRA became convinced that Provinse's plan for more social scientists should be acted on immediately. ~~in the hope of helping~~ ^{was that it would} to forestall any further disruption of the relocation centers. Two outside consultants --- Robert Redfield ~~xxxx~~ and Conrad Arensberg, anthropologists who had visited the centers briefly during the summer of 1942 --- both supported Provinse and Embree's proposal that a social science unit be created.

The result was the formation of the Community Analysis Section within Provinse's Division of Community Management. ^(Embree 1944) Embree became the Head of the Section and proceeded to hire as his assistant ^{locating} a sociologist, Frank Sweetser. Their plan, following the objective of ^{lists} social science ~~staff~~ at all levels, ~~was to~~ ^{called for} in addition to the Washington office staff of two, ^{an analyst} to place a social scientist in each of the ten relocation ~~centers~~ ^{other than Poston}. Within ^{seven} three months they had filled ^{nine} ~~eight~~ of the field posts, with ~~six~~ ^{seven} anthropologists: ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Weston Labarre, E. Adamson Hoebel, Morris Opler, Marvin K. Opler, John De Young, ^{Charles Wisdom} and G. Gordon Brown and two sociologists: John Rademaker and Forrest Laviolette. Thus by the late spring of 1943, one year after the formation of the WRA, ^a working team of social scientists had been established, linking all ~~but one of~~ the centers with the Washington office.

Meanwhile a difference in policy thinking had developed between John Collier and Dillon Myer resulting in the withdrawal of Collier from administrative responsibility for the Poston center. ^{The Bureau of Sociological Research was eliminated; and} Leighton ^{Colson} ~~Jr.~~ resigned, ~~from his post as director of the Bureau of Sociological Research and moved into other war-related research and policy making in Washington.~~ ^{and his assistant Sweetser} Embree also resigned from the WRA and Spicer took ^{Embree's} ~~his~~ place in Washington, ~~and xxxxxxxx~~ ^{became} another anthropologist, David French, ~~took his place to be~~ ^{Community Analyst at Poston.} ~~The Community Analysis~~

Section continued to operate until the liquidation of the WCA in the summer of 1946. The Washington office staff was increased by the addition of two ~~more~~ anthropologists, ~~Katharine Luomala~~ ^{Katharine Luomala} and Margaret Lantis, as ~~Rachel Sady~~ ^{Rachel Sady} took the place of Sweetser there. Two of the ~~first~~ sociologists first hired, Laviolette and Rademaker resigned after only short tours of duty, as did two anthropologists, Labatte and Hoebel. They were eventually replaced by Asael Hansen and Charles Hoffman, ^{and} Edgar McVoy, Sociologists, and Elmer Smith, anthropologist. Thus reorganized, ~~with~~ ^{the later addition of sociologist J.R. McFadden,} and with some turnover in personnel, leaving two of the centers without analysts for extended periods, the Community Analysis Section continued operation until the liquidation of the agency in June, 1946. In all it employed ^{21 social scientists,} 13 anthropologists and 8 sociologists.

J.R. McFadden

their responsibilities and ~~did not suffer from the sense of isolation~~ ^{were not isolated from evacuee}
~~contacts~~ ^{contacts} from what was going on that characterized most Washington ~~off.~~ ^{off.} In the
~~sense~~ ^{sense} reporting that filled the administrators' needs was more difficult.
 One of the most successful roles was as participant in ~~off~~ meetings
 that took place between the camp Director and his assistants and ~~the~~
 various evacuee administrative groups, such as the Block Managers, and
 evacuee committees organized for particular purposes. Here the role
 was not simply reporter of information but participant in ~~policy~~ de-
 cisions affecting operations. The Analyst in such a role ~~combined~~
 combined an awareness of the viewpoints of both administrators and evac-
 uees and often was able to bring about adjustment of differences simply
 by stating the differences clearly. An Analyst ~~who demonstrated~~
 who demonstrated this sort of capacity usually gained the confidence
 of evacuees and was relied on for ~~their~~ ^{aid in} gaining fair consideration by
 them. Not all Analysts had such negotiating ~~and~~ ^{or interest} ability, and those who
 did not tended to withdraw from ~~immediate~~ operating participation and
 spent more time in the preparation of written reports which the Washington
 Community Analysis ^{office} constantly requested.

From the beginning the Community Analysis Section undertook as
 a major responsibility the preparation of reports which were mimeo-
 graphed in quantity and distributed through^{OU} ^(Spicer-1948) the agency. The first of
 these ~~reports~~ by John Embree dealt with such matters as "Dealing
 with Japanese Americans" (which contained a discussion of race and culture
 and the institution of the go-between, among other ~~things~~ things),
 "Japanese Groups and Associations in the United States," and "Notes on
 Japanese Holidays." While short reports on special Japanese customs
 continued to appear occasionally throughout the program, the ~~subjects~~
~~of~~ subjects of the reports quickly changed character, beginning in
 February, 1943. "Causes of Unrest at Relocation Centers," "Army Regis-
 tration at Granada," "Preliminary Survey of Resistances to Resettlement
 at the Tule Lake Relocation Center," "An Analysis of the Segrega-
 tion Program," ~~and~~ "The Tule Lake Incident" were the subjects of
 reports during 1943 and early 1944, ^{for example,} which indicated the focus of effort
 as on the urgent immediate problems of center administration, ^{such reports} as ^{shift of} it be-
 came complicated ^{note Tex} by the Army's decision to re-open Selective Service to
 Nisei, ^{with} the WRA initiated its all-out resettlement program from the
 centers, and ^{the creation of} the "segregation center" ^{at} Tule Lake, ^{reports} was created. These
 ranged from 5 to a dozen or more pages and were circulated among all
 WRA personnel. ^{More than} ~~Some~~ fifty such reports were issued. ^(See Spicer et al. 1969 for complete list)

By November 1944 the Community Analysis Section decided that there was need for ~~and interest in~~ a regular and frequent reporting of ~~of~~ the effects of the WRA programs for resettlement and center closing on evacuee attitudes and organization. A series of trend reports was initiated, collating information from all the centers, which shortly became weekly. Thirty of these was prepared and distributed and were widely read by evacuees and WRA staff. They were issued throughout 1945, until the closing of ~~in~~ all the centers, at the end of that year, as the Supreme Court decided that Japanese Americans could no longer be excluded from the west coast. At the same time a series of studies of attitudes of west coast communities to which Japanese Americans were returning or expected to return were initiated: "Prejudice in Hood River Valley -- A Case Study in Race Relations," "West Coast Localities: Sacramento County and City," "West Coast Localities: Imperial Valley," and others.

The most influential of the Community Analysis ~~reports~~ written reports ~~within~~ among the agency personnel were probably those that reported directly the results of Analysts' interviews with evacuees of various viewpoints. Notable among these were Morris Edward Opler's "From a Nisei Who Said 'No'" and "A Nisei Requests Expatriation." These were products of the Army's registration program which required evacuees to fill out a registration form containing a question ~~which~~ ^{that} came to be labelled "the Loyalty Question." Many Nisei gave replies of "no" ~~for~~ for various reasons ranging from deep anger at the whole evacuation program to wild and careless defiance of ~~what~~ ^{what} they felt was arbitrary government power. Some Nisei then proceeded to renounce their U. S. citizenship and ask for ~~expatriation~~ ^{ex} ^{to Japan} ¹ expatriation. The "morass", as some WRA staff called it, of conflicting attitudes and loyalties among the Nisei was only slowly realized by the administrators. The direct reporting of interviews which were then circulated among administrators at all levels was a major influence in the steady growth of understanding ^{on the part of} ~~among~~ the administrators, most of whom had begun their service in WRA with no understanding whatever of the background of Japanese Americans or of the real nature of the impact of the evacuation on them.

In the job descriptions for the position of "Social Science Analyst" (the Civil Service name for ~~the~~ what WRA called Community Analyst) there was no mention of any ~~responsibility~~ ^{responsibility} to the people administered by ~~an~~ ^{the} agency for whom the analyst ~~was~~ ^{was} to work.

The ~~responsibility~~^{position} was described entirely in terms of responsibility in reporting and other matters upward to administrators in the line organization. The Community Analysts ~~of the~~ nevertheless found themselves immediately in situations ~~which~~ in which it appeared that there were ~~other~~^{additional} responsibilities, namely, to the evacuees from whom most of the materials with which they worked were derived. The Bureau of Sociological Research staff, first in the field, came promptly up against some problems. The first was a result of a complete misunderstanding ~~on the part of~~^{by} administrators ~~of the relocation center~~ of the nature of social science research. This lack of understanding was not surprising, in view of the absence of ~~experience~~^{prior} with staff social scientists~~xmxxxxxxx~~. It had to be made clear by the Director of the Bureau that his staff was not aiming at the collection of information on individuals, even though individuals were the source of all the knowledge which the research was ~~developing~~^{developing}. In short, the sources of information were not to be made available to the administrators, ~~only~~^S the results of interview and observation on an anonymous basis. This procedure had to be learned by the administrators and was eventually accepted. They ceased to look to the Bureau for information about any particular individual and realized that they had to rely on other ~~parts~~^{members} of their staff for that, such as Internal Security officers and welfare workers, whose work depended on the identification of individuals. The limitation on what was made available came up again when investigators of the House Un-American Activities ~~Committee~~^{Committee} appeared in the relocation center. The staff decided to ~~make~~ portions of their materials completely unavailable because the handling of hearings in Los Angeles had made it apparent that the investigators could not be relied on for fair and reasonable handling of evidence. The decision of the Bureau would probably have forced its staff into illegal actions, if the investigators had pushed the matter, but they did not, and so the problem was avoided rather than solved.

These experiences made it clear that there was a responsibility to evacuees which was not fully accepted by the administrators or the agency as an arm of government. The problem was dealt with both formally and informally by the Community Analysis Section. The responsibilities of Analysts were defined in terms of ~~providing information~~ to administrators only information about group processes and structure and attitudes and viewpoints anonymously reported. This was ~~fully~~^{finally}

accepted as policy by the WRA, although to some administrators it ~~continued to~~ raise questions about any real utility the Analysts might have. In practice it meant that Analysts maintained confidential, ~~fixxxxxxxx~~ as well as other, file material. In all Analysts' reports the confidentiality of "key informants," through whom they worked constantly, was scrupulously maintained. The question of the availability of confidential file material is of course still a controversial matter being decided by the courts in connection with government supported ^{research} ~~information gathering~~. No case of ~~xxxxxxx~~ breach of confidence was ever complained ^{of} by any evacuee.

Despite the absence of ~~responsibility~~ ^{obligation to report} to the administered people as provided ~~xxx~~ in the Analysts' job descriptions, probably every Analyst chose to assume some ~~degree~~ kind of such responsibility. ~~xxxxxxx~~ All the Community Analysis offices in the centers had staffs of evacuees who provided information ~~xxxxxx~~ for the Analysts' reports, oral and written. Every Analyst knew that what was done in his office was known eventually in some form in the evacuee community. No system of classified relorting was developed. The work of the Analysts was, in short, common knowledge ~~xxxxxxx~~ among the evacuees. Moreover, the mimeographed reports ~~xxxxxx~~ that emanated from the Washington office were available ^{equally} to evacuees and "appointed personnel," as the WRA employees were called. In addition most, if not all, the Analysts became intimate with a number of older ~~xxxxxxx~~ Japanese with whom they discussed frequently the problems of relocation life from the social scientist's point of view. Reports prepared for the Washington office of the Section were often worked out jointly with such close associates of the Analysts. In these relationships the influences undoubtedly worked both ways, so that in some degree the Analysts' viewpoints and analyses became known in the levels of leadership in the evacuee communities. This did not mean, of course, that the analyses were accepted as the basis for ~~xxxxxxx~~ ~~xxx~~ evacuee cooperation or opposition any more than the Community Analysis reports were accepted as the basis for action by the administrators. In both contexts they were part of the situation, sometimes exerting strong influence, sometimes merely providing ~~informationxxxxxxx~~ knowledge of alternatives ~~xxxx~~ not incorporated ^{into} into policy or program of either evacuees or administrators. There is no question, however, that in two or three centers the intimate relations of ~~evacuee leadership~~

between influential Japanese and Community Analysts affected the course of events.

A third kind of responsibility, which is to be regarded as an imperative in all instances of applied social science, was also recognized and acted on ~~to some extent~~ by ^{the some} individuals, ~~and by the Community Analysis Section as a whole.~~ ~~by the Community Analysis Section~~ and by the Community Analysis Section as a whole. This is the obligation to colleagues in the social sciences to interpret the results of the experience in application. The responsibility as fulfilled by individuals is best and most fully represented by Leighton's study focussed around the Poston general strike (Leighton 1945). In the published book, ^{Leighton} makes an analysis of the particular relocation situation in terms of ~~a~~ general ideas about the nature of human psychological types and provides a hypothesis regarding their behavior ~~in~~ ^{specific} a type of administrative situation, ~~of the respective~~ types ~~of~~ thing-minded and people-minded persons. This ~~is~~ idea ~~which~~ might be applied further in, for example, the selection of personnel for particular administrative assignments. Leighton, however, went further in his book and developed an elaborate theory ~~in~~ regarding the behavior of individuals and of communities under different forms of "stress." The book was widely read by social scientists ~~and by administrative~~ as well as by a general reading public and constituted a contribution of some influence in the ~~fields~~ fields of both administrative management and psychology.

Individual Community Analysts also made some contributions in the special fields of their interests. For example, Morris Opler (1944) Marvin Opler (1945, 1950a, 1950b, 1958), John Embree (1943, 1944), K. Luomala (1947), ~~and~~ E. C. McVoy (1943), G. Gordon Brown (1945), E.R. Smith (1948), and ^{L.H.} Spicer (1946~~xxx~~, 1952 a, 1952b) published in various journals, ranging from ^{the} American Anthropologist to the Utah Humanities Review, analyses of different aspects of the relocation program. It was true also that the Community Analysis Section as a whole made an effort to meet this sort of obligation. ~~social~~ ~~science~~ ~~colleagues~~ The final report of the Section, ^{prepared} prepared by four of the Analysts, was obviously aimed ^{at} social science colleagues (Spicer, et al. ~~1969~~ 1946 and 1969). Although it avoided an explicit framework of formulated theory, it is clear nevertheless that it sought to provide an overall analysis of the processes of restructuralization of community and reorientation of collective values. The report

Kiefer, C. W. - Changing Cultures,
Changing Lives 1974

1632

Evaluation —

1. Adm not convinced
of value of CA or BSR.
Gov. Sec. had to define
roles & to whom to
report.

CA set up at low
level.
concerned re info &
trouble shooters

2. 1 among many
specialties

major policy decided
& new not decided
by WRA - (see)
closure

McVey
Oplers
Spicer
Embree
Brown
Latomala

SPICER

WRA ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WRA - THE USES OF ANTHROPOLOGY 1971

Goe - 7 (-5)

Hoffmann
Sweetser -
La Violette
Hansen
McVay
Greed -
~~Walter~~ Smith

Asath - 12⁸⁰

McE Oler
McK Oler
Yenick
Eynbee
Lomala
Rody
Spicer
Brown
De Young
Widom
La Barre
Hoebel
Bakewell
McFarling

Evaluation -

Process facilitation by agency

CA results in relation to aim

ATL - too simple admin dich
e.g. people-minded who say
persecution complex,
unable to empathize

Decisions already made

Imp. Pop emphasizes ~~or~~ how far

Colonialism

EDWARD H. SPICER

WRA

ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WRA - THE USES OF

WRA —

2. The power framework and the WRA policy alternatives. The choice ^(lawyer) separates in the process. WRA in the total U.S. structure.
1. The socio-cultural process
3. The working relations BSR-CA ↔ Adm. selection & training of C.A. personnel
4. The models developed
Adm. — BDA vs WRA
C.A. — not clear — just within center
Adm. be enforced of City
Embree, AHL, Bill Whyte, EHS
5. Contact, data, process models
advocacy + Mumball
5. The work done
Reports — mimeo oral (slants)
Publications — AHL, EHS et al
6. Ethics — responsibility, accepted + rejected
no evasive no admin of people studied
public to colleagues (from the "plan etc hearings on
evaluation")
7. The "case" as soc. sci. in action
not high policy — but low policy
"adequate picture of reality"
the policy structure as govt type
Relational type — limits + possibilities
Alternative relations
Service in major process
"urgency" principle — priorities
Hindsight

PAPERS — MS 5

WRA
"ANTHROPOLOGISTS AND THE WRA: THE USES OF
ANTHROPOLOGY 1976