

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
GILA RIVER PROJECT
RIVERS, ARIZONA
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

Return copy

March 8, 1945

TRENDS REPORT FROM MARCH 1, 1945 TO MARCH 7, 1945

I. Reactions to Center Closing

Since the date of the previous trends report the two major happenings have been the spreading of news of the All-Center Conference to the people, and the visit of the National Director. Since both of these were occurring simultaneously, and dealt with the same all-absorbing topic, the present attitudes of the people are resultants of both causes and it is impossible thoroughly to disentangle the contributing causes.

When Mr. Myer arrived, most people knew what he had said at Salt Lake City. Results of the Conference had been published in the Japanese language newspapers, in the Gila News Courier and had been conveyed to many people at mass meetings where the delegates reported. Since, however, there was believed to be some slight ambiguity, which still left some hope to those not wishing to leave (i.e., the majority) the people were curious to see him, to hear their hopes or fears confirmed vocally, and to witness his answers to questions.

The response to Mr. Myer's public appearances was overwhelmingly favorable. They were impressed by his sincerity, his "kindness", his concern for their welfare, and by memories of the many times he had taken their part in the past. An Issei said "I didn't understand what he said but he is a gentlomen". This reaction was probably of more significance than the things he said, although the latter also had their effects.

One direct and immediate consequence was that some who had been hesitating now became convinced that they must go. Several informants said in so many words "the people now realize that they must go". Some of this result was the reaction to the Directors personality. "Since he has done so much for us, we should not squawk too much". "If Mr. Myer said so, we must go". "The Government has never been very kind to us, but if Mr. Myer says we must go we shall". These are sample remarks.

The reactions to his talks to the high schools were the most enthusiastic. This is reported by both teachers and children. "They understood what he said and liked it". A Nisei father said, gloomily, "The high school kids will become pressure groups inside their families".

Interviews have revealed that, in some, though not in all blocks,

the change is already noticeable. Block X had formerly resolved to have a "sit down strike against relocation"; now the people are beginning to plan relocation. Most people in Block Y have not yet made plans, but are convinced that they must. In Block Z, similarly, "people have not made plans, but will do so when summer comes". These, of course, are not opinions formed from systematic surveys, but they are statements made by people who, in general, know the sentiments of blocks.

In brief, Mr. Myer's visit, together with the publicizing of the results of the Conference, have convinced many, and have brought home to others the fact that they must leave. The positive results are clear.

There still remains an appreciable number of people who are not yet convinced. The most important groups are the welfare cases, the large families and the bachelors. They can't go. The bars to their going are those already noted several times, the observed difficulties in the working of the Resettlement Assistance Program, and uncertainties about that program. The existence of those who "can't go" is significant because it affects more than the immediate groups concerned. If many can't go, then the Centers can't close, therefore all who want can stay. It is to be noted that the "can't go" argument is expressed most vociferously by many who can go but don't want to.

The actual working of the program does not seem, in many cases, to be as represented. People in discussion will agree that it takes time to get these things going, but they do see that some Government agencies in some localities are not performing as promised. Such opinions are confined, as yet, to a minority, but if the number of such cases increases, the result will be unfavorable.

Far more important is the general uncertainty as to the program. Ignorance and uncertainty as to its provisions are almost universal. Even most block managers say they don't understand it: how, then, can they explain it to the people? This uncertainty was not aided by the somewhat different interpretations and emphases given by Mr. Wolter and Mr. Myer. "Why was what Mr. Myer and Mr. Wolter said so different?"

Negative reactions to Mr. Myers talks are also to be noted. "He is a smooth fish and you can't hold him", (i.e., he avoids the most difficult issues); "he says it very nicely but you can't make me like it"; "He talked nothing but _____". These are examples of negative reactions.

Negative reactions also continue because of bad news from California. The shootings at Fresno are, at present, the events causing the most perturbation. This will not be further mentioned in this report, but its importance continues.

The status of the parolees causes many to hesitate. A well-

known Christian minister, who is also a parolee, applied six weeks ago for permission to go to Idaho for a month. This was the preliminary move in his relocation plans. His papers have not yet been cleared, possibly because of some delay in the Department of Justice. This has not only delayed his relocation but has disrupted his plans. Far more important than the delay to relocation of one family is the result upon many other parolees who are following his case with interest. "If this is what happens to a Christian minister, what will happen to us?"

In some blocks it is reported that few people have made or changed plans. In Block A "they still don't know what to do"; in Block B "they can't see what they can plan to do".

There is evidence that an increasing number of people plan to return to Japan after the war; these in addition to any who may be applying for repatriation. The evidence is both from direct statements by the adults and naive remarks of young children. It is reported that in Sunday-Schools, both Buddhist and Christian, a larger number of the very young children tell the others that they are going to Japan. They have come to this decision as a result of their treatment in this country; being "forced out" has convinced them that they can never receive consideration in the United States. They will continue to oppose center closing as long as they believe it will have any effect.

A number of families would prefer to relocate in Arizona, in place of returning to California. The weather is good, there will need be no great outlay on clothing, and it is near California so that return there will be easy after the war. Some have done so, but many are deterred by the hostility this State expresses towards them.

The Hawaiians remain a special group. They have their own problems, and Mr. Myer was not able to give them satisfaction on all the points they raised. At present, it seems probable that most of them will stay here as long as they can. Their decision will to some degree depend upon the results of the appeals of two of them against exclusion orders. But it is to be noted that their spokesman on the occasion of Mr. Myer's visit, Mr. Araki, has already been out on trial indefinite leave, and plans to go again in near future.

One factor peculiar to this Center is a present deterrent. The changes in the Evacuee Property Office have caused much uneasiness among the property owners. Oblique questions from several have indicated vague fears. This may pass when the new arrangements have become accepted.

The gloomiest picture was painted by a pro-administration evacuee. By December, one-third of the people will be gone, two-thirds will still be here. He bases his estimate on the following analysis: "They got it all worked out. They say with a lot of people here, they wont close the camps. Mr. Myer didn't say that the camps would be closed regardless. He said things like, 'I hope',

'I think'. The camps won't be run by WRA, maybe Department of Justice or Army. Things won't be good like they are now. Food won't be so good. We'll have to work but won't get no sixteen dollars, just clothing allowance maybe. And we'll have to work hard. No twenty men on a mess-crow, maybe four. We'll probably have to work like we was getting two hundred bucks a month outside. Then maybe when we've done that for a while some of us will see we been fools and we'll relocate. But not for a while.'" This extreme point of view was not commonly stated but it still exists.

Summing up reactions, it seems certain that the number of those planning to relocate has very materially increased; but there still remain many who think that because they can't go they won't be made to go, and that, if closing is resisted, some form of shelter and subsistence will be provided. This passive resistance will possibly continue for some weeks, but the present probability seems that it will fall apart, as the number of those actually relocating increases.

The Relocation Office reports 61 terminal leaves for the week ending March 3. Of these only six went to California. It is possible that this simply the beginning of the regular seasonal relocation and not a result of any recent event. Relocation during the current week will be a better indication of future tendencies, although more definite results will probably not be evident for several weeks.

II. Internal Events

Concern for the hospital was still evident. At its last meeting the Canal Community Council debated medical matters at greater length than any other topic. There are said to be tensions and disruptions within the hospital which threaten medical services, so people are uneasy. But what has been said in previous reports should be repeated here: concern in internal affairs is so much less than it was that nothing is likely to be done about the hospital. What occurs within the hospital is another matter, one on which the Community Analyst has not, as yet, sufficient information.

Juvenile delinquency, chiefly among adolescent and post-adolescent boys, is still feared by responsible evacuees. No serious incidents have occurred, but gang activities seem to be such that delinquency may occur at any moment. The official committees are considering ways and means, Internal Security is watching carefully. It seems inevitable that there will be outbreaks because of the social disorganization now in progress. A report on social disorganization is in preparation.

There are no serious criticisms of the mess-halls or of the food at present. "We could do better if they gave us the same materials" is a frequent comment, but this varies from one block to the other according to the abilities of the mess supervisors and the chef. Considering that institutional feeding is always an object of criti-

cism, it is really a remarkable achievement that complaints are so few.

III. Foreign Affairs

Conversations with many people on the attack on Iwo Jima have brought out two points. First, it continues to convince the people that possibly American news releases are not all false. "They are beginning to believe it (the Iwo Jima invasion) may really be true". As a corollary, maybe the news on Radio Tokyo may be partly untrue. Most Issei still continue to follow Radio Tokyo broadcasts, but scepticism is developing; this is a new phenomenon. Second, the perturbation about the invasion of "a part of Japan" will not have any material effect upon relocation plans. It will affect the feeling of security of Japanese nationals but most realize that they must still plan within the limits of reality.

As a comment on Japanese national self-esteem, the reactions to war news over the past year has been very revealing. A year ago, 90% of Radio Tokyo news was believed true, 90% of American news was pure propanganda. A year ago, also, a prominent evacuee, one who has always cooperated with the Administration, said privately "of course Japan will win the war". The context of the conversation implied that no other outcome was credible. Hence the change is significant. A commentary on the fighting now is that "the American Marines must be the best soldiers in the world". They are defeating the Japanese army, so they must be the best. The remark is also an admission that they are defeating the Japanese.



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Community Analysis Section
Colorado River Relocation Center
Poston, Arizona

COMMUNITY ANALYST TREND REPORT FROM
MARCH 5 to 11, 1945

Dillon Myer's Visit

After a morning of conferences with administrative personnel, Dillon Myer addressed a meeting of from 2000 to 3000 evacuees and appointed personnel at the Block 4 stage on March 6. As many were present from Camps II and III as could be brought with the limited transportation facilities available. Myer spoke for approximately 45 minutes; a translation of the speech, which seems to have been a good one, was then presented. Evacuee leaders were on the stage with the Director. The audience was quiet and attentive, even those who didn't know what Myer was saying.

Before mentioning the few negative remarks about the speech, it ought to be said that the evacuees reception was overwhelmingly favorable. The speech was, "Too good," one councilman said later. Evacuees were impressed with the strength and quality of Myer's voice, with his appearance, and with his personality.

Regarding the content of the speech, people were fairly cynical. They thought they knew (from reports from other centers) the content of the speech before it was given. Afterwards, they commented that they had been right. It has been very difficult to find substantial, significant negative reactions, except against the familiar idea that the center would close. One evacuee noted that Myer made no promise of protection of those returning to California; the evacuee added that he would stay here until personal security is guaranteed. Another remark

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was that Myer made no commitments regarding the amount of financial aid that could be obtained by people who relocated. One man noticed that no definite plan was presented for those who are still here by the end of 1945; in fact, Myer did not even say what would happen if there were still people here.

The reactions of the Block Managers and Councilmen to their meeting with Myer on the morning of March 7 did not differ greatly from the reactions to the general meeting. Myer answered a long list of questions from the three units; some of these involved the issue of the closing of the center, but many also covered specific points about relocation policies and procedures.

On the afternoon of March 7, Myer spoke to school students in all three camps. He was favorably received.

Every discussion of the closing of the schools, including Myer's, has distressed the Issei parents. They always say that the program is "too severe" and is "pressure" to make people leave. School closing, even though it has not yet arrived, is the first termination of an activity with a project-wide effect.

A few appointed personnel members have thought that they could detect an immediate increase in interest regarding relocation following Myer's visit, but this is doubtful. Probably people who were planning to discuss their relocation plans anyhow mentioned Myer's speech as a plausible reason for doing so at this time. The most significant effect of the visit will be in adding authority and finality to the previous announcements of the closing of the centers and of post-exclusion plans for relocation. Various evacuees have been commenting that they can now see that these things are really going to happen.

Rumor about Relocation Grants

I have heard that a few people are planning to relocate now because they have heard rumors that the \$25 relocation grant will be stopped soon. While this is a rumor that, for once, is of some immediate help to the WRA's program, nevertheless, it must be pointed out that there is no truth in it.

Parents of Nisei Soldiers

One Issei group that seems somewhat more interested in relocation than previously is that composed of the parents of the Nisei soldiers. When their sons first entered the Army, many of the parents were reluctant to accept dependency benefits, but since the beginning of this year a large number have begun to receive them. Now, some of these elderly people are asking about the effect relocation would have on the amount of money. In the center they have been in Class B and have received the flat rate of \$37; this would not be sufficient outside of the center.¹ The Welfare Section is investigating the possibility that an increased amount could be arranged with the Office of Dependents Benefits before the family leaves.

Relocation Aid for Issei

It was reported to me that some Issei were disappointed by the stories presented in the new WRA booklet in Japanese on the help that has and will be given for those who relocate. Residents asked, "Is that all WRA going to give?"

¹Class B includes those with less than 50% dependency.

Rumors About the Closing of Other Centers

During recent weeks there have been rumors among evacuees that Topaz would be the first center to close. Others have said that Manzanar would be the first to close; this is an old rumor which has appeared off and on for several years. During the past week, however, Minidoka was being named by evacuees as a likely candidate for early closing.

Clothing Allowance and Pay Checks

There was a good deal of grumbling during the week because no December and January clothing allowance checks and only a few January pay checks had arrived.²

Indictment of Draft Evaders

About 100 young men who have refused induction during the past year were indicted or reindicted in Tucson by the Federal Grand Jury. This was expected, so no significant evacuee reactions have yet occurred.

Community Enterprises Executives

Along with the departure, or planned departure, of other evacuees in key positions, the top administrators of the co-operative system are leaving. This has led to anxiety in the organization. One plan that has been discussed is the hiring of a relocated evacuee at regular wages to manage the section.

David French
Community Analyst

²Most of these came during the first part of the next week.

Report No. 64
April 2, 1945

Community Analysis Section
Colorado River Relocation Center
Poston, Arizona

COMMUNITY ANALYST TREND REPORT FROM
MARCH 26 to APRIL 1, 1945

Relocation

Despite the slow start at the beginning of the month, terminal departure figures reached the fair total of 272 by March 31. The trend was continuing upward as April began.

Camp II residents have shown an increased interest in returning to California, especially to the Sacramento area. San Joaquin Valley people have been planning and departing for several months now. On April 2 there will be 51 people returning to Sacramento. This makes the use of a special railroad car possible.

On Wednesday, March 28, C. R. Carter, Relocation Program Officer, talked to about 50 evacuees in Camp III. They were Block Managers, Councilmen, and the heads of administrative departments. These people were definitely interested in Carter's account of his recent visit to California, and they asked a number of intelligent questions. Insurance of all kinds and loans were matters of particular interest to Issei. Some of the leaders remarked that they would like to have more of such meetings so that they could transmit better information to the people in their blocks. They felt that the written material that they had received so far did not serve as satisfactorily as meetings.

Not long ago a certain Issei in Camp III urged on various occasions that meetings be held in which information about relocation would be presented by appointed personnel members. This was discouraged by both appointed personnel and evacuee leaders as being premature, and likely to arouse negative reactions. It seems that this period has been passed, and that as much reliable information as is available should be made public through meetings.

Some evacuee leaders are continuing to urge a change in the relocation procedures of WRA. They say that at the present time all that is done for people who relocate is to promise them that they will be able to find housing and jobs, and assure them that WRA and other agencies will provide help in obtaining household furnishings and in meeting emergencies. The other approach which they advocate is that of arranging housing in advance (jobs are believed to be less important) and also to provide money or the articles themselves, in case household equipment is needed. The people do not feel secure about leaving when only promises are given. Housing is the insecurity most often mentioned.

One leader is insisting on the importance of short term visits to cities in California and elsewhere in changing the attitudes of evacuees toward relocation. He can cite specific instances of such changes. He believes, therefore, that if a subsidy of 50% or more were given for short term trips, relocation plans would advance rapidly. An alternative proposal is that a research body, made up of evacuees, be financed to make regular exploratory trips to various parts of California and report on conditions.

Since the West Coast has not yet become reaccustomed to the presence of American Japanese, certain difficulties that were common in parts of the East a year or two ago are still present on the Coast. For example, evacuees continue to report that employers and others are confused when they appear. Even firms and individuals who need help badly are refusing in some cases to consider the application of returned evacuees. It is common for such people to say that they are going to follow the trends of public opinion, since their business is influenced by the public. They say that when others hire Japanese, and it becomes apparent that no trouble is arising from other employees or those doing business with the firm, they will also hire Japanese. Los Angeles, which generally speaking does not present important public relations problems, is one of the commoner sources of such reports by evacuees.

Evacuee Participation in Welfare Work

In the special meeting of the Community Council on March 26, the work of the Welfare Section was discussed. The Council decided to recommend to Project Director Mills that an Issei counselor be employed. The Councilmen felt that this would remove the necessity for interpreters during the interviews and give the people being interviewed the feeling that their problems were being thoroughly understood.

Protecting Power

The news that the Spanish Government no longer represents the interests of Japanese citizens in America reached the project only by newspaper and radio. No official notification arrived. There was very little interest in this news and no excitement. Many have not yet heard about it. Families with applications for expatriation or repatriation, however, as well as the members of the appointed personnel concerned with matters of this kind, were confused. It has been believed by some members of both groups that there will be another exchange of Japanese nationals before the end of the war. Yet the question has arisen as to how this could be arranged if there is no Protecting Power for Japanese interests.

One Issei who had thought in the past that complaints to the representative of the Spanish Government were important, summed up the present attitude of many of the residents by saying, "Having friends in Washington is more important than having the Spanish Government to help us."

Mess Hall Quotas

The cut in the quotas for evacuees working in mess halls was accomplished on schedule on April 1. There were no unusual incidents accompanying the reduction.

Combining of Mess Halls

When the mess hall facilities for the people of two blocks are combined, a period of readjustment is necessary. In one case, a definite deterioration of the quality of food and service was noticed by the people. In several instances there have been hard feelings between the residents of the two blocks, particularly in regard to employment in the kitchen. Tension approaching that found in some blocks in 1942 has been reported. However, it is apparent that this adjustment period is never long in duration.

Rupkey's Departure

On the night of April 1, a small party was held in the Camp I appointed personnel mess hall in honor of Mr. Rupkey, who has resigned. Several evacuees and a mixture of old and new appointed employees experienced cake, coffee, foolishness, and a serious regret that Rupkey is leaving.

Government Property in Evacuee Blocks

Excellent progress is reported by both evacuee and appointed administrators in regard to the inventory of government property assigned to evacuees. In Camp II, at least, the inventory is simplified by a return of many surplus articles to the warehouses.

Watermelons

Among the crops that Poston has been forbidden to plant are watermelons. These ripen after June 30, and there will be no workers on the agricultural pay roll to irrigate and harvest them. The people of Poston, however, have appreciated the watermelons grown during the previous seasons. It became known during the past week or so that about three acres of watermelons were planted without authorization. Evacuees are reasoning that there will be people here during the latter part of the summer, and since they will want watermelons, why shouldn't they have them? It is rumored that watermelons have been planted in Gila, and this had had an influence on the attitudes of the Poston evacuees. Several meetings have been held to try to straighten out policies and procedures on this question.

David French
Community Analyst

Report No. 80
May 29, 1945

Colorado River Relocation Center
Poston, Arizona
Community Analysis Section

COMMUNITY ANALYST TREND REPORT FROM
MAY 21 to 27, 1945

Relocation--Departures

In my last weekly report I predicted an increase in the number of terminal leaves during this last part of May. The week ending May 26, at least, did not show an increase; 84 people left, which was a decrease of 1. Of the people taking terminal leave, 26 returned to California.

Relocation to Fresno

The news of more incidents in the vicinity of Fresno has had a significant effect on the people who have been planning to return to that area. This has been the destination of a large number of the people who have left Camps II and III; many who were intending to leave in June are now saying that perhaps they should wait three months or so to see whether the situation has improved. This is primarily an Issei reaction--most Nisei would return, if their reasons were strong enough, or would go east instead. While many of these who are wondering about leaving will actually leave, if there aren't too many more incidents, the self assurance of these people is beginning to wane.

Relocation Advisory Committee

The Reverend Shunji Forrest Nishi representing the Church Council of Cleveland met with the Relocation Advisory Board last Thursday. He talked about relocation to the various parts of the country with which he was familiar.

Other current information relating to changes in relocation procedures and opportunities were discussed at the meeting. It was decided that the Relocation Planning Executives should confer with the Relocation Planning Committees in their respective units. The ideas of the committees would be brought to the attention of the whole Relocation Advisory Board.

Resettlement Assistance

On the night of May 24, one or more Block Managers announced in the mess hall that, starting in June, every individual leaving the center would receive \$150.00. The rumor spread fast, so that by the end of the next day, almost everyone in Camp I and some in the other camps had heard it. This story was, of course, based on the teletype that had arrived the previous Saturday about the giving of resettlement assistance grants on the project to a limited number of families.

The Relocation Advisory Board and other evacuees reacted very favorably to the new procedure. They felt, however, that the amounts to be granted and the number of families to be aided is quite inadequate to assure the relocation of all the people in the project this year.

Group Relocation to California

Another group of men, representing 16 families, talked with members of the Relocation Division about the possibilities of group relocation. They were interested in the Dos Palos-Firebaugh rural area in western San Joaquin Valley. These families are all from the Salinas-Watsonville area; they see no immediate prospect of returning, but they do not want to go east. Therefore, a district reasonably close to their old area--thus possibly permitting a return some day--is an acceptable substitute. These people are planning to send three representatives to investigate the new district in the near future. Incidentally, the district has a history of Japanese farming; before evacuation some Japanese had a very large rice-growing operation near Los Banos.

Buddhist Hostels

Sporadic, but increasing activity has been taking place among Buddhist Church leaders in respect to relocation. Some time back, two Buddhist priests visited Poston to discuss the opening of church property on the West Coast for use as hostels. Last week, another priest from Topaz talked with Camp II and III people about opening a temple in Fresno as a hostel. He had just visited Gila, and had made many of the necessary arrangements there.

Leaders of another small Buddhist sect in Poston are also interested in using their Los Angeles temple as a hostel.

Wives of Servicemen

Ruth Green, Supervisor of Community Activities, is working with C. R. Carter, Relocation Program Officer, on plans to help the wives of servicemen. There are a variety of special services available for such women outside of the center, and the plan is to make these known through other channels than those of the Relocation Division.

Parent-Teacher Conferences

The teachers have been conferring with parents on the school records and the future education of evacuee children. The Camp I schools operated during the week on a half-day schedule to facilitate this. A total of about 900 parent-teacher conferences were held.

Gate Procedures

On the morning of May 24, a new gate house at the entrance of Camp I, beside the main road, began to be used. Gate clerks and Internal Security personnel have been stationed there. Military Police continued to be stationed at the old gate house some distance from camp.

For months now, incoming and outgoing busses have been held up because of the complexity of gate procedures. New and different situations constantly arise. For example on the morning of May 22, a man, his wife, and six children attempted to leave for Miami, Florida. The father had returned to camp with a visitor's pass to relocate his family. His pass had been properly executed, except that the day before his departure the system had changed--his pass was supposed to have been stamped by the Commanding Officer of the Security Command Post. However, this information had not reached the departing family. They were stopped at the gate and were unable to leave until that afternoon, when a special bus was provided to take them to Parker.

The above case differs in detail from the others that have occurred but is similar in that confusion, embarrassment (many people had come to see the family off), and needless extra work arose from the complexity of the gate procedures. It happens that many evacuees learned of the delay in the departure, just as they had previously learned of a few of the other similar cases. Usually these do not become a subject for general discussion, but most evacuees have gradually accumulated the impression that leaving camp can easily be very difficult. This impression is certainly no aid to relocation.

Transportation to Parker

On Saturday night, May 26, the first trips between Poston and Parker were made by a bus belonging to a company called the Las Vegas-Needles-Phoenix Stages. Negotiations have been under way for some time with this company for a supplement to the project's regular transportation facilities. After final WRA approval had been given during the week, a driver and two busses arrived. It was easy to arrange to transport those who are relocating in the bus or busses, but by the end of the week no arrangements had been made to permit the issuance of numerous passes for visiting Parker. Only three trips per day are being made at present; later, more frequent trips to facilitate shopping are planned.

Visitors and people taking short term trips were surprised and annoyed on Saturday when they were asked to pay 35¢ to travel to Parker.

Intercamp Transportation

The Project Director received a memorandum signed by the three Unit Administrators requesting busses between the camps on Saturday afternoons and Sundays. The Administrators pointed out that those doing relocation planning can confer with people in other units only during working hours. This leads to absences from work. (Probably matters other than relocation would also be advanced by week end intercamp travel.)

One significance of the above memorandum is the cooperation between the Unit Administrators that it demonstrates. I believe there was no great amount of this during the first year that the positions were held by evacuees. It may be that the Wednesday joint conferences of evacuee and appointed administrative personnel have facilitated this cooperation.

Closing of Mess Halls

The mess hall in Block 327 was closed on May 25, and the people began to eat in Block 326. While the closing was uneventful, complaints reached the Unit Administrator about the quota of workers for the combined mess hall. 21 people had worked in Block 327, and 22 had worked in 326. The quota for the combined mess hall permits 28 to work. It was pointed out that the efficiency of the older workers that are available is not as great as that of the younger people who have relocated; a request for an increase in the quota was made to the Administrator.

Two other mess halls which are scheduled to be closed in the near future are the ones used by the appointed personnel in Camps II and III. It has been uneconomical to operate these, and the mess hall in Camp I has carried some of the burden of supporting the other two. Both Camp II and III people will eat in Block 324, the diet kitchen, with bus transportation provided between the camps.

David French
Community Analyst



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

TRENDS IN THE RELOCATION CENTERS: III

September 26, 1945

Two major trends in evacuee thinking have been apparent since last March. The dominant one through July was the persistence of the conviction that centers could not be closed out completely. The other, which developed slowly through the spring and summer, was that resettlement on the West Coast was possible even before the end of the war. The two points of view have gone through dynamic changes, each gaining and losing adherents as WRA policy developments have unfolded and the war, housing shortage, and West Coast prejudice and discrimination have played on conceptions of the future.

1. The Idea of the Residue

The evacuee view that centers should exist for the duration of the war goes back to evacuation, when they were led to believe that the centers would be "war duration" homes. It lost some ground in the face of satisfactory relocation outside the centers by Nisei and some Issei, but it had remained throughout the three years of center life the generally accepted view among Issei.

When WRA presented its policy of center closure in December, 1944, it required more than three months before there was any general acceptance even of the belief that the agency was in earnest. It was only after repeated statements by project officials, visits to all centers by the National Director during which he discussed the policy with evacuee groups, and the failure of the All-Center Conference to influence WRA in important ways that large numbers of evacuees became convinced that WRA had stated its actual intentions. Perhaps by April most evacuees were living with the idea of center closure in some form. This acceptance did not however result in widespread decisions to relocate. Influenced by a variety of motives, ranging from simple satisfaction with relocation center life, through fear of reception outside, to conviction of the injustice of closing centers during the war, the great majority of people waited.

By June most of the persons in the centers had a settled conviction that, even though WRA was determined to relocate everyone, a large number could not and would not relocate either until more assistance was given or they were simply ordered out of the centers. There would, in other words, be a "residue." The residue concept had been formulated earlier, in 1944, when there were rumors of center closure, but now it became a constant subject of discussion and a center political issue. By the end of June it was as basic an element in evacuee thinking as the war, West Coast prejudice, or government

obtusity. Almost all responsible evacuee leaders believed in it and many members of project staffs shared the belief. Estimates of the extent of the residue were freely made. Most were a third to a half lower than such estimates made in January by councils and other evacuee bodies. A widely accepted estimate by Poston evacuees was about 5000 for that center. At Minidoka in June evacuee leaders spoke in terms of a residue of 2000. At Topaz estimates in late July ranged from 1000 to 2000. The residue was regarded as inevitable unless WRA changed its policy in some way.

Once accepted, the idea of the residue led necessarily to certain further questions. For example, "What about schools in the fall for the children of persons 'who cannot relocate?'" During the spring schools were raised as an issue with WRA. Closing them by the end of the summer was regarded as a broken promise and as unjust to those who couldn't relocate. The Minidoka Council sought legal grounds for requiring WRA to continue the schools. The PTA and other groups in various centers protested and cast about for means of continuing the schools. In most centers groups of parents continued through August to make plans for giving their children schooling in the centers.

A second important question was "What will be done with the residue ultimately after WRA closes out?" This was a constant point of discussion in all centers. Speculation developed along innumerable lines: Gila and Poston would remain open; Manzanar would remain open as an old peoples' home; the Justice Department would take over; a new agency would be created; etc. The feeling was strong that WRA must have some undisclosed plan for taking care of the residue. This feeling grew, and the issue was taken up in some councils. WRA's refusal to admit a residue was branded as unrealistic. As discussion continued, feeling against WRA hardened. It was held that it was inhumane not to reveal the plan for disposal. WRA should let people know their fate. If on the other hand there was no plan that was even more inhumane, for it would mean that unrellocatable people would be forced out at the end with nowhere to go. Feeling of this sort was strong in Topaz and other centers by the end of July.

Evacuee thinking concerning a residue was based, at least in part, on lack of information concerning the possibilities for the various kinds of people then left in the centers. Thus persons classified as internees (such as renunciants of citizenship) by the Justice Department, those excluded from the coast by Army orders, dependency cases, large families with depleted resources and other hardship cases, persons able but disinclined for personal reasons to leave the centers, repatriates, persons too timid to take the step to leave, and those who felt that they should have internee status were all lumped together in the concept of the residue. The residue idea had become an unanalyzed stereotype which for many was something to lean on in their search for security and a block to individual initiative.

But the residue theory was based on a good deal more than lack of information about the plans for various types of cases. It was rooted in the experience of the past three years. It was nourished by the feeling that a government commitment for "war duration homes" was not being lived up to and by the hostility which, characteristically, had developed toward an agency charged with the problems of people made dependent through no fault of their own. It was fanned by each new shooting incident or evidence of anti-evacuee feeling on the West Coast. It rested in the feeling of helplessness of family heads isolated in centers and unable to see the way to a new start outside. It was rooted in the feeling that the government was not being as generous as it might in helping evacuees toward a readjustment. If there had been complete isolation in the centers during this period, it is likely that the residue viewpoint would have been the only one of any consequence and the overwhelming majority would have settled back to regard themselves as all members of the residue. There were, however, other forces working against the acceptance of the idea, and these gathered momentum during June and July.

2. Relocation West

By March 1 only about 700 persons had left the centers for the three West Coast states. These were mostly property owners, usually individuals with exceptional confidence in themselves and their ability to buck antagonism. Despite the opening of the West Coast only between 500 and 600 persons were leaving the centers weekly by the end of March. This was, however, almost double the weekly average for March the previous year. Much of the increase was obviously due to West Coast movement, but still three times as many were going eastward as west. Relocation through the winter and early spring was still largely determined by the eastward base, but it was clear that a new factor was already working strongly.

The terminal departures do not indicate the major factor which was ultimately to influence relocation most profoundly. This was the volume of exploratory movement to the West Coast. Persons on short term leave, "scouts" as they came to be called, looking over the old territory at their own expense, began to go out in the winter. By April their numbers had reached considerable proportions. At Poston in April, there were more than twice as many "scouts" out to California points as persons who had permanently left the center for the coast: 410 on short term as against 183 on terminal leave. The number of scouts continued to multiply during the spring. Inevitably they influenced attitudes in the centers. They came back with a wide variety of stories, some good and some bad, but all of actual experiences in which friends and relatives had confidence. The basis for real participation in relocation planning was steadily being laid. New attitudes about the possibility of return despite the war slowly grew up, attitudes not at all characteristic of relocation center thinking up to this point.

The month of April marked the turning point in feeling about the West Coast. In general during the early months of the year evacuees in the centers accepted the constantly reiterated statements written by West Coast friends that "the time is not yet ripe for return." Numerous shooting and arson incidents in the Central Valley of California re-inforced this view, as did the sudden appearance of anti-Japanese organizations in Oregon and Washington. Well on into May the dominant objection raised to West Coast relocation was fear of violence at the hands of West Coast people. Nevertheless already in April began to appear unmistakable signs of a new positive approach to re-establishment on the West Coast.

Two indications of this new approach may be singled out as examples. In the same week, the last week in April, two events occurred which reveal the trend most clearly. On April 27, the Buddhist Churches of America under the leadership of Bishop Matsukage announced a plan for the reestablishment of headquarters outside the Topaz center and for a systematic participation in resettlement with the establishment of hostels in West Coast regions. At the same time a Christian minister Rev. D. Kitagawa was at Heart Mountain telling his experience during a return to an actively hostile community, White River, Washington. He spread widely through the centers a letter announcing his conviction that the only way to combat West Coast hostility was to return in numbers to the old communities and meet it face to face. These particular events by no means affected large numbers of evacuees instantaneously. They are merely indicative of the influences which were beginning to operate on a small scale among the evacuees themselves, focusing the problem and influencing group after group to participate in the settlement of its own future and to resume the old frontal attack on prejudice.

By June another type of influence was beginning to be felt. This was the change in attitude of prominent persons in the centers who had been publicly opposed to relocation. Some went out on scouting trips, came back and with no declaration of change of view quietly slipped out of the centers with their families. Others came back, described their experiences publicly, plumped for relocation, and one day went out. The term "bandwagon" leader began to be heard, as defections from the so-called "sit-tighter" groups increased. Any sense of unity which the sit-tighters may have felt was steadily undermined. As one prominent Minidoka leader said in July: "You can't really tell who's who any more. What a man says in public doesn't count. He may go out tomorrow." What was happening was the disintegration of the community into individuals who were putting the solution of their personal problems before any group considerations.

The greater number of community leaders were not however behaving in this way. Many had never been in the ranks of "the opposition." Others under the sway of the residue theory continued to hammer at WRA for more relocation aid. Still others, perhaps the most effective and most respected, worked hard, despite conviction that there would be a residue, to help others solve their relocation problems and to coordinate individual planning with what assistance was available from the government.

Relocation figures mounted slowly but steadily through May. In mid-May they were little above those for the same period in 1944. In June, however, there was a slight upsurge, bringing weekly departures from all centers to about 1100. By the end of July, after a brief midsummer slump, it appeared that the new influences had reached a maximum and that the centers had settled down to a higher summer relocation rate than in previous years, but not one which would result in emptying the centers by the end of the year. This was pretty much in accordance with the predictions of those who held to the residue theory, maintaining that relocation would rise sharply after May as a result of the new relocation base on the West Coast, but that it would fall or level off to a "plateau," not accelerating in late summer and fall.

By August almost as many persons were going west as east. The figures, however, hardly reflected the mounting interest in the West Coast. Attitudes in the centers indicated that the major block to a steadily accelerating relocation rate lay mainly in housing. People were piling up in the hostels on the West Coast, despite the constant opening of more hostels. There was extreme difficulty in locating either permanent or temporary places to live and the accounts of these difficulties were influencing people in the centers. Three months earlier the major anxiety had been fear of violence. Now that fear had become relatively unimportant and the chief obstacle everywhere was lack of housing. Although rooted in reality the concern over housing was steadily becoming an obsession.

The shift from West Coast violence to housing as the chief relocation anxiety indicated a profound change in center attitudes. People were in touch again in an intimate way with the West Coast and their former communities. Anti-evacuee feeling was admitted to be sporadic and localized. The orientation was definitely outward now. Worries were tied in with practical difficulties in the old localities. Still the idea of the residue was dominant in the centers and the real shortage of housing was sufficient to cause a majority of people to regard themselves as members of the residue.

3. The Disintegration of the Centers

During August the whole situation in the centers changed with unpredicted rapidity. By the middle of August, Poston which had been sauntering along with one of the lower relocation rates suddenly began to lead all centers in weekly departures. This was indicative of a general turn toward accelerated relocation activity. The relocation figures for the third week in August were twice the number which had become routine in July. Three weeks later even this figure had nearly doubled to a total of 3,748 departures for the week from all centers. The increases varied considerably from center to center, reflecting local influences, but all centers except Manzanar showed sudden rises at some time during the period. There were obviously new factors at work.

It is difficult to assess the relative importance of the new factors. One which had some influence was certainly the recent developments in WRA policy, all centering on making center closure more definite. From December through early June WRA indicated no new features of closing policy. People knew only that WRA intended to close centers not later than January 2, 1946. By the time the residue theory had crystallized in evacuee thinking, however, a new feature was announced, namely, that the smaller units of Poston and Gila would close by October 1. There was no pronounced evacuee reaction and no apparent effect on relocation figures. It is probable that the announced dates for these units eliminated some of the speculation to the effect that Gila and Poston would be retained for the residue. It also sharpened the question which everyone was asking: "What will be done with those still in centers when they close?" Within a month the closing schedule for all centers, somewhat in advance of January 2, was announced. Again there was no pronounced evacuee reaction or any important effect on relocation figures. If the announcement had any great effect on persons who had not already been planning relocation, it was chiefly to convince them that some agency other than WRA would ultimately take over the residue. However, there was some indication that it gave impetus to leaders who were actively working to help other evacuees solve their relocation problems. Aside from this the major effect was probably to stimulate the relocation staff in the centers to more intensive effort. Early in August the final implementation of WRA policy was announced in Administrative Instruction No. 289, which provided for the scheduling of departure quotas for all centers so that they would be empty on the dates set. Whatever general reaction there may have been to this was almost immediately submerged in the announcement of peace with Japan.

The closing of hostilities between Japan and the United States has probably been the crucial factor in the now general acceptance of relocation. WRA policy; after the summer of 1942, hinged not on the duration of the war, but rather on exclusion from the former residence area, as crucial in the determination of liquidation dates for the centers. The most common Issei view, on the other hand, was that the war had given rise to the camps and that such havens of neutrality, once established, should remain until the war was over.

The reaction to peace was immediate. It is true that poorly informed persons and some who disbelieved American war news on principle did not accept the announcement promptly. Even a month later there were individuals who still felt that it did not ring true. They had not expected such an end, and the suddenness with which it came caught them unprepared. The better informed among the Issei, however, accepted the new situation within a week or two, and most of these were in influential positions among the evacuees. As one chairman of a Japanese Nationals committee said, "We feel that there is no longer a fence around the center," and another, "We have nothing to argue about now." Even before the Army lifted its restrictions on segregees and individually excluded persons the tide had turned. By the first of September the movement outward was steady and on such a scale that it taxed the processing

facilities in most centers. Even the continued housing shortage seemed to retard very little the general exodus. Only Manzanar lagged.

By the middle of September life in the centers was charged with a sense of temporariness. Populations had been reduced from 40 to 70 per cent in a space of eight months. Center newspapers had been discontinued. The process of merging messhalls had long since been accepted and had now become a routine matter, usually smoothed during the first consolidation meal with a pleasant ceremony. Councils were generally disintegrating, although most continued to hold meetings. Except at Manzanar, block closures had been resisted, and consequently the emptiness of blocks occupied by only a few families contributed to the ghost town atmosphere. Social activities had largely ceased, especially in the centers nearest to closing date.

The sense of temporariness was heightened by a gradual development of confusion. In the centers about to close the work of maintenance, keeping the blocks clean, janitor service, even messhall work was done by volunteers and consequently irregularly and none too efficiently. Most activity was in dismantling apartments, crating household goods, hauling baggage. Evacuees were helping each other voluntarily, much as they had in the early days when the centers were starting. Project directors' worries shifted sharply to those of getting baggage packed and hauled, to appointed staff morale, and to how to maintain services for the appointed staff. The most urgent problems were all suddenly tied up with the ways and means of departure.

It was clear that center disintegration had reached a point at which it could not be reversed. Whether or not every center closed to the day on schedule, there was no doubt that the view of centers as places holding any security whatever had vanished. The real problems of relocation had been shifted back to the communities of the West Coast where they originated.

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HEART MOUNTAIN RELOCATION CENTER
Community Analysis section
September 28, 1946

Community Analyst Trend Report for
July 27 to September 27, 1946

~~Central Files~~
Community Analysis

During most of the period covered by this report, the analyst was absent from Heart Mountain. The time interval is too long to be presented in detail, even if the analyst had full knowledge of what has happened. The idea will be to record some of the major developments and to try to indicate the general drift of things.

At the end of July the population of the center was about 3600. Now it is about 3500 -- a reduction of almost 40%. The center has an unkept, semi-deserted look. At night especially, the place appears only partially inhabited. Many of the apartments are dark and a large percentage of the outside lights at the ends of the barracks are unlit. The streets are empty. One person said, "There is no place to go in the evening, even to visit."

There has been much closing. All Community Enterprises services have stopped. Community Activities has ceased to function, except for the operation of one movie. The cemetery is no more. The religious schools sponsored by the churches have ended. Even church services are on a sort of emergency basis. After September 28, there will be just one Buddhist priest and one Christian minister* (of those who were associated with the Community Church) in the center. In the case of the Buddhists, the change during the period covered by this report has been notable. Up to the end of July, only one Buddhist priest had ever relocated; five have gone in two months. By August 1, 11 of the 39 messhalls had been closed; now the number is 20. There was a plan to close half of the latrines and laundries on September 18, but a compromise was worked out by which they would be kept running with volunteer labor.

Community government has suffered. At the beginning of the period covered by this report there was a full Council and almost a full corps of managers. Now there are only 9 out of 20 managers. The Council is a little better off. It has 14 members, with the possibility of replacements soon from two blocks where vacancies were created by relocation this week. A few observations on what has been happening in community government may be made:

(1) There is a growing disposition to think in terms of whether or not there is a block functionary of any kind. Clerks

* Error: There are five; two ill; three capable of discharging ministerial duties.

pinch-hit for managers, managers for councilmen, and councilmen for managers. It seems that clerks and councilmen do not take each other's places as yet, but may come to that. What is going on may be stated in general terms: As the population declines, the division of labor becomes simpler and related jobs coalesce. (The process was observed at an advanced stage in Canal and in Poston II and III.)

(2) When vacancies occur in the managers group, replacements are hard to recruit. With one exception, the present nine managers are the residue of those who have been in office for a considerable period. Seven of the nine were managers last February.

(3) In the case of the Council only four of the February members are still members. All changes but one were due to relocation rather than to the election that took place in August. When vacancies developed, generally another man could be found. Two blocks have had three different councilmen; 10 blocks have had two.

(4) Block clerks are the easiest to recruit. There is only one vacancy in spite of 12 terminations during the past two months.

At this stage of the center's existence, block public opinion probably has a good deal to do with inducing people to accept block positions. Labor is short and block jobs involve more work than they used to. It would seem to follow that, in terms of the importance the residents attach to the different block officers, they can be rated in order (a) clerks, (b) councilmen, (c) managers. As the decay of the center proceeds, it may be that the last public functionaries will be the clerks. The services they perform for people are closer, more tangible, and more practical than are the services that have generally been performed by councilmen or managers.

The analyst asked his assistant if girls liked to be block clerks. She replied, "It isn't so much that they like to. But parents like to have their daughters be clerks because they can help the people that way. Parents consider it an honor to have a daughter work as clerk. Especially now they do many things to help in relocation. They answer questions, explain Bulletins, and write letters, besides receiving the Government property. I see our clerk washing at 11 o'clock on Saturday night. She is too busy to get to it at other times. Even while she is in the bath tub, I hear her explaining things through the partition."

Returning to the curtailment and closing of services: What was the reaction of people? Marshall closing had become an old story and has continued to be accepted. Retrenchment in Community Activities was preceded by a long meeting in which the evacuee C.A. heads argued for keeping up the activities for children. They con-

ed to administration suggestions grudgingly. In a few days they got used to the idea. The proposed closing of latrines and laundry rooms brought conferences between councilmen and the Project Director and protests to Washington. But until the deadline arrived, no compromises were seriously considered. The evacees insisted on the status quo. The administration said things must change. On September 15, the facilities were closed. On Monday, September 17, two to three hundred women called on the Project Director. They offered a compromise; the residents would run the laundries, latrines, and boilers by volunteer labor if they were left open. He agreed, providing that, the facilities in both halves of the block were run in the same way, i.e., with a reduced crew supplemented by volunteers. The compromise was adopted, in principle by the community; the practical angles are still being worked out with varying degrees of success in the different blocks.

Incidentally everybody seems happy. The people figure they won a victory. The administration accomplished what it wanted, i.e., block workers were relieved of duties within the block so that they could be used elsewhere and operating the block was placed more on a volunteer basis in preparation for the time to come when it will have to be almost all volunteer.

Incidentally, also, the institution of a system of volunteer work is relieved the burden certain volunteers were already bearing. In one half-block a woman could not be found who was willing to go on the payroll as a janitress. The councilman had made an appeal in the block meeting, the manager had canvassed the residents, the councilman's wife had called on a few women she thought might be likely prospects -- all to no avail. Then, the councilman's wife began cleaning the women's latrine herself without pay. Two ladies felt it was not right for her to do it alone so they offered to take turns. This had been going on for weeks. After Monday, September 17, a schedule was made and all able-bodied women, not elsewhere employed, were assigned a day. Now the councilman's wife has only her regular, rather infrequent turn. As long as the idea prevailed that WPA was obliged to find and pay a janitress most women would not consider doing the work gratis. The job was done only because one, and later three, especially public-spirited women took over. When the Administration made it clear that the latrine and laundry would be closed if it were not operated by volunteer labor, most women accepted their turn without hesitation.

In this instance, the old system of a paid janitress had broken down some time ago. The latrine was cleaned only because there happened to be in the half-block three women whose personalities were such that they were willing to meet the emergency.

The solution was ad hoc; there was no system. Now, a system exists again or is in the process of development -- a volunteer system under which all women have the socially recognized obligation of taking their turn as latrine janitress.

This process of breakdown and re-organization has been going on for months and will accelerate from now until the end. Just at present a workable method of getting coal unloaded and delivered is being sought. There is resistance among the evacuees to each new readjustment. The resistance gradually becomes less as readjustments multiply. The "maroon" of the women on the Project Director, provoked by the closing of the laundries and latrines, occurred only because the action affected so many people so drastically. Significantly, they arrived ready to propose a compromise that was a radical departure from the past. More often, resistance takes the form of discussions with the administration of councilmen or managers, widespread griping in the community, reluctance for awhile to volunteer or do other things the change involves, and gradual acceptance.

With a month to go in Canal and Posten II and III, practically all resistance had ceased. Everybody was doing anything and everything. Probably this is inevitable in the final stage in the decay of a center. The "system", if it can be called one, is a system of improvisation of catch-as-catch-can living. Things that have to be done get done -- somehow, by somebody. It is likely that this stage is two or three weeks away at Heart Mountain.

At the beginning of the report, the fact that about 2100 persons had relocated was cited without comment. How do people feel about relocation now as contrasted to two months ago? Even two months ago the closing of the center was accepted by the great majority. Several "prophets" who had proclaimed its impossibility had either gone out already or were actively planning to go. There was much talk of the housing shortage; some hope that the shortage might force postponement of the closing date. Quite a few people apparently thought of relocation as a fairly certain but somewhat abstract eventuality and were doing little in the way of concrete preparations. Perhaps two or three hundred family heads, steeped in the center-generated conceptions of how the war was going, entertained notions that American military reverses might result in a change of policy and cling to the center so as not to violate their interpretation of the Japanese Penal Code by voluntary relocation. A small number of people continued to insist that they could be transferred to Lake Lake or somewhere.

The war has ended, 309 has been issued, the closing date is two months closer. It is not hard to see that relocation has become a real certainty to almost everybody. Bitters-to-and are

stirring; some have gone already. There is a willingness to accept housing and employment that would not have been considered before. Worry about the practical problems individuals face has largely replaced the worry about distant generalized relocation problems that disturbed people's thinking earlier.

Yet, an observer who has seen centers nearer to closing time is struck by the apparent continued inertia of a minority. Talk of the housing shortage reveals it is still a somewhat abstract obstacle to a good many Heart Mountaineers. They say, "we will go if WRA will find housing" or "unless the Government does something about housing." There are rumors that people in Los Angeles are sleeping under bridges; that Pomona Assembly Center will presently re-open. In Canal and in Boston II and III, housing rumors were at a minimum. Perhaps the residents were individually too busy trying to locate something that would keep the rain off themselves to handy rumors. They appeared to have ceased to hope for Government-sponsored miracles. Housing was a topic of conversation, a dominant topic. But the discussions turned on the efforts a particular family, often the speaker's own family, had made and were making to find a place. The failures cited and the possibilities currently being explored were specific. In the conversations the analyst has had at Heart Mountain he recalls just one in which a man referred in considerable detail to his own attempts to get living quarters: Characteristically, others ask, "what are we (evacuees collectively) going to do?" Or they cite persons known to them, frequently not well known, who have been out so-and-so many weeks or months and have found nothing. Also, in Canal one heard of people who had found housing; here one hears mostly about those who haven't.

It would seem that the closing date has to get a little closer before evacuees put forth their maximum effort to solve their own problems and before the difficulties of relocation fully become the practical, concrete, and detailed ^{problems} that individual families face.

Plans for scheduling early in October have been announced. Maybe they will hasten the down-to-earth acceptance of center closing and relocation. The analyst has not had opportunity to gauge the reaction to these plans.

It would be appropriate to discuss the changes the end of the war had wrought in the psychological climate of Heart Mountain and to indicate in some detail the present thinking on the matter. This will have to be deferred due to the limitations of time.

The report will be ended with an account of developments in Block X. It will be recalled that the predictions of the two informants were made in May and that the starting point was June 1. The trend report of July 30 gave the changes up until the 14th of

that month. This will follow through to September 14.

The relocation rate was a little higher for Block X than for the center as a whole between July 15 and September 14. Of the June 1 population, about 26 % left from the whole center; 33 % from Block X.

How to look at the categories.

Will relocate June 1 - July 14, sure: By July 14, 82 % had gone. An additional 11 % departed before September 15. There remains 6 persons, 7 %. It is interesting that early in May these 6 were said to be "sitters." At the end of May an apparent revolution in thinking had occurred. They were going "very soon." It seems the revolution was only apparent.

Will relocate June 1 to July 15, probably: By July 15 not one had taken leave. Since then 15 of the 26 have gone, 60 %. All of the 10 who remain are waiting to be called by family members on the outside, just as they were on June 1.

Will relocate July 15 - September 14, sure (the second date was changed from August 31 because the point the informants emphasized was "before school starts"): No one had departed before July 15. By September 14, 10 of the 26 in the category had left, only 38 %. In many of these predictions, the informants had banked on the character of the people. They were thought to be the kind of people who would be certain to get their children out before school started.

Will relocate July 15 - September 14, probably: There were 90 in this category. Three, 3 %, were out before July 15. Thirty six, 40 %, went during the period indicated, making 43 % out -- higher than the "sure" category.

Will relocate September 14 - closing date. Three sub-categories were set up.

(1) Face no serious difficulties, could go at almost any time: Just one man had gone before July 15. (His wife was still here on September 15. Childless couple, aged 41 and 33.) By September 14, 10 more had departed, making 11 of 29, 38 %, out by that date.

(2) Face serious difficulties; said not to be "sitters", but would have a hard time. The informants just assumed they would find "something" when they had to: No departures before July 15. There have been only 6 since then. The category was small, 21 persons. Out by September 14, 24 %.

(3) Welfare cases according to the informants: There were 21 in the category. No departures before July 15. By September 14, 9 persons had gone, 43 %.

sitters and registers: There were 96 in this category. No departures before July 15. By September 14, 15 had left, 16 %.

It may be worthwhile to look at this last group a little further. Of the departures, 12 constitute three complete families. The other 3 are family heads. Members of their families in the center number 11. Two other men left the center on short term more than a month before September 14. There is no record of their having returned. Presumably their status is due to change to terminal. Family members in these two cases total 15. It seems likely that in all of these instances relocation is being actively worked on. (One family departed on September 19.) When all of them go, almost half of the category, 42 persons, will be out.

A final item: In Block X on June 1 there were 103 children aged 6 to 16. By September 14, 49 of them had gone. More than half, 54, are still here -- and school is in session.

A.T. Hansen
A. T. Hansen
Community Analyst

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

21293

March 15, 1945

To Project Directors:

In November the Community Analysis Section began a series called "Trends in the Relocation Centers." The first issue covered a period ending November 15. It was based on weekly trend reports made by analysts in all the relocation centers and was restricted in distribution.

In December the series was interrupted by the lifting of the exclusion orders which changed the whole basis of center life. Since then weekly summaries of events and opinions in the centers have been issued with little interpretation.

The present report is a continuation of the former series. It attempts to interpret in broad terms the happenings since the lifting of exclusion. It also attempts to project current trends a little way into the future in an effort to shed some light for guidance on the human problems of the relocation centers. Further trend reports will be issued from time to time during the coming year.

Robert H. Province
Chief, Community Management Division

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APR 23 1945

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

TRENDS IN THE RELOCATION CENTERS: II
March 1, 1945

During January and February a revolution was taking place in the relocation centers. The revolution involved for some 60,000 people a shift in the basis of their thinking about the future. This revolution was taking place in the familiar barracks setting with no upset of the daily routine: the New Year came and went with parties and mochigome pounding; blocks gave send-offs for inductees; there was a sweetheart contest at Minidoka; committees wrestled with manpower problems; Councils were elected and took office; people died and were born. But the people who carried on the daily round were thinking new thoughts, asking new questions, and a few were making new decisions. The centers unquestionably were stirred as they had not been since registration.

They were stirred by the announcement on December 17 that the barracks they had lived in for almost three years could no longer be home after January, 1946. For a few days after the announcement, there was little reaction. Gradually during the course of the next two weeks its meaning seeped back, person by person, to men and women and children in the apartments, messhalls, and laundry rooms. Probably only a handful of people believed it in each center by this time, possibly not even a handful. People had talked about such a possibility since June, 1944, the last time the rumor of the opening of the west coast had been strong. Here was the rumor again, but now it was on everyone's lips. It became necessary to believe or not believe it.

The reaction was disbelief. "The centers can't be closed." A high school girl said, "You can't close a town." It was not like accepting a statement that Allied bombers had obliterated Dresden. It was not that easy. After all the centers were still there. If you had never seen them, or visited them only occasionally from Washington, you could say that the centers will close and accept it as a fact to be. But if you lived in a center,..... If you had nowhere to go..... If you believed that government policy is capricious..... Of course, Jerome had closed. But "the centers" couldn't close. Possibly Heart Mountain and Rohwer or others, but there would always be Gila or Poston or some center.

"The centers can't be closed." But people went on talking about it. There were block meetings. Some of the men were getting excited. "Suppose they do close the center....." The thought made people mad. "They can't force us out." "We have a right to live somewhere." "We have a right to the centers."

January was a month of harsh thoughts about WRA and the government. "What can they do if we're still here next January?" But after all it wouldn't be possible to close the centers. And all through the month and on into February people kept saying that. Two months after the announcement, there was no general belief.

The centers, however, were not (any more than they had ever been) places where all think alike. There were levels of belief. There were the laundry rooms, places of gossip and chatter. Here during January and February a part of the revolution took place. In December, as people chatted, no one believed the centers would close; it was too revolutionary an idea. It was too great a feat of the imagination to see the messhalls quiet and empty, all the apartments bare, the children gone. But as the women talked the image became clearer. It could happen. Slowly the women in the laundry rooms admitted a new possibility into their planning. "If it did happen, then we might try to make a go of it in We would take this with us, store this, throw this away. Send Hisako to live with Henry after school is out, while we get started."

Then there was the level of the block meetings. The men sat on the wooden benches in the block manager's office talking. Here the possibility could not be admitted. "It is not just. They can't push us around. We can't go out on a pittance. The government wants to get rid of us now. We won't be treated that way." All the feelings of the men came up in the talk and crystallized around the symbols of the group -- evacuation losses, the barbed wire insult, our spirit is strong, our children, our rights. "We will not be forced." And the possibility was thrust aside. "The people in the centers will not permit them to be closed."

There was still a third level of belief. The men formed committees. The Councilmen met. The atmosphere of the block meetings was thick in the committee room; the committeemen learned quickly what the people wanted. Men who were leaders in the political life found that they must have a new vote of confidence from the people. Here was an issue that went beyond the routine of center life, of the settled smoothness of deliberations about "city codes" or the less smooth manpower discussions. They felt a "popular will." The leaders went back to the blocks for licenses to talk and emerged with a solid sense of how people felt. They emerged with real feelings of being representatives of the people. But as they concentrated into smaller groups for discussion, they found themselves, as the spokesmen of the block meetings were not, up against another will. They listened to and talked with administration staff who repeated the words about closing the centers, who passed on to them the administrative instructions and the post-exclusion bulletins. If this was not reality itself, it was the image of it. And so the committees talked on a different level from the blocks. They had to find a common ground with the directives from the administration -- if they were to talk at all. They talked of the difficulties of closing the centers, analyzed them, broke them down into 10, 15, 21 points. The centers might be closed -- if these difficulties were met.

Outside the laundry rooms, the block meetings, and the committees some men and women had what they wanted. They could go back to the butler's job in Santa Barbara, to the old house in Fresno, to the apple orchard in Oregon, to the little farm in Santa Clara. Closing the centers meant nothing to them. The old life was open. Others were now ready with the plans to go east that they had been working on for six months. Although they sat in the laundry room or the meeting and assented, it was assent for

the others, not themselves. A few at a time they packed up and left. So there was still another level of belief, but for such persons belief mattered little, because they were able to act.

This is the process. It has been remarkably uniform from center to center. Block meetings have been stormy at Heart Mountain and Topaz, peaceful elsewhere. Otherwise there is little essential difference to report. The hopes and fears of all in the centers are about the same.

The process is one of planting an idea so that it takes root and grows. The planting is taking place in the minds of 60,000 people. The planting is easy, but taking root is not immediate and growth depends on taking root.

The idea has no reality at all until thousands of persons have said it over and over again and tied it up with all their hopes and fears. An efficient administrator is accustomed to stating a policy, making it clear and understandable, and then finding his organization accepting it, acting on it, and directing all energies to its accomplishment. Stating, even making clear and understandable, an objective to a community of thousands of people is not the same thing. Whatever is stated must be brought into relation to the desires, the hopes, the worries, the past ideas of the people, before they will act on it. They themselves must do this in their own way. The idea of closing the centers cannot be accepted quickly with an act of faith by the evacuees, because it is not something they have wanted. They have feared it for some time and have hoped that it would not really happen.

The talk and discussions of the past ten weeks, the all-center conference, the discussions that will follow the conference, are all part of the process of giving reality to the new idea. With remarkable speed so far the idea is assuming a reality. Despite the fact that the people's hopes are generally broken by it, despite the fact that the leaders of the community were not prepared for it by participation in the formulation of the idea, despite the fact that it therefore seems irrational and arbitrary — despite all this, the idea is taking root. And those who will not for various reasons accept it are being steadily walled off into a minority with decreasing influence. The trend is unmistakable.

But the trend is not inevitable.

We have seen the beginnings of a revolution in things ^{being} take place in the centers, but that revolution is still in progress. After an initial rejection, acceptance of the idea of closing has spread and taken root in individual minds. The situation is comparable to that which existed in the centers in the fall of 1942 when the relocation program was first instituted. Acceptance of relocation came slowly for many Nisei and for a very few Issei.

People went the way their hopes led them. Hope for most Issei lay in the neutrality of center life for the duration of the war, and accordingly they rejected relocation.

A large part of the acceptance of the idea of center closing up to March 1 was a kind of conditional acceptance. "It could happen, if the WRA (synonymous with 'the government') would give us more help in getting out." The growth of acceptance depends on the amount of hope that people can read into WRA's post-exclusion program.

It is now clear that the first wave of disbelief in the centers rested in part on lack of knowledge of the nature of the new policies and of work that WRA and others have done in connection with relocation aids and public relations. This lack of information has persisted throughout the period. Despite all administrative efforts so far, information about what is actually offered is very far from being common knowledge. This gulf between WRA planners and even the best-informed center residents was strikingly apparent in the recommendations of the delegates to the all-center conference. The spread of acceptance depends first of all on the evacuees really becoming acquainted with the aids that have been set up, and secondly of course on the demonstration that they work.

The spread of acceptance depends (as did the early relocation program) on still a third factor. This is the residents' feelings about center life. A first reaction of Nisei and a few Issei to the early relocation program was to relocate because they "couldn't stand living in the centers." The emptiness in terms of goals and achievement, the little tensions of crowded life, the recurring anxieties, the restriction and dependence — in short, the unsatisfactoriness of center life drove people out. It became apparent a little later in the program, however, that these very same conditions, especially the anxieties and personal tensions, the restrictions, and the sense of dependence, were undermining self-confidence and therefore keeping people in. Individuals who through achievement of leadership in center life or good adjustment with neighbors and appointed staff managed to shake off the feelings of unsatisfactoriness began to think in terms of relocation.

During the next three months the centers as communities will certainly become less satisfactory. Messhalls will close, requiring new personal adjustments. The agricultural programs will be curtailed. Prominent men and women will disappear with their families from the center scene as they return to the west coast. A new set of anxieties, as people follow west coast developments and the course of the war, will plague the centers. The signs of community dissolution will be clear-cut even before the schools close. The sense of living in a dissolving community will increase, and will have a two-edged effect -- driving some out and paralyzing the initiative of others.

Despite the surprisingly rapid spread ~~of the acceptance~~ of the idea of closing, little has thus far happened in the centers that can properly

be called a relocation response to the closing. Almost all the relocation that has taken place has been a result of the pre-exclusion program or the opening of the west coast. It has not been a response to the prospect of center closing. Informing people about the real nature of the post-exclusion program, demonstration of the workability of that program, and the disintegration of the communities are all slow processes. But they should be well-advanced by the end of the next three months. By May or June the real response to the prospect of liquidation will be clear.