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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Manzanar Relocation Area
Manzanar, California

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO: D.S. Myer, Director
Washington, D.C.

FROM: Robt. L. Brown, Acting Asst. Project Director
Manzanar, California

SUBJECT: Final report on the "Negotiating Committee" of the
December 8th incident.

It appeared to those of us who witnessed the incident of December 8, that a serious breakdown had developed in the law enforcing policy of the Camp. A perfectly logical explanation was immediately given - A assaulted B. A was arrested. Friends of A demanded his release. This was refused.

Ordinarily the matter would have been closed at this point, but the temper of the people was such that a riot ensued. What concerns us at the moment is not so much what disposition was made of the guilty participants as why it was possible for the case to assume riotous proportions. The subsequent negotiations and final settlement of the case were based on actual facts related to the riot, but the real disposition of the affair has been a settlement of the differences arising between the evacuees as a whole and the United States government.

The various Project Directors have been charged with the responsibility of feeding, clothing and housing 10,000 people, herded within a very limited area. Theirs was a job of a very practical nature - to see that sufficient rice was on the tables; to see that the oil never ran too low; to see that the government regulations were properly carried out, etc. Occasionally a strike would take place, now and then a committee of evacuees would present a case involving what it considered just cause for complaint; these and similar matters were readily disposed of in the daily rush of routine business.

The ever-increasing feeling of unrest that prevailed throughout the camp was either ignored or discussed lightly by the administration.

The enormous burden placed on a man to be a well-behaved being is made bearable by permitting him to indulge in his inherent desire for freedom. Deprived of freedom and lacking the necessity for making a livelihood, he may soon despair of the future, which in turn is the seed of revolt. In lieu of freedom, if this be denied a man, he must place his faith and trust in some individual to whom he can look for guidance. The question then arises as to whether the administration recognized this state of mind of the evacuee, and whether or not there was an adminis-

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trator to whom he could look for guidance.

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The most significant indication to the Japanese that there had finally come to them such a man was when Mr. Merritt addressed the Committee of 108 on December 12th.

He was faced by a group of essentially honest men whose frustrations and real or fancied grievances had culminated in demanding the return from jail of men whom they knew had committed a crime. In the few minutes that Mr. Merritt spoke it was apparent that these men were impressed by his logic, sincerity and force. These 108 men had gathered at Mr. Merritt's request to elect a negotiating committee to represent the majority of the well-meaning people of the camp in the negotiations to follow.

A committee was elected. To this committee fell the difficult task of presenting to Mr. Merritt the case of the people of Manzanar. To Mr. Merritt fell the difficult task of presenting to the people of Manzanar the case of the government.

The immediate and tangible vehicle by which this exchange was effected were matters pertaining to the riot itself. The committee at once demanded the release of the prisoners. It was on this point that the Committee would be successful or fail. Tactfully and patiently Mr. Merritt met with the Committee every day; skillfully and uncompromisingly he won their confidence and inspired them. This Committee in time became of considerable value to the Administration and was instrumental in convincing many of them of the futility of making unreasonable demands of the Director. This confidence in Mr. Merritt was transmitted throughout the camp and was further evidenced by repeated votes of confidence in the Negotiating Committee by the Committee of 108 in spite of its failure to effect the return of the prisoners.

The Committee usually called on Mr. Merritt every morning. Their first statement daily for the first month was always, "Are you ready to release the men in jail back to us?" To which Mr. Merritt would reply, always, "I am not able to release the prisoners and never will be." This was a daily morning greeting.

Having done their duty, as far as the people were concerned, the Committee would then get down to matter-of-fact business. These conferences lasted from one to four hours daily, and in them many minor grievances were worked out. The matter of payment of clothing allowances, for instance, was a major grievance in the camp. No clothing allowances had been paid up to the time of the incident. Mr. Merritt agreed to start the payment of the clothing allowances immediately, temporarily giving it to the Fiscal Department to handle. Within a week's time the first payments were made. This was an evidence of good faith on the part of the management, and the Committee recognized it as such.

There were many other similar matters which were discussed and steps taken immediately by the management to conform to the wishes of the evacuees. As these things began to function, the Committee, on its own, began to give information to Mr. Merritt concerning the activities

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of many of the men we had in jail.

The climax came in these conversations some thirty or forty days after the actual incident. The Committee met one day in an all-out attempt to find out why the men in jail could not be released. Mr. Merritt remained firm in his explanation that the matter was entirely out of his hands. When the Committee found out that it could not move Mr. Merritt one inch, the leader, Mr. Tom Ozomoto, finally spoke up and said, "Personally we think you are right. The people here need a strong man. We admire you because you are strong. You give the orders from now on and we will see that they are carried out."

As the Committee left the room, Ozomoto stopped in the doorway, saluted and said, "Good night, General."

From that day on, the Committee has given excellent, constructive advice to the Project Director on every move affecting the residents, and this advice has shown that the Committee is fully aware of the position of the Federal Government in the situation.

Two months have now passed since the riot, and the results of Mr. Merritt's close association and dealing with influential Japanese are very much in evidence through the camp. "If Mr. Merritt wants it that way, it's good enough for us." These words come from many a group which in the past might have insisted on going it in its own way, regardless of the consequences.

It is hoped, and entirely reasonable to expect, that though mutually sympathetic understanding guided by the inspired leadership of Mr. Merritt the complex undertaking of administering of affairs of Manzanar will in the future admit of few serious failures.

/s/ Robert L. Brown

Robert L. Brown
Acting Project Director

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Community Analysis Section
Manzanar Relocation Center
September 25, 1943

A Preliminary Analysis of the Segregation Group at Manzanar

The segregation roster for Manzanar has been compiled, and the names listed therein have been sent to Washington. Some changes will undoubtedly be made but the data are close enough to their final form so that analysis of them may be profitable.

The segregation roster contains the names of 2242 individuals. Of these 630,-344 boys and 296 girls, are 16 years of age or younger, and therefore have never been called upon to answer Question 28. These children and pubescents account for 28 percent of the segregants. Of this number only two, a girl 8 years of age and a 16 year old boy, are Japanese nationals. The break-down of the figure according to age and sex is as follows:

Under one year	males 31	females 30	total 61
One year	males 32	females 22	total 54
Two years	males 19	females 19	total 38
Three years	males 17	females 19	total 36
Four years	males 26	females 21	total 47
Five years	males 23	females 8	total 31
Six years	males 21	females 12	total 33
Seven years	males 20	females 15	total 35
Eight years	males 16	females 10	total 26
Nine years	males 17	females 12	total 29
Ten years	males 14	females 14	total 28
Eleven years	males 10	females 13	total 23
Twelve years	males 21	females 18	total 39
Thirteen years	males 13	females 11	total 24
Fourteen years	males 23	females 15	total 38
Fifteen years	males 11	females 23	total 34
Sixteen years	males 30	females 24	total 54

In addition, 244 more of the segregants, 136 males and 109 females, are less than 21 years old, ranging in age from 17 through 20 years. Most countries, where a choice must be made or where an individuals must act

to preserve nationality, set the age at which this is done at 21. The implication is that the youth who has not reached his majority lacks the background and experience wisely to decide so important and far-reaching an issue. We have at Manzanar, then, 874 segregants who are 20 years of age or less, and who are under the age at which binding decisions determining nationality are ordinarily made. This is approximately 36 per cent of the total number of those on the segregation roster.

Beside the 630 minors who have not been required to answer Question 28, there are 483 persons on the segregation roster whose answer to the question has been "yes." Under present rules, were it not for family affiliations governing their decision, few if any of these persons would be subject to segregation.

The total number of persons who have never been confronted with Question 28 or who have answered it in the affirmative is, accordingly, 1113, or almost exactly half of the designated segregants.

The degree to which family considerations intrude and are taking persons with "yes" answers to Tule Lake can perhaps be shown by the following analysis of figures relating to segregants and their families. There are 176 families represented at Manzanar by two or more members in which only one member answered "no." The distribution according to size of family and the numbers involved is as follows:

No. in family	No. of families	No. of "yes" individuals and family members involved
2	37	37
3	33	66
4	40	120
5	32	128
6	17	65
7	7	42
8	6	42
9	2	16
10	1	9
11	1	10
	<u>176</u>	<u>555</u>

Thus, on the face of it, of the 731 members of these 176 families, 556 persons have had their names placed on the segregation roster because of the statement of 176 of their number. In other words, of this group 4 are going to Yule Lake for every one who answered Question 28 negatively!

The rest of the names listed on the segregation roster, with the exception of few special cases, are those of repatriates, expatriates and of those who maintained their "no" answers to Question 28.

The repatriates are 234 in number, 186 males and 48 females. In regard to most of them the question of loyalty does not arise, for the great majority of them voluntarily answered Question 28 submitted to aliens and, like the non-repatriates, have pledged themselves to obey the laws of this country while they remain within its jurisdiction and to do nothing to interfere with the war effort. The right of enemy aliens at a time of international crisis to request repatriation is well established, and, especially in view of the fact that these people are not permitted to naturalize in this country, their action would not seem to call for harsh treatment or a controversy over their loyalties.

The motives of the majority of these repatriates are fairly clear. One hundred thirty-nine of the men and 8 of the women are the sole representatives of families in Manchuria. They are either unmarried or have spouses and families in Japan. The single men who fall into this bracket, and they constitute the majority, are harmless old bachelors who have been unable to establish normal family life in this country because of the disproportion of the sexes among the issei. Now that their economic life has been disrupted they are prepared to return to the land of their origin to die. Eighty-seven other repatriates are linked with 60 family clusters. Of

these 60 families, 14 consist of man and wife only, both repatriates. In 46 instances, however, the action of the repatriate has involved children or other family members. Eighty-two individuals, 71 of them minors, have been listed as expatriates as a result of their connection with repatriates. The 59 repatriates in these 46 families are officially responsible for taking 157 persons to Tule Lake. I have made a survey of the family constellations in which repatriates are involved which will be the basis of another report. In a previous report dated August 24, 1943 and entitled "An Analysis of the Repatriate Group at Manzanar" I paid particular attention to the motives underlying repatriation requests and found them usually linked to factors which I have called personal-family and economic-uncertainty. Attachment to Japan as such, or what I designated as the cultural-national factor was found to be a minor element in the picture.

The expatriates, 170 in number, fall into a number of classifications. Seventy-one of them are minors who were listed by repatriate parents or guardians on family summary forms. Their presence on the repatriate-expatriate list and therefore on the segregation roster is due to no action on their part. Eleven older expatriates filled out individual forms in order to accompany repatriate parents. In addition 40 expatriates are males unattached to any family group in Manzanar. Four single females are expatriates. Finally there are 16 families of expatriates with a total of 49 members and dependents. Of the 49 persons involved, 5 are not expatriates but are listed as family members who are going to Tule Lake with the expatriates. Fifteen are children who have been listed as expatriates by parents. In 97 of the 170 cases of expatriation we can

say that the action was not self-initiated but arose from the acts and decisions of repatriate or expatriate elders. Any search for evidence of disloyalty or for complex motivations must be directed toward the 43 percent, the 73 expatriate individuals who theoretically, at least, enjoyed some freedom of choice in this situation.

We come, then, to the number named on the segregation roster who answered "no" to Question 28. In view of the popular impression in many quarters and the generally voiced press opinion that practically all those destined for Tule Lake have answered "no" to a loyalty question, it is startling to realize that only 796 of those to be segregated or 35 percent of the 2242 total have maintained a "no" answer.

The distribution of the "no" answers according to citizenship, sex and the nisei-kibei dichotomy is interesting. Only 27 aliens, 21 men and 6 women, have failed to answer "yes" to the question submitted to issei. Of citizens, 467 males and 329 females have maintained "no" answers, a total of 796 individuals. A further division of these figures is revealing. The 476 "no" answers from male citizens are divided between 306 kibei and 170 nisei. The 320 "no" answers of the citizen women involve 126 kibei and 194 nisei. In other words, of the 796 "no" answers only 339 or 42 percent come from citizens who have received all or nearly all of their education and training in this country.

These figures point to a very significant factor in the segregation program at Manzanar. This center has numbered among its population a rather large group of kibei. The implications of this for segregation has extended far beyond the kibei group. For instance there are 180 families being segregated in which a male kibei said "no". In a number of instances

this youth was the only member of the family who gave a negative answer. The desire for family solidarity dictates that the others follow. Moreover, these kisei have not only influenced their consanguineous relatives but have also swelled the list of segregants with their affinal kin. In 90 cases in which a married male kisei maintained his "no," his wife followed suit. Many of these wives are nisei and this has added to the total of nisei women saying "no."

The female kisei, too, have had an influence upon the final tally out of proportion to their own numbers. For example, of 31 single kisei women who held to "no," in 18 cases this "no" was the only one in the family. Of 94 married kisei women who said "no," 26 or approximately one-third gave the only "no's" registered in the families.

Statistics and the arrangement of figures may be useful and suggestive, but by themselves they are seldom definitive or interpretive in human affairs. Source materials and case materials are inevitably required to breathe meaning into these counts. To illustrate: Of 339 families on the segregation roster which include both citizens and aliens old enough to answer Question 28, in 227 cases it was the citizen alone who answered "no" and who is therefore technically responsible for the family's destination. In but 5 instances is it the alien only who said "no," and in 9 cases only have both alien and citizen members of the same family replied in the negative. It does not suffice to say that the revised question asked of the aliens was mild while that presented to citizens was much stricter and broader. It is scarcely possible that in 227 families, children, many of them no more than 17 or 18 years old,

would have maintained an answer necessitating yet another family upheaval and removal if parental objection had been strong. Certainly one aspect of the problem is to determine the influence of the issei upon the citizen answers. This calls for an inquiry into the state of mind of the elders, a topic which has important implications for the leave clearance hearings to come, for relocation, and for the future of those of Japanese ancestry in America.

I am in the midst of gathering and arranging source materials relating to segregation which lend themselves primarily to the exposition and clarification of such problems. Consequently I have limited this preliminary report to the analysis of the general picture in respect to numbers and categories of segregants, and have only offered such generalizations and interpretations as seem obvious from the information reviewed.

Yet even this initial and incomplete approach has brought interesting facts and arrangements of facts to light. To summarize, 28 percent of the segregants from Manzanar are children under 16 years of age whose loyalty has never been questioned. Thirty-five percent of the segregants are legal minors, 20 years of age or less. Of those who are bound for Tule Lake, 483 or 22 percent have answered "yes" to Question 28 and are going as "family members" in order to preserve family unity. Thus 176 "no" answers have been found to involve 731 "yes" individuals and family members. Moreover, 80 percent of the repatriates have answered the loyalty question affirmatively, and in respect to this issue stand on the same basis as most of the non-repatriate issei. In addition, a substantial portion of the expatriates are not persons who have shown any positive

interest in Japan or Japanese culture, but are the offspring of repatriates who have been listed by their parents on family summary forms, or the small children of expatriate parents. Actually only 796 individuals or 35 percent of those on the segregation roster are persons who answered "no" to Question 28. In view of the large number of children and of "loyal" family members who are being involved in the segregation program, it is an oversimplification and a superficial reading of the evidence to contend that the only issue involved is one of simple national loyalties.

Morris Edward Opler
Social Science Analyst

Community Analysis Section
Manzanar Relocation Center
August 24, 1943

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An Analysis of the Repatriate Group at Manzanar

On August 3, 1943 I attended a series of interviews in which Mrs. D'Ille of the Welfare Department discussed plans for travel to Tule Lake with members of the repatriate and expatriate group. On this day she was interviewing family heads (and also members of the family if they appeared) in order to determine whether all segregants would be able to travel or whether infirmities, pregnancies, etc., might necessitate special arrangements. She also answered questions which repatriates or members of their families asked and told them where they could obtain legal aid or information about property and baggage arrangements. Mrs. D'Ille very kindly took time to draw out information in which she thought I might be especially interested, and it is largely due to her thoughtfulness in this regard that some of the most illuminating particulars emerged.

While I was present the representatives of 27 families were heard. Ninety-three individuals were involved in decisions concerning these 27 families. One family was large, consisting of father, mother and seven children. In two others three children were involved. But most were families with but one or two children or were cases of couples with no children, with no children at Manzanar, or with children

in Japan only.

I was considerably interested, of course, in the reasons for repatriation by which these people have been motivated. One of the most conspicuous of these can be called the personal-family. It has been generated by the war but it is not due primarily to a feeling of patriotism or attachment to Japan. The first person to be interviewed exemplified this particular motivation. His initial question was, "When will the Gripsholm sail?" He explained that his children are in Japan, caught there by the war while visiting relatives. Not long after Pearl Harbor he got a telegram through the Red Cross informing him that his daughter was very sick. He has not been able to obtain further word concerning her health. His one thought is to be reunited with his children and to determine the state of health of the girl who was reported ill. He signed for repatriation in the hopes that this would be the speediest manner of attaining these ends. The war enters into his thinking mainly because it is the factor that prevents direct communication and reunion with his children. Evacuation divested him of all but personal property. In view of his concern over his children there is little to hold him here at a time of war, especially when he must live here under the unfavorable conditions created by evacuation.

Another man explained that he is much worried about

his mother, who is seventy-one years old. He supported her on his earnings as a gardener, sending her money every month. Now his possessions are gone and he can do nothing for her until he gets to Japan, where he hopes to work and aid her once more. As a result of his overwhelming sense of obligation this man is taking his wife and three children to Japan. The children range in age from 11 to 15 years. None of them holds Japanese citizenship.

One of the finest and most respected men in the center, a person who has worked faithfully in the Welfare Division, told much the same story. He came to the office with his handsome wife and two beautiful daughters. He expressed regret that he felt obligated to make a decision to leave America, which had been his home since 1910. He also stated that he had no special interest in Tule Lake. "I like Manzanar best. I don't like to go to Tule Lake, but I can't help it," is the way he put it. "I have a feeling of responsibility for the old people in Japan; that is the only reason", he explained. "My mother, father and one sister are in Japan. My father is 72, my mother is 70 years old. I have been helping them and cannot do it as long as the war lasts and I am here. Also my wife has relatives in Japan about whom she is worrying." It is evident that this family would have continued to live in this country and that this man would have continued to discharge his obligations to his parents from this side of the sea had not the war come. The

family had purchased a home, which has lately been sold, in the name of the eldest daughter. Had war been declared 10 years or even 5 years later, the old people who are drawing the family to Japan would probably be gone and there would be no thought of return. As it is these worthy and peaceable alien residents and their two lovely and entirely Americanized children are being lost to this nation.

Quite often to the personal-family factor is added an economic element. This is the case with a man and wife who operated a restaurant in Los Angeles until the time of evacuation. Their equipment and most of their investment were lost. The man's father, who is in Japan, is old -- "old enough so that I should take care of him." Two children of the couple are in Japan with the grandparents. In this instance it is difficult to separate the personal from the economic factors. The man naturally wishes to be reunited with his parents and children at this critical time. But he also is plainly aware that he has lost his economic stake in this country and will inherit from his father, who is now old, if he can get to Japan. In view of what has happened to his fortunes in this country, the family assets remaining in Japan are now more attractive.

In another group of cases the economic motive, or what is better described as the economic-uncertainty element was definitely dominant. In these instances the family head has suffered severe financial loss and sees no way of

rehabilitating himself in this country in the future because of age, because of legal obstacles (alien land laws, etc.,) or because of anticipated discrimination. In the past, Japanese in this country who suffered reverses could look for aid from relatives or associates of their own group. But the losses sustained during evacuation have been so general and so severe that this is now a forlorn hope. Therefore many who have lost heavily assume that whatever assistance they receive from others must come from relatives in Japan. Accordingly those who have kin in Japan whom they think may be in a position to help them, look to the Orient rather than to this country as the place where they will be best able to make a fresh start.

One old man, whose appearance gave unmistakable evidence of the years of toil on a celery ranch which he had developed near Venice, expressed this view in these words:

"I have a sister, a brother and a daughter in Japan. I am 62 years old now. I have been here in America 43 years. I really am an American; I feel that I am an American, for I have been here 43 years. But I think of it this way. If the war lasts 5 years I will be 67 years old. It will be too late to start in again then. If I get to Japan now I still can work; I can make enough on which to live. That's all I want. My daughter will help me out and I think it is cheaper to live in Japan than here. Here these young boys will get

all the jobs. I'm sorry I'm an old grandfather. I never thought I'd be a nuisance in this United States after 43 years, but that's the way it is."

Another case which belongs to the same category is that of a man who lost most of his assets in a restaurant he operated in Los Angeles for 15 years. He has a father and two brothers in Japan and feels that it will be safer to start over in the country of his origin after the war.

In another instance a man and wife and the wife's parents are eager to reach Japan. They feel that they have a better alternative than trying to restore the family economy in this country, for the woman has a relative who owns an important mining property in Manchuria, and they hope to share in this wealth.

Still another man has a 90-year old father in Japan from whom he will inherit property. Now that he is dispossessed here the family property looms large in his future plans.

Still another motive for repatriation can be termed cultural-national. In these instances the individual feels his affiliation with Japanese culture so strongly or his sympathy as a national of Japan is so decidedly with the mother country, that he feels he should be in Japan at this period of crisis and conflict. A good example of this attitude was that of a man who declared, when he was asked why he wanted to repatriate, "One of the main reasons is to put

myself definitely on record as a Japanese. That's the main thing." He was quick to point out the "Japanese" character of the whole family saying, "My wife is a Nisei; she was born in this country. But she was taken to Japan at 18 months and came back at the age of 17. She is Japanese." This man's resentment at the United States and his self-identification with Japan were unmistakable. But these emotions, it should be stated, cannot be entirely separated from the economic picture. Of his former business he said grimly, "I used to live in West Los Angeles and worked at the nursery business. At evacuation it was all cleaned up."

A young man, a Kibei, who has spent 7 of the last 10 years in Japan and whose parents are in Japan, feels that it is his obligation to the Japanese government to return at the earliest possible moment. He explained his position thus: "I came to the United States in 1940. When I left I told the Japanese government that I would be back in two years. I married here, got a wife here and we have a baby. That's all I have left of my trip to the United States." His stay in this country has been "a trip" to this man and repatriation is the logical and honest step for him to take.

A second young man, also a Kibei, seemed hostile and sullen. He returned to this country in 1938, after 18 years in Japan. When asked whether he had been working he replied, "I haven't been working (at Manzanar) lately. I don't feel like working. It's too hot I guess."

The most pathetic instance of this kind was that of the Issei father who is paying a high personal price for sending his two boys to Japan for their education. The boys were sent to Japan in 1924. One returned in 1937, the other reentered the United States in 1941. Both, though they are American-born, have requested repatriation. Their foreign-born father refuses to do so. The old man came to the hearing with the one son with whom he is on speaking terms. He testified that he had little control over the boys, particularly over the one who had returned in 1941. He said that he would go with his sons to Tule Lake but that he did not wish to return to Japan and would not do so, though the boys would go at the first opportunity. The old Issei, as a result of long and continuous residence in this country has become more assimilated and Americanized than his native-born sons.

There were a few cases that did not lend themselves to the three broad categories mentioned. One is that of an uneducated and poorly endowed farmer from the Florin, California region who wishes to take his family of nine to Japan. He has no living relatives in Japan. There is no property there which he expects to obtain. All that sustains him in his request for repatriation is the sense of helplessness and frustration at having lost his farm, and the pious hope that he will be somehow better treated and more fortunate in

Japan. Out of loyalty to the parents the older children have signed individual repatriation forms, though they are obviously dismayed at the turn of affairs. Said the oldest girl:

"I don't know whether I would be willing to live in Japan the rest of my life. But whatever my father decides is all right. At times like these I don't want argument in the family and I don't want to have my father worrying about me."

The oldest boy, who has just reached the age of 18, decided to sign the individual repatriation request on the same grounds, declaring, "If I have to go I will. If my parents go to Tule Lake, I'd better go too."

That the father has little conception of the legal and political implications of what is taking place is indicated by his remark, "I want to be sure that my son can come back to America after the war."

Probably the most touching of the cases which do not yield to neat classification is that of a man and wife, neither of whom is in good health. When asked about their motives and whether they had many relatives or particular interests in Japan, the old man responded:

"No, I have only one sister in Japan and she is poor. The reason I signed it was that I understood that for every Japanese that went to Japan, and American would be brought back to this country. For that reason I signed it and I want to leave it that way even though it is disappointing, the number of Americans that have got back."

To summarize: The dominant motivations for repatriation requests of 27 families at Manzanar have been analyzed and classified. Since this is almost half of the total number of families involved, it is considered a fair sample. With few exceptions (allowing of course for overlapping and multiple factors) the dominant motives can be brought under three headings, namely, personal-family, economic-uncertainty, and cultural-national. By far the greater number of cases fall into the first two categories. The first category exists primarily because Japanese immigration to this country has been so recent that kinship and personal ties between the immigrants and relatives in Japan have not been finally severed. The second category is largely the result of evacuation. Active disloyalty to the United States or hostility against this country are not, consequently, the driving forces behind repatriation requests, despite the popular belief to the contrary.

Morris Edward Opler
Social Science Analyst

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Manzanar Committee
1566 Curran St.
Los Angeles Ca. 90026

977.

October 14, 1975

Dr. Ed Spicer
Department of Anthropology
University of Arizona
Tucson, Arizona 85721

Dear Dr. Spicer:

Recently, our research group visited the University Library and was able to duplicate and compile a great deal of material from the special collection on the WRA relocation camps of World War II. Unfortunately, they did not get an opportunity to meet you.

We are a community based, volunteer organization which was successful in January of 1972 in our negotiations to make Manzanar a California state historical landmark. After a year of controversy over the appropriate terminology to use, with community support, we did get the wording which we wrote. I am enclosing a copy of the plaque wording as it stands today at the front gate of the former camp site at Manzanar, California.


We are still involved in writing our own ethnic history - this time for Tule Lake, California, which is Historic Landmark No. 850-B, an extension of the application for Manzanar (#850). The terminology is very important in defining that history and I am writing to you to lend support to our efforts. One of the controversial terms on the plaque is "concentration camp" which we insist upon in describing the ten WRA "relocation centers".

Another sore point is the historic fact that Tule Lake was a maximum security segregation center and we would appreciate your expertise on that terminology and historic fact.

We found the material in the special collections to be of great value in our research and we thank you for your sensitive and scholarly records from a lamentable episode in American history.

Sincerely yours,

THE MANZANAR COMMITTEE

By 
Sue Kunitomi Embrey, Chairperson

Enc.

EDWARD H. SPICER

WRA: WRA (Calders: MANZANAR CALIFORNIA

THE EVACUATION OF THE JAPANESE DURING WORLD WAR II

In the spring of 1942, the government of the United States forced approximately 112,000 persons of Japanese ancestry residing on the West Coast to leave their homes to enter concentration camps in desolate inland areas. Two-thirds of these were Nisei (NEE-say) or second generation, American citizens by birth. The rest were Issei (EE-say) or first generation, born in Japan and forbidden by American law from becoming citizens. This uprooting of an entire racial group happened during World War II when the U.S. was at war with Japan.

This almost incredible episode can only be understood in the historical context of the agitation and sentiment against Asian immigrants as they came to the U.S. beginning in the middle of the 19th century. From the start they were looked upon with great suspicion. There were many individuals and groups that were active and persistent in fostering anti-Asian feelings, particularly on the West Coast. The Oriental Exclusion Act was passed in 1924 to stop Japanese immigration into the U.S. Alien land laws were passed prohibiting Japanese immigrants from owning land. There were many other acts restricting the activities of the Japanese in the political, economic, educational and social arenas.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, provided impetus for the "final victory" for forces opposing the Japanese in America. Nevertheless, plans for a final solution were never that clear. Instead, the months after the Japanese attack and the ensuing declaration of war were troubled and confusing ones. The question of what was to be done with the Japanese in the U.S. can probably be best understood in the context of this confusion, since even today it is difficult to ascertain accurately the roles of various individuals, officials, and institutions in relation to the decision to evacuate the Japanese from the West Coast.

Immediately after Pearl Harbor, selected enemy aliens, including 2,192 Japanese, were arrested by the FBI. Curfew regulations and other precautions were also instituted. These steps might have been sufficient for protective purposes, except in the light of the continued battle between Californians and the Japanese. The Hearst papers presented the issue vigorously; for example, the Los Angeles Examiner on December 16, 1941, led off with the headline, "Fifth Column Treachery Told," using a quotation from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, but omitting the fact that Knox was discussing only rumors against the Japanese. The San Francisco Examiner picked up the cry, then the American Legion, then the chambers of commerce, then the farm groups, and finally the politicians--"all Japanese are traitors."

Evidence to the contrary was ignored. Bill Henry, conservative columnist for the Los Angeles Times, wrote on December 26, 1941:

The FBI chief says that yarns about the dead Jap flyers with McKinley High School (Honolulu) rings on their fingers, the stories of the arrows in the cane fields pointing toward Pearl Harbor, and the yarns about the Jap vegetable trucks blocking the roadway to Pearl Harbor that day are all unadulterated bunk.

But the rumors continued to fly and were picked up on a national level. On January 29, 1942, Henry McLemore, a syndicated Hearst columnist wrote:

I am for the immediate removal of every Japanese on the West Coast to a point deep in the interior . . . let 'em be pinched, hurt, hungry . . . let us have no patience with the enemy or with anyone whose veins carry his blood. Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for all of them.

Austin Anson of the Grower-Shippers Association in Salinas, California, writing in the Saturday Evening Post of May 9, 1942, said:

We're charged with wanting to get rid of the Japs for selfish reasons. We might as well be honest. We do. They came into this valley to work, and they stayed to take over . . . If all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we'd never miss them . . . because the white farmer can take over and produce everything the Jap grows, and we don't want them back when the war ends either.

The Japanese 'handicaps' of race and nationality, compounded by social and legal discrimination, isolated ghetto lives, and the outbreak of war, were even too much for the spirit of American democracy and fair play. Very few caucasians really knew the Japanese; their general ignorance about this group helped to foster and maintain negative stereotypes. The range of those attacking the Japanese was truly remarkable--the American Legion, the State Federation of Labor, the Native Sons of the Golden West, the California State Grange, the leftist parties, and individuals such as California Attorney General Earl Warren and "liberal" columnist Walter Lippman, as well as the usual racists. The major newspapers in California kept up a constant attack and were joined by local and national magazines. Also as damaging to the future of the Japanese was the silence of the traditional liberal organizations. Only some Quaker groups and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) provided visible support.

On January 29, 1942, the first of a series of orders by the U.S. Attorney General, Francis Biddle, established security areas along the Pacific Coast that required the removal of all enemy aliens from these areas. On February 13, 1942, a West Coast congressional delegation wrote to President Roosevelt urging the immediate evacuation of all Japanese, whether aliens or citizens, from the West Coast states. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which (1) designated military areas where military commanders could exclude persons, and (2) authorized the building of "relocation" camps to house those people excluded. This set the stage for the evacuation of the Japanese.

On March 2, 1942, General John L. DeWitt, then commander in charge of the Western Defense Command, issued an order to evacuate all persons of Japanese ancestry (defined as children with as little as one-eighth Japanese blood), from the Western half of the three Pacific Coast states and the southern third of Arizona.

On March 22, 1942, the first large contingent of Japanese, both aliens and citizens, were moved from Los Angeles to the Manzanar Assembly Center in California. Prior to this, there was initial governmental encouragement of

voluntary movement away from the designated strategic areas, followed by an order on March 27 to halt voluntary emigration.

From then on, all evacuation procedures were controlled by the Army, and by August 7, 1942, the more than 112,000 West Coast Japanese had been removed from their homes. The evacuation proceeded in two stages--first into temporary assembly centers at such places as the Tanforan and Santa Anita racetracks in California, and then to more permanent camps (10 in all) under the jurisdiction of the War Relocation Authority (WRA). The permanent camps were located in Utah, Arizona, Wyoming, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho and California.

By November 3, 1942, the transfer from Army to WRA jurisdiction and from the temporary assembly centers to the more permanent concentration camps was complete.

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The evacuation and imprisonment of the West Coast Japanese has left in its wake a very real threat to the freedom of every American citizen. A majority of the U. S. Supreme Court by validating the evacuation orders established a precedent which, as dissenting Justice Robert H. Jackson pointed out, now "lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need." Korematsu v. U. S., 323 U. S., 214, 246, 1944.

This is a deep and vital concern that should weigh heavily upon all Americans who are committed to the survival of this country as a free, open and democratic society. Thus, hopefully, some valuable lessons can be learned by a closer look at this unfortunate experience of the Japanese in America.

For those interested in pursuing this subject further, the following references are provided:

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For information concerning speakers, films and programs regarding this episode in American history, call or write The Manzanar Committee, 1566 Curran Street, Los Angeles 90026, California; phone (213) 662-5102.

**WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND AND FOURTH ARMY
WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION**

Presidio of San Francisco, California

May 3, 1942

**INSTRUCTIONS
TO ALL PERSONS OF
JAPANESE
ANCESTRY**

Living in the Following Area:

All of that portion of the City of Los Angeles, State of California, within that boundary beginning at the point at which North Figueroa Street meets a line following the middle of the Los Angeles River; thence southerly and following the said line to East First Street; thence westerly on East First Street to Alameda Street; thence southerly on Alameda Street to East Third Street; thence northwesterly on East Third Street to Main Street; thence northerly on Main Street to First Street; thence northwesterly on First Street to Figueroa Street; thence northeasterly on Figueroa Street to the point of beginning.

Pursuant to the provisions of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 33, this Headquarters, dated May 3, 1942, all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, will be evacuated from the above area by 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Saturday, May 9, 1942.

No Japanese person living in the above area will be permitted to change residence after 12 o'clock noon, P. W. T., Sunday, May 3, 1942, without obtaining special permission from the representative of the Commanding General, Southern California Sector, at the Civil Control Station located at:

Japanese Union Church,
120 North San Pedro Street,
Los Angeles, California.

Such permits will only be granted for the purpose of uniting members of a family, or in cases of grave emergency.

The Civil Control Station is equipped to assist the Japanese population affected by this evacuation in the following ways:

1. Give advice and instructions on the evacuation.
2. Provide services with respect to the management, leasing, sale, storage or other disposition of most kinds of property, such as real estate, business and professional equipment, household goods, boats, automobiles and livestock.
3. Provide temporary residence elsewhere for all Japanese in family groups.
4. Transport persons and a limited amount of clothing and equipment to their new residence.

The Following Instructions Must Be Observed:

1. A responsible member of each family, preferably the head of the family, or the person in whose name most of the property is held, and each individual living alone, will report to the Civil Control Station to receive further instructions. This must be done between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Monday, May 4, 1942, or between 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M. on Tuesday, May 5, 1942.

2. Evacuees must carry with them on departure for the Assembly Center, the following property:

- (a) Bedding and linens (no mattress) for each member of the family;
- (b) Toilet articles for each member of the family;
- (c) Extra clothing for each member of the family;
- (d) Sufficient knives, forks, spoons, plates, bowls and cups for each member of the family;
- (e) Essential personal effects for each member of the family.

All items carried will be securely packaged, tied and plainly marked with the name of the owner and numbered in accordance with instructions obtained at the Civil Control Station. The size and number of packages is limited to that which can be carried by the individual or family group.

3. No pets of any kind will be permitted.
4. No personal items and no household goods will be shipped to the Assembly Center.
5. The United States Government through its agencies will provide for the storage, at the sole risk of the owner, of the more substantial household items, such as iceboxes, washing machines, pianos and other heavy furniture. Cooking utensils and other small items will be accepted for storage if crated, packed and plainly marked with the name and address of the owner. Only one name and address will be used by a given family.
6. Each family, and individual living alone, will be furnished transportation to the Assembly Center or will be authorized to travel by private automobile in a supervised group. All instructions pertaining to the movement will be obtained at the Civil Control Station.

Go to the Civil Control Station between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Monday, May 4, 1942, or between the hours of 8:00 A. M. and 5:00 P. M., Tuesday, May 5, 1942, to receive further instructions.

J. L. DeWITT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Commanding



IN THE EARLY PART OF WORLD WAR II, 110,000 PERSONS OF JAPANESE ANCESTRY WERE INTERNED IN RELOCATION CENTERS BY EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 9066, ISSUED ON FEBRUARY 19, 1942.

MANZANAR, THE FIRST OF TEN SUCH CONCENTRATION CAMPS, WAS BOUNDED BY BARBED WIRE AND GUARD TOWERS, CONFINING 10,000 PERSONS, THE MAJORITY BEING AMERICAN CITIZENS.

MAY THE INJUSTICES AND HUMILIATION SUFFERED HERE AS A RESULT OF HYSTERIA, RACISM AND ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION NEVER EMERGE AGAIN.

MANZANAR COMMITTEE/JACL
APRIL 14, 1973

DRIVE CAREFULLY !!

PLEASE STOP AND HELP ANY FELLOW TRAVELERS IN TROUBLE

SPEED LIMIT 55 MILES PER HOUR

NORTH TO BISHOP. . . . GONE TOO FAR !!




MANZANAR IS LOCATED BETWEEN LONE PINE (L.P.) AND INDEPENDENCE. IT IS ON THE WEST SIDE OF HWY 395 APPROX. 9 MI. NORTH (NO.) OF L.P. ON YOUR LEFT. YOU WILL NOTICE A LARGE GREEN BUILDING, (OLD CAMP AUD.) THEN TWO STONE GUARD HOUSES,

THIS IS MANZANAR

NOW, APPROX. 1 MI. NO. OF THE GUARD HOUSES ON THE LEFT (WEST) YOU WILL SEE A SMALL DIRT ROAD AND A CATTLE GATE*. THIS IS THE ROAD TO THE CEMETERY. FOLLOW IT WEST (GOOD ROAD) AND IT WILL TURN LEFT (SOUTH) AND THEN YOU'LL SEE THE

MONUMENT

HWY 14 TURNS INTO HWY 395



TAKE PALMDALE TURN OFF - HWY 14
(JUST NO. OF SAN FERNANDO VALLEY)

GOLDEN STATE FWY. TO BAKERSFIELD (GRAPE VINE)

LOS ANGELES