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CASE STUDY

A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF A WARTIME "NATIONAL CHARACTER" STUDY [1]

Peter T. Suzuki

During World War II a new "discipline" emerged as a result of endeavors in psychological warfare against the Axis Powers. Led primarily by anthropologists, the national character studies undertaken during this period were attempts at analyzing the character structures of various nationalities, cultures, and peoples [2].

These projects were often done "at a distance," i.e., because of wartime exigencies, access to the peoples and their nations or cultures was not possible. Consequently interviews of immigrants in the United States and analyses of published and unpublished materials and of films and radio broadcasts were the methods which were employed. So far as the national character studies of the Japanese are concerned, perhaps the best known (and generally paradigmatic) is Ruth Benedict's *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, published in 1946. Less well known but nevertheless important are two studies of Japanese national character which antedated Benedict's and which were also undertaken by anthropologists. In 1943, Geoffrey Gorer, who was to later gain notoriety for his study of the Russian people, published his "Themes in Japanese Culture." Two years later, Weston LaBarre, presently professor emeritus of anthropology at Duke University, published his "Some Observations on Character Structure in the Orient: The Japanese" [3].

It is LaBarre's publication which will be the

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focus of attention in this paper, because he based some of his comments and opinions on observations of the inmates of Topaz, Utah, one of the ten internment camps which held Japanese Americans during World War II. I should note parenthetically my focus on LaBarre is not to be construed as an ad hominem reduction, but as an example of anthropology in the service of ideology.

As was common practice of the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority (WRA) which ran the camps, anthropologists were recruited as Community Analysts to undertake, among other things, analytic studies of inmate behavior in the areas to which they were assigned.

In May 1943, Weston LaBarre (B.A. Princeton, Ph.D. in Anthropology, Yale) assumed the Community Analyst position at Topaz [4]; forty-four days later he left Topaz for the Navy. His character study of the Japanese appeared in a 1945 issue of *Psychiatry*, and this article, the reader is informed, is "based on residence and research among the internees of the Central Utah Project, War Relocation Authority, at Topaz, Utah in 1943" [5]. According to the author, the article was written "between May 1943 and August 1944" [6]. However, according to a document deposited in The National Archives in Washington, DC, after only "a little over a week" at Topaz, LaBarre read a five-page single-spaced paper entitled "Some Observations on Japanese Character Structure" to members of the Topaz Community Service Division "to shoot at" [7]. It is of some significance that so far as Topaz inmates and Japanese character

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*Ad,
Please return,
This is my only
copy, Ned*

ANTHROPOLOGISTS IN THE WARTIME CAMPS FOR JAPANESE AMERICANS: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY

Peter T. Suzuki

There are many accounts — some quite recent — which document the historical roles of social scientists in the War Relocation Authority, the government agency established in March 1942 to administer the relocation camps for Japanese Americans (including alien Japanese) [1]. Therefore, only a few basic matters regarding that history need be recounted here.

Initially, there were nine camps under the War Relocation Authority (WRA). The tenth, at Poston, Arizona, was on an Indian reservation (as was Gila, Arizona, which was always under WRA management). For this reason the Office of Indian Affairs administered Poston for a year before it came under WRA's aegis. In March 1942, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, an anthropologist, made plans for a social science research laboratory at Poston. In August 1942, a psychiatrist and anthropologist, Lieutenant Commander Alexander H. Leighton, Medical Corps, USNR, consultant with the Indian Personality and Research Project, headed the laboratory, which was established as the Bureau of Sociological Research. In turn, Leighton recruited two anthropologists, Edward H. Spicer and Elizabeth Colson, who, along with fifteen

Japanese Americans, undertook research on Poston life [2].

Also, in March 1942, John H. Provinse, anthropologist with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was appointed Chief of the Community Management Division, one of the largest divisions within WRA, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. He, too, conceived of social science research in the relocation camps. John F. Embree, an anthropologist who had conducted field research in Japan, was requested to head the Documentation Section within the Reports Division, the latter being another major WRA office. What eventually emerged as a result of this bureaucratic activity was the Community Analysis Section within the Community Management Division, with Embree as the first head of the Community Analysis Section (CAS). CAS, with headquarters in Washington, was formerly established by the director of WRA on February 26, 1943, and there came to be a CAS in each of the camps (later on, in Poston as well) [3].

WRA's agreement to establish the Community Analysis Section was of itself a major concession because Embree had to hurdle many obstacles in order to get this sub-agency

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SUMMARY OF THE STATEMENT TO THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

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Wednesday, 2 p.m.
September 23, 1981
Northeastern Illinois State University

The first two pages are a summary of the longer document. The last two are additions. Both courtesy of Kaneshiro.

Madam Chairperson and Commissioners:

Thank you for inviting me to take part at this hearing.

I am Peter T. Suzuki, an anthropologist teaching in the Urban Studies Department of the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

I was born in Seattle. When I was 13 we were removed from Seattle to the camp in Puyallup, WA. In August, 1942, we were then moved from the camp in Puyallup to the one in Minidoka, Idaho. I left Minidoka, Idaho, by myself at age 15; this was September, 1944.

In 1952, 1975,¹⁹⁷⁷ 1978, 1979, and this year, I did research in the National Archives pertaining to the camp experience.

I have several articles in anthropology journals based on that research which are germane to this testimony.

Briefly, here are some little-known facts I wish to bring to your attention. Within the War Relocation Authority there was a Community Analysis Section, with headquarters in Washington, D.C. By late summer of 1943, each of the 10 camps had a branch of the Community Analysis Section, headed by a person called a Community Analyst. The entire Community Analysis Section operation, both in Washington and in the camps, was an anthropological undertaking inasmuch as 20 of the 27 in the Community Analysis Section were anthropologists. Ostensibly these social scientists were hired to study the culture patterns of the internees. As it turned out, a significant number carried out such activities as informing, spying, and the gathering of intelligence data.

Because of the intelligence-gathering activities of the Community Analyst at Jerome, Arkansas, Edgar McVoy, at least three internees were removed to Leupp, AZ, the isolation camp. The Community Analyst at Topaz, Weston LaBarre, worked closely with that camp's attorney regarding its inmates. E. Adamson Hoebel,

the Community Analyst at Granada, CO, gathered intelligence data on draft evaders. G. Gordon Brown of Gila, AZ, and John Rademaker of Granada, were members of their camps' review boards, which judged cases of loyalty. Rademaker reported regularly to the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence at Granada, as he gathered intelligence information on the internees. He also spied on "suspicious" visitors, with reports to the intelligence agencies at Granada, and on his fellow White co-workers. John Province, the anthropologist who headed the Community Management Division, one of the largest units within WRA, made arrangements to furnish the Washington office of the FBI with cards on the internees leaving camp on a permanent basis so that wherever they "relocated," the FBI could monitor them. John deYoung, the Minidoka, ID, Community Analyst, informed on the dissidents of that camp when they complained about camp conditions to the Spanish Consul. Edward H. Spicer, the head of the Community Analysis Section in Washington, D.C., passed on information to the Tule Lake director about some internees who had moved from Topaz to Tule Lake because he had suspected them of having taken part in a protest movement at Tule Lake.

In a report by John F. Embree, the first head of the Washington office of the Community Analysis Section, clearly saw the Section as an intelligence-gathering channel, as brought out in his report to the FBI, declassified in 1975.

Although not with WRA because she was with the research project entitled the Evacuation and Resettlement Study, the anthropologist Rosalie Hankey Wax turned informer while

doing "research" at Tule Lake from 1944 to 1945. The direct result of her informing to the FBI was that the person she informed on ended up in Japan.

Other cases of improprieties and unethical behavior by the social scientists in the camps can be cited. They are fully documented in several recent articles of mine.

The camp experience was a corrupting one for those social scientists who, under the pretext of scientific research, undertook the questionable practices referred to in the previous paragraphs. To be sure, there were some who did not indulge in such unethical practices.

The fact remains, the internees had to suffer yet another indignity in addition to those which are already known, but perhaps more painful than those because this added indignity came from scientists, whose ethics should have obviated the intolerable behavior that came under the guise of "scientific research."

Recommendations Investigate the following:

1. Who established the policy of permitting the Community Analysts to spy, inform, and gather intelligence data?
2. What was the relationship between the government intelligence agencies in the camps and the Community Analysis Section in Washington, D.C. and its field offices?
3. Whatever happened to the known victims of the spying and informing by the Community Analysts? How can they be helped?
4. Although a government employee, why were the materials by Alexander Leighton, an anthropologist at Poston, AZ, sent to the Bancroft Library of the University of California, instead of to the National Archi

5. Were social experiments on the inmates carried out by Community Analysts? For example, did certain Community Analysts "float" rumors in order to "test" the reactions of the internees? Were there any other kinds of social experiments in which the internees were used as the social scientists' guinea pigs?

Given the fact that a number of unanswered questions remain solely on the issue of the anthropologists in the camps, I finally recommend that the life of this commission be extended to look into these and the many other issues which still remain to be investigated.

Thank you for your time, consideration, and attention.

Ad, Please return.

UNETHICAL RESEARCH BY SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN
THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY CAMPS

A Statement Submitted to the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians

by Peter T. Suzuki, Ph.D.

September 23, 1981
Chicago, IL

STATEMENT SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

Madam Chairperson and Members of the Commission:

My name is Peter T. Suzuki. I am presently Professor of Urban Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. I was born in Seattle and interned when I was thirteen years old. My family and I were placed in Puyallup, Washington and Minidoka, Idaho.

At age 19 my brother volunteered for the 442nd when the first call for volunteers was announced in 1943. At age 17 my sister moved ("relocated," according to the then official terminology) to Wisconsin on her own. In September 1944, at age 15 I left Minidoka by myself and moved to a Midwestern town in order to attend a decent high school and in order to get a decent education. Therefore, when my parents left Minidoka for Connecticut in the spring of 1945, only one of their children was left in camp to move with them. However, my twin sister and parents ended up in different towns in Connecticut. Since camp days we never again lived as a family unit

Be that as it may, my reason for submitting this testimony is not to dwell on my personal^{al} background, save as it is germane to the thrust of this presentation.

Ever since I was an undergraduate at Columbia University I have been interested in the camps and the camp experience as a field of study. I wrote a term paper on an aspect of a camp when I was an undergraduate student and expanded it, based upon research in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.,

when I was doing graduate work toward my M.A. degree, also at Columbia, in anthropology in 1952. All told, I have conducted research on the War Relocation Authority (WRA) materials in the National Archives in 1952, 1975, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1981.

I wish to take this opportunity to apprise you about a little-known aspect of camp life, based upon my research in the National Archives. Full details appear in a 37-page article in Dialectical Anthropology.^{*} The article cites over two-hundred documents, many classified until quite recently, hitherto not utilized by scholars who have written about the concentration camps for Japanese Americans. The manuscript for the article was 135 pages.

What follow are some highlights of this forthcoming article.

The WRA established the Community Analysis Section in 1943. The Section was purportedly established to study the behavior patterns and "trouble patterns" of the inmates in the ten camps. The headquarters of the Community Analysis Section was in Washington, D.C., and it was initially headed by an anthropologist, John F. Embree. Eventually, each of the ten camps had a Community Analysis Section with a Community Analyst. The vast majority of the Community Analysts were professional anthropologists; a few were sociologists. Ostensibly these social scientists were to do social research. As it turned out not a few gathered intelligence data and informed on inmates.

^{*}1981, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 23-60.

Despite John F. Embree's admonition as head of the WRA Community Analysis Section to the social scientists (the Community Analysts), that these anthropologists "must never take on any administrative functions,"² G. GORDON BROWN, anthropologist at Gila, AZ, worked for the administration of that camp when he was "put in charge of maintaining the accuracy of all lists of those to be removed to Tule Lake," the segregation camp in California, and was appointed to a "special review committee," which judged cases of removal to Tule Lake.³

JOHN deYOUNG, the anthropologist at Minidoka's Community Analysis Section, quickly notified the proper authorities, including EDWARD H. SPICER, the anthropologist who had succeeded Embree after Embree left WRA, when some dissidents of Minidoka filed complaints about camp conditions to the Spanish Government, which was the neutral power representing Japanese interests in wartime America. DeYoung provided names of the dissidents in his communications,⁴ despite Embree's policy that Community Analysts "should be interested in why,⁵ not who."

ASAEL T. HANSEN, the anthropologist at Heart Mountain ...learned what a Project Director [camp director] wanted and needed to know about the community and what the administration was doing and planning to do. The long-continued contacts had another result, closely connected with the above. They tended to keep the Analyst [Hansen] from "going over" to the evacuees.⁶

BROWN, the Gila anthropologist, had similar sentiments:

"One very good dicipline (sic) we have on the project [camp] is that we put our reports through the project [camp] director so that we must be careful of what we say."⁷

The renowned anthropologist E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, while a Community Analyst at Granada, CO, in the summer of 1944, requested from the camp's Relocation Officer a "list of the names and addresses of the [Japanese American] boys... who failed to answer the Selective Service call, giving the date of the delinquency."⁸ He then analyzed the information which he had received and made a list and a map showing the distribution of the evaders, which he then passed on to the Relocation Officer,⁹ in addition to a lengthy classified report on the subject of evaders to the camp director.¹⁰

Anthropologist WESTON LABARRE, in addition to his pseudo-scientific analysis of Japanese character based upon his 44-day tenure as Community Analyst at Topaz, UT,¹¹ was praised by that camp's director because "...the [Topaz] Attorney and the Social Science Analyst [LaBarre] ...worked together with profit, regarding individual members of the resident community [i.e., inmates] ."¹² Furthermore, he made a detailed "block by block" map of Toapz, showing, among other things, the places of residence of the dissidents who had complained to the Spanish Consul and of the inmates who had made statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).¹³

ALEXANDER H. LEIGHTON, psychiatrist and anthropologist, another eminent social scientist, as head of the Bureau of Sociological Research at Poston, AZ, in two reports to the Poston Administration, strongly advocated the policy of segregation; that is, the removal of dissidents, to a special camp.¹⁴ He also aroused strong suspicions among both Whites and inmates of Poston by constantly walking around in a naval officer's uniform -- he was a Lt. Commander in the Navy -- thus causing him to be seen as a spy by both peoples.¹⁵

The Community Analyst at Jerome, AR, EDGAR C. MCVOY, did a series of interviews of various inmates of that camp. All of these were for intelligence-gathering purposes. In one interview he wanted to get information about the "most dangerous group" in Jerome,¹⁶ and in another, about the "separation of loyal and disloyal groups,"¹⁷ while in a third, about the loyalty to the U.S. of a Buddhist priest's followers.¹⁸ The significance of all these interviews plus some 16 others he conducted on similar topics takes on an added dimension when one learns that the Jerome director shortly thereafter, "removed" a Buddhist reverend, a certain Rev. T., who, along with two other men, was sent to Leupp, AZ, the isolation camp¹⁹ for "troublemakers," for his alleged pro-Japan attitude. MCVOY also informed on Whites in Jerome. Here is an excerpt from a memorandum marked "Confidential," which he wrote to the Jerome Community Management Division Chief:

All statements concerning appointed personnel [Whites] shall be sent to Mr. Taylor [Camp Director of Jerome] in a confidential form. He may then use his own discretion

about submitting such statements to Washington. For the most part, however, these statements must continue to be in anonymous form. I cannot be placed in the role here of being an informer to the administration about either evacuees or appointed personnel [whites]. I should much prefer to go myself to the person or the staff involved and discuss the situation with him. Then, if it seemed advisable, I might report the instance to you and Mr. Taylor. In flagrant cases, however, which seem to jeopardize the operation of the project [camp], I shall make an exception and give what facts I know to you and Mr. Taylor directly. 20

A major division within WRA, the Community Management Division, under which the Community Analysis Section in Washington operated, was headed by JOHN H. PROVINSE, an anthropologist. As chief, he constantly dealt with security matters and therefore with specific inmates. In addition to this kind of activity, of which there were too many cases to mention or list at this juncture, in a September 4, 1943 letter to J. Edgar Hoover -- declassified in 1975 -- Provinse wrote:

As outlined in my letter to you, dated April 5, 1943, arrangements have been made to furnish the Washington office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a card giving the destination of evacuees leaving relocation centers on indefinite leave. Our understanding is that the Washington office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation will forward this information

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to the appropriate field offices of the Bureau.

In other words, he made it possible for the FBI to keep track of every person who left camp as part of the relocation policy, which was strongly promoted by the WRA; therefore even those who had left the camp with the Government's blessing were under the watchful eye of the FBI.

Provinse further wrote: "We agree that any evacuee who becomes a persistent and serious source of trouble in a relocation center should be returned to an internment camp or [be] transferred to the isolation center at Leupp [AZ]."²²

The Community Analyst at Granada, CO, for more than a year, JOHN A. RADEMAKER, who had suspected from 50 to 100 "disloyals" at Granada, once segregation became the official policy, in a confidential letter to the camp director, wanted to hold

immediate hearings on 10 or 12 Kibei leaders...and send them forthwith to Leupp. The evidence [against them] would be fragmentary but after the vociferous leaders are yanked out (sic), it will be easier to get further evidence from loyal residents.²³

Rademaker then proposed to the camp director that those who were denied leave clearance -- the permit to leave camp -- and could not relocate or did not qualify for a pass to leave camp temporarily, "might be used as a criterion for shipping them out [to Leupp]. We could catch most of them that way without delay and without further hearings and

fuss." ²⁴ This Community Analyst also routinely passed on reports to the "F.B.I. agent and to the representative of the Naval Intelligence [stationed at Granada]" regarding the "disloyals." ²⁵ In order to find out more about them, Rademaker, with the permission of the camp director, attended inmate meetings which were known to both as being illegal. ²⁶ Furthermore, in line with this kind of work, from March 25 to April 7, 1944, when "a colored attorney from Los Angeles," Hugh MacBeth, visited Granada, Rademaker immediately reported this event to the camp director of Granada. What struck Rademaker was that the visitor wanted to form "a comprehensive alliance of colored peoples," ²⁷ and, because, according to MacBeth, the Japanese, like the Negroes, were "slaves," this Black urged cooperation between the "slaves" to overthrow their "masters." ²⁸ Rademaker concluded that "...the evidence we have here indicates that Mr. MacBeth is genuinely and sincerely concerned about the injustices which are unquestionably ²⁹ being suffered by colored people the world over." Nevertheless, a report on MacBeth was duly sent to the FBI agent at Granada ³⁰ by Rademaker; furthermore Rademaker provided the Naval ³¹ Intelligence Officer of Granada with information about MacBeth.

Rademaker did not confine his intelligence work to gathering data on inmates and visitors, however. The camp director of Granada requested him to sit in on staff (composed solely of Whites) meetings, where, for example, Rademaker "...listened carefully for reaction to that [staff] meeting [of July 12, 1943] and

for conversations concerning such meetings in general,"³²
and in two separate documents to the director, reported
to him conversations he had overheard among the White staff
members.³³ The result of this type of work was a document
of 17 single-spaced typed pages sent to SPICER, in which 23
key White administrators of Granada were evaluated, which
included ad hominem statements by Rademaker.³⁴ Earlier, in
October 1943, Rademaker had felt uneasy about investigative
work, as revealed in these passages from a letter marked
"Personal" and stamped "Confidential" to FRANK L. SWEETSER
and EDWARD H. SPICER:

As a matter of fact, this investigation [of dissidents]
has me a bit concerned. In the first place, we're not
an FBI nor detective outfit. If we do this sort
of thing and it gets known that we do (as it unquestion-
ably will if we do much of it), it will stop us from
getting a lot of other information which we ought to
get. On the other hand, it is essential to know
the tenor of public opinion in any question which seems
to involve loyalty or disloyalty to the United States,
and threats against the life and safety of any loyal
Americans. However, digging out the dirt on that sort
of thing is not our job. Can you give me any
enlightenment on the problem?

As ever, but somewhat puzzledly yours,
³⁵
/s/ John Rademaker

At the request of the Granada camp director, Rademaker also assumed membership on the segregation review panel
 36
 of that camp.

As can be inferred from Rademaker's letter just quoted, EDWARD H. SPICER apparently encouraged such intelligence work. In concert with Provinse, Spicer suppressed two detailed reports by ANNE O. FREED of the Washington Community Analysis Section because these reports detailed the deplorable conditions which had prevailed in the detention or assembly
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 camps. Another bit of information he collaborated with Provinse to successfully have suppressed had to do with the good relations which existed between Japanese Americans and Whites in Hawaii, and the fact that one-sixth of the Honolulu police force were of Japanese ancestry. The Chief of Internal Security at Tule Lake wanted to publicize the information, but on the advice of Spicer, Provinse suppressed
 38
 it. Moreover, Spicer passed on to an official at Tule Lake -- the segregation camp -- the names of two former inmates of Topaz, UT, who may have been in a strike which
 39
 was going on at Tule.

The anthropologist who had worked for another research project which was being conducted in some of the camps, a project which was financed by private foundations and was being directed by DOROTHY S. THOMAS at Berkeley, ROSALIE HANKEY (later ROSALIE WAX), was described by Thomas in her book The Spoilage, as the researcher who was able to obtain "confidential

reports from a group of determined 'disloyals' with whom
 no Japanese-American staff member [of the Evaluation and
 Resettlement Study] could possibly have established contact." ⁴⁰

Yet, Rosalie Hankey is not mentioned by name at all in
The Spoilage, save on the title page. ⁴¹ Perhaps this anomaly
 is because she turned informer on one of Tule Lake's "disloyals."
 She denounced a vigorous proponent of renunciation of U.S.
 citizenship because he himself did not renounce it. Thus,
 Hankey approached the proper authorities, "...suggesting
 that they [the Department of Justice investigators] call in Mr.
 Kira [the proponent of renunciation] and question him about his
 loyalties in the presence of some of the young Hokoku
 [renunciants] officers. Mr. Kira [subsequent to the interrogation]
 applied for denationalization." ⁴²

Subsequently, he [Mr. Kira] was sent to Japan with
 the expatriates, and they were all once again confined
 in a "center," this time by the Japanese government.
 Many months later, a friend sent me a clipping from
 a California newspaper. The clipping told how a
 certain expatriate, Stanley Masanobu Kira, confined
 in a detention area in Japan, had appealed to the
 American army to remove him because certain of the
 young men confined with him were threatening to kill
 him. ⁴³

Rosalie Hankey, shortly after having informed on Kira, received
 a telephone call from Dorothy Thomas in Berkeley, telling
 Hankey to leave Tule Lake immediately, "without letting anyone
 know." ⁴⁴ She left Tule under cover of darkness that very night.

She was expelled by WRA, among other reasons, for having
contacted the Department of Justice, that is to say, the FBI. 44

These then were some examples of the kindsof activities
the social scientists undertook in the name of science and
"research." Space does not permit me to go over the
personnel policy actions which were taken regarding MORRIS
E. OPLER, anthropologist at Manzanar, or JAMES H. BARNETT,
the Community Analyst at Gila. Also left unmentioned must
be Rosalie Hankey's truly bizarre behavior while at Tule.
Nor will space allow me to touch upon the devastating
criticisms of Leighton and of his Bureau of Social Research
by JOHN WALKER POWELL, Chief, Poston Community Management
Division, in his 51 single-spaced typed report in the
National Archives.

Most unfortunate, however, is the fact that I cannot
spell out for you the kinds of publications -- in professional
journals and between hard covers -- of these social scientists.
Suffice it to say, except for the few ethnographic/ethnological
publications, the vast majority of the others, including
the books The Governing of Men, The Spoilage, Impounded
People, and Doing Fieldwork and some twenty-five journal
articles, can be accurately characterized as one or a combination
of the following: self-serving, disingenuous, superficial,
distorted, expiational, pseudo-scientific, bizarre, surrealistc,
ethnocentric. One publication by a well-known anthropologist,
supposedly based upon field work in Topaz, borders on fraud.

Yet, how could these publications be otherwise because
so many of these anthropologists -- including some of

America's foremost anthropologists -- misused and abused their science and were, in effect, subverting the science of man.

A statement by JOHN EMBREE to the FBI (declassified only in 1975) reads as follows:

... [T]o keep the project director [camp director] informed of any unrest that may be developing or of any attempt at agitation, is desirable: [but we question the advisability of utilizing the Internal Security organization for monitoring purposes. Instead,] the control of community activities [through the Community Activity Supervisor as provided in Administrative Instruction No. 73 could be made a channel of information, and the Documentation Section of WRA] and the newly organized Community Analysis Section can be expected to provide additional channels.

The information should be obtained and should be brought to the project director's attention, but the task had better be undertaken by some other unit than the Internal Security Section.

This policy statement may have been the basis for the actions of the social scientists in the Community Analysis Section. Whatever the case may have been, it is clear that they undertook work which included spying, informing, gathering intelligence data, and, in general, working against the welfare of the inmates.

In conclusion, the camp experience was a corrupting one for those social scientists, who, under the pretext of scientific research, undertook such activities as spying, informing, and intelligence work. It also shows the extent to which the Government attempted to manipulate and control the inmates.

I firmly believe that it is important for you to know that the Japanese Americans in the ten concentration camps had to suffer yet another indignity, in addition to those which are well known. It is sad but true that this added indignity came from the ranks of anthropologists and from the halls of academe; from scientists who were trained in the best graduate schools in the United States; finally, from representatives of a science -- anthropology -- which had been held up to be the humane science par excellence.

Thank you for your attention.

Respectfully submitted,

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NOTES & REFERENCES

(All unpublished materials are in the National Archives, Washington, D.C., under Record Group 210. Unless otherwise noted, all documents are in typescript.)

1. Cf. William Petersen, 1971. Japanese Americans (NY: Random House), p. 82.
2. John Embree, Letter to Marvin K. Opler, 1 April, 1943, p. 2.
3. Gila Reports Office, Gila, AZ, 1943. "Segregation Proceedings,": pp. 1 and 2.
4. John deYoung, 1943, Covering Letter to Edward H. Spicer, attached to:
"Letter by Minidoka Evacuee X to Captain Antonio R. Martin," Minidoka Field Report No. 20, 4 September, 1943. ("Restricted.") ("X" substituted for inmate's name by Peter Suzuki.)
5. John Embree, 1944. "Community Analysis -- An Example of Anthropology in Government," American Anthropologist 46: p. 283; repeated in "Attitudes Toward Selective Service and Relocation (Notes on a Visit to Topaz, February 11-14, 1944)," Washington Community Analysis Section, February 1944, p. 10. ("Confidential.") Also repeated in "Discussion on Field Techniques," Denver Conference of Community Analysts, 13 September, 1944, p. 5.
6. Asael T. Hansen, 1946, "Community Analysis at Heart Mountain," Applied Anthropology 5 (3), p. 21. He describes the same in, 1944, "Discussion on Field Techniques," Denver Conference of Community Analysts, 13 September 1944, pp. 2-4.
7. G. Gordon Brown, 1944. "Denver Conference of Community Analysts: Morning Session," 12 September, 1944, p. 7.
8. E. Adamson Hoebel, 1944. "Draft Evaders," Memo. to Walter J. Knodel. Granada Community Analysis Section. 17 July, 1944.
9. _____, 1944. "Distribution of Draft Evaders," Memo. to Walter J. Knodel. Granada Community Analysis Section. 27 July, 1944.
10. _____, 1944. "Relocation Situation in Granada Relocation Center," Memo. to John Lindley. Granada Community Analysis Section. 1 August, 1944. ("Confidential.")
11. Peter T. Suzuki, 1980. "A Retrospective Analysis of a Wartime 'National Character' Study," Dialectical Anthropology 5: 33-46. (This is a detailed analysis of Weston LaBarre's 1945 publication on Japanese national character. My article is based on research in the National Archives.)
12. Charles Ernst, 1943. "Monthly Report of Social Science Analyst [Weston LaBarre] at Topaz," Memo. to Dillon S. Myer, Attention: John Provinse and John Embree. Topaz. 8 June, 1943, p. 5.
13. Weston LaBarre, 1943. "Ecological Map of Topaz, Utah. Block by Block." (With the Assistance of Mary Sasajima.) Topaz Community Analysis Section. 30 May, 1943.
14. Alexander Leighton, 1943. "Monthly Report on the Colorado River War Relocation Center for Evacuated Japanese," Poston, AZ. 10 June, 1943, p. 6.
"Monthly Report on the Colorado River War Relocation Center for Evacuated Japanese," Poston. 10 July, 1943, p. 9. (Both reports are mimeographed.)
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17. _____, 1943. "Interview with Two Evacuee Christian Ministers." Jerome Community Analysis Section. 28 May, 1943, p. 1. (All but initials of all names inked out.)

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21. John H. Provinse, 1943. Letter to J. Edgar Hoover, 4 September, 1943, pp. 16-17. Box title: "Washington Central Files: Confidential, Justice Department-Federal Bureau of Investigation Correspondence; Gurnea Report."
22. _____, 1943. "Comments on: 'Recommendations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers'." (Same box as material cited in Note 21, above.)
23. John Rademaker, 1944. "Disloyals." Memo. to James G. Lindley. 20 February 1944. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
24. Ibid.
25. _____, Letter to Edward H. Spicer. 22 February, 1944, p. 14. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
26. _____, Letter to Edward H. Spicer. 16 February, 1944, p. 5. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
27. _____, 1944. "Visitor to Granada." Memo. to James G. Lindley. 8 April, 1944, p. 5. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
28. Ibid., p. 7.
29. _____, 1944. Letter to James G. Lindley. 23 May, 1944, p. 3. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
30. Ibid., p. 1.
31. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
32. _____, 1943. Letter to James G. Lindley. 26 July, 1943, p. 1. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
33. _____, 1943. "July 12, 1944 General Staff Meeting." 12 July, 1943. "July 12, 1943 General Staff Meeting." 15 July, 1943. Granada Community Analysis Section.
34. _____, 1944. Letter to Edward G. Spicer. 20 April, 1944. ("Personal and Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
35. _____, 1943. Letter to Frank L. Sweetser and "Ned" [Edward H. Spicer]. 3 October, 1943. ("Personal"; stamped "Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
36. _____, 1943. Letter to Frank L. Sweetser. 25 August, 1943. ("Confidential.") Granada Community Analysis Section.
37. Edward H. Spicer, 1943. Note to John H. Provinse. (Written in blue pencil.) (Attached to Report by Anne O. Freed.) (Part of Spicer's note is printed in Michi Weglyn's Years of Infamy (New York: Morrow, 1976), p. 297, Note 6.)
38. _____, 1943. Memo. to John H. Provinse. 9 October, 1943. Washington Community Analysis Section.
39. _____, 1943. "Central Utah Segregatns Now in Tule Lake." Memo. to Leland Barrows. 23 October, 1943. Washington Community Analysis Section.
40. Dorothy S. Thomas and Robert S. Nishimoto, 1946. The Spoilage (Berkeley: University of California Press), p. viii, fn 5.
41. Nor is Marvin K. Opler mentioned. He was the anthropologist at Tule who headed its Community Analysis Section and who had written numerous important reports.)
42. Rosalie Hankey Wax, 1971. Doing Fieldwork (Chicago: University of Chicago Press Paperback), pp. 168-169.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p. 169.

Marutani's questioning, from WRA tape

M: Miss Sady, I must say that as one of the inmates of the concentration camps this comes as a complete surprise to me that I perhaps was a subject of a study under some microscope and I feel a little intimidated. Who initiated this, do you know?

R: Yes, the WRA agency and the anthropologists--Dr. Redfield who was just mentioned earlier by Mr. Krueger...

M: But certainly wasn't there someone above that individual who said we've got to do this?

R: No, we sold ourselves.

M: Oh, you sold yourselves. To whom?

R: To the WRA, the top echelon, and it took some doing.

M: And who at the WRA, do you know?

R: I didn't do it, I'm...

M: I understand.

R: Okay. Dillon Meyer. And earlier than that there was a Bureau of Sociological Research under John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, they were running that particular Center. And it was their success in helping to solve one of the disturbances--a big strike at Poston--that is, bringing the administration and the people together and discuss their differences and arrive at a solution. It was because of the success of that particular event by the Bureau of Sociological Research in which evacuees and-- Dr. Spicer, that I believe the top echelon of WRA began to realize that there was a real function here, that it wasn't really so easy, not only to understand different cultural backgrounds, but the feelings of people in situations of stress.

M: Well, the reason I express some amazement is because before evacuation I was a happy normal poor American boy and I didn't realize that suddenly I was a guinea pig.

R: I do not believe you were a guinea pig.

M: Well, under some microscopic examination. Although I must tell you...

R: ...talking...

M: ...that maybe the pieces begin to fit together because after I left camp to go back to school in the midwest they assigned me a FBI agent to check on me. I couldn't understand for the world why the government was wasting its assets to check on a poor little boy just going to school but...

R: Excuse me...

M: I'll tell you why. I'll explore this a little bit more. I'm not prepared to go into it totally but there is some indication according to the documents that this study was ordered by someone very highly placed in the government. And now we've got all these people together, now let's examine them and see what makes them tick. I want to verify it. I have seen some references to such a document. That's why I was exploring this.

R: I absolutely deny that the Community Analysis Section was appointed with that end in mind or that--I'm not inside each analyst's brain--but it's not the brunt...

M: No, I'm not...

R: If you will just read the documentation I have given you I think you will see, not the microscope--talking, interaction, it happens all the time--that the reports I have given you will show what our intent was and I think what the results were.

M: Well, mam, I certainly don't question your personal intent or others but I think you'll also recognize that sometimes we of good intention can be used by those higher up.

R: I would have to see the documentation myself and I have not seen it.

M: Well, I--we intend to get in it. Thank you very much.

R: I have already seen one article by Prof. Suzuki...

M: No, I'm not referring to an article but to a directive from someone very, very high up in the government in 1946 (sic).

R: To have a Community Analysis Section?

M: We'll see.

WILLIAM M. MARUTANI
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

October 19, 1981

Dr. Rachel Sady
40 Euclid Avenue
Hastings on Hudson, N.Y. 10706


Dear Dr. Sady:

Yours of September 28th was received today. Insofar as questioning is involved, whether in a courtroom or a hearing, the purpose is to probe, to elicit information, and not necessarily to convey a view and certainly not to formulate any fixed opinions. I can assure you that I've long ago learned that one must wait until all the facts are known, followed by due deliberation, and only then can one begin to formulate conclusions of any substance.

At the same time, however, as just another American I was taken aback, - as any American would be, - to suddenly be informed that my government had been spending time, labor and money "studying" me through the Community Analysis Section. If anyone today were to surreptitiously engage in a "study" of me because I happen to belong to some racial group, - an irrelevant factor, - I, and my fellow citizens, might begin to wonder what was "wrong" about me that required study and, inferentially, need for remedial measures. This, I'm sure you'll understand, is demeaning, particularly if you happen to be the subject of the study.

Insofar as irresponsible reporting and charges, having been the target of such myself, I concur with you. Irrational stridency, in print or otherwise, is best left ignored.

Sincerely,



WILLIAM M. MARUTANI

WMM/ms

To the Honorable Commissioners on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians:

Any expertise I have concerning evacuation and the Relocation Centers is due to my work in the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority. You have asked me to explain the work of this Section. In doing so I also refer briefly to something of the impact upon the 110,000 victims of our country's war-time decision to expell them from their West Coast homes, and of subsequent governmental programs impinging upon them.

In describing the Section, aside from using my own files and memory, I rely heavily on Dr. Edward H. Spicer's "Anthropologists and the War Relocation Authority" in The Uses of Anthropology, a special publication of the American anthropological association in 1979.

Executive Order 9056 resulted from the combination of wartime hysteria, economic and political opportunism, and the blatant racism of the commander of the strategic West Coast military area, all in the face of strong opposition from the Justice Department and because many "fair play" citizens groups did not realize the danger and were caught napping.

The evacuation order itself reinforced and even initiated prejudice against Japanese Americans where it had not been before. An easterner's remark was typical: "There must be something seriously wrong with those people or the Army wouldn't have them all under wraps. That's all I need to know."

The government almost immediately established WRA to deal with the homeless people it had created. The agency saw its job as restoring human rights and providing for the welfare of the evacuees. In doing so it was compelled to counteract

the image of them that resulted from their expulsion. WRA opted not for "concentration camps," as so often and understandably is charged, but for abolishing the "relocation centers," getting the people back in the mainstream of national life, and lifting the ban against them on the West Coast. Not easy in a country at war, and extremely hard on the victims buffeted by the series of programs that resulted from that decision.

To help achieve its aim WRA turned to social scientists as staff advisors. Before the liquidation of WRA in June, 1946, thirteen anthropologists and eight sociologists had been employed over time as Community Analysts. Most of the time there was one analyst at each center, and there was a small central office in Washington coordinating their efforts and funneling out their data. I worked in Washington and was assigned for three months to Jerome, Arkansas when that center was being closed.

The Community Analysts' role was a new one, with little or no precedent: to study and report on the evacuees' attitudes and behavior in the situation in which they were caught. It is a mistaken, but again understandable, idea that these social scientists were preoccupied with explaining to the administration enough about the evacuees that they could be manipulated. Particularly, I want to emphasize that analysts did not transmit covert information about individuals to any one at all. We studied the attitudes and behavior of the administration, too, seeking ways to make them understand the very real fears, anxieties and concerns of the center populations.

Much of this was done through oral reports and discussion; most importantly the head of the Section was in constant contact with WRA's top echelon. Beyond talk, we wrote a wide variety of Community analysis reports on our research

that were reproduced and distributed in Washington and in the centers. Each analyst had a small staff of evacuee assistants that helped in gathering data and in preparing the reports. Some of these Japanese Americans, with that start, are distinguished social scientists today.

Community Analysts were first conceived as cross-cultural interpreters of what, to the administrators, were unfamiliar ethnic ways. They wrote about the function of the "go-between" and the importance of sharing responsibility among the Issei, for example, of their values and many other aspects of their social and material life. Soon, however, research switched away from differences to the evacuees as people in a crisis situation, reacting to events over which they had little if any control--the attempt to segregate the "disloyal" from the "loyal;" the reinstatement of selective service for the Nisei, drafting them from behind barbed wire; the effort to relocate evacuees throughout the country with WRA pushing the effort sometimes wisely and sometimes unwisely; and the closing of the centers which many had come to see as secure homes for the duration of the war. We tried to help the administration see evacuees' problems as they themselves saw them, see what life in the centers was really like.

I would like to present you a very small sample of the huge amount of varied work done.

--an interview with "A Nisei Who Said No" to the loyalty question, a young man tongue-tied before the Loyalty Board but who expressed himself with simple eloquence to the Community Analyst and anthropologist Morris Opler.

--my own case study on "Prejudice in Hood River Valley," including background material on the notorious "Hood River incident" that galvanized editorialists throughout the country.

--a "Trends" report, one of several by Dr. Spicer, covering what was going on in the centers as their closing loomed sure and soon.

To understand the Community Analysis Section in fuller context I recommend to you the Spicer article mentioned previously and the final report of the Section, Impounded People, written by Spicer and three other Section anthropologists, and republished by the University of Arizona Press.

In my opinion, anyone immersed in the kind of information collected not only by the Section but by the agency in general, can well understand the desire of Nikkei for governmental redress that goes beyond an apology.

Rachel Sady
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COMMENTS ON THE TESTIMONY OF DR. PETER T. SUZUKI
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

BY

Edward H. Spicer
Formerly Head, Community Analysis
Section, War Relocation
Authority

These comments are divided into two parts, first, replies to Dr. Suzuki's specific charges and, second, a general statement regarding the work of the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority. My comments will be confined to the work of the Community Analysis Section and the Division of Community Management of the War Relocation Authority and the Bureau of Sociological Research. They will not deal with the activities of the Evacuation and Resettlement Study directed by Dorothy S. Thomas; I had no working relations with those who worked in that study and hence will not presume to comment on their activities.

1. G. Gordon Brown. Dr. Suzuki implies that G. Gordon Brown was one who gathered intelligence data, since his discussion of Brown's activities immediately follows the general statement in Dr. Suzuki's comments to the effect that "not a few" social scientists in the WRA carried on intelligence work. Brown did not gather intelligence information on evacuees at the Gila Relocation Center or anywhere else, and Dr. Suzuki's statement does not present evidence that he did. Brown assisted administrators of the WRA during the segregation program. He checked lists of names of persons scheduled for removal ^{to} Tule Lake Segregation Center and served on the review committee which passed on cases for removal. It was part of the Community Analysts' job to advise administrators in the carrying out of their duties. Dr. Suzuki does not supply information regarding the nature of Brown's activities in these instances. The jobs listed certainly involved information about specific individuals; if Brown supplied any of that information he would have violated the policy

of population had formed, developed their community organizations, and built their churches. The churches were immediately surrounded by houses in which the 400-500 Yaquis of each settlement lived. However, most of these households were empty or reduced to a very few persons during a large part of the year, so that they could be characterized as "vacant towns." This settlement pattern was an important feature of Yaqui adaptation to the Arizona economic conditions.

The first phase of Yaqui life in Arizona was characterized by an economic base in railroad labor, but Yaquis generally did not find the track work acceptable. The great majority rejected the section house way of life with its mixed ethnic community and periodic reassignment to new locations. Only a few individuals adjusted to it. Yaquis steadily withdrew and sought what work they could find near the cities of Arizona.

Just before the 1920s, as Yaquis were increasing in numbers, Arizona was entering a major economic transformation. To cattle ranching and mining was added agriculture with cotton and citrus fruit production. A new strain of cotton, the long staple Pima variety, had been developed in southern Arizona at precisely the time that large scale irrigation brought extensive areas of the Santa Cruz, Gila, and Salt River Valleys under cultivation in the 1920s. Yaquis made their first major economic adaptation in Arizona to the burgeoning cotton production during the period from 1920 to 1945. The majority of Yaquis found employment as cotton-pickers, cotton "choppers," and irrigators. The peaks of these activities were seasonal. The standard pattern of work for Yaquis was as

of the Community Analysis Section. Dr. Suzuki does not say that he did. In short, no evidence is presented that Brown carried out intelligence activities. My knowledge of Brown's work, with whom I was in close touch throughout his period of employment by the WRA, enables me to say that he was a very scrupulous performer within the policy framework of the Community Analysis Section. He understood that Analysts were not to involve themselves in supplying information about individual evacuees to WRA administrators or to anyone outside the agency. He prepared reports which were models of CA work, always keeping individuals' names out of the reports and reworking the information in the general terms which it was the Community Analysis Section's obligation to present.

2. John de Young. Dr. Suzuki reports, apparently as an example of intelligence work, de Young's transmission of a report to John Provinse in the Community Management Division (through Edward H. Spicer) which contained a transcription of a petition to the Spanish Consul signed by some evacuees of the Minidoka Relocation Center. De Young did not violate Community Analysis policy or carry out an intelligence operation in doing what he did. The document with its signatures was not a piece of information gathered exclusively by de Young's work as a Community Analyst. It was available through other channels to Provinse and others in the WRA, as well as to persons outside of WRA, such as those in the office of the Spanish Consul and other agencies. It was a document which had in some degree become a public document through being transmitted by the evacuees concerned to the Spanish Consul.

3. The charge against Asael Hansen is not fully intelligible. Dr. Suzuki appears to say that Hansen acquainted himself with the activities and viewpoints of administrators in the Heart Mountain Relocation Center. Hansen certainly did so, as I know from close contact with him during his whole period as a Community Analyst. This was an important part of his work as a Community Analyst, since Analysts were instructed to study the administrative personnel's relations with evacuees, as well as the evacuee viewpoints. Dr. Suzuki says that Hansen's carrying out of these duties "tended to keep the Analyst [Hansen] from 'going over' to the evacuees." He presents nothing indicating that this has anything to do with the charges of informing and intelligence work. My interpretation of

and other major Yaqui traditions. It is probable that Yaquis felt that the Arizona Yaqui churches lacked properly-sanctioned patrons, namely, those named in the myths of the founding of the Eight Yaqui Towns. Funeral duties were performed, therefore, not by the Pahkome as on the Yaqui River, but by ritual kin (godparents and compadres). Thus while the church organization and the Horsemen-Pharisee complex were promptly re-created in the old tradition in each major Yaqui settlement, the civil, the saint's day, and the military authorities were not permanently re-established.

The church organization and the ceremonial sodalities, which managed the annual Easter ceremonies, were revived in very much the same form as that of the nineteenth century Sonora towns. Smaller communities which grew up from time to time were organized as satellites ceremonially dependent on the principal settlements. However, when a major new settlement--New Pascua--was established in 1966 it immediately developed its own independent form of community organization. A stable adaptation to the conditions in Arizona had been achieved, involving a truncated model of the traditional town structure.

The Arizona communities became stabilized not only in social organization by the 1930s, but also demographically. The four major settlements of the Tucson and Phoenix areas each had populations of about 500 by the mid-1930s, and this population level remained nearly constant for 30 years. This was not the year-round population but rather the maximum during the spring season when the annual Easter ceremony was performed. Within 15 years after the second wave of migration entered Arizona in 1916-17, the four major centers

Dr. Suzuki's vague statement is that it is drawn from an account of his way of working by Hansen which emphasizes his efforts to keep bias out of his reports. He understood that maintaining close contacts with administrators would help to keep him aware of their viewpoints and thus avoid biasing his reports wholly in the direction of the evacuee viewpoints. It was also true of Hansen's work that he maintained close contacts with evacuees and thus avoided reporting any event or relationship wholly from the administrative point of view. In this same section Dr. Suzuki states that G. Gordon Brown (mentioned above) channels his reports through the project director (that is, the top local administrator). This was required practice in the Community Analysis Section designed to make sure that the local administration was not by-passed in the reporting of local Analysts to the Washington office, as well as to assist project directors in their management of the camps through acquaintance with the Analysts' understanding of the local situations. No evidence is presented in this section by Dr. Suzuki regarding intelligence work by Analysts.

4. E. Adamson Hoebel. Hoebel did not submit names of evacuees resulting from his research to administrators. On the contrary, he was supplied with names and addresses of evacuees by the administrators. He used this administrative information to prepare a distribution map of the center. In other words, he converted information regarding individuals into general information, a common type of activity of Community Analysts. Such general information was used to show the relationships between different kinds of phenomena characteristic of the center life, and thus to isolate significant factors in various administrative problems. Dr. Suzuki does not state precisely either the nature of Hoebel's reports or how the study was utilized. On the basis of what is reported by Dr. Suzuki there is no substance to any charge of intelligence operation carried out by Hoebel.

5. Weston LaBarre. The statement that LaBarre worked with the Project Attorney suggests that the Analyst assisted in the solution of some legal problems of evacuees in the Topaz Center. Apparently Dr. Suzuki is unaware of the nature of the activities of Project Attorneys in the WRA. An Attorney at the project level spent most of his time advising evacuees with regard to the legal problems which many of them had in connection with property which

consisted of the Matachin dancers dedicated to the Virgin Mary; the Horsemen dedicated to the Infant Jesus; and the Pharisees (Fariseos), as they were called usually in Arizona, consisting of "Soldiers of Rome" and masked Chapayekas under the general authority of a Pontius Pilate. This was the basic nucleus of dedicated ceremonial participants. Their activities however were linked with other performers--the Pascola dancers, the Deer dancer, and their musicians, required for carrying out both calendarial and crisis rites. By 1924 each Yaqui community had such a complement of ceremonial performers. Each had begun to carry on the religious life as nearly in accordance with traditions in the Eight Towns as they were able.

The religious structure of the Yaqui communities began to form first, rapidly becoming patterned in ways that obtained for more than fifty years following. By 1925 in the four major communities the adapted Arizona ceremonies had assumed their stable forms; but this did not satisfy the immigrants. The urge to recreate the whole panoply of town officers and organization became stronger during the 1920s. People discussed the issue as to whether it was proper to elect governors in a situation where there was no Yaqui land to manage and where ^{the authority of} United States governing officials had already been accepted. The decision was that Yaquis should not try to re-establish their traditional officers, because the functions were being fulfilled by federal and state officials. It was especially emphasized that there were no land management functions to be assumed by Yaqui governors. It was held, however, that disputes among Yaquis in their own communities might be settled by their own elected governors.

they held on the West Coast. What sort of assistance in these matters LaBarre rendered is not stated. Nothing of the nature of "informing" or "intelligence work" is indicated. The ecological map mentioned by Dr. Suzuki as being prepared by LaBarre is obviously one of those tools of analysis often utilized by Analysts, taking information supplied by administrators and plotting it in an effort to show interrelationships among various factors operating in relocation center life. Again, there is no evidence presented here that LaBarre supplied information about individuals which the administration did not have from their own files.

6. Alexander H. Leighton. Leighton directed the Bureau of Sociological Research at Poston during parts of 1942 and 1943. He was not employed by the Community Analysis Section. Dr. Suzuki states that he advocated the "policy of segregation." I do not recall the circumstances of the advocacy, but it should be recognized that advice regarding policy and program to the administration was well recognized as part of the role of research workers in both the Bureau and the Community Analysis Section. What does the offering of advice on the segregation policy have to do with "intelligence work.?" There seems to be implicit in Dr. Suzuki's statement disapproval on his part of the segregation policy. This has nothing to do with "intelligence," but it might be helpful to the Commission if Dr. Suzuki would disentangle his personal opinions about War Relocation Authority policy ~~and~~ from his attempts to characterize the activities of research workers in the centers. If Dr. Suzuki disapproves of the segregation policy, what is the basis of that opinion? Has he considered alternatives to it? And does he understand the circumstances which led the WRA administration to choose that policy? Dr. Suzuki repeats an old criticism of Leighton, current in the Poston Center, that he "roused suspicion" by walking around the center in naval uniform. In the first place, Leighton did not wear a naval uniform; he wore only collar ornaments. He did this to make sure that he was not hiding ~~the~~ fact about himself that he was a lieutenant commander in the navy. Any effort to hide that fact would have roused far more suspicion, as well as being dishonest. Of course, the open identification of himself as a naval officer would have been entirely incompatible with intelligence work, and hence his behavior in this connection is a demonstration that he was not engaged in "intelligence."

At Pascua Village this was tried in 1923 by electing some individuals as "judges." In the only judgment made in a dispute between two family heads, the decision was not generally accepted. The complaint was taken to a county judge, who made a decision which was accepted. This ended the idea of Yaqui civil government in Arizona (Spicer 1940:169-70). Yaquis accepted the Arizona courts and law enforcement systems, except in one area, namely, policing of the Easter and other large ceremonials. In 1923 the Barrio Libre Yaquis brought Papagos who were neighbors of theirs and proposed that they police a joint Libre-Pascua ceremonial. The Pascua people objected, a fight occurred, and Papagos were not recruited again for this purpose. For several years Yaquis assigned the Fariseo Society to maintain order at their ceremonies. When they staked out a violater on the ground, Anglo-Americans objected. Ceremonies thereafter were policed by both Fariseos and sheriff's deputies.

The Military Society was revived and remained in existence at Pascua from the mid-1920s until the early 1940s. The organization was composed of eight or more men, all elderly, who had taken vows in Sonora to serve the Virgin of Guadalupe as soldiers. They prepared fox skin capes, bows and arrows, the necessary ritual paraphernalia, and performed their "Coyote dance" during the Lenten ceremonial. However, no young men were dedicated and the organization died out. It was never instituted at Barrio Libre, but existed for a few years at Guadalupe. There is no record that any attempt was made to revive the Pahkome organization, that is, the organizers of the annual saint's day celebrations, so important and so elaborate in Sonora as the vehicle of the drama of the Moors and Christians

7. Edgar McVoy. Evidence that McVoy's interviews were "for intelligence-gathering purposes" is not presented by Dr. Suzuki. If the blanket statement about "intelligence-gathering" is to be accepted, Dr. Suzuki would have to give detailed information about the specific form of McVoy's reports, whether or not they included the names of individuals, and about the particular uses to which the reports, if they included names, were put. I think it is possible that McVoy did supply some information on individuals, either orally or in written form, to administrators at Jerome Center. I say this because, as I recall, McVoy did not at first fully understand Community Analysis policy to the effect that reports were to be in general and not in individual terms. The quote which Dr. Suzuki gives seems to bear out McVoy's lack of understanding of the policy, at least with respect to administrative personnel, in connection with whom he ^{however} expresses an inconsistent approach. However, Dr. Suzuki does not clearly present a definite case. Dr. Suzuki's statement about McVoy's role in the removal of a Buddhist minister to ~~Hamamatsu~~ Leupp isolation camp is pure inference and cannot be accepted as solid evidence.

8. John Provinse. John Provinse was employed by the WRA as an administrator, not as an anthropologist. As Chief of the Division of Community Management he had responsibility for the setting up and running of schools, hospitals, a recreation program, and what was called the Internal Security program. The last was essentially the police force for maintaining law and order within the relocation centers. Provinse's memorandum to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was written in connection with Provinse's responsibilities for leave clearance from the centers for evacuees. This was a program for ~~enabling~~ enabling evacuees to leave the relocation centers and settle elsewhere in the United States rather than to remain within the centers. The circumstances which led to the involvement of the FBI in the leave clearance program is certainly a subject that should be looked into and understood by the Commission. It, however, is an aspect of the WRA program which the Community Analysts did not take any part in and therefore this section of Dr. Suzuki's testimony is irrelevant to the charges made at the beginning of his statement.

9. John A. Rademaker. Dr. Suzuki presents four fairly clear cases in which Rademaker carried on activities which might legitimately

given a certain context, and given the status of participants. The following code was employed to record such interchange:

I	Indian	→	speaks to	
NI	non-Indian	1/2/3/4	age group membership	
m	Male	=	speaks in	
f	Female	E	English	
K	Known	} to alter	L	Lakota
UK	Unknown			

Such a recording might look like this:

I (m)/1/K → NI (f)/2/K = E

I (m)/4/UK → I (m)/4/UK = L

(Prose: An Indian male of age group 1, who knows alter speaks to a non-Indian female of age group 2 who knows/recognizes speaker; exchange is in English.)

Such formulae were later deciphered and "translated" in attempts to discern patterns and speech preferences. It was often impossible to determine the relationship between speaker and alter (known or unknown, kinsman or non-kinsman). (See chapter VI, data analysis.)

2) and 3) A distinction is made between "formal" and "informal" interviews as follows: "formal interviews"

be called intelligence work among evacuees and administrative personnel. He communicated the names of individuals to WRA administrators and to the FBI and Naval Intelligence for the purpose of having action taken against the individuals. These were clear violations of Community Analysis policy. Rademaker's letter of October, 1943, written early in the period of his employment, quoted by Dr. Suzuki, shows that he was unable to understand that his assignment as Community Analyst prohibited the reporting of the names of individuals and their behavior. His confusion on this matter persisted throughout his service for WRA. Embree made the effort when he was first hired and Spicer continued to try to educate him, but they were unable to make him understand. His separation from WRA after about a year of employment was a great relief to the Community Analysis Section. No other Analyst performed in this manner. It should be said that Rademaker's activities were inspired by his very strong identification ^{with} what he thought were the best interests of one segment of the Nisei population, namely, those who actively sought to make known their loyalty to the United States and were vociferous about this during and immediately after evacuation. Rademaker could not separate his assigned work from what he thought were their interests. It kept him from developing a long term, overall understanding of the welfare of the whole evacuee group. Dr. Suzuki's inference on page 10 of his testimony that Spicer encouraged Rademaker is entirely wrong, and evidence for such encouragement is not to be found in the letter quoted.

10. Edward H. Spicer. Dr. Suzuki charges that Spicer "suppressed" information on two occasions. The first instance is the following. Anne Freed of the Community Analysis Section in Washington made a study of conditions in the Assembly Centers set up as temporary locations for the evacuees before they were transferred to the Relocation Centers. Her reports contained information demonstrating that living conditions were generally very bad in the converted racetracks and other hastily converted quarters. The Assembly Centers were managed by the Army, that is, by the Western Defense Command. The decision regarding Freed's reports was whether to circulate them in mimeographed form within the WRA and other governmental agencies or to file them without circulating. Spicer, as Head of the Community Analysis Section, thought they ought not to be circulated. He

harp-player, a former native of Cocorit. Under his inspiration and that of some others, such as José María García, a lame man trained as a maestro in Cocorit, the Yaquis planned and carried out on the land where their temporary houses were built a Lenten-Easter ceremony. Some had been promised during childhood in Sonora to serve in the roles of Pontius Pilate, Chapayeka, Matachin dancer, altar attendant, image bearer, and so on. The roles for which persons had already been dedicated were few and miscellaneous; new vows were made, the roles filled, and the 40 day ceremony carried out with the encouragement of employers. In the following year the ceremony was undertaken not only at Tierras Flojas, but also at Mezquital in South Tucson, ~~and at Guadalupe near Phoenix.~~ During the next few years under the instruction of experienced men like the harp-player the necessary organization, which called for a minimum of 50 persons in the proper roles, was developed at all three places. New knowledge and experience stimulated the revival as the second wave of immigrants came in, fleeing from Obregon's renewed Yaqui campaign, in 1916. On this base grew a closer and closer approximation to what the older immigrants remembered as the organization of the river towns before the diaspora. The revival of the Easter ceremony had taken place along precisely the same lines in Guadalupe three years earlier in 1906.

During the decade of the 1920s two Tucson settlements--Pascua and Barrio Libre--and two Phoenix settlements--Guadalupe and Eskatel (Scottsdale)--became established both as to location and organization of community life. An attempt was made to merge the two Tucson communities in 1921-22, but this was not successful. They continued

presented two reasons for this. One was that for the WRA to circulate information critical of the Army at that particular time might hurt working relations between the Army and WRA. It was important that these relations not be impaired because the Army and the WRA were engaged in an effort on behalf of the Nisei. They were inaugurating a campaign to dispel the suspicion aroused by the action of evacuation by publicizing the abundant expressions of Nisei loyalty to the United States, including their performance in the armed services. The second reason advanced by Spicer was that publicity regarding the conditions in the Assembly Centers might be noted in Japan and result in retaliatory treatment of prisoners of war and interned U. S. citizens. On this basis, Spicer recommended against circulating the reports and his superior, Provinse, concurred. The other instance of what Dr. Suzuki calls "suppression" was the following. Spicer expressed an opinion to Provinse that publicity regarding the high percentage of Japanese Americans in the Honolulu police force might backfire against Japanese Americans on the continent. My reasoning, as I now recall, was that much misinformation about the role of Japanese Americans in the attack on Pearl Harbor was still circulating in the United States. The fact that many police in Honolulu were of Japanese ancestry could be interpreted by the misinformed public as a contributing factor in the attack. I so advised my superior, Provinse, and he decided not to encourage the circulation of the information by the WRA. This was, it should be noted, not information to which only the WRA had access. Neither of these instances, obviously, has anything to do with the assertions made by Dr. Suzuki concerning "intelligence work" or "informing." I do not recall the circumstances of the transmission of the names of two residents of Topaz Center to "an official at Tule Lake." Dr. Suzuki gives no information concerning the occasion or the utilization of the information; his statement does not support a charge of "intelligence work."

11. Rosalie Hanke Wax. I will not comment on Dr. Suzuki's testimony regarding the activities of Rosalie Hanke at Tule Lake. She was not connected with the WRA and can comment for herself on Dr. Suzuki's assertions.

12. On page 12 of his testimony, Dr. Suzuki makes sweeping comment on two books --- The Governing of Men by Alexander H. Leighton and Impounded People by members of the Community Analysis Section ---

separate maintaining different kinds of relationships with other ethnic groups, chiefly Papagos and Anglos. Each developed its separate but closely similar community organization, following the model of Yaqui River town structure. The "Eskatel" settlement branched off from, but eventually in the 1950s merged again with Guadalupe.

The guiding principle for the Arizona Yaqui communities was revival of the nineteenth century institutions on the Yaqui River. Details of results varied because of many factors, including the places of origin of leading men and women in the Arizona settlements, the nature and extent of their former participation in community life, and the kinds of contact with Anglos and others. In general, it was nevertheless true that revival resulted in many similar forms in the major Arizona Yaqui settlements. This pattern of revival was exemplified at Pascua Village (Spicer 1940).

A first essential was an open-front building with an altar where sacred images could be placed, space for worshippers in front of the altar, and unobstructed passage for groups of dancers from the outside to the interior--in short a church on the plan of those on the Yaqui River. The churches were, however, much smaller and were constructed in part of cast-off materials, such as railroad tie^s for the walls and in part sun-dried adobes made by the Yaquis.

A church was built at each location by the early 1920s. The necessary organization for the Easter ceremony was then instituted; this consisted of a "church group" and three ceremonial sodalities for men. The church group was composed primarily of the lay readers (maestros) and singers (kopariam). The three ceremonial sodalities

and some articles published by Community Analysis workers in professional journals. Nothing is offered in support of the series of strange adjectives by which he characterizes all of the publications. His previous comments in his ~~testimony~~ testimony, as I have pointed out, provide no basis for accepting Dr. Suzuki as a competent and authoritative critic of the work of the Community Analysts. His criticism must therefore be regarded as an intemperate and unbalanced outburst of personal emotion.

13. John F. Embree. Finally, the statement by Embree to the FBI quoted on p. 13 of Dr. Suzuki's testimony is not a policy statement of the Community Analysis Section, as asserted by Dr. Suzuki. It is a recommendation regarding communication channels in the relocation centers. It appears to propose a type of channel different from and in addition to that provided by the Internal Security Section. Dr. Suzuki's inferences from it are not clear; he seems to wish to employ it as a confirmation of the broad charges with which he introduced his testimony, most of which have not been substantiated in the body of his document. It obviously does not confirm in any way those charges.

In summary, Dr. Suzuki's testimony brings out the fact that one Community Analyst, in addition to his proper duties as an Analyst, engaged in the gathering and reporting of information about individuals to WRA administrators and the FBI. This violated the policy of the Community Analysis Section and stood out as a different kind of activity from that of the other Community Analysts. The one Analyst, John Rademaker, who repeatedly violated CA policy in this way was employed for about a year at the beginning of the Community Analysis program and was separated from the WRA when it became apparent that he was unable to learn the prescribed role of a Community Analyst. None of the other more than 20 individuals employed by the CA section during the approximate four years of its program behaved as did Rademaker. Except for the pieces of information regarding John Rademaker, the overwhelmingly greater part of Dr. Suzuki's testimony is either irrelevant^{to} or wholly unsubstantiating of his charge on page 2 that "not a few [social scientists] gathered intelligence data and informed on inmates."

Arizona were obviously many, certainly not ^{exclusively} ~~the single one~~ of economic, ~~considerations~~ ^{necessity}. The latest mode of land tenure to develop, as at New Pascua, for example, was clearly a combination of influences from Yaqui traditional community organization, Anglo-American traditional legal requirements, and new trends in United States institutional processes.

By 1909 Yaquis had developed organized community life in both the Tucson and Phoenix areas. Thus before the attempts of the dominant society to stabilize the Yaqui settlements physically for the sake of better external control, overall organization had developed under Yaqui leadership. It had taken fifteen years more or less, against the odds of social fragmentation and the psychological effects of suppression in Sonora. Between the mid 1890s and 1909 Yaqui clusters had formed in the vicinity of Tucson in the various places mentioned. New family groupings had developed both through reunion of separated individuals and the starting of new families. Ritual kin units composed of persons in the relationships of god-parent, godchild, and co-parents, had formed; in fact the term "compadre" or, in Yaqui kompai, (co-parent), had been applied widely whether people established the relationship through formal ritual or not. Yaquis in general were calling each other "kompai" and linking themselves in terms of this form of ritual, in lieu of real, kinship. The aggregates of fragmentary kin groups and ritual kin groups had formed households at Barrio Anita, Sasco, Tierras Flojas, and elsewhere. The potential for formation of stable local groups was building.

What follows is a general statement designed to make clear what it was the Community Analysis Section did do and to assist in explaining the errors and misinterpretations so numerous in Dr. Suzuki's testimony.

Dr. Suzuki carried out his investigations in the National Archives apparently without any understanding of the nature of applied work in anthropology in general or of the purpose for which the Community Analysis Section was set up in particular. It would have been possible to gain the necessary understanding by following standard methods of anthropology, Dr. Suzuki's profession. He could have interviewed living government administrators who participated in or were familiar with the WRA program, Community Analysts, and persons of Japanese ancestry and thus obtained some perspective for interpreting the bits of information that he dug out of the National Archives. Dr. Suzuki apparently, insofar as his statements tell ~~xxx~~ us, did not proceed in this way, and hence much error and misunderstanding appears in what he has published and what he presented to the Commission.

The Community Analysis Section was established, as was the Bureau of Sociological Research before it, to assist in the problems of administering the relocation centers, in the interests of both administrators and evacuees. It was not established for the purpose of carrying on traditional anthropological research in isolation from administrative problems, but rather for finding ways in which anthropological and sociological techniques and concepts might be utilized for bringing about mutual understanding between administrators and administered people and thus promote mutually satisfactory working relationships. The method required the observation and interview of both administrators and evacuees in their day-to-day ~~any~~ interactions, the analysis of the information on social relations thus gathered, and the making of recommendations designed to bring about and maintain good administration. The data with which Analysts worked was derived from individuals, but the method required that that information be re-worked and presented as general conclusions usable in understanding the factors involved in the administrative problems. The Community Analysis Section ~~section~~ insisted that reports not mention individual names and that specific individuals not be identifiable as a result of reading the Community Analysis reports.


under fire from non-Yaquis as an "anomalous" institution, as the River Towns had been in the 1880s by the Sonorans. Thus after three-quarters of a century in the United States most Yaquis lived under unstable conditions of land tenure.

There were similarities in the land history of the Yaquis of the Phoenix-Tempe area (Spicer 1936-7:field notes; Jones 1963:5-9; Nichols 1961:3-4). The first settlement about 1906 was encouraged by the Salt River Valley Water Users Association in efforts to increase the labor supply for the large new agricultural enterprises being developed in the Salt River region. In 1910 Yaquis were encouraged to settle on unused land bordering some of these developments and were allowed to squat there for five or six years. Their numbers steadily increased. Yaquis were expected to pay for the land individually, but the payments were not met; 40 acres were placed in trust in 1910 under the authority of a Superior Court judge. Yaquis continued to live on the land and increased in numbers, but at the same time non-Yaquis, mostly persons of Mexican descent also settled there, so that it became a mixed Yaqui-Mexican American settlement. The Catholic Church acquired a part of the land; Yaquis built a church. During the next 60 years, however, the ownership of the 40 acres⁵ remained in legal contention, as did the trust status of the land. The settlement was called Guadalupe and in the 1930s had a population of more than 500 Yaquis.

Beginning in the 1920s the Salt River Valley Water Users Association established on their land a second location for Yaquis a few miles west of Scottsdale. This was a settlement of nearly a thousand agricultural workers during the 1930s and 1940s. In 1944,

Some 20 individuals worked as Community Analysts during ~~the~~ much of the approximate four years of the WRA's existence. Most of the time there was one Analyst in each of the relocation centers and in what became the segregation center. They ~~worked~~ in the way that has been described. Three or four Analysts also worked in the Washington office coordinating the results of the center Analysts activities and, like the latter, preparing reports dealing with aspects of the administrative problems that arose. In the published final report of the Community Analysis Section, Impounded People, are listed more than 100 mimeographed reports which provide a summary of the work accomplished by the Analysts. An adequate and balanced view of the work of Community Analysts could be prepared from that material, which is available in the National Archives and elsewhere.

A careful survey leading to a complete view of the work of the social scientists has not been presented by Dr. Suzuki either in his testimony before the Commission or in his published article in Dialectical Anthropology. Instead, through listing activities of several Analysts which for the most part he misunderstands and through misstatement and exaggeration, his testimony conveys a false impression. It is to be hoped that the Commission will seek other sources in its highly commendable efforts to make clear the conditions under which Japanese Americans were forced to live in the relocation centers.



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November 14, 1981

Question 4. As anticipated by results of the previous two questions, this tabulation yields data confirming the strong maintenance of Lakota at Spring Creek and the reduction in the use of Lakota at Antelope. Spring Creek's homogeneity with regard to the respondent's first language is impressive: all claimed native knowledge of Lakota, while only half claimed this at Antelope.

Recognizing that Spring Creek is a community of native speakers has implications for all concerns; it is an indicator of what kinds of values and priorities still exist there. Furthermore, it cannot be maintained that the language is in any danger of being lost or replaced by English. It cannot be assumed that native speakers would adopt English in their homes, (as is assumed by Public school curriculum) and teach their children English as a native language.

Question 5. This question was designed to indicate whether teaching English was one of the school's concerns or whether respondents were being exposed to a sufficient amount of English in the home so that English was a medium for instruction rather than a subject of it. Also, this would allow comparisons to be made between the numbers of people who learned English at home or school and the corresponding statistics regarding where their children learned English. Thus trends could be studied regarding the prevalence of English home instruction.

COMMENTS ON THE TESTIMONY OF DR. PETER T. SUZUKI
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, 8/23/81

By Edward H. Spicer

These comments will be confined to the statements of Dr. Suzuki concerning the activities of individuals who worked in the Community Analysis Section of the WRA, the Bureau of Sociological Research, and the Community Management Division of the WRA. They will not deal with those employed by the Evacuation and Resettlement Study directed by Dr. Dorothy S. Thomas; I had no working relations with those individuals and hence will not presume to comment on their activities.

1. G. Gordon Brown did not ~~in fact~~ gather intelligence data on evacuees at the Gila Relocation Center. Dr. Suzuki does not say that he did, although his statement that "not a few" social scientists did gather such data immediately precedes his consideration of Dr. Brown's activities and therefore opens up Brown's work to that implication. As Suzuki writes, Dr. Brown did assist administrators in the WRA during the segregation program. He checked the accuracy of lists of names of persons for removal to Tule Lake Segregation Center and served on the review committee which judged cases for removal. The Community Analysts had as part of their duties the advising of administrators to facilitate the carrying out of the latter's ~~administrative~~ responsibilities. These activities of Dr. Brown could have violated the Community Analysis Section's policy of ~~not permitting analysts to~~ not permitting analysts to serve in the role of administrators, but no evidence is presented by Suzuki that Dr. Brown's activities did violate that rule. In any case Dr. Suzuki's charge here ~~is irrelevant to the issue~~ is irrelevant to the issue of performance of intelligence work. No evidence is presented that intelligence data were ~~involved~~ gathered.

2. John de Young transmitted in a report to Spicer, which was then transmitted to Dr. Provinse of the Community Management Division, a petition to the Spanish consul signed by evacuees of the Minidoka Relocation Center. The petition, with the names of its signers, was a document known to administrators in Minidoka and to administrators in

the Washington office. Dr. Provinse had access to it through a variety of sources within the WRA. The names had not been gathered as Community Analysis material derived from the ~~intellig~~ research of the Community Analysis Section in Minidoka. DeYoung was not therefore guilty of making use of individual names in reports to administrators, names which administrators would not know about other than through Community Analysis fieldwork. DeYoung, in short, did not carry out intelligence work, nor did he violate Community Analysis policy in transmitting the document which was common knowledge within WRA.

3. The charge against Hansen is not fully intelligible. If it is that he acquainted himself with administrative activities in the operation of the camp, then it should be said that he was fulfilling his duties as a Community Analyst and very properly at that. There is also a statement about "going over" to the evacuees. What is meant by this as Suzuki sees it? From my own standpoint as one who worked very closely with Hansen through his period of work for WRA, I should say that it is an indication that Hansen made an effort not to become too completely biased in favor of the evacuee point of view (a tendency which he often felt was strong in him). He sought to balance his understanding of the relocation situation by maintaining close contacts with both evacuees and administrators. This was of course the ideal way of working from the point of view of Community Analysis policy. Similarly Gordon Brown reported that he was clearing his reports with the local project director before transmitting them to Washington, thus making sure that they took the administrators' point of view into consideration and also at the same time complying with Community Analysis policy. Thus obviously Suzuki's comments on these two analysts have nothing to do with intelligence work. They merely shed ~~xxxxxxx~~ light on how Analysts sought to avoid the two major sorts of bias to which their work was liable --- that of the administrators' and the evacuees' viewpoints.

4. Hoebel cannot be accused of submitting names of evacuees, resulting from his research, to administrators. On the contrary, he was supplied with names and addresses of evacuees by the administrators. What he did was to use administrative information to prepare a distribution map, which ~~of course~~ was the kind of study which ~~ignored~~ supplanted information about individuals with an overall

view of distribution~~xxx~~ in relation to other aspects of camp life, as ^{It was carried out} an attempt, probably, at understanding factors in the behavior of a category of individuals in the camp. However, Suzuki does not tell us in what form Hoebel's report was presented nor for what purposes it was used. Hence I feel safe in saying that the testimony on Hoebel does not indicate ^{an} intelligence type of work, since the Analysts worked from data ^{on} individuals (already in the hands of the administration to some kind of general interpretation of the patterns of behavior, a type of activity quite consistent with Community Analysis assignments.

5. The statement that LaBarre worked together with the Project Attorney ~~xxxxxxx~~ regarding individuals suggests that LaBarre assisted in working out legal problems faced by evacuees. The Attorneys on the ~~xxxxxxx~~ centers worked chiefly to provide legal aid to evacuees, who of course had many and difficult legal problems, usually concerning property ^{they owned} matters in the evacuated zone. Apparently, insofar as one ^{can} tell from what is presented, the Analysts in this case advised the Attorney on legal problems presented to the Attorney by individual evacuees. There was no question here of the Analyst providing individual names for any purpose to any administrator. The map which LaBarre made of the Topaz evacuee community is not described fully beyond pointing out that LaBarre took the information on individuals in the administrators files and plotted it on a map. For what purpose? How ^{was it} used? This again does not provide evidence that LaBarre supplied information on individuals which the administration did not already have, except to show the ~~xxx~~ spatial relationships of one type of information to other types.

6. Alexander Leighton did not work for the Community Analysis Section, ^{but for the Bureau of Sociological Research} Suzuki states that he advocated "the policy of segregation," presumably advising administration to set up a special camp for what Suzuki calls "dissidents." I do not recall the circumstances of the advocacy, but it should be recognized that advice on policy and program to the administration was well recognized in both the Bureau and the CA Section as part of the role of the research workers. Why does Suzuki point this out in connection with Leighton? There seems to be implicit in Suzuki's statement a disapproval of the segregation policy. What does that have to do with his "charges"? I do not think that his implied opinion about the policy is worthy of consideration by the

Commission without a reasoned analysis of the policy, which Suzuki does not present. Even if there were such a policy analysis it would have no relevance to Suzuki's attempt to demonstrate the ^{carrying on} ~~existence~~ of intelligence work by social scientists in the WKA. With regard to Suzuki's statement about Leighton's rousing of suspicion among both evacuees and administration by walking ^{about} in the Poston camp in his "naval officer's uniform," in the first place Suzuki is wrong on a detail. Leighton wore only collar ornaments of his rank, not a uniform. This is unimportant, but secondly, would it not have aroused much more suspicion if Leighton had tried to hide the fact that he was indeed a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy. It is important to note that Leighton's collar ornaments did not interfere with his carrying on the kind of research into administration-evacuee relationships in the Poston center which he set out to do.

The open identification of himself as a naval officer would not have been competitive with intelligence work.

7. The statement that McVoy's interviews were "for intelligence - gathering purposes" is not backed up. How McVoy's interviews were used, how his reports were made, whether they included the names of individuals --- these matters would have to be included by Suzuki if we are to accept his blanket statement about intelligence-gathering. I think it is possible that McVoy did supply information on individuals because as I recall he did not at first fully understand the Community Analysis Section policy. However, the second statement about McVoy by Suzuki indicates that McVoy did understand CA policy, at least to a certain point. In Suzuki's quote McVoy asserts that his statements must be "in anonymous form", that is, the statements about administrative personnel. He, however, is not consistent and thus seems to indicate that he does ^{not} fully understand CA policy. I believe that McVoy may be legitimately charged with violating CA policy with regard to reporting on individuals, but the case is not made clearly ^{or} definitely in this regard by Suzuki. Suzuki must gather ~~kn~~ better information than his inference about the removal of the Buddhist minister from Jerome after McVoy made some interviews. I should say that the case by Suzuki here remains open.

8. John Provinse was Chief of the Division of ~~the~~ Community Management. He had full responsibility for the operation of Hospitals, Schools, Recreation, Internal Security (which was essentially the Police Force in the centers which maintained law and order and other policing functions). Provinse was a full-fledged administrator, not a Community Analyst, but the CA section was under his administration.

The memorandum ~~by~~ ^{by} Provinse to FBI Director Hoover was written in connection with Provinse's administrative responsibilities for leave clearance for evacuees. This was a program to make it possible for evacuees to leave the relocation centers rather than to remain incarcerated in the ~~centers~~. Again I wonder what Suzuki is criticizing here. If he simply believes that the relocation program of the WRA was a bad program, then he ought to make clear what his criticism of it is, ~~and~~ bring into the open ~~what~~ the basis of his opinion, ~~is~~ and why he believes that there were other and better alternatives. It is clear that nothing is presented by Suzuki regarding intelligence work by Community Analysts in this section of his testimony ~~regard-~~ concerned with John Provinse.

9. Dr. Suzuki presents four fairly clear cases in which John Rademaker participated in activities which might be called intelligence work concerning evacuees, that is, communicating the names of individuals to the WRA administration and the FBI ~~ixxxix~~ for the purpose of having action taken against the individuals. He also violated Community Analysis policy in communicating the names of individual WRA staff to the Washington office of the CA section together with reports on their attitudes and behavior. It is clear from Rademaker's letter of October 1943 quoted by Suzuki that he was unable to understand that his assignment as Community Analyst did not include the reporting of individual names and their behavior. This is indicative of Rademaker's behavior throughout his service as Community Analyst. It was never possible to get Rademaker to understand the nature of Community Analysis work, although the effort was made by Embree when he was first hired and by Spicer during following months. It was with relief that he was finally let go after about ²/₁ year's employment. Suzuki's inference on page 10 of his testimony that Spicer encouraged Rademaker is entirely wrong and evidence for such encouragement is not to be found in the letter quoted.

10. Dr. Suzuki says that Edward H. Spicer "suppressed" two reports on the Assembly Centers. This is his interpretation of the following events ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ referred to in material Suzuki found in the National Archives. Anne Freed of the Community Analysis Section made a study of the conditions in the Assembly Centers. Her reports contained information which indicated that living conditions for the evacuees

It should be said that Rademakers activities were inspired by a very strong identification by him with the best interests of a segment of the Nisei population, namely those who actively expressed their loyalty to the U.S.

were in some instances very bad, as in connection with the conversion of stables at Santa Anita Racetrack to temporary quarters for ^{evacuees} ~~people~~. The Assembly Centers were managed by the Army, that is, the Western Defense Command. The decision regarding Freed's reports was whether to circulate them in mimeographed form within the WRA ^{and other government agencies} or to file them without circulating. Spicer ~~XXXXXXXX~~ expressed ~~XXXXXXXX~~ the opinion that they ought not to be circulated. His reasoning was that good relations ~~with~~ ^{between WRA and} the Department of the Army were important to maintain at that time, because the WRA was working closely with the Army in the latter's efforts ~~XXXXXXXX~~ to erase the bad effects of the evacuation episode on U. S. public opinion. The Army was instituting favorable publicity on behalf of the Nisei and the WRA was actively supporting the Army in this campaign. Spicer reasoned that ~~XXXXXXXX~~ ~~my~~ publicity for the Army's ~~XXXX~~ ^{questionable} management of the Assembly Centers promulgated by the WRA ^{at this time} might interfere with the efforts to restore the Nisei's good name in U. S. opinion. Hence he decided to file rather than circulate the reports.

The other instance of what Suzuki calls "suppression" was the following. Spicer expressed an opinion to Provinse that publicity regarding the high percentage of ~~NXXXX~~ Japanese Americans in the ~~HXXXX~~ Honolulu police force might backfire. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ My reasoning, as I recall now, was that with much misinformation about the role of Japanese Americans in the attack on Pearl Harbor still circulating in the United States, the fact that many police in Honolulu ^{were} of Japanese ancestry could be interpreted by the public as a contributing factor in the attack. I so advised my superior, John Provinse, and he decided, I believe, not to encourage the circulation of the information by the WRA. This was not information ~~XXXX~~ to which only the WRA had access.

What the circumstances of the transmission of names of two ~~residents~~ residents of Topaz Relocation Center to ~~an~~ "an official at Tule Lake" were I do not recall. It sounds, as reported by Dr. Suzuki, as if it may have been a violation of Community Analysis policy.

I will not comment on Suzuki's testimony regarding the activities of Rosalie Hanke at Tule Lake. She was not connected with the WRA and can herself make adequate comment on Dr. Suzuki's testimony.

On page 12 of Dr. Suzuki's testimony it is important to note that he characterizes two publications, one by ^{scriptor of} the Bureau of Soci-

logical Research (The Governing of ~~Immigrants~~ Men) and the other by members of the Community Analysis Section (Impounded People), along with articles in professional journals, in sweeping terms, using a series of invidious ~~terms~~ adjectives which demonstrate an unbalanced judgment and suggest that Dr. Suzuki allowed himself in this characterization ^{to go on} an emotional spree. He has presented nothing in his testimony that would allow us to honor his opinions about these publications, as competent and authoritative. Moreover, in the article by Dr. Suzuki published in Dialectical Anthropology and referred to in his testimony, there is much evidence that he either failed to read or completely misinterpreted reports and articles ~~written~~ written by Community Analysts which he cited. His intemperate and sweeping criticisms of the publications mentioned ^{ought} ~~must~~ therefore ^{to} be ^{exposed} ~~opposed~~ as a reasonable part of the record.

Finally, the statement by John Embree to the FBI on page 13 of Dr. Suzuki's testimony is not a policy statement of the Community Analysis Section. It is a recommendation regarding communication channels in the Relocation Centers and appears to ~~propose~~ ^a ~~different~~ ^{different and in addition to} kind of channel from that provided by the Internal Security Section. Dr. Suzuki's inferences from it are not clear, although he seems to wish to employ it as a confirmation of the broad charges with which he introduced his testimony, most of which have not been ~~substantiated~~ substantiated in the body of his document.

What does emerge from Dr. Suzuki's testimony is the following:

1. One (out of more than 20 Community Analysts) engaged in a number of instances of reporting the names of individual ~~names~~ evacuees to administrators, thereby violating the policy of the Community Analysis Section. This analyst served for ^a little more than a year and left the WRA's employ in the summer of 1944. ~~He~~ Dr. Suzuki's report does not describe the circumstances, but the analyst in question was regarded as rendering unsatisfactory service by the heads of the Community Analysis Section and was ^{relieved} ~~re~~ased with great relief, because the Section head had become convinced that he would never be able to learn the ~~requirements~~ requirements of Community Analysis reporting, namely, as description and analysis of relocation center conditions without the implication of individuals.

2. Two other analysts are reported as having engaged in one instance

each of violations ^{of} Community Analysis policy by reporting the names of individuals to administrators in the course of their activities. In neither instance is it specifically shown that these apparent violations led to action against the individuals concerned. In the case of McVoy only inference connects McVoy's reporting with the removal of a Buddhist minister from the Jerome center. In the case of Spicer no inferences are made and nothing is ~~presented~~ ^{presented} concerning the use of the information.

This analysis of Dr. Suzuki's testimony ~~indicates~~ demonstrates that his introductory statement to the effect that "Not a few [Community Analysts] gathered intelligence data and informed on inmates" is wildly exaggerated and does not conform with the facts. On examination all of his charges, except those applying to John Rademaker, evaporate into nothing of significance. They are based on ignorance and unsupported inference and cannot be taken seriously. The charges concerning John Rademaker add up to the fact that this Analyst did operate as though he had administrative responsibility for aspects of the ~~segregation~~ segregation and, perhaps, of the relocation programs. He did not limit his activities to the kind assigned and approved by the Community Analysis Section. I think that perhaps the Section was greatly at fault in allowing him to continue as long as he did in the Analyst's position when he was not fulfilling the proper role. What the circumstances ~~of~~ surrounding the Section's long-drawn-out dissatisfaction with John Rademaker were I do not recall. What I do recall is that satisfaction engendered by his separation from the WRA, simply because of his inability to learn and accept the Analyst's role. This should not be taken as any reflection on Rademaker's integrity as a man. He was deeply sympathetic with the evacuees in their suffering. He allowed his sympathies to interfere with the objective role demanded of him as a Community Analyst. What he did was directed toward helping Nisei to overcome the stigma they had suffered by evacuation in the eyes of the U.S. public.

1. CA made studies of "restraint"
Did not justify relocation
2. Pademassee tells what R's -
location is
person's psychological
3. Spicer opposed of R's
evangelization
4. McFarling illustrates CA
work at its desirable
5. names of Council petitioners
well-known. Proceeding of
info. by CA, what was it?
728
6. Satisfaction in #'s relocated?
7. Relocation misunderstood
8. Intelligence - Mcboy Pademassee
Spicer - 2 names at Yale hall
9. Labelling as ill
10. Failed to do Kinsley + Langens

La Prere — 44
Hoebel — 3 mos. } out
Pademakie — 1 yr } of
Spicer } 22

wax
Spencer

by EHS

Professor Suzuki makes five kinds of charges against the Community Analysts insofar as I can make out. These are (1) that they acted in the capacity of administrators with responsibility for implementing the Relocation program, (2) that they worked as intelligence officers gathering information on individuals and feeding it to administrators, (3) that they failed to predict significant events in the relocation centers, (4) that they did not produce ethnographic reports describing Japanese American culture patterns, and (5) that they failed to ~~produce~~ make contributions to anthropological theory. As nearly as I can make out from what is a chaotic organization of his materials, these are the major concerns which Professor Suzuki expresses in criticizing the Community Analysts and their work. We shall consider each of these in detail.

In dealing with these "charges" I shall ignore the inability of Dr. Suzuki to comprehend the nature of the jobs which the Community Analysts were attempting to perform and also his very narrow understanding of what constitutes anthropology. Both of these weaknesses lead to confusion and misrepresentation throughout Dr. Suzuki's article; these aspects of what he has written must be set aside here in an effort to introduce some clarity into his position by considering only his most specific statements.

Community Analysts and the WRA Relocation Program. Professor Suzuki seems to say that certain Analysts participated as administrators rather than ~~as~~ in the role of Community Analyst in the Relocation program. He charges three Analysts with this kind of behavior: John Rademaker, Edgar McVoy, and E. Adamson Hoebel. I find it very difficult to accept the charge in the case of any of these that they stepped out of the role of Community Analyst. Rademaker prepared a "Syllabus" for the use of WRA ~~adminsitrators~~ administrators in their efforts to persuade evacuees to relocate. This is quite consistent with the job descriptions for analysts, namely, advising administrators in order to assist them in carrying out their duties. The syllabus contained suggestions derived from Rademaker's analysis of evacuee attitudes and reactions to the relocation program. The suggestions were designed to give administrators a better grasp of the avcuee points of view. This sort of material was exactly what Analysts were supposed to do according to their job descriptions.

Edgar McVoy is cited by Suzuki as having made a recommendation

used in the Merck Manual (1966).

Table 6 presents an analysis of reported health problems in decreasing order of their frequency.

TABLE 6: Partial Listing of Health Problems by Race

	Black	White	Total
Arthritis	25	24	49
Hypertension	25	15	40
Other heart problems	9	15	24
Diabetic	8	5	13
Emphysema	-	3	3
Asthma	1	6	7
Allergy&Resp. symptoms	1	2	3
Eye Problems	6	13	19
Ear Problems	1	6	6
Gastrointestinal	6	10	16
Genitourinary	5	4	9

In general, the higher rates of hypertensive heart disease and of diabetes for Black women is consistent with known differences between the races. Arthritis is generally reported to be lower in Black groups than in White (Jackson 1971); in this sample the rates are virtually the same. Rates for respiratory disease including emphysema, asthma and allergy seem rather lower than one would expect in Tucson -- people frequently migrate to the southwest for these problems. Three women were legally blind but only one was completely without vision.

to the CA Washington Office that evacuees who refused to take jobs offered on relocation be refused jobs within the centers. This recommendation was wholly against WRA policy. It was what WRA called "forced relocation," a policy which was interdicted as indicated at the Minidoka Relocation Center where the project director tried forms of forced relocation and was stopped from doing so, as reported by among others Suzuki. McVoy's recommendation was not acted on. It indicates both that McVoy at the time he made it was not yet familiar with WRA policy and also that he was somewhat emotionally involved in this issue to the point of being frustrated by the pure persuasion policy of the WRA.

E. Adamson Hoebel is reported by Suzuki as working in his off-hours to give pep talks to evacuees to stimulate them to leave the centers. The giving of such pep talks was not looked at favorably by the CA section as part of the Analysts' job. Other analysts were not reported as having behaved in this way.

Besides holding up these three analysts for criticism for specific activities which turn out to be of little importance, Suzuki also ~~is~~ makes general criticism of the CA section for its role in connection with relocation. This is not always easy to follow, because Suzuki's tendency to confuse ~~the~~ ~~analysts~~ ~~issue~~ by unsupported contentions makes it difficult to pin him down. In general he seems to say ~~that~~ two things that (1) Analysts were very ~~in~~ ~~favor~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ ~~relocation~~ ~~program~~ and urged evacuees to relocate and (2) Analysts never gained any understanding about evacuees' attitudes and viewpoints about relocation. Regarding the first point, it is quite true that John Embree, first head of the CA, was very strongly in favor of the relocation program, ~~and~~ ~~was~~ ~~an~~ ~~advocate~~ ~~for~~ ~~it~~, and instructed the analysts he hired to push it among evacuees. It is not on record that he advocated "forced relocation" in any way. He merely joined with the Washington WRA staff in ~~the~~ ~~advocating~~ ~~it~~ through persuasive methods. We have seen that two other analysts shared this active approach, and that these three men had all left the WRA by the summer of 1944, Embree leaving by August 1943. The other more than 20 analysts did not take ~~any~~ ~~active~~ ~~roles~~ in anything other than reporting evacuee attitudes. Spicer who succeeded Embree as head of the CA was sceptical of the program having spent his first year in the centers at close

spokes of her father's delivery wagon when she was five. She had undergone three subsequent operations on the kitchen table that year, once without chloroform, she told me. She still keeps her entire collection of outgrown legs, lovingly describing her childhood leg, made of wood and red leather, her adolescent ^{with} leg/which she was "in love" , and the best, most practical leg which she has had now for nearly twenty years. This is a pylon, a "peg-leg" which has the advantage, she explained, of having no foot to catch in chair rungs and in carpets. Now 72, she does maintenance on her home, climbing a ladder to fix wires on the roof, painting indoor and outdoor walls and maintaining a large garden. Two women reported no illness or chronic condition at the time of interview, nor could they recall any disability in the past two years - - an unusual and refreshing finding in view of the typical length of time needed for this section. One of these had seen a doctor only once in her life, she told me -- at the time of a gall bladder attack which spontaneously subsided.

Reported Health Problems

Each respondent was asked to describe current health problems. Information was solicited about chronic illness, as well as acute conditions and any surgery during the past two years. When chronic ailments such as "heart condition" or diabetes mellitus were reported, information was taken as to whether medication was being used. There were six variables used in the health section of the interview and a good deal of information was offered. Illnesses were classified according to the system

range with evacuee problems and viewpoints. He advocated studying the situation and it is important to note that the only supposed cases reported by Suzuki are all in the period before the summer of 1944, that is, cases of Analysts taking part in ^{only} persuasive measures. Of the more than 20 analysts then there appears to be none who took an active role similar to that of an administrator and he did it "after hours." The Analysts it may be said did not participate in the relocation program except as reporters to the administration as to how it was working and why it was failing or succeeding, the ideal role of the analyst.

The other general criticism by Suzuki is to the effect that the analysts did not learn despite all their reports on the subject how complex the evacuee attitudes and behavior were regarding the relocation program. Suzuki is simply totally wrong in this matter. The simplest, shortest, and most available refutation of his general and irresponsible statement on this theme is to be found in Spicer's article in the Casebook, which goes in some detail into all the complexities of the matter. This statement is based on the considerable store of information that analysts gathered during the whole period of the WRA. This article is quoted by title, by the way, by Suzuki, but it is quite clear that he did not read it or he could never have made the ^{untrue} summary statement which he makes on page 29 of his article. This article is entitled "Resistance to Freedom," a title full of an irony which entirely escapes Suzuki's sensibilities (assuming that he ever read the article).

It must be said that Suzuki appears in his discussion of relocation to regard the analysts' extensive activity in studying evacuee attitudes about relocation as somehow reprehensible. He seems to imply this and also that regarding relocation as a desirable thing was somehow a bad thing to do. Does Mr. Suzuki believe that the relocation was a bad thing, in other words, that WRA policy in this respect was evil. If that is his belief he should somewhere explain why he believes this. This would involve him in policy analysis, but nowhere ~~he~~ does he make such an analysis. To imply that analysts were reprehensible for believing the policy to be good needs to be justified by showing that the policy was bad. For my own part, I believed that it was a good thing to make sure that the relocation centers were kept open for those evacuees, like Professor

It is a fact that the boarding school education and experience of the early 1900's has had tremendous negative implications for parental philosophies concerning children's education. For the most part, two simultaneous but conflicting attitudes are prevalent in the minds of most Indian parents and grandparents at Rosebud: first, in conjunction with a traditionally Indian style of life, formal education lacks the high priority that other activities have in a highly traditional Indian style of life; and antithetically, there is a prevalent attitude that good, thorough formal schooling is the key to a better life economically, socially, and financially. These two opposing philosophies wreak havoc on school age children. The convergence of these coexistent attitudes can be demonstrated by the following incident:

A teen-age boy who was playing hooky from school was "found out" by his mother who went to school to ask that he be excused for the day so that he might come with her to their land in the country and assist in the care of the horses and livestock. The discovery of the boy's absence infuriated her because she wanted him to be in school and to feel responsible in his attitude toward attendance. But clearly, her need and willingness to remove him from his school work to assist with the chores reflect the secondary place that formal school does--and must--have.

This example characterizes the general attitude among Rosebud residents that school is a resource, not a way of life.

School is viewed as a means to improve one's lot, to "pick up some education and get a better job"; or a practical approach is adopted: "take a class and learn a skill". Seldom is the

11. Obviously Suzuki is wrong in saying that Spicer encouraged intelligence work. The letter does not say so. And I am well aware that I did not and that I regarded it as paramount that CA not carry on such work. The letter says nothing of the kind. Spicer is accused of "suppressing" reports. The reports dealing with the Assembly centers were discussed with Provinse and decided not to circulate them among WRA personnel. As I recall the reason for filing rather than circulating them was that they described very bad conditions in assembly centers for which the ~~AR~~ the Army had responsibility. At the time ~~xxxx~~ the WRA was trying hard to cooperate with the Army in the efforts to help the Nisei regain their reputation as loyal Americans, including the post-registration efforts involving the Tailgunner etc. It appeared to me, as I recall, that giving publicity to these reports might antagonize some in the Department of the Army, especially the West Coast Defense Command. The reports were filed rather than circulated. This matter has nothing to do with intelligence work, as implied in Suzuki's opening sentence in that paragraph on p. 0 of his testimony. The other matter called suppression by Suzuki is that of the composition of the police force in Hawaii. I thought that a statement that the police force was heavily Nisei would work against Nisei in the U. S. and Hawaii at that time in early October 1943 when as a result of evacuation Nisei were still suspect. I suggested ~~not~~ that it would not help either group because it might be likely that they would be blamed for what happened at Pearl Harbor, as they already had been barricades etc. Apparently Provinse agreed with me and we did help publicize the matter. This has nothing to do with informing or intelligence work. It was the expression of an opinion that may or may not have been wrong. It should be noted that "suppression" is hardly the word to be used. ~~Spixxxx~~Suzuki's statement about Spicer's passing on the names of 2 persons from Tipaz to an administrator at Tule Lake I will assume to be correct. If so, it would have been against our policy. I would like to know both what was done about the two persons and the other circumstances surrounding the instance before I could accept Suzuki's opinion that this was an instance of intelligence or informing.

respondents--those from Spring Creek. A direct positive correlation exists between reduced native language fluency and conscious desire to learn the language. Since Antelope has fewer "speakers", there is a heightened interest in and stress placed upon learning it. At Spring Creek the concern is unnecessary and is therefore nearly absent.

Few individuals could be said to object to their children learning Lakota. One atypical informant stated that she wished her children to be as removed as possible from "things Indian" and that association with Indian events, activities and traditions was useless and abhorrent. Most informants believed to the contrary, that children should be taught their history and culture, should develop pride in their identities, and should be educated with regard to their backgrounds. Learning the language was seen as a prerequisite to this.

Many parents expressed regret that they had not taught their children Lakota. One informant stated: "I didn't want my kids to speak broken English so I decided not to teach them Indian. Now I wish I had." Many young informants (and children) expressed their strong desire to learn it. General consciousness of ethnicity along with increasing political involvement seems to be pushing individuals closer to a realization of their ethnicity. It would seem that at the core of this renaissance there

Community Analysts and Intelligence Work.

The following is a summary of the work of community analysts in intelligence work. The work of community analysts is to identify and analyze the social structure of a community, and to use this information to identify and analyze the behavior of individuals within the community. This work is done in a variety of ways, including interviews, observations, and the use of social network analysis. The work of community analysts is an important part of intelligence work, and it is essential for the identification and analysis of threats to national security.

Health is central to one's well being at any age. In older persons it increases in importance as recuperative reserves are diminished. There is a transition throughout the life cycle in the kinds of conditions which are most troublesome. In childhood and early adulthood, acute illness: infectious disease and accidents are the most disabling. These are the diseases which have been most successfully reduced by new medical preventative or curative techniques. The enormous mortality from tuberculosis, infantile diarrhea and gastroenteritis, smallpox, measles and other acute conditions has been dramatically reduced in industrialized countries within this century. In middle adulthood, many deaths are attributable to accidents, suicides and homicides. In later years, chronic and often progressive diseases are the most troublesome (Atchley 1977, Hendricks 1977). The most frequent causes of death in the 65 and older group are heart disease, cancers and cerebrovascular diseases (National Center for Health Statistics 1971). Chronic disease in itself may not be particularly troublesome. Although 85% of all Americans have at least one chronic condition over the age of 65, only half of these experience limitation from the condition (U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972). Chronic conditions which do limit activity for persons over 65 in decreasing order of importance are: heart conditions, arthritis and rheumatism, visual impairment and hypertension without heart involvement (Atchley 1977:108).

Cultural differences play a part in what constitutes disease, and the importance of pain. Antonovsky (1972, 1973) ^{for example, in} / ^{comparing} Arab and Israeli patients, ^{finds} that the former are most concerned with

Suzuki's family, who wished to resettle. I also believed that the WRA policy makers were overoptimistic about the degree to which evacuees would accept relocation, because it was very apparent from the first that relocation was not seen as "freedom" by most evacuees and that the problems of adjustment on the outside were insurmountable for very many families. It was also apparent that there were many who accepted the idea that they were entitled, as a result of having been forcibly moved out of their homes, to a secure place to stay for the duration of the war, namely, the relocation centers. Considerations such as these led me to be highly sceptical of the relocation program and to be, like the top staff of WRA generally, strongly opposed to any measures that would be felt as forced relocation by evacuees. My position from the beginning was that the WRA staff needed to know far more than they did about the reasons why it appeared that the great majority of evacuees would never relocate until the centers were closed.

relief of immediate pain, while the Israelis seemed most preoccupied with the underlying condition causing the pain and its significance and prognosis.

Race, too, plays a significant part in disease. In the United States Blacks are considerably more prone to hypertensive heart disease; nearly twice as many suffer from this condition as Whites, while coronary heart disease rates are higher for Whites. Black rates for diabetic conditions are higher than for Whites and self-reported nervous breakdowns are two-and-one-half times more frequently found in Blacks. Environmental stress is frequently suggested as being linked with these higher rates for Black people (Jackson 1971:169-60, Weeks and Darsky 1968).

In this study, I had the impression that the overall health for the group as a whole was rather good. Interestingly, the youngest women were also the "sickest" according to their reports and at the uppermost age ranges relatively good health was reported (see Table 7). Two women in the sample were bedridden much of the time, although each was able to get around to use bathroom facilities. A few used wheelchairs but, like Alice who went off to the senior center each day, or Mabel, who cooked for relatives and defends her home with a shotgun propped at the door, they seemed to perform a wide range of activity despite this handicap. There seemed to be an extraordinary number of women missing one or both lower limbs; in fact there were five. Only one mentioned this as a chronic problem-- she had lost one leg due to a circulatory disorder a year prior to the interview. Martha, perhaps the most colorful in this category, had lost her leg as a result of catching it in the wooden

Having responded to Dr. Suzuki's specific points, I feel that there should be on record before the Commission some statement which corrects the general confusion and misstatement in what Dr. Suzuki has presented. It is unfortunate that his research, which I am sure must have been undertaken in a spirit of fairness and honest concern for the truth, has not led ^{him to} a clear understanding of what the Community Analysis Section set out to do and what it accomplished. It is important that the Commission understand the nature of the CA activities and that they not be clouded in a mist of inference, unbridled suspicion, and innuendo.

The Community Analysis Section was established as an effort to make use of social science techniques and approaches ~~in~~ in the improvement of administration in the Relocation Centers in the interests of both the administrators and the evacuees. The aim was to carry on running studies of the problems that arose in the administration of the centers, such as, for example, the early conflicts resulting in strikes, demonstrations, and serious friction in the relations between administrators and evacuees. The method employed was to observe the behavior of both administrators and evacuees in their day-to-day interactions, to analyze the information on social relations thus gathered, and to make recommendations regarding the causes of conflict and friction. It was assumed that their ^{rc} would be misunderstandings of intentions and of attitudes on both sides, because neither the evacuees nor the administrators had previous experience with one another. The Community Analysts sought to assist in the solution of problems as interpreters of one group to the other.

The objectives did not require for their fulfillment anything involving what Dr. Suzuki calls "spying" or "intelligence work." It involved learning from individuals, through observation and interview, how they acted and what attitudes they ~~expressed~~ ^{held} about current activities in the relocation centers. It involved also trying to relate attitudes and actions to previous ~~maximum~~ experiences of evacuees and administrators. The information gathered in this way did not require that the individuals from whom it was obtained be identified in the analytical reports. For example, it turned out to be a matter of great importance that Issei had never been permitted to obtain U. S. citizenship. This basic fact led to

necessarily the same. While in the previous question 60% and 25% from Antelope and 80% and 90% from Spring Creek responded that Lakota was the chosen (selected) language used in their home, this question shows that fewer respondents' parents were actually strictly monolingual Lakota speakers--50% and 15% for Antelope and 60% and 70% for Spring Creek. Here again the data shows a far more frequent use of Lakota in the home at Spring Creek than at Antelope. It is equally significant that no respondents' parents from Spring Creek spoke English in the home, indicating that all respondents must have been raised in an environment which was culturally traditional, i.e., maintaining native practices at home despite continual exposure to Euro-American technology and education.

From the remaining tables as well it can be demonstrated that far fewer people from Antelope were exposed to Lakota monolingualism than from Spring Creek. Therefore, it would be expected that the same trends would be present now: that Antelope respondents, who, as children, were raised in homes where Lakota was seldom used, would be most likely to eliminate it partially or completely in their own conjugal homes. And those from Spring Creek, would, with little change, perpetuate the traditions of their homes and maintain Lakota as the native language.

a whole series of behaviors of the Issei in the centers, such as not wanting to be in any way associated with U.S. wartime activities directly against Japan, because as citizens of Japan the Issei did not want to be active against their mother country. These attitudes and their basis in U. S. law were not understood at all in the beginning by the administrators and they had to be pointed out by Community Analysts and others who learned how they underlay much behavior which the administrators found inexplicable. In reporting on and making clear this set of attitudes and viewpoints, it was entirely unnecessary ~~and unimportant~~ to identify any particular individuals; the important point was that there were attitudes governing Issei behavior which had a reasonable basis and required to be taken into consideration in center management.

Similarly a Community Analysis report on how messhalls tended to become the focus of conflicts among evacuees ~~as~~ in the early days of the centers did not require any mention of particular chefs or other individuals in particular blocks. A report on messhalls and the attitudes centered on them was made in general terms, but with an eye to acquainting administrators with factors affecting the adjustment of evacuees in their blocks, so that action could be taken to eliminate conflict in blocks where messhall troubles arose.

The kind of work undertaken by the Community Analysts was often misunderstood by the administrators and by the evacuees at the beginning, and some of these misunderstandings persisted even to the end of the WRA program in the minds of some individuals. The accusation of spying was common, at least at the beginning, on the evacuee side. But since the Community Analysis work was carried on very much in the open, ~~this~~ the misconception about spying steadily disappeared, especially as many evacuees, both Nisei and Issei, were involved in the work itself. One of the chief difficulties was the early misunderstanding characteristic of the administrators. None had had experience with the kind of work carried on by Community Analysts. They were inclined to think that it was of no value and that the Analysts ought to be employed in administrative work directly. This the Community Analysis Section had to fight strongly at the beginning, until administrators slowly realized what the function of Community Analysis was.

However, the misunderstandings of CA work that were characteristic of especially the early months in the relocation centers are

(Ferguson 1959) has indicated that many languages consist of a formal (High/H) and informal (Low/L) style of speaking which are selected by the speaker in particular circumstances. In Barker's study, for example, High Spanish was considered the language of the Spanish Catholic church, whereas Low Spanish characterized street language. The domain or situational context determines which variety is appropriate. Lakota too has a High and a Low variety, a formal and informal speech. A problem arises, however, in studying these styles: many informants state that Lakota has changed tremendously since the coming of the White man, and that there is an "old" and a "new" way of speaking Lakota as well as a High and a Low variety. Other informants equate the High with the "old" and the Low with the "new" colloquial style. The data is inadequate to support the thesis that there is really an "old" language which is substantially different from modern Lakota. Perhaps it is a moot point. Certainly the language has changed with contact; as certain traditional elements of the culture were lost, so were their linguistic counterparts. Words for technological items, forms of social organization, many kin terms, words for details of the hunt, political structures, knowledge of the prairie, subsistence, and botanical knowledge must have been eliminated, forgotten or rendered obsolete and the lexicon strongly altered with the disappearance of many elements of

now being repeated by Dr. Suzuki. It is a weakness of his method of research that he has not sought to obtain information concerning CA from living Community Analysts or from living administrators, or even from evacuees who worked with Community Analysts or who saw them in action. His statements are singularly free from any information derived from any sources except isolated memorandums or reports in the National Archives. This leads to his making inferences that are entirely wrong, because he does not understand the context of the bits of information that he has gathered. He further makes no effort to understand and reconstruct the immediate circumstances, either within the agency or outside among the U. S. public, of the period from which his bits of information date. This is ^{a procedure} hardly worthy of ~~an~~ professional ~~behavior~~ ^{his} anthropologist. It leads to ^{his} complete misunderstanding of much of the data which he has collected.

Probably his failure to carry out any interviews with living persons who are informed about and have had experience with Community Analysis work is based on his making a fundamentally wrong assumption about CA. Apparently he ^{bases his research on the assumption} ~~assumes~~ that there was some kind of mysterious network of intelligence-gathering in which the Analysts were involved. Assuming this he probably feels that anything an Analyst might say would be coverup for that intelligence operation. Serious research, of course, requires that ^{one} ~~he~~ proceed not on only one assumption, but also on others toward which full information concerning his data points. This also leads to ^{making} ~~making~~ ~~his research on~~ inferences ^{which} proceeding from his one basic assumption. The fact that this assumption is completely wrong leads to one after another of his inferences also being wrong. Good research would lead to testing ^{the} ~~an~~ assumption that the Community Analysts were carrying on work such as I have tried to describe above.

A most important weakness in Dr. Suzuki's statements is that ~~he~~ makes no effort to examine the work of the Community Analysts as a whole. The more than 100 mimeographed reports that were circulated by the CA section prepared by the more than 20 Community Analysts receive no careful study and reporting by Suzuki. Instead he pays ^{much} attention to documenting the activities of one Analyst at one center during one year of the four year WRA program --- one analyst who unquestionably did violate the policy of the CA Section. This is typical of Dr. Suzuki's unbalanced research and reporting.

Rosebud appears to be a functionally bilingual community. Furthermore, it cannot be substantiated that the Lakota language is in danger of falling into obsolescence or that it is being replaced by the use of English. In some communities, the Lakota language is seldom heard; in others, only Lakota is heard. Due to a high degree of reservation interaction and the continuation of native activities--both sacred and secular--which require the use of Lakota, it is unlikely that Lakota will or could be replaced by English. While Indian Studies programs in many elementary schools have Lakota language classes in their curricula, it is unlikely that such instruction could return a primarily English-speaking community to a bilingual state. The conscious effort to re-learn a language which has, for the most part, been lost to a particular community, can enhance or promote bilingualism; but true bilingualism can only result from the simultaneous maintenance of two different languages.

This point will be returned to in the following chapter, after the speech style varieties and their sociolinguistic contexts have been outlined.

4.1 Varieties of Lakota

In sociolinguistic literature, the frequent reference to "High" and "Low" varieties of languages such as Spanish, German, Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, French, and many others

It is too bad that we have to spend time making replies to someone whose quality of thought and perception is so poor and limited and whose conception of the nature of anthropology is so narrow and backward. But I suppose that somewhere there ought to be on record how some community analysts regarded Suzuki's statements. What is infuriating to you, I am sure, is this fundamental lack of comprehension of what he is trying to analyze. He seems so perversely obtuse, but actually he is ignorant and quite unable to comprehend the approach of Community Analysis.

But what are his criticisms?

1. Regarding relocation. I think, although it is very difficult to be sure, that he is trying to say that community Analysts took administrative responsibility for advancing the relocation program. He quotes from Embree to the effect that Embree approved of the WRA relocation program and thought that analysts ought to assist in it. Embree was quite sold on relocation at first as a sort of solution for the dilemma of the relocation centers. I think he later saw the matter of relocation in its complexity, but he did at first take a fairly simple view of it. Suzuki presents the case against Rademaker as having assisted, or tried to, in furthering relocation at Granada. Specifically he cites Rademaker's preparation of a "Syllabus" to aid ~~xxxx~~ administrators in persuading evacuees to relocate. I see this as consistent with the Community Analysis role --- advising administrators in their efforts to further WRA policy. Suzuki correctly reports that Rademaker became increasingly emotionally involved with the WRA relocation effort, to the point where I regarded him as forsaking the Community Analyst's role for that of evangelist on behalf of relocation. Suzuki also reports on McVoy's expressed opinion that evacuees ought to be forced to relocate by denying them jobs in the centers, an opinion expressed in ~~xxxxxxx~~ recommendation to the Washington office of CA. This was contrary to WRA policy and McVoy's recommendation was not accepted. Suzuki also cites DeLong and Spicer's passing on to Provinse of a petition signed by Minidoka evacuees addressed to the Spanish Consul as somehow contrary to the proper role of Community Analysts. ~~xxxxxx~~ The point Suzuki makes here is obscure; the names on the petition were not information which any Community Analyst had gathered apart from any other part of the agency. The petition and the names on it were public knowledge, no confidentiality was being violated, and Provinse and others in WRA had the names from several other sources.

It is difficult to reply to Suzuki on every point, because to me his basic approach seems so confused. Is he criticizing CA for being concerned with how evacuees were reacting to the relocation program? One gets that impression because he mentions the large amount of reporting that they did on the subject. That was their job and they did it in such a way that they gained and passed on to WRA administrators an understanding of the meaning ~~xxxx~~ for evacuees' of relocation --- an understanding which the administrators certainly did not have at the beginning. Contrary to Suzuki's flat statements on the first paragraph on page 29, the Community Analysts understood very well after the first few months the complexities of relocation from the evacuee viewpoint. This is set forth succinctly in one statement by Spicer in the case called "Resistance to Freedom," ~~xxxxxxx~~ an article cited by Suzuki, but of which he apparently read only the title and failed even to sense the irony in that title, if he had read the article.

Some of them, in fact, were quite general. They simply went on living in the memory of their husbands. These women would almost obsessively speak of their husbands, their lives with their husbands, travels with their husbands, what John, Harry or Frank "always used to say"; what their husband's opinion was on any matter under discussion. These women never used the first person singular pronoun; events, invariably of the past, were spoken of in terms of "we". Myra continued this habit on each of three occasions when we met although Sam had been dead for now twenty years.

The third type of widow that I encountered I have called the "Recovered Widow". These ~~too~~ ^(w12) formed ~~two~~ subtypes: the "inner activity" widow/and the "outside activity" (6) widow. These women were secure in the status of widow. Their husbands had played active roles in their lives suggesting that their marriages had been relatively happy. Often had pleasant things to say about their departed spouses such as, "my husband bought this TV for me before he died in '57 and it certainly was a good choice", or "Benny was a very fine jazz musician until he died". Women who represented the first subtype, the "inner activity" widows, continued to play what must have ^{always} been a very active role in their homes. These women had children, grandchildren, nieces and nephews flocking into their homes at all hours of the day. They were among the few who would babysit for grandchildren and great-grandchildren. I visited several of these women several times and, were a relative or friend not already there when I arrived, the

What is infuriating to you, I am sure, is this fundamental lack of comprehension about what he is trying to analyze. It seems like arbitrary and determined obtusity. Actually it is ignorance and real incomprehension, inadequate preparation for the job he has undertaken.

But what has he done?

1. As I see it he has failed to understand and has distorted the CA activities regarding relocation. He reports correctly (or at least cites a memorandum that reports) that Embree urged analysts to further the relocation program and that Rademaker and Hoebel took some steps to do so, such as Rademaker's preparation of a Syllabus urging relocation. I think Embree was very much sold at the beginning ~~that~~ on relocation as the great solution to the center problem. However, Embree was out by August, 1943. Spicer and other analysts with center experience took quite a different approach. We reported attitudes and steadily became acquainted with the several avacuee viewpoints. I would say that the analysts after the fall of 1942 generally had lost the early over-simple view of relocation as a the great cure-all. Beginning in 1943 we consistently reported the complexities and analysts generally, as I knew them, became increasingly sceptical of the whole program. I think that my case in the Cornell Casebook "Resistance to Freedom" pretty well reports our ultimate understanding of the relocation situation, although Suzuki makes it appear that particular analysis is some kind of apology for the relocation policy. However, there were maybe three analysts, including Embree, who in the first months after WRA declared the policy appeared to regard their job as taking part in the administrative effort directly. That was never my view and after "ademaker left (or was fired, I don't remember which) in the spring of 1943 analysts took the role of reporting the nature of evacuee failure to accept relocation, along with some reporting of the attitudes of those who did relocate. ... I think, although its is hard to tell, that Suzuki is trying to say that CA took administrative, rather than analytical, responsibility for the relocation program.

2. Again Suzuki seems to hold that CA was responsible for the policy of segregation and that Rademaker, McVoy, and I reported on individuals during the period the program was developed. Of course, CA did not formulate the policy or program, but rather was more responsible than any other part of the WRA bureaucracy for establishing that the whole basis for classification of individuals as "loyal" and "disloyal" was specious. It was the Oplers whose work emphasized this and the work of other analysts backed this up. Again, however, I think it is clear that Rademaker got intensely involved in identification of "disloyal" evacuees; it was his involvement in this that led to Province's letting him go in the spring of 1943 (Suzuki says 1944, but I think he must be wrong in this, although he quotes letters to me from Rademaker through the fall of 1943).

p. 2. Not a few gathered intelligence data and informed on inmates

This statement is misleading. There were only a few --- 4 out of 22 --- whom Suzuki charges with what he calls informing and intelligence work. To say more than a few did what he charges is to misrepresent his case. The facts about his charges we shall consider below.

1. Brown clearly did take on functions other than the gathering of information, as a member of the review committee and maintaining accuracy in a list of sgregees. The functions involved advising the administrators on accuracy and with regard to removal to Tule Lake. ~~Both of these activities dealt with~~ Both of these activities dealt with names of specific individuals. In this sense, Brown was not behaving in accord with CA policy. However, neither activity can be derined as informing or intelligence work. It consisted of advising on errors or poor judgments by the administrators.

2. De Young and Spicer are charged with having "provided names of dissidents" to proper authorities. This activity consisted in including in a report of the CA section the petition and the names of its signers to the Spanish consul. This involved no gathering of information and reporting on individuals. The petition and the signatures were ~~not~~ not secret information and had not been discovered by de Young. The "proper authorities", in this case Proorvinse chief of the Community Managment Division, had several different surces through which they were informed about the petition and its signers. It was in fact a document of publci knowledge in the WRA and elsewhere. This activity therefore did not involve any informing or intelligence work by Community Abalyats. It simply involved passing on a document of general knowledge as part of an analytical report.

3. The "charge against Hansen iss not fully intelligible. Hansen was supposed by his job to help the Prohct Director understand the organization and sentiments in therrelocation community as an aid to intelligent and humane administration. The statement that the long-continued contacts tended to keep the Analysts from "going over " to the evancuces is not fully intelligible. From my extensive knowledge of Hansen's work, I would say that this is probably a partial quote from something that Hansen wrote and was intended to indicate that Hansen balanced his approach to his work by learning bohth the evacuee and the administrative points of view, so as not to report one-sidedly

only glosses, no referents for them. The various kinds of healers, those who use herbal or medicine cures and the spiritual healers (who do not), perform their ceremonies with intentions of seeking supernatural agents, asking their assistance, and employing their power to effect cures. The English language is irrelevant, inaccurate and possibly too dangerous to be of practical use in these circumstances. Traditional activities might only include some English when a non-Indian participates, or if a ceremony is held at the request of a non-Indian.

Traditional Giveaways and Feasts employ Lakota for similar reasons: they are Lakota events and are strictly Indian events. Most Giveaways employ English only to announce names and, generally, to talk over the loudspeaker. Again, this depends on the event, the audience and the sponsor. Some Giveaways take place with not one word of English spoken. Others rely on English to "address the crowds". Since Giveaways are serious events, they do not contain the same joyful ostentation of the Pow-wow; announcing is more informative than solicitous. Lakota is the language of these functions, intended for the Indian community and not the general public.

The Native American Church is not a so-called "traditional" religious tradition, although many informants believe it is. Its roots and origins stem from the Peyote Cult, diffusing from Mexico northward into the Southern

from only the evacuee point of view.

4. The comment on Brown's putting his reports through the project director seem to mean that he was following CA policy in making sure that the Project Directors were wfully acquainted with the CA reports and that he was not being by-passed in the communictaion lines of CA in the local level with Washington. This obviously has nothing to do with informing or intelligence in the sense that Suzuki uses those terms at the beginning of his report.

5. Hoebel asked for a list of Japanese American men who id not answer a Selective Calls, he did not supply the names. What he did was according to Suzku suply information concerning the places of residence of those on the list, as well as other information. This could well have been a violation of CA policy about information on specific personsx by name. However, it remains doubtdful since Suzuki does not tell us how the information was used, or indeed w what presicely it was other than place of residence in the camp, a kind of information wa swas available to the ~~project director~~ Relocation officer from other cources. The information he did supply was a distribution map which in sitself was not a violation of confidence orprivacy but a means for understanding the colobgy of the camp. This could have been a case of "informing" about individuals.

6. LaBarre worked with the Attorney regarding individuals at Topaz. How did he work? We are not told that he supplied the information on individuals. Did he advise the Attorney regarding the evacuee legal ptoblems and how they might be solved? Suzuki does not say. The project attorneys were swamped with requests by evacuees for aid in solving their legal problems. Possibly LaBarre was of assistance in that connection. LaBarre's block by block map was designed to show the location of certain individuals. For what purpose and how was it used? There is no evidence presented here of informing on individuals or of intelligence work. Place of residence in the camp was well known to administrators in several different divisions of the WRA. Mapping was a means of determining t he relations between lviing conditions and friendship circles to senti-ments held. Not necessarily an intelligence operation. Again however, this reports information that could have been used to the injury of individuals.

7. Leighton advocated the policy of segregation, says, Suzuki.

In Domain Group I, English has become the primary accepted and expected communication alternative, largely for practical reasons. It is inefficient to interrogate every clerk with regard to his knowledge of English. Since all clerks in business establishments speak English (whether or not they speak Lakota), it is more efficient to use English. Only at trading posts or small stores located in Indian communities is Lakota heard; in these cases, people are familiar with one another and everyone knows who speaks Lakota and who does not.

English is similarly preferred for dealing with topics of business or commercial affairs. One reason for this is the belief that many hold that employees in federal, county and tribal offices are "breeds" and cannot speak Lakota. Attempting to address them in Lakota would be futile and possibly embarrassing.

At the hospital, English is used the most unequivocally. The hospital is staffed almost entirely by non-Indians, with the exception of some technicians, practical nurses, janitors, nurse's aides, and receptionists. Once again, most employees are considered mixed-bloods who are not fluent in Lakota. Informants frequently commented that Lakota-speakers are badly needed at the hospital, to assist patients in discussing their problems, describing physical ailments and receiving instruction concerning medication.

This is not informing or intelligence activity. Leighton did not hide his official position as a Lt-Commander in the Navy, but was perfectly open about it. He did not wear a full uniform but merely the collar ornaments of his rank. He regarded this as the best way to ~~xxxxxxx~~ prevent serious suspicion arising from his being undercover about his affiliation. He was perfectly able to carry on the kind of research his job required, as demonstrated in the quality of his writings about the early phase of relocation center life.

~~xxxxxxx~~8. McVoy's interviews are asserted to have been "for intelligence purposes." How were they so used? ~~xxxxxxx~~ The names were inked out, which does not sound as if they individuals were being reported on, but rather that their viewpoints and attitudes were being reported on for better understanding rather than for action against them. Suzuki does not directly connect McVoy's interviews with the removal of a Buddhist Reverend, merely infers that there was a connection. The statement that McVoy "informed on Whites" is backed up by a memo McVoy wrote in which he says that his statements will be reported for the most part in anonymous form. This would be consistent with CA policy, and consistent with our responsibility to study the AWRA personnel attitudes and behavior as well as the evacuee. To call this informing is misleading and untrue. McVoy seems possibly to be reported as having an inconsistent attitude in saying that he will give apparently names in Flagrant cases of whites where the operation is jeopardized.

9. The statements about Provinse cannot be regarded as concerning CA. Provinse was head of City Mgmt and as such had responsibility for Internal Security (Camp Police), Schools, Recreation etc. He was a responsible administrator not a City Analyst. His relations with the FBI were in connection with his responsibility for Internal Security in the centers, not with CA.

10. Rademaker involved himself in many matters of concern w/ loyal and disloyal, which was strictly against CA policy and practice. Also with FBI. The memo from Rademaker quoted by SUZUKI indicates that Rademaker did not understand what his job as CA was and how to do it. He could never separate information on individuals from description and analysis of behavior and sentiments. For this reason he was regarded by myself as when I came in as not suitable for the CA job. When he left I was relieved, whether hired or fired I do not remember. He was the great exception of CA work. He did report information on individuals. One out of 2w2

would be an increase in use of the Lakota language. Certainly at social events held on the reservation, one feels "left out" if he cannot understand what is being said. One feels it is somewhat incomplete to claim that he is an Indian when he cannot speak the language. From the data, it would seem that re-learning the language is ultimately desirable. Whether programs which successfully do this are implemented remains to be seen.

Question 11. The data here are highly involved and complex, elucidating the various attitudes about the propriety of certain language varieties for particular situations. The information has been presented in detail in Chapter VI; attempts will be made here to explain it more fully. Occasionally, respondents replied that there was no particular linguistic variety appropriate to a situation; rather, that the verbal choices depended on the status of the participants, regardless of locale. Other situations did require the use of particular varieties. For the purpose of discussion, they are organized into the following three categories:

- I. Situations requiring the use of English:
the domain of the secular and commercial
- II. Situations requiring the use of Lakota: the
domain of the traditionally sacred
- III. Situations permitting the use of Both (E/L)

Forecasting -

Center-specific assembly center info
M E Opler - ethnography - "nearly fixed" JHP supported
Criticized in annual report
not enough policy work
M K Opler - predicted "Tule Lake"

CA reports on anthrop.
little longitudinal or kinship
Reports Div. did better

Labelling -

"mentally ill" "rehabilitate" /
Rademaker "psychopaths"
"Resistance to Freedom" something wrong with people
But CA = not freedom to leave

Publications -

Poor record - no contributions to theory
Spencer Spoilage
Unfounded people - no kinship chart
"Topy incident + fence"
M KO reports good

CA absorbed into Bureaucracy

Local City emphasis restructuring but reports still to wash.

Conclusion -

Did what job called for
Lack understanding or compassion

store of Don Sen Lee at the edge of the city, or as he came home from work, he would suddenly hear the hated voice or feel a hand touch his right arm --- just barely, in a brushing movement. It was Gil always, walking beside him in the darkness, or just a little behind, ~~and then~~ plucking at him with his voice. It was Gil, usually just a little drunk, speaking in his thin, plaintive way. The remarks were harmless at first, remembered events of their life in Hermosillo, the hard times so different from the way it is here, the baptisms of Francisco's boys that had made them compadres. But increasingly as Miguel, in spite of himself, simply walked on each time, never stopping for more than a moment to murmur a greeting, Gil's remarks took on a further quality. He became accusing, dwelling repeatedly on Miguel's rejection of ~~him~~ him. Then his high voice became taunting, as ^{on} one night when he said,

"I know. You are afraid that Micaela will go with me again. You do not trust her. Maybe she will."

Miguel could not respond. It was the truth, but it was not the whole truth. That went deeper, ~~and~~ emerged from Gil's whole character. Yet somehow Miguel was powerless to do or say anything about this evil that he knew was there. He could not face his rejection and hatred ~~and~~ ^{2nd} that ~~was~~ ^{was} indeed ^{of} what it was ^{of} a close compadre. He knew it was his sacred duty to help and in the case of a younger man to guide his compadre, but he also knew that Gil was unreachable, that his compadre could destroy him .

As the days and nights went by Miguel measured them by the encounters with Gil, these backward encounters, these sudden appearances in the dark now nearly every night.

As Miguel tossed on his narrow bed, he developed a habit of throwing his arms backwards violently as far ~~as~~ as he could. It was a movement of thrusting away, of rejection of a familiar but unseen presence, of getting rid of the shadow and the voice at his back, of casting it off and away. Sometimes he was wakened by the pain and ~~the~~ shock of his upper arms encountering the metal frame of the cot, and his hands sometimes struck the hard dirt floor. But he noticed that there was temporary relief, too, as though the violence of the gesture cast out of his chest the terrible pressure near his heart.

It was near Christmas time. Miguel was coming back in the darkness from a lone trip to the stores to buy some little presents at the dime store, toys for Lola and Jose. He was empty-handed, however,

Policy was not settled that camps be permanent -
Collier wanted them that way.

CA looked at source for non-relocation

Embree was pro - of memo

Rademaker = a Syllabus
+ asked for a psychiatrist

(What were Spicer's feelings about
relocation?) p 26

Spicer view that R. was not studying, D

CA work = exemplar

"Destructive" theory of relocation McFarley = real CA

McVoy - group resettlement

refuse job if outside job offered

Hoebel - Ref talks

Spicer - "Disidents" names seized
no processing of info.

Anthropologists much concerned with
complexity of problem

Segregation

CA made clear the 'questionable basis'

Rademaker to FBI + DNI to 1944 apul

Involved in locating 'disloyals'

Winter evaluated On review etc

McVoy at Jerome - to Kempf

Hoebel - map

Spicer - Yofay names

Brown on review etc

[Wax - long section]

because he had found nothing that he could afford. As he passed the old ramada at the south side of the plaza where the pascolas danced during a ceremony, he heard a guitar and some singing and laughter. He hurried faster, but as he had learned to expect, he ^{soon} heard the uncertain steps of someone following him. He knew who it was, of course, before the first taunt came. He knew that Gil was there just behind him on his right side, coming close. He could not bear again to hear that ^{fitful} accusing voice. As though in his sleep, Miguel pulled his hands from his pockets and swung them violently backwards ^{in what had become his field of} ~~as Gil lurched close to~~ ^{him.} ~~The right hand held the switch-blade~~ ^{that he always carried in his} ~~his pants pocket~~ ^{for cutting the feed sacks.} ~~He felt the impact as Gil~~ ^{lurched against the knife.} Miguel heard a gasp ^{that ended in a gasping sound.} He walked on towards his house. ~~The pressure that had been there near his heart since the first meeting with Gil was, he noticed as he got into bed, no longer there. He slept well.~~ ^{No one walked behind him.}

^{found the body} ~~Gil's body was found by his drinking companions.~~ ^{At dawn on} Sunday morning ~~the~~ ^{They} ~~sheriff's deputy~~ ^{who} ~~took Miguel into~~ custody as he ~~was~~ ^{walked} to church holding Jose's hand. At the sheriff's office in the city, Miguel admitted all that had happened and asked that he be whipped and sent to jail immediately to fulfill his penance. If they wanted to shoot him right there, he told them, that would be their judgment. ^{As} ~~he felt that~~ ^{gathered to hear his answers,} ~~the men who crowded around him could not~~ ^{understand the full enormity of his sin.} The word "compadre" seemed to have ^{no} meaning for them, no matter how many times he said it.

After trial, ^{the} ~~where~~ ^{in which} he plead ^{ed} guilty he knew that he would have to work out most of the penance ^{ed} himself. ^{No one in the Cabot understood what he had done.} His boss, Joe Smiley, and many other people testified to the fact that he was the quietest, steadiest worker and church-goer in Navidad. The judge was impressed and sentenced him to only 10 years in the state penitentiary.

In two years Miguel was ^{paroled} ~~released~~ for good behavior. ^{He} ~~and~~ came back and went to work in his old job. In the church every Sunday he was on his knees throughout the services, regardless of the fresh creases in his pants. ~~Often~~ ^{Often} Jose knelt for awhile beside him.

What is infuriating to you, I am sure, is this fundamental lack of comprehension about what he is trying to analyze. It seems like arbitrary and determined obtusity. Actually it is ignorance and real incomprehension, inadequate preparation for the job he has undertaken.

But what has he done?

1. As I see it he has failed to understand and has distorted the CA activities regarding relocation. He reports correctly (or at leasts cites a memorandum that reports) that Embree urged analysts to further the relocation program and that Rademaker and Hoebel took some steps to do so, such as Rademaker's preparation of a Syllabus urging relocation. I think Embree was very much sold at the beginning ~~sxxx~~ on relocation as the great solution to the center problem. However, Embree was out by August, 1943. Spicer and other analysts with center experience took quite a different approach. We reported attitudes and steadily became acquainted with the several avacuee viewpoints. I would say that the analysts after the fall of 1942 generally had lost the early over-simple view of relocation as a the great cure-all. Beginning in 1943 we consistently reported the complexities and analysts generally, as I knew them, became increasingly sceptical of the whole program. I think that my case in the Cornell Casebook "Resistance to Freedom" pretty well reports our ultimate understanding of the relocation situation, although Suzuki makes it appear that particular analysis is some kind of apology for the relocation policy. However, there were maybe three analysts, including Embree, who in the first months after WRA declared the policy appeared to regard their job as taking part in the administrative effort directly. That was never my view and after Rademaker left (or was fired, I don't remember which) in the spring of 1943 analysts took the role of reporting the nature of evacuee failure to accept relocation, along with some reporting of the attitudes of those who did relocate. ... I think, although its is hard to tell, that Suzuki is trying to say that CA took administrative, rather than analytical, responsibility for the relocation program.

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Spiritual Healing

Snow (1971) has examined alternative curing systems in the black community in which this study was conducted. She describes the complex system:

The medical system of Neighborhood residents is a composite, comprising elements of African origin, the folk and formal medicine of the ante-bellum South, and modern scientific medicine -- all inextricably melded with the beliefs of fundamentalist Christianity (164).

In keeping with the system that she describes, within at least the Black community, use of herbal remedies, a physician, and a spiritual healer concomitantly is in keeping with the Black system of medical beliefs. Illness is caused by disharmony with the rules governing man within the universe ("natural" illnesses) or by problems resulting from anxieties and tensions in the society ("unnatural" illnesses: Snow, 167-68). Some natural illnesses are thought of as divine punishment for sin; others may result from witchcraft. Since healing is a God-given ability, practitioners differ largely in the mode of healing used. Doctors control many sorts of drugs (now that herbal remedies are less available), and surgical techniques; chiropractors: massage techniques. Cases deemed incurable by physicians are still thought to be amenable to healers who have been given the gift by the Lord, since the Lord's will, through the vehicle of the healer, is at work and all-powerful.

In this study, while only ten percent of the White women said they had sought out those with the gift of healing (or the laying on of hands), nearly half (46%) of the Black community said that they had consulted^{them} Intimate information about religious and healing beliefs is never an easy topic for anthropologists to elicit. Since this information was taken in a single first interview, it cannot approach

45. Ibid.
 46. John Embree, 1943. "Comments on: Recommendation 105 of the FBI's 'Federal Bureau of Investigation's Survey of Japanese Relocation Centers: Part I, Recommendations'." Box Title: "Washington Central Files: Confidential, Justice Department-Federal Bureau of Investigation Correspondence; Gurnea Report."

Articles by Peter T. Suzuki on aspects of the concentration camp based upon research in the National Archives, Washington, D.C.

1976: "The Ethnolinguistics of Japanese Americans in the Wartime Camps," Anthropological Linguistics, vol. 18, pp. 416-427.

1977: "Wartime Tanka [Classical Japanese Poetry of 31 Syllables]: Issai and Kibei Contributions to a Literature East and West," Literature East and West: Journal of World and Comparative Literature vol. 21, pp. 242-254.

1980: "A Retrospective Analysis of a Wartime 'National Character' Study," Dialectical Anthropology, vol. 5, pp. 33-46. (A detailed analysis of Weston LaBarre's 1945 article on Japanese character based upon his 44-day tenure as Community Analyst at Topaz.)

"Planned Communities in Wartime America: A Province for the New Urban History," Societas: A Review of Social History. (In press.) (An examination of the ten concentration camps as an aspect of urban planning.)

"Anthropologists and the Wartime Camps for Japanese Americans: A Documentary Study," Dialectical Anthropology. 1981, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 23-60.

Peter T. Suzuki:

A.B., 1951, Columbia University

A.M. in Anthropology, 1952, Columbia

Graduate work, Yale University, 1952-1953

M. Phil. in Anthropology, 1955, Leiden University, Holland

Ph.D. in Anthropology, 1959, Leiden University, Holland

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Memorandum

To: John H. Provinse

Date: 10/9/43

From: Edward E. Spicer

Concerning your memorandum of 10/8/43 on Schmidt's suggestion, the kind of data which he mentions on Misi in the police department, etc., could be dynamite here in the United States, especially at the present time, for example, when there is a wave of publicity concerning Axis under-cover agents in the Americas. If used in the wrong way, it could result in agitation which would hurt persons of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii and do nothing to help them here. However, the facts on these points ought to be in our hands for use under proper circumstances. Miles Cary is back in Honolulu and also Nell Findley. I think that Miles would be able to gather some facts in a fairly objective manner. I would be glad to write him, if you think it advisable. Also we can discuss with John Pollock Monday.

Andrew Lind

E. S.

8-1805 nobu-pd-ct-wp

*Re Pollock
JA in Hawaii*

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Memorandum

To: Edward H. Spicer

Date: 10/8/43

From: John H. Provinse *J.H.P.*

Schmidt, Internal Security Chief, has recently written me the following from Tule Lake:

"I have had something on my mind for some time, that I am taking the liberty to mention now. It's only an idea, but I believe it will assist us in doing the job our Director wants done. I believe we have a wealth of positive material to assist us in our racial prejudice program, in the Hawaiian Islands. I believe it would be worthwhile for Mr. Myer to direct you to go to the Islands, and with our point of view, record the actual participation and efforts of the Japanese there in the "front lines" of the civilian war effort. The gaining, first hand, of such facts as one sixth of the Honolulu Police Department are of Japanese ancestry, as well as four key investigators and Chief Gabrielson's secretary, etc. While Chief Gabrielson's feeling is very friendly concerning the Japanese question, he was reluctant to go on record for publication in any of the facts he gave me, as it would have placed him in a rather embarrassing position with the military at the Islands. However, I believe he would assist us in our effort to get it first hand and therefore he would have no responsibility for same. It won't hurt my feelings if you find the idea "all wet".

In general, what do you think of such an idea? Do you know anyone there who could check such information for us? Perhaps Shaeffer, if he comes, could advise us.

4) White who
are out - Jpn.

1064

JEROME RELOCATION CENTER
Denson, Ark.

Aug. 22, 1943

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. R. E. Arne, Chief, Community Management Division

Subject: Community Analysis Section Operation

by E.E. & C.M.
(McVoy)

Fran
Edgar
McVoy
CA of
JEROME

In view of our discussion with Mr. Taylor on August 21, it seems to me that we should come to some agreement as to future work of the Community Analysis Section. I have the following proposals to make:

X →

1. All statements concerning appointed personnel shall be sent to Mr. Taylor in a confidential form. He may then use his own discretion about submitting such statements to Washington. For the most part, however, these statements must continue to be in anonymous form. I cannot be placed in the role here of being an informer to the administration about either evacuees or appointed personnel. I should much prefer to go myself to the person on the staff involved and discuss the situation with him. Then, if it seemed advisable, I might report the instance to you and Mr. Taylor. In flagrant cases, however, which seem to jeopardize the operation of the project, I shall make an exception and give what facts I know to you and Mr. Taylor directly.

effect
Spicer's
policy?

2. Personal letters to the head of the Community Analysis Section in Washington will be discontinued, except for the discussion of actual personal matters. This device has been used by all Analysts and an informal means of intercommunication, to avoid the necessity of sending everything through cumbersome "channels." It has been valuable in some respects, but probably has served to raise a doubt in the minds of people here as to what is being reported in these letters. I feel it is better for you and Mr. Taylor to see every report that is made to Washington concerning operation of the center.

3. I should like to retain Kiyoshi Hamanaka on my staff. For the most part, his analysis of reactions of evacuees checks pretty closely with my own. I should like to point out that I do not rely on his interpretations without a continual check through my own contacts. I have a fairly wide acquaintance among evacuee leaders of various types in the center, and I talk with them frequently to get their ideas. In recent interview study we made was done because we did not believe we were getting the average view but were getting the extreme view from certain leaders. Our interview of 95 cases taken at random by four field workers and myself indicated that such had been the case. We found a great "middle group" which is relatively

R. E. Arne

indifferent to many of the issues on which some of the evacuees have very strong opinions. I am merely trying to demonstrate that our methods are varied and flexible enough that I think we are close to being right more often than we are wrong. I take full responsibility for any statements coming from this section since my arrival here. If Mr. Taylor feels that the presence of Hamanaka on my staff here invalidates our work, it is an indictment of my judgment as well. This does not mean that I endorse the personal views of Hamanaka, some of which are diametrically opposed to my own. It only means that I think he is reasonably objective in reporting evacuee opinion, and his own personal views usually do not distort his reporting.

I am sorry if any of my reporting has been responsible for giving the Jerome Center a "black eye" in Washington. My own impression concerning prejudice of appointed personnel is about as follows:

- (1) Three or four members of the staff have such a strong prejudice against evacuees as to make their work very difficult.
- (2) About two-thirds of the staff has a moderate degree of prejudice against evacuees, though not enough to hamper relations with them to a marked degree. They are usually fair-minded in official relations with them. Evacuees, though are sensitive to this prejudice.
- (3) About one-third has a very well-balanced attitude, generally free of prejudice or antagonism.
- (4) One or two individuals have the kind of indulgent, over-sympathetic attitude which has a negative reaction among evacuees.
- (5) This situation is not greatly different from that of other relocation centers. I should judge Jerome to be about average in the degree to which the appointed personnel has a constructive attitude toward evacuees.

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(Encly)

COMMENTS ON THE TESTIMONY OF DR. PETER T. SUZUKI
BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION
AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS

BY

Rosalie Hankey Wax
Professor Emerita, Anthropology
Washington University at St. Louis

Omission of my Name from "The Spoilage"

In his statement Dr. Suzuki notes that my name does not appear in the text of The Spoilage. He suggests that my name was omitted because I "turned informer on one of Tule Lake's 'disloyals'".

I would like to point out that The Spoilage was co-authored by Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto. Listed as "contributors" on the title page are Rosalie A. Hankey, James M. Sakoda, Morton Grodzins, and Frank Miyamoto. The names of none of these individuals appear in the text. Similarly The Spoilage contains many quotations from the Community Analysis Reports composed by Dr. Marvin Opler. Yet Dr. Opler's name does not appear in the text.

Again, Dr. Suzuki asserts that I was expelled from Tule Lake "shortly after having informed on Kira". The facts are that Mr. Kira was interned in December of 1944. I was not expelled from Tule Lake until May 9, 1945. It is most unlikely that Mr. Kira's internment had anything to do with my expulsion.

WAS ROSALIE HANKEY AN INFORMER?

I wrote "Doing Fieldwork" in sections over a period of 25 years. When I added the section quoted by Dr. Suzuki I did not consult my extensive field notes from Tule Lake. When I did review these notes, I found that my memory had been unreliable. My notes indicate that I did not denounce Mr. Kira to "Department of Justice investigators". However, the story of my involvement in the Tule Lake internments is very complex; but it is essential for an understanding of what I did, and why I did it.

The Internment of Mr. Kira

Dramatis Personae in Order Presented

(I have used pseudonyms for all Japanese Americans except for Mr. Kurihara, who gave me and Dr. Thomas permission to use his name.,

Dr. Marvin Opler, Community Analyst at Tule Lake.

Stanley Kira, a Kibei, about 47 years old was a behind the scene leader of the resegregation groups. He was also rumored to be the leader of a gang of young fanatics.

Koshiro Yamashita, an Issei about 40 years old, was probably the most influential leader of the resegregation groups.

Kazuhike Itabashi, an Issei, about 57 years old, was a member of the Seichi No Ie movement which holds to an ideal of "a world of happiness, gratitude a peace." Along with other elders of his church, he urged young men not to engage in violence and advised people not to join the resegregation groups. (For information on this sect see Contemporary Religions in Japan, IV, No. 3 (September 1963, pp. 212-229).)

Joseph Kurihara, was a Nisei, about 55 years old. In April of 1944 Mr. Kurihara told me that he objected to the (first) resegregationist petition because the presenters had given no clear explanation to the people. As the months passed he grew increasingly critical. On one occasion he told me that some of the resegregationists were threatening to use force and that if they did so he would not keep quiet "even if they call me an inu (informer)".

Lou Noyes, Project Attorney at Tule Lake.

John Burling, Assistant Director of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice.

* * * * *

Organizations Referred to in Text

Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi dan (Organization to Return Immediately to the Homeland to Serve). The name assumed by the resegregationists in November, 1944.

Sokoku Kenkyu Seinen dan (Young Men's Association for the Study of the Mother Country). An Association sponsored by leaders of the resegregation group. Its first meeting was held on August 12, 1944.

Hokoku Seinen dan (Young Men's Association to Serve our Mother Country). In November of 1944 the Sokoku, as it was commonly called, changed its name to Hokoku. Most non-members continued to call the organization "the Sokoku".

* * * * *

Narrative

In late Summer and early Fall of 1944 several people, including Dr. Marvin Opler had hinted to me that Mr. Kira was the leader of a gang of young fanatics "who had signed their names in blood". I visited Mr. Kira a few times and concluded that he was an underground leader of the pro-Japanese resegregationists. In late September of 1944, the Sokuji Kikoku Hoshi dan (Organization to Return Immediately to the Homeland to Serve) brought forth its second petition, asking for the signatures of all persons who wished to return to Japan immediately. On September 21 I visited Mr. Yamashita, an influential leader of the resegregation group. He told me:

"If they (the people) don't sign this they will be known to be not loyal to Japan and will be told so in public. Of course, many people who don't want to go back to Japan will sign, but then they will go in a corner and keep quiet."

Some of the responsible older Japanese American men did not keep quiet. In a Community Analysis Report, Dr. Opler stated:

"Feeling ran so high in ward VII, that vocal anti-resegregationists

or residents of 'tough' blocks who had refused to sign were definitely on the spot. In block 73, the block manager. . .was forced by public opinion to move quietly out of his block and later resign; his secretary did likewise. In block 74. . .one aged anti-resegregationist was hit over the back of the head and knocked unconscious (October 7)."¹

On October 10, Mr. Itabashi, a frail little man, told me that he was telling the leaders of the resegregation groups: "The Japanese government is not so narrow minded as you." I was concerned and remarked obliquely that there were dangerous men in camp. Mr. Itabashi replied in a reassuring tone: "Even among themselves they are not agreed."

On the night of October 15, when Mr. Itabashi and two other older men were leaving a church meeting, they were assaulted by a gang of young men and were brutally beaten. The victims refused to name their assailants and the Caucasian Internal Security was able to accomplish nothing. The evacuee police, following the precedent that they would not involve themselves in any "political" matters, refused to handle the case.

(Subsequently I was told by a Japanese American respondent that on October 21, Mr. Kira had addressed a meeting of the Sokoku and had incited them to violence. He promised that he would take care of them if they got into trouble and quoted a Japanese proverb which may be translated as: "To help the great cause, we must destroy those who oppose it.")

On October 23, Mr. Kurihara, a friend of Mr. Itabashi, told me:

"The men (who were beaten) are keeping it under cover. The Police Department isn't doing anything about it. They were beaten because they refused to sign the petition. They were blamed. . .for influencing people against it. . . .I went to see Mr. Itabashi on Tuesday. He requested

1. Cited from "The Spoilage", p. 318.

me to let the thing die out. They fear that neither they nor their families will be safe. . . .One of our friends was going right over to beat Kira up, but we restrained him. . . .We know threats were made and we know where the threats came from."

On October 30, the son of a man, said to be hostile to Kira, was knifed by a man who was known to be Kira's right-hand man.

On November 13, I called on Mr. Kurihara. He opened the conversation by saying that he knew little because he had purposely been staying at home. He closed it by saying that he had told one of Kira's spies that he was going out two nights a week to a class on Japanese singing. He then opened the drawer of his desk and showed me a stout club, about six inches long, to which a pipe joint was attached by a leather thong. On November 20, Mr. Kurihara told me that he had talked to some of the leaders of the Resegregation Group and that he was sure that he now had Kira "shivering in his shoes".

I was obliged to leave Tule Lake on November 21 to attend a conference of the members of our study and I did not return until December 8. On the evening of the 8th I called on Mr. Noyes, the WRA Project Attorney and found him having dinner with John Burling of the Department of Justice, who had come to Tule Lake to initiate the hearings for persons who had applied for renunciation of citizenship. After Mr. Burling left, Mr. Noyes told me that in his opinion, Burling was doing a very good job. He was telling the young men that if their decision was made of their own initiative, O.K., but if it was due to pressure, they should reconsider it. Mr. Noyes also told me that Mr. Kira had not submitted a resegregation form. I was surprised, and, since Mr. Noyes knew that Kira was an important resegregationist leader, I told him jokingly that they ought to question Kira about his feelings in the presence of some of the strong arm boys in his group.

On December 12, Mr. Noyes told me that Mr. Burling had called in Mr. Kira. According to Noyes, Burling had asked Kira: "Are you loyal to Japan and willing to give your all?" Kira said "Yes". After a number of similar statements, Burling held out a resegregation form and said: "Well if that's the way you feel, here's the blank." Mr. Kira signed.

On December 14, I called on Mr. Itabashi. He gave me a detailed account of how Mr. Kurihara had coped with Mr. Kira.

"Kira was in Terminal Island before the war and so was Kurihara. So they know each other for a long time and Kurihara knows the personality of Kira and that he is always for himself only."

"He knew everything that he did in Manzanar. He knew Kira was a coward. And still he bragged himself. But Kurihara kept quiet as long as Kira didn't do any big wrong. But since Kira's followers had attacked me at night Kurihara was as mad as a bulldog. He came to me immediately the next day and said he's going to either kill him or have him arrested because he knew everything what he did in the past. I told him to be quiet and see what will happen in a month or two."

"Then a young boy was slashed. And the fellow who attacked him was one of the men who attacked me."

"And then Kira tried to attack Kurihara. He planned it and Kurihara found out. And then Kurihara was kind of alarmed. And one of the Sokoku men, a mean fellow, he and one other went to Kurihara early in the morning. Both went there and stayed there talking until two o'clock in the afternoon. And Kurihara said to them, 'I might be attacked and killed but in the meantime I might kill a couple of you. I dedicate myself to the justice and welfare of the camp. That's the only way we can keep the peace in the camp. When Itabashi and Sasaki were attacked

I was ready to punish Kira. But at the request of Itabashi and Sasaki I withheld. But now I am ready.'"

"And then he told these two men who were representatives of Mr. Kira all that he knew about Kira and his movements. He said, 'You are having as leader such a man as Kira. Do you know about this?' These two men were surprised."

"Before this, these two men had said, 'As long as we let you alone you shouldn't mind what happens in camp.' Then Kurihara was madder than ever. 'What!!!' he said. Then he told them all about Kira."

"And that was Thursday or Friday. The next morning Kira resigned for the reason that his wife had a baby and there was a lot of work to do in the house. And the baby was born about four months ago."

"Ever since Kurihara had told all about Kira, a lot of people found out what he was. The people didn't know (before) and they worshipped him highly. But now they've found out that he's a coward and just doing everything for publicity."

Mr. Itabashi then began to tell me about the stabbing that occurred on October 30.

"I understand that the father of the boy (who was stabbed) is a Sokoku man. He didn't know that the inside of that party was so rotten. When he found out how rotten the inside was he was indignant at Kira, and was speaking about it openly. That's why his son was attacked, I heard."

"The main reason Kurihara was mad was that they wronged the young people. The young people don't know anything. They do as the leaders say."

On March 22, 1946, Mr. Best, Project Director, Tule Lake, sent Dillon Myer, Director of the WRA, a 19-page essay entitled: "Joe Kurihara, 'Repatriate': His Story." In this essay Mr. Best states:

"So violently did Kurihara counsel against these organizations --- when he was asked for advice --- that word reached me that Stanley Kira,¹ acknowledged leader of the pro-Japan groups, had threatened to kill Joe. I sent a messenger to warn Joe of the rumored intention. Back came a message telling me not to worry. That everything was in hand in the colony and that he very well could take care of himself. He did, and did what he could to take care of some others too."²

Comment by Rosalie Hankey Wax

From the foregoing it may be seen that Mr. Kira was a person who had engaged in violent tactics against Japanese Americans who opposed him. Among those assaulted or threatened were some of my friends. I was naturally interested in seeing that he was restrained from further violence. But even if I had been tempted to inform on him it would not have been necessary. Mr. Best, the Project Director, and other staff members of high rank were already aware of what Mr. Kira was doing.

How I Tried to Help Mr. Wakida's Friend

In an article which appeared in the September issue of Dialectical Anthropology, Dr. Suzuki accuses me of "informing the Department of Justice Personnel at Tule Lake" in an effort to keep a young man from being interned. He does not quote my explanation: that I did this because I believed that "interning him would put him in grave physical danger."³

Here are the facts as they are recorded in my fieldnotes.

On December 27, seventy of the members of the two resegregationist organizations (64 of whom were officers) were taken to the detention camp at Santa Fe.

1. (Pseudonym inserted by me.)

2. Japanese Relocation Papers, Bancroft Library; the quotation is from p. 15 of the typescript.

3. "Doing Fieldwork", p. 168.

On January 24, Burling announced plans for another internment scheduled for January 26. I did not know of this announcement, and on January 25, I visited my friends, Mr. and Mrs. Wakida. They were in great distress, because their friend, Mr. Abo, who was an instructor in one of the Japanese language schools, was among those scheduled to be interned. George Wakida said, desperately: "I'm trying to save my friend. He's the only friend I've got. . . Abo was 100% against the Hokoku. . . .If more people like Abo are going, everybody should go." Sally Wakida put her arms around her husband and cried. They asked me if I could do anything.

Since I had spoken to Mr. Abo several times and knew he was opposing the resegregationists, I said that I would speak to Mr. Burling. I went to see Burling immediately and told him that interning Mr. Abo with a group of ardent members of the Hokoku Seinen dan might well put his life in danger. Burling refused to commit himself. But two days later, on January 26, Burling told me that before the internment:

"When he was on his way to the stockade, where the men were being kept temporarily, a man named Sato called to him through the fence. . . and said, 'You are making a big mistake Mr. Burling. It's a mistake about the school teachers.' So Burling took the man to his office. Sato explained that there were four school teachers who should not be taken to Santa Fe. These men had been fighting the Hokoku and had stood for principles of no pressure for resegregation and that they had been teaching a policy of living peacefully. After consulting Mr. Best, the Project Director, Burling released the four Japanese school teachers and Mr. Abo."

Handwritten signature

CWRIC HEARINGS: CHICAGO

U.S. kidnap of Japanese Peruvians told

BY PETER IMAMURA

CHICAGO—Among the 111 witnesses who testified before the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians here on Sept. 22 and 23 was a panel of Japanese Peruvians, now all U.S. citizens, who had been abducted by the U.S. government and interned in American concentration camps.

C. Harvey Gardiner, professor-emeritus of history at Southern Illinois University, testified that in 12 Latin American countries—Central America, the Caribbean and South America—the U.S. "kidnapped" thousands of innocent men, women and children of Japanese descent.

Gardiner said that according to records from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and the FBI, some 1,800 Japanese Peruvians were taken from their homes and had their property—some \$10,000 worth—seized, even though there were no charges nor proof of any wrong doing filed against them. Many were interned in Crystal City, Tx., where death and disease took its toll upon them.

"The U.S. encouraged violations of Peruvian laws and then manipulated the illegal entry of thousands of Latin American Japanese," charged Gardiner, who also noted that this action was unrelated to the incarceration and evacuation of Japanese Americans.

The professor noted that some 500 Japanese Peruvians were used as "trade bait"—even though they were innocent persons—to release American POWs being held by the Japanese Imperial Forces.

Gardiner also said that U.S. Ambassador Henry Norweb had persuaded Peruvian officials to perceive the Japanese there as a "threat" to the Western Hemisphere, even though, in reality, no such threat existed.

Japanese Peruvians Describe Their Ordeal

In a tearful recollection, Elsa Kudo, now living in Hawaii, told of how armed police took her father away while the family was living in Peru in 1944.

"He had not committed any crime, nor broken any law, and the only explanation given was, 'We are sorry, but this is by the order of the United States!'"

Her father was forced to perform hard labor in the Panama Canal Zone Army Prison Camp (which Gardiner noted was in violation of the terms set by the Geneva Convention).

Kudo described the ordeal the rest of the family went through, when they were ordered to board a ship bound for the U.S. During the voyage, armed guards threw overboard all food-stuffs carried by Japanese Peruvians, thus leaving her mother unable to feed her children.

As were many of the Japanese Peruvians who were brought to the U.S., Kudo and her family were classified as "illegal aliens" which put them in a very anxiety-ridden situation—a "catch-22" predicament wherein they could not return to their homeland nor could they live in the U.S. securely.

Kudo had asked herself, "Why are we illegal aliens when the U.S. brought us here by force and the Immigration authorities processed us?"

Similar to the experience of Kudo's father, Selichi Higashide had also been forced to hard labor in the Panama Canal Zone. He, too could not go back to Peru nor remain in the U.S., and he noted that many Japanese Peruvians were shipped to Japan with no shelters available for them there.

Higashide credited the late Wayne M. Collins, the ACLU attorney, in helping the 370 Japanese Peruvians who refused to go to Japan and asked to remain in the U.S.

In addition to the problems caused by his illegal alien status, Higashide also noted that many "broken families" resulted from the evacuation of the Japanese Peruvians, because the U.S. authorities did not give any consideration to the families of the evacuees who were left behind in Peru.

Solid Support Presented

Other witnesses from various sections of Illinois and the Midwest came forth in support of redress. No one testified against redress during the two sessions here at Northeastern Illinois University. Commissioners Joan Z. Bernstein (chair), Edward W. Brooke, Fr. Robert F. Drinan, Arthur S. Flemming, Arthur J. Goldberg, William M. Marutani and Hugh B. Mitchell listened to testimony from former internees, veterans, church groups, politicians and academicians, the majority asking for some form of monetary reparations, along with legislative measures which would prevent the occurrence of such government actions.

Maryann Mahaffey, Detroit City Council member, had been a volunteer recreation worker at Poston II, Az., during the closing days of the war. Recalling her work there, she noted, "Poston Camp II was the most memorable and traumatic experience of my life. Poston was a concentration camp."

Mahaffey recalled an Army MP who bragged about his assignment to patrol the camp, allowing him to display his "macho superiority" over the detainees. She also remembered the future and

ered a statement in support for redress through her spokesman John Cory. "I join with the Japanese Americans of Chicago and all Americans to call upon this [commission] to insure that people will never again be rounded up on the basis of race, color or creed," said the mayor.

Media at Fault

Studs Terkel, the nationally known author and radio commentator, said that the news media coverage of America's involvement during the early days of WW2 made the incarceration acceptable.

Terkel said that some of the most persuasive and "devastating" pieces were written by distinguished columnist Walter Lippmann (1889-1974), who advocated the evacuation of the Japanese Americans.

Lippmann's columns, noted Terkel, "influenced American politicians who were easily impressed." Terkel added that "no acknowledgment of culpability" after 40 years, was ever given to Lippmann.

[The oft-mentioned Lippmann piece, written after he was briefed by Gen. DeWitt in San Francisco, appeared his New York Herald-Tribune column, "Today and Tomorrow," on Feb. 12, 1942—a week before President Roosevelt was to sign Executive Order 9066. Lippmann, as in the language of E.O. 9099, refrained from expressing it outright that all Japanese Americans were potential "fifth columnists" and saboteurs, by suggesting "everyone should be compelled to prove that he has a good reason for being there" (the entire west coast having been declared a warzone) and those who had no such reason could legitimately be removed. To his dying day, Lippmann believed the evacuation was proper.—Ed. Note.]

Fred J. MacDonald, professor of history at Northeastern Illinois University, alleged that both the California politicians and press, at times, had "orchestrated" campaigns against the Nikkei "to precipitate a military response from

Washington, D.C. and Sacramento."

Illustrating his statement with a slide presentation showing anti-Japanese propaganda, MacDonald felt that "political and publishing leaders on the West Coast deliberately stoked the fires of popular distrust and racism toward the Japanese Americans" in order to "panic public opinion and thereby compel state and national military planners to bolster military defenses along the West Coast."

He also felt that some weight should be given to the political motives behind these campaigns, noting that the "greatest achievement of the anti-Japanese crusade, as far as Attorney General Earl Warren was concerned, occurred in November 1942 when he defeated Governor Olson to become himself, the Governor of California."

'Guinea Pigs'

Controversial testimony was presented by Peter T. Suzuki, professor of urban studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, who said that according to his research from the National Archives, the War Relocation Authority's Community Analysis Section had gathered intelligence data and Nikkei members of this section "informed on inmates" in the camps.

Although the section, composed of professional anthropologists and sociologists, was purportedly established to study the behavior and "trouble" patterns of the internees of the ten camps, Suzuki alleged that "the camp experience was a corrupting one for those social scientists who, under the pretext of scientific research, undertook such activities as spying, informing and intelligence work." He added, "It also shows the extent to which the government attempted to manipulate and control the inmates."

Suzuki also felt that, perhaps, this section had performed social experiments on the internees in the camps—such as "floating" rumors in order to "test" their reaction.

Continued on Next Page

Friendship treaty no crutch to skirt U.S. civil rights laws

CHICAGO—The 1953 U.S.-Japan friendship treaty does not exempt Japanese corporations or their subsidiaries from U.S. civil rights laws, U.S. District Judge Bernard Decker ruled here Sept. 22 in the Canon USA case.

Lawyers for the giant Japanese camera company firm contended the treaty allowed companies to hire specialists of their choice and had sought dismissal of a \$1 million discrimination suit filed last spring by William Porto, 38, of Itasca, who said he was fired as midwest sales manager because he was not Japanese.

The judge observed that Canon's argument taken to its logical conclusion would not only exempt the company from civil rights laws but also labor laws and even possibly from laws prohibiting child labor.

Porto's lawyer said he intended to use the ruling on behalf of another Canon employee, Edward Mattison of Bensenville, who was fired. Both seek reinstatement and punitive damages.

Geo. Doizaki pledges \$100,000 to JACCC

LOS ANGELES—George J. Doizaki, president of the Japanese American Cultural and Community Center, announced Sept. 21 his pledge of \$100,000 to JACCC payable within the coming five years to "insure the mortgage on the Center building is paid off." It is in addition to the \$20,000 already donated in concert with American Fish Co., of which he is board chairman. The pledge makes it the largest single donation and "hopefully the first in a series of major pledges by some of the elder statesmen in the Southern California community," JACCC executive director Gerald Yoshitomi said.

Doizaki, when elected JACCC board chairman in 1974, organized the task of raising funds for the center, going to Japan several times to stimulate gifts toward the theater now under construction. The prize-winning Japanese garden has been completed, a plaza featuring a Isamu Noguchi sculpture is about to start and a feasibility study is underway for the martial arts center-gymnasium. The JACCC complex will be worth \$30 million in total.

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CHICAGO

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On the same panel was Rachel Sady, a former social scientist assigned to this section, who denied the allegation that community analysts were intelligence-gathering agents for the government. She said that the section's aims were to help "abolish the relocation centers" and get the incarcerated Japanese Americans back into the mainstream.

Sady, who had worked both in Washington D.C. and in the Jerome, Ark., center, said that the Community Analysis Section's role was to study "the evacuees attitudes and behavior in the situation in which they were caught."

"It is a mistaken, but again understandable, idea that these social scientists were preoccupied with explaining to the [Roosevelt] administration enough about the evacuees so that they could be manipulated," she added.

Sady also said that the section tried to help the administration see the evacuees' problems as they themselves saw them—to see what life in the camps were really like.

"In my opinion, anyone immersed in the kind of information collected not only by their section but by the agency in general can well understand the desire of the Nikkei for governmental redress that goes beyond an apology," said Sady.

Commissioner Marutani told both Sady and Suzuki that he was completely "surprised" to discover that, while he was interned, he was "a subject of study under some microscope." Marutani also wondered if the evacuees in the camps were being used as "guinea pigs" by the WRA's Community Analysts.

Sady denied that the section's intent had that end in mind, but Marutani told her that there is "some indication, according to docu-

ments, that the study was ordered at very high levels in the government—that, now we've got all these people [internees] together, let's see what makes them tick." He also recalled the fact that after he was released from camp to go to college, an FBI agent was sent to check up on him—something he could not understand at the time.

When Commissioner Mitchell asked the panel if he would be "half-right" to say that they would be both correct in their testimonies, Suzuki responded by reading a memo from John F. Embree, head of the section, addressed to the FBI, which stated that the section could provide "additional channels" of information regarding any internee who might possibly be an agitator in a camp.

The commissioners all agreed that the matter would need further investigation.

Sad Recollections

As in the other regional hearings, numerous victims of the Evacuation described their ordeals to the CWRIC.

Tom Watanabe of Chicago painfully recounted the death of his wife and two children in a Manzanar hospital. After giving birth to twins, Mrs. Watanabe began hemorrhaging and she died in her husband's arms. The children, too, died.

"For some time things were hazy and to this day, I don't remember being informed of how or why she died," said Watanabe. "I haven't even seen the death certificates."

Watanabe, who never found out where they were buried, asked, "Are my wife and children laying out in Manzanar in [an] unmarked grave? This is the thought that has haunted me all through the years."

John Shigenori Kimoto had been a flower grower in Hawthorne, Ca., and when the orders came for him to evacuate in 1942, he was so angry that he began to pour gasoline on the front porch of his house to burn it down. His wife, however,

stopped him, reminding him that they were "civilized people" and as for their home, "someone else could use it." Kimoto and his wife then "voluntarily" evacuated to Salt Lake City, losing his property and business.

"No matter what happened in the past, I still love my country," he said. "God bless America."

Food Smuggling

Hiroshi Kadokura said that in the Santa Anita Assembly Center (Arcadia, Ca.), Caucasian mess hall stewards were suspected of smuggling food from the center and one day, some internees attempted to stop and search a car, driven by a Caucasian, to see if he was smuggling food.

The MPs stepped in and closed the gate which separated the internees from the mess hall. Kadokura remembered the hysteria which followed:

"Babies were beginning to cry and mothers and babies were getting hysterical because with the gate being closed, the mothers were unable to get to the mess hall to bring back milk for their babies."

Frustrated, the internees broke down the gate, but soon additional MPs and later tanks moved into the center to disperse the people.

"I kept thinking—how much more deprivation and degradation need I be subjected to by my government—when and in what form will corruptions occur again?" asked Kadokura.

Kazuko Ige, who had lived in San Diego before the war, was the eldest of five children at 16. When the FBI took their father away, they found themselves without parents, since their mother was already hospitalized with an illness. The children moved in with relatives in San Diego and soon all of them were sent to Manzanar. "Except for these kind, sacrificing relatives, we were evacuated among strangers to Manzanar, and also a visit to our sick, 41-year old mother, left behind, was now impossible," said Ige.

Sam Sato, who had been interned at the Portland, Or. Assembly Center, said that he had been denied visitation rights to see his parents, both ill with tuberculosis. He was eventually granted permission to attend his mother's funeral.

Lack of Education

S. Maren Sharvey had taught in high schools at the Topaz, Ut., and Poston II centers from 1943 to 1945. She noted that there was "almost total intellectual deprivation" in the schools, because of the lack of adequate textbooks, school supplies and personnel.

"My students did their homework in the local barrack latrine with a bare lightbulb hanging over them," she noted.

Sharvey added that there was also cultural and social deprivation for the children as well, and that "psychological damage" was inflicted upon them. The school children could not go to nearby towns on field trips without facing some type of discrimination or act of racism.

Speaking in favor of redress, Sharvey said, "Leadership and adherence to the Constitution could have changed the whole picture. It is legal to evacuate citizens; it is not legal to detain them with no grand jury proceedings, no indictments, no trials. To lose our basic principles in wartime is to lose the very reason we fight."

Mary K.H. Nishimoto had been living in San Francisco but was sent to Topaz, Ut., where she developed a permanent disability due to asthma, which was caused by the weather and dust at the camp.

Her family had been living in Los Angeles, and was sent to Manzanar. Her mother developed a tumor there, but Nishimoto could not visit her unless she could pay for an "MP escort."

She also recalled the discrimination she faced in Chicago after the war, and, being a divorced mother with an infant to care for, had to "rely on charity" for six months.

Nishimoto also remembered being called a "dirty Jap" by a woman, who was later hit in the mouth by the Nisei.

Kay Uno Kaneko, sister of the late Edison Uno and the late Amy Uno Ishii, told of her families' ordeal at the Crystal City Internment Camp. Her father was interned in Bismarck, N.D. and she recalled how her sister was constantly questioned by authorities regarding their father's activities. She also noted how her brother served the U.S. in the military.

Marutani commented to Kaneko, "If Edison were here, how truly amazed he would be... this is something that the Nisei have resisted for years [speaking out]. When he kept speaking, and telling

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For the Record

A revised statement to the CWRIC by Junji Kumamoto specifically mentions "conspiracy" at four places, contrary to what was reported in the Sept. 18 PC article where he questioned whether the U.S. government, the Congress included, conspired to cause the evacuation.

Chicago, Chicago; Ben Kudo, Honolulu; ... Canton, OH; Masy ... Ohio, OH; Rev. Jinsuo ... Ohio, OH; Toyo Suye ... Evanston; Mitsu Shio ... Ishiyama, Parma, ... Northfield, OH; ... Illinois, IL; the Brethren, Fort ... Mayeda, Bloom ... Nakao, Jr., Parma ... Grove, IL; Allen ... Ohio; Harry Taketa, ... Brigadier (Ret.), ... Michael Yasutake, ... Intelligence Service, ... Hayashi, Chicago, ... Village, IL; Sue ... Akura Arai, Chicago; ... Hachiya, Chicago, ... Frank Sakamoto, ... Northbrook, IL; ... Sidney R. Yates; ... John Tani, Chicago; ... Mahoney, Chicago, ... Heights, IL; 34th ... remainder of Chicago ... Ed Kelley, ... 442nd, Chi ... MIS, Chicago; ... Shigeo ... John Takashi ... Fumi Hasegawa, ... Kimoto, Chicago; ... Hukoyama, Chicago; ... Univ. of Chicago; ... Harold W. Flit- ... Christopher Ander- ... Minnesota, Minneapolis; ... Fellowship, ... Nebraska, Omaha, ... anthropology, Pace

CWRIC

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us to speak out, and here we are... how Edison would really be pleased, for you [to be] here."

Chicago JACL

John Tani, Chicago JACL Chapter president, noted that "the character and the perspective of the Japanese Americans in the Midwest are a little different from those of their counterparts on the West Coast."

Tani added that those evacuees who made the Midwest their new home shared "common characteristics" such as "courage" since "they did not have the comfort of resettling groups, rather, they made their treks as individuals."

He then called for redress, which included monetary reparations and a reopening of the Korematsu, Yasui and Hirabayashi cases. He then paid tribute to his late father Henry, then executive secretary for San Francisco JACL, who had testified at the Tolan hearings in 1942.

Constitutional issues were also presented to the CWRIC, as Shirley Castelnovo, Professor of Political Science at Northeastern Illinois University, and Victor Rosenblum, Professor of Law at Northwestern University, made recommendations for redress.

Castelnovo suggested that the CWRIC use the West German system of reparations to Holocaust survivors as a model, one which uses both individual and group compensation.

Rosenblum agreed with Commissioner Goldberg's contention that parts of the Korematsu case have been overturned by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.

He suggested, "The Korematsu case has, in principle, been reversed by the Court, but the actuality of it has not taken place, and to my way of thinking, since the Court relied so heavily on congressional action in justifying the act [evacuation], my initial step would be a repudiation of the propriety of that action by Congress."

Veterans' Testimony

Many veterans also testified be-

fore the CWRIC during the two sessions, all supporting redress, including panels from the American Legion, the 34th Infantry Division Assn. and the 442nd RCT.

Commissioner Brooke, himself a WW2 veteran of the 92nd Infantry, told the panels that veterans from across the nation will need to lend their support in order for any type of redress to be successful.

One of the most poignant testimonies given by the veterans was delivered by Tomoharu Hachiya, a former member of the 442nd

He said that for the Nisei soldiers, the psychological effect of being in a segregated unit, while their families were imprisoned back home, took its toll on many.

Men were sometimes threatened by their superior officers, that if they did not perform well they would be "locked up in the stockade." Some of the Nisei, said

Hachiya, thought, "Well, that's one way to live longer—I bet they [the officers] won't do it."

As for the casualties that the 442nd suffered, Hachiya said:

"When you've seen men lying on the side, wrapped up... you look down and you think, 'Oh, you poor S.O.B., you'll never know what happened to your family and your family will never know what happened to you.'"

He sadly concluded:

"It hurts to watch men who have to send their pay home to families [in camps] because their families can't get enough to live on, and they have to exist on stuff like that. Now, I can't put a value on that—I can't put a price tag on that."

"All I know is that it existed and that I saw these men... there was feeling that there can't be a God—because God would never let this happen to us."



Documents Informant Activity by Camp Analysts

BY WILLIAM HOHRI

The largely Nisei audience in Alumni Hall, Northeastern Illinois University, who were listening to the solemn testimony given before the Chicago appearance of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, broke into laughter, sardonic laughter, when an emissary from Chicago's Mayor Jane Byrne addressed Joan Bernstein as "Mr. Chairman" and then introduced himself as the representative of Mayor Daley. That happened on the second day, September 23rd, rudely beyond the mayor's scheduled appearance on the morning of the 22nd. Ruder still was his failure to include Tule Lake and Rohwer in his first recitation of camps and then including Tule Lake in the second recitation, suggesting casual carelessness. He was squeezed into a panel of white folks who were active during the WWII period in their support of the victims, except a young man from the U. of Minnesota. It would have been interesting to hear what he did at the time.

Professor emeritus Maynard C. Krueger led off this panel. He identified himself as the running mate of Norman Thomas on the 1940 Socialist Party ticket. Krueger spoke off the cuff and used his years of experience as professor and as stumper for the Socialist Party to good effect. He did the audience and the commissioners the service of placing the need for compensatory redress with the majority rather than the minority and victims. This nicely complemented an earlier statement by Rev. Jitsuo Morikawa.

Morikawa, perhaps the elder statesman of Japanese American Christian clergy, mounted an eloquent attack on the whole concept of the commission with a series of contrasts. The government acted with lightning speed to incarcerate 120,000 persons but takes 40 years to question its own acts. Witnesses are given a few minutes to explain years of internment. The impression of magnanimity of the commission to listen is contradicted by the structure of its hearings. Victims "are expected to bear the moral burden to determine the nature of the redress... of begging or even demanding reparations for our suffering and offering the privileged luxury to those ultimately responsible of simply saying yes or no." His statement stung. Most of the commissioners responded in their self-defense.

This theme was reinforced by a panel of United Methodists clergy, including Rev. Martin Deppe, Bishop Jesse DeWitt, Rev. Martha Coursey; and Rev. Greg Dell. Deppe, speaking for the General Board of Church and Society, said, "It is altogether shocking and shameful that we should be gathered here today, almost 40 years... after the so-called 'resettlement' of Japanese-Americans. Shocking because... a minority people... have still not received just recompense... Shameful because the majority people... have not demanded an accounting by our government." DeWitt, bishop to the Northern Illinois Conference, said, "To confess error is to open the way for national healing and forgiveness." Coursey, pastor of the Parish of the Holy Covenant, said, "... the time is past for symbols and apologies... It is ridiculous to question 'whether' any wrong was committed... Let us be about redress and reparations." All the United Methodists supported redress legislation and legislation to enable the filing of lawsuits by the victims.

During most of the first day there were no demonstrations by applause. Jitsuo Morikawa's statement seemed to break the ice. By the second day, everyone was being applauded.

Another bombshell was dropped in the afternoon of the second day. But its effect was diminished. The ranks of the commissioners had thinned to Bernstein, Flemming, Marutani, and Mitchell. (Goldberg, Brooke, and Drinan had left.) Exhaustion was beginning to set in. Professor Peter Suzuki of the University of Nebraska read his statement in a flat, matter-of-fact tone within the prescribed five minutes. It was a charge of informant, intelligence gathering, and spying activity by social scientists who worked in the camps as community analysts. He was paired on the panel with Professor Rachel Sady of Pace University who did work as a communist analyst. Sady stared with incredulity at Suzuki as he testified. His testimony was based on an article soon to appear in *Dialectical Anthropology*. According to Suzuki, "The WRA established the Community Analysis Section in 1943. The Section was purportedly established to study the behavior patterns and 'trouble patterns' of the inmates in the ten camps." He named names of these scientists who provided the administration with lists of dissidents, draft evaders, persons who complained to the Spanish Consulate, and such. In some cases, the persons so identified were shipped to the special, high security, isolation camp at Leupp, Arizona. His written testimony was thoroughly documented. He cites a National Archives document to demonstrate the policy of co-operation between the FBI and the Section. In 1943, John Embree, Washington director of the Section, writes to the FBI: "... to keep the project director informed of any unrest that may be developing or of any attempt at agitation, is desirable... the control of community activities... could be made a channel of information... and the newly organized Community Analysis Section can be expected to provide additional channels."

WRA's official pronouncements, i.e., that WRA "opted not for concentration camps... but for abolishing relocation centers and getting people in the mainstream of national life and lifting the ban against them on the West Coast." She said that the purpose of Community Analysis was "the study and report on evacuees' attitudes and behavior" and that analysts served as cross cultural interpreters and as intermediaries for inmates who found it difficult to express themselves before the loyalty board. She strongly affirmed, "Analysts did not transmit covert information about individuals to any one at all." It was a stand-off. In the questioning by commissioners, only Senator Mitchell seemed to grasp the dilemma when he asked if it were possible that both were right.

(Sady seemed to be unaware of the initial and continued role by the War Dept. and of the legal initiatives taken to free victims. The Mitsuye Endo application for the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus drew the War Dept. response of proposing the suspension of the writ so as to avoid the release of people to the West Coast and the closing of the camps. Edgar Bernhard, principal attorney for the WRA, wrote on September 25, 1943, "That word 'relocation' certainly does not refer only to final relocation outside of a center. The evacuee who is detained for the duration of the war in a relocation center has also been 'relocated'. His place of relocation is a center.")

In the cafeteria below Alumni Hall, during the lunch and dinner breaks, one could overhear snatches of white folk conversation which identified Japanese-Americans with Imperial Japan and formulated the equations between our treatment and their treatment in easy rationalization. One wished their position on this had been heard as well. Then, at least, the semblance of an open, public hearing would have been presented. As it was, the bulk of the hearings consisted of largely Nisei victims telling their tales of woe to a largely Nisei-Sansei audience. (There were a number of NEIU students present because their attendance substituted for a class in political science.) Their testimony seemed especially intense, quintessential. They lost their sense of time. Some must have felt their five minutes had only been seconds, for they seemed hardly anywhere near the end when they had to be stopped. There was one conscious attempt to break the time barrier. Merry Omori says firmly, "I have not finished!" Applause. She continues. Bernstein interrupts. Omori persists. Bernstein remains adamant. Bernstein wins. Omori stands up and leaves. (Too bad, too, for she was about to attack the JACL.) But for the rest, this must have been their one chance to lay bare their souls before the United States of America.

At one point in the hearings, Ms. Bernstein expressed her appreciation at being the ears of America. It was certainly the biggest J-A event in the history of Chicago. There was the media coverage, all right. And we kept hearing the admonition of putting it in the record, as though there were really important people who were going to read all this and make the big dif-

Baker Soloist Ensemble Nov. 7

Metropolitan Ensemble of New York will perform at Alice Tully Hall, Lincoln Center, at 3 p.m. Nov. 7, under the auspices of U.S. Concert Society, Inc.

Performing as soloists will be Ashley on piano and Julius Rute. Mr. Baker is first flutist of the New York Philharmonic.

Program will include works by Bach, Debienne and Mozart. Tickets may be obtained for from \$6 to \$10 at box office from Oct. 7.

Woman United Concert-Party

"Yellow Madness," a 1-party fund raiser, will be given by Woman United at New York, 33 West 52nd Street, from 10 p.m. to 4 a.m.

Performers will include Sumi Tonooka and the Rock Band with Alex Chin.

Tickets bought in advance are \$12 at door, \$15. Mail orders will be accepted until Oct. 20. Checks made payable to Asian Women United and sent to 170 West 51st Street, Suite 5A, New York, N.Y. Telephone number for further information is 887-6315.

Niko Picnickers Apple Picking

Apple picking will be the new twist in foliage-viewing outing to be held by the Niko Niko Club on Oct. 11th. Croton Falls, 1 1/2-hour ride away, is the destination this year.

A chartered bus will leave at 9:30 a.m. from the Yodo Restaurant, 47th Street. Because of limited capacity, only the first 15 reservations for seats can be accepted. Fee for transportation and lunch is \$12 per person, and tickets to call after 5 p.m. for reservations are 478-0022 (Kazuo Mitani) or 81-8058 (Roy Kajihara). The picnic will be made rain or shine.

Play by David Henry Hwang at Public Theater

The play by David Henry Hwang, produced by Joseph Papp, is the first of the New York Shakespeare Festival's 10th anniversary. "Family Devotions" will be performed Tuesday evening at the Public Theater, 425 West 42nd Street.

Director Robert Ackerman is the director of the play by the Obie Award-winning playwright whose "M. Butterfly" and "The Railroad" have been full houses at the Public Theater. "Family Devotions" depicts the relationship of a meeting between a Chinese immigrant and his new American wife.

The play's cast features Michael Paul Chan, Tina Chen, Helen Funai, Marc Hayashi, Jim Ishida, June Kim, Jodi Long, Lauren Tom and Victor Wong.

The play's set was designed by David Gropman; costumes, by Willa Kim; and lighting, by Tom Skelton.

Performances are at 8 p.m. Tuesdays through Sundays; 3 p.m. Saturdays and Sundays. Ticket prices are \$12 for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Sunday evenings and Saturday matinees; \$14 for Friday and Saturday evenings and Sunday matinees. QuikTix are available the day

Unfocused L.A. Hearings: "A Circus of Freaks"

Robust Testimony of Nikkei Witnesses, Mob-Like Reaction of Spectators Hit Why Has the Commission Shunned Expert Testimony in Favor of Emotionalism?

Chinese American playwright/journalist Frank Chin has been researching the experience of Japanese Americans in America's World War II concentration camps for the past five years or so. He has been researching the histories of the Chinese and Japanese in America for more than a decade. Chin, creator of plays such as "Chicken Coop Chinaman," "Year of the Dragon," "Gee Pop" and "Oofly Goofly," attended both the Washington, D.C. and the Los Angeles hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians. A couple of weeks ago, this lanky Asian guy walks up and says, "Hey, there's something I just wrote up about the hearings... What do you think?" Well, after reading the 10-pages of stream of consciousness he handed me that day, I have come to feel that this former San Francisco State University and UC Davis faculty member's perceptions of the camps, Japanese America and the recent hearings ring painfully true.

—The Editor

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Ladies and gentlemen, friends... The Los Angeles hearings of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians was a circus of freaks. Rep. Daniel E. Lungren sweats and looks desperate as the gallery became an audience at a show. They cheered, applauded, commented and Lungren sitting as chair, in place of Joan Bernstein, left them to clap and boo. They booed and jeered S.I. Hayakawa. They made Hayakawa look good. Hayakawa made the news.

Of course he made the news. Of course he's ridiculous and an asshole and everything everybody will dears old Sleepy Sam.

Who... who advised Lungren to allow applause and audience participation at the L.A. hearings to make the Japanese Americans look like a raving mob? No matter how they felt as individuals, the members of the audience joining in one big boo, with hate on their faces are wrong to mob Hayakawa. And Lungren is wrong to allow the guests to do anything more than listen. Applause is not proper in the courtroom, Congress, state legislatures and congressional commissions. The audience— if we must call it that— as Lungren did, attends at the whim of the chair. They are there to listen, not to influence the commission or the witnesses or attempt to... There was not applause at the Warren Commission on the Kennedy assassination. No applause at the war crime trials at Nuremberg. Applause in court at hearings is always extraordinary, never the accepted norm.

After making news for booing Hayakawa, the Japanese Americans came into Room 1138, the auditorium of the state building in L.A. ripe for a fight. They came not to listen but to cheer their side at a sporting event. They applauded the good guys, fumbling out their sob stories full of property loss, financial ruin and woeful career development, the story of the father returning to the family in camp, two years later told again and again, and not as well as the sappy but efficient telling of the same true story in "Farewell to Manzanar."

Listen to the stories, friends. You've heard them all before, at so-called writer's conferences, in group therapy. The endless procession of newspaper-interview-famous Nisei bleeding the same stories before Asian American Studies classes that didn't use books. You've seen these tears before staining the mimeograph program of yet another narrated slide show and panel of former internees remembering camp at Pine Methodist Church in San Francisco, or the Oakland Museum, 30 years of interviews, articles, panel discussions, forums, seminars, pilgrimages, where the Nisei have shown up to week in public. Amy Uno Ishii, late of L.A., had a slide show she worked on 'til the day she died. Jack and Dorothy Yamaguchi have been building and showing their slides for almost 20 years now. Aki and Juns Kurose speak to the American dream in Studs Terkel's "The American Dream." Pity! Pity! Pity! Open weeping. Wild applause.

At the commission hearings we are not hearing anything that has not been said before, by the WWII eager beaver social scientists of the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority. We're not hearing anything we haven't heard better said in the 1950s "Go For Broke," a film directed by Robert Pirosh, starring Van Johnson and former members of the 442nd Regimental Combat Team. Dore Schary produced, Mike Masaoka was the technical consultant. No matter what else can be said about the former field secretary and executive-at-large of the JACL, the movie with his name on it is still the best, most complete, complex, detailed and dramatic portrait of Japanese America to come out of Hollywood, including "Hito Hata: Raise the Banner!"

Sob stories. Property loss. Financial ruin. Boo hoo. Camp set back my career 15 years, six promotions, 20 raises in pay and big bonuses. Boo hoo. Wild applause. No questions from the commission. Next panel of witnesses. The Nisei vets. Paul Oda testifies. Boom! Pearl Harbor on the radio. Shock.

Executive Order 9066. Property loss. Financial ruin. Questions 27 and 28 of the loyalty oath. Some go "No No" with the answers and off to jail or Tule Lake. Some go "Yes Yes" on to the 442nd. Medals galore. Heroes overflowing the eyes of widows and Issei mothers. Constitutional wrongs. "Even as I was serving in my country's army, my parents were interned behind barbed wire... I want to know why!" Thomas Kinaga said, and Paul Oda much the same thing. Phil Shigekuni read a statement by the Nisei Medal of Honor winner—he won the Medal of Honor in Korea, not in Europe with the 442nd. Shigekuni, a member of the original John Tateishi JACL redress committee, read the medal of honor winner's military record into the record of the commission. We've heard it before. What does it say about damage to Japanese America done by the executive order? Jim Kawaminami, president of the 100th/442nd Association, formerly of Amachi, was next after the applause.

The 100th/442nd Association president was winding up to pitch his organization's stand on redress. He was about to climax another JACL-inspired show. A good public show of Nisei veterans and vets organizations, laying their resolutions and great American slogans on the record. Kawaminami was disassociating the 100th/442nd from a letter to the editor by Lillian Baker, the blonde avenging angel. A Japanese flag taken as a war trophy was on display in Gardena. The Manzanar Committee objected. They took the flag as a racial slur. Lillian Baker's letter claimed the 442nd vets organization joined her in supporting the display of the war trophy.

Then Lillian Baker stood up from the sixth row of the audience. "Be careful, because Lillian Baker is here" she said, rising to her aluminum four-legged cane. The crowd peered. "Sit down!" Then "Out! Out! Out!" and "Nazi!"

Lungren was slow, slower than slow about bringing his gavel into play and calling for order. Rachel Grace Kawasaki, a white woman stood on a chair by the witness table and faced the crowd and shook her fist, and shouted back at the crowd, calling them racists. Lillian Baker leaped and hopped to the table and grabbed at the notes in Nisei vet Kawaminami's hands. The security police moved in. A white woman cop and a black male cop. A strange wrestling match between uniformed police, a Nisei vet in his 70s, Lillian Baker in her white pantsuit and hanging onto her four-legged cane, towering over him, and Rachel Grace Kawasaki standing on a chair. And the jeering crowd. It's as if Hayakawa was right about the "small but vocal minority."

The blonde woman cop and black male cop hustled Lillian Baker and Rachel Grace Kawasaki out of the hearing room, without drawing their batons or using much force. No scratches. No punches. A little shoving. A lot of grabbing of wrists, perhaps an elbow. And the crowd applauded.

The press was totally bewildered. The sob stories were dull, and bland. Sob after sob, and awww the poor pitiful people. We've heard stories like this before. The Great Depression. The Bonus Marches. The Hobo Jungles. Riding the rods. The Okies abandoning the great Dust Bowl. Hardship. Ruin. Pulling on the bootstraps. The families following their soldier husbands and fathers, from camp to camp. Victim after victim. Soldier victims. Terminal Island victims. Issel victims. Pity me. Applause. Pity me. Pity me. Applause. Pity me, or else! Wild applause.

Vice chairman Lungren looked stoned, drunk, holding back nausea, mindblown and out of it. The crowd was in control. The victims and their mob. Of course they are victims. And of course the more they've repeated these stories from college campus to church meeting, from one kind of Asian American conference to Japanese American pilgrimage, the more aware they become of neither being heard nor understood.

The Japanese Americans at the L.A. hearing, in the audience and at the witness table were indulging themselves. Lungren five or six beats too late mumbles into the mike about summarizing your statement because we're running an hour behind schedule—"Let him speak!"—a few in the crowd shout. And Lungren without a call to order, lean back, blushes and lets them speak. Lungren blushes a lot. He can't stand up to challenges. Luckily, for him, his incompetence and flop-sweat aren't as visually interesting as the surly mob.

Without understanding the questions or knowing the history, the newshawks dive on the obvious emotional charge of the moment. Two old white women in dark glasses against an angry hostile crowd. Where is the expert testimony? Where are the penologists, the cultural anthropologists, applied anthropologists sociologists?—There certainly were enough of them working in the camps. Where are the psychologists, the historians? The experts and specialists?

clear the victims of the science did not understand beyond the immediate orbit their family. They don't know what happened to anyone but themselves. And they're vague and full of protective rhetoric about that. They've read a few book and the Pacific Citizen, the Japanese American Citizens League weekly. They are neither technically nor temperamentally equipped to speak knowledgeably, factually and candidly about the depth, degree and kinds of damage they absorbed because of camp. They are victims still inhabiting the shock and horror of the unspeakable. They are not experts. No more experts than the victims of the Holocaust were experts on the Nazi's "Final Solution." The victims' testimony on damage done them by camp, is as expert as the testimony of the mentally retarded on retardation.

It is no accident that expert testimony has neither been sought nor encouraged by the commission. Unless the commission is so arrogant as to determine no experts on the camps and their effects on the various kinds and generation of Nikkei culture and history exist.

Michi Weglyn's research in the National Archives unearthed recently declassified government documents that confirm the Hollywood hint that the U.S. State Department looked on the camps as hostage reserves. The book she wrote with her research, "Years of Infamy," is universally recognized as the most original and thoroughly scholarly work on camps ever produced by a former internee. Ironically and sadly, she is not emotionally equipped to speak of her personal experience in the camps.

From the testimony heard in Washington, D.C. and Los Angeles, it's obvious everyone in the JACL, every Nikkei witness testifying before the commission, has read and memorized if not plagiarized whole sections of Weglyn's work. Her work is cited directly and indirectly in every piece written on the x camps since 1976. Michi Weglyn is a popularly recognized expert on the camps, the decision to create them and the damage they created.

She has neither briefed the staff or commissioners, nor appeared at the hearings. She was not even asked.

This is amazing, since no serious study of any aspect of the camps is complete without her.

Peter T. Suzuki, an anthropologist at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, has been doing a study on the camp anthropologists and sociologists for years. He finds all their social science "fishy." They and their Nisei "informants" and "assistants" manipulated behavior, created Issei fanatics, they reported the fanatics to military intelligence officers posted at the camps. The shoddiness of the published scientific work and the egregious violations of scientific methods and ethnics

are defended rather than denied by the former camp social scientists, not emeritus and the "establishment" of their disciplines Suzuki's scholarly article exposing the excesses and patriotically-motivated violations of scientific ethics have been kept out of the "American Anthropologist" by the former mad scientists of the camps.

The books by the former camp social scientists that Suzuki's work and research cast doubt upon, include Leighton's "The Governing of Men," Thomas and Nishimoto's "The Spoilage" and "The Salvage," Rosalie Hankey Wax's, "Doing Fieldwork," the Community Analysis Section reports to the War Relocation Authority and the resulting, "Impounded People," that form the foundation of all Japanese American social science. The foundation is rotten.

Suzuki's research in the National Archives and the papers of former Community Analysis Section chief, Spicer, at the University of Arizona archives seem especially germane to the commission's study of psychological and social damage to individual Nikkei and Nikkei social integrity. Suzuki is the only expert in the area of damage done Japanese America by the social scientists in the camps. But, he has not been asked to brief the staff or appear before the commission.

The only experts on the camp the commission seems to recognize are members of the JACL, an advocacy, public relations organization, like the Moral Majority, as opposed to an organization like, say, the ABA or the AMA or the AIA that represents a standard of professional training, expertise and ethics.

So, no expert witnesses, other than JACL blowhards using the commission to write their past sins and the impact of their loyalty oath out of history. Only victims with their pocketfuls of sobstories, and antique white racists. The hearings are being populated with grotesques and pglies. Everybody looks bad. The importance and the purpose of the commission are made incomprehensible in the fakey theatrics raised by all the performers. Applause.

Arthur Goldberg leaned back in his thickly-upholstered chair to make a brief statement before he left the L.A. hearings early, because of his slipped disc. He was disturbed by the "hatred" he saw on the faces of the crowd today. He said he wanted to remove the hatred, "Dillon Myer is not a racist," he said, and mentioning his long friendship with Myer. He said Myer was a "victim of circumstance. He had an impossible situation foisted on him. He didn't do as well as he wanted. They were camps. Don't quibble over the word, 'concentration.' They were camps. Japanese Americans were forced into camps, on as short as 24 hours notice. Massive property loss. Financial ruin. Mental anguish. Family insecurity. American citizens were imprisoned without being charged or given a hearing

in clear violation of the constitution. The basis for imprisonment was race. Those are the facts.

"I make an appeal," Goldberg continued. "Let's get rid of this hatred. Let's get rid of this division . . ." Goldberg carried on for 20 or 30 rambling grandfatherly mellowing minutes. He was the great grandpa scolding his beloved grandchildren, giving them a lesson in manners. He was also, indirectly, scolding Lungren for a sloppy hold on his gavel. Lungren was defeated, crestfallen. Perhaps it was jetlag. All he could do was drop flosssweat and and look around the room like a lost boy in need of his mother.

Goldberg repeated the facts of short notice, property loss, financial ruin, no habeas corpus, no charges, no hearings, mass imprisonment in many and wonderful ways. The plain facts took wonderful forms in his contemplative old man's drift, like plain bread and American cheese whip becoming an array of charming canapes. The crowd loved him. He cared. He loved them. And they gave him a standing ovation. After all his mellowing lessons in manners, the audience was still out of control. The chair was still weak and the hearings still unfocused.

—FRANK CHIN

Friday, August 28, 1981

THE RAFU SHIMPO

Letters

Editor

We had mixed feelings about Frank Chin's satirical essay ("Unfocused L.A. Hearings: A Circus of Freaks": R.S. 8-21-31). On the one hand, we feel it is important to criticize the political process, to expose it for what it is, and to warn ourselves of false hopes and our own vulnerabilities to paternalism, reacting) as oppressed people.

On the other hand we feel sad that in the process of sharing his thoughts and feelings he was insensitive toward the persons who testified and attended to hearings. His cynicism came across as demeaning.

It's ironic that in his criticism of the unfocused, dehumanizing process of the commission hearings he victimizes persons by his cynicism.

Susan Kuwaye
Amy Chuman
Agape Fellowship

Dr. Mary S. Oda
North Hollywood

Editor

Chinese American Frank Chin's write-up of the hearings as a "Circus of Freaks" and the accounts of the witnesses as "sob stories" is an appalling, shocking display of utter callousness and insensitivity on the part of a fellow Asian. He is the yellow counterpart of Lillian Baker with her historical inaccuracies and shrill anti-Jap sentiments. His sardonic ridicule of human suffering bared by the witnesses at the recent hearings reflect a bitter, angry man, scarcely qualifying him to write of the human condition. I wonder what in his own personal life fills him with such venom against other Asians? Does he not know that there were no social scientists in camp—the average age of Nisei in camp being under 20?

From my own experience as a physician, I know of the suicides and deaths of my fellow campmates. The shortened lives, the heart disease and cancers, the depressive states, all brought on by the terrible consequences of the Evacuation.

I have in my own practice three brothers with schizophrenia whose psychiatrist called me the day after the hearings to tell me that their psychosis was brought on by the camp experience. He told me that individual testimony does not have the impact that group statistics and hard facts demonstrate. Anyone knows that such hard facts take decades to accumulate—we are only beginning to delve into the effects of the degrading experience on ourselves and succeeding generations to come.

The only part of the entire article worth printing was the last three paragraphs pertaining to Justice Goldberg. Mr. Chin should stick to writing about his own chicken coop Chinamen. He lacks the sensitivity, perception and depth of character necessary to understand the Japanese Americans . . .

. . . I hope the day will come when all minorities, assisted by dedicated whites, will work for the common good rather than engage in petty, destructive inter-minority conflicts.

Ex-official says apology not due WWII internees

WASHINGTON (AP) — Retired diplomat John J. McCloy said yesterday that 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry interned by the United States during World War II are due neither reparations nor an apology.

McCloy, 87, who was assistant secretary of war at the time, said the suffering by Japanese-Americans and Japanese aliens was no worse than that others underwent during the war.

He spoke forcefully for nearly four hours before the Commission on War-time Relocation and Internment of Civilians.

The panel was created by Congress to recommend whether the United States should compensate those who lost their jobs, homes, farms — and often their dignity — because the government assumed that their loyalty could not be counted upon.

McCloy said the uprooting of people of Japanese origin from their West Coast homes was decided upon by men like then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt and former Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who, he said, could not be accused of racism.

"It sends me up the wall when someone suggests we ought to apologize for what they did," he said.

He said everyone made sacrifices, including those who gave up everything to join the Army.

"Is there not a big distinction between serving your country — as you and I did — and being stigmatized as disloyal?" asked former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, a commission member.

Replied McCloy: "All of us suffered. People who died on Iwo Jima suffered, too. I don't think we ought to apologize."

At one point, McCloy used the term "retribution" to describe the internment, provoking the only Japanese-American member of the panel, William Marutani, to question him closely. Marutani, a judge in Philadelphia, spent six months in a camp before enlisting in the U.S. Army.

Marutani had the stenographer play a recording of the proceedings to make sure he had heard correctly.

Retribution is defined as "a deserved punishment for evil done." After Marutani questioned him, McCloy said he wanted to withdraw his use of that word.

In his formal statement to the commission, McCloy suggested that Japanese-Americans benefited from having been interned.

He said: "I hope the commission will find, as I believe to be the case, that the whole operation was as benignly conducted as wartime conditions permitted."

"I gained the impression, after making considerable effort to follow the destinies of those who had been relocated, that on the whole, the de-concentration of the Japanese population and its redistribution throughout the country resulted in their finding a healthier and more advantageous environment than they would have had on the West Coast following the Pearl Harbor attack and the reports of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines and the Southwest Pacific."

After the war, McCloy served as high commissioner of Germany, in effect, the allied commander of that defeated nation. Later he was president of the World Bank, a disarmament adviser to presidents and chairman of the board of the Chase Manhattan Bank.