A P P L I E D A N T H R O P O L O G Y
in a
DISLOCATED COMMUNITY

(An Experience in a Japanese Relocation Center)

by

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For many years, but most particularly in the last ten, applied anthropology has been developing a place in numerous fields ranging from colonial administration to industry. As part of this growth it became an instrument in the War Relocation Authority's management of the Japanese evacuated from the Pacific Coast after the beginning of the war. In the present article we shall outline the initiation of this instance of applied social science and describe briefly for one Relocation Center the aims, conceptual framework, and results. ~~and methods~~ methods. For a description of the growth of this kind of work in the War Relocation Authority generally, see

History and Scope

During the years that he has been Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier has utilized the assistance of cultural anthropologists and other social scientists as technical aids to administration and has found their contribution of value. Consequently, in March, 1942, when the Office of Indian Affairs became responsible for the management of Poston, Arizona, a Japanese Relocation Center in the Colorado River Valley on Indian land, he at once began making preparations for the establishment of scientific analysis as an integral part of the project. As a result, Leighton, a psychiatrist who had some previous experience in studying Navaho and Eskimo communities, was detailed from the Navy to take charge of the research and he arrived at Poston on June 26, 1942. After a preliminary survey of the Center, and several consultations with Collier, the aims and functions of the research project were defined and recorded. They may be summarized as follows.

1.) To aid the administration by analyzing the attitudes of the evacuees with particular reference to their responses to administrative acts and to draw practical conclusions as to what

worked well, what did not work so well and why.

2.) To gather data of a general character that might be of value in the administration of dislocated communities in occupied areas.

A few months later, a third aim was added.

3.) To train field workers of Japanese ancestry in social analysis so that they could be helpful in occupied areas of the Pacific, during or after the war.

On August first, 1942, Spicer, an Anthropologist with experience analyzing Yaqui communities, joined the research work as Leighton's assistant. About the same time, through the Society for Applied Anthropology, Collier secured the temporary services of Conrad Arensberg, Professor of Anthropology at Brooklyn College, who joined Leighton and Spicer for most of August and aided them in a preliminary analysis of the community, the definition of the research problems and the selection of methods. Arensberg brought to bear the results of his experience with community studies in Ireland and with applied anthropology in industry. Laura Thompson also acted as a consultant on a number of occasions and contributed suggestions based on her work in communities in the South Pacific. In November, Elizabeth Colson, M.A. in anthropology from Radcliffe, with field experience among the Pomo and Maca Indians, joined the staff as a permanent member.

Through 1942 Poston was the only relocation center to have social scientific observation and analysis allied to its administration and as has been noted, this was due to Indian Service experience.*

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* The War Relocation Authority determined general policy for all ten relocation centers and directly administered nine. The Indian Service administered the remaining one, Poston, but did so under the general policies.

However, within the War Relocation Authority organization there was arising an independent movement in the same direction. The most important influence was the Chief of Community Services, John H. Provinse who as both anthropologist and administrator had had many years of experience with applied social science in the soil conservation program of the Department of Agriculture. For some time he had been maturing ideas relative to developing an organized department of social analysis as an adjunct to administration, and he was interested in the course Collier took in regard to scientific work at Poston. In August, 1942, Robert Redfield acting as a consultant to W.R.A. wrote a memorandum proposing a plan for utilizing social analysis in the administrative program. About August, 1942, John Embree, an anthropologist with extensive experience among the Japanese in Hawaii and in Japan, came as archivist to the reports division of the War Relocation Authority and in conjunction with Provinse gradually brought to the attention of other members of the staff the possibilities in applied social science. (1)

In November and December, a number of things occurred which resulted in the full establishment of applied anthropology in the War Relocation Authority's administrative organization. Arensberg turned in a report analyzing the management problems of Poston which was rather widely circulated among the top officials of the War Relocation Authority in Washington.(2) In a strike which occurred at Poston, our

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(1) Ibid

(2) The principal parts of this report were published in Applied Anthropology for October-November-December, 1942, Vol. 2, Number 1, "Report on a Developing Community, Poston, Arizona."

research project played a part in its control and settlement and was able to give by telephone a brief account of the factors involved to the Indian Office in Washington. Later we followed this up with an analytical report which was transmitted to the War Relocation Authority. Several weeks after the Poston strike, a similar episode occurred at the Manzanar Relocation Center, but in this case there were no trained observers on the spot, the mode of settlement was different and the immediate results less satisfactory. Drawing on these events and their own experiences, Provinse and Embree were able to establish the usefulness of applied anthropology, and Embree was requested to organize a department. In January, he visited Poston and asked for our collaboration in building his program. Information concerning our methods and materials were made available to him, and Spicer was loaned for a period of five weeks in which he made a survey of another Center and helped prepare the way for the establishment of social analysis there. In the meantime, working in Washington and in the field, Embree and Frank Sweetser organized and put into operation the Community Analysis Section.

In September, 1943, we terminated our field work and Leighton began a period of analysis and preparing reports directed at fulfilling the second of the general aims with which the project was started. The field work at Poston became a part of the War Relocation Authority's Community Analysis Section and Spicer went to Washington to become acting Senior Community Analyst on the resignation of Embree to teach in the Civil Affairs Military Training School in Chicago and his assistant Frank Sweetser to accept a commission in the Navy.

Organization of the Research Unit

Like the other relocation centers set up to house the 110,000 evacuated Japanese Americans, the Colorado River Center took form slowly as an organized community. During the first months the Administrative framework was nebulous and the functions of individuals within it were little related to the Civil Service titles which they held. The Reports Officer, for example, spent a large amount of time organizing the process of ushering evacuees from the busses in which they arrived to the newly built, bare barracks. The director of Adult education spent his time as housing administrator. The efforts of all were directed toward the urgent, inescapable problems of caring for the physical needs of the up-rooted people. Lines of authority had little relation to the organization charts posted in the offices, and functions of individuals were constantly changing. The place of research within the administrative framework, its organization as a working unit, and its relations to the community of evacuees evolved slowly during the course of the year. It was originally planned to include three assistants to Leighton, an anthropologist, a sociologist, and a psychologist, but there was difficulty in securing this personnel. At the end of five months the three assistants secured were all anthropologists. One of these, an evacuee, left the staff about this time, and the research unit continued to function with the two anthropologist assistants.

It was early decided to include as an important part of the work, the training of an evacuee staff. This influenced greatly the total plan of work and the kind of personnel participating in the research. It led to the securing of young persons who were interested in training in social science. The time required for

teaching the courses reduced by so much the time that we could devote to widening and deepening our contacts with the community. In this aspect of the work, therefore, we were geared less to an immediate contribution to the administration of the project and more to the following: (1) rehabilitation of evacuees, (2) utilization of the situation to contribute to occupied area work, and (3) long term planning of a research base in the project.

The Research Staff

The advantages in evacuee aids were that they could penetrate the community in a manner impossible for us because of physical appearance, cultural differences, and our relationship to the Administration, and that the more observers available the more widely would create an opportunity to establish systematic methods of observation, recording, and analysis which, once set up, could function of themselves without our close supervision.

Staff members were acquired gradually and there were some changes from time to time. However, after three months, an essentially stable core was in existence and remained so for the rest of the time we were in the field. It consisted in eight field workers, two secretaries, four typists, an artist, a draftsman, and a teacher of Japanese who functioned bothas instructor and as translator. There were also a number of high school students who gave faithful service as part time workers and there were at various times many persons who voluntarily contributed much of their time to the work.

The staff was heavily weighted on the side of college graduate or undergraduate American born Japanese (Nisei) because we attempted to secure persons with some previous acquaintance with social science. Another feature contributing bias was the fact that of the field

workers, only two were women. However, in spite of these factors, the group as a whole represented rather widely different natural contacts in different parts of the camp and in such different groups as urban and rural, Christian and Buddhist. Four out of the eight field workers spoke Japanese fluently. A consistent and partially successful effort was made to compensate for the college Nisei bias by making the staff aware of it and through the field work Leighton and Spicer did on their own in which Issei and Kibei contacts were sought.

A group of young persons signed up for research and equipped with paper, typewriters and pencils, of course, constitute a research organization. The members came impelled by many different motives, in many different states of mind, and as already said, from many different backgrounds. Only the secretaries and typists had sufficient training to be immediately qualified for their duties. However, they and all the other members were in the midst of the upheaval of evacuation and were no more immune to its disturbing affects than the other residents of the Center. Therefore, both the need for effective work and our respect for and a desire to help people in a difficult situation made it clear that we must do for this little group what the Administration was trying to accomplish for all 18,000 evacuees. That is to say,

1.) Create a sense of purpose and an opportunity for personal achievement that would make the work absorbing and rewarding beyond consideration of the $16 per month they received as salary.

2.) To encourage the development of forms of working and other social relationships between all the members of the department so that each would feel identified with it, a coordinated part of

it and able to get out of it satisfactions that arose from performance of work, from fellowship and to some extent from recreation.

3.) To develop a sense of confidence in the leadership of the research department.

4.) To promote adjustment to relocation center life by an opportunity for greater understanding and an opportunity to participate usefully.

These aims were in a large measure a formulation in terms of the immediate situation of a working concept of morale ~~formulated~~ outlined by Leighton some time previously,

"Morale is the capacity of a group of people to pull together persistently and consistently in a common purpose. The factors most concerned in its production and maintenance are: 1.) Faith in the common purpose, 2.) Faith in each other, 3.) Faith in the leadership, 4.) Adequate health and a balance of work, rest and recreation."*

There is no need to present all the plans and acts whereby these general aims were put into particular effect, but a few instances may be given.

The teaching program was instituted and organized for the field workers somewhat along the lines of a group carrying out clinical studies, but with the community in this instance being the subject of study rather than patients. Regular lectures were given, field work was supervised in personal consultations with either Spicer or Leighton and twice a week staff meetings were held partly as seminars to hear members report on what they were doing, partly as an

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* "A Working Concept of Morale for Flight Surgeons", Alexander H. Leighton, The Military Surgeon, Vol. 92, No. 6, June 1943.

opportunity to give direction to the work and partly for discussion and exchange of ideas. All members, including the secretaries were encouraged to contribute and their suggestions were discussed by the group as a whole and often adopted. The emphasis was on discussion and agreement, and Leighton and Spicer tried to contribute leadership as persons with wider knowledge and experience in the kind of work that had to be done, rather than as employers giving orders. The employer type of relationship between evacuees and Government personnel was extremely weak in the Center for many different reasons not the least of which was the low wage. We tried to lay information before our staff members, to propose problems and to allow them to make selection, but then we held them responsible for results and tried to develop in each one spontaneity coordinated by general aims and integrated with the work of other members.

Through the courtesy of Dean Robert H. Redfield, arrangements were made whereby the field workers who completed their courses received credits as students-at-large from the University of Chicago. This connection not only gave the field workers something that had specific value for them as individuals, but also increased the standing of the research project in the community and gave a sense that it had some recognition outside the Center.

A few parties, picnics and other forms of group recreation served to build feelings of mutual enjoyment and pleasure in the department.

During the early days when organization of the department was weak or non-existant and while the individual members had not yet found their "sea legs", inquiry into complicated or sensitive problems was avoided, but gradually as it became apparent that the

load could be borne, the work became more significant. This was possible in proportion to the development of interest, knowledge and training, the dropping out of persons mal-adjusted to the work or to other staff members, the realization of the aims and value of the research, and the adjustment to Center life.

Trips away from the Center taken by individual members and on two occasions by almost the entire group did much to improve feelings and to create more objectivity and efficiency in tackling the problems in the community.

Working Relations with Administration

The administrators who had been chosen for the responsibility of setting up and administering the Poston Center had not asked for a research unit. Its inclusion was suggested from above, although readily concurred in by the Project Director. When Leighton arrived to establish the unit, he found no plan worked out for placing it in the organization, nor did he find any crystallized ideas as to what his relations ought to be with the rest of the administration. It was three months before the place of research in the administrative framework was formally established.

The first move was to make the research part of the Department of Public Health with offices in the hospital. Leighton was an M.D. and his training was immediately turned to practical account in the health problems of the mushrooming community. During his first month on the project he spent a considerable amount of time in health work and, in the course of this, also laid the foundations for social analysis. He set up a special section of his department and called it a "Bureau of Sociological Research." The considerations which gave rise to this name were (1) that

"sociological" was preferable to "anthropological" in that it was thought it would not give offense to evacuees who might associate the latter with studies of "primitive" people and (?) the whole title seemed neutral enough not to give rise to serious misunderstanding as to function. The name was not a good choice. The term Bureau undoubtedly had connotations of the FBI for some among the evacuees, and "sociological research" was for the staff associated either with social welfare or with remote and "useless" activities of a pure science nature. It is questionable, however, whether any name at all describing the unit would have been understood at the time in any other ways. The Bureau of Sociological Research continued under that name during the rest of its existence. It was never wholly disassociated in the minds of the evacuee community from the Department of Public Health, for most of its staff continued to work in the hospital wing where it was first established.

The utilization of Leighton during his first month as Director of Public Health was indicative not only of the urgent need for skilled personnel, but also of the general attitude of the top administrators at first towards social analysis. They continued to make use of Leighton's special abilities during the second month by making him Acting Chief Medical Officer in charge of the hospital. When Spicer arrived to begin work as Leighton's assistant, there was also immediate pressure to put him into operations work. The chronic emergency situation of these early days was pointed to as justifying this use of the research workers, but it was also the considered opinion of the top administrators that actual experience in administrative responsibility would be a good foundation for research designed to assist the administrative program later. Although we

agreed that there was something in this idea, we nevertheless insisted that it was essential to get started immediately on the systematic study of the community if the research were to have value for guidance in the multiplying administrative problems. It is doubtful if the administrators at this time believed that research had much to contribute, but they yielded and released Leighton from his hospital responsibilities as soon as he could be replaced. The persistence of the administrators' initial point of view is indicated in the fact that six months later they did not hesitate to urge one of us to drop research and assume an operations job that needed filling.

During the third month the place of the Bureau was formally established within the project organization. It had become apparent to Leighton that the unit would have difficulty fulfilling its real function so long as it remained a part of one of the divisions of the project set-up. Social analysis was conceived by us as having an over-all function, namely, to advise the administration concerning community sentiments and social structure as they bore on any aspect of the administrative program. The project Director had begun to recognize the over-all character of the research findings and with Leighton worked out a plan to set up the unit as a separate division with its head reporting directly to the Project Director. The unit thus ceased to be identified with any single branch of the administration and began to operate as a special advisory group to the Project Director's office.

The formal relations with the top administration thus established were paralleled by the informal relations. Contacts through which knowledge of and points of view about the community

could be passed on informally to the Project Director and his immediate associates were maintained through social life, as well as in terms of the formal organization. Such contacts were not developed to any extent with the Engineering, Agriculture, and Administrative Divisions. On the other hand, relations with the staff of the Community Management Division and the Project Attorney's office were close and continuous throughout the year.

This placement of ourselves in relation to the other staff members had both advantages and disadvantages.

In establishing ourselves in close relationship with the administration, we reaped the benefits of contact with the heart of the administrative thinking that determined policies and consequently had that much more opportunity to bring the products of our work to bear on operations. However, by that same fact we created obstacles in our relations with other parts of the administrative organization. As in virtually all systems of society arranged in a hierarchy, there were certain sanctions governing communication between the different levels, and the closer one was known to be to the top, the more he is isolated from levels further down. There were also cliques within the administration divided from each other on matters of internal policy, and by becoming identified with one group, we automatically acquired a certain amount of hostility from others. To put the matter crudely we had to work against being considered either "apple polishers" or "snoopers" for the top administration. Our efforts were successful to a large extent through personal contact with individuals, and through the fact that time proved we did not report on individuals or indulge in any maneuvers in the administration of a political character. Each of us attempted to

move in rather different areas in the society of the administration so that even though we overlapped to some extent, between us we would cover most of the important cliques and associations and have friendly contacts in each. We were not as successful in this as we were in the same problem in the evacuee community, probably because we did stick closely to the top administrative group, not only in our working relations, but also in our recreation. However, in spite of this we did not run into any serious obstacles as far as collecting data was concerned. There were resistances, however, in some quarters which prevented the results of our work being sought and used as it might otherwise have been.

The Position of the Research Department in the Community

From the point of view of operation, the position of the research department and its personnel in the community had the same two important aspects it had in regard to the Administration, one being concerned with gathering information, and the other being concerned with the transmission of the results of analysis to the places where it could be used.

The most effective gathering of information was done through the personal contacts of individual staff members, but it was important that the organization as a whole be accepted by the community in so far as it was known to exist, and that it be considered an asset to the people. This was not easy to do for a number of reasons. Social analysis was something new and strange in the experience of most of the residents and due to their psychological state, was ipso facto open to suspicion and hostility. This initial reaction was enhanced by finding out that a large part of our work consisted in some sort of investigation, which was immediately associated with intelligence work and the fear that what we gathered

would be used against individuals. Leighton's naval uniform gave impetus to this idea. Then there was the general fact that we were associated with the Administration and like them liable to be a symbol of all the frustrations suffered by the residents and in consequence a target for hostilities arising from many sources. In time, there also came to be special problems arising out of jealousy of such things as the college courses, trips into seclusion for analysis and parties which were regarded as special privileges. To some extent they were special privileges, but those who were resentful lost sight of the fact that they had been earned.

The course we steered in these choppy seas had the following general characterisites. We avoided extensive publicity, yet tried to make it as plain as possible through talks and conversation to those who were aware of our activities and critical, just what it was we were trying to do. A general impression that we were contributing to community welfare was furthered by the relations with the Health Department and by the fact that some of our offices were in the hospital and Leighton that acted as psychiatric consultant to the hospital and for the welfare department. Most significant was getting to know the evacuee leaders whom our studies indicated were influential persons in the community and making them acquainted with our aims and the nature of our work. Some of these became important contributors and as a consequence felt an interest in what we were doing as well as in our personal friendship and carried to their friends and followers the impression that we were at least harmless, and perhaps a source of help to the evacuees. In time both of us developed a circle of evacuee friends who liked to come and talk about community affairs, feeling apparently that we had some influence with the administration, but at the same time were

safe confidents. It was an opportunity for them to pour out their feelings to interested listeners without fear of consequences, and we thus played a role somewhat analogous to the "Councilors" in the Western Electric Company*

In the beginning, we had hoped to lean rather heavily on actual contributions to community welfare that would be obvious. As part of this, we had expected to deliver reports and recommendations to the evacuee leaders in work programs and self-government in about the same manner we did to the administrative personnel. On the whole, we failed in this, partly through lack of skill, partly through the disorganized state of the community and the difficulty of becoming active in practical issues without getting embroiled in conflicts between hostile factions. However, we did contribute some talks on community matters and gave a little advice to community leaders who asked for it, though usually it was they who gave the advice. Spicer helped the Community Council in the preparation of organization charts and in other minor matters. The thing which probably did more than anything else to make the members of the community feel that we were an influence of a constructive sort was the reputation, considerably exaggerated, which we acquired after the strike for having brought about negotiation and for having kept the military out of the camp.

The net result was that although there was some hostility toward us and some suspicion of our being spies, it did not assume proportions that seriously interfered with our work or which involved us more

*Ref.

heavily than many other departments. To most of the community we were unknown, or little thought of, and to those who did know us, we were considered honest and sympathetic, if somewhat obscure as far as usefulness was concerned. The main stay of our existence in the community was the nature of the personal relationships which the different members as individuals had or established. When we were accepted as persons who were "all right", the nature of our work was presumed to be all right.

Since this was the basis of adjustment, it is important to note that it involved a matter of applying our own science to ourselves. It was manifestly impossible for us to know everybody in the community on a personal basis, and it was therefore important to make sure that among those who did know and accept us there was an adequate selection of leaders from all the different parts of the community's social structure. Through this, support for us spread in many different quarters and we avoided the weakness of having all our friends in one or a few areas in the society and consequently open to attack from other quarters.

Concepts and Methods

The state of chronic crisis which existed during the first ten months of the project was both a source of frustration and a source of invaluable insights into the community for the research workers. Each systematic program for mapping out the pre- and post-evacuation social structure of the evacuees was broken into by the need for following up some current crisis or event. But each crisis constituted a new revelation of the complex systems of sentiments at work in the group and of the nature of the social organization that

was developing. It can be said that the ruling concepts with which we began the study of the community continued with little alteration to guide us throughout, but our field approach veered and shifted with the rapidly changing relations between the many different groups of people concerned.

We conceived the understanding of the community as being dependent upon knowledge of its patterns of sentiment and its social organization. We emphasized the inter-relationship of the two and sought to learn how individuals are influenced by both and how in turn they are modified by contributions from individuals. If we knew those things, the states of balance that existed and the drift of changes, we thought we could better comprehend reactions to the administrative program and even predict future reactions in some cases.

As a result of psychiatric training with Adolf Meyer and some field experience in which personality study was used as a means of studying communities, Leighton in his approach to the problem at Poston was largely preoccupied with sentiments, interpersonal relations and intensive studies of sample personalities. After two weeks of general observation at the Center, he made the following notes for the staff regarding the conceptual basis of the work to be done.

"The word "sentiments" will be used here in a special sense as a brief equivalent of opinions and attitudes. Sentiments are ideas or action tendencies charged with emotions and persistent like habits - they are partially cognitive, partially affective and partially conative.

"Sentiments are important due to the degree in which they

influence the way people respond to changes. When an event happens in a person's life requiring some response, that response depends in part on the person's intelligence, in part on the demands of the situation and very largely on the person's sentiments. A raise in salary causes A to celebrate. To some extent, this is because he knows he can now have more security in food and clothing and other pleasures of life, but even more because of a general sentiment that it is a good thing to have a raise.

"The same amount of raise causes B to have attacks of fear and anxiety because in spite of knowing that he can purchase more security with more money, he has a sentiment of being entirely inadequate for coping with his increased responsibilities. Roethlisberger" diagrams this relationship somewhat after this fashion:

Change----------(Sentiment)----------Response

"From this it is evident that sentiments can produce responses which may or may not be appropriate to the circumstances.

"The sentiments shared by a social group are even more important than individual sentiments. They play a role in determining the ability of the group to adjust its own internal problems and to adjust its relationship to the rest of the world.

"The mechanism by which sentiments are acquired is probably not unconnected with the phenomenon of 'conditional reflexes' that has been studied extensively in lower animals.** Human responses certainly show some tendency to follow the laws of conditioning,

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*Ref "Management and Morale"
**Ref. Gantt monograph

reinforcement and extinction. In each individual, his sentiments arise as a result of his personal experiences in life - particularly during childhood and youth, the "Formative years." They are modified, kept alive and reinforced by the type of relationship that exists between the individual and his fellows - the current social situation. Thus, when A on getting his raise has a sentiment that leads him to rejoice, it comes in part from A's previous experiences and in part from A's feeling that all his friends and family will admire or envy him. B, on the other hand, who fears the raise, has had unhappy experiences with responsibility and feels everybody will expect him to make a mess of things.

"These statements are, of course, gross over-simplifications of complex inter-relationships, but they give an idea of the general trends. Again following Roethlisberger, we may amplify the previous diagram.

Change ----------(Sentiments)----------Response

Life History — Current Social Equilibrium

"In any study of the dynamic relationships of a community, it is important to investigate carefully the prevailing sentiments. What is their nature? With what topics do they deal? What quantitative indicators can be devised? How well are the sentiments adjusted to the biological and other aspects of reality? How do they contribute and interfere with efficient and happy living? How can they be modified to produce improvements? From a knowledge of the sentiments, what predictions can be made about the response to a given change?

"Much data concerning the origin of sentiments should in time become available from the selected personality studies which are being carried out. In the meantime, the sentiments themselves should be carefully surveyed.

"A sentiment may be expressed in two ways - (a) By words, (b) by actions. Either of these is acceptable for recording here. Opinions regarding sentiments and interpretations of actions are sentiments of the author and are also acceptable as part of these records provided they are clearly marked for what they are. In order to know how thorough and extensive our survey is, it is essential that the origin and context of each entry be clearly stated if known. If not known, an effort should be made to find out, and as a last resort, the entry made stating that origin and context are not known."

Spicer, with his training in social anthropology under Robert Redfield and Radcliffe-Brown, directed his attention toward determining the social organization of the community. He looked on society as made up of individuals who expect certain kinds of behavior of each other. Each individual knows from experience how others will behave towards him or has certain rules of thumb by which he can quickly predict to his own satisfaction how an individual with whom he has not had personal contact will behave. Every person in his daily life constantly makes use of certain categories for individuals which provide him with a guide for his own behavior and a basis of expectation for the behavior of others. Thus he is constantly making use of categories such as man, woman, mother, son, boss, friend, policeman, mayor, doctor, servant, and even New Yorker, Oklahoman, Japanese, etc. The recognition of standardized behavior appropriate to individuals is the basis of all social organization. These behaviors in a long

established community come to seem as inevitable as the contours of the land and all newcomers are quickly fitted to them or else new categories are established which in turn become standardized within the community. Each individual, no matter how many personal idiosyncrasies he may have such as a way of walking or an irreverence for the deities, conforms with a preponderant and essential set of standardized behaviors or else he cannot live in the community.

The process by which individuals conform is the application of sanctions by others in which, ofcourse, patterns of sentiment play a leading part. People laugh at others, they speak unfavorably of them, they refuse to work or eat or play with them, they put them in jail or they beat them up --- if they do not conform in the essential minimum of ways of behaving. Every group within a society has its sanctions --- its sentiments for social pressure --- by means of which it "makes people behave" according to established custom. The agreed-on behaviors and the sanctions by which they are imposed constitute the basic data for the understanding of any society. If we know these we are in a position to predict approximately how the people in the society will act from day to day in their usual routine of living and we also have some basis for predicting how they will act if new stimuli are injected into their routine.

The study of social structure in Poston was aimed at compiling a schedule of the standard behaviors recognized by the evacuees with especial emphasis on out-lying patterns of leadership and follower-ship and on defining the principal groups, cliques and social levels of which the community was composed. However, it was immediately apparent that the people of Poston were in a state of rapid transition. They had come from a condition of organized group life in California

to a condition very different in which the old social organization was in process of almost daily change and new groupings were appearing from the moment of arrival. It was necessary to study simultaneously the old social organization as best we could through retrospective accounts of it and the tentative new social organization which we could observe directly in the center. Thus we began to gather at the same time accounts of the local communities in, for example, Orange County, California, and also to observe the growth of social relations in the new geographic unit of the block which to some extent cut across old local groupings. It became steadily apparent that social disorganization --- the absence of agreed-on behaviors among individuals — was an outstanding feature of the transitional state in which the evacuees existed.

The transition in the social organization was determined by the physical features of life in the center, by the social relations imposed by the administration of the project, and by the shift in the whole set of relations between Japanese-Americans and the "Caucasian" majority. These factors in the dynamics of the social organization and disorganization were early recognized and the study of social structure formulated in terms of them.

On the basis of the general aims and the conceptual thinking outlined, the following questions were kept in mind.

1.) What are the predominant sentiments in the community?

2.) How well are these adjusted to the biological needs of the people and do they facilitate or interfere with the attainment of these needs?

3.) How do the sentiments contribute to the happy living of the people in relationship to each other and to the administration?

4.) Which sentiments are most modifiable and which are most resistant? In what directions can modification be achieved most easily?

5.) What are the principal associations in the community and how are they related to each other and to the total social organization?

6.) What sentiments are characteristic of what associations?

7.) On the basis of a knowledge of the social organization and the sentiments found in its different parts, what kinds of action may be expected from the community as a whole or from its principal parts?

8.) To what extent is the administrative program realistically geared to what the community can do on the basis of its predominant sentiments and social structure?

9.) To what extent are the methods used by the administration to achieve its program realistically geared to what the community can do on the basis of its predominant sentiments and its social structure?

Methods of Collecting Data

Methods of collecting data through staff activities and through our own field work were developed rather gropingly, but eventually took the form of five general approaches applied more or less simultaneously.[4]

1.) General observation of what was happening and what was being said in all parts of the community we could reach. Casual conversations were included in these recordings, but special emphasis was placed on meetings that were held concerning community problems, politics, religion and recreation.

2.) Intensive interviews which consisted in prolonged and

repeated discussion with certain representative indivuduals on topics relevent to ascertaining information about sentiments and social structure.

For a more detailed discussion of data gathering, see (POG ref.)[4]

6.) Records were collected, in whole or in part, from all available sources such sources as the census office, the employment division, welfare and schools.

4.) Public opinion polls according to standard techniques were conducted during the latter part of our field work.[5]

5.) Personality studies of a limited number of individuals with emphasis on life-stories, interpersonal relationships, mental and emotional make-up, and deeper patterns of sentiment were secured through interviews and a few psychological tests.

Our view of the data gathering problem in the community may be represented schematically in the accompanying diagram.



A indicates the amount of data gathered per individual, increasing toward the top, while B indicates the number of persons concerning whom it is possible to gather data, increasing toward the right. Thus there is a continuum from studies of one individual to studies of the entire community, with the amount of material that it is possible to gather inversely proportional to the number of individuals concerned. Personality studies would come at the upper apex of the triangle, (x) representing considerable material about few persons, while census records, containing as they do some data on everybody, would be at the bottom.(y) Between these two extremes, come the other forms of data

gathering. What the diagram helps to make clear is that any type of material is rendered much more valuable by correlation with other types than when considered by itself. For example, a personality study might reveal sentiments of considerable significance in understanding a particular Japanese-American tuna fisherman, but whether or not these were important among tuna fisherman generally could only be found by some sort of sampling through interview or observation, and whether or not tuna fishermen are significant in the total community would involve some referent to census records. Similarly, the "deeper" meaning of sentiments discovered by polling techniques might very well be much illuminated by personality studies on a few individuals.

Consequently, we determined to obtain as much material as possible from the total area represented in the triangular figure and to avoid viewing the community narrowly through one technique limited to one level of data sampling.

With the realization of the importance of breadth, there was at the same time the need to avoid becoming so all-inclusive as to be completely inconclusive. The aims of the research which have been mentioned under "conceptual thinking" in this article limited the manner in which the total area in the triangle would be used. We were not trying to acquire <u>all the facts</u> about everything but to approach our particular problems in such a way that we would gather all the facts pertinent to our problems from <u>all sources</u>. Of course, we did not succeed in this, but it was a goal the striving for which sharpened, rather than muddled our work.

5 We are greatly indebted to Harry H. Field, director of the National Opinion Research Center and to the members of his staff for training two of our field workers, Toshio Yatsushiro and Iwao Ishino, in public opinion polling methods and for supervising their subsequent surveys.

The Organization of Data

After establishing channels through which information might be taken in from the field, the next step was the storing of that material in a manner that would make it as systematic and as available as possible without imposing more artificial categorizing than was essential. For this purpose a journal was established to which members of the staff contributed their observations in chronological order. All sorts of observations were recorded except two that will be mentioned presently. The journal was, in effect, a field notebook, kept by the entire staff, rather than by one individual. For a schematic representation, prepared in July, 1942, for the guidance of the field workers, see Chart I.

The personality studies constituted a second system of organizing data. A folder was kept on selected individuals into which went data from all the sources indicated in Chart II. From time to time the miscellaneous material so gathered was analyzed and interpreted according to a system developed from psychiatric methods of studying individuals.[6]

In actual practice, the personality studies were developed very slowly due to uneasiness on the part of residents in regard to any fact finding about individuals, and our desire to avoid becoming identified with intelligence work. It was not until the spring of 1943 that we began to acquire a body of data that had much significance.

A third type of organization dealt in surveys on particular problems, such as food, family adjustment, the reactions to a severe storm and other matters. Data of this type was kept together in

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6 A monograph on this method as employed in a Navajo community by Alexander H. Leighton and Dorothea C. Leighton is to be published soon by the Peabody Museum, Harvard.

folders under the heading of the subject of the survey.

Chart III shows how it was planned to integrate the three different storehouses of material for a better understanding of the community's sentiments. It was planned to analyze these sentiments for their significance and distribution and controlling factors. To some extent this was done all through the year, but because of preoccupation with the surveys and other matters that at the time seemed more pressing and because of the time required to train the staff so that they would be able to carry out such analysis, a really systematic attack on the problem was not made until after we left the field. This is to be regretted, and we believe that had we continued with our work in the Center for a second year, we would have been able to establish a system whereby major sentiment changes week by week could be mapped and some approximate interpretations given.

As the staff expanded and became organized, and the amount of material they obtained increased and its general nature became more obvious and the natural divisions apparent, the character of the journal gradually changed and finally was completely reorganized. Folders were kept on topics of significance in the community such as City Management, Community Enterprises, Education, Health, Religion, Studies of individual blocks and so on. These, combined with the survey folders were organized according to a number system in such a manner that any folder could be reclassified into several subdivision folders, or new folders added without upsetting the system. All subjects were cross-referenced with each other through the use of cards. Thus, it became possible to look up a topic in its folder, then through the cross-references to find almost all other references to that same subject scattered through other folders or in the journal.

CHART I


-- T H E F I E L D --
Observation by Field Workers
Press
Letters
Legal Office
Medical Dept.
Educational Department
Family Welfare
Public Health Office
Adjult Education
Assistant Project Director
Project Director
Police
Personal Contacts
SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNAL

CHART II

-- T H E F I E L D --



CHART III


SOCIOLOGICAL JOURNAL
SURVEYS
PERSONALITY STUDIES
SENTIMENTS

The original journal became a sort of miscellany after the filing system was established. Aside from what went into the files, each staff member was encouraged to keep a personal journal which he discussed privately with one of us, or kept to himself as he wished, but which formed a basis over a period of time for some of his generalizations about the community and from which he eventually contributed to the files. This was found necessary because in practice the journal shared commonly became limited by the sanctions of the group and material of value was omitted that might otherwise have been recorded. The keeping of a journal that was absolutely private and personal enabled the field workers to put things down as they saw and felt them and then decide later about how and when to contribute them. This matter was of more importance in our work than it might be in many community studies, because our staff members were themselves part of the community. In many cases this policy resulted in field workers making private notes on things that had high emotional significance and then months afterward when the matter had cooled off, contributing these recorded at the time observations to the general file. Had personal journals not been encouraged, only a retrospective account would have been obtainable. It should be noted, however, that the tendency to hold back decreased progressively as the spirit of the group increased and they became more clear as to what it was they were doing, how the material would be used, and aware of the reality of ethical consideration for confidence.

Another matter which developed the confidence of those who contributed data was the Project Director's statement that no one, including himself, had access to our files and that no material which we collected would ever be used against any individual.

This protection was further reinforced by an understanding with the Indian Service that only the reports and general conclusions were to be considered government property and that the raw field notes on which these were based was a matter to be decided between Leighton, Spicer and the field workers, though it was understood that eventually the data would be given to some institution of research and learning.

The research department's policies were set forth on August 15th as follows:

1.) All confidential material must be safely guarded. All non-confidential material must be prevented from falling into the hands of persons who might misuse it for personal gain or to harm others.

2.) The files are our own and no other division or branch and nobody in the administration has authority over them.

3.) No data relative to subversive activities will be kept in our files.

4.) Individual members of the Bureau of Sociological Research will refrain from divulging any of the material that they collect or that they learn from other workers. They will not express individual opinions on any subject if their opinion is based on data in the Bureau.

5.) From time to time the Bureau will give out statements of opinion and fact, but these must come only from the coordinator or some one acting in his place. As a rule those statements will be carefully discussed by the entire group and a general agreement reached. No names will be attached to the statements other than that of the Bureau.

6.) All requests for information should be referred to the Coordinator.

7.) In giving statements, the Bureau must attempt to avoid

getting involved in controversy, or apparently taking sides. Above all, it must refrain from any attempt to propagandize or maintain the correctness of its own stand.

8.) It must avoid becoming a competitor with any group or persons in any issue whatever. It must not take pride in the acceptance of its suggestions. The point for attention is whether or not in the long run the suggestions turn out to be correct, not whether or not they are accepted.

Because of the way the community developed, with each block becoming a sort of village unit in a larger community, the block studies combined with personality and family studies gradually increased in significance and in the attention given to compiling data concerning them.

Leighton and Spicer found that making monthly and weekly reports on events, trends, and sentiments in the community greatly sharpened their perceptions and served as a means of pulling together otherwise scattered material. The monthly reports were usually read to the staff for their comments and suggestions, while the less carefully worked out weekly reports were for the most part kept merely as a record of our current opinions, and a means of reviewing the direction of changes.

Results

An assessment of the work of the research unit should be made in terms of two major objectives: (1) contribution to the needs of the WRA program and (2) contribution to the general problems of administration of dislocated peoples. We shall dwell here on the first, since the second has been taken up elsewhere.[1]

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1 Refs.

Techniques of Application The effectiveness of research in the administrative program depended on the one hand on the accuracy of our observation and analysis and on the other on the extent to which our findings could be injected into policy making. We ourselves of course attempted to subject our work to the standards of the social disciplines in regard to evaluation of samples and objectivity in collecting data.

The standard applied by the administrators was different and consisted mainly in evaluation in terms of whether or not our suggestions aided immediately in the smooth solution of current difficulties. Thus the accuracy of our work remained a problem which we wrestled with ourselves. The real problem of application was that of discovering means of presenting whatever we found in such a way that it would be utilized. To the administrators our data remained, as it properly should, merely one element in the total situation to be dealt with. We emphasized the need for considering the actual feelings and attitudes of the evacuees in all policy decisions and procedure making. We came to constitute one source of information on such matters and sometimes our information was acted on and sometimes it was not. We early came to realize that whether or not it was acted on depended not on whether it measured up to our standards of accuracy but rather on the circumstances under which it was presented to those in a position to act. At first the conception we had of technique was to dig out facts concerning evacuee reactions, write summary reports, and lay these on the project director's desk. Thus during the first month a careful report was prepared on the anxieties which a destructive wind and dust storm had given rise to among the residents and some suggestions were included as to how some of these anxieties could be

allayed. Similarly an extensive report on reactions to food served in the messes halls was prepared and focussed on the importance of food dissatisfactions and anxieties in evacuee adjustment to the new life. These reports insofar as we could tell were not regarded as very helpful by the administrators. They were characterized as interesting but were not really absorbed or acted on. Although the reports were concerned with immediate and current problems, they were not cast in a form with which the administrators were familiar. Information and points of view which were influencing the administrators were in the form of off-the-cuff statements in conversation and informal conference among the top staff. There was no time at this point for the latter to sit down with a stream of reports, digest them, and formulate ideas and decisions in their light, nor had they ever had experience and training in understanding such material. Realization of this influenced us to a totally different approach. Leighton worked out a plan for establishing his relations with the top staff, which consisted essentially in assuring a place for himself in the meetings of the small group of top staff who formulated basic policy. We thus became aware of what would seem to be a basic principle in the application of social science to a fast-moving administrative program, namely, that the research staff have direct access to the policy makers and participation in policy meetings. This does not mean responsibility in operations: it means that there be a constantly open channel from the research work to the top group in the administration who make policy from day to day. What it meant at Poston was that Leighton participated in the almost daily give and take of planning and decision and in the course of this injected orally fragments of fact and opinion and ultimately a general point of

view based on the understanding of the community which he was gaining from systematic study by the research unit.

This sort of utilization of the research material became thoroughly established at the time of the most extreme crisis of the year --- the general strike in November. This was a crisis in the relations between administrators and administered. Leighton and Spicer were called in and given every opportunity to express ideas and suggest actions as to how to resolve the crisis. Their view of the community was presented, not in systematic descriptive fashion, but by implication in their specific suggestions as to what administration should do as the crisis developed to a climax. Their view was obviously influential in the settlement which had basic policy implications for the whole future of the project. From that time on Leighton was regularly called on and given a voice in policy making, whether in minor crisis situations or in the general course of administration. Fragmentary suggestions that worked, rather than carefully documented systematic data, had made a place for research in the administration of the project.

At the same time that we developed the approach of direct participation in policy making, we were also working out a method of systematic reporting on the development of the community. The great mass of our systematic reports never got beyond our own research staff. They probably never would have been read if they had, except by one or two of the administrative staff who had more time and inclination in such directions than the others. Thus we prepared a voluminous report on the initial family adjustment to life in the center, another on the early developments in self-government, another on labor relations in the early days. These reports sharpened our understanding

of problems and their background; they were not suitable for passing on to over-worked administrators. Our problem was the pointing out of the administrative implications of these facts to the administration.

Leighton began a series of monthly reports in which he summarized in concise fashion one or two major trends in community sentiments and organization during the current month. Running to no more than ten pages, these were analyses of events that had already happened and therefore did not influence decisions in regard to the particular events described. But a selection of material was made which emphasized the long-term, never-fully-solved problems of administering the center. For example, the first one pointed out the emergence of the block as the fundamental social unit and the implications of this for incentive to work and community morale. The second analyzed the general strike as an example of the appearance of effective community leadership for the first time and the bases of that leadership. Another pointed up the elements in the social structure hindering good communication between administrators and evacuees and among evacuees. Each report contained recommendations or suggestions for dealing with the problems described. Few of these were acted on, although the reports were read by one or two of the top staff.

If they were effective at all, it was in terms of broadening the background of staff members who read them, an intangible not measurable sort of contribution. As time went on and as our understanding of the community broadened and deepened, we developed this method of trend analysis and refined it. As we have described, we worked out weekly reports on the trend of community sentiments. These we incorporated into brief weekly summaries which we presented

both orally and in writing to the project director. Here again specific results were almost impossible to measure, but at least it is certain that some contribution was made to the project director's information about and understanding of the community, which entered into his daily decisions.

Evaluation of the work. In the direct participation in policy-making, in the monthly reports and occasional memoranda the research workers expressed a developing viewpoint about the community, its needs, and the kind of program which could meet these needs. This viewpoint may be clearly seen in a backward glance over the materials produced. An evaluation of the work may be made in terms of pointing out the extent to which this viewpoint was incorporated into the actual administrative program.

The problem which faced the administration at Poston was to manage as efficiently as possible a camp of 18,000 forceably evacuated people. This meant utilizing the manpower and the leadership of the people themselves in order to provide food, shelter, clothing, medical care, education, maintenance and repair, fire protection, law and order and other matters essential in the survival of a community of this size and character. To accomplish these aims it was necessary to have general plans and an administrative organization and in order for the administrative organization to operate it required money, supplies, equipment and sources of technical knowledge in accounting, stewardship, agriculture, civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, construction work, medicine, law and social analysis bearing on the habits, customs and attitudes of the people who were to participate.

Thus social research was one of a number of parts in the body

of the administration each of which was contributing to the total requirements of operation.

It should be clearly stated that while some of the items we stressed did originate in our field work and analysis, many were the common property of all the people in the administration who were thinking about Boston's problems. Our contributions were frequently limited to redefining and reformulating already well

81 –

Questions for Brophy —

1. Are you studying past experience systematically — US experience?
2. Any evaluation of effects of Reorganization Act?

Mekeel's points — Reorganization Act

1. Designed to benefit those most nearly assimilated
2. Interferes with already established self-govt.
3. Field personnel mostly of pre-1934 vintage, trained to different policies
4. Knowledge of Indian people very important
5. Applied Anthrop. unit needed with go between
6. Reorg Act pushed too fast
7. No provision for factional adjustment
8. In-service training
9. Follow-up evaluation

This experience raises a number of what seem to me important questions. I wish to discuss three of these here. Purpose: not to discuss the job but how an anthropologist feels about it.

1. The first of these is the relation of the anthropologists training to this sort of job. and the2nd is whether or not what we did was science. A third question is the relation of this sort of work to the science of anthropology.

1. The first question is: how well trained were the 14 anthropologists to participate in this sort of work. My feeling is very strong that as a group we were not welltrained to participate in this sort of work. There were the following difficulties:
   a. Inability to focus on the present happening and a slant toward the past rather than the future. This slant was serious disability in work which moved rapidly. I am not saying that we did not learn how to work in the present, but it took a long time for most of us to get this set. We were good at getting at the past, which was allright because that had to be known to understand the past, but there were anthropologically trained analysts who carried out no sort of analysis of the social structu and cultural value system that grew up in the camp while they were-there, or at least made no record of it. They remained largely unaware apparently of what was taking place about them, although they were ready to probe into the past.
   b. Too great tendency to stay in the realm of opinion and attitude and not attempt to get down to the fact of what really did happen. I realize that this is dangerous ground and that what really did happen is really only the consensus of what all who saw the event thought happened. But their seemed to be a certain constitutional lack of rigorousness in running down facts to which attitudes were connected.
   c. A tendency to write off the administrator as necessarily wrong. This situation augmented such tendency because of the invasion of civil rights involved and the tendency to consider the government as inevitably oppressive.
   d. A lack of ability to deal objectively with staff as well as evacuees.

1. Longer
2. Orientation
3. Science?
4. Value & Unity

a lack of sympathy with the administrator

The question arises why did we select anthpopologists primarily to do this job. It was a job of interpreting a people to another people, Japanese Americans to so-called Caucasian government administrators. The anthropologists generally were not quick to assume the role of interpreter; there was a tendency to assume the role of apologist! The problem was one of making sure that the problem was considered by the administrators but not becoming the irreconcilable advocate of a course of action to solve it.

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

Line No. (1)	Family No. (2)	Individual's Name[1] (3)	Age (4)	Dependent (Relationship) (5)	Relationship of Family Head (6)	Allowance (7)	Total Payment to Family Head (8)	Payment to Individual (9)	(Signature of Payee) We, the subscribers, severally acknowledge to have received, IN CASH, the sums set opposite our respective names. (10)
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2. The second question is whether or not this was science in which we were engaged. I think that we were employing an approach and carrying out the first step or two in scientific work. Up to now the close of our center program last week, the analysts have not gone ahead with the further final steps in scientific analysis. They have observed and recorded. This is the first step in science, or the first two steps. They have not compared, checked, and drawn generalizations from their observations. That is at present being done by a few analysts who are now working in Washington and will be for six months more, writing up some of the material.

It was science in that it consisted of observaion and recording of social data by trained anthropologists and sociologists. During most of the time they did not have time to carry through the later steps of sceicntific work. If that can be done within the framework of the program, then the work will unquestionably be scientific.

unique agency + unique opportunity

3. Finally what about the relationship to the whole science of anthropology. It has seemed to me to be very important as a government effort in the utilization of social science. The more anthro ologists we can get into such positions to work on action programs of one sort or another the better it will be for anthropology. It is such programs that provide real laboratories. The WRA program like most other government programs was an effort to get people to behave in certain ways by means of various techniques. Precisely what techniques were used and what their objectives were are very well recorded, as well as precisely what the reaction and effect of their application to the evacuees was. If we have trained persons working in these positions, then we have our laboratories for which we have so often dried out in the past in the social sciences.

I dont see how a more important function or one more relevant to anthrop. aims could be performed than this - the interpretation of groups.

Artificial society

Need to train to provide in our anthropology classes some training & this knowledge of events & problems of this sort.

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APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY
IN THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The War Relocation Authority was one of several war agencies which hired anthropologists to work as anthropologists during the war. During the four years of its existence it will have employed 22 social scientists to work as such. Fourteen of these were trained anthropologists, the others sociologists.

The WRA hired the anthropologists to study and report on communities of people which it had the responsibility for administering, not to do administrative jobs. The anthropologists were required to become familiar with the social structure and culture traits of the communities of people and to interpret these to the administrators as an aid in getting the administrative job done. The first aspect of their work was therefore field anthropology of the general type familiar among social anthropologists who study living communities. The second aspect, aiding the administrative program, introduced a new element into the activity which is not similar to anything that anthropologists ordinarily do. I wish to discuss and evaluate this aspectof the work. But first it will be necessary to describe clearly just what the anthropologists did and how they went about it.

As a result of an Army decision in March, 1942, 110,000 persons of Japanese descent were evacuated from their homes on our Pacific coast and detained in camps. They were a varied immigrant group, ranging from lwest income farm laborers to extremely wealthy businessmen, from men and women born in Japan and hardly able to speak English to

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completely Americanized young men and women born in this country and graduated from our colleges and with no knowledge of or interest in the Japanese language or Japanese culture traits. The Army decision, however, made no distinctions between them, but threw all, both the 70,000 American citizens and the 40,000 Japanese citizens, into the same condition ---- as temporarily homeless people forced to live under government supervision in camps of 5000 or 10,000. The WRA was established as an independent agency to take care of the unrooted people and work out some solution of their future. After some months the WRA decided that the best interests of the whole group would be served by widespread resettlement over the whole United States and consequent liquidation of the camps.

The major problems which faced the WRA may be outlined as follows: (1) the maintenance of the camps as decently habitable places for those who wished to live in them until such time as they should no longer be excluded from the west coast, and (2) assisting all those who could be persuaded to leave the camps to resettle in other parts of the United States. These, rather than questions of the relationship of Japanese physical characters to cultural behavoor of the group or other theoretical points became the focus of the anthropologists' activities. They became especially concerned with causes of conflict and disharmony in the camps and with the attitudes of the evacuees towards resettlement and the bases of these attitudes.

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The top administrators in the WRA did not come to the conclusion for several months that any specialized knowledge would be helpful in seting up and administering the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ten camps of evacuated people. At one of the camps, however, which was administered bythe Indian Service, the decision had been made independently of the rest of the WRA to establish a unit of social scientists to aid the administrators in understanding the community. The experieince of this unit at the Colorado River camp has been described in some detail in Commander Alexander Leighton's book, The Governing of Men. I shall not discuss that activity here and shall merely say that the Colorado River unit was an influence in the development of what came to be calle d Community Anlysis in the WRA as a whole. John Embree has already told the beginings of Community Analysis in an article in the American Anthropologist. I shall try to go beyond his exposition which was written about a year after the institution of the applied anthropology unit ~~xxx~~ for the whole of the ~~WRA~~ agency.

What led the top administration to decide to seek aid from anthropologists and other social scientists was a couple of social explosions at two of the camps. A general strike at the Colorado River center and a near riot at the Manzanar Center in California made it clear that more knowledge of the people was needed if trouble was to be avoided. The disturbances at the two camps, some six months after their foundation, were due to throwing together suddenly a very heterogeneous group of people under very considerable restrictions of movement. The WRA staff in Washington became convinced they needed a better understanding of the attitudes and social organization of the evacuees. They then pro-

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

Line No. (1)	Family No. (2)	Individual's Name [1] (3)	Age (4)	Dependent (Relationship) (5)	Relationship of Family Head (6)	Allowance (7)	Total Payment to Family Head (8)	Payment to Individual (9)	(Signature of Payee) We, the subscribers, severally acknowledge to have received, IN CASH, the sums set opposite our respective names. (10)
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ceeded to set up what was called the Community Analysis Section as a part of the general agency organization.

The Section consisted essentially of thirteen or fourteen trained social scientists ---- one in each of the ten centers and three or four in Washington. The center analyst, as he was called, worked with whatever staff of evacuees he could recruit, usually about four or five untrained persons. The analysts in the Washington office tried to give some coordination to the work in the ten centers, but found themselves chiefly occupied with passing on the data which came from the centers to the most appropriate members of the Washington administrative staff. The utility of the set-up depended entirely on the soundness of the field analysts' work.

The framework within which the analysts operated was a much more complex one than that of the usual anthropological community study. Although the functions of the analysts were carefully defined in the agency regulations in terms quite similar to a general set of instructions for an ethnographer going into the field, the analyst's position was a great deal more complicated. He was a member of the administrative staff, and ultimately in any conflict situations in the camps identified therefore by evacuees with the administrators, not as a neutral. He was required to report his findings concerning the community to the camp director at more or less regular intervals. This opened him to the charge of being a sort of spy or stooge for the administration, or as the evacuees called it, a dog. Thus although he was trying to establish the sort of relationship with evacuees

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

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which an ethnologist wishes to establish with his informants, one of intimacy and confidence and mutal trust, he found certain walls because of his official hook-ups. These were not so serious as they sound in a brief xxxxxxx description of the situation.

On the other hand the relationships with the administrative staff were not simple. The analysts were place d on the staff with the definite understanding that they were not to have responsibility for getting any of the numerous administrative jobs done. They were merely to study and report. The only precedent in government for such a relationship was that of the attorney or solicitor, who is legal advisor to the administrator without responsibility for accomplishing a program. [illegible] The analysts were in a similar advisory capacity, but the nature of their specialized knowledge was not so well understood, nor was the need for it so well recognized by staff as in the case ofxx the legal advisor. All this made for uncertainty and misunderstanding in the analysts' staff relationships.

Eastablishing the analysts in this sort of advisory relationship indicated however a recognition, at least on Washington's part, that the WRA program of administering ten communities of people would have a continuous need for specialized knowledge and information concerning the social organization and culture traits of the people being administered. This it seems to me xxx is a very important fact. Community analysts were not to be hired simply for a special consultation on a specific problem of a riot or other social disturbance, but they were to be given an opportunity to inject their findings continuously into the decision making and planning. It was a recognition of the need for specialized advice on human relations.

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

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CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—30525-1

The main point in connection with the framework of working relations of the analysts is that they were in a situation unusual for the field anthropologist. They were carrying on their community studies quite obtrusively. No one could really confide in them as complete neutrals: they had a role in the community which colored the sort of information they got and the sort of reporting of it that they carried out. This, I think, however, aids in a critical evaluation of their findings: their role is much more clear and efinite than in the case of most anthropological field workers.

The community analysts came into the WRA organization, as has been indicated, not becausex of a need for specialized knowledge to be used in planning a set of over-all objectives for the WRA. The over-all objectives, such as resettlement widely over the United States, had been decided on before the anthropologists were brought in. They were brought in primarily to help solve current problems of human relations, the social friction that had developed between administrators and evacuees and among evacuees. They were brought in pretty much as trouble-shooters and continued pretty much in that capacity, although with a somewhat broader development of function which involved a general educational one---that of continuous interpretation of the evacuee group to the administrative staff. They were allowed a good deal of scope in this aducativnal interpretive job, permitted to prepare and distribute widely for the use of staff and outsiders theirfindings and analyses.

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

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Roughly and taking the ten camps as a whole there were three fairly distinct periods in our work. At first, in accordance with the reasons for establishing community analysis, the work consisted mainly of analyzing the social disturbances which had already taken place and pointing out the factors in social relations which had brought them about --- the diversity in viewpoints of the immigrant and the citizen generations, the attitudes of staff toward the Japanese, the treatment by the government, etc. These analyses were immediately supplemented by others as a new series of crisis situations arose in the camp during ~~a~~program of registration for army service. Intensive analysis of all these situat ions was made and a series of recommendations for avoiding such "trouble" was presented. The recommendations were probably of little importance, because they had (by the time thyuwere completed) become pretty much a part of WRA thinking generally, or at least of the top staff who made decisions. The real importance of the reports lay probably chiefly in putting in systematic form that which staff generally had learned in going through the various crisis situations.

Secondly, a good deal of time was devoted to surveys of attitudes and predictions of response based on them to the WRA's program of resettlement [illegible] as to other minor programs). The surveys generally indicated that a majority of the evacuees did not agree that resettlement ~~xxxx~~ before the war should end was in their best interest. These findings did not alter WRA's decision to concentrate on resettlement, but merely led to intensive efforts to discover ways and means of persuading the evacuees that resettlement was in their best interest. In other

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

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words the analysts' data on attitudes served to make clear what the problem was. The analysts' did not discover the solutions to the problem.

Finally, after these two sets of activities had contributed to the defintion of the human problems confronting the WRA program, we settled down to record and report the trend of eve nts. This meant the reporting of reactions to the various techniques for persuading people to resettle, the reporting of reactions to policies of running the camps, the reporting of political and factional struggles among the evacuees. Analysts began to produce for their camp directors and the Washington office weekly reports on the shifting relations among groups in the camps and the changing attitudes toward resettlement as the WRA program developed. The analysts became reporters [illegible] and to some extent interpreters of the current community life as it was affected by the administrative policies and procedures. Most of their reports were sought after and read by the top administrators as an important element to be considered in framing policy.

Looking back over the experience the basic contribution made by Community Analysis seems to me to have been ax constant keeping before the administrators of the nature of the human beings they were working with. Someone once described Community Anlaysis as "the conscience of the WRA." I think he meant that Community Analysis kept the administrators from forgetting what kind of human beings they were working with. The analysts, free of the responsibility of carrying out the details of the WRA rogram, were able to constantly report what the evacuees were saying and doing about what WRA was doing to them. Some of this would have

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

CLOTHING ALLOWANCE ORDER FOR MONTH OF _____, 19____

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inevitably come to the attention to the administrators, but to have it presented more or less systeamtically, regularly each week, by a specialist who at least made a constant effort to listen to all segments of the community, who could present his findings through regular official channels, was something new in a government program. It led the top administrators to take into consideration the reality of feeling and thought among the administered. This was the essential contribution of community analysis, rather than a finding of solutions to major problems, insofar as the official program was concerned.

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
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The activities of anthropologists in the WRA program seem to me to raise a number of important questions. I wish to discuss three of these here. These seem to me to have relation to current discussions of what "applied anthropology" is, if anything, and what its relationship is to what we call the science of anthropology.

Form No. WRA-93
Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S.
November 17, 1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

_____ Relocation Center

Order No. _____
Page No. _____
Subvoucher No. _____
Grant Voucher No. _____

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Radcliffe-Brown

Definition of anthropology?

Formulation of problems in terms soc. or cult. theory.

Super—sub relations — caste system

Necessary friction in such case

How obviate?

Identification with group — ambivalence

Leader = ambivalent attitudes

11/24/45

Mr. Province

John,

See p 635 for Embree on applied anthropology.

very timely and worth saying.

He implies, however, that activities of social scientists in administration cannot contribute to science (2nd ¶). I don't agree and feel (1) that the areas of application are the best laboratories we have in social science and (2) that we have to aim at carrying on good science in connection with adm. programs.

Fred

Steen

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ANTHROPOLOGY DURING THE WAR AND AFTER

A Memorandum Prepared by the
Committee on War Service of Anthropologists
Division of Anthropology and Psychology
National Research Council

March 10, 1943

FOREWORD

Numerous letters have come to my attention from anthropologists throughout the country requesting information as to the contributions being made by anthropologists in the war agencies and the assistance that our discipline can render after the war.

In order to obtain the information requested, as soon as possible, the National Research Council appointed a small Committee in the Division of Anthropology and Psychology to compile the necessary data and prepare a report. The following report is designed to acquaint anthropologists outside of Washington with the scope of the activities in which anthropologists are now participating or may participate in the future. These data may also serve a useful purpose in those universities unaware of the essential nature of anthropological training.

The Committee charged with the compilation and preparation of this report consisted of: Ralph L. Beals, Chairman; F. L. W. Richardson, Julian H. Steward, Jr., and Joseph E. Weckler.

Frank M. Setzler, Vice-Chairman
Division of Anthropology and Psychology

ANTHROPOLOGY DURING THE WAR AND AFTER

Summary

Governmental agencies and the armed forces are currently employing a large and growing number of American anthropologists. Over half of the professional anthropologists in the country are devoting their full time and energy to the war effort and another twenty-five per cent or more are doing part-time war work. Social and cultural anthropologists are particularly useful because of their comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the peoples of the world and the communities and regions in which these people live.

Anthropological knowledge has become extremely valuable in providing the military and other war agencies with information basic to war and post-war planning. Techniques developed by this discipline have been used, in various parts of the world, to secure the cooperation of diverse native and national groups in the production of strategic materials and in other action programs essential to victory.

The important governmental work now actually being done by professional anthropologists, both in war agencies and in post-war planning, is summarized in the following pages. The demand for anthropologically trained personnel, which is increasing and will probably soon exhaust the supply, indicates the desirability of broadening and intensifying the teaching of this subject in our colleges and universities.

A. WAR ACTIVITIES OF ANTHROPOLOGISTS

I. WORLD-WIDE PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE WORK -- REQUIRING PRIMARILY A DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF WORLD REGIONS AND PEOPLES

Seven government war agencies are employing about eighty anthropologists (over one-fifth of the professional anthropologists in the United States) to provide detailed knowledge on the regions and peoples with which they have first-hand familiarity. The Army, Navy, and Office of Strategic Services, which is attached to the Army, together have about fifty men in the field or in Washington.[1] The State Department has two. About thirty-eight provide regional information to the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the Office of War Information.[2]

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[1] This figure does not include a number of men in various branches of the Army and Navy, often on overseas duty, who occupy special positions because of rare techniques acquired as a result of anthropological experience and training. For example, several anthropologists hold commissions because of their experience in interpreting aerial photographs and maps.

[2] The Board of Economic Warfare is engaged in controlling exports to foreign countries and in increasing the imports of strategic materials to further the war effort, in part through increasing production. The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs is engaged in programs to bring all the American Republics into closer cooperation for both the war and post-war period. The Office of War Information dispenses information about the war and related topics to this country and all others except the other American Republics.

In addition to the above war agencies, a number of regular government and private organizations employing anthropologists or supporting anthropological activities are devoting much of their

energies to war work or to assisting the war agencies, either by direct service or in advisory capacities. Among these are the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Research Council, the Social Science Research Council, the Smithsonian Institution, the Ethnogeographic Board (sponsored by the four preceding agencies), the Office of Indian Affairs, numerous committees such as those on Latin America, Oceania, and Africa, and many universities.[3] (About forty-five persons are involved.)

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[3]The agencies and organizations mentioned also cooperate with war action programs discussed in the next section. The American Council of Learned Societies contributes to the support of several committees and administers the Language Training Program (see Languages). The National Research Council also contributes to the support of several committees and supports the Food Habits Survey, which collects data on food habits, effects of rationing, public opinion, and other data. The program is administered in Washington by three anthropologists and has an advisory board including several university anthropologists. A large part-time field staff includes anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and others. The Social Science Research Council also contributes to the support of several committees. The Smithsonian Institution staff of seventeen anthropologists assembles reports on regional problems, collaborates with the Ethnogeographic Board (four persons now give full time to the activities of the Board), advises military authorities on food, clothing, and other supply problems requiring regional knowledge, furthers cooperation with other American Republics, collaborates with the Office of the Censor, and serves on various committees and advisory boards (e.g. Latin America, Oceania, Strategic Index, etc.). The membership of the Joint Committee on Latin-American Studies and its subcommittees includes a number of anthropologists who advise various agencies such as the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs on problems of research and personnel. The Ethnogeographic Board, headed by an anthropologist, acts as a clearing house for social science personnel with specialized regional knowledge, assembles regional information, and prepares reports. Most of its work thus far has been directly connected with problems of the armed forces. Over twenty anthropologists are employed in Washington in the above activities. In addition, numerous anthropologists in universities are serving in advisory capacities in connection with the same activities.

The types of regional work and social analysis being performed by anthropologists in the above agencies may be classified as follows:

1) Military Warfare (about forty anthropologists)[4]

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[4]Some overlapping occurs in the classification of activities because in some cases one individual functions in two or more distinct categories. Accurate figures are impossible because of rapid shifts in personnel.

The use of detailed regional knowledge in the armed forces ranges from Field Intelligence to problems of supply. Anthropologists familiar with the needs in a given region assist in designing clothing and equipment, in selecting types of food and preservation methods, and in teaching the utilization of indigenous food supplies and other resources. For military operations they provide information about the terrain; for occupying forces they provide handbooks explaining the habits and customs of the people and indicating how occupying forces should behave to ensure a friendly reception. They suggest policies to enlist the active cooperation of local or native populations.

2) Economic Warfare and Planning (about fifteen anthropologists)

The anthropologists in Economic Warfare aid in determining means for denying the Axis strategic materials and crippling its productive and transportation systems. Through their regional knowledge they often aid in locating supplies of needed materials, suggest better assembly points for shipment, and improved routing of marine and aerial transport. Because of their comprehensive knowledge of peoples and customs in each region, some anthropologists take part in planning the

methods for reoccupying and rehabilitating captured territories. An anthropologist holds an important research post for the Philippine Commonwealth.

3) Political Warfare and National Morale (about thirty anthropologists; in addition, eighteen universities are cooperating)

The anthropologists in political warfare are engaged in analyzing the relation of events to social conditions in various countries. Such analysis aids in determining the courses of action and types of propaganda best adapted to each country. One anthropologist is determining hostile national and minority groups on a world-wide basis.

4) Languages (about thirty anthropologists or linguists using methods developed by anthropologists)

Many anthropologists, because of their familiarity with the numerous little-known and unwritten languages, have proven extremely useful. Moreover, through their study of American Indian languages, anthropological linguists in the United States have developed their techniques to a higher point than anywhere else in the world. These techniques are now being applied to Asiatic, Oceanic, and African languages in order to facilitate their teaching, regarded as essential by the armed forces.

5) Compiling Basic Regional Information (ten anthropologists)

To facilitate access to comprehensive regional information and to make it available to everyone for war or post-war purposes, published materials are being culled and copied on cards and filed according to appropriate categories.

II. ACTION PROGRAMS REQUIRING ABILITY TO GAIN INTIMATE KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC COMMUNITIES

About forty anthropologists are participating in action programs.

These forty anthropologists are distributed between six government agencies and five private agencies.

The government agencies include the Board of Economic Warfare, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the War Labor Board, the War Relocation Authority, Office of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Agriculture.[5] The five private organizations are the

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[5]The function of the first two has already been explained. The War Labor Board is concerned with settling labor disputes; the War Relocation Authority is administering the Japanese evacuated from the West Coast. The anthropologists in the Department of Agriculture have mostly been taken over by other war agencies. Formerly, they were engaged in resettlement, regional rehabilitation, etc., or in research and administration.

Western Electric Company, Vega Aircraft Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company, the Harvard Business School, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Some of the men involved in private organizations are not professional anthropologists but are familiar with the subject matter and its point of view.

The types of activity involved are summarized below:

1) Facilitating Strategic War Material Production in Foreign Communities (ten anthropologists)

Anthropologists are helping to win greater participation and cooperation of natives in the production of minerals, rubber, and food crops in this hemisphere and in the South Pacific through their knowledge of customs and social problems in particular regions.[6]

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[6]While the anthropologists listed are directly engaged in the activities mentioned, additional anthropologists contribute indirectly.

For example, the Ethnogeographic Board arranges conferences of specialists on crucial areas. One such conference has already issued a report on the Bolivian Indians and their relation to Bolivian labor problems, while members are acting as consultants to labor specialists trying to solve the present complex difficulties in Bolivia.

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2) Worker-Management Relations in U. S. A. Factories and Communities (ten anthropologists or anthropologically trained specialists)

These anthropologists are engaged in pointing out the human problems arising out of specific social situations which are involved in industrial relations -- problems which are at the root of industrial disorder but which are commonly misunderstood or overlooked.

3) Community Resettlement and Regional Rehabilitation (about fifteen anthropologists)

These anthropologists are discovering the causes of irritations and conflicts among the groups being aided, analyzing what action needs to be taken to eliminate causes for grievance, and transmitting the information to the operating executives.

4) Indian Service Administration (about seven anthropologists at present; part of the larger staff normally employed has been surrendered to other agencies)

Aside from its normal peace-time activities, the Indian Service has secured the cooperation of Indians in the war, both in the fighting forces and in increasing production (12,000 in the armed forces, production of five per cent of lumber now used, etc.). The Indian Service points out that much of this result is due to anthropology and that the experience of the Indian Service is undoubtedly applicable to situations in many other parts of the world.

III. TEACHING DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF REGIONS, COMMUNITIES, AND SOCIETIES

Only those teaching activities of special interest to the war effort are discussed in this summary. All of the teachers are familiar

with anthropological techniques and viewpoints, and five of them are professional anthropologists.

1) Administration in Reoccupied Areas (two anthropologists)

The school for Naval Administrators at Columbia University is engaged in teaching naval administrative officers to deal with the native groups in Southeastern Asia and Oceania. One anthropologist gives a detailed regional description of the environment and the people, etc., while a second gives a background in the understanding of alien cultures and various types of social situations and institutions, enabling the administrator to discover why specific alien peoples behave and think as they do and to perceive the interrelations of various aspects of culture.

2) Human Relations in Industry (one professional anthropologist and several others with anthropological background)

These people are teaching students of labor and management problems the anthropologically developed view that labor relations involve not only problems of wages and hours but the understanding of complex social factors and human relationships.

3) Methods of Increasing Production (two anthropologists)

Some training is given field men of the Board of Economic Warfare to help them secure the cooperation of native peoples in increasing production.

IV. MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES

1) Selecting Pilots for the Military Air Forces (one anthropologist)

One anthropologist, combining the psychological and physiological with the social and cultural approach, is improving methods of selecting pilots.

2) Physical Anthropology

Physical anthropologists have aided in the designing of properly sized clothing for the armed forces. One has assisted in designing airplane cockpits. Others have provided data on racial problems, including confidential reports to the President of the United States. Several anthropologically trained persons are on the Surgeon General's staff.

B. THE DISTINCTIVE CONTRIBUTION OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO THESE ACTIVITIES

Analysis of the opinions collected from the various agencies mentioned above indicates the following reasons for the employment of anthropologists:

I. REGIONAL KNOWLEDGE

Most anthropologists have both comprehensive and detailed information on the peoples and environment of one or more regions, usually based on first-hand experience. Anthropologists are the only social scientists who systematically study all aspects of a given culture -- language, technology, social organization, use of environment, etc. -- and their training equips them to learn the essential facts about a new area quickly.

II. KNOWLEDGE OF CULTURAL INTERRELATIONS

Anthropologists are trained to be aware of the relations between various aspects of culture -- for example, between environment, economics, and size of groups, or between political power, religion, marriage systems, and class structures. This point of view has aided some anthropologists to become effective administrators and helps economists, public health workers, engineers, agronomists, and others to understand

the relation of their specialty to the total life of a community.

III. ABILITY TO ANALYZE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Anthropologists are trained to define systematically the organization of people in a culture into formal and informal social groups -- families, economic groups, clubs, friendship groups, minority and subculture groups, etc. -- and to describe the attitudes and characteristics of the members of such groups. Such precise knowledge is essential to problems of propaganda, morale, and administration.

IV. UNDERSTANDING OF HUMAN RELATIONS

Training in anthropological viewpoints and analysis of social structures give special insight into the behavior and attitudes of individuals which may be applied to all types of problems involving human relations.

V. EXPERIENCE IN TRANSLATING KNOWLEDGE INTO ACTION

Some anthropologists have successfully supplied anthropological knowledge to administrators of action programs in native administration, resettlement and rehabilitation programs, and industry.

Supporting documents are quoted in the Appendix.

C. ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE POST-WAR WORLD

Many of the uses of anthropology during the war seem destined to continue and expand during the post-war period. Moreover, new uses seem likely. In view of the present shortage of properly trained personnel, it is important to anticipate future demands so that present training may be properly oriented.

I. INTEGRATION OF NATIONAL GROUPS

Many war-torn areas will require the understanding cooperation of the

United Nations in reintegrating the lives of their people on a satisfactory basis. As many of these peoples have cultures that differ fundamentally from our own, the solution cannot rest on a cultural imperialism that substitutes our institutions for theirs. It must be based on a recognition of local cultural values and on an understanding of the complex social, economic, linguistic, and racial factors that are interrelated in the totality of any culture.

In all these problems the service of the anthropologist will be essential. He is trained to recognize divergent cultural values, to analyze societies in broad terms, and to appraise cultural change. With these skills, anthropologists in the post-war world are especially well equipped to (1) delimit world regions realistically, (2) handle minority groups intelligently, (3) deal with problems which national and colonial areas will experience as a result of the expectable post-war technological revolution and its accompanying social changes. Colonial administrators and some Latin-American countries, especially Mexico, already have recognized the value of anthropologists for these problems.

II. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

An enduring peace must be based not only on satisfactory international economic, trade, and political relations but also on mutual understanding between nations, so that differing national cultural values are understood and nations permitted to develop so that the people may offer their full genius to the world. Anthropology can contribute to the success of international relations in two ways: (1) by furnishing international planners and administrators a background

of information against which to project their special problems and tasks; (2) by a broad program of popular education that demonstrates to the people of each nation that the way of life of peoples of other nations are natural and "necessary" -- that, for example, the "American Way" of life cannot be transplanted wholesale to China, for many Chinese customs are as "necessary" to them as many American customs are to Americans.

D. SUGGESTIONS FOR UNIVERSITY TRAINING IN ANTHROPOLOGY

I. ORIENTATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL TEACHING

General and specialized courses in anthropology might profitably be reviewed with respect to the following audiences and needs suggested in the preceding sections of this memorandum:

1) The need of prospective military personnel for an understanding of the societies of alien peoples and methods of adapting to them.

2) The need to collaborate with human geographers and others in providing basic training for regional specialists of various types.

3) The need to provide specialists in other social science disciplines, public health workers, engineers, agronomists, and others with an understanding of the relation of their specific problems to the total situation of a society.

4) The need of anthropologists to assist administrators in action programs.

5) The need of the general public to have understanding and tolerance of the life goals and customs of alien peoples. In this connection, expansion of university activities into adult education programs has been suggested as a practical measure to compensate for

the lack of students during the war period.

II. INTEGRATING THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Anthropologists and others may profitably examine the integrating role anthropology may play in developing interdisciplinary approaches and problems:

1) On the teaching level along lines already suggested.

2) On the research level through cooperative research programs. In this connection it should be pointed out that most war research is done by teams, not by a single individual.

As a final word, this memorandum is intended to call attention to the contributions anthropology is making in many fields where its value has hitherto not been widely recognized. In consequence, it may appear that the importance of other social science disciplines has been minimized. Obviously, the contribution of anthropology in many of the activities mentioned is secondary, and other social science disciplines play a more important part. Thus, geography is an equally basic subject for regional specialists. Anthropological training alone will not create good administrators. However, a well-trained administrator will almost certainly be more valuable if he has knowledge of certain facts and viewpoints developed in the field of anthropology.

APPENDIX

SOME STATEMENTS FROM AGENCIES EMPLOYING ANTHROPOLOGISTS

OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

"Intelligent administration of Indian Affairs is almost completely dependent upon the findings of anthropology." (This statement is documented by numerous examples.)

"Because Indians have been handled decently and intelligently during the past 12-15 years, they are today making every possible contribution to the war. They could have been a serious fifth column, or at least a potential liability. Instead, 12,000 are in the armed forces; they have purchased two million dollars worth of bonds; they have supplied 5 per cent of all the lumber used for war purposes; their food production program has increased,-- they are definitely an asset, not a liability.

"It will be seen, therefore, that anthropology is making one of its contributions to the war through the medium of the Indian Service. This contribution would not be materially restricted for the next year or two if every department of anthropology and every course in the subject were discontinued. However, winning the peace is going to be a much longer and drawn out affair than winning the war. Anthropology taught now will be effective five and ten years hence when the problem of peace will be most acute."

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

Anthropologists in the Office of Warfare Analysis "were chosen, among other reasons, because of their familiarity with the people, cultures, and environments of specific regions -- in most cases, a familiarity shared by few others."

Men in the Office of Imports "were chosen because of detailed knowledge of a region and because of wide experience in adapting to work among all kinds of people in different parts of the world."

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

A summary of the reasons advanced for the various divisions in which anthropologists are employed includes the following:

1) Specialized regional knowledge.

2) Experience with field operating programs.

3) Ability to point out the total ramification of social and political events on all segments of the population.

4) Experience in systematizing complex cultural and social data.

COMMITTEE ON FOOD HABITS
(National Research Council)

The central problems require anthropologists because of their "training in viewing cultures as wholes, and because of the discipline anthropologists have received in standing outside their own culture and viewing it detachedly. They called for a continued awareness of the interrelationship between problems relating to food and nutrition and other aspects of the culture, ability to deal with the distinctive character of subcultures and subgroups, and ability to translate the knowledge of cultural emphasis into programs of action, and precise recommendations about poster content, block organization, group feeding, educational methods, etc."

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

"The Office of War Information employs social anthropologists for two sorts of tasks: (1) five professional anthropologists and three anthropology minors are employed as interviewers to gather and

analyze, in the field, expressions of public opinion; (2) two professional anthropologists and several anthropology minors are employed in the main office of OWI to do research leading to policy formulation regarding minority groups in this country.

"Requirement for class (1) is experience in the informal interview techniques used by anthropologists to obtain intimate data from informants. Requirement for class (2) is detailed knowledge of living habits and attitudes of various ethnic and racial minorities such as some anthropologists have attained in their investigations of modern communities. Important to either class is the detached scientific attitude developed in individuals, by anthropological training, toward divergent peoples and cultures."

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE

"Over a period of years the Soil Conservation Service in the Southwest region developed a program that is quite unique among the programs of governmental agencies because it was more closely related to the realities of the life of the communities of the area than any other governmental program. It is undoubtedly true that a great deal of its effectiveness was due to the employment of anthropological techniques in the analysis of the social situation into which the Service was projecting its program."

DIVISION OF FARM POPULATION AND RURAL WELFARE,
BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

"At the present time on the staff of the Division are three trained anthropologists. (Note: A number of anthropologists have been transferred from the Division to other war agencies since the start of the war.)

With the exception of these men, several economists and one geographer, the Division is staffed with sociologists, most of whom are rural sociologists. The majority of these sociologists have had at least one graduate course in Anthropology. The administration of the Division values cultural anthropological training very highly so that what is said about the usefulness of the anthropologists holds also for the sociologists with anthropological training. The anthropologists have been of great service to the Division in two interrelated fields (1) administration, (2) research. The Rural Life Study series was directed by and staffed by three anthropologists, five sociologists, two social psychologists, and one geographer. All of the participants with no exception had anthropological training. These studies, which are being acclaimed by administrators as well as sociologists and anthropologists, demonstrate the value of cultural anthropology because these studies were all very much influenced by this discipline. In this and other studies made to assist the Department of Agriculture in the administration of its programs the discipline of anthropology has played an important role.

Most of the anthropologists who have been employed in the Division have been assigned administrative tasks. They have functioned as directors of research projects, sections in the Washington office, and heads of regional offices of the Division. Although personal executive abilities not directly related to training in anthropology partly account for the rise of the cultural anthropologists to executive posts, training in said discipline has had its influence. Administrators who see the 'whole' of situations and appreciate the complexity of

administrative problems involving people may be better executives than those whose training obscures important elements in the situation.

"In summary, it may be stated that cultural anthropology, like sociology, has contributed to research studies of the Division in making these studies more realistic and usable to administrators who must direct programs in the rural areas. In addition, this training contributes to the abilities required by executives and coordinators."

Statements from other war agencies and the armed forces may not be reproduced at this time.

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COMMUNITY ANALYSIS—AN EXAMPLE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN GOVERNMENT

By JOHN F. EMBREE

THE War Relocation Authority, a government agency charged with the duty of caring for persons forced to leave restricted military areas, was set up by Presidential edict on March 18, 1942. As a result of General De Witt's Exclusion Order concerning persons of Japanese ancestry, the chief duty of the WRA has been with these people: Japanese nationals and Japanese-Americans resident in the United States. By the summer of 1942, it became necessary to provide food and shelter for over a hundred thousand such evacuees from the West Coast restricted area. In addition to food and shelter, special wartime circumstances such as state governors' attitudes made it necessary to provide armed guards and barbed wire fences for the protective custody of these people, two-thirds of whom happened to be American citizens. Ten relocation centers were established housing from seven to eighteen thousand people each.

The situation created by the evacuation raised many special problems in human relations for the War Relocation Authority. The initial staff of the Authority was drawn largely from other governmental agencies such as the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Service—administrators who had had some experience in dealing with community organization. However, when it came to staffing the relocation centers themselves, centers which were virtually small towns and cities, the problems in human relations became more complex and difficult. Men had to be found to take charge of such specialized matters as feeding, housing, health and a public hospital, internal security, social welfare work—in fact all of the services necessary in any community of ten thousand people.

The evacuees themselves had very little in common with one another beyond their ancestry, some coming from well-to-do families, some from poor families, some being professional people or businessmen, others farmers or dock workers. The communities in their initial organization were thus highly artificial—simply a gathering of refugees thrown together as a result of the war. Since many of the civil service staff members were not experienced in dealing with social groups of this nature and since the evacuees came from such varied backgrounds and were, in addition, subject to many worries and anxieties, it was inevitable that there should be many local administrative crises of one

ANTHROPOLOGY AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

The interpretation of human beings to other human beings who do not know them has long been recognized as the proper sphere of the anthropologist. The interpretation of strange human groups to other anthropologists, to university students, and to the "general public" has been the usual function procedure. The interpretation of groups specifically to men who are working with them and trying to get them to behave in certain ways has been less common

1. Interpretation of human beings
To — ? , to selves Lantz
To administration
2. The situations defined
3. What happened in the process
What adm. wanted
What anthr. learned to do
A discipline

What happens when you interpret to someone who is doing something about it?

4. Results for program
For people
A communication channel
5. Relation to the science of anthropology
a. Scientific — specific & general — Tax, Embree
b. Training for opportunities
c. Meaning for science — as Steward has said

Presume were to remain scientists, not citizens, from WRA