

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

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FINAL REPORT ON THE GILA RIVER RELOCATION CENTER
AS OF MAY 20, 1945

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INTRODUCTION: THE AIMS OF THIS REPORT

The aims of this report are two fold. First, it is proposed to present the aims, methods, and techniques of Community Analysis as developed on this project; to outline the relationship between the Community Analysis Section with other branches of the Administration; to estimate the value of Community Analysis to the WRA Administration; and to make a few suggestions as to future uses of social analysis in administrative procedures.

Secondly, it is proposed to present a view of the social organization of this center. Some of this has been done in previous reports; the present aim is to give a rounded outline of the social organization. This outline will not only describe the various aspects of evacuee society; it will try to show the relationship of the parts to the whole. Further, as part of a total social situation, it will indicate the relationship of evacuee organization to project administration and, more remotely, to Washington administration, to the State of Arizona and to the country at large. The possible values of such a presentation are: (1) that it will provide material which, when compared with other similar material, will indicate the type of phenomena to be expected when a social group is put into such a position as was necessitated by evacuation and isolation in relocation centers; (2) that it can provide data for guidance, or at least for suggestions, in making administrative decision in the future; and (3) it may form part of a body of knowledge for the development of administrative policies in similar situations, not necessarily confined to the WRA.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

HISTORICAL SKETCH

Shortly after the establishment of the Community Analysis Section in Washington, a Community Analyst was appointed to this project. He arrived in the month of March, 1943; unfortunately, his health failed him within two weeks, and he was forced to resign. His successor, the present Community Analyst, did not arrive until June 30, 1943. Thus, while most other Projects received their Analysts in March, April, or May, this project was, practically, without an Analyst until July 1, 1943.

During the first year, the Community Analyst worked about half the time on Community Analysis. The rest of his time was spent on various assignments: interviewing applicants for segregation, assisting in the process of segregation, and acting for the Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division. During the second year, all of his time was spent on Community Analysis, with the exception of a period of absence of seven weeks.

STAFF

Upon his arrival the Community Analyst found that the size of his staff had already been fixed: he was allotted two Research Assistants (since named Assistant Community Analysts) and an office staff of three. A high standard of formal or informal qualifications was decided upon. Excluding temporary assistants who were either uninterested in or not qualified for the task, the Assistant Community Analysts have been as follows:

- (1) Mr. Seiichi Oguchi, Issei. He had no academic qualifications but he was well-read, and quickly learned the techniques of the interview. He was employed on July 29, 1943, and stayed until July 29, 1944, when he relocated.
- (2) Mr. Takeshi Sakurai, a Nisei. He was a graduate of U. C. L. A. in business administration. This had included some study of social science. He had also had some graduate work, including social research. He also proved himself an excellent assistant, from August, 1943, to March, 1944, when he relocated.
- (3) Mr. Nagao Fujita, also a Nisei. He had gone out on student relocation in 1942, and had graduated in political science from Brigham Young University, Utah, early in 1944. He joined the Community Analysis staff in March, 1944, and remained until his induction into the Army in June, 1944. He was better instructed and had keener insight into social organization than either of the others, and, had he remained longer, would probably have been the best assistant of all of them.
- (4) Mrs. Yone Satow. She is Issei, the wife of a Christian minister, and well-educated, though not specifically in social science. She is an excellent assistant as far as honest and painstaking inquiries go; but the imperfection of her English limits her usefulness. She is not able to make adequate records of her own interviews and observations, as were the other assistants. She was employed in October, 1944, and is still a member of the staff.

The Community Analyst was also greatly aided by volunteer assistants, men or women employed in other departments who made specific and limited inquiries; these, of course in addition to a varying number of informants, who gave information upon request, in interviews.

METHOD

The method adopted was that common among social anthropologists in the study of any social group. The basic assumption is that a social group maintains its cohesion and its order by the working of various interrelated social mechanisms; it is the object of the inquiries to find out what these are by certain techniques. The study

not only involves an examination of the social groupings within the community, but the relationship of these groupings to each other. In this particular setting, it involves also a study of the inter-relationships of two groups, evacuee and staff.

TECHNIQUES

The techniques adopted included some of the standard techniques of the social anthropologist. These need be indicated only briefly.

- (1) Observation: the observation of the physical situation, of behavior of people in large and small groups and of more formal events, such as entertainments, meetings, and so on.
- (2) Case Studies: examination of a related series of events either directly or by interviewing others. Thus, a strike is a case study and a careful analysis of such occurrence throws much light, not only on employment relationships but on many other relationships.
- (3) Records: these are useful as being either observations or case studies made and recorded by other people. The minutes of Community Council meetings, records of conferences, reports of the Reports Office are examples.
- (4) Statistics: the Community Analysis Section collected very few statistics and these were usually only samplings. However, the data collected by the Statistical Unit were utilized for various purposes. The Community Analyst was fortunate in that the statisticians were extremely cooperative in making their data available.
- (5) The basic device was the interview. As many people as time permitted were interviewed, and the interview was used to determine current attitudes, individual case histories, case studies, or descriptions of social groupings.
- (6) Polls, questionnaires, and schedules were not used for several reasons. First, the staff was so small that such devices would have taken too long. Secondly, in this situation, it was felt that answers to polls would indicate what the people wished the Administration to believe rather than anything else; while this may have been useful, it was hardly worth the trouble. The nearest approach was a sample poll: on some limited, immediate issue, a number of people were briefly questioned but also upon the degree to which those selected for questioning were representative of the various segments and strata of the population. This device was used, for example, to assess reactions to the shooting incident of December 8, 1943.

Since this is a general report, a more detailed analysis of methods and techniques is not in place. It should be noted, however, that the results are those obtained by close contact of a few individuals with the social group concerned. On other projects the Community Analysts have larger staffs; they are thus able to accumulate larger bodies of data. Whatever validity exists in the results of the made on this project depends upon the quality of the work of a small number of people: the Community Analyst, working in association with one or two Assistant Community Analysts, with, at any given time, a few selected volunteer assistants.

PRACTICAL PROCEDURES

Upon arrival at a center, the Community Analyst must make personal and professional adjustments to two social groups to the appointive staff, of which he is a member, and to the evacuee residents, whom it is his job to study. This distinction between the groups is sometimes blurred, as there exist relationships between members of the appointive staff and evacuee individuals or groups; but in this center, the distinction is marked, a point to be elaborated later.

The Analyst adjusts to the appointive staff as a member of the group. He is a member of the Administration, he is expected to participate in the occupational life of that group, and, to some degree or other, to participate in its recreational activities. It is, in fact, essential that he do so for two reasons: first, he must know something of the group which interprets national policies and initiates project policies; and, second, if he is to make the point that he has certain professional techniques which are useful to administration (even as other professionals have their techniques) he must gain some kind of personal acceptance. This is a significant factor in the utilization of the results of social research.

At the same time the Analyst must begin to make some adjustments to the evacuee group. This is an even more difficult process. The residents are suspicious of members of the Administration. Some will brand as inu (dogs) all of their fellows who have more than necessary contacts with Administrative personnel. And they are quick to resent an appearance of condescension or patronage. Thus the Analyst has an exacting task for the first weeks on the job.

These difficulties were accentuated at Gila by the fact that, at the end of three weeks, the Analyst was assigned an administrative task, that of interviewing applicants for repatriation. As previously noted, throughout the first year these interruptions were repeated. From the point of view of good analysis, this is probably a mistake. It is a mistake for several reasons. In gaining the confidence of the people, it is useful to have continually developing contacts; these are slowed down by the assumption of other duties. Further, these administrative assignments put the Analyst in the position of making decisions which may be considered oppressive; this will alter the

nature of his relationships to the evacuees. A further objection sometimes advanced is that such a course identifies him as a member of the Administration. This is really not important. He is already so identified, and if he adopts the subterfuge that he is really not a member of the administrative staff he is apt to be discredited as a fool for thinking he can get away with it, or a liar, or both. In expressing the belief that the assignment of administrative tasks to the Analyst was a mistake, the Analyst does not wish to blame others; after the first two interruptions, he was at least as much to blame as anyone else. The first thing to note is that he now believes it a mistake.

The process of adjustment to evacuees consists simply in developing acquaintance and friendship with a sufficient number of people. As and when opportunity offers, or is created, these acquaintances become larger in number and mutual confidence comes into being. The technique here is simple--to treat the evacuee group with precisely the same sincere respect that would be accorded to any other individual or group. Consequently, both attitudes and manners are essential. If the attitude contains any prejudice or feeling of superiority, it will eventually be detected, and the Analyst's usefulness diminished. At the same time, if the manners are at fault, analysis will equally suffer. Particularly in dealing with Issei, whose codes of manners are somewhat different from ours. Manners must be carefully controlled.

Certain devices assist in dispelling suspicion. From the first, it was decided that the function of Community Analysis was to be explained to the residents as completely as possible. While the majority were uninterested, careful explanations were given the Block Managers, the Community Councils, and to other evacuee leaders. A second device was to ensure that all information went to the files anonymously. Informants were apt to be apprehensive if they thought their remarks were to be quoted; it allayed their fears if their names were not recorded. Thus, unless a resident spoke in an official capacity, his name does not appear. Mr. Oguchi accentuated the usefulness of this device by advertising it; he took the Community Analysis files to block managers' meetings and displayed them. A further development was that the files were always available for reference by any member of the community. Though very few have availed themselves of this facility, the fact that it existed was of great service in the early days.

Once confidence is accorded, the Analyst is in a good position to work. It is not necessary that every individual have confidence in him, but merely that a sufficient number of people and groups trust his integrity. Also in a group which contains many highly educated and mentally alert people, it is essential that they understand the functions of the Analyst, and have confidence that they will be used for the furtherance of good administration. Both types of confidence take time to develop.

Physically, the Community Analysis Section was without an office for the first few weeks. The office was finally established at one end of the Community Activities Building, in the recreation barrack of Block 51, Butte. This is approximately in the middle of Butte community, which is an obvious advantage; it has additional advantage of being at some distance from the Administration Building; informants may drop in without coming into contact with other administrative offices, and contacts can be more informal and, therefore, more productive of information.

One limitation upon the usefulness of Community Analysis in this center should be noted; Butte was studied much more intensively than Canal. This developed from the nature of the Analyst's activities in the first year. He lived and had his office in Butte, and Butte was therefore more convenient. His work was frequently interrupted. Consequently he always felt the urge to resume his Butte contacts and to pursue his inquiries in Butte, to the detriment of those in Canal. Further, no Assistant Community Analyst was ever obtainable in Canal. Three individuals at different times seemed available; each time, something happened to prevent their employment. Looking back, it is now apparent that it would have been advantageous to live for a few weeks in Canal to establish a number of informal contacts, but this was not done. Information from Canal is limited to the following sources: (1) observation and records of meetings in Canal, Community Council, block managers, etc; (2) interviews with publicly recognized leaders; (3) periodic interviews with a few people (now nearly all relocated) with whom personal contacts had been established; (4) interviews by Assistant Community Analysts with friends and acquaintances in Canal; (5) records pertaining to Canal; and, (6) observations made by other members of the appointive staff.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATION

The task of the Community Analyst has been stated in various instructions. It may be summarized as follows: to present such facts of social organization, attitudes and reactions of the resident community as will assist in efficient administration, and be of use in the formulation, modification, and execution of both national and project policies. This imposes certain responsibilities upon the Analyst. Apart from the primary obligation to report accurately and objectively, inseparable from any scientific approach, the obligation is also laid upon him to report such facts as are useful to the administrator and in such a manner as will be comprehensible to the practical man; who will not necessarily be trained in the methods and terminology of the social sciences.

It follows that while the Analyst must acquire a mass of knowledge, he need not necessarily report all of it. To understand the implications of any event, the greater his background the better. But

the practical man will not necessarily be interested in all the complex processes by which the Analyst arrived at his results. As long as the professional qualifications of the Analyst are conceded, the administrator may well be impatient at elaborate documentation. In view of these considerations, the policy would seem to be to build up a mass of background knowledge but to confine verbal or written reports to those conclusions which have practical import, with only such documentation or evidence as is necessary to illustrate the process by which the conclusions are reached.

However, there are certain long range considerations. If the process of evacuation is to be adequately documented for historical purposes, the background material should also be presented. The actual policy adopted at this center was a compromise. Preference was given to those conclusions and to certain basic facts of immediate significance to administration; but a limited number of background studies were also reported. Within the limits of time left, it is one of the aims of this report to supplement the background studies.

Organizationally, the Section of Community Analysis is part of the Division of Community Management. This worked very well on this project. The Community Analyst worked closely with each of the two successive Assistant Project Directors, Community Management Division. He had frequent informal conferences with them, and, of course, his reports were forwarded through them. The functions of the Community Management Division are such that the conclusions of the Analyst are of more importance to it than to any other division; and the policies of the division are of more interest to the Analyst than those of the other divisions. Thus the practice was established of frequent discussions with the Assistant Project Director. However, all matters believed to be of sufficient urgency or importance were immediately communicated to the Project Director, either by the Assistant Project Director or by the Analyst.

Although this arrangement worked well on this project, it is not now believed to be the best organizational arrangement. The conference of Community Analysts held at Denver in September, 1944, recommended as follows: "Ideally, Community Analysis would be in a position to perform its functions most effectively if it were set up as an independent division directly responsible to the Director on the national level, and the Project Director on the project level". But later on, the recommendation hedges: "However, the effectiveness of Community Analysis depends upon the operation of many other factors than the mere position of the section in organizational structure.----- Therefore, it is believed that the operating effectiveness of Community Analysis can best be maintained under the present organizational setup". The Gila Analyst now wishes he had voiced a more determined opposition to this recommendation than he did. He wishes that, even at the cost of some reorganization, the recommendations in the first section had been adopted unconditionally and acted upon. That the present situation works well is beside the point; if the other is preferable, it is worth putting into effect.

The advantages of being directly responsible to the Director are that the Analyst is in a position to give him such technical assistance as is required; that he is free to confer with such division or section heads as may find his assistance useful, without interposition of the Assistant Project Director; and that he will not feel that his primary interests are bound up in one division, even if that division is the one in which, as a matter of scientific orientation, an appreciable part of his assistance would be useful. An individual Analyst can, and of course does rise above the structural position assigned him; but it is in spite of the structural position, not because of it. For example, one of the limitations of the studies of the Gila Analyst is that he might have done more work on labor relations than he did. It is at least possible that if his technical assistance had been considered equally available to all divisions, he might have done more work in that line.

The actual procedures, thus, were to communicate by individual conference with the Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division, at frequent intervals; with the Project Director on important or urgent matters; and with heads of other divisions or sections on matters on which his advice was asked, or if some information of importance to them came to his attention. The other divisions most often concerned were Reports, Legal, and Relocation. Sections concerned were Welfare, Community Activities, Evacuee Property, and Employment.

In addition to individual conferences, the Analyst also attended various types of staff meetings. These were sometimes meetings of the Project Director, the Assistant Project Director, Community Management, the Relocation Division, the Welfare Section, and the Community Activities Section. He was also a member of the Staff Relocation Committee, and attended general staff meetings as a section head.

Reports were written irregularly. In the first year, when part of his time was spent in administrative activities, the reports were too infrequent; only ten are worth listing. In the eleven months of the second year, and during which period the Analyst was absent for seven weeks, twenty-eight reports have been submitted.

The purposes of written reports are three-fold. First, they set forth useful conclusions more systematically than is possible in conferences. Second, they provide a permanent record which can be consulted, at need, by project officials. Third, they provide information considered to be useful to the Washington office.

The content of the reports has already been touched upon. More specifically, the project officials have found most useful the following types of reports: (1) those noting current reactions to official policies; (2) those dealing with factors of dissatisfaction or unrest not fully realized by the Administration; (3) those dealing with basic structures, such as block councils and community

councils, by accurate description of their workings and by interpretation of their functions. They have also, to a less degree; found utilization of statistical material of some value; for example, the population pyramids give a quick comprehensible picture of the population structure, useful in orienting policies to the type of people in the center at any given time.

The following statements were made, upon request, concerning the value of Community Analysis. The interviews were recorded immediately after they occurred; they are paraphrases rather than quotations, but are believed to be a close approximation to what was said.

The Project Director stated that he found Community Analysis most useful because it was an independent opinion indicative as to whether the community was going along with the Administration or not. As a response to a leading question, he said that it was one of the sets of facts he always took into consideration before making an administrative decision. He added that he read Community Analysis reports more carefully than any other reports. He further said that now he was particularly concerned with the present policy of center closing and that the role of Community Analysis in such a crisis situation was extremely important.

The further statement was made that he does not always agree with some of the details of the Community Analysis reports, but that he always forwards them to Washington without change of word.

The Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division, made statements to the following effect. First, insofar as the Administration was receptive to Community Analysis findings, it was enabled to discover the needs of the people, and thereby to meet them as far as possible within the administrative instructions. He used them in making his decisions and considered the opinions of the Community Analyst as a balance to the opinions of the section heads; in any major decision respecting one section, he considered primarily the opinion of the section head, but used the knowledge of the Community Analyst to modify their decisions in some cases.

As a means of communication, he believes written reports useful, probably essential, but favors the informal conference. In this way, an interchange of opinion can be developed, not possible if confined to the written report.

He gave three examples of fields in which Community Analysis had proved very useful. The first was in the field of relocation. The Community Analyst has been able to submit conclusions which not only showed community reactions to the relocation program, and to the program of center closing, but his findings, also suggested new approaches to the problem. Secondly, the Analyst has always followed the development of the community councils very closely, and his findings and opinions have been utilized. Thirdly, in his dealings with the hospital, always a delicate point in the community, he has been aided by reports

of the Analyst upon community reactions to hospital policies, to hospital officials, and upon reports of internal tensions within the hospital.

Asked specifically, the Assistant Project Director agreed that statements made by informants to the Analyst should be considered privileged communications. If the Analyst is to do his work properly, he must gain the confidence of a sufficient number of people. To retain that confidence, he must not divulge what they have said if they themselves would not want their names to be known. Hence the sources of information must be kept confidential, unless they are publicly available in minutes of meetings or conferences.

The Supervisor of Community Activities made two statements as to the use of Community Analysis. First, the Analyst describes the cultural medium within which the Supervisor must organize his activities. Second, the Analyst is able to note social changes which necessitate changes in the direction and emphasis of community activities.

Taking into account the statements just noted, together with other less formal statements made by administrative officers, and adding the experience acquired by two years in the WRA, the Community Analyst ventures the following opinions as to the usefulness of Community Analysis.

Any administrative action involving a group of people has certain results. These results are, to a degree, predictable in a social setting which the administrator knows and understands. Thus a good administrator can, to some extent, predict the consequences of his actions in a traditional setting where the attitudes and motivations are those which he shares, which are part, in effect, of the culture of which the administrator is a member. To the degree that the culture of the administrator and that of the people he administers are different, the results of any administrative action will be unpredictable, or predictable with a great margin of error.

Cultural differences may exist because of regional, occupational, or social class differences, because of differences of cultural origin or because of differences in the social situation. The problems presented to an administrative officer of the WRA are accentuated chiefly by two of these factors: differences of cultural origin and differences in the social situation; by the latter is meant the differences created by the facts of evacuation and isolation in a relocation center.

A good administrative officer will, in time, learn what is likely to happen; the difficulty lies in the fact that it takes time to learn empirically, and during that period of learning, mistakes will inevitably be made. The Community Analyst has the professional qualifications to discover the social organization, attitudes and reactions of a social group, the time to make the requisite studies, and the experience to interpret his findings and to apply them to new situations. Hence he is in a position to offer information and advice upon administrative policies, upon their probable and actual results, and thus to diminish the possibility of mistake.

There is a tendency in some quarters to minimize the importance of Community Analysis, in other quarters to exaggerate it. The truth lies somewhere in the middle. Since the Community Analyst is trained to discover and interpret social facts, he is less likely to be mistaken in that field than one not so trained. On the other hand, the social sciences are not exact sciences. Hence the Community Analyst is not in a position to regard himself as infallible. He should be satisfied if the Administration accepts his information as well-founded, and his advice as worth listening to, and not feel that other people are grossly in error if they do not adopt his suggestions without change.

The position of the Analyst in the Administration might thus be that of an expert, whose advice should be available on all relevant occasions. It would be useful if he attended all important conferences, both to know what is happening, and to be present with information or opinion as required. There can be no blue-print as to what conferences he should or should not attend; that will depend, in the final analysis, upon the confidence accorded him by whoever conducts the meeting. The principle can merely be stated.

Administrative decisions are made, in the long run, on the basis of a complexity of factors, of which the factors adduced by the Community Analyst are only one group. For example, project decisions may be made with an eye to the attitudes of the community, the attitudes of the staff, public opinion and Washington instructions. Functionally, the Community Analyst is required to report only on the attitudes of the community, though he may, as a matter of common sense, have opinions on the other factors.

The Assistant Project Director made the point that Community Analysis was useful to the Administration only insofar as the Administration is receptive to it. If it is to be useful, it follows that administrative officers should know something about it, its uses and its limitations. As the Community Analyst increases his knowledge of practical administration, his usefulness to administration will increase. Similarly, as the administrative officer's knowledge of social analysis increases, so will its value to him increase.

The foregoing remarks were intended to apply only to Community Analysis within the WRA. It is obvious that they have potentially a much wider application. After the war, and, indeed, even during its concluding phases, there will arise many situations where the results of any administrative decision will be problematical. The social upheavals caused by the war will accelerate social change afterwards, and motives and attitudes which could formerly be taken for granted will then be modified. Thus social analysis could be made a useful instrument of government, particularly in those government agencies which will control large social groups. Presumably this point will be made in the final report of the Washington office of the Community Analysis Section. It is simply mentioned here.

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF A RELOCATION CENTER

BRIEF SOCIAL HISTORY

The Gila River Center came into existence as the residence of an evacuee group when the first trainload arrived on July 20, 1942. The first arrivals were 520 people from Turlock Assembly Center who had volunteered to be the pioneers. They settled in the partially completed blocks in Canal (Camp I) and immediately began the work of setting up mess halls, warehouses, and supplies. Those of this group who remain reside in blocks 3, 4, 5, and 6.

They had just a week to straighten away, when other arrivals began. (A small trainload arrived on July 23 from Pinedale Assembly Center) One trainload arrived each day on August 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 11 from Sanger, California, these being people from Military Area No. 2, who had not been collected into assembly centers. On July 27, 28, and 29 and on August 12, 13, and 14 the rest of the people from Turlock Assembly Center arrived. From August 21 to September 5, ten trainloads arrived from Tulare Assembly Center. On October 17, a small trainload arrived from Stockton, Fresno, and Lodi. October 18, 19, and 27 each saw the arrival of a trainload from Santa Anita Assembly Center.

The immediate origin of the people was, thus, as follows:

- Turlock Assembly Center		Santa Anita Assembly Center	
10 trainloads	3,573	3 trainloads	1,271
By direct entry from Sanger, Stockton, Lodi, and Fresno		Stockton Assembly Center	
7 trainloads	2,938	1 trainload	220
Tulare Assembly Center		Fresno Assembly Center	
10 trainloads	4,942	1 trainload	156
		Pinedale Assembly Center	
		1 trainload	40
Total arrivals by October 27 - (Source: WCCA Lists)			13,140

Transfers from other centers followed from time to time. The peak population was reached on January, 1943 - approximately 13,350 (1)

The early months were months of hardship. Most of the people arrived in the period of greatest heat. Basic facilities there were, but not all installations were completed. The holes and trenches in which water pipes were placed were in many cases uncovered. Sandstorms raged without any grass or shrubbery to diminish or alleviate them. Possibly worst of all, people arrived before housing was ready for the

(1) For complete tabulation of arrivals at Center see Appendix A.

Even today, some residents get bitter when they talk about the overcrowding. They also speculate on how it happened, and give it as a typical example of WRA inefficiency. By August 31, the population of Canal had risen to 5400; if every available apartment had been inhabited to the limit of the housing standard, the community could have taken only 4,800. Thus families doubled up; people slept in laundry rooms, block managers' offices and recreation halls.

On August 21, Butte camp was opened and by August 31, it held 3000 people. It eventually became the larger camp, its population rising through the succeeding months until by March 31, 1943 it had a population of 8301. Canal's population began to drop; several blocks moved from Canal to Butte as housing became available. By March 31, 1943, the population of Canal was reduced to about 4,950. This still left it crowded, a condition not relieved until segregation: but the housing crisis was probably passed by the end of October.

By and large, Canal received the people from Turlock Assembly Center and from Military Area No. 2. Butte received the people from Tulare Assembly Center and Santa Anita Assembly Center. Three blocks and some families moved from Canal to Butte, so that there are people in Butte from Turlock and Military Area No. 2. But in spite of these exceptions, the communities were already differentiated on the basis of their points of origin.

Community government began to take shape early. From the beginning, each block had a council; the block managers held weekly meetings; and temporary community councils were established on September 14 in Canal and September 28 in Butte. These developments will be more comprehensively noted in the section on community government.

The earlier hardships were those of heat, dust, shortage of sanitary facilities, and overcrowding. As winter drew on, another hardship emerged - shortage of heating stoves. By the end of December, oil stoves were installed in all apartments but in the meantime many people had suffered.

The next crisis was not material; army registration began. The Army teams arrived on February 8, 1943, and left early in March. During this period there was bitterness, suspicion, and conflict. At the end of initial registration, responses to Question 28 were as follows:

(1) Responses to Question No. 28

Citizens:	Total	Negative	Positive
Male	2588	951	1637
Female	2394	252	2142
Total	4982	1203	3779
Aliens:			
Male	2750	1 (1 did not answer)	2748
Female	1877	0 (3 did not answer)	1874

(1) The details of differential responses to Question No. 27 and No. 28 are not given. The results were reported in detail in May, 1943.

Total . 4627 1 4622
(4 did not answer)

Contemporary reports give the details and the interpretation of this episode better than can be done now, particularly as the Community Analyst was not present during registration. Only three comments will be made. First, the evidence is conclusive that the negative responses to the loyalty question were given from a variety of motives. Some were doubtless disloyal. Others responded from confusion as to the issues involved; the coupling of volunteering for the Army along with registration, was one of the main contributions to that confusion. Still others responded negatively because of resentment at evacuation, protest against registration or other similar motives. And there is evidence that pressures of various kinds were brought to bear upon the registrants.

Secondly, registration colored evacuee-staff relationships for the rest of the year, of those who responded No, several hundred applied to change the answer to Yes; the consequent hearings turned the WRA staff into a quasi-judicial body, with powers to decide for or against segregation. Even in 1945, a small number of families bear resentments at registration and its consequences.

Thirdly, the camp was divided into "loyal" and "disloyal". This resolved itself into a question of destination; the sending of the "disloyal" to Tule Lake meant the breaking of friendships and sometimes even the division of families. Consequently, in the ensuing months, the camp was in a depressed mood. By July, some people were saying that never had the spirits of the people sunk so low.

Registration also had one unfortunate by-product. It had been considered necessary to remove some people believed to be trouble-makers. In particular, some leaders of the Seinen-Kai (Young People's Association) were believed, with good evidence, to be pro-Japanese, or at least anti-administration. A few were removed to Moab. The consequence was that, for a long time, the people were afraid that any anti-administration word or deed would lead to summary removal; this fear continued well into 1944.

While these events were socially disruptive, concurrent events were socially constructive. The temporary community councils had named a committee to draft the permanent constitution. This was forwarded to Washington in May. Word of approval reached the project on July 9, 1943. It was approved by the electors of Canal on August 30 and in Butte on September 6. The reception of the constitution was unenthusiastic but it did mark a point in social reorganization. The new councils were elected in Canal on September 14 and in Butte on September 28.

In the meantime, the segregation movement was under way. On July 22, interviews of applicants for repatriation were begun and on July 26

hearings for all those who had answered negatively to Question 28 were instituted. This went on through most of the month of August. On September 1, those who had been selected to return to Japan on the Gripsholm-76 in number-left the center. (71 persons actually sailed)

The segregation movement to Tule Lake began on October 1. Four trainloads, carrying a total of 1915 segregees left, the last departure being October 6.

Following segregation there was a period of relative quiet. The community gradually recovered from the severing of social bonds, and much work of a constructive nature went on. The community councils functioned, some mistakes were made and the councillors were at first unsure of themselves and ignorant of procedure, and of their functions. Moreover, the Administration had much to learn about working with an elected council. Evidence of improved relationships was the reaction to an incident on December 8. On that date, a young man, temporarily insane, walked past the sentry at the gate and was shot and wounded. The public reaction was very quiet. If the incident had occurred before segregation, there would probably have been an uproar.

At the end of 1943, new councils were elected, according to the constitution, to take office at the beginning of 1944. Three incidents are deserving of notice. On January 27, the Bataan atrocities were announced. The community councils passed resolutions condemning these atrocities. The Issei members of the councils for the first time (the resolutions had been written by committees) reacted violently and resentfully. The committees were opposed, and the councils sunk in popular esteem. Some people stated that it was the most upsetting incident since registration. The incident served to bring to notice two facts: first, the cultural attachment of the Issei to Japan; second, the emergence of the Issei as overt leaders. Relocation had disproportionately diminished the Nisei; it was now evident that the center had become primarily an Issei community.

The next incident to note is the reapplication of Selective Service to the evacuees. The announcement met a mixed reception. It was unpopular with the Issei, and many Nisei felt that it was unfair to deprive them of their constitutional rights and at the same time force them to fight for their country. After much discussion it was finally resolved to submit a petition. In the petition, loyalty was affirmed, Selective Service was accepted, and equal treatment and restoration of constitutional privileges were asked. This petition was signed by most of the Nisei of military age and sent to the President. Some members of the Administration objected to any petition being sent. The Community Analyst differs from them. There was enough dissatisfaction that some expression of it was needed. That expression was made in an unobjectionable way in the petition; loyalty and acceptance of Selective Service were not made conditional upon restoration of rights; the latter were merely petitioned for.

It was probably one of a number of factors which contributed to the record of this project of not having a single refusal to serve.

The third event was the growing dissatisfaction of the councils in themselves and in their usefulness. This found expression in March and April in various discussions as to changes in form. No great changes were, in fact, made, but procedures were smoothed, and minor improvements made them more efficient. Since that period, the usefulness of the councils has increased.

In June, 2,051 people were transferred from Jerome Relocation Center to Gila. Two facts are worth noting. First, the arrangements for their reception worked excellently. The Jerome people had left their camp with reluctance, and resented its closing. Many did not want to come to Gila, as they feared the heat. Nevertheless, the reception was so well conducted that the new arrivals settled into camp and were absorbed with very little trouble. Secondly, in this reception, the community councils took the lead, thus helping in the restoration of their self-esteem. Block managers also participated wholeheartedly.

The year 1944 as a whole was marked by two tendencies. The first was the increasing cooperation which developed between the residents and the Administration. The second was the progress of relocation.

Concerning the first, there did not develop any major difference between people and the Administration, and there was increasing mutual understanding. In June the mid-year elections to the community councils were held. In Butte, there was little change in personnel and the executive board remained intact. In Canal there were large changes in both councils and board, but this was because of local politics and not because of administrative friction. In the ensuing months each council elected a new chairman, but there was little change of policy though procedures became more efficient. In September, with manpower shortage looming, the councils appointed manpower commissions. The principles were laid down by which essential services were to be kept operating, a very useful achievement. Towards the end of the year, there was some dissatisfaction with the Butte council on the part of the residents; it was felt that they had cooperated too wholeheartedly with the Administration. The result was that, as the next election in December, there was a definite overturn. The irreducible minimum of harmony had been overpassed; there is apparently an ineradicable factor of resentment which must find expression. The Canal council avoided this difficulty by finding minor issues with the Administration. In spite of these small differences, it was a period of surprising peace and harmony,

This was achieved in spite of the continual losses of key residents as a result of relocation. The net relocation figures for the year were 2,696. Those relocating included, of course, an undue proportion of the able and the physically fit, so that, with each succeed-

ing month there were departures of residents whose cooperation had been depended upon. The population trend was reversed twice; first in June, when the people from Jerome arrived; and second, during the last months of the year when the returns of short term, seasonal, and trial indefinite leaves outnumbered the departures. But the population of December 31, 1944, included fewer able-bodied men and a larger proportion of the old and the very young than at any previous time in the history of the center.

The all-absorbing consideration in the year 1945 is of course the announced opening of the West Coast and the closing of the centers. The announcement was made on December 17, 1944. Those immediately interested were some property owners who wished to return as soon as possible. The vast majority took some time to let the news sink in. At the present time, a large minority have gone or have made plans to go. The majority are yet undecided. This topic will be discussed more fully at the end of this report.

If one wished to sum up the history in a few words it might be phrased as follows. The months of July to October 1943, were months of hardship and intensification of resentments, in which, nevertheless, the community began to be organized. November, 1942, to the end of January, 1943, were months of organization. February and March, 1943 were months of confusion and conflict because of the issues raised at registration. From March, 1943, to October, 1943, there was an increase in constructive organization, but the outstanding facts were the preparations for the completion of segregation. The winter of 1943-1944 probably witnessed the height of social and constitutional organization, because, while there were some conflicts, events showed that the constructive efforts had borne fruit. The fact was demonstrated by the painless absorption of 2,000 people from Jerome in June, 1944. The year 1944 was a year of partial relocation and of more complete emergence of Issei leadership; it was also a period of harmonious relationships. The first months of 1945 are overshadowed by the announced closing of the centers and the beginning of the breakdown of a highly integrated, complex social group.

THE PEOPLE

The people who came as evacuees to this center had in common the fact of their Japanese origin. The Issei had in addition their Japanese citizenship. But the differences were probably greater than the similarities.

To analyze the 16,000 and more people who have, at one time or another been in this center would be an undertaking too great for the present report. If locality groups are taken as the basis, they could be subdivided by economic, occupational, social class, or religious groupings. Many of these subdivisions could again be redivided on the basis of the degree of assimilation of American culture. And within each of the minor divisions there are differences of personality. In this report will first be mentioned certain factors common to all groups, followed by notes on differences between locality groups.

All of these notes are made on the basis of studies made in the relocation center; the Community Analyst has never studied Japanese or Japanese-Americans in California.

Of Japanese cultural traits which survived in some degree, only a few will be mentioned here. First to note is the attachment to Japanese culture. This has become very evident in the life in a relocation center and partly conditions that life. It shows itself in interest in Japanese sports and games, in Japanese drama and in the several clubs which exist for the rendition of Japanese ancient verse.

There is a great attention paid to the verbal and gestural rituals of social relationships. Under certain conditions, the correct words must be uttered, proper bows made, and social events which, in America, are casual, are the occasion for a good deal of formality. The casualness of the American staff members has led to a number of minor misunderstandings. The Issei seldom express these, but they cause resentment.

The Japanese in America are industrious. In spite of the laxity of employment standards in the center this habit of industry persists. Possibly it has been one of those factors which have made Administration relatively easy. An indolent population would have had time to create many more problems than has been the case here.

Last trait to be mentioned, the Japanese family solidarity has persisted. That some changes in the form of that solidarity have occurred will be elaborated later. The trait is merely mentioned here because it was one of the factors of greatest strength to the Japanese in California and has probably been a socially stabilizing factor within the center.

It remains to note that the Japanese, like all immigrant groups, developed conflict between the first and second generations. Culturally, the Issei are Japanese; the Nisei are more American than Japanese; at the same time, the Nisei must conform to some of their parents' opinions, culturally different from their own. This leads to dissension within the center, and, sometimes, within the family.

The locality groups which came to this center may be divided into two main sections. The first were those from central California, under which term is included a city as far north as Sacramento and as far south as Fresno. The people of this group were either brought first to Turlock Assembly Center, or were in the "free zone", and entrained from Sanger, a town east of Fresno. As noted, they settled mostly in Canal.

The second group came mostly from southern California.- from Los Angeles and surrounding towns and cities; from points as far south as San Diego; and from Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties. The bulk of these were assembled at Tulare Assembly Center; a smaller number came via Santa Anita Assembly Center; they form most of the population of Butte. It is to be noted that there were relatively few from the Bay Area.

The first group were, for the most part, farmers or farm laborers. This statement must be accepted as being only generally true; there were many exceptions, and the group included professional men, merchants, and craftsmen. But the basic economy was agriculture. Moreover, the group included an appreciable number of landowners; either Issei who had purchased land before the Anti-Alien Land Laws had been passed, or Nisei who owned it in their own right or for their parents.

The second group was mixed. It included a large number of city people. It also included farmers and farm laborers from Ventura and Santa Barbara. The latter group were not in an entirely similar position to the farmers of central California. The sentiment against the Japanese in the southern agricultural counties had been consistently stronger, and, though the group included some very well-to-do farmers, it included a relatively small number of landowners. Because of the urban origin of so many, the southern Californians showed a much greater diversity of occupation. Merchants, artisans, and other (though not all) city occupations were represented to a much greater degree; but it is to be noted that there were a large number of gardeners, nurserymen, and florists.

By the time of their arrival at Gila the people had other common experiences - the experiences of evacuation and movement to a relocation center. But between those two experiences, the majority had added a third - life in an assembly center. This latter experience differentiated them from the approximately 3,000 who had been evacuated directly to a relocation center.

Evacuation itself had given rise to a number of attitudes and reactions. These have been documented so frequently that they need not be elaborated here. Forced departure from homes, loss of livelihood, frequently loss of property, and all its concomitants had given rise to a number of emotions and confusions. After their arrival at assembly centers, the dominant attitudes were probably resentment and insecurity. The resentment was directed first to the Army; life in an assembly center directed it at the WCCA, just as later it was directed to the WRA.

The three assembly centers which sent people to this relocation center had much in common. There was crowding, hastily constructed housing, lack of privacy and closer surveillance than was the case in a relocation center. In the assembly center some of the floors were of dirt; the partitions between apartments did not reach to the roof. The sanitary arrangements were much more public than is the case here and, in some cases, even the showers were inadequately protected against gazers. For people accustomed to the privacy of individual homes, these were shocks enough.

The curfew law gave rise to the nightly counting of heads by the military police. Some evacuees laugh at it now; the nightly challenge to declare their presence seems a joke; others resent it bitterly.

At the assembly centers were also raised certain political issues. The WCCA accepted the offer of the JAACL (Japanese-American Citizens League) to assist in camp administration. This meant that much responsibility was given the Nisei. The Issei stayed in the background in the first stages; only after their arrival at relocation centers did they begin to assert themselves and to take issue with JAACL leaders. At Gila this did not, as far as the Community Analyst is aware, take the form of objecting to the JAACL as such. It manifested itself rather in opposing the policies of many JAACL leaders and opposing their influence by degrees. It also expressed itself in grumblings and in informal accusations of corruption.

The assembly centers are said to have differed one from another. Certainly every person considers his own assembly center to have been superior. This seems to have been more a question of detail than of basic differences. For example, at Turlock, the people never received their clothing allowance. It is alleged that the Nisei in authority there embezzled it; and a beating which occurred during registration time is said to have been a belated revenge for that embezzlement. Santa Anita got a reputation for turbulence. This had at least two results. First, the Santa Anitans were not sent to one relocation center, but were distributed to several. Second, the people of this center blame the Santa Anitans for the juvenile delinquency, once existent here; if it happened that the delinquent did not come from Santa Anita, it would still be said that the Santa Anitans set the example.

Minor differences aside, the assembly center life deepened insecurity and resentments. It also set the pattern of resistance to administration and laid the foundations for disputes and differences between evacuee groups.

Paradoxically, the assembly centers are now looked at in retrospect with a certain kind of nostalgia. The fact of common residence created a social bond. Moreover, evacuation at that time being but a short time past, everyone seems to have lived more intensely than before or since. Thus, while resentments were created or intensified, the tempo of life was in itself a kind of a satisfaction. Several Nisei have stated that they had "more fun" at the assembly centers than at Gila.

The movements from assembly centers to Gila, or from the free zone to Gila, were made in trains, each carrying approximately 500 people. The people were brought here under military guard and their freedom of movement on the trains was severely restricted. Some stated that they were not able to get a drink of water for a whole day, and this in the height of summer heat. To these hardships were added those of the early days of the center, already mentioned. Thus, to the resentments of evacuation and of life in the assembly centers, were added those created by "unnecessary" privations.

These resentments did not prevent cooperation. The essential services were manned with surprisingly little trouble; there were troubles, but, in the early stages they did not prevent the work being done. This is particularly worth noting. Officials sometimes complain of the "lack of cooperation" of the evacuee staff; actually, it has been on only rare occasions that essential operations were threatened with a breakdown because of labor troubles. But the resentments piled up, and found, and have found ever since, many forms of expressions. The resentments were probably the greater in that behind them were fear and insecurity; fear of the immediate future, insecurity as to the future, and as to their whole status. There were differences of local origin of the evacuees. The people of Turlock Assembly Center and of the free zone went to Canal. These were predominantly agricultural. Further, most of them came from central California. It is possibly because of these common factors in their background that the people of Canal became a highly integrated and closely organized community. It became, moreover, a highly exclusive community. The people claim themselves as definitely superior to the people of Butte. In addition to the factors in their background, this expression of superiority probably arises from a complexity of other factors.

First, the Canal people include a much larger proportion of landowners than those of Butte. This gives them a sense of belonging to the country in a way that leasehold farmers do not possess. Secondly they come from a part of California where anti-Japanese sentiment was less felt than further south. Thirdly, they were the first community, yet they sooner became the smaller of the two; this threatened their feeling of superiority, and so caused it to be reasserted in compensation. The fact that the administrative offices were located in Butte probably added to the need for compensation.

One more factor needs noting. An appreciable proportion of the Canal people were never in assembly centers. They thus escaped the discomforts, frustrations, and limitations of that phase of evacuation. This seems to have had two contradictory results. On the one hand, never having been previously subjected to discipline by military police, they were more ready to assert themselves; and this was probably intensified by resentment at restraints new to them, but already an old story to people from assembly centers. On the other hand, they felt less insecure than assembly center people; hence there was less need for compensatory assertion of rights. The result is that reactions to policies which may occur in one community do not necessarily occur in another. For example, the time of the evening meal hour was made quite an issue in Butte late in the year 1944. It was a matter of some concern to Canal, but it never became an issue to the extent that it did in Butte. On the other hand, the fuel oil shortage in late 1944 was taken much more seriously in Canal; they felt that they were being discriminated against and asserted themselves accordingly.

The people of Butte have never constituted a solid social group as have the people of Canal. This may be explained by their diversity of origin. As mentioned, the people from Tulare and Santa Anita included both urban and rural groups. The urban groups were, on the whole, more Americanized than the rural people. They represented a greater variety of occupations. The rural groups had been more isolated and more under the influence of Japanese culture. Thus, the people of Butte do not unite as do the people of Canal. This may be the basis of the taunt of other centers, who designate this center as "spineless Gila". What they imply is that Gilans are too submissive to the administration. What may be back of it is that the people of Butte (not Canal) do not effectively unite in opposition to the administration. And they do not unite because their interests and attitudes are more widely divergent.

The following case studies may give a little body to the rather abstract statements made. Those selected deal more with prevacation life than life in the center and are reported to show some of the variations of background and experience of the residents.

1. Block 23, Age 60, Farmer, Male, an Issei.
(The man in this case is a fairly successful farmer)

I was born on a farm; not physically strong and little timid mentally.

I had an uncle in Osaka, who was in foreign trade. As a boy when I visited his store he was talking to a Caucasian with an interpreter, and my curiosity was attracted.

When I was sixteen, I wanted to come to Hawaii where I had another relative, but my father did not consent, saying that I should be like the uncle in Osaka. At last with the assistance of my uncle in Osaka my father consented to my coming to Hawaii.

First I tried to work in an American family but I did not understand the language and could not keep up the job. So I worked for a dormitory a part of the time and attended grammar school; after I finished the grammar school I came to San Francisco and later started a high school, two years. Then I got sick and had to quit the school. I was doing daily labor at the time of earthquake in San Francisco and later started a hotel with my friend I have mentioned. But we failed. I went to Ogden to work for the railroad. Then I came back to California.

I started farming in Watsonville, such crops as lettuce, berries, and tomato, making money some years then losing.

Through my hard experiences I found out that bushberries are safe. Before the war I had 45 acres of them and in a good year I used to net \$10,000 annually.

You have to figure to prepare about \$250 per acre, and clear just about that much. The plants are productive about ten years. After that the soil gets sour and unprofitable to keep up.

If you farm lettuce, buy good land and improve the soil all the time. For bushberry, soil need not be first class but select the soil where berries were not planted before.

The soil, used for berries is generally turned to hay or beans. But such soil where berries were raised once never produces satisfactorily vegetables or berry crops again.

Through my years' experience I felt that such farming as lettuce and tomato is hard work and not sure of profit. Figure out to farm, not to speculate, but sure growth.

When the war is over, I think we can return to California; individually I do not think they hate us so much.

The reason why we had good results with berries there, seems to me is the climate. There was no danger of overproduction as the demand was steady.

The man who bought our farm is making twice as much, as the price of the berries went up.

The work is easy if you specialize in bushberries: the crop season lasts only a month and half.

In farming the labor is a very vital question and I arranged with high school students ahead of time for their services. With that in my mind I expanded the acreage.

Other farming has labor problems.

I never lost money on bushberry farming. I had too much time if I raise this one line, so I raised other crops, did hard work and lost money on other crops.

I specialized on boysenberry which is a larger berry. The advantage is that there is no tendency of overproduction as it is used for freezing. There is saving on labor as berries are larger.

I tried other ways, but the ends of the branches which were stuck in the ground make best cuttings, which grow faster.

In general, owners of the orchards prefer pruning by our race as they attend in details.

Before the war broke out the local feeling between Caucasians and our race was good: the owners of the land profited by renting the land to us. Otherwise they had to raise hay and rents were lower.

In early days the farmers' profit went to commission merchants a great deal but in later days they organized cooperatives and retained a good portion of growers' profit.

Some people blame us because our cousins and distant relatives started this war, but they do not think that we are the losers and they should not blame us. I think Americans who stand for the principle of justice will be on our side.

There are many who had benefit in business relations and when the war is over they want to do business with us just as before the war. Those who were competitors in business naturally are against us; but when the condition change, they will change their attitude.

When we disposed of our business, the farm could be sold at a good price as they know there is enough profit. But the farm implements and house, we had to dispose of at great loss.

Hiring good help or poor help make a great deal of difference: there is 50% difference in efficiency. For those who do good work, I gave a bonus.

Comment:

This man has savings but has not yet relocated (May 20, 1945).

2. Block 49, Age 63, Gardener, an Issei

I was born in Kashi-ken and came over to the United States when I was 24 years of age. I landed in San Francisco, stayed there about a month then decided to be a farmer, and went to Biggs, 75 miles north of Sacramento and worked for the Balfour Ranch Co. The work was raising rice and it was a pioneer work in California in this line of farming. Two hundred varieties of rice were experimented and found out that one of Japanese species will do well. The ranch was 40 acres in 1904.

I was there three years then moved to Colusa, (the company I worked for was the Moulton Land Co.) and started rice farming on a larger scale. The company had 5,000 acres of rice farm and my share was 200 acres. Ducks and blackbirds caused big damage and rice farming there was a failure while I was there. But dry beans and broom corn were successful. After the rice failed we planted deccan-grass and made it a pasture for the cattle and sheep and earned \$4 per acre. The failure was turned into success by doing so. The acreage of the company was 15,000 and 5,000 acres were for beans and corns. I sold out my share and moved to Fresno to raise grapes. But the grapes dropped in price and I failed.

I was interested in the silkworm possibilities in those days and spent much time as I had some knowledge previously before I came to this country. Both Luther Burbank and Dr. Oacis tried but they did not succeed so well in those days. However, a Japanese made a

success in Olivil and exhibited its products in a department store's show window in Sacramento. There were large mulberry trees in Fresno which have grown up even 60 feet high. The reason of their failure was chiefly due to the wrong feeding of the mulberry leaves. They fed young soft leaves even at the finishing stages which was wrong. In young leaves the starch content is good but there is not sufficient protein which is needed at the finishing period. That was one of the reasons that they raised silk worms but failed to have good cocoons.

I have four nephews and some of them asked to come to the United States but I told them not to do so as here is prejudice against our race. They studied medicine and are doing well.

The locality where I was born was noted for a democratic and cooperative way of living. There was no police or warden. The local people handled affairs themselves. No criminal cases on record that I remember while I lived there as youth.

I am single yet. I was too busy and passed the time of marriage period. Now it is too late to think about marriage.

Comment:

This man has not yet laid plans to relocate as far as is known.
(May 21, 1945)

3. Block 72, Age 32, Store Manager, Male, Nisei

I was born in Los Angeles. My father had a business on North Main St., at that time. My father and mother did not get along well and I was taken by my mother to Japan when I was two years old. I came back to the United States when I was twelve years old. I lived with my father one and a half years after I came back. He was killed in an accident and I was raised by an American family. I finished grammar school and High School, living at 553 South Van Ness Ave., Los Angeles. Then I went to National Radio School, near the Exposition Park in Los Angeles.

Then I worked awhile for a fruit stand as salesman, then I secured a job in Southern California Trading Co. of Gardena. The store was selling such things as radics, refrigerators, and washing machines. Later I was transferred to manage a branch store in Los Angeles until the store was closed on account of the effect of the war.

The business suffered badly on account of the war. Then I got sick, a case of acute appendicitis, went to a hospital for an operation. Three weeks after I had the operation, I went to Sanger, central California, as the rumors were frequent that the Japanese in southern California must evacuate. I could not find a vacant house, went to Reedley without result. Some people around there were kind but they didn't want me to pitch a tent around as it might attract others' attention too much. I was not recovered from the effect of the operation. Without finding a house I had to return to Los Angeles.

I went to Oxnard then as my wife's parents were living there, and from there we went to Tulare together. I can't forget those sorrowful days of hunting houses before I gained health! I felt the real cruelty of war.

In Tulare I worked as an interpreter. It took one and a half weeks to organize. Mr. M. was one of hard workers in those days. The accommodation was poor as it was not organized and equipment was not completed. We had mass meetings day and night. Mr. M. appealed to them to be patient.

Mr. Honorson, the Director, asked the people to form the Community Council. First the volunteer leaders took care of affairs, then the Council members were appointed. Then we had a general election but that time Issei were eliminated. We found out it was not a good policy to run the Center smoothly (that is, to run the Center smoothly, it would have been a good policy to include Issei - Ed.), and Mr. Honorson worked hard to change the policy and succeeded in getting half and half representation. However, one and a half months before we evacuated there again we had noticed Issei are not eligible and the reaction was bad. We had the misunderstanding that some of the Issei thought it was planned by Nisei. At that time Japanese books and phonograph records were taken away. We were sorry for Issei that we could not do much for them in that assembly center. However, we had impression that Mr. Honorson was a very honorable and sincere man and he had done everything within his power. He was democratic and was friendly. We wanted him to come here with us but there was difference between WCCA and WRA and we parted in tears.

Comment:

This man relocated in August, 1944.

4. Block 60, Age 54, Gardener, an Issei

There have been some difference between Japanese in Hawaii and Continent, and that is a reflection of the treatment they have received in the past. They sprang from the same stock but the circumstances make them different.

I came to the United States when I was 23. My uncle was at Columbia, studying law, and he had friends among well-known business men in Tokyo and Yokohama and Americans in Japan, whose cases he handled. In such circumstances I had a notion that I wanted to go to America when I was a boy.

After I graduated from the Yokohama Commercial High School I worked for a trading company which was handling soya bean oil and cake for export.

After I served and was discharged from the army, I came over to this country and my first experience was in Seattle. I went to the Oriental Trading Co. with my uncle's introduction. I was there two years but the business was facing difficulties as it was a depression period.

I went from there to Los Angeles, worked in American families, restaurant and went to Imperial Valley and Fresno. I have done almost all kinds of laboring work. I intended to become a business man but at last became a gardener and was doing that line of work when the war broke out and we had to evacuate.

This war is causing a great change and none can predict the future with assurance.

If my daughter is married and my son goes to school outside or drafted, I may relocate. (A widower, he lost his wife in the center). I have a good friend Mr. T. in Las Vegas, Nevada, who is doing well as a farmer and his sons are all educated and doing well.

Relocation is very important, but when a person of older age tries to relocate, he must think about climatic change and sickness, etc. If we live in California we have no such fear as we are accustomed to the climate and circumstances. But when we have to go to new localities we have such fears.

(This man relocated late in 1944).

5. Block 47, Age 35, Produce Shipping, Male, a Nisei.

I was born in Hawaii and as our family was a large one, I was independent at the age of 13, after I finished fifth grade. I worked in a store from 13 to 15 years of age to help the family. But I wanted to keep up study. One of my brothers was in Stanford University in California, I went to stay with him and I finished the grammar school and the high school there. I entered a junior college and intended to study medicine but could not keep up for financial reasons. Then I decided to work for a big farming group. In 1933 I was working under Mr. M. and went to Oceano to do packing vegetables. In 1935 I became a supervisor of the packing house. Worked for a Cooperative in Delano. Became business manager of Mr. F. in 1939. I was working for Mr. M. again before the war.

I went out for a seasonal work last summer. There is a good future in business but it is also difficult to get crates and shook materials. The business possibility is good but to start newly is almost impossible as can't get new materials. The preference is given to those who are in business. To get nails is difficult.

If I start business I hope to do so with Americans as partners who are in the business already.

(This man relocated to Chicago in July, 1944 and got a job in a war plant).

6. Block 51, Age 43, Insurance Agent, Male, an Issei.

I came to United States when I was sixteen years old after I finished third grade of local commercial high school. I was born in Kichiu, from where many came to this country. My father was in the United States already as a farmer in Tenitihell Island, near Stockton, California. It was 1916 when I entered this country.

My first experience was a helper in soda fountain and worked there about one and a half years. My father was raising onion as a farmer and I helped his work later.

I had a visit to Japan in 1920, went away in January and returned in October. I worked for C. C. Morse Seed Co., then for a fruit ranch as a truck driver from March to the end of the season. Went to Mills, California, and then to Stockton and to Corcord. I worked mostly at asparagus packing.

In 1925 I started 190 acres farming, taking responsibility as the manager, raising peas, peaches, asparagus, and seed. Married in 1926. Then started another farming venture which was devoted to asparagus. The times were against me and I lost money, incurred debts. People said to go bankrupt but I did not. We worked very hard and paid debts.

In 1927, we had a seed farm raising beet, carrot and lettuce, worked night and day. In summer after the crop was harvested, I sold insurance and became interested in that line. The company was the American Accident Insurance Co. In that year I moved to Sacramento and became an insurance agent. I worked for the State Farm Mutual Insurance agent. I worked for life insurance also. From 1927 to 1941 I was an insurance man. I moved from Sacramento to Gardena in 1929.

Beside insurance, I worked as the Secretary of the Japanese Association of Gardena Valley and also as an insurance claim adjuster. I worked on a committee on recreation for the city of Gardena and a member of the draft board.

When the war started, the F. B. I. took me and I went to Santa Fe Detention Camp on February 22, 1942. Returned to Tulare Assembly Center on July 11, 1942. In Santa Fe, I worked as a branch Post Office master, hospital attendant, interpreter, vice-chairman of recreation, a detainees' welfare committee. In Tulare, I worked as a detective in Police Department. Then moved to Gila October 7, 1942, and became a block manager.

I lived here in United States a long time. My wife was born here. I have parents and many children; and I have no wish to go back to Japan. I have five children and one is sick and I am thinking about relocation. But I must be careful on account of the large family. I will go out myself first and find out a suitable way of living. Then I will take them.

I have not any bad feeling against evacuation, because the Authority tried to protect us. I have lost my setup but can't help it under the circumstances. We should feel that it is a good experience to learn lot of things. All I am looking forward to is resettlement nicely. If I can help, I want to help innocent farmers, many of them depend on me. We lived this life two and a half years, wasting time. They want to go out, don't know what to do. "Why don't you go alone first? Find out the way, then move the family," I advise, and many of them agree with me.

Comment:

This man relocated in April, 1944, to Cleveland and later to Chicago. He came back to visit his family then returned. His family is still in the center. (May 20, 1945).

7. Block 34, Age 32, Female, a Nisei.

This woman went to Japan at the age of twelve and returned after eight years there. She spent seven of the eight years hating the country and what it had in store for her. She lived those seven years in a small village in Hiroshima-ken with relatives. In her last year in Japan she moved to Tokyo, and studied Japanese language and customs systematically. These studies made her realize the meanings behind the customs and she began to like Japan.

She thinks that each country has its good points. If she had not later acquired a good knowledge of English she would have preferred Japan.

Returning to the United States, she had trouble relearning English. She discovered that the relearning process was easier if she took up French at the same time. She now has an exceptional command of English.

She went to work as a draper in an exclusive dress shop in Beverly Hills. She became a designer of woman's dresses and was very successful. She was evacuated to Tulare Assembly Center.

At Tulare she applied for expatriation, "for personal reasons" (not elaborated). She shortly became convinced that this was a mistake and before registration time she cancelled this application. She answered "yes" to both questions 27 and 28.

Concerning segregation, she believes it should never have occurred. In many cases it was "emotional hysteria" rather than disloyalty which caused negative answers. In the case of other Nisei, it was pressure by parents, who wanted to repatriate. "A son or daughter of 25 years is in many cases subject to the wishes of the parents, especially when they remain in the same household. The father's decision is law even though the son may be married and have children. Depending upon the upbringing, some of the Nisei adults do not know their own needs as they have been taught to obey their parents".

This lady relocated in 1944, going first to New York. Her present occupation is unknown.

THE ADMINISTRATION

The Administration was formed in the earliest days of the project; some were at work, preparing, before the first trainload of evacuees arrived. Recruitment has been continuous for two reasons. It was maintained in the early days as new jobs were created. It developed later that the rate of turnover was very high. While there are some who have been here from the beginning and others who have been here two years or more, a large number are the second or third occupants of their positions.

It is not the function of the Community Analyst to criticize the administrative organization or to characterize the Administration as "good" or "bad" or "indifferent." The aim of this section of the report is to make certain comments; these comments will either be statements of evacuee criticism, or estimates of reactions to administrative organization, attitudes, and policies.

Organization

The evacuee criticism of the organizational structure is that it is too complex and involves the employment of too many appointive personnel. Some of this criticism is rational to the extent that alternatives have been thought of. Some is resentful; it is based upon dislike of having "too many in authority." It is also sometimes based upon the naive assumption that if so many appointed people did not have to be paid, the money would "go to the evacuees."

The alternatives suggested nearly always involve the belief that many of the jobs could be performed by the evacuees. They would concede that there are certain types of technical work which could not be done, or done only in part, by the evacuees, but believe that many administrative posts and some of the technical jobs could be assigned to evacuees with full responsibility for carrying them out. Behind these criticisms are certain basic attitudes. First, there is dislike of their whole status; they object to the fact that they are subordinate in everything. Secondly, there is dislike of the existence of a group enjoying privileges which they themselves do not possess. Thirdly, there is a general resentment, finding expression in dislike of the group which is to them the symbol of their frustration.

Resentment at subordination sometimes arises from dislike of the actions or attitudes of specific officials. The argument thus runs: if the man in the job acts like that, get rid of the appointed official and put an evacuee in his place.

The more unreal of the criticisms offer nothing in place of the present plan. They do not object to any job in particular, merely the vague feeling that "there are too many appointive personnel."

Attitudes.

Evacuees object to the attitude of superiority, expressed explicitly, or implied by certain actions, of the Caucasian over the Japanese. This is evident by some labor troubles which have occurred, by stated resentment, or by reactions of distrust.

It is true that some of the appointive personnel believe the Japanese to be inferior. This may imply a belief in inferior intelligence, in belief in the irresponsibility of the evacuees, or in a belief that they really are a subversive group, and therefore morally inferior. These remarks, of course, do not apply to all the staff, but they are true of enough of them to give an appearance of justification to evacuees' criticisms.

It is interesting, but not surprising to one who has witnessed analogous social situations, to observe the number of experts on racial or cultural differences which this social situation has created. "I have one or two evacuees who are on the up-and-up, but the rest of them you can't trust an inch (i. e., give any responsibility);" "they will take advantage of you everytime;" "they do not understand business methods;" "they are loyal to you as long as they think it pays;" "they are all right in their own way' (but it is not our way);" "I don't think the Japs should have been evacuated because they haven't the intelligence to be good spies or saboteurs;" "they don't feel things the way we do." Similar utterances could be multiplied many hundred times. They imply, in some cases, prejudice; in others it is a failure to distinguish so-called racial traits from reactions caused by the situation in which the evacuees find themselves. The racial experts fail to understand that if an individual or a group is not given responsibility, irresponsibility results. They also fail to include in their generalizations the number of evacuees who have assumed very great responsibility and responded positively to it.

The causes of such attitudes are beside the point; it is the administrative disadvantages which are important. These attitudes, when detected, and they are nearly always detected, are the origin of much administrative trouble. In labor relations and in executive action, these attitudes are resented and cause negative reactions. Cooperation is rendered more difficult. These points will be elaborated later. The attitudes need be labelled neither "good" nor "bad;" they can be labelled administratively "efficient" or "wasteful." Much trouble would have been saved on the project if attitudes could have been discussed or tested before staff employment.

Two other types of special attitudes deserve notice. One is that of unreserved sympathy. It is as uncritical as the hostile prejudice. The sympathy is expressed, and reactions are elicited in a proportion equally harmful to healthy social relations. Some people have labelled it the "missionary attitude."

The last attitude to be mentioned is one that respects the Japanese but believes they are different. In terms of relationships it involves a separation of staff and evacuee except in those relationships which are official, and which are essential to administrative and operational functions. It involves a racial segregation, but on a basis of respect.

There is no "official" attitude in this center. The nearest approach to it is the last. Public opinion frowns on undue intimacies with evacuees. The results of this attitude combined with others will be elaborated in the next section.

There are, of course, some members of the staff who can operate with a minimum of racial bias. They can deal with evacuees almost, if not quite, as if racial differences did not exist or did not matter. But probably the majority of the staff is biased to some degree or other by prejudice of some sort.

Policy-making

The broad policies of the WRA are, of course, made at Washington; in some cases, details are worked out there. It is the responsibility of the Project Director, after taking such advice as he believes necessary, to work out the means of applying these policies and also to adopt project policies in fields not covered by Washington regulations, or in fields left to his discretion.

In the early days of the center, very few evacuees understood the whole process of policy-making. Some of them were apt to regard them as a series of arbitrary decrees, made without regard to their wishes or welfare. This view, of course, was justified as regards some policies; registration, for example, was an arbitrary and mistaken policy. Some evacuees still hold that view, both of Washington WRA and of the project policies; and many hold that view as regards the policy of center closing. But there are increasing numbers who understand that policies are evolved with some care; the custom of open discussion of all important policies with evacuee leaders has led to this better understanding and consequent efficiency of administration.

Where there is any flexibility in Washington instructions, the center procedure is for the Director first to consult a small group of the senior members of the appointive staff. This group usually includes the Assistant Project Directors, the Project Attorney, section heads particularly concerned, and the Reports Officer. These preliminary meetings are held to formulate the Administration's point of view, to discover the degree of flexibility in the instructions, and to decide upon the means of discussing the policy with the representatives of the people.

The next step is to consult a small body of evacuees; this body will include the executive boards of the community councils, and, sometimes, the central block managers. Also sometimes included, either in the group discussion, or by private conference, are evacuees whose opinion on that particular topic is considered valuable. The point at issue is laid before the selected group and their advice and cooperation asked. In important matters, the Project Director will make the key statement; in smaller matters this will be left to the Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division, or, occasionally, to a division head particularly concerned.

For example, when the announcement of center closing was made, a meeting of a group of the staff was held. As soon as possible, the evacuee group was informed. The evacuee group consisted of the executive boards of the community councils, two representatives from each of the block manager groups, and three other evacuees. The Project Director stated his own attitude: every available bit of information was to be handed on to the evacuee groups; he wanted no misunderstandings such as those which had occurred during registration.

Since there was no flexibility as to whether or not the policy was to be put into effect, the problem became primarily one of communication. A coordinating committee was created for the dissemination of relevant information, and the various means of informing the people were discussed in detail.

The next step was to communicate with the community councils and with the block manager groups. This step was taken at early meetings. Opportunity was thus given the residents to voice their protests, ask their questions and organize themselves. The rest of the process involved improvements on modes of communication, a problem not yet totally solved.

Participation in policy making has thus improved evacuee-staff relationships to a very great degree. "We have learned how to live in a relocation center" was the statement made by a prominent evacuee. It may also be said that the Administration has learned much about its task.

This is not to say that the situation is ideal. Some people still mistrust the Administration. A minimum of this is probably ineradicable, and it rests on the resentments so often referred to in this report. But useful working arrangements have been evolved by which the evacuee leaders are given a share in community government and in modes of implementing policies; and with responsibility has come restraint, to the advantage of good government and efficient administration.

BASIC ASPECTS OF CENTER ORGANIZATION

Much has already been said of center organization. The aim of this section of the report is to bring certain facts together, to make a brief synthesis of the basic organization.

First and foremost, there exist two groups within the center - the appointive staff and their families on the one hand, the evacuees on the other. They differ in status. The members of the appointive staff have privileges denied evacuees. They may travel freely (subject to OPA and ODT restrictions); they live a life approximating normal family life; and they are paid salaries comparable to those paid "outside." The evacuees are restricted in movement; have family life modified by limited quarters, by meals served in messhalls and by public washhouses; and they are paid on a wage scale which considerably reduces the economic motivation to employment.

This in itself creates a caste society; a society, that is, in which there is a vast difference in privilege, in which members of one social group cannot pass into the other social group, and in which a member of one group may not marry a member of the other group. The case nature of this society is intensified by several contributory factors.

First, there is the attitude of the staff as a whole subject to individual variation that staff and evacuees should keep apart, except in official and occupational relationships. Second, there are the cultural differences, including the language difference (though this difference does not include the Nisei). Third, there is the position which the evacuees feel that they occupy in America and in Arizona; that of a group which is, to say the least, in a difficult position. Each of these factors is significant in itself; added together they make for a very great degree of segregation.

The results in the center are complex and not what might be expected. There are resentments on the part of the evacuees. These resentments are what might be predicted as the reaction of any group placed in an inferior position. But these resentments are much stronger on the part of the adult Nisei than on the part of the Issei. "The Issei are so used to discrimination that they expect it."

Administratively more significant is the fact that there are relatively few informal contacts between staff and evacuee. Formal, official, and employment relationships are excellent, but they can function only along established lines. When a new situation arises, such as that posed by the present problems of center closing, useful relationships do not exist; they have to be created painfully and slowly; and the "slowly" may possibly become "too late."

Another result, or possibly another way of saying the same thing, is that, in relation to policies, there is the belief on the part of the evacuees that there are "administration policies," something quite divorced from any share the evacuees may have in their making. This attitude has been greatly modified by the development of

very effective administrative procedures for consultation and cooperation, already described; but there are some lingering remains of that belief. Relationships have very definitely improved with this evolution of administrative practices and the lingering suspicion is simply the result of the total situation, one which good administration can minimize but not cause to disappear.

The attitude of the evacuees to the Washington office is complex. On the one hand they regard it as a potential means of appeal against real or fancied grievances on the part of the project administration. On the other hand, they join with the staff in thinking that some Washington instructions or policies are unrealistic, arbitrary, and uninformed. On the whole, their chief concern is with the project administration. Washington is a long way off.

Only one other basic organizational fact will be mentioned in this section: the fact that there are two communities. Though under the same administration, they have developed a number of differences and very definite feelings of difference. Some causes have been mentioned in the historical sketch. The results are various. There are differences in the school system, divergences in the recreational organizations and the Canal Community Council makes a point of passing legislation which, while in accord with that of Butte on major policies, contains minor variations.

THE ORGANIZATION OF ITS PEOPLE

Some aspects of social organization have been discussed in previous reports. This section will briefly summarize some of the more important relationships.

Population

Population pyramids show an asymmetrical population structure. There is an undue proportion of old men, nearly 30% of them unmarried. The average age of the women is ten years less than that of the men; the median age difference in Issei marriages is nine years.

There is also a large proportion of children, the sex distribution, however, being more symmetrical than that of the older generation.

The people between the ages of 20 and 39 are relatively few; and the men in that age group are proportionately smaller still. This is partly due to the population structure of Japanese-Americans; it has been intensified by relocation and induction into the Army.

The age distribution of the population poses several problems. There is a relative scarcity of men at the best working years of life, with its effect upon center operation. It also makes the relocation program more difficult. The group which can reestablish itself most easily has been greatly diminished; there remain those who will find it harder to start life anew.

The large number of older Issei also effects the moral and recreational nature of center life. Japanese standards of behavior and the Japanese forms of recreation have assumed a greater prominence in the past two years.

The Family

The Japanese and Japanese-American family have undergone some changes as a result of center life. However, these changes are not evident in all families, and many exceptions could be made to most general statements made. The factors making for changes are as follows: (1) the alterations in the pattern of life caused by messhalls; (2) the nature of the block organization; (3) relocation of family members, causing breaks, even if temporary, in families; (4) Army induction; (5) the reduction in family cooperative tasks such as those involved in family economic undertakings, and in maintaining a household.

In spite of all the strains to which it has been subjected, the Japanese family remains a unit exhibiting great solidarity. The children, when grown, remain to some extent under the influence of their parents, feel responsible for them if they are unable to support themselves and plan the future in terms of the family group. Some Nisei who have relocated have shown signs of breaking away but they seem to be few in number.

In some families the authoritarian pattern persists. The father gives or withholds permission to marry, to relocate, or to work and the children seem to be as obedient as ever before; this is particularly true of the girls. But in some families this pattern is changing. The solidarity is based upon a greater approximation to equality. The future is planned by family conferences rather than by paternal decree. In some cases children take the initiative, inducing half-reluctant parents to join them "outside."

In some cases, the friction between the generations strains family solidarity. Children have been known to make plans to leave without informing parents, and telling them at the last possible moment. This procedure has had varying results. Sometimes it happens that the parents veto the plan and the children submit; one girl was induced to abandon her plans to leave on three successive occasions. Sometimes the parents give in after more or less bitter arguments or, sometimes in the case of mothers, after resort to tears. In a few cases they accept the decision with good grace.

Parents sometimes complain that they are losing authority over their children. They refer particularly to younger children. They say the children don't learn proper manners eating in messhalls, that they seldom come home except to sleep, and that they grow up generally undisciplined. In general, this is only partly true. It is true of some families that the children do not learn manners. But most families manage to keep their children in order, aided, possibly, by the discipline imposed by the block. Some families avoid some of these troubles by drawing their cooked food from the messhalls and

servicing it to the family in the apartment; in several blocks more than half the families do this. The complaint of loss of authority is possibly true in a minority of families; and possibly the authority has become diminished but not lost.

Traditionally, the Japanese wife is subordinate to the husband. She serves and obeys him; his word is law. As observed at this center, the wife is by no means as subordinate in fact as she is in theory. Whether this is a result of life in relocation center or whether it was always so is not known to the Community Analyst; informants have made conflicting statements. The wife generally observes the rituals of respect in the presence of others; but that is only good manners. In many families she has a definite influence in making important decisions. Many cases could be cited of how the wife induced an unwilling husband to relocate "for the sake of the children." Probably an equal number of cases exist where the wife retarded or prevented relocation. In many families the wife takes charge of the family purse. These statements are by no means true of all families; there are many husbands and fathers who wield a very great deal of authority. The point is that the pattern of female subordination is not so absolute as some general statements would indicate; probably in nearly all families it is modified to a greater or less degree.

The traditional position of the eldest son continues in some families. It may take two forms. He may, in some cases be given authority early in life, and be an object of respect to his brothers and sisters as the future controller of the family property; or he may be indulged, leaving his sisters to assume the responsibilities while he enjoys a carefree existence. In other families, the eldest son is no longer of significance. This is a very definite result of Americanization. Even in some families owning property, the sons are treated as equals, or in accord with their individual temperaments.

When a Japanese woman marries, she joins the family of her husband, and leaves her own. Her mother-in-law has claims on her superior to those of her own mother. This relationship exists almost unchanged in some families. Both the mother of the girl, her husband, and she herself accept the traditional modes of behavior. But in some families it has completely disappeared. The mother of the husband is accorded respect as a member of the husband's family and as belonging to the older generation, but nothing more. In at least three families observed, there was conflict. In each case there was a demanding mother-in-law and a mother who sought for her daughter's assistance. In one case this led to a succession of violent quarrels. In two of the cases, the girl submitted to the traditional behavior. In the third case, the husband and wife relocated, leaving his mother in the center.

The extended family groups have more cohesion among Japanese-Americans than among the majority group. A man may be responsible not only for his own parents, but those of his wife; or he may also undertake the support of an aunt or uncle. Whether this pattern continues because of the relative segregation in California, or because of the stresses of evacuation could not be determined; there

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is some suggestion that both factors are operative.

The Japanese family has thus undergone changes but not violent ones, and there is a great variation within the group. The most notable changes are the democratization of some families, and the partial disappearance of some Japanese family traits, such as the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.

The Block

The formation of the block as a compact cohesive social unit was one of the unique results of life in a relocation center. Those circumstances which contributed to its cohesion are worth study.

Physically, the Gila block consists of 14 residential barracks, 1 recreation hall, 1 messhall, 1 store room, 1 laundry and two lavatories. The residential barracks and the recreation hall are each 100 feet long and 20 feet wide. The messhall is 100 feet long and 40 feet wide. The residential barracks are arranged in two rows, in each row the barracks being longitudinally parallel and 30 feet apart. At the end of one row is the recreation hall. At the same end of the other row is the messhall. In the space between the rows are placed the service buildings. At the end of the open space farthest from the messhall end is an open space utilized in some blocks for the recreation of young people or children.

Each residential barrack is normally divided into four apartments; measuring 24, 24, 24 and 28 feet each in length. The smaller ones house not more than five people, the larger ones six. This standard of housing may be changed and partitions moved or added to adjust for larger families, or to house married couples without children. At the time of maximum population, many apartments housed more than the standard; for more than a year, since relocation and induction have reduced the population, many apartments housed fewer than the standard number.

The recreation hall, while physically a part of the block, is seldom available for the block recreation. Most recreation halls are assigned as churches, temples, canteens, libraries, clubrooms, and other activities of community-wide significance. A few blocks have a whole recreation hall to themselves, a few have part of one. The absence of any recreation center for most blocks has been a source of continual complaint from the people. Some block managers have tried to compensate for this by assigning empty apartments for block activities. Occasionally this works satisfactorily but more often not. If assigned to young people, neighbors complain of the noise; if assigned to old men, it frequently becomes a gambling center; and if the Housing Unit hears of it, objections are raised because Housing has the sole right to assign apartments.

The social cohesion of the block was created from the very beginning by a number of conditions. First, people who were relatives, who know each other, or who came from the same localities in California, elected to live in the same block. Some blocks are made up almost entirely of people who knew each other in the past, as relatives,

neighbors or friends. Other blocks may have two, three or four segments of people, each segment consisting of relatives, neighbors, or friends. There are some blocks said to be "disunited." These are usually blocks in which the people come from a variety of localities.

These elementary factors of block solidarity were reinforced by the simple fact of living together. The people ate at the same messhall, shared the same lavatories with block members of their own sex, shared the same laundry, and gossiped together in the open spaces of the block, and in each others apartments. Their children played together; and various other natural groups arose, to be noted later.

Block unity became early important also because any unity of the community was confused and took a long time to become organized. From the earliest days, the block had two formal factors of significance. First, and of the greatest importance, was the appointment of the block manager. Second, was the organization of the block council.

The block manager was appointed by the Administration, as an official of the Administration, from the residents of the block. The majority of the managers were and are Issei. Their duties which have varied from time to time, are, in essence, the care of government property within the block, the issuance of supplies, collection and distribution of mail, and the transmission of administrative instructions. But these official duties quickly became of much less significance than their unofficial functions. They became the representatives of the block to the Administration; they kept peace within the block and generally supervised the moral as well as the material welfare of the block residents.

The further power of the block managers pertains to the community as a whole and will be discussed under community government.

The block council consists of one representative from each residential barrack and the block manager. In some blocks, the mess supervisor is a member; in others, he attends but is not a member. Since the permanent community council was formed, some blocks have added the community councillor. The membership thus varies from 15 to 17. In some blocks the block manager is chairman; in a few blocks, the community councillor; in one known block the chairmanship goes to whichever of the two calls the meeting; but most commonly the chairman is elected. The barrack representatives are nominally elected; but such has become the indifference to this council in the past year that frequently the representative is appointed by the manager. Sometimes, also, the representation rotates between family heads of the barrack.

In the early days of the center the councils met frequently. By 1944, meetings were fewer and in some blocks the councils ceased to function. In a few blocks regular meetings have been maintained up to the time of this writing.

The functions of the block council originally extended in two directions. First, it dealt with matters of interest to the block alone. It organized recreation. This recreation may take the form of block parties, or of purchasing recreation equipment for the children and youth of the block. Sendoffs, with parties and presents, may be organized for people leaving. And block physical amenities may be improved by painting the messhall, building a cement base for the refrigerator, or similar improvements of the basic facilities.

Payment for block undertakings is provided for by assessing each family head for each specific occasion. This may be increased by gifts. If there is a balance, it is held by an elected block treasurer.

Secondly, the block council takes cognizance of community affairs. This was particularly true in the early days of the center. Complaints to the Administration, grievances, resolutions, all of a type which would later have been brought up by the block managers. Meeting or by the community council, were brought up originally in the block council. Finally, the block council is an important link in the system of communication between Administration and people. Again, in the early days it was more active than it became in the last year. But some block managers have used the block councils in these past months as a means of transmitting information about center closing.

In addition to the council, formal block control was exercised by block mass meetings. This was particularly true in the first twelve months. Their importance declined. Later on, when mass meetings were called only a few attended. Constitutionally, there should have been at least two a year for the nomination of community councillors. Even this rule was not observed in all blocks, councillors being nominated by various unconstitutional means. Two events were the occasion of mass meetings in many blocks. The first to be noted is the messhall trouble in 1943, when reduction in the staffs caused a resistance movement. The second occurred early in 1945. Rice of a type considered undesirable was issued to the messhalls. Most, if not all of the blocks called meetings to protest.

Managers, block councils, and mass meetings are the more formal aspects of block organization, but there exist recreational groups and clubs within the blocks, which are of great moment to the recreational life of the people. Not all of the clubs noted below exist in all blocks, but most blocks have, or have had one or several such clubs.

Most blocks have a block club. This was for general recreation. Its emphasis was different in each block. In some, it was chiefly concerned with the young people, older people being members to support and guide the younger. In other blocks it was chiefly a recreational group for the older people. In some blocks the clubs were strong; in the majority of blocks they met but seldom. They were most active in the first two winters. Toward the end of 1944 many of them died out.

Many blocks had a Young People's Association. This Association organized parties, outings and dances. Very occasionally pursuits of a more serious nature, such as discussions on set topics, were organized, but these were never very popular. The Young People's Associations died out during the year 1944, as the young people left the center.

In some blocks, boy's clubs were organized. One of these was noted in a previous report (Youth Groups), the Tuxis Hi-Y of block 52. This depended for its organization upon a relatively large (15-20) natural group of boys from 14 to 18, and a leader at hand in the block who knew how to organize. This group had a life of about 18 months and eventually included some members from outside the block. It went out of existence in the middle of 1944.

Many blocks had Old Men's Clubs. These were sometimes for the purpose of playing go or shogi, sometimes for card-playing. A number of them were undoubtedly nothing but gambling clubs. Some were assigned empty apartments, and troubles arose from time to time. Most of them are still in existence.

Just as important as organized clubs are the natural groups which developed. In general, the children of the block formed into compact play-groups, clustering by age-graders. The number of play-groups is not identical in every block; the number depends upon the age-distribution of children within the block. A typical grouping would be as follows: (1) children of 3 to 6, both sexes; (2) boy's groups and girl's groups 7 to 9 or 10; (3) boy's groups and girl's groups 10 or 11 to 14; (4) youth's groups with boys' groups and girls' groups being distinct.

Adults also grouped into cliques or informal recreational groups, the grouping being based on common background, locality origin (both in Japan and in California), and on common interests. The members of any group "drank tea together, gossiped together, knit and sewed together, played checkers together."

Within these cliques lies block leadership. Leadership within any block rests usually with a small group of men, who think alike on most important matters, and who are respected because of their ability, integrity, and achievements. Wealth is important only as a symbol of ability. This group usually controls public opinion within the block; if there is conflict, the majority is usually on the side of the leaders' group. Sometimes one of them will become block manager or even community councillor, but the preferred procedure is to exert or even community councillor, but the preferred procedure is to exert influence in the background.

The above sketch is an oversimplification. In some blocks there are permanent factions and leadership is divided or non-existent. In other blocks there are majority and minority groups; each may have its leaders. In at least two blocks, leadership rests with an individual; in the one case he became the community councillor, in the other the block manager. Here it should be noted that the block manager is sometimes one of the group of leaders, but more often he is a man, not of the group, but acceptable to them. He attains prestige; he is tolerated by the group of leaders and is permitted to perform his necessary tasks but no more.

Leadership in the blocks is nearly always Issei. Even in the days when Misci took overt leadership in the community, the Issei dominated the blocks. This is one of the reasons for the failure of the temporary community councils and for the early difficulties of the permanent community councils; the real leaders were not permitted to be elected to the first and were thus very suspicious of the second.

Over and above all these formal and informal organizations, there exists a block consciousness, a feeling that block membership is a unique bond. "My block is like my family," a statement made several times, was intended as an analogy, but with the purpose of showing the intensity of block feeling. It is at once an intensely organized village, a neighborhood, a commensal unit and an extended household. Its unity of feeling is demonstrated not only by the way it acts together, but by the intensity which develops within such conflicts as occur. It is not as strong or enduring a unit as the family, but it stands probably next, and its unity gets both official and unofficial recognition.

In such a unit, the control of public opinion is relatively efficient. No overt act is necessary; the expression of disapproval is nearly always enough to enforce conformity. This conformity is not, of course, absolute; there are too many sources of disagreement based upon origin, education, and similar factors; but it remains remarkably efficient. This explains why the block frowns upon youth organizations which cut across block membership; the Issei believe that such organizations get out of control and sometimes lead to juvenile delinquency. The slogan is "Keep the children within the blocks." And the reason believed is the well-founded belief that if the children are kept within the blocks they can be kept in control.

After the announcement of center closing, the blocks celebrated Christmas and New Year as they had celebrated in the past. Since then, interest in block affairs has begun to diminish; some say it is dead. Some blocks have given farewell parties or picnics. Others have let block interest die without doing anything. But the blocks as agencies of social control still remain. Public opinion is strong, both to keep delinquency in check and to aid or retard the relocation movement.

Community Government

An analysis of the government of the community must include an account of the Administration, the block managers, the community

councils, and the block councils; it must also consider the reactions of the people to the acts of these various formally constituted groups.

Throughout the whole history of the center, essential control of many aspects of community government rested with the Administration; more specifically, with the Project Director, acting on the advice of his division and section heads, and in accordance with Washington instructions. The Project Director retained the power to issue project instructions, to veto acts of the community councils, and to instruct the block managers on matters which lay within their jurisdiction. Above all, the Administration maintained the power of the purse. Money expended for community needs and community benefit remained under the control of the administrative staff, subject to official procedures. The community councils never had more than small sums of money at their disposal. The development of other organs of community government is thus a study of the degree to which the Administration felt it expedient to let representatives of the people share in community control, and the degree to which it felt impelled to accept the point of view of the people.

The Block Councils

The block councils have already been noted. In the early months they dealt with matters of project-wide importance. As the community-wide organizations developed, some block councils disappeared; those which continued dealt with matters of interest only to the block. They remained important to community government only for the share they had in ordering block life, and as links in the system of communication. This development was completed by the end of 1943.

The block managers were the first to emerge as a group of men which could represent, with some degree of effectiveness, the needs and wishes of the people. From the beginning, the block managers held regular weekly meetings, each community holding its separate meeting. At these meetings they received and discussed administrative instructions, brought up matters of material welfare, and discussed matters of general interest to the people, sometimes passing resolutions or making requests to the Administration. During the period of the temporary community councils, the block managers were a far more important body. With the beginnings of the permanent community councils in September, 1943, there was some feeling of competition. This competition continued throughout the winter of 1943-44. By May, 1944, councils and block managers got on better and more effectively together through a process to be discussed later. But up until the present the two block managers groups have kept their prestige and their influence. They are the bodies which have functioned continuously from the very beginning.

The block managers derive their influence from this continuity of functioning, from their consequent relative efficiency of action, from their intimate knowledge of block needs, from the fact that they have the control of the distribution of various supplies, and from the fact that they are officially appointed. They have, at once, the support of the people and recognition by the Administration. It is probable that they will be one body of men which

will function to the very end.

The Community Councils

The community councils began under no such favorable auspices. First were formed temporary community councils; these were to act until a constitution was drawn up and permanent councils formed. They were elected in 1942; that of Canal in September, that of Butte in October. They began under several handicaps. First, they shared the general insecurity of the people, and were, in addition, uncertain of their use and of their functions. Second, they knew they were only temporary. Third, and most significant of all, membership was restricted to Nisei. This was one of the major mistakes of WRA policy. It meant that the recognized community leaders could have no part in what was intended to be the major organ of community government, and that overt leadership was left to a comparative handful of the older Nisei.

A reading of the minutes of the temporary councils' meetings, and discussions with former members of these councils leads to the following conclusions. They discussed issues such as the permanent councils have since done. Even in those early days, when there were many evacuee physicians, they expressed fears of a shortage, and debated means to keep medical men in the center. They expressed opinions on the camouflage factory. And they touched upon all other major issues, such as mess operations, labor policies, administrative policies, internal security, and similar matters.

Throughout, their uncertainty as to their position was accentuated by the fact that they set up no useful executive bodies. Temporary committees were appointed, but they could only inquire and recommend and, in the end, could do nothing but pass resolutions which merely amounted to advice to the Project Director. Probably their most effective contribution was the appointment of a committee to draw up a permanent constitution. During the winter of 1942-43 their meetings grew less frequent. The last meeting was held in June, 1943.

During this period, it was realized that the Issei had no way of expressing their point of view. This situation was remedied in part by the appointment of an Advisory Board composed of Issei. The Community Analyst is unable to report upon its functioning. He does not know how often it was consulted, on what issues its opinion was asked nor the degree to which its advice was taken. It should be reported, however, that some Issei expressed satisfaction at its existence, so it probably meant something as a body which expressed useful opinions.

The Constitution Committee, appointed in March, 1943, completed its work and the proposed constitution was forwarded to Washington in May. With some minor amendments, it was approved, and, as approved, was received at Gila on July 6. On July 9, a joint meeting of the two temporary councils and the advisory boards was called, and the constitution was again discussed. There was little enthusiasm. Ten months had elapsed without permanent representative government and many doubted its success at this juncture. The remark "it is

too late" expressed the attitude of many. However, it was decided to go ahead with the plan, to submit the constitution to popular vote and to conduct a campaign for its adoption. It was adopted in Canal on August 30, and in Butte on September 6.

The history of the community councils has been dealt with in some detail in two reports (1) a brief summary is all that will be given.

The members of councils were elected in September, 1943, and held their first meetings late that month. In Canal, the chairman of the temporary council was reelected from his block and elected chairman of the permanent council. A certain amount of continuity was thus provided for. In Butte, while some members of the temporary council were reelected, many members were new. As chairman the council elected a man who had not before been on the council, but who had experience as one of the early Central Block Managers. (2) Both chairmen were Nisei. For the first time, Issei were on a representative council, the new constitution, and Washington instructions permitting them to take office. In the first councils, there were slightly more Nisei than Issei.

In the first year of the councils' existence, two main tendencies were evident. First, the council began by being unsure of itself, its position, and its functions. This feeling of insecurity was accentuated by the fact that it was not greatly trusted by the people, and by many it was highly suspect. This led occasionally to irrational opposition to the Administration, to poor attendance, and to attacks on members or sections of the Administration.

There were, further three incidents which increased various tensions. The first such incident was the reduction in the number of block janitors. This had been planned in December on instruction from Washington, and the councils were aware of it. They opposed it and hoped to avoid it by negotiation and by making other labor force adjustments. Their feelings of security and their sense of block membership made the sharing of a janitress between two blocks highly unwelcome. No compromise was reached and the extra janitors were terminated at the end of the month. The councils felt that they had been disregarded upon a matter of high importance to them; and the people felt that the councils had no power.

The second incident arose out of the announcement of Japanese atrocities in the Philippines to American prisoners of war, released on January 27, 1944. On January 28, special meetings of the council were called. At the suggestion of some administrative officers, it was decided that a resolution be passed condemning these atrocities. The actual wording of the resolution gave offense; it was considered too unbalanced and too extreme. It angered most Issei, including the Issei on the councils, who did not really believe that the Japanese could be guilty of such acts. The councils were divided within themselves, and were objects of dislike to the community.

(1) One Year of Community Government at the Gila River Relocation Center. Project analysis report, July 14, 1944. (Issued in mimeographed form in Washington as Project Analysis Series No. 19; November 6, 1944). Community Government at the Gila Relocation Center, July 1, 1944 to December 31, 1944. Project Analysis Report, January 15, 1945.

(2) At Gila the chairman of the block managers is called the Central Block Manager. The Community Analyst was unable to discover the reason for this unusual nomenclature.

The third event, not so significant as the preceding, was the Nisei petition to the President. On the reinstatement of Selective Service for Japanese-Americans, a group of Nisei drew up a petition, accepting Selective Service but requesting equal treatment, removal of segregation, and restoration of their constitutional privileges. This petition was signed by a substantial majority of adult Nisei and was recognized by the community councils. But the wording of the petition was considered too mild by many Issei and some Nisei. The community council leaders, who had also been among the foremost in drawing up the petition, fell into some disputes.

These events combined with ineffective criticism of the personnel of Internal Security caused the council members to become disillusioned and sceptical of their position and functions. There was a widespread belief that the councils were useless. Moreover, the superior position and prestige of the block managers was always disheartening. A block manager was quoted as saying, "We are the government; the community council is a child's toy," and his remarks were generally approved. Late in March and early in April, 1944, there were prolonged discussions as to the advisability of a change of form of government, the most favored being an amalgamation of block managers and councillors. Many grievances emerged - their ineffectiveness, the fact that the people did not accept the authority of their elected representatives when that authority was used to impose restraints, and the belief that the councils had fallen into contempt. But when it came to the point neither council wished to abolish itself; the non accepted the necessity to have unpaid members who would be free to criticize the Administration. The upshot was that the council remained materially unchanged, but the executive boards were given greater authority to act, thus constituting a body giving continuity to policy and action. The crisis passed.

The results of the various discussions on constitutional change was probably partly determined by the fact that, in spite of setbacks and discouragement, the councils had been learning their jobs and were becoming more efficient. Under the guidance of the Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division, they had been establishing the mechanisms of government. From the very beginning, one executive board for each council was created. This consisted of four men, under the chairmanship of the council chairman; the members were paid unless they were employed elsewhere, thus ensuring that at least some of them could give their full time to executive tasks. A system of committees was set up. Commissions were also established, the most important being the judicial commissions. The work of these committees and commissions will be dealt with later. Here it is important to note that their work was useful and constructive, in spite of blunders and disappointments. Thus, by March, 1944, the councils were doing really effective work, and had an appreciable share in the control of internal events. They thus felt strong enough to carry on, in spite of their frustrations.

The crisis past, the councils worked more effectively. In the month of June, two events of some moment took place: First, a referendum was held to decide whether beer would be sold. The vote was in favor of the sale, and it is unfortunate that the ruling of the Solicitor, that the sale of beer on Indian land (even if leased) was illegal was not consulted before the referendum. The second was the organization of the reception and welcome of the Jerome people. This was largely organized by the councils and a very efficient job was done by them.

By the month of June, 1944, the councils had grown in efficiency and prestige, and were accepted as an integral part of the community, though they were still not immune to violent criticism.

To bring the summary of the first year of the community councils' history to a close, three other matters should be noted. First, the constitution required that a new council be elected to take office each January 1 and July 1. Thus, a second election had been held in December, 1943. It made little difference. A few old members were replaced, but the councils and the executive boards were very little changed.

Second, there had been a change in the councils, but that had occurred in the spring and early summer of 1944. The chairman, the executive secretary, and some councilmen of Butte had relocated; in June the chairman of the Canal council relocated, so that by the time of the third election new leadership had emerged.

Third, the Canal council was shaken by an investigation into gambling which involved members of the Internal Security personnel and, indirectly, of some council members. Faith in leadership was somewhat shaken, and at the third election, the changes in the Canal council were large. The Butte council, which had suffered more doubt and frustration than that of Canal in the crisis of March and April, suffered relatively little change.

The second year of the councils was more peaceful. In Canal, the new chairman first elected was unwilling to act and consented to take the post only temporarily. He was succeeded in August by the present chairman. The Canal council worked with a measure of satisfaction to all. Minor issues were raised with the Administration, but no major conflict arose, and some constructive legislation and executive organization was accomplished. In the December, 1944, election, the majority of the councilmen were reelected.

In Butte, the second chairman was an older Nisei. He had succeeded the first upon his relocation, had been reelected for the third council, and had himself relocated in August. The third chairman was a much respected Issei. He cooperated effectively and honestly with the Administration. Unfortunately for himself and for the council, there arose no conflict issue with the Administration. In addition, the chairman was forceful and contemptuous of inefficiency. His control of council meetings was too tight. The results of these factors were that the council members grew suspicious of the executive board, and the people grew suspicious of the

council. With the limitations and frustrations of center life, there are inevitable feelings of resentment. If the councils do not appear to have some conflict with the Administration the belief grows that they have betrayed the people. Thus the very efficiency of the council weakened it, and by the time of the new elections there was much dissatisfaction. Many of the older members were not renominated or reelected, and an essentially new executive board took office at the beginning of 1945.

The major problem confronting the new councils was the closing of the centers. They were instrumental in choosing the delegates for the All-center Conference at Utah. The chairmen were both delegates. They represented the wishes of the people and advanced a number of requests made to the National Director. Their share in this will be dealt with more fully under the heading Relocation.

Internally, there was a good measure of harmony. Both councils cooperated to deal with minor issues, notably the recurrent hospital squabbles. And much that a year ago would have been a source of conflict has been resolved by effective executive cooperation between the Administration and the executive boards of the councils.

When the Analyst left the center, the councils were still functioning and the elections for the new councils had not been held. Two difficulties will probably arise. First, some of the most efficient councilmen will have relocated or will be planning early relocation. Second, it may be difficult to find representation for some of the blocks. But it seems probable at this writing that the councils will continue after a fashion.

Council Achievements and Functions.

The foregoing is a general sketch of the operations of the councils. It remains to note their achievements and to analyse their functions.

Legislation. The legislative achievements of the councils were not many, and legislation turned out to be one of their lesser functions. A code of offenses was passed early in 1944, also a safety code. A juvenile code was drafted early in the same year but successive revisions delayed its passage until September. Other legislative acts dealt with smaller details.

Executive Boards. From the beginning of the permanent councils, executive boards were established. These consisted of the council chairman, the executive secretary and two other members of the council elected by the council. They gradually proved themselves to be of immense significance. Being paid, they can give full time to the job. Being elected, they feel they have the right to represent the people's point of view. As each learns his job, he understands administrative problems. The boards are utilized to give effect to the recommendations of the councils, to act as a link between councils and the Administration, and to secure joint action of Butte and Canal as described above. Many minor problems are settled by them. One of their latest achievements was the amalgamation of two messhalls in accordance with the Washington instruction that messhalls

be closed when the number in a block is less than 125. Although the closing was resisted, negotiations between the block managers, the blocks and the chairman of the Butte community council resulted in a peaceful solution. Many matters which might have become issues have been settled quietly as a result of quick action by the boards.

Committees. A committee system was organized in October, 1944. The committees were organized into three divisions corresponding approximately (but not exactly) to the three main administrative divisions of the Project. Each division was headed by a chairman, a member of the executive board, and each committee within the division had its chairman.

The committees started off lamely. They took some time to learn the job. One of the early actions, an attack on an appointed official of Internal Security, proved to be baseless and the committee lost face, though an acceptable report was eventually made. To offset this, there was some constructive committee action. The mess committee, for example, sat down with the officials of Mess Operations and discussed certain grievances. Possibly as a result of this, there has been no major criticism of or major grievance against Mess Operations since October, 1943, a distinct achievement when it is remembered that feeding is always a potential source of conflict.

There were probably three main contributions of the committee system. First, it was educational. Committee members learned the workings of the division or section into which they were inquiring and the budgetary limitations within which the operation must act; hence, there was less possibility of groundless criticism. Second, preliminary investigation often prevented conflict because of the opportunity it gave for discussion by a small group. Third, if anything was to be done, the committee was able to take or recommend the necessary action.

The committee system of the first year thus worked, but a large number of standing committees proved to be cumbersome. Hence, in July 1944, Butte reorganized. Many standing committees were dropped. Instead, the three division chairmen were charged with certain large areas of responsibility. As and when committees were needed they were specially appointed for the matter in hand and went out of existence when the task was completed. Canal adopted the same system in September, 1944. It has worked with efficiency until the present time.

Commissions. In the course of the winter of 1943-44, a number of commissions were appointed, each consisting usually of some members of the council and some non-members. A few commissions previously existing had council members added to their numbers. In general, this increased the authority of the councils. Through reports, the councils were able to keep in touch with many significant activities and to bring to the attention of commission members grievances, inefficiencies, and suggestions. It is not intended to list all the commissions here, but to note only the more important.

The Relocation Commission had existed before the councils. Some council members already belonged to it. It proceeded

practically independently of the councils except that the councils had reports on what it did. It functioned with varying utility, As some members were passively opposed to relocation, it did not press relocation with enthusiasm. Nevertheless, it was of use to the Relocation Officer in that through it he was able to keep in touch with community sentiment and through it to communicate matters of importance to relocation. In the last few months, he has found it more useful to use the members as individuals. However, some meetings have been held to hear reports from relocation officers, visitors, and evacuees returning from the coast after short-term leave.

The Juvenile Commissions. With the passing of the juvenile code in September 1944, it became necessary to appoint juvenile commissions, one for each community. They are to deal with juvenile offenders referred to them by the judicial commission. Juvenile offenses have been so few that they have had little to do. What they have done seems to have given satisfaction.

In addition to its juvenile commission, the Butte council created also a Juvenile Board to consider ways and means of preventing juvenile delinquency.

The Manpower Commissions. In September, 1944, the manpower shortage showed signs of becoming acute because of relocation, and it was realized that it might become even more so. Consequently, each council appointed a manpower commission. A central body, the Manpower Executive Board, secured unity of action in the two communities. The commissions drew up a list of priorities of claims on labor, calculated to maintain essential services. It gave its authority to necessary transfers of labor. Its most useful contribution was its acceptance of the responsibility for labor reassignments, thus relieving the Administration of the onus of imposing these regulations upon an unwilling community. While compulsory labor transfers have been few, its work will still have importance in the final months of the center's existence.

The Judicial Commissions. The commissions already mentioned were important, each in its own field. Hence, to say that one is more important than another is to make a comparison when many common factors are missing. However, if one commission could be called more significant than another it is the judicial commission, or, rather the two judicial commissions, one for each community.

Until the end of 1944, all offenses were tried by the Project Director. This worked very well, but it was believed better that members of the community should be responsible for the task, as one of the aspects of self-government. While there had been no general community complaints, there was growing up an attitude adverse to the Director's jurisdiction in some groups, particularly the juvenile delinquents; they had a tendency to feel that law was something forced upon them by the Administration, rather than by public sentiment. One of the major aims of the creation of judicial commissions was to bring the force of public opinion behind law and order.

The community council passed codes of offenses in the autumn of 1943. The judicial commissions, each consisting of three commissioners, were appointed by January, 1944. The first trial was

held in Butte on February 28, 1944, and the first verdict and sentence in a case of assault and battery were satisfactory to all parties.

The first trials were held with some formality. A member of Internal Security acted as prosecutor, and an evacuee, formerly a lawyer of California, usually acted as defender. This meant that the same group of men both collected evidence and prosecuted, a situation that eventually led to some trouble.

Following the first case, there were two main types of cases. The first type involved breaches of the peace or similar complaint against juvenile or youthful delinquents. The commissioners dealt with lightly with these cases, usually suspending sentence, as they did not believe that jail sentences were effective. The second type was gambling. The police believed that all the offenses they brought to court concerned the running of gambling houses, but the evidence showed only gambling, with no gambling group or ring. Consequently, the commissioners' sentences were lighter than the police thought right. Cumulatively, Internal Security believed it was not getting the support of the judicial commission and there developed a serious rift between the commissioners and Internal Security.

In April, 1944, the Project Attorney took over the training and supervision of the judicial commissions. First, he altered procedure. There was no longer to be a prosecutor, the commissioners were to make their examination by direct questioning. Second, he trained them in the various considerations that went into the arrival at the verdict and the determination of an adequate sentence.

In Butte, this training had good effects in a relatively short time. Verdicts and sentences became suitable to the offenses and collateral circumstances. The tension between Internal Security and commissioners disappeared. Up to the present time, the officers of Internal Security have no hesitations in presenting cases for trial. There is much evidence that the people are also satisfied.

Matters were not so soon settled to everyone's satisfaction in Canal. Canal had had few cases, at first, as compared to Butte. After their first few cases, their judgments were not considered suitable. In a case involving juvenile or youth delinquency as late as September, 1944, sentences were absurdly inadequate and had to be revised by the Project Director. There was more than a suspicion that the commissioners were being unduly influenced by the pressures of certain community groups. Since then, cases have been dealt with satisfactorily.

The chief offenses for both communities are gambling, disorderly behavior (mostly by juveniles or young men), and less often, assault and battery.

The only other point to be noted here is that the total number of offenses is very small, and long intervals may elapse between sittings of the judicial commissions' courts.

Two further functions of the organs of community government require notice -- Communication and the Regulation of Conflict:

Communication

The community councils and the block managers are essential links in the scheme of communication. They receive information and instruction from the Administration and transmit it to the blocks. In reverse, they convey some of the desires or attitudes of the people to the Administration. It should be especially noted that communication in this sense is not a mere passive reception of information. It involves also a process of questioning, even of argument, so that the information transmitted is assimilated after being freed, to some extent, from ambiguity. Further, as instruments of communication, the councillors and block managers acquire experience. They build up some kind of a background of knowledge that enables them to interpret communications with more insight. Some individuals are imperfect instruments of communication, but the two groups become better than any random selection of people could be. They are recognized; they have experience; and they have the opportunity to get exact information.

In those blocks which still have them, the block councils are the next link in the communication system, but their efficiency and the degree to which they are utilized vary. Some function regularly, some seldom, and some not at all.

Communication is not perfect in the center. In the final analysis, the efficiency of any communication system depends upon the will and the ability of the people to pay attention. The councils and the block managers function pretty well; the block councils unevenly; sometimes communications fail to reach the mass of the people because of their unwillingness to be informed. The transmission of information about relocation and center closing reached a number correctly; others still remained in error or in ignorance late in May because the whole topic was distasteful.

The Regulation of Conflict

Occasions of conflict between evacuees and Administration or between one evacuee group and another have been noted. An example of the first is the reduction of block janitors at the end of 1943. An example of the second is the dispute about the atrocities resolution. Some administrative officers are concerned at their occurrence. The point of view advanced here is that the emergence of conflict in regularly constituted instruments of government is a matter of congratulation.

Between administrators and those administered there are inevitably difference of interest. This is the case even when the administrators are chosen by the representatives of the people. It is more so when the administrators are put over the people from the outside. One of the attitudes of the evacuees is that of frustration; another is resentment; and the Administration is blamed for the frustration and is the object of much resentment.

When a difference of opinion arises, causing a grievance one of several consequences may ensue. An administrative act can rankle, can cause indignation, or can cause resistance. If it is driven underground it may find outlet in an unregulated manner; it may, as in the case of the mess halls strike in August, 1943, result in action disturbing to the effective operation of an essential service. It is thus most desirable that grievances or differences of opinion find expression in a regularly constituted body. No matter how violent the resentment, if it can be discussed in council it is controlled. Debate and executive action follow certain rules, and the course of action can be observed, and irregular violence forestalled. Hence, conflict in community government should be not only expected it should be welcome. It may be a matter of regret that differences of opinion or of interest arise. Since they are inevitable in the situation, the councils and block managers meetings should be recognized as the best bodies for the expression and resolution of these differences. Occasionally, individuals may find themselves under attack. Unpleasant as it may be for the individual, it is a healthier situation than gossip and grumbling. Usually the individual is attacked because of some resentment at the system. But the total system of administration will probably work as long as the regulated mechanisms for adjusting difference continue to function.

This sketch of community government, necessarily condensed could be made the basis of a number of comments. Only a few will be offered. First, it suffered from being rather late in starting. This lateness was the result of ignorance of the problem in Washington, in the project administration, and on the part of the evacuee leaders. All made mistakes, probably because of the fact that all groups were faced with an unprecedented situation.

Second, it is worth noting that the final system was one that was not planned and could not have been predicted. In particular, the coordinate influence of community councils and block managers was not part of the original blueprint.

Third, it is significant that once the councils were established, and the lines upon which they could work became clear, they can continue to function almost regardless of the personalities involved. By May, 1945, the fourth chairman of the Butte council was in office; also, it was his first term in office. The fourth executive secretary occupied that post. The vice-chairman was the fifth. All the members of the executive board were new. Yet the council functioned as well as, or better than it had done before. This is not to say that the councils could not be destroyed; gross mismanagement on either side could do it. But granted a little good will and a little understanding, there seems reason to believe that the councils can continue as long as enough men remain in the center.

Clubs and Societies

From the inception of the center, many clubs and societies were organized; some were carryovers from assembly centers. They played a large part in center life and should be fully described. For various reasons, it is not possible to do so in this report and only

a brief outline of their nature and function will be attempted.

For purposes of this report the following classification will be adopted:

Japanese Cultural Societies
Japanese Athletic Societies
Other Interest Groups
American Cultural Societies
American Interest Groups
American Athletic Activities
The Seimon-kai

In this classification, the term "cultural" is used in its popular rather than its scientific sense.

The most important of the Japanese cultural societies were the Engei-kai. They produced both classical and modern plays. In Butte, there were two separate societies, one producing modern Japanese plays, the other, classical plays. In Canal, one society produced both kinds of plays.

In Butte, there was much jealousy between the two societies. We had come, almost completely organized, from Tulare Assembly Center, with its own officers and organization. Subsequent arrivals who were interested found themselves frozen out, so that they founded a second society. The division of interests into classical and modern was eventually agreed upon, but conflict broke out from time to time. One of the most able of Community Activities Section coordinators kept the peace for nearly a year but resigned in the middle of 1944, as he found matters had gone beyond his control. His belief was that another would keep the peace better. In spite of conflict many plays were produced, and were a source of great interest to Issei and Kibei. Some Nisei also participated but they were few in number.

In Canal, there seems to have been no major conflict. There was only one society. In addition, control was exercised by the community. The governing board in Butte consisted of officers elected by members of the society, whereas in Canal the governing board was constituted of members elected by blocks, all people voting. The structure of the society was thus closely articulated to the structure of the community. This was characteristic of nearly all Canal organizations. The community as such had a hand in the making of policies, usually by the same device of having block representatives upon the controlling body, and the active members of the society merely controlled the technical aspects of the activities. This is a further evidence of the greater cohesiveness of Canal as contrasted with Butte.

Other Japanese cultural groups were the societies for the reciting of ancient verse. Two such societies were noted by the Community Analyst: The society for reciting utai and that for reciting shigin. Each of these is a traditional form of verse, recited (or changed.) There are variations within each according to different traditional techniques of composition and rendition. These were also a source of intense interest to the participants, all Issei; one member got out a monthly magazine, in which a certain number of verses were re-

produced. These societies flourished in both Butte and Canal up to the time of segregation. After that, the Canal societies were too weak to carry on, and those still interested joined the Butte societies. The Butte societies were still in existence in May, 1945.

Other Japanese-type cultural activities to be noted are various types of dance. These activities were organized around instructors rather than as regularly constituted societies. They differed from the activities already noted in that they were a source of interest to Nisai as well as Issei, and an appreciable number of children and young people were taught one or another of various traditional dance forms.

The Japanese athletic societies were the judo and the sumo clubs. The distinction in kind between these two activities is not only in the type of contest or wrestling they follow, it is in the purpose behind the activities.

Sumo is a form of popular wrestling which is produced as a spectacle for the pleasure of the spectators. The performers are thus either professionals, or approximating to professionalism. Traditionally it is a sport of interest to men-only, and women are seldom spectators, much as was the condition in prize-fighting two generations ago.

Judo is considered an activity for the training of character, and enjoys a much higher status. By practicing judo, the youth learns control of his body, learns to conduct himself within rigid rules of fair play and follows a traditional ritual throughout. He thus not only acquires a type of fighting skill but also a complex of attitudes. Thus judo has certain possibilities of nationalistic orientation, not implicit in sumo.

There was never any evidence that these nationalistic implications ever became important at Gila. There was always the suspicion that they might become important. Because of the attitudes of the parents of some of the members, there was always some pressure by members of the Administration upon the Community Activities Section supervision to have judo discontinued. The possible defense of the judo leaders was always that it was strictly a body and character-building activity, with no nationalist leanings. In the event, judo was left untouched, with nothing more than a suggestion that instruction be given in English, and that it be conducted like an American-type activity.

Judo and sumo were both active up to the time of segregation. Many experts and instructors went to Tule Lake. Sumo continued in both camps, but the performances were infrequent and irregular, and were attended by only small numbers.

Judo also continued. In Butte the class numbered about 40, with at least two well-qualified instructors. (It is regretted that their exact grade is not available in any present notes.) In Canal, only one instructor was left, and he had only half a dozen students. Judo was still active in May, 1945.

Of the other interest groups of significance to Issei, only brief notes will be given. Each community had an Old Men's Club and a Women's Club. The Old Men's Clubs were centers for the playing of games and for reading. The Women's Clubs developed instruction in sewing, knitting and other female skills. Each community had also a Co-Shogi club. This incomplete list serves to indicate the range of interests of the people.

It is significant that Japanese-type activities and recreations were so popular with Issei and Kibei and so thoroughly cultivated. Everyone questioned was emphatic that the Japanese were able to pursue these interests far more intensely than before evacuation. People had more time for them; there was a concentration of population; and instructors were available to a greater extent than previously. It is possible, also, that it was a compensatory phenomenon. Rejected by the United States, the people sought refuge in the cultural activities associated with their youth and related to a people which had not rejected them. From another point of view, it is significant evidence of the way in which evacuation caused a return to Japanese interests.

As a group, the Nisei did not participate in these Japanese activities, though there were exceptions. Their interests were centered in American type activities. The YMCA, YWCA and societies stemming from these had large memberships. The YBA also developed recreational activities, though it always remained closely identified with Buddhist religious activities.

These organizations put on parties from time to time which were approximately of the American type. Refreshments were usually American. Social dances were frequently given. The dancing was unique. It was based upon American type dancing, and was believed to be American by the dancers. It was actually a variant, a cultural item characteristic of the center. The rules could be stated thus, "Dance as slowly as possible." All attempts made to teach differently failed.

For the youth there were Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Craft Clubs (e. g. the Model Aeroplane Club) Girl Reserves, and so on.

Because the majority of the Nisei were young, athletic clubs were of great importance. Football, basketball, and baseball were all played in season. Some of the teams stemmed from the high schools, others were organized simply as athletic clubs, some of them for all games, others for one game only.

The school systems plays a notable part in the recreational life of the youth. Athletic groups are organized there. Various clubs based on interests have arisen, principally in the high schools. In general, the schools have been one of the most effective and the most consistent agents of Americanization within the center. Linguistically and in the field of recreation they have offered experiences which the youth could not get elsewhere, and have prevented them from falling too greatly under the influence of Japanese culture. This

aspect of their activities has become increasingly important as the elder Nisei have relocated. It should also be added that the educational system is one administrative service which has given most satisfaction to the people, and which has encountered the least adverse criticism.

The Seinen-kai is treated separately because it is one group which had more overt political significance than any other formally organized group. It was founded as a cultural society, with a Japanese library, and with literary and recreational aims. Its membership was largely Kibei, but some Nisei also were members. Though not formally avowed as such, it was to some degree pro-Japanese and, from the time of registration, anti-administration. This was not necessarily true of all members but it was true of the group in control. The most outspoken leader was so opposed to military service, and so against the declaration of loyalty that he was removed from the camp late in February, 1943. After his departure, systematic resistance disappeared, but the club continued as a Japanese influence. It disappeared with segregation; the officers and an appreciable proportion of the members went to Tule Lake.

All, or nearly all, societies and activities are registered with CAS. A full account of their regulation, and the coordination of activities should show how CAS is organized. Since that is a professional matter and will certainly be done in the final report of that section it is merely mentioned here.

Associations

The types of associations to be dealt with in this part of the report are the immediate concern of Community Activities and will, presumably, be fully described in the final report of that section. They are outlined here because they are an integral and necessary part of the social life of the center.

Intensive and extensive organizations have been characteristic of the center from its earliest days. The familial and geographic organizations (block and community) have so far been taken into consideration. The kinds of association next to be considered are organizations which cut across block organization, and include members from the whole community. They are associations based upon religious, cultural or recreational interests.

Religious Organizations

The most important religious groups are the Buddhist and the Christian. Two smaller religious groups also exist -- Seicho-no-iyē (the House of the Spirit) and Tenri-kyō.

Buddhism

The largest religious group is the Buddhist. It is difficult to estimate the number of adherents. The Buddhists keep no membership lists. In the Individual Record Sheets 58% declared themselves Buddhists. Most informants say that is an understatement; they say that many who were Buddhists declared themselves Christians because

they thought they would not get into trouble if they were Christians. A Buddhist priest estimated that 80% of Canal Community were Buddhist. Some think that an overestimate.

Another difficulty is that being a Buddhist is not always a very definite matter. There are many devout and regular Buddhists. There are also many who attend few services or none at all and show themselves as Buddhists only at times of funerals. Putting all these considerations together, the best that can be estimated is that more than 50% and probably not more than 75% of the population are Buddhists.

Of the Buddhists sects, only two are represented in any numbers. The largest sect is the Shinshu; all informants are agreed that about 75% Buddhists in the center belong to that sect. Most of the remainder are Zenshu. The Nichiren and Shingon sects are represented by small numbers.

Most of the priests are Shinshu. In Butte there were originally two Zen priests. One, the "Bishop," was interned in August, 1943; the other was considering relocation in May, 1945.

There is one temple at Canal and there are two at Butte. Shin priests officiate at the Canal temple and one of the Butte temples. The Zen priest officiates at the other Butte temple. However, on occasion, such as a funeral, the Shin priests may use the Zen temple; and for some funerals, all priests officiate together.

The services conducted by the priests are regular religious services on Sunday, and in Canal there is a daily service from 8:30 to 9:30 a.m.; weekly Young Buddhist Association services; and Sunday Schools every Sunday morning. In addition, special services are conducted. For example, the members of the Shingon sect in Butte have a special service once a month, following the complex rituals pertaining to that sect; this service is performed by the Zen priest.

Funeral services are conducted usually by several or all of the community priests. The funeral is the test of a family's Buddhism. No matter how indifferent to the religion, if a family is in any degree Buddhist its members are buried or cremated only after the rites of Buddhism have been performed.

There exist several groups associated with the Buddhist Church. First there is the Young Buddhist Association. This has, by some of its members, been characterized as the Buddhist equivalent of the YMCA and the YWCA. This is true only in small measure. Its aims are primarily religious; it remains under the jurisdiction of a priest; it holds weekly religious services; and its principal function seems to be to propagate the Buddhist faith. It occasionally assumes recreational or social welfare functions, but these are secondary.

For especially devout Buddhists there are other societies. The Howa-kai is a group formed to learn Buddhist teachings; only those especially interested belong. The Kenkyu-kai is a society for research into Buddhism for young people, using English texts.

The functions of Buddhism may be conveniently analysed into religious, cultural, and political functions.

The religious function will be noted only briefly here, as a more profound research into Buddhist theology would be necessary to deal with this adequately. Its philosophy gives its adherents a meaning to life, to the continuance of life in the future, both of the individual and the society, but it emphasizes individual "enlightenment," i. e., knowledge of oneself and one's soul. Ethically, it lays down principles for the guidance of one's relations to other people.

Culturally, it is a link with Japan. The services are all Japanese, and Buddhists are, on the whole, closer to Japanese culture than are Christians. This is not its conscious aim, but it is nevertheless true.

The Buddhist funeral service shows the combined functions better than any other ritual. The service is presided over by a prominent layman. It includes many religious rituals, performed by priests. It also includes many laudatory speeches. At the final part of the service, all members of those in attendance file to the front of the temple and bow in succession, to the religious symbol, to the dead, and to the family of the dead. The service thus gives the purely religious consolation, mourns with the bereaved, comforts them with tributes to the virtues of the deceased, and reaffirms the social solidarity of the group. Attendance at the service in itself accomplishes the last-named purpose; the bow emphasizes it.

Buddhism seems to have become strengthened as a result of evacuation. People are more assiduous in attendance at religious services than they used to be. Some say this is because they have "more time." It may also be because the consolations of religion mean more in a period of insecurity, and because participation in religious ceremonies increases the sense of social solidarity.

When asked what particular contribution Buddhism has for America, the usual answer is "democracy." The Lord Buddha believed all men to be, potentially, spiritual equals. He attempted to break down the caste system of India. Buddhism is interested in the eternal aspects of men's lives, beside which the immediate social distinctions are as nothing. Buddhism disregards race.

This pat answer, which obviously gives but a fraction of the teaching of Buddha, is clearly a response to the particular situation in which Japanese Buddhism finds itself. Many priests are still excluded from California, some are interned. They belong to "an oppressed group." Buddhism is "against discrimination." Hence, both to aid themselves and to meet a hostile world, they must concentrate upon that particular interpretation of their religious teachings which will find the most favorable response.

When asked about the future of Buddhism in the United States, the common answer is to explain the types of organization which are being created to deal with the new circumstances. It is realized that the people of Japanese ancestry will be scattered. Consequently, efforts are being put forth in two directions. First, it is hoped that temples will be built wherever there is a sufficient concentration of Buddhists. Second, a central organization is to publish and distribute printed materials, including sermons and expositions, to keep the interest and maintain the faith of those living in small groups. A central Buddhist Association has been created, with headquarters at Denver. A few Nisei are being trained for the priesthood and it is hoped that, in the future, the sutras will be in Japanese, the sermons preached in English.

This postulates the continuance of Japanese Buddhism. A more far reaching and philosophical idea is being propounded by the Reverend Kyogoku. He believes that Buddhism becomes vital as it "takes on the color of the country in which it is established." Buddhism will prosper in America only as it takes on American color. The Nisei should study Buddhism in English. Most English books on Buddhism deal with the Hinayana, which he calls "primitive Buddhism," the form of Buddhism brought to Europe and America from India. The Nisei should therefore study primitive Buddhism. As they advance, they should then study the more philosophical Mahayana, the Buddhism eventually accepted in China and Japan. In this way, they will identify themselves with the whole Buddhist religious group in America, including members of all races. Buddhism will then develop its own American color, and Japanese Buddhism in the United States will disappear, having made its contribution to the new Buddhist forms which will emerge.

Seicho-no-iyē

It is difficult to know whether to call this a sect, a cult, or a philosophy. It is relatively new, its founder being still alive. Stated most briefly, its basic tenet is that if the heart or mind is pure the body will also be pure. Its weekly meetings and its publications are devoted to secure that end. Hence, some informants call it a "Japanese Christian Science."

Some members say it is a separate religion. Others seem to keep some sort of a connection with Buddhism, hence, the difficulty of defining it.

Its numbers are few but enthusiastic; in April the number of attendants at regular meetings at Gila was said to be between 100 and 120. The local leader says that numbers have slightly increased since evacuation.

There seem to be no political implications to the cult. It stems from Japanese sources, and is oriented to Japan, but its aims appear to be solely inspirational and devoted to "spiritual improvement." The adherents seem to derive a high degree of emotional satisfaction and serenity from participation in the cult's activities.

Tenri-kyo.

This cult was founded as a result of a vision by a woman in 1838. It was organized as the Tenri-kyo-kai in 1888 and was recognized as a religious group, and classified as a Shinto sect in 1908. Its tenets superficially sound much like those of the Seicho-no-iyē; if the heart is pure, the body will also be pure. To this is added the injunction to give all to the House (of God) and to avoid hurting any other being. The priests of the cult are said to conduct all ceremonies, including funeral rites.

The Community Analyst knows only two Gila families who belong to this sect, but informants say that there are more; the total number, however, does not seem to be large. They live very quietly, and try to help others. They seem almost morbidly anxious to avoid doing any form of injury to other people. One case cited was that of a woman of the sect who, in alarm at seeing a face looking in her window, called out for assistance. The peeper, a juvenile, was arrested. In contrition at having caused harm to others, the woman went to the family of the boy with gifts of money and candy, and full of expressions of remorse for what she had done.

Because it was classified as a Shinto sect, all of its priests in this country were interned and remain in interment. Paroled internees state that the priests are highly educated and intellectual men, and politically harmless.

The sect seems to possess no political significance. The members live quiet and harmless lives. While it is oriented to the culture of Japan it does not seem to be nationalistic. These tentative statements, however, need verification, particularly by someone who has had a chance to interview the interned priests, and who has a closer acquaintance with lay members in the centers.

Christianity

It is nearly as difficult to estimate the number of Christians as that of Buddhists. While Christian churches have membership lists, these will include some who are Christians in name only; and they will exclude some who are more Christian than they are anything else. Without going further into the question of "What is a Christian," the estimate here made is that Christians number from 12 to 15% of the Center's population, the proportion of Christians being slightly higher at Butte than at Canal.¹

Shortly after the people arrived at the center, the Protestants organized a united church, called "The Rivers Christian Church." The Roman Catholics and the Seventh Day Adventists kept their separate identities. The Rivers Christian Church is managed by two central boards, one for each community. There is a weekly ministers meeting. There is also a common treasury. The church was allotted two recreation halls at Butte and one in Canal.

(1) This particular part of the report is being written at Philadelphia, without full notes. An attempt will be made to make the above estimate more accurate in a future memorandum.

The ministers cooperated to perform the necessary functions. The Issei ministers conducted Sunday services for the Issei in Japanese; there were also prayer-meetings during the week. The Nisei ministers conducted services for the Nisei in English. Sunday Schools were conducted in English under the general guidance of the ministers. Nisei ministers were active in the organization of such religious societies as the Christian Endeavor.

Each of the two communities was allotted part of a barrack as a church office for the conduct of church business.

The pastors and members of the different sects kept up contact with their outside church organizations. There is thus no indication that the conduct of a united church will break down sectarianism; unity is a device useful, even essential, within the center, but the old sectarian loyalties seem to persist.

It is said that the Christians lost in numbers during life in the center. At the time of registration, a well-known Japanese-American minister spoke publicly supporting volunteering for the army. He incurred the wrath of many and was labelled a "dog." This opprobrium was extended to all Christians and some extremists even today say that "all Christians are dogs." Many half-hearted Christians ceased to identify themselves as such and would not permit their children to attend Christian Sunday School. They were afraid of the consequences of being considered dogs.

The Christian leaders claim that what they lost in numbers they gained in quality of faith. Those who continued to avow themselves Christians had sufficient strength of belief to make them brave the dangers of being classified as dogs.

Christians as a whole are much more cooperative with the Administration and much more pro-American than non-Christians. This must be taken as a very broad statement; if made by itself it would not do justice to a large number of loyal Buddhists. But the fact of being Christian seems to create a greater possibility of identification with American culture. Many Christian Issei have memories of American teachers and preachers; and even in Japan, before the war, Christians looked to America with greater friendliness than did the non-Christians. An interesting confirmation of the pro-Americanism of Christians is that only one Christian family went to Tule Lake from Gila.

Further, the fact of being Christian means that one is a member of a larger group in the United States. A Japanese Presbyterian will have many common interests and feel a bond with a Caucasian Presbyterian. He does not, therefore, feel isolated. He knows that outside, he can immediately establish relationships with people in the community to which he relocates. Another consequence of Christianity, thus, is that Christians relocate more readily than do non-Christians.

Neither Christianity nor Buddhism is, as such, of political significance, but there are, nevertheless, political implications of each. The stronger pro-Japanese elements are to be found among the Buddhists because of the orientation to Japan; the stronger pro-American

elements are to be found among the Christians because of the orientation toward the United States. And, thus to repeat, while each religion is, in theory, non-national, each exerts an influence towards one nationalism or another. This influence is usually wielded not by the religious leaders, the ministers or priests, but by the laymen of each religious group; and, to repeat once more, a Buddhist is not essentially disloyal; he is merely subject to an influence which, other things being equal, will sway him towards Japan. As a further caution, it should be noted that the vast majority of Nisei Buddhists in the center are loyal. Similarly, there are disloyal elements among Christians; but they are, proportionately, much smaller than among Buddhists.

EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR PROBLEMS

Five essential factors underlie the labor problems of the center. First, the employer of nearly all the people is the WRA (the only important exceptions being the Co-op employees.) Hence the same body of men which administers the evacuee, which "restricts" and frustrates them is the body towards which they have a complex of resentments. Labor problems therefore are closely integrated with other human problems, and labor troubles may arise from factors having little if any relationship to conditions of employment.

Second, the wage-scale makes a very feeble appeal to economic motivation. Even though clothing allowances make the actual amount of money somewhat larger than the despised sixteen dollar job or nineteen-dollar job, the economic reward is not large. Thus, to economic motivation must be added other motivations; and this extra motivation was not always present, so that continual trouble was experienced in keeping some positions filled.

This diminution of economic motivation is intensified by the third factor; the certainty every individual has of food and shelter. Being discharged, striking, or simply leaving the job brings no fear of starvation. It is well, however, to note that the economic motivation is not quite absent. Unless a family has means of its own, it will suffer without employment. Clothing and other necessities are not provided automatically.

The fourth factor is the WRA policy of over-employment adopted at the beginning. The policy of work for work's sake meant that, on most jobs, there were far more workers than were needed. It meant, further, that there were many jobs with practically no work attached. This was true of many activities sponsored by the Community Activities Section and of many Community Activities Section employees. It was also true on the farm, in public works, and in many offices. The result was that bad work habits were developed.

This situation was only partly remedied by the reduction in employment which was put into effect from July 1 to September 30, 1943. The number of workers had a somewhat closer approximation to the needs of the job but most jobs were still overmanned, and bad work habits persisted. The only jobs not overstaffed were of two kinds. The first was certain skilled jobs; the number of qualified workers was not sufficient and this type of shortage became increasingly

acute as relocation progressed. The second was certain unpopular jobs, such as garbage collection; special inducements had to be given to get these jobs done.

The fifth factor is that the people in the center are not a normal labor force. One of the most industrious of ethnic groups in the United States was transformed by evacuation into highly unstable and unreliable labor. Resentment already mentioned had much to do with this; the resentment found expression in specific grievances against supervisors, against the monthly wage, against administrative actions affecting labor. Insecurity sometimes aided the employment situation superficially; people accepted jobs as a form of emotional security because it gave them a position in the community. But this was detrimental to the performance of the job. Much energy and time was spent in building up prestige and security situations within the job, and many labor disputes arose from the same considerations.

One major result of all these factors is that it is very difficult to get people to accept responsibility. This partly arises from the favored position of the Administration officials, and from the fact that the appointive staff is always in the superior position. This is not only an added cause for resentment, it gives a rationalization for the refusal of responsibility. But all of the main factors outlined contribute to it. Hence, the practical men often say, "A Japanese is incapable of taking responsibility." A more correct, though not totally correct statement might be "an evacuee is incapable of taking responsibility."

Having said all this, it must be emphatically stated that all essential services were maintained for the most part by evacuee labor, frequently by the acceptance of some type of responsibility by evacuee supervisors. It should also be stated that, in proportion to the amount of labor, the actual disputes were few.

The two largest employed groups were the people in mess operations and those on the farm, (though, as farm operations are closing down, the latter is no longer the second largest group.).

Mess operations groups may be divided into two groups; those centrally employed, and those actually operating the mess halls. The difficulties of the centrally employed group arose mainly in the mess warehouses. It was difficult in the beginning to keep labor and to evolve any system of responsibility. In the last year both of these difficulties have been overcome. The appointive staff have learned how to deal with the situation. One man; who had formerly believed in discharging all who were inefficient, remarked, "You've got to deal with them like volunteer labor; once you do that you're all right." As a further device, in most dealings with evacuee labor, evacuee supervisors have been increasingly utilized. There are some able and responsible men in the central office who have helped to maintain quiet and efficiency.

The mess crews caused major trouble on only one occasion. When the policy of reduction of employment was adopted, mess crews were reduced in July, 1943. The mess supervisors were told, or thought

they were told, that there would be no further reductions until segregation was completed. Without adequate notice, they were suddenly informed in August that a further reduction must be made within a very few days. Meetings of block managers, of supervisors, and of the public were held. The Project Director and other senior officials spoke, explaining the necessity, and emphasizing the fact that there was not enough money to pay more than the authorized numbers. When the deadline was reached, a few messhalls closed; others were operated by volunteer crews; and a few meals were missed in some blocks. The reduction went through, and the brief strike was over within two days.

Subsequent reductions have been put into effect with no trouble. The head of Mess Operations discusses the reductions in advance. Everyone concerned is fully informed in plenty of time. The reduction is taken as a joint responsibility and none of the mistakes made in 1943 has been repeated.

The mess crews wield great power within the block, and the mess supervisor is one of the most powerful people within the block. This arises from several factors. The mess crews perform an essential service. They have access to food and can dispense food for special occasions. They were the first groups organized. They form the largest organized labor group in the block. And, in those blocks where the bulk of the mess crew is recruited within the block (which is the case in most blocks), the members of the crew are sufficient in number to represent at least half the families in the block. Consequently, when the mess crews take any action, they can summon an almost unanimous public support. More will be said about this under the heading of Cooperation and Conflict.

The farm labor problems are chiefly those of getting adequate work output. There have been no major conflicts over policies. The work is physically hard, particularly in the summer. The individual laborer, or a labor unit, has no incentive to work. He is not credited with his individual or unit output in any way which has meaning for him. He knows that he will be fed (though possibly not quite so well) whether the farm produces or not; and he believes himself to be grossly underpaid.

As a result, the head of the Agricultural Division estimates that each laborer only puts out about one quarter of his potential labor. In moments of crisis, such as a deadline for loading a freight car, he will speed up and work as hard as is necessary to accomplish the task within the limited time. But this incentive works for limited periods only. Mostly, the farm laborers exemplify the principle that cheap labor is expensive labor.

Within the last year, only one labor dispute has occurred on the farm: A "utility gang" working under a foreman, refused to do a certain job, and did instead another job which they thought needed doing. The foreman was called in and it was explained to him that he must accept instructions coming to him through regular channels. He refused. The problem was solved, or avoided, by disbanding the crew. It was a typical example of the development of a prestige system both for the foreman and for his gang, and of refusal to face loss of prestige.

In other divisions and sections, labor difficulties occurred. In the middle of 1943, the Engineering Department found it almost impossible to recruit men to put in the irrigation channels. The problem was finally solved by handing the whole undertaking to a prominent evacuee. He recruited his own labor, worked them as he saw fit, and the channels were installed. Later in the year, the same man took charge of building the auditorium. He worked on the same terms and carried it through to completion.

In the Property Control Unit, it was found impossible to keep men for one of the central warehouses. The men were unable to get on with their appointive foremen. Finally a man whom they liked was appointed and the difficulties decreased.

In 1945, the Finance Officer instructed the timekeepers to enter hours actually put in. This was revolutionary. Few evacuees worked the full eight hours a day; and the Director had set as his highest achievable aim the seven-hour day. Nevertheless, the full eight hours was always entered. Upon receipt of the Finance Officer's instruction, an informal strike was threatened by the timekeepers. Peace was restored by giving a picnic. But the actual working hours were not noticeably increased.

Only one further difficulty will be noted here. A number of men who were qualified for highly skilled tasks would not take the jobs. They preferred to take jobs without responsibility, and the extra three dollars a month was insufficient inducement. For example, qualified bookkeepers and accountants were hard to get. It was found that there were several of these driving tractors on the farm. Upon being interviewed by the Employment Officer, they refused to change jobs; they did not want the responsibility.

Difficulties continually occurred in the hospital, but these will be more appropriately dealt with in the next section (Cooperation and Conflict).

On the whole, the employment and labor situation at Gila has been unemphatic. Troubles occurred, as the examples cited show. Crucial deficiencies sometimes were evident. But the work of the center was carried out. The adverse attitudes of the evacuees and the lack of effective motivation meant that much work was inefficiently done; too many workers were required to accomplish a specific piece of work. On the other hand, some evacuees assumed and exercised effective responsibility, and many individual workers performed their tasks effectively and loyally.

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

There exist both cooperation and conflict within the center. The fact that essential services are continued with few interruptions, and that peace and order is seldom seriously threatened is definite indication that cooperation predominates. This cooperation is frequently passive but it is effective. Conflict situations have developed however. These conflicts are almost entirely verbal, and except in the time of registration were not in serious danger of

being other than verbal. Much evidence of both cooperation and conflict has already been noted in this report. It will be useful to summarize the existence of both processes in a few major relationships, and to give a few examples not already cited.

Administration and Evacuees.

Administration and evacuees have many objectives in common. Common objectives are peace and order, provision of food and shelter, education for the children, adequate medical care and healthful recreation, to name only a few; and, as noted, these have been continuously provided. It does not necessarily follow that the means to these ends are always agreed upon.

Offenses against the law and against the municipal code have been surprisingly few. All are agreed that something must be done about these offenses. The evacuee groups are generally on the side of leniency, and it is certain that members of the judicial commissions act under continual pressures. Thus, at first sentences were inadequate, sometimes merely nominal. But the groups exerting pressure were not the only groups. Large segments of public opinion were in favor of law maintenance. The decisions of the judicial commissions gradually conformed to accepted principles; and in the last six months of the period covered by this report they functioned satisfactorily.

Dissatisfaction, even resentment, against certain necessary restrictions of center life is generally undercurrent, but occasionally flares up. For example, for reasons of public relations, the Project Director restricted the number of passes to adjacent towns and cities. The evacuees might have approved, in general, of the objective; the improvement of relations between the camp and the people of Arizona. They do not approve the means. In fact, because of isolation and the manner in which they are engrossed in their own troubles, they are astonishingly indifferent to public relations.

However, they would subscribe to public relations principles in theory. Thus this restriction is a constant detriment to good relations within the center; though, it should be added, the resentment is by no means shared by the whole community.

If this disagreement extends not only to means but to ends, conflict of some sort arises almost inevitably. Three important administrative policies have been opposed by the evacuees. The first was registration. The fact of being forced to register, the misunderstanding concerning the intentions, the other aspects of the situation which have been reported elsewhere, all combined to arouse opposition; a conflict condition of serious dimensions arose, with consequences still undetermined.

The second policy was the reduction in employment. This was disliked everywhere, and suspicions of its purpose were universal. "They want to make it tough for us and force us to relocate." The conflict

which developed in the mess and the resistance to the reduction of janitors are examples of the conflicts caused by this policy.

The third is the closing of the center. This will be more fully discussed in the next section. It is enough to note here that it is disliked and opposed because it deprives large numbers of the security they believe they had been promised.

Another type of conflict is that which occurs within institutions. This is usually the result of struggles for power or prestige between individuals or groups. Examples of this type of conflict can be drawn from occurrences relating to the hospital and by a specific series of events in Community Activities Section.

The hospital occupies a particular position within the community because of the real and symbolic importance of its functions. The professional and skilled hospital workers enjoy a high prestige. At the same time, they are subjected to a greater criticism than are other groups, also because of their importance. Everything done by the hospital is of consequence to the community and if an unpopular policy is instituted there is a community reaction. Consequently there is always potential conflict between hospital and community.

Within the hospital, there is a complex of vested interests. This is partly because of professional status. Medical men, technicians, and graduate nurses exact an even greater deference to their status than is the case outside; deprived of any appreciable monetary rewards there is a drive to compensate for that by non-material rewards

The position is further complicated by the latitude which was allowed the staff in the first year. There were shortage in some skills, but there was gross overstaffing. This meant that most of the staff expected to do little work for their salaries, and small groups fought reduction. There were further privileges in a more material sense. Food from the hospital mess and some types of supplies found their way into the houses of many staff members. Any tightening up of controls on warehouses or pantries caused discontent and resistance.

To make a complex situation even more difficult to administer, professional rank cut across the usual caste lines. A doctor is superior, for example, to a nurse or a dietitian. When the physician is evacuee and the nurse or dietitian is appointive, the usual pattern of authority no longer holds.

Finally, the evacuee hospital staff share the resentments of the community as a whole, and have resisted any new exercise of discipline on the part of the head of the hospital.

Accordingly, the hospital has been a center of conflict from the beginning of its history. It became axiomatic in the Community Analysis section that, if no hospital trouble were reported, it merely meant that the section was losing touch with the hospital.

With only one exception; all hospital heads were in a condition of strife with the professional and skilled staff. Dr. A, who got on well, was transferred and Dr. B, his successor, was appointed in July, 1943. Dr. B was immediately unpopular. He made procedural reforms; these deprived some of the staff of irregular privileges. He was accused of race prejudice. He was accused of "prying and snooping." The resistance to him became so great that he was removed in September. Dr. A was brought back and peace was restored. Dr. A was again transferred later in the year and Dr. C appointed. Dr. C was accused of arbitrary and unjustifiable acts, of race prejudice, and so on. He resigned at the end of the year. Dr. A was brought back and peace was again restored. Dr. D was appointed. The same accusations were hurled against him and he was transferred. Dr. E was appointed and after a period had to be terminated. Up to May, 1945, there were still jurisdictional disputes.

Within the hospital, one of the tightly organized groups was the mess crew. Its supervisor got into disputes with the doctors about their "arbitrary" manner of bringing in unannounced guests; and with the dietitian, for her "high-handed" disregard of his authority. These recurred at intervals. The supervisor had always the implicit threat that if he resigned or was forced to resign the whole hospital mess crew would quit. He had built up his own system of security.

There were continual troubles about the TB ward. The Japanese are fearful of this disease, and a system of social sanctions has forced the same avoidance of it upon the Nisei. It became difficult to recruit nurses aides, among other reasons because of the fear of duty in the TB ward. For a long time the professional staff of the hospital resisted any special concessions to this fear. It was claimed that if nurses aides were exempted from taking turns in that ward there could be no educational campaign to change Japanese attitudes and opinions. But the hospital staff had to give in finally; special arrangements were made to have TB patients cared for by members of their families.

In the last months of 1944 and the first months of 1945, the medical staff fell into disrepute with the people. They were "too cold," "too unsympathetic;" and they did not give adequate attention to the patients. This antagonism found mostly verbal expression; but there were many families who said that they would go to the hospital only in cases of desperate necessity. Incidentally, it was during this period that the mechanism of exacting money contributions for gifts to doctors was perfected. Though the doctors were resented, it was greatly feared that they would leave, and this device was adopted to induce them to stay.

These brief suggestions as to the nature of conflict in or concerning the hospital are all that can be given here.

In the Community Activities Section, one man, a Nisei, had been supervisor of Butte from the beginning. He had built himself a compact and loyal following. He kept his eye on all activities, concentrated much authority to himself, and established a position of great prestige and authority. One coordinator, an Issei, who

had come into conflict with him, resigned. His successor, also Issei eventually came into conflict and only averted a forced resignation by relocation. However, the incident which brought the conflict between supervisor and coordinator to a head also gave the Community Activities Section appointed supervisor opportunity to ask for his resignation. This resignation was given; but such was the nature of his hold on his staff, that most of them resigned with him.

There was not only conflict between and within organized groups; there was also conflict between unorganized groups which, because unorganized, found only spasmodic and irregular expression. One of these conflicts was that between Issei and Nisei. The Issei objected to many Nisei activities. The Nisei objected to the attempts to constrain them. This conflict sometimes found expression in the blocks. American dancing was disliked by the Issei, but they frequently objected to a particular dance on the overt grounds that it was "too noisy." "But," said a Nisei girl, "when the Issei have parties the men get drunk and make more noise than we ever thought of doing."

It sometimes took more widespread forms. The Issei disliked the JACL. The grounds for this dislike were complex. But one factor was certainly resentment at the position of authority attained by the Nisei group at the expense of their elders.

In general, it was a conflict between two generations and two cultures. But its form varied with the circumstances, and sometimes was merely a contributory factor to other major disputes.

The Kibei were a complicating factor. In some regards, they evoked the support of the Issei, particularly in their attachment to Japanese culture. But the Issei are old and conservative, the Kibei are young and aggressive. Consequently, the Kibei were potentially at odds with both Issei and Nisei. During registration, they were in conflict with Nisei as well as with the Administration. Their numbers were greatly depleted by segregation and of those that remained some were peaceful and had accommodated to life in America; others were individual sources of discontent but no longer a group problem.

The evacuees, although they sometimes showed a united front to the Administration are, in fact, a divided community. They are divided in cultural preferences, in loyalty, in social class, and in education. This division has one consequence, among others; they are suspicious of each other. This shows itself in the use of the term inu (dog, informer, stool pigeon.) Some extend the term to any who may be considered pro-administration, the extension of the term to all Christians has been noted. But in general, it is used to denote those (partly mythical) people who give information harmful to the group. It is a persistent belief that there is one spy planted in every block by the Administration and much intra-block conflict is caused by changing suspicions as to who the spy is. Gila has not had the number of beatings that have occurred in other centers; but the fear of being taken for a "dog" limits the degree to which many individuals are willing to cooperate with the Administration.

It should finally be noted that there is conflict within the Administration. Reference is not here made to the personal grudges which develop when a small group are thrown together in comparative isolation; what is important is that there are conflicts of attitudes. This shows itself in differences as to how policies should be formulated or implemented. While there are many individual exceptions, the general difference of attitude follows the administrative divisions. Those in Community Management conceive of the evacuees as people, whose interests and situation should be taken into account and whose cooperation should be sought. Those in Administrative Management inevitably think of procedures and regulations; their training has made it difficult for them to do otherwise. Those in Operations think of the material job to be done; people should adapt themselves to material necessities. And overriding these attitudes, there are those who think, "The Jap ought to be kept in his place," as contrasted with those who believe that the evacuees are human beings. A project director trying to hit a balance after listening to his chief advisers must inevitably give offense to some.

RELOCATION

Relocation has been reported on at various times by the Community Analysis Section, and the Trends Reports of 1945 have dealt mainly with that topic. It is proposed here to give only a summary of what has happened and of what may happen.

The exact figures are not available as this report is being written, but the situation was approximately as follows in December, 1944: 2,000 people had been segregated, over 4,000 had relocated and 9,500 remained in the center.

From the completion of segregation in October, 1943, until the announcement of the closing of the centers, relocation was voluntary and was the primary task of the WRA. The policy proceeded against resistance. Many Nisei wanted to leave. But the bulk of the Issei were afraid to leave. They had lost their sense of security and felt unequal to reestablishing themselves in a hostile world. To insecurity was added resentment and some Nisei shared the resentment. The Government had moved them forcibly and therefore owed them security while the war lasted.

In spite of this, relocation proceeded continuously until late in 1944. The population structure of December 31, 1944, included many elderly or old men; fewer, but still many elderly and old women; very few men 18 to 39; a larger number of women of that age; and a large number of children under 18. In brief, the vast majority of those who could most easily earn a living and adjust "outside" had already gone; more were planning to go; and it seemed possible that the rate of voluntary relocation would diminish in 1945.

The announcement of the closing of the centers changed the situation, but it took a while for the people to grasp that fact. A summary of changing attitudes from December 17, 1944 to the middle of May, 1945, may throw some light on what may happen in the future.

The announcement of closing was made on December 17, a Sunday. By the following Wednesday all members of the community were aware of it, probably had been aware of it since Monday night at latest. By Wednesday they were also aware of the reactions of the California and Arizona newspapers. People instantly formed opinions, though attitude were fluid and changing. But the immediate reaction was partially to disregard the announcement. Glutinous rice arrived in time to make mochi for New Year's celebrations, and all families and blocks concentrated on Christmas and New Year parties.

During the following days, the closing became the most engrossing topic of conversation. Typical reactions were as follows:

- (1) Fears of discrimination and violence.
- (2) Fears of inability to make an economic adjustment.
- (3) Fears of being unable to get housing.
- (4) General fear of relocating under war conditions.
- (5) Belief that they were entitled to shelter and had, in fact, been promised it for the duration of the war.
- (6) Resentment at the whole program.
- (7) Belief that the centers would not really close.

In general the belief was either that "it can't be done" or "we won't leave," though there were exceptions, and some property owners made arrangements to leave as soon as possible.

Toward the end of January, the situation seemed to have changed. The publicly expressed attitudes were the same. But in private, many families were making plans; possibly this included about 40% of the population. Reactions differed according to economic circumstances, according to area of California origin and, of course, according to intensity of fears. But the plans were tentative, and people were waiting for more information and to see what happened to others.

By the end of the month, resistance had again crystallized against leaving. Early in the month, the All-Center Conference was suggested by Topaz; the Gila councils agreed. The selection of delegates necessitated block meetings. At these meetings, the underlying fears and resentments were given expression, and the community attitudes adverse to relocation were strengthened by the fact that they were shared by many.

The period was marked by continuous and sometimes contradictory rumors. On the whole, the general attitude was one of the waiting, of waiting to see what would happen, and of hoping that the center would not really close.

During the month of February, the people were still waiting. Resentments and resistance were still manifest. The representatives to the All-Center Conference returned at the end of the month, and reported, among other things, that not all the centers would likely be closed, and that some of their major problems, such as housing

and personal security, were not being adequately tackled by the Government. One delegate dissented in one respect; he thought the centers would close. The visit of the chief of the Liaison Section of the Relocation Division drew some support, but many thought that the provisions of the Resettlement Assistance Program were "too good to be true."

A minority made definite plans for relocation.

The month of March was marked by the visit of the National Director. The immediate response to his visit was favorable to the program. "If Mr. Myer says we must go, we must go." But even at that time, a large minority were unconvinced. Later in the month there was an increase in adverse reactions. There were signs of increased dependency upon Japan. And the conviction on the part of many that "the centers can't close" remained unbroken.

A quick poll of eleven Butte blocks indicated mixed reactions. Many still did not want to leave but the trend was towards relocation.

Resistance up to this point concentrated on several factors.

- (1) There are many dependent people; therefore the camps can't close; therefore many not dependent can remain.
- (2) "The Government can't let us down."
- (3) Violence, housing, and discrimination make return to California impossible; people can't go elsewhere. Therefore, the center will not close.
- (4) There are many to be repatriated or segregated. They will remain in camp. Therefore, etc.

During this period, also information about resettlement and the Resettlement Assistance Program was not generally disseminated throughout the community. This was partly because of the apathy of some block managers, but primarily because very few Issei were, as yet interested enough to assimilate the information.

During the month of April, actual relocation increased, but there was systematic, though unorganized, opposition. Canal was united in opposition led by community leaders. Butte was divided, with an appreciable number adverse. The techniques of resistance were to pass on the word, "Stick tight and they won't throw us out," dissuasion of people planning to relocate, and the dissemination of gossip. One example of the latter was that Gila would close but Poston would stay open; another, that Poston would close but Gila stay open. A poll of all families in seven Butte blocks showed 43% of the people adverse, 28.5% favorable, and 28.5% with unknown attitudes.

During these months, some of the staff were unconvinced that the program would work. Attitudes changed somewhat after some staff

relocation meetings, but there were signs that further indoctrination was needed.

The month of May was the last month the Community Analyst was at Gila. Slight changes in attitude were observed. Relocation again increased slightly and increasing numbers announced plans for leaving when school closed on June 8. But many were still adverse. On the basis of many interviews, some noted in previous reports, some not reported, the following conclusions were reached. These conclusions are based (1) upon existent attitudes and (2) upon the assumption that present WRA policies would not be radically changed. Any factor profoundly changing attitudes, or any major changes in WRA policies would make these conclusions invalid.

1. About 1,000 would relocate in the month following school closing, i. e., June 8 to July 8.

2. Another 2,000 to 2,500 would relocate from July 8 to some day early in September.

3. Possibly another 500 would relocate during the rest of September.

4. The center would still have between 4,000 and 5,000 people by October 1. These would consist of welfare cases, bachelors, people thoroughly institutionalized, and people so resistant to the program, or so tied up in a future in Japan that they would stay until the last possible moment. In brief, the residue would consist of the most difficult segment of the population; and, to carry out the program, these must be relocated in three months, three months of the year formerly not favorable to relocation.

Since these conclusions were formed, the compulsory closing of Canal by October has been announced. If this instruction can be carried out in such a way as to break the social solidarity of Canal, it will have a profound effect upon Butte. But it remains to be seen whether this will, in fact, happen. It is worth remembering that, even though many are planning to leave, the basic adverse factors exist, and are only partly overcome by favorable factors. And, further, many people conforming to the program still believe it to be an outrage, and one to which they conform only from necessity, not conviction.

SOME COMMENTS ON ADMINISTRATION

This report will not contain any comprehensive evaluation of administration. Some of these are implicit or explicit in certain sections. A statement of some of the more obvious conclusions may be of use.

(1) Administration may be improved as knowledge of the people administered is increased. This knowledge consists partly of a comprehension of cultural factors, and partly of insight into the situational factors. By the latter is meant those attitudes which have developed as a result of the experiences the group has undergone, in the case in hand, evacuation and all its attendant and consequent experiences.

(2) Administration can be good only to the extent that the cooperation of the people can be secured. If possible, they should concur in the aims of administration. Granted the aims they should be persuaded to concur in the means. If they do not concur in the ends, good administration can still try to persuade them as to the inevitability of those ends, and secure their support in the means adapted to achieve those ends.

(3) Some form of regulated popular expression is useful, probably essential. This was accomplished, haltingly at first, more effectively later, by the community councils and the block managers, in consultation with administrative officials. Such expression not only indicates what people want, but the degree to which they want it. Consultation is a means of adjusting these wants to other necessities. The mere expression of these wants may give satisfaction even if they can not all be satisfied.

(4) Knowledge of the people, expression of wants, and consultation are all contributory to an essential factor of efficient administration: effective communication. Communication should be two-way; the administration should understand the people, the people should be thoroughly informed as to the purposes of the administration.

(5) The existence of a regulated means of expression also leads to a regulation of conflict. No administration can be perfect in the sense that it gives complete satisfaction to everyone. The best any administration can do is to take into account all basic attitudes and necessities. Some administrative actions will excite widespread opposition. If there is a regulated means of popular expression, the conflict can be controlled and a solution reached without recourse to underground intrigue or to violence.

(6) Good administration thus strives to secure some form of balance. A state of equilibrium may be said to exist when nothing occurs to upset the balance. A pressure from people or from administrators may upset the equilibrium. This may result from an administrative action on the one hand, or demands which cannot be met on the other. The equilibrium is restored when the administrative act is either explained or modified, and thereby accepted, or when demands are considered and, after consultation, either met, partly met, or the reasons for the impossibility of meeting them fully explained. A crisis arises when the equilibrium cannot be restored. This situation occurred at registration and, for a briefer period, during the partial mess strike in August, 1943. Equilibrium was restored in each case, but only after difficulty and delay.

The situation created by the movement of some thousands of people into a center was unprecedented in the experience of both administration and people. Ignorance and prejudice existed on both sides. No one knew the necessary social devices for dealing with each situation, nor could these devices have been known in advance. Advice and suggestions were available but these had to be formulated into more precise policies and tested.

From the beginning, and to some extent throughout the whole course of its history, the government at Gila was government by bureaucracy. Without attempting to give any ultimate definition of bureaucracy, the following summary is offered. Government by bureaucracy is government by a group of people, (a) who are not appointed by nor responsible to the people they administer, (b) who govern according to regulations drawn up neither by themselves nor the people, and (c) whose tenure of office is secure so long as they abide by regulations and are not guilty of serious misconduct.

This form of government was partly necessitated by the nature of the situation. The fate of the people was to be decided, not by themselves, but, ultimately, by the Congress of the United States. The money for their support was provided not by themselves, but by congressional appropriation. Therefore, self-government in any complete sense was impossible. The best that good administration could do was to create mechanisms for giving a hearing to their desires, and take these desires into account to whatever degree was possible.

The conferring of limited self-government was the device adopted, and, as noted, it worked with some degree of satisfaction. The process of learning on the part of the Administration was one of the favorable factors. While some members of the staff kept their prejudices unchanged until the end; while others maintained the bureaucratic attitude that regulations, and only regulations mattered, regardless of people or circumstances; most responsible officials learned both the need to deal with people and how to do it. During the year 1944 an administrative balance was developed and maintained until upset by the advent of a new regulation imposed from without - the closing of the centers.

One other factor needs noting. The center was isolated. It was isolated physically, in that travel to and from it was difficult for most. It was even more isolated psychologically, in that all inhabitants, evacuee and staff alike, tended to think in terms of center needs and center interests. This sometimes warped perspective in dealing with important problems. It showed itself in many ways. Evacuees were generally unable to realize the need for any public relations measures. They were unable to understand the "outside." They knew, from reading California papers, that the country had elements of hostility to them but, immersed in their own personal problems they were unable to grasp the fact that what they did within the centers would affect their status with the whole population.

The Administration was affected somewhat differently. The staff members realized, to some extent, the importance of public relations. Their isolation showed itself as being "center-minded" as opposed to "WRA minded." There was a general hostility to the Washington office. "Washington is impractical," "Washington does not understand," "Washington sends out too many instructions." In brief, Washington lived in unreality, only the staff in the center understood the real necessities of the situation. This was partly isolation; it was also partly functional. It was a result of the immediate contact with somewhat exacting local tasks and an inability to see far enough beyond those tasks.

Presumably Washington is similarly isolated from the centers. Pos-

sibly the Washington staff is too far removed from the day-to-day necessities of center administration. Possibly they may even say, "Only we, who get information from all centers, and are in touch with public opinion, can see this thing in perspective."

In brief, possibly there was not a sufficiently effective attempt to put Washington in touch with the centers, and to put the center staff members in touch with Washington. Senior officials from Washington visited the centers. Senior center officials visited Washington. But the majority of the center appointed staff, of necessity, remained center-minded. This was true of the Community Analysts. Only one Community Analysis conference was held. Some Analysts did not visit Washington once after the short initial training period. Consequently the Analysts, who, by the nature of their job should keep their perspective, became as center-minded as anyone else.

The full perspective can only be seen when the total social inter-relationships are grasped. The center is simply one segment of the WRA organization. The WRA is only one of several government agencies. It is dependent, ultimately, upon Congress and, more remotely, upon public opinion.

The center has also a geographical location. It is in the state of Arizona, a state hostile to the evacuees. Its people came from California, a state with many elements hostile to the Japanese. It is in the United States, a country with mixed attitudes to the evacuees. It is hoped that whoever writes the final report upon the whole process of evacuation will have a mind sufficiently detached to give due weight to all of these factors.

IV. APPENDIX

POPULATION BY MONTH FROM JULY 23, 1942, to JULY 23, 1945

<u>DATE</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>
July 23, 1942	563
August 23, 1942	7,607
September 23, 1942	11,559
October 23, 1942	12,987
November 23, 1942	13,253
December 23, 1942	13,316
January 23, 1943	13,328
February 23, 1943	13,288
March 23, 1943	13,267
April 23, 1943	13,081
May 23, 1943	12,753
June 23, 1943	12,423
July 23, 1943	12,278
August 23, 1943	12,062
September 23, 1943	11,749
October 23, 1943	9,612
November 23, 1943	9,675
December 23, 1943	9,713
January 23, 1944	9,679
February 23, 1944	9,528
March 23, 1944	9,313
April 23, 1944	9,115
May 23, 1944	8,724
June 23, 1944	9,210
July 23, 1944	10,028
August 23, 1944	9,760
September 23, 1944	9,385
October 23, 1944	9,279
November 23, 1944	9,423
December 23, 1944	9,473
January 23, 1945	9,420
February 23, 1945	9,187
March 23, 1945	8,955
April 23, 1945	8,669
May 23, 1945	8,311
June 23, 1945	7,769
July 23, 1945	6,928

ADMISSIONS TO GILA RIVER RELOCATION CENTER

TOTAL ADMISSIONS ROSTER COUNT

ADMISSIONS

Direct evacuation	2,961
Voluntary evacuation	1
Assembly center	10,287
Seasonal assembly center	40
Transfer other centers	2,394
Births	549
Parolees	145
Institutions	75
Others	9
	<hr/>
Grand Total	16,461

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

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STRESSES AND STRAINS OF CENTER LIFE

By

J. Ralph McFarling, Community Analyst at Granada Relocation Center

(Editor's Note: This report was written by the Granada Community Analyst several months after leaving the center. It represents an attempt on his part to look back over the relocation center experience and to describe some of the chief points of strain in staff-evacuee relations. It is an unusually successful analysis of basic factors in the problem which WRA faced in securing the cooperation of evacuees in the agency's program. It is applicable not only to the Granada Relocation Center, but also to all the other relocation centers).

INTRODUCTION: ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY ANALYST

My work, whether by personal inclination or by the necessity of the situation, developed into a liaison function between the evacuee community (particularly through the medium of the Community Council and the Evacuee Information Office) and the administration. I found myself constantly in the role of interpreting WRA policies emanating from the Washington Office and the center administrative staff to the evacuees; and of interpreting evacuee attitudes and reactions to the administrative staff, principally by means of my weekly reports and through participation in various conferences. Misinterpretation on both sides was based on certain fixed attitudinal patterns and on the paradoxes of the situation in which the total community was involved. This liaison function meant talking for the administrative staff and its policies when meeting with the evacuees; talking for the evacuees when meeting with the administration; and at the same time attempting to identify and give conscious expression to the essential truth in each position.

Thus, I never became fully identified without reservation with either group and so missed that sense of personal and unqualified acceptance by either side. This, as I interpreted my function, was inevitable. I only mention it here to point out that I must have missed a great deal of importance to students which could only have been obtained by a more complete identification with and acceptance by the evacuee community.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CONDITIONED FIXED REACTION PATTERNS

When the writer arrived in Granada Center in January, 1944, there was a very noticeable and fixed division of the community, both socially and professionally, into evacuees and administrative personnel. This division had expressed itself in behavior patterns of mutual suspicion and distrust, especially on the part of the evacuees. There was, on the part of those appointed personnel charged with responsibility for relocation, a behavior pattern of annoyance and even dislike. There was annoyance and aggravation that, in spite of all the best laid plans of the resettlement program and all the opportunities developed for evacuees east of the Rockies, they for some obtuse reason did not respond. There was dislike, as you dislike that which thwarts your success and achievement of a personal goal. On the part of the evacuees, the behavior pattern was one of resistance to any change in the status quo and of distrust engendered by the watchful vigil necessary to prevent any change, whether through fiat or act of persuasion.

Passive resistance to change might well sum up their behavior pattern. It was focused on the WRA administrative staff as the aggressor who was always attempting to bring about that change.

How this came about can only be understood by preceding events. I am told by both evacuees and appointed personnel that the first few months of residence in the center (although filled with many difficult problems) was the most pleasant and cooperative period of center life as far as working relationship between evacuees and the appointed staff was concerned. The important thing is that people accepted the center as a place of residence. They also accepted their status of dependency (with, for many, an emotional content of satisfaction) for the duration of the war, adjusted their lives to it, and set about making the most of it. The appointed staff likewise accepted their duration-of-the-war status with its emotional content of job security for an indefinite time. As yet, relocation had not arisen as a threat to both groups, and the evacuees' normal emotions connected with reassuming individual responsibility for their families had not been aroused.

In the evacuee community only the tough-minded of the Nisei recognized that center life was not a solution and that the abnormal life developed was detrimental to the group individually and collectively. They began, voluntarily, to make plans to move on to a normal community.

Many accepted center life as a satisfactory means of escape from the economic struggle. Many (principally Issei) accepted it as a satisfactory means of escape from the decisions, overt acts, and expression of allegiance either to Japan or to the United States which they would have been compelled to make in a normal community. This, I am convinced, was a secondary reaction to evacuation. Left in

their home communities, it would not have developed except in rare cases. To them, however, the center once established became a small island of neutrality, "a twilight zone in which all objects are gray."

But no matter how satisfactory the situation was in various degrees, the evacuees increasingly resented the indignity and loss which they suffered through evacuation. They felt that because of their cooperative action they left the West Coast in a fanfare of seeming good-will from the West Coast residents. After leaving the Coast they began to hear rumors of an increase in anti-Japanese sentiment, of pillaging of stored goods, and of betrayal of trust by Caucasians. They then began to feel that they had been taken in and had been "suckers" for submitting so readily to evacuation. With fuller realization of what evacuation had cost them in capital goods, earning power, and legal and civil rights, their resentment increased. It was expressed not only against the government (with WRA as the nearest tangible symbol) but against their own Japanese American Citizens League which had been so active in influencing them to accept evacuation without resistance.

Registration.* Into this atmosphere of growing resentment, registration burst. It served as a focus for all the pent-up anger of the previous year. The compulsory necessity of making a decision brought the Issei forcibly out of their "twilight zone" to the hard realities of life in which they had to choose between allegiance to the country of their birth and the country of their residence which had compelled them to evacuate. The situation was complicated, of course, by the fact that they could not, by American law, apply, even if they wished, for citizenship in the country to which they were being asked to pledge allegiance. The added paradox of requiring Nisei (American citizens) to re-affirm allegiance to their own country further aggravated the situation and increased the resentment. They inferred that they, out of all the racial groups, had been condemned before the trial and were being considered guilty until they had proved themselves innocent. Emotionally they felt rejected; legally they felt unjustly accused.

All the pent-up resentment against the discrimination of the past focused on registration. While they recognized the paradox of their own situation, they failed to recognize the reasons for this move on the part of WRA which was trying to condition a favorable response from American public opinion. They did not recognize the counter unfavorable effect on public opinion of their own expressions of resentment and their vacillation in answering the questions. They were unable to see their situation in perspective in relation to the hopes and fears of the country engaged in a war the outcome of which was fraught with uncertainty. Likewise they failed to realize the effect of their actions in conditioning the attitudes toward them of the appointed staff responsible for their welfare.

That this unfortunate crisis resulted from a failure on the part of WRA to understand fully the emotional feelings of the residents and

*The registration program for all evacuees over 17 years of age was instituted and carried out by both the Authority and the Army for the purpose of getting basic data about the evacuees. The Authority intended to use the information for its leave-clearance program which was to determine whether individual evacuees were eligible from the standpoint of national security to relocate on indefinite leave. The Army was using the information in recruiting volunteers for the Japanese American combat teams - Editor's Note.

to secure their participation in its planning is now generally recognized. But at the time, the failure resulted in the evacuees (with their entire attention centered on themselves) not seeing their position in perspective. They began to question the motives of WRA and to suspect some secret plan of WRA not disclosed at the time of registration.

This evacuee attitude of being wary of WRA policies became an obsession, which resulted in a negative response to practically every innovation. Instead of a smooth meshing of the gears of center organization, the gears often worked against each other at every change of policy or change of emphasis in policy. It might almost be likened to a tug of war with WRA personnel and policies pulling in one direction and the evacuee community pulling in the other. It also had the appearance of a football game with WRA staff in a huddle calling signals and then lining up over the ball in an effort to push it across, to make an end run or pass, or even to punt when the evacuee line was working well and successfully to repel all attempts to advance the ball. This figure is more apt than may seem apparent at first thought. There are three similarities. First, the purpose of secret signals is to insure the surprise and confusion of the opposition. Although this practice was used in a lesser degree as time went on, the preparation of the evacuee community to receive and participate in a new policy always contained the element of urgency and haste which precluded intelligent discussion. Second, in order to advance the ball through a pass, one or more members of the team must filter down into the opposition territory to be in a position to receive the ball. Since any member of the appointed staff who succeeded in gaining the confidence of a segment of the evacuee community was in a position at least to receive such a pass, there was difficulty in getting complete confidence. Third, on a number of occasions it was necessary for the administration to punt out on the fourth down without making the yardage.

Segregation. Again, in segregation, the large picture of their relation to American public opinion as a whole was lost on the evacuees as was the effect of center attitudes on their life in the future. Or if it was not lost, it was geared to the uncertain outcome of the war. The majority thought only in terms of the present and refused to believe that WRA was concerned with their best welfare in the future.

Employment. After segregation had been completed, the Issei more or less settled down again to a vigil of waiting for the end of the war. Their principal concern was with center problems. Life was focused on the family, barrack, block, messhall, school, hospital, religious life, games of go and shogi and center employment. Some jobs were preferred to others. The messhall jobs are a case in point. They were preferred because the work was light, was in the block, and was supervised by evacuees. Block residents resisted being forced to accept work in the slaughter house, on the farm, and at the coal unloading station. Jobs in these places were less desirable, more difficult, and farther from the residence blocks.

The evacuees were greatly concerned when employment problems threatened the service at the hospital and the messhalls. But all efforts of the administration to place the burden of the employment problem on the evacuees and to get them to recruit workers for the less desirable jobs were countered with the statement, "The government put us here, and it is up to it to take care of us."

Among themselves, evacuees debated as to the fairness of the practice of some of their number who periodically took seasonal leave to earn money but left their families in the center for others to provide services for. They would then return in the winter to rest and refuse center employment. The same antagonism was shown toward bachelors who took seasonal leave in the summer and loafed in camp all winter, while other evacuees worked the year around at center wages to maintain normal services in the center for them.

It was suggested that no one be allowed to take seasonal leave who could not prove that he had been employed in the center for three months previously. It was also suggested that every one who went on seasonal leave pay a certain amount into a center-wide fund to be paid to the workers who remained in the center. Even if these suggestions had been carried out, the problem of maintaining the center in the summer when farming operations required more workers (though fewer were available) would not have been alleviated.

The evacuees who remained in the center the year around resented the administration's tendency to push the importance of farming which was interpreted as providing food for "seasonal leavers" in the winter. While the evacuees stressed the importance of maintaining routine center services in the face of the depleted manpower, they felt that more should not be expected of them.

In the case of the slaughter house workers the Council early set a precedent by agreeing to supplement the \$16 rate of pay with an additional \$3 per month from Council funds. This placed the slaughter house workers on an economic par with the doctors and others considered socially above them. In part it made up for the performance of an onerous and despised task allotted in Japan to the "Eta" group. This fund was paid out of a contribution of \$500 per year made to the Council by the Co-op for the welfare of center residents.

This practice set a precedent for a similar supplementing of wages of doctors and nurses in the fall of 1944 when relocation depleted the hospital staff. The Ishi Koen Kai was formed at this time to raise funds from center residents at the rate of five cents per person per month to increase the salary of doctors to \$50 and other hospital workers in proportion. It was also designed to offset the custom of doctors accepting money on the side as gifts from patients who could afford to pay.

When a shortage developed in manpower for an essential service supplying food or other needs of the evacuees, the administration often laid the problem in the lap of the Council and the Block Managers

with the statement, "This is your problem. Either find workers to haul coal and food, slaughter cattle, and nurse the sick, or go without this service. We have supplied the materials. It is up to you to provide the workers." After the ball had been tossed back and forth a few times, the evacuees usually accepted the fact and the job grudgingly. But, in every instance, resentment deepened toward the paradoxes of their lot and was usually focused on the administration of the center and WRA in general.

Problems Connected With Authority From The Top. The appointed staff which followed authority from the top down came to adopt the practice of following rules rigidly for their own personal security. As long as they followed the letter of the rule, they were, in a sense, relieved of responsibility for the result if it did not prove satisfactory. This may have been due to fear developed in the personnel by the rare but unpleasant incidents in other centers. Also, the "holier than thou" attitude of certain Washington officials did not foster creative thinking in the center. Whenever the center staff failed after using a method different from the one outlined, these officials would say, "If you had followed our advice, you wouldn't have got into trouble."

The maintenance of a peaceful center was accepted as the test of good administration. And good administration came to be accepted as the result of following the letter of the regulation.

WRA is an agency performing a task for which there is no precedent. It is self-evident, then, that, in such an unprecedented task, where so much responsibility for administrative direction exists at the top of the hierarchy, there must be close liaison between the Washington staff and the center. The adequacy of this liaison work may be judged not only by the phrasing of the policy but by the manner in which the policy was put into effect and the amount of time and effort given to preparing the evacuees for it.

Selective Service. As late as the early part of 1944, policies such as the "drafting of the Nisei" (the reinstatement of Selective Service for the Nisei) were put into effect with such speed as to condition a negative reaction. It may be argued that to have proceeded slowly might have caused reactions in the evacuee community which would have prejudiced the action of the War Department in accepting Nisei for the armed services. It may also be argued that once the War Department decides on a policy, it announces it without preparation or recourse. But from the point of view of the effect on the evacuee community, the reinstatement of Selective Service for the Nisei was a bombshell generating sudden reactions which might have been avoided if the evacuee community had been carried along in the thinking.

Relocation. While evacuees maintained that their reason for resisting WRA was the inefficient manner and lack of appreciative understanding with which its policies were put into effect, this can be only partially true. For no matter how carefully a policy or a program was introduced, it inevitably met with resistance if it effected the status quo of center life. It was resisted if it meant a change in the evacuees' essential position of passive neutrality and their

accepted and desired determination to remain in the center for the duration of the war. Granted that with proper preparation of the people through their chosen representatives for any inter-center changes, center life would have proceeded with less friction. But because relocation, the most vital part of the WRA program, went counter to the wishes of the majority of the population, there was friction and resistance. Resistance thus became an obsession which extended beyond the program of relocation to center issues as well.

In the summer of 1944, Dr. E. Adamson Hoebel (who was then Community Analyst) developed a well laid program to get people to talk about relocation. This program had been introduced by the evacuees themselves to prepare people in advance for the relocation program. Dr. Hoebel succeeded admirably in getting them to talk through his development of the evacuee-initiated program. However, their principal concern was to tell why it was impossible to accept relocation as a possibility. Accepting it in principle, they revealed, meant a change in thinking which would undermine their determination to keep the status quo.

Up to the time that I left the center in July, 1945, only one group (the Community Council under the leadership of Dr. Ichihashi and with the support of the Evacuee Information Bureau) had the temerity openly to advocate relocation as an accepted policy. And this group met with so much criticism that it had to back-track and adopt a more passive attitude of helping to iron out some of the minor kinks in relocation. People, even at that late date, were in no mood to be stampeded into relocation. Acceptance could only come about through gradual recession from the evacuee concept of center residence for the duration, or from the actual end of the war itself.

One might sensibly reason that the evacuees would have come to accept relocation much sooner if every issue had been approached in open discussion between the evacuees and the appointed staff, with both on the same footing. Into this open discussion could have come all the center policies, programs, and WRA thinking about relocation and the necessity for it. The appointed staff could have presented the position of WRA, admitted the need for change when need was seen, and overcome rumors with facts. However, the doubts, misgivings, and uncertainties in the minds of the evacuees would have complicated such an open discussion and the attaining of the goal of relocation acceptance.

These emotional problems stemmed from the unique position of the evacuees, outside public opinion, and from the uncertainties of events in a world at war, a war the outcome of which none could foresee or control. There is also grave doubt that any amount of free discussion could have changed the attitudes of a group of people from an accepted neutrality to a willing choice (come what may) which would forever cast their lot with the side that had rejected them and discriminated against them.

In a number of private conversations, responsible Nisei and Issei pointed out that a group of fanatic Issei "on the hill" (the local name for the evacuee residence area of Granada Center) who believed that Japan was going to win the war were the main obstacle to the

relocation of others. No one mentioned names, or wanted his name mentioned, but each was convinced that this group served as a powerful deterrent to relocation.

Given the situation in which the resentment of the evacuees was expressed in resistance to most WRA policies, one could reason that the solution lay in the hands of the personnel and their treatment of the problem. If they had accepted this resentment as natural, kept their heads in every interview with the evacuees, given them the opportunity to express that resentment without counter-charge or recrimination, and maintained a positive and healthy attitude toward the realities of the relocation program, the evacuees would have gradually adjusted their thinking to a healthier point of view. But that would have required a staff of trained psychiatrists (who would probably have bungled the routine, business end of the work). We did not have such a staff. We had one which was subject to the same mixture of feelings of anger, fear, guilt, insecurity, and good-will as the evacuees themselves. Sometimes it is amazing that the appointed personnel kept their heads as well as they often did among the uncertainties of the situation and the pressure from the top to get on with the job of relocation.

CENTER POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS

Assembly Center Origins.

Granada Center was made up largely of evacuees from Merced and Santa Anita Assembly Centers. There was, of course, a movement between the centers to reunite family groups. Then several hundred were transferred to Granada from Tule Lake at the time of segregation, and five hundred came from Jerome at the time that center closed.

The people from the Merced Assembly Center were the first to arrive and therefore had the first choice of housing. Whether by choice or by administration planning, this group settled in the blocks on the west and north side of the center, with the exception of Block 6E where construction was not complete. These blocks were very accessible to the administration area and the Co-op. However, the southwest corner was farthest from the hospital and the grade school, which indicates that the administration defined certain areas into which they could move. Small locality groups tended to settle in one block, or two or three adjacent blocks, where they continued their close social relationships.

When the Santa Anita group arrived, they filled in the vacancies left in the blocks by the Merced group and settled the blocks south-east of the high school and on the extreme east side of the center.

The Santa Anita group was more homogeneous than the Mercedians. All came from a much larger Japanese population which had been located in a more or less segregated area of Los Angeles. However, there were no indications of any particular street or community group being carried over to the blocks in which the Santa Anitans settled. By contrast, this settling together was very noticeable among the people from Merced Assembly Center. Whole blocks were settled by former residents of Marin County, Sonoma County, Merced County, and Sacramento. At least two-thirds of 9H block was made up of former

residents of Livingston, California, with the balance from nearby Cressey and other neighboring towns.

The Merced Assembly Center groups were characterized by their rural origin. The people were made up of vegetable farmers, fruit and nut growers, farm managers, and farm laborers. The Buddhist religion predominated among them, except in 9H Block which was primarily Christian.

The Santa Anita Assembly Center group was characterized by the urban origin of its people who were gardeners, produce dealers, skilled laborers, and small business men. The Christian religion predominated among them.

Age, Sex, and Citizenship Distribution. The age and sex distribution of the community was never normal, even at the beginning of the center, due to the influence of the manner of Japanese immigration to America. Immigration began with adult, able-bodied, single men, and was followed by the advent of younger, picture-brides several years later. This made for an average spread of fifteen years between the ages of husband and wife. Thus the typical family was composed of young children of middle-aged mothers and much older fathers. In a normal community this would have resulted in a high dependency rate of families within a few years when the fathers became unemployable.

Evacuation thrust dependency upon them. A tremendous block to resettlement was the insecurity felt by the many older fathers in starting over again after suffering so much loss and in re-establishing their families at a time when they were least physically able to do so.

This was apparent by August, 1944, when Dr. Hoebel wrote, "For resettlement and future management of this community, the important fact is that there are relatively few family heads (males) in the vigorous age of initiative and responsibility left. Of the 2909 males in the population only 665 are between 20-54 years old. Of these only 373 are citizens. On the other hand, we have 903 males who are over 55 years of age. They constitute 31% of the total male population. At the other extreme of the age scale, we have 2575 dependent boys and girls 19 years old and under...Conclusion: Physically the residual population consists mainly of over-aged Issei, and dependent under-aged Nisei."*

Also there were nearly 500 single, elderly males who prior to evacuation were nominally attached to some family group but were mostly migratory workers.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

The Block Managers Assembly being the first evacuee organization formed in the center on a block by block basis more or less set the pattern for the later Community Council. The jockeying for positions of leadership which went on in the selection of the Block Managers (the usual practice was for the block to select three, and the administration to choose one of these three) resulted in the

* Washington file number 94 of Granada Community Analysis Reports.

Nisei obtaining the majority of these jobs. This was due to their facility in speaking English and their past experience as "go-betweens" in transacting business for the older Issei population, who nevertheless retained the final voice in family and economic matters.

When the regulation was later made requiring the establishment of a Community Council the provision was also made that no alien could hold this office. The provision caused a good deal of resentment in the Issei population, and there developed a struggle for leadership between the Issei and the Nisei. To offset this tendency, the Nisei among the Block Managers said, "Since the Issei cannot become Councilmen, it does not seem fair that we Nisei should dominate both groups. So, we will resign as Block Managers and turn this function over to the Issei." This was done. As a result the Block Managers Assembly came to be composed of Issei; and the Council, of Nisei. This may have been satisfactory as a compromise solution but it continued to make for friction between the two groups in defining their functions. If the Block Managers were subordinated to the Council, the Nisei were getting a break. If the Council was subordinated to the Block Managers, the Issei were getting a break. This rivalry was only partially alleviated by the later removal of the provision which had required all Councilmen to be Nisei.

In the meantime, although the Block Managers Assembly was designed to be an administrative group, and the Council, a policy making group, both groups tended to discuss and pass judgment on policy matters. This was even more confusing to the evacuee community than to the administration. One evacuee, in expressing this overlapping, said, "One person goes to the Block Managers about a situation and says 'fix-em-up;' another goes to the Council about the same situation and says 'fix-em-up.' So they both try to 'fix-em-up' and only make it worse."

In general, the Council failed to gain the support of either the evacuee community or the administrative staff. When they adequately represented the will of the people regarding an administrative policy; it was usually a sharp negative response or drastic modification. This displeased administrative personnel and led to the Council being regarded with annoyance. As a result, it was left pretty much alone by the administration, except, as Councilmen expressed it, "When they had some unpleasant job they wanted done." This job on rare occasions was presented to the Council by a sudden attendance at its meeting, for a half-hour or more, of a dozen or more of the appointed staff. They would present the problem and then abruptly exit leaving the job in the lap of the Council. Occasionally the opportunity was given for discussion, but usually the problem was presented and then left for the Council to discuss among themselves.

The Block Managers, being chosen by the administration from a list of three selected by the people and paid by the administration, felt a greater responsibility toward the administration. The Block Managers and the administration had one predominant desire in common. That was "to maintain a peaceful community." More and more as time went on, the administrative staff leaned on the Block Managers not only regarding administrative functions but also for advice on policy-making functions.

The Block Managers were the ones who could get things done in the blocks for the residents' comfort in return for insuring that the residents remained fairly tractable to administrative policies. The system has been likened among evacuees to the English Colonial system with the Block Managers assuming the position of the Maharajahs of India who ruled over small segments of the country, saw to it that the people remained tractable, and at the same time wheedled concessions out of the government in return for their services. The Council was also likened to the Indian Congress which was chosen by and represented (in theory) the native population, but which had little power to bring about important and permanent changes in the lot of the native population.

As a result, constant rivalry existed between the two groups. The most heated discussions in each group developed about Council-Block Manager relationships.

The question of division of function, however, remained more or less dormant until July, 1944, when the newly elected Council Chairman brought it out into the open. As one evacuee said, "The new Council Chairman seems to enjoy being the center of a controversy and usually regards himself as the hero of the piece." Copies of the administrative regulations relating to the functions of the Block Managers and of the Council were said to have been inadvertently left on the Chairman's table after the meeting of the Council on a Thursday. They were there the next Monday when the Block Managers met. The latter felt that the copies had been left on purpose and became very angry. They charged the Council with attempting to revive old issues and to undermine the status of the Block Managers. The Council charged that the Block Managers were residents just like others, and as such they did not represent the people as they often assumed to do. The ball was tossed back and forth many times with various individuals trying to bring about a reconciliation through mediation between the two groups. The Chairman of the Council had a majority of the Council behind him, but fully one-third were opposed to his methods. Finally a combined meeting was held in which the proverbial hatchet was given its proverbial burial in the interest of all working for the welfare of the people.

However, the issue broke out anew a month later when the Council Chairman, during a combined meeting, ruled that the Block Managers could not vote on the issue under question since they were not representatives of the people. The Block Managers walked out in a body. From then on, there was no reconciliation until the end of the Council term when the new Council was elected and the former Chairman relocated.

During this time, center residents (or those who were concerned at all) were either on one side or the other. Those of the appointed staff who knew anything about the rift generally favored the Block Managers and criticized the Council. Even after a new Council was formed, there was never an actual reconciliation but only a withdrawal from discussing the rivalry. Later the Council refused to invite the Block Managers as such into plans for the Inter-Center Conference or for the selection of delegates to it.

When the new Council began to be more interested in relocation and to reorganize the Evacuee Information Bureau, it was the Block Managers who were most vocal in criticizing the mass meeting at which Dr. Ichihashi spoke under the auspices of the Council. This meeting proved, however, to be one of the most important incidents in shaping the attitudes of the people to a more favorable acceptance of relocation. It might be concluded that while the Block Managers were concerned with maintaining a peaceful center, they did not consider relocation to be a part of that task. Several evacuees stated in private that the Block Managers, especially about seven of the leading members, opposed relocation. For that matter, the Council probably never had even a majority committed to resettlement, but they did have a few influential leaders who were and who succeeded in getting some action from the group.

A partial solution to the problem of defining the function of each of the two groups was attempted by certain Councilmen. It happened that both the Council and the Block Managers were under the supervision of the Assistant Director who was in charge of Community Management. The Councilmen in question proposed that the Council be taken out of this Division and made responsible to the Assistant Director who was in charge of Administration. The reason for this choice was purely personal. These Councilmen felt that they had a better relationship with the latter than they did with the former. On a functional basis, it was recognized that the Block Managers, being concerned with center maintenance, should have originally been set up under the Division of Administrative Management, while the Council, being concerned with over-all policy, should have been under the Division of Community Management. However, so much had happened and so many fixed patterns had been forced of a personal nature that it did not seem practical to make the drastic change at so late a date.

One thing more. The development of community government in Granada and the relocation of the thinking and vigorous Nisei resulted in the election of less and less capable men and women to the Council. A block committee would be formed to secure nominees. The problem was to get the best man in the block to accept the nomination. The best man would be approached by the committee. He would often refuse. Then the next best man would refuse and the next, until the committee finally nominated anyone who would accept the job.

In this connection it is worth noting that the Issei who were leaders in their communities before evacuation and to whom one would expect people to turn for center leadership practically abdicated all leadership. Many of them were parolees who had been picked up on suspicion because they were in positions of prominence. Some were prominent people who had assumed leadership in the Assembly Centers and for some reason had found themselves on a spot. Others just wanted to keep out of the limelight to avoid any suspicion. They often accepted responsible jobs in the hospital, the school, and the Co-op, or menial block jobs, but they steadfastly retreated from positions of leadership in community government. Some actually felt that they would be degrading their own status by associating with the calibre of men who made up the Council and the Block Managers. Although wanting no active part in shaping center policies, they continued to influence public opinion in their blocks through their own personal opinions.

The Co-op leadership, composed entirely of evacuees, set itself more or less apart from community government and the administration. The leadership consisted of a group of business men for business purposes. However, it threw its weight first toward the Block Managers and then toward the Council in what seemed to be an effort to maintain a balance of power between the two groups. It often seemed inclined to assume the function of mediator in jurisdictional disputes. It was as concerned in insuring the continuance of the Council when it seemed that a Council quorum might not be elected in January, 1945, as in bolstering the prestige of the Block Managers when, in the spring of 1945, the Council began to get the upper hand by promoting relocation.

Everything seemed to add up to maintaining the status quo in the center and resisting any drastic change.