

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
November 6, 1944

Project Analysis Series No. 19

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT IN THE RELOCATION CENTERS

Part I. One Year of Community Government  
at the Gila River Relocation Center

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Summary
- II. Introduction
- III. The Constitution
- IV. The First Term
  - Initial Meetings of the Councils
    - Election of officers at Butte
    - Election of officers at Canal
  - Achievements of the Councils
    - Communication
    - Legislation
    - Work of the Executive Boards
    - Committees and Commissions
  - Evaluation of the Achievements
- V. The Second Term
  - The Reduction in the Number of Block Janitors
    - History of the reduction
    - Evacuee opposition
    - Effects on the Council
  - The Atrocities Resolution
  - Other Notable Activities
    - Appointment of Judicial Commission
    - Accusation against a staff member
    - Preparation for Relocation Conference
  - A Period of Crisis
    - Influence of relocation
    - Influence of Block Managers
    - Meetings for reorganization
      - Summary of opinions expressed
      - Constructive proposals
      - Action on the proposals
  - The Remainder of the Term
    - Juvenile delinquency

(Over)

Table of Contents (Cont.)

Recreation Commission  
Welcome to Jerome people  
Referendum on beer  
Rise in prestige of Butte Council  
Dilcmma of Canal Council

VI. The Present Councils

Canal

Butte

Elections

Prestige of Council compared with that of Block Managers

Present and possible future status of the Council

Influence of Relocation on Both Councils

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT IN THE RELOCATION CENTERS  
Part I. One Year of Community Government  
at the Gila River Relocation Center

SUMMARY

After more than two years of experience, it is possible to make some evaluation of community government in the relocation centers. The program developed from a tentative plan announced in June, 1942. A general policy was formulated in October, 1942. The councils elected as a result of this policy have differed from project to project. Both appointed staff and evacuee residents have responded in different ways. There is at present, moreover, much difference of opinion as to the value of community government.

An adequate evaluation of the program can be made only in the light of the various center experiences. This report on Gila River, which was prepared by the Community Analyst at that Center and edited in Washington, is the first in a series of case studies. Together with similar reports from other relocation centers, it will provide a basis for weighing the contribution of community government to the total War Relocation Authority program.

The Gila River Relocation Center consists of two communities, Butte and Canal, four miles apart.

After almost a year of community government under a temporary plan, permanent Councils were set up in both communities in July, 1943. Elections were held and the Councils inaugurated without enthusiasm on the part of either evacuees or appointed staff. It was felt that recognized leaders among the evacuees had not allowed themselves to be put in office. The new Councilmen were uncertain as to what anyone expected of them. Some regarded the Councils as places to air grievances; others thought that through the Councils direct action for the improvement of community life might be taken. There was little understanding of the Councils as means for bringing community sentiment to bear on the solution of community problems.

Almost immediately minor conflict developed within the Butte Council. The Nisei leadership of the Council did not have the confidence of conservative residents and other Council members. A working organization was however soon established. It consisted of an Executive Board to coordinate the Councils and a three divisional organization of committees. The Canal Council, on the other hand, organized and proceeded to work smoothly without conflict comparable to that in the Butte Council.

The achievements of the Councils during their first term were primarily in the field of community organization and the establishment of channels of communication in the community. The creation of Executive Boards which integrated the two Councils with each other and with the project

administration resulted at least in a framework of community organization through which administration and evacuees might coordinate efforts. Further, the Councils organized committees on Health, Relocation, Mess, etc., thus formally relating community interests to aspects of administration.

Largely as a result of this organization, communication between evacuees and administration and among evacuees was noticeably improved during the first term of the Councils. This was especially apparent in connection with the problem of medical services which was aired thoroughly in the Councils and through them relayed back to the residents. The Councils also played a part in the control of rumor at the time of the shooting of an insane youth by a military guard. Except for the voting of an order to keep all mess halls open despite declining population, no legislation of any importance was carried out.

At the end of the first term, the Councils still had not the full support of Councilmen. The administration in general remained unconvinced that the Councils mattered, and there was general public indifference and even hostility. It was clear that procedures were slow and cumbersome and that the Councils as agents of community welfare suffered by comparison with the Block Managers.

The second term of the Councils, beginning in January, 1944, saw little change in personnel. Although the Councils undertook to do more during the term, they also suffered some clear-cut failures. They undertook legislation, passing a code of offenses and a traffic code, and formulating a juvenile code. A judicial commission was put into operation. These practical achievements probably weighed less with the community than a series of failures.

The Councils in common with Councils at other centers took great interest in making plans for a general evacuee conference on the future of the Japanese in America. When nothing came of these efforts, there was general doubt as to the utility of the Councils. The Councils took a stand against reduction of the block janitor force ordered by the administration. Their recommendations were not acted on, and as a result the Council lost prestige with the community and at the same time accumulated antagonism to the administration among its own membership. This was followed by the passing of a resolution denouncing the Japanese atrocities on Bataan, which created a violent reaction in the community against the Council. An investigation of internal security also resulted in unfavorable community reaction.

These setbacks indicated more clearly the limitations within which the Council had to work, both those resulting from the administrative framework and those stemming from community sentiment. They contributed in April to a crisis in the Councils' role in the community. There had been considerable replacement of Councilmen as a result of relocation, with Issei assuming the vacated Council positions. There was a feeling on the part of the Block Managers and of a large part of the community that the

Block Managers were the real government.

A reconsideration of the Councils' role resulted in a proposal that the Council-Block Manager system be consolidated through a block coordinator organization. Discussion of the proposal crystallized thinking about the functions of Councils and Block Managers and made clear some of the weaknesses of the Councils. When the proposal to consolidate was presented to the people, however, the result was a decision to retain the Councils. It was clear that the residents after a year's experience regarded unpaid representatives as a necessary part of community government.

The Councils then acted to streamline their procedure, giving the Executive Board more power, enforcing attendance at Council meetings, and clarifying in written statements the functions of Block Managers and Councils. Thus was ended a year of representative government at Gila River Relocation Center.

## INTRODUCTION

In June, 1944, the third elections for the Community Councils took place, and early in July the members of the third permanent Community Councils were sworn in. These events marked the beginning of the second year of community government at Gila River under a permanent constitution. The aim of this report is to assess community government during its first year. In particular, an attempt is made to show the Councils as functioning bodies, indicating their uses and achievements as well as their shortcomings and failures. In addition, and necessarily, it will show their relationship with the administration, with the residents and with a rival body, the Block Managers.

The materials for the report are the minutes of the Community Councils, the minutes of the Block Managers, informal accounts of meetings of both bodies written by members of the Community Analysis staff, many interviews with members of the Council and Block Managers and interviews with resident evacuees, during the whole period under review.

Much more is said about Butte than about Canal. That is because no evacuee assistant was ever obtainable in Canal for the Community Analysis staff, and because contacts with Canal people have always been slighter. This is regrettable.

Certain individuals must be mentioned. Even if they are cited by title, they are easily identifiable. The Project Director, the Assistant Project Director, Community Management Division, and various evacuee officials of the Council had definite effects upon the development of the Councils and their influence must be taken into account. In this connection the Community Analyst has endeavored to exert restraint and, while he must observe the effects of the actions of various individuals, he has refrained from imputation of motive or criticism. He would have preferred to deal with the topic without regard to personalities.

### THE CONSTITUTION

On July 6, 1943, the Constitution, as drawn up by the Constitution Committee acting under the authority of the temporary Community Councils, was received as approved from the Washington office of the RA. Some minor amendments, chiefly concerned with license fees and eligibility for office, had been made, but it was substantially as submitted. On July 9, a joint meeting of the Advisory Boards, the Temporary Community Councils, and the Constitution Committee, was called by the Assistant Project Director\* at Butte to discuss further action.

At the meeting it was decided that the Constitution be translated into Japanese and submitted to the people for acceptance or rejection by written vote. Discussion indicated that many present already foresaw difficulties. The case of Minidoka was cited, where the Constitution had been turned down. This was a possibility which had to be faced, and the need for education of the Issei was stressed. In informal discussion, one member remarked, "It is too late." A summary opinion given at the time is that there was a genuine, but not enthusiastic interest in having the Constitution adopted.

The principal foreseen difficulties were antagonism to the Constitution and indifference to it. These were caused by attitudes arising from the experiences of the temporary Community Councils. Rightly or wrongly, it was believed by a large number that these bodies had been inept and futile, and that new Community Councils, even if labelled "permanent", would be equally useless. It was also believed that the Administration would never permit them any real power; this belief has persisted among some to the present time.

The remark "it is too late" indicates another handicap. It was believed that a very long time had been consumed in drafting the Constitution, that Washington had taken a very long time to approve and return it, and that consequently potential interest in it had diminished considerably.

Thus, unenthusiastically, the Constitution was launched. Translation was completed and approved by August; it was submitted to the people and adopted in Canal on August 30, in Butte on September 6. The voting was: Canal, 596 for, 96 against; Butte, 1383 for, 96 neutral, 108 against.

The first elections were held in Canal on September 14, 1943, and in Butte on September 28. During the process of the elections, two facts were of importance. The first was that the process of segregation was well under way. That two thousand people were going to Tule Lake in the

---

\* Unless otherwise indicated in this report the term Assistant Project Director means the Chief of the Community Management Division, since he is responsible to the Project Director for the Community Councils.

near future was of paramount interest. To complicate matters, the segregants were permitted to vote. Even those not segregated favored the segregants' vote. It was not primarily a matter of right but conceived as a gesture of good will; good will on the part of those going, and good will on the part of those remaining. Consequently, many hundreds of voters who were hostile to or indifferent to the developments of community government participated in the election of the candidates.

The second fact was that in many blocks it was difficult to get able men to run. This was partly the result of the confusion of segregation, but partly because of disbelief in the efficacy of the Council, already mentioned. The consequence was that, while a number of able and loyal men were elected, a number of blocks were represented by men of indifferent ability or even by men ready to oppose any constructive measures.

Such as they were, good and indifferent, the Councils were elected in September. Canal Council had its first formal meeting on September 21 and its first business meeting on September 23. Butte Council had its first formal meeting on September 23 and its first business meeting on October 4.

## THE FIRST TERM

### Initial Meetings of the Councils

The Councils at their initial meetings were not certain of what was expected of them by their colleagues, their constituents, or the Administration. To some, a Council was a place to voice complaints, or to redress grievances. To others, it was a means of protest. To still others, it was a means of getting certain specific acts performed. Few understood it as a means of achieving systematic expression of the people's will within limitations laid down, so that harmonious administration resulted; and of those few who did so understand it, only a tiny minority had any idea of how to achieve this end.

Election of officers at Butte. In Butte, the conflict situation came more to the surface. At the second meeting, on October 11, the permanent officers were elected. The Chairman was well-known in the community, having previously been Central Block Manager. He was an older Nisei, of little formal education but much native intelligence and energy. He had the drive to get things done. He lacked tact, which alienated many Councilmen and the more conservative Japanese thought him an "inu" (dog: informer) for the way he collaborated with the Administration. It is due to him that many things were done during the first few months of the Butte Council, but it is also due to him that many of the more conservative people were confirmed in their distrust of and disregard for the Council.

The Secretary was a younger Nisei, highly educated, extremely intelligent and energetic. He understood the functioning of democratic bodies better than most. His chief handicap was his extreme Americanism which made it difficult for him to understand the more conservative Japanese point of view.

The Vice-chairman was an Issei, and one of the most independent and respected people in the camp. While he always remained influential, he did not exert his influence to the degree he might have done because he was more intensely concerned with another public task, and he was then only half convinced that the Council, as constituted, would function. The Treasurer was an officer of Community Cooperative Enterprises, a well-educated and intelligent Kibei.

The leadership was vigorously assumed within the Council by the Chairman. He carried the other officers with him, but in so doing, he alienated a number of Councilmen who thought him at once too assertive and at the same time too dominated by the Administration. Thus, when the time came to elect the Executive Board, an effective opposition developed. The Assistant Project Director had proposed a plan whereby the Chairman and the Secretary of the Council be ex-officio members, the other three members being chosen, one from the Council, two from the community at large, outside the Council. The motion was put and lost, and a motion was made and carried that the Executive Board be composed of five members of the Council.

The practical effect of this was not great. It merely meant that able people not elected to the Council were not available for that kind of public service. The psychological effect, on the other hand, was marked. It established a pattern of opposition to the Council officers which was utilized on other occasions, and it was hailed primarily as a defeat of the elected officials.

Other organizational plans were passed. In particular, the system of committees, organized into three divisions was passed with little comment other than requests for explanations and the basis of much constructive work was laid. The three elected members of the Executive Board became the three chairmen of the administrative divisions, and went ahead to appoint the respective chairmen of their committees and commissions.

Election of officers at Canal. In Canal, events proceeded more smoothly to all appearances at that time. A Wisei was elected Chairman who is young, has a pleasant personality and gets on well with people. He is not aggressive. His handicaps are that he does not appreciate the complexities of the problems he faces, and is not old enough to have the complete respect of the older Issei when any significant issue arises. Thus, he maintained an appearance of order in the Council until events in May and June, 1944, disclosed the real rulers of that community and overturned the existing state of affairs.

A young Issei was elected Secretary who is also quiet and unaggressive. On the minutes of the Canal Community Council he is the only one noted as elected to the Executive Board, but Community analysis notes show that an elder Issei, highly respected and somewhat scholarly, was also appointed. The three worked together well for a period.

With these organizations the Councils proceeded to their work. In an estimate made at the end of December, 1943, when new elections were held, their positive achievements seem small. Much more was accomplished than appeared on the surface.

#### Achievements of the Councils

Communication. The Councils became another, and useful organ of communication. The Executive Boards and the various committees began to get some notion of administrative problems, and some of this was communicated to the other Council members. For example, on October 11, the Council backed a petition to retain a popular medical officer. This proved not to be possible, but it was the occasion of a full explanation of the whole medical problem, and the statement by the Principal Medical Officer to the Executive Boards that RA would accept responsibility for adequate medical services. Though this did not dispel the fears of the residents (nothing has completely dispelled their fears on that score) it probably kept the fears within bounds.

On December 1, a young man was shot leaving the gates of the camp. The

Council proved a useful body through which to disseminate information. The Project Director gave a full and frank statement of all that had occurred. This in turn gave the Councilmen an opportunity to ask questions and to make certain recommendations. While the amount of false rumor was remarkably small, the existence of a responsible body to which explanations could be made had its share in still further minimizing fears and resentments.

Other communications of significance were made. They concerned housing, welfare, the functions of the Community Activities Section, relocation, health and mess. In general the effect was good. Communications from the Administration had been difficult because of suspicions and fears. The existence of Community Councils did not make communication perfect, but it improved the situation.

Legislation. The amount of legislation was small. It was made mandatory to report cases of incipient insanity, as a result of the shooting incident. Drives for funds were restricted to the War Fund and the Red Cross (though this was later altered, and a drive for gifts to the medical staff was permitted). Much legislation was discussed. A code of offenses was drawn up but not passed. Judicial Commissions were authorized, but only appointed toward the end of the term. The regulation of private enterprise was much discussed, but it was finally decided to wait until Washington policy was announced. The playing of baseball in the blocks was forbidden at the suggestion of the Block Managers. But the committee work was not sufficiently developed to be the basis of much legislation. Probably the act giving most satisfaction to the public was the decision to keep open all existing mess halls (with one exception) and to staff them in proportion to block population. Consolidation of blocks was not popular.

Work of the Executive Boards. The Executive Boards were constantly active. Early in the term the Butte Chairman was able to assist in the settlement of a labor dispute which might have caused trouble. They also acted as liaison bodies between the two Councils, meeting frequently with each other. Their meetings were finally regularized. They assembled once a week in the Assistant Project Director's office, coordinating the actions of the two Councils and discussing matters which were afterwards brought to the attention of the Councils. Without their preparatory work and coordinating activities the Councils would have been much less effective.

Committees and Commissions. A number of committees and commissions were established. Some of these had little to do, others did useful work. The Relocation Commission, which had previously existed, was coordinated with the Councils and continued its contributions to the relocation program. The Recreation Commission kept in touch with the Community Activities Section, was instrumental in creating a recreation center in Block 42, and laying the basis of its future development. The Committee on Enterprises collected much material, but failed to induce action until Washington's policy was announced. The Health Committee organized a successful "Clean-up Day." The Mess Committee was most successful. Up until October, Mess Operations had been a constant source of trouble. In August, a partial

strike followed the reduction of mess hall staffs. From June through October, complaints of food were many and bitter. And much criticism was levelled against the personal attitudes of the personnel of Mess Operations. The Committee got together with the Chief of Mess Operations and his staff, and matters were arranged so satisfactorily that the mess halls, always a potential source of disturbance because of their importance to the people, have given no major trouble to this date. The credit for this should be divided between the committee and the staff of Mess Operations.

#### Evaluation of the Achievements

Considering the initial handicaps, the Councils had moved far. But at the end of the term, that was not very apparent. The Councils were still divided within themselves, many members being convinced that what they did was futile. One cause of dissatisfaction was the slowness with which anything was accomplished. A matter was referred to a committee. The committee reported at the next Council meeting. The matter might be referred back to them. Much time was consumed. In the meantime, administrative action may have been necessary. The Councils then felt themselves ignored. Hence, while some were learning and were willing to carry on, others were not convinced that any good could be accomplished, failed to attend meetings and failed to keep the people in touch with Council activities.

The public were mostly indifferent, some contemptuous. The names called the Council were, in extreme cases, unprintable. Criticism took two main lines. First, the Councils were futile; or worse, rubber stamps for the Administration. Second, the Councils did much harm because of ill-advised legislation; or inconsistently, did harm because they did not legislate. The Council leaders were still suspected. For these opinions, some of the Councilmen were themselves to blame. They did not keep in touch with the people, as above noted or, worse, they made no attempt to conceal their disbelief in their own effectiveness.

The personnel of the Administration staff were, as a whole, still unconvinced that the Council mattered. At one extreme, they resented interference in the management of what they considered their own functions. At the other extreme, they welcomed cooperation. Possibly it could be said of those holding the middle ground that they recognized the value of a group to which matters could be explained, and were willing to make minor policy changes in deference to the opinion of the Council; but they were not convinced that the representatives of the evacuees should influence any major policy or operational procedure.

Finally, the Councils suffered because of unfavorable comparisons with the Block Managers. This rivalry came to a head later, and will be discussed more fully, but it may be noted now that the Block Managers were a well-organized and respected body of much more prestige than the Councils; that they debated and passed resolutions on every important matter; and that their opinions were much more likely to be considered than those of the Councils.

Under these complex circumstances the second members were elected in December and took office early in January, 1944.

### THE SECOND TERM

The elections did not change the personnel of the Councils to any great extent. In Canal, 14 of the 17 members were re-elected; in Butte 27 of 32 were re-elected. The officers and the Executive Boards were also substantially unchanged.

The development of the Councils proceeded much as it had done in the previous term, and their achievements will not be mentioned in detail. Certain outstanding positive accomplishments were, the final adoption of a code of offenses, a traffic code and the final appointment of judicial commissioners.

During this term, also, more matters were referred to the Councils. These were infrequently matters requiring legislative activity. They were informative, and emanated from committees, from the Administration from the evacuee leaders of other activities and from outside organizations. Often the matter could be referred to committees for appropriate action. Sometimes a recommendation from the Council became a basis of administrative action.

Committees and commissions also functioned more effectively. Much work was done by them for which little public credit was given. Their recommendations tended to harmonize internal security problems, fire prevention, work of the Community Activities Section, relations with external bodies, the ups and downs of the special diet kitchens, garbage collection and a host of other matters.

In brief, the Councilmen were slowly learning their business and their limitations. The value of the Councils as organs of communication and coordination between Administration and people gradually increased.

But there were very definite setbacks and a number of incidents made many Councilmen doubt the value of their work and kept the public from giving them much support. Some of these incidents are worth noting in detail.

#### The Reduction in the Number of Block Janitors

History of the reduction. This problem had already been brought to the attention of the Councils during the first term. Instructions from Washington were that janitorial services were to be reduced. Each block had had a janitor and a janitress. The instruction, as first read, would have allowed only one janitor or janitress per block. Public Health and Labor Relations Committees met with the appointed official concerned, and it was agreed that by adjustments of the labor force, there could be one janitor for each block and one janitress for every two blocks. This, however, did not satisfy the Councils, the Blocks Managers or the people. They all wished to retain two people for each block. But events moved too rapidly. The official in charge felt bound by his instructions to terminate the requisite number of workers. According to evacuee statements, this was

done on the last day of the year, without the customary ten days' notice, and, in fact, the notices were posted so late that some workers did not get them until after the New Year, although they were supposed to be terminated on December 31.

Evacuee opposition. The evacuees, particularly the Council members, claimed that the appointed staff members concerned did not listen to any of their requests, and had no intention of deviating from the course laid down. It is further stated that the appointed staff members did not care what were the results of this reduction in labor. One is quoted as saying, "If the janitors fail to cooperate, we will terminate all of them, in which case the Japs will take care of their own blocks voluntarily." Whether all these statements represent facts is not important. The significant fact is that they were believed. The Council members thus felt themselves slighted and made of no account.

Actually, matters came to an impasse because of the time limits set by the Washington instruction and the cumbersome nature of the proceedings of the Councils. The matter was first referred to the Councils on December 10. The Councils referred it to the appropriate committees. The committees conferred with the appointed officials and reported back to the Councils. And by the time the Councils could act, the termination notices were out.

It was also the result of failure of either party to understand the point of view of the other. To the appointed officials, the reduction was mandatory by a certain date. Further it was in keeping with the TIA policy effective from July 1, 1943, of reducing employment to increase efficiency. From any common sense analysis of the labor situation it was justified. Even those who claimed most for the janitors stated that a thorough cleaning of the wash-houses and latrines took three and a half hours, with two moppings up in addition. No one claimed that the janitors worked an 8-hour day. Hence, although some officials tried to be sympathetic, they did not realize the strength of the opposition to the reduction.

The strength of the opposition came originally from several factors. First, there was the general feeling of insecurity following each reduction of labor. Such reductions had been in progress for six months, and each fresh one caused new anxiety. Second, the block janitors were associated with block solidarity. If a janitress must be shared, that was a blow at the identity of the block. Third, janitorial work was unpopular. If the work were not made relatively easy, janitors would not be obtainable. "A Japanese would be a janitor to Caucasians in the old days, but not to another Japanese." The arguments advanced were all variations of the last consideration. If the janitors were made to work too hard, they would resign. Hence, keep them happy, so that the community be kept clean. "The staff should be satisfied on the basis of satisfactory sanitation and that alone." There was a complete rejection of the administrative point of view.

In their opposition to the reduction, the Councilmen were supported, indirectly, by the Chief Medical Officer. He reported that sanitary conditions had deteriorated. Other appointed officials, however, believed this

would rectify itself as the janitors adapted to the not very onerous demands on them. And besides, there was still the Washington instruction.

Finally, a letter was written to Washington. To this, no reply was received. To this date, there is still agitation to bring back the janitorial staff to its former numbers.

Effects on the Council. On the whole, the results were unfortunate. The Council lost face in the eyes of the community. It had exerted its utmost, and its influence was nil. Among many the feeling spread that the Council would have no influence or authority on any matter of significance to themselves. The local Administration and Washington both ignored them.

The adverse effects were the outstanding results, but there was a constructive side to it. The limitations laid upon administrative discretion by budgetary needs and rules had become evident, and budget studies were made. Charts, showing appropriations and labor force, and their breakdown by division and sections, were made, and some members learned more of the problems with which they were faced. This knowledge did not permeate the whole Council; recent comments suggest that the charts were too complex; but some few understood pretty well, and some principles became evident to others. But these favorable results did not have constructive effects for some time to come.

#### The Atrocities Resolution

On January 27, the account of Japanese atrocities to prisoners of war in the Philippines was released. The Executive Boards were summoned on the morning of the 28th. They were told that any resolution they passed on the news would be given favorable publicity.

Then and there, a resolution, unreservedly condemning the atrocities, was drawn up. The Chairman showed it to a well-known resident. He first explained, "But the Japanese do not do such things!" The Chairman said that the American public believed them. The resident replied, "Yes, that is true. I advise you to be very careful how you present this to the Council."

Special meetings of both Councils were called at 1:30 that afternoon. In Butte, the draft of the resolution was not shown. Instead, the Executive Board, together with three named Issai, were empowered to draw up a resolution in terms of the discussion. This committee then accepted the resolution as drafted. At Canal, the Council adjourned without taking any action. After making a careful translation, the Canal Council passed the English version of the resolution at the following regular meeting, February 1, though they did not accept any translation.

The passing of the resolutions had unfortunate consequences. When the text became known, there was much violent resentment. Some of the Councilmen denounced its terms as being "hysterical," "like what a high-school boy

would write." One Councilman brought a statement that his block had held a meeting and disapproved the resolution unanimously. The opposition was bitter because very few of the Issei believed the stories of atrocities. In their experience, the Japanese people could not possibly be guilty of such enormities. On the other hand, some Issei, as well as some Nisei, defended the resolution on the grounds of public relations. The overt opposition in the Butte Council died down.

The community reaction was violent. One individual said that it was the most upsetting thing that had happened since Army registration. The Councilmen were objects of abuse, of scorn, in some cases of hatred. In Canal, one of the more prominent Councilmen resigned, though he later withdrew his resignation. The prestige of the Councils sank lower than it had been before.

#### Other Notable Activities

It is not intended to give case histories of all significant activities, but three other series of events may be mentioned.

Appointment of Judicial Commission. The Constitution gave the Council power to appoint judicial commissioners, but it was not until late in December, 1943, that three suitable men were obtainable. Of the original three, one, a medical man, resigned before hearing any cases, so that it was not until January, 1944, that a suitable commission was finally created.

Accusation against a staff member. On January 24, a member of the Internal Security Force, who was also a Council member for Butte accused one of the appointed staff of improper conduct. An excited discussion took place, in which alleged irregularities of the wardens were brought up. The Fire and Police Commission was authorized to inquire and report. Many denunciations of the wardens were received, but it was impossible to procure witnesses willing to appear. The first tentative report was a statement of much of the gossip directed against Internal Security. This, on advice, was not presented to the Council, and a much more balanced report was finally submitted. The useful consequences were that the committee members learned some rules of evidence, how to conduct an inquiry, and how to present a report. This educational advantage was confined to Council members. Those of the public who were interested in the matter thought it just another whitewash and the prestige of the Council suffered accordingly.

Preparation for Relocation Conference. The Council devoted some time to the relocation conference to be held with the National Director. It started off unfortunately. At a joint meeting of the Council members and Block Managers, the Chairman failed to direct the meeting constructively and the discussion was mainly concerned with what should be the demands of the evacuees rather than with the advisability of the conference and necessary procedures to make it effective. Later, the plans were discussed more intelligently and much useful work went into preparations for the conference. The indefinite postponement was something of a let-down, and the

whole set of events created further doubt of the real benefit of community government.

### A Period of Crisis

By March, there was a widespread belief that community government had proved ineffective. This belief was held by a number of Council members and by a large number of residents. This was possibly caused by the setbacks, or believed setbacks, the Councils had suffered. But two other causes were effective.

Influence of relocation. The first of these was relocation. A number of Councilmen relocated, and were replaced by less experienced men. In Butte, both the Chairman and the Executive Secretary relocated in March. In April, the successor to the first Executive Secretary resigned to take up the post of Central Block Manager. While successors to all these officials were found, their departure added to the feeling of instability and made the process of education in self-government seem unending.

A further consequence of relocation was that the adult population was becoming increasingly Issei. The majority of relocators were Nisei. Thus there was proportionately less acceptance of democratic procedures, and less acceptance of American ideas.

Influence of Block Managers. The second cause was the competition of the Block Managers. As noted, the Block Managers as a deliberating body had been in existence much longer. They had more prestige, closer contact with the people, and their executive functions gave them added authority. While their job description did not warrant it, they felt themselves responsible for the total welfare of their respective blocks, and for the welfare of the community as a whole. Every important issue debated by the Councils was also debated by the Block Managers. Their resolutions had at least as much weight with the people as an act of the Council. Their appointment by the Administration gave them added prestige. And the continuity of their office gave them more experience than that attained by most Councilmen.

One Block Manager remarked, "We are the Government; the Community Council is a child's toy." On one occasion a Block Manager was asked the name of the Councilman from his block. He replied, "Oh! he has relocated; I don't know whom I will send to the Council in his place." While this condition would not be true of every block, it was undoubtedly true of some.

Meetings for reorganization. The Council members felt their position keenly. Finally matters came to a head at a meeting of the joint Executive Boards in the Assistant Project Director's office on March 10. Another conference was held on March 17. The matter was discussed at Council meetings the following week, and the Executive Boards were empowered to discuss plans of reorganization. This constitutional conference met with the

Assistant Project Director on March 24.

Summary of opinion expressed. A summary of opinions expressed at these conferences is all that can be given here. First, it was agreed that many Japanese do not accept the authority of an elected representative. Their idea is that he represents them; therefore he is bound to do their will. If he does what they want, all is well. If he fails to do what they want, they do not accept his failure; he must try again. Further, he must not do what they do not like. They do not accept as right or authoritative any repressive legislation which he may have a hand in passing. When he does things of which they approve, they take it for granted; when he does something of which they disapprove, he incurs their displeasure. There is no respect for his status, only the belief that he is their elected creature, whose duty it is to do as told.

Second, there were many who believed that the Block Managers were not only more respected and obeyed, but would always be so. In addition to the reasons already given, the particular meaning attached to an elected representative implies a corresponding respect for an appointed official. Besides, the Block Managers are the dispensers of material issuances. If you are going to do something a man dislikes (such as passing repressive legislation) he is much more likely to accept it if he also give you things (such as mops, brooms and buckets). "If a man hits me on the jaw I will dislike it less if he also gives me a glass of beer." The people respect the Block Manager, dislike the Councilman.

Constructive proposals. Constructively, there were a number of proposals. That most discussed was the abolition of both Councilmen and Block Managers. In their places would be created a Block Coordinator. He would combine the functions of both, would be both elected and appointed, and would be paid. As Block Manager he would (with an assistant) still be responsible for the material welfare of his block. As Councilor, he would represent his block at the legislative assembly. A number of variations were discussed: (1) he might be elected; (2) he might be chosen by the Administration from a group selected by election; (3) he might be appointed. Some variations in other details, particularly in the composition of the Executive Boards, were also proposed. One suggestion was that part of the Executive Board be elected by wards. Another suggestion was that the two Executive Boards combined be the Supreme Project Council. Much thought was put into the proposals and into criticisms of the proposals.

Action on the proposals. But when it came to the actual abolition of the Councils, much opposition developed.

Canal decided to retain their Council as it was. The deciding factors seemed to be two: (1) if a man were appointed by the Administration, he would be the creature of the Administration and could not

discuss and criticize freely; (2) if the post were paid, a man would have to resign his other job; many able men would not do this, hence their services would be lost to community government.

Butte took a more devious route. The general principles of reorganization were accepted at a meeting on April 3, and a Constitutional Committee, consisting of the Executive Board and five Council members, was empowered to work out the details and submit a plan for vote at the next meeting. This Committee met with the Assistant Project Director on April 7. After much animated discussion, a general reluctance to make any radical change manifested itself, for much the same reasons as had determined the decision of the Canal Council. Two important decisions were made. The first was that procedure be streamlined. This, it was believed, could be done by delegating more power to the Executive Board to act between Council meetings. The waste of time in reporting and then getting authority to act was thereby eliminated, the speed with which many matters could be accomplished was greatly increased. The second was that the attendance rule be enforced, and failure to attend meetings be made reason for removal. These proposals were accepted by the Council on April 17.

Further consequences were the publication of instructions to Councilmen, and a clear statement of the respective functions of Community Council and Block Managers; and a resolution of the Council stating specifically how and under what limitations the Executive Board could act.

The Council members felt that they had passed a crisis and that the status and efficiency of the Councils had improved.

#### The Remainder of the Term

Juvenile delinquency. For the remainder of the term a certain amount of useful work was done. The juvenile delinquency situation was again to the fore. Boys were guilty of causing disturbances, of destruction of property and of general uncontrollability. The Judicial Commission was not empowered to handle it in any effective way. The boy could be imprisoned, which does no good. Or he could be put on probation, which does no good here because the center lacks trained probation officers and facilities for any retraining process. After many abortive attempts, a Juvenile Code was finally drawn up. Changes delayed it, and it was not passed until July, by the third Council. It still lacks the Project Director's approval and may have to be revised further, but it seems possible that its main provisions will be retained. It is not possible to predict whether it will be effective.

Recreation Commission. A Recreation Commission was established and began to function effectively. This makes possible a consistent and constructive use of funds collected from paying events, such as movies, for the financing of desirable but non-profitable activities.

Welcome to Jerome people. The welcome of the people from Jerome was one of the outstanding achievements of the Councils, though, of course other evacuee bodies, including the Block Managers, and the Administration also participated. The Butte Council delegated its Chairman, and the Canal Council meeting jointly with the Block Managers designated the Central Block Manager to accompany the Community Analyst to Jerome. Their presence at Jerome had an appreciable influence upon the attitudes of numbers of people toward the transfer to Gila.

At Gila, the Community Councils had a large part in the program of welcome. They assisted in the block arrangements for the reception of the new residents, met the trains, and promoted the successful assimilation of the Jerome residents.

Referendum on beer. In May, it was voted by the Butte Council to submit a referendum to the people to determine whether the sale of beer was favored. The interest in this was very great. A larger number of voters turned out than had ever been the case before. The sale of beer was favored by a definite, but not overwhelming majority. It is unfortunate that so much interest and action was wasted on an already determined issue; beer cannot be sold on an Indian reservation.

Rise in prestige of Butte Council. During May and June, the authority of the Council of Butte became increasingly recognized. More matters were referred to it than had been the case before. The Block Managers had some debates in which their status was, sometimes resentfully, discussed, but they fell into line, and now defer, formally at least, to the Council's position. The elections held in June returned an appreciable proportion of old members, including all the members of the Executive Board, as their representatives for the third term.

Dilemma of Canal Council. Canal, having passed the constitutional crisis of March and April, found itself in a new dilemma. A raid on a gambling house on May 20 began a series of inquiries which disclosed a corrupt state of affairs. A gambling ring had much to do with the control of the community. At least two members of the Council were creatures of the ring, others were intimidated by threats of the "ironwood club rule." It became apparent that, to put it at its mildest, the Council was less important than the gamblers. At any rate, the Council fell again into some disrepute, though it continued to function. As a result, of the 17 old members, only 4 were reelected for the third term (and one of the four immediately relocated.) The Chairman did not run for reelection, as he was expecting army induction. The other members of the Executive Board either did not run or were defeated. There was an almost complete change, and a new condition confronted Canal.

## THE PRESENT COUNCILS

### Canal

The Canal elections, as well as ousting most of the old members, put in office a totally Issei Council. One reason for this latter fact is that already mentioned: the majority of the adults are Issei. Such information as can be gained about the new Council members indicates that a good proportion of them are chronic grumblers. They grumble at what they termed the futility of the Council, its adoption of some unpopular resolutions, the connection between some members and the gambling ring. Some of the old Councilmen refused to run again. So the grumblers were elected. There are a few able men in the new Council, some of them on the Executive Board, and the regular procedures are being followed in an orderly fashion. But it is possible that trouble may develop there because of the inexperience and lack of constructive ability on the part of a number of the members.

### Butte

Elections. In Butte, the situation is more complex. Butte has always had more varied attitudes than Canal. In Butte, there was not the same election upset. Many old members were reelected, including all of the previous Executive Board. In the elections by the Council of the Executive Board there was one change, but that was to put in again the former Vice-chairman who had always been popular and who had remained relatively inactive only at his own request.

It is believed that the new Council will begin with a better understanding of procedures and what to do than the previous Council. There is no evidence that the newly elected people are of better or worse ability than those they replaced. Possibly this knowledge of procedure may be counterbalanced by the arrival of people from Jerome. Difficulties will be caused by the fact that the Jeromians will have different ideas of what the Community Council should do and, to some extent, different wants.

Prestige of Council compared with that of Block Managers. The Butte Community Council is considered more important than it was three months ago. There is a greater tendency on the part of the Block Managers, as a group, to present matters to the Community Council for formal action, but Block Managers continue to pass resolutions on matters which they think are important to the community. Within each block, the relative influence of the Councilman and the Block Manager is determined on the basis of personal ability and popularity. In some blocks, the Block Manager is definitely prominent. In other blocks, the Councilman is of more importance.

The Community Council is said to be looked upon favorably or otherwise in each block, according to the activities of the Councilman of that block. Where the Councilman is active in the Council and is conscientious about

keeping his people informed concerning Council activities, the Councilman is looked upon favorably. In some blocks, block affairs are run by a group of men regardless of who is Councilman or Block Manager.

Present and possible future status of the Council. Thus Butte is in a relatively favorable position, and has acquired prestige and experience. It is given as an opinion that its position is not as secure as appears on the surface. It has functioned with the moderate degree of success that it has had in the face of opposition, both from some of its members and many of the public. This opposition is definitely decreasing, but is still there. If the support of the Administration were lessened, or if it were subject to many frustrations, its confidence in itself would diminish and the confidence of the people would be less. It might then become a futile debating society or an instrument of obstruction; or, alternatively, it might die out. Again as an opinion, it continues to exist, not because it is perfect, not because it never makes mistakes, but because the members and the public feel that it has at least some voice in making or modifying some policies.

#### Influence of Relocation on Both Councils

In both Councils the problems caused by relocation will be continuous. Experienced executives and those who have learned something of orderly procedure will resettle. New Councilmen and executives must be trained. In Canal already all are Issei. That condition will gradually be approximated in Butte and ignorance of parliamentary procedure and language difficulties will make the task of cooperation between the Administration and Council more exacting. Whether or how these problems will be solved cannot be predicted; it depends upon factors too complex on both the evacuee and the administrative sides.

00124

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
February 7, 1945

Project Analysis Series No. 20

RELOCATION AT ROHWER CENTER

Part III. Background for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers.

By Margaret Lantis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Foreword
- II. Summary of Major Findings
- III. California Origin of Rohwer Rural Population
  - Los Angeles County
  - San Joaquin County
- IV. General Characteristics of Japanese Farming in California
  - Total Size of Japanese Farm Operation
  - Size and Value of the Japanese Farm
    - Acreage
    - Farm values
  - Farm Labor and Marketing on Japanese Farms
    - Farm labor
    - Marketing
  - Financing
  - Japanese Farmers' Relationships with Government Agencies
- V. Specific Characteristics of Japanese Farming in Los Angeles County
  - Relations between City and Country
  - Community Relationships
  - Types of Farming
  - Summary
- VI. Specific Characteristics of Japanese Farming in San Joaquin County
  - Self-sufficiency and Stability
  - San Joaquin Delta
  - Other Communities: Isleton, Walnut Grove, and French Camp
  - Lodi
  - Marketing in San Joaquin County
  - Labor
  - Summary
- VII. Recent Trends and Changes in the Japanese Agricultural Situation in California
  - Rising Standard of Living
  - Nisei in Agriculture

Table of Contents (Cont.)

Change in Tenure Status  
Weakening of Influence of Little Tokyo  
Agricultural Changes  
Possible Withdrawal from Agriculture  
Urbanization of Farmers

## FOREWORD

Special attention must be paid to the Rohwer farmers' experience in California on the assumption that when they resettle, they will not live in government barracks and eat in mess halls; they will not farm for \$16 a month. They will try to live as they did before evacuation. They will provide for themselves; not be provided for. They will farm for whatever they can make out of the farming enterprise. Inevitably they will live and farm somewhat differently for having gone through the center experience. Yet they will seek to re-establish a life fundamentally Californian, not fundamentally relocation center or Mississippi Delta.

This study of the pre-evacuation life of the rural population which was transferred from West Coast assembly centers to Rohwer Relocation Center in Arkansas is Part II of a series of studies on resettlement problems at Rohwer.

Part I (issued on July 24, 1944, as Project Analysis Series No. 17) described not only the general characteristics of the entire population at the center but singled out for detailed analysis the residents who have resettled throughout the United States except in restricted areas.

Part II (issued on September 2, 1944, as Project Analysis Series No. 18) dealt exclusively with Issei relocation problems.

Part IV, soon to be issued as Project Analysis Series No. 21, will describe the evacuation and post-evacuation experiences of the rural population whose California background was analyzed in Part III, and will discuss the problems this large segment of Rohwer population faces in making plans for life outside the center.\*

---

\* Most of the material of this and the following report was collected as part of a study on the adjustment of rural families to planned resettlement. The study was undertaken on a Post-doctoral Fellowship granted by the Social Science Research Council in 1942-43. Final data were obtained and the report was written while the author was working in the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority in 1944. Gratitude is expressed to all people in both organizations who have given generous and effective assistance.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

The farmers at Rohwer Center came from counties with an agricultural production that was not only outstanding in California but also in the whole United States. These Counties are Los Angeles and San Joaquin, in Southern and Northern California respectively.

The farms of the Japanese, sharecropped, leased, or owned, had an average size that was larger than 40% of the farms of California. They were irrigated, had a high valuation (an average of \$13,000 per farm) and high rental value. The percentage of farms that were mortgaged, the ratio of debt to total value of farm, and the interest rates paid by Japanese farm operators were all slightly higher than those of California farm averages for all races. However, the differences were insignificant except possibly in the case of the high interest rates paid by Japanese. Although financing always was difficult for non-white farmers, they had gradually become part of a system of year-to-year financing by produce shipping companies and other agencies.

With their high fixed costs of intensive vegetable and fruit production, the Japanese farm operators were under pressure to cut the fluctuating costs of marketing and labor. They formed their own marketing associations and used the labor of their own nationals, but they hired other nationals and used other means of marketing also. Except for a few who sold fresh produce directly to the consumer, the Japanese were becoming more and more concerned with marketing facilities and were judging a specific farming operation in relation to the opportunities for assured and profitable marketing.

In regard to the specific characteristics of the Japanese in Los Angeles County and San Joaquin County, there were the following contrasts between the two groups:

The southern county had a concentrated Japanese population of small landholders usually renting the land on a year-to-year basis (only one-thirteenth of the Japanese farm operators were owners); more specialists in raising cut-flowers, seeds for seed companies, poultry, and such truck specialties as melons and celery; and a more complex interlocking of rural and urban influences involving "Little Tokyo" in Los Angeles, Japanese athletic clubs for young people, Christian mission churches serving rural areas, and large economic and racial-interest associations.

In the northern county, the Japanese associations and trade centers were smaller, the religious and Japanese cultural influences less numerous, but the farms were larger; a higher percentage was owned (one-fourth), and the Japanese farm income was greater. However, there was proportionately a greater number of unattached farm laborers than in Los Angeles County. Of the farm operators, more Japanese here were old residents with a secure position in their communities.

The trends of change in the Japanese agricultural group just before evacuation, in California generally and in these counties in particular, showed a rising standard of living of an American type and a shift of interest among the Nisei from personal cultivation of the land to the business aspects of farming. However, this did not mean necessarily their leaving the farm altogether. Rather, there was more land ownership and lease-holding and less working for wages. At the same time, the Japanese farm population was increasing so little in these counties particularly, that there must have been a drift into the city of those people who represented the natural increase in the rural population. Thus there were really two trends, one toward a more secure position on the farm and the other away from the farm entirely. For those who remained on the farm, agricultural adjustments in crops raised and in methods of cultivation were necessary as well as general cultural adjustments. These changes had only begun when the evacuation stopped the agricultural work of the Japanese in California.

### CALIFORNIA ORIGIN OF ROHWER RURAL POPULATION

The farmers of the original Rohwer population came from two of the most productive agricultural areas in the United States, Los Angeles County and San Joaquin County.

#### Los Angeles County

Rohwer's Southern California farmers came from such communities as Gardena, Whittier, and Torrance just south of the City of Los Angeles, where they specialized in truck crops and nursery and greenhouse products; a few raised garden seeds for large seed companies, and a few were in the poultry business.

Of the 3,000 counties in the United States, the top-ranking agricultural county is Los Angeles. In 1939-40 it was:

- first in total value of agricultural products;
- first in gallons of milk produced and value of dairy products sold;
- first in value of fruits and nuts;
- first in expenditures for farm implements and machinery, for feed, and for hired farm labor;
- fourth in crops grown under glass (area devoted to such crops);
- seventh in area devoted to commercial vegetable production.

Although Los Angeles County is large, its acreage in cultivation is no greater than that of many other counties in the West which have a comparable irrigation agriculture. In the present context, the important point is not that Los Angeles County does or does not produce more per acre, but the fact that its residents think it so productive. Los Angeles has the richest and best of everything, according to them. It is remarkable that one region should produce so much in such varied products as orchard fruits, milk, and cut flowers.

#### San Joaquin County

The Northern California farmers came from the western half of a circle drawn around Stockton, county seat of San Joaquin County, where they were somewhat concentrated into three communities:

- French Camp, south of Stockton, where vegetables and berries were grown with rather poor financial return;
- Delta of the San Joaquin River, to the west and northwest, an area of great fertility where farming was big business carried on largely by companies specializing in growing potatoes and sugar beets;
- Lodi, to the north, surrounded by vineyards, orchards, and fields of beans and tomatoes grown on a large scale. The fertile Lodi area is famous for its table and wine grapes, especially Tokays.

Like Los Angeles County, San Joaquin County also was doing well in 1940 and

significantly was increasing its production. Whereas Los Angeles County was at the top in 1929 as well as in 1939, San Joaquin County had not made nearly such a good showing a decade earlier. In 1939-40 it was:

- fourth in the United States in total value of farm products (tenth in 1929);
- fourth in expenditures for farm labor;
- second in acres devoted to tomatoes (sixty-fourth in 1929);
- second in grape production in pounds, though third in number of vines;
- third in value of commercial vegetable production, although fourth in vegetable acreage;
- eighth in number of acres of sugar beets;
- tenth in value of fruits and nuts.

Twenty-five percent of all the asparagus and 9% of all the celery grown in the United States were produced in this one County. So the San Joaquin people are proud of themselves too.

The common elements of the Japanese farmer's situation in both Northern and Southern California will be given before any further analysis of each separately.

## GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE FARMING IN CALIFORNIA

Although spectacular, the county records given above are not isolated occurrences in California agriculture. The State as a whole produces nearly twice the value of vegetables and nearly five times the value of fruits and nuts produced by its nearest competitor, Florida. In horticultural specialties, its third big class of crops, it is second only to New York State. However, California has 30,000,000 acres in its farms whereas Florida has only 8,000,000. Was California agriculture really so rich and productive for the individual farmer, especially the Japanese farmer, as it seems?

### Total Size of Japanese Farm Operation

The Japanese did little in dairying, livestock raising (except a few large-scale hog farmers), or in general dry-land farming. They concentrated on truck and fruit crops and on horticultural products, which are also the specialties of the State.

When evacuation was first suggested, Agricultural Extension workers, with the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, made local surveys of the acreage under cultivation and the production by Japanese and Japanese Americans. They were raising:

- 95% of the State's fresh snap beans;
- 51% of snap beans for canning;
- 40% of the fresh green peas;
- 35% of the State's canning tomatoes;
- 30-35% of fresh tomatoes;
- 34% of the cabbage;
- 3% of green peas for canning.

The Japanese also produced a high percentage of the luxury crops like celery, melons, and strawberries.

Known Japanese farm operators numbered fewer than 6,000. About 4,000 more were unpaid farm laborers; between 7,500 and 8,000 were hired farm workers and foremen. People of other races, including Caucasians, were hired by them and contributed to the above production.

In comparison with the numbers of Dust Bowl migrants and Mexican seasonal workers who have come into California, the Japanese were a small element in California farm labor. 350,000 people, it has been estimated, entered California in the years of the Dust Bowl migration, many of them going into rural areas. During World War II, there has been little difficulty in importing more than 50,000 Mexican seasonal workers a year.

One may ask whether the small labor force compared with the high production of tomatoes, peas, and other vegetables and fruits does not indicate very hard labor by Japanese farm workers. Although the Japanese did work hard, they did not show prodigious effort or production. The explanation

is that their efforts were expended on only a few crops. For example, Japanese farm operators had little part in the large asparagus production of San Joaquin County, mentioned above, although field laborers did have some part in it. In any case, figures on total production do not tell much about the operation and worth of the individual farm.

#### Size and Value of the Japanese Farm

Acreage. The average acreage per California farm, according to the 1940 Census of Agriculture, was 230 acres, which is unusually high for such intensive irrigation agriculture (Table 1). This figure is deceptive, however, for actually a higher percentage of California farms were little farms than in any other state. 39% of all California farms had fewer than 20 acres. Contrasting with the 86,000 small "ranches" under 50-acres each (in California every farm is a ranch even if it is only a 3-acre chicken farm) are 5,000 ranches having more than a thousand acres each, and a few dozen very large ones owned by the Kern County Land Company, the Di Giorgio Fruit Company, and a few others.

The Japanese farmer, according to his State average in 1940 which was 44 acres, was not among the 39% of little fellows (Table 1). The average Japanese tenant farm in California, including the share tenant as well as the cash tenant farm, had 39 acres; the average Japanese-managed or supervised farm had 76 acres; the average Japanese-owned farm, 52 acres. These figures are based on 5,135 Japanese-operated farms, including those owned or part-owned, managed, or rented on a cash or share basis.

TABLE 1.

Data on California Agriculture in 1940  
(From U. S. Census of Agriculture)

	Farms of All Racial Groups (1)	Farms of Japanese (1)
Average acreage per farm	230 A.	44 A. (2)
Average value per farm	\$16,351	\$13,005 (2)
full and part owners		13,408
tenants, all types		12,099
Average value per acre		
owners		258
tenants		310
Average value per acre, wholly irrigated	168	295 (2)
		Farms of All Non-whites (3)
Average cash rent per acre paid by cash tenants	\$3.67	\$19.73
Average weighed interest rate paid by full owners reporting mortgage debt	5.3%	5.8%
Percent of farms on which <del>5%</del> -6½% interest paid	59.8	56.2
Percent of farms on which <del>7%</del> -7½% interest paid	12.4	21.4
Ratio of debt to value of farm, for full owners, in percent	35.3	41.0

1 Include value of land and buildings.

2 These figures include farms with Japanese managers.

3 Figures not available for Japanese specifically, but since they constituted the largest element among non-white farm owners and cash tenants, the figures for all non-whites can be applied to the Japanese with only minor reservations.

Again it must be admitted that the figures are deceptive. The size of farms varied greatly from one part of the state to another and from one crop to another. For example, many of the Japanese farmers in Los Angeles County, both tenants and owners, had little farms of 5, 10, or 15 acres; whereas in San Joaquin County many rented or owned land totaling 80 to 1,000 acres, and the best supervisors were responsible for more than 1,000 acres. Thus the Japanese within their own areas of settlement followed the general California pattern of a few large farms and many small ones.

Farm values. The average value per farm of all racial groups in California was \$16,351 in 1940; the average value of a farm owned or managed by persons of Japanese descent was \$13,005 (Table 1). It will be recalled that the average acreage per farm of all racial groups was 230 acres, that of Japanese only, 44 acres. The high value of the Japanese farms in comparison with those of all racial groups can be further judged from the fact that the average value per acre of wholly irrigated land on Japanese farms was \$295, while that on farms of all racial groups was only \$168 (Table 1).

The Japanese farms were good; the rented farms in particular undoubtedly had very good soil. Since most Japanese farms did not have better-than-average buildings, the value must have been in the soil itself, in the irrigation system, and in such improvements as orchards and vineyards.

Such land values meant high taxes and high rentals. As a matter of fact, annual cash rent paid by Rohwer farmers who were interviewed ranged from \$15 to \$75 an acre and even \$90 for vineyard or other land with producing plants.

However, the average cash rent per acre paid in 1940 by non-white (most of them Japanese) farm operators was \$19.73 (Table 1). They paid more than five times more per acre than farm operators of all racial groups who paid an average cash rent of only \$3.67. Although most of the non-white cash tenants were on irrigated land where the rent can be expected to be higher, there is also the suggestion that they might have been charged more rent because of their racial origin. An average cash rent of approximately \$20 an acre, covering some unirrigated as well as irrigated land, is high, especially when compared with the California average rent of \$10.43 for wholly irrigated cropland.

#### Farm Labor and Marketing on Japanese Farms

In farm values, California agriculture is high-priced even though the State is not at the top in money spent on commercial fertilizer and on farm implements and machinery, however expensive they are. While California does have more trucks on farms than has any other state, it has only half as many tractors as Iowa, Illinois, or Minnesota.

However, California agriculture does have one very large cash outlay: the labor cost. Also, the California farmer has to pay for irrigation and special facilities for marketing perishables, two costs which farmers in many other parts of the country do not have at all.

Farm labor and marketing add human problems to the natural problems that

any farmer faces, and unfortunately in California they have added intense competition and distrust. Unfortunately also, the Japanese farmer has held a peculiar position in regard to both labor and marketing because the Japanese farm community has sought to provide largely within itself both of these important and expensive necessities of intensive farming.

Farm labor. The figures given earlier on rentals give a clue to the dilemma of the Japanese farmer. On such expensive land, he had to cut down costs somehow and still produce a lot in order to get an adequate return. Over the long stretch, he could not save much on the cost of seed or fertilizer or irrigation; but he could save on one of his biggest costs, labor. So he used family labor instead of machinery. The average value of implements, including trucks, on Japanese-owned or part-owned farms was only \$1,396, and on tenant farms, \$1,041.

The use of family members and fellow nationals as farm labor was natural for a people with a recent peasant background and rational in the competition of California's high-pressure agriculture. Family labor, or the common California alternative of cheap hired labor, thus was perpetuated in an agriculture which is very different from that in Japan in being cosmopolitan, highly commercialized, and organized into an intricate marketing system with centralized control. In value of farm products used by farm households, California is down in 27th place among the states, where it is up near the top in total production.

Marketing was the other aspect of farming in which the Japanese farmer sought to save money. Dairying is the only other type of agriculture comparable with fruit and vegetable production in the need for daily, rapid, well-regulated marketing. It is significant that in the dairy industry there has been great development of farmers' cooperatives and other associations, and not simply because many of the dairy farmers are Scandinavian. The fruit and vegetable people need association and protection perhaps even more than the dairy men because the criteria of grading are not so objective and the grower is at the mercy of the shipper and canner who grade up or grade down according to their desire for the product.

In addition to the difficulties inherent in marketing perishables, the Japanese farmer had special difficulties of his own. The older immigrant farmer, who was likely to be a small farmer and who could not speak English well, had little strength in the competition unless he combined with others like him and hired a representative who could speak English and "knew his way around." Occasionally, the large and secure operators and those who spoke English fluently were invited to join the Caucasians' cooperatives, but since most did not have this opportunity, they did what again seemed natural and rational. They formed their own associations.

However, it must be stressed that they formed Japanese marketing associations not just because they were Japanese but also because they were California farmers or, one might even say, because they were Pacific Coast farmers.

The Japanese farmers' associations in Southern California were much larger and more comprehensive in function and membership than were the northern

ones. A study in 1937 disclosed that Southern California had about 60 local farmers' associations. For example, four associations of farmers north of Los Angeles, working with the Japanese Produce Merchants' Association in the city, formed a wholesale marketing organization. It handled a business of \$250,000 annually, with an income to the organization of \$12,500 a year, which not only covered operating costs but also provided a welfare fund for the members.

The Japanese Southern California Farm Federation consisted of 31 farmers' associations in Los Angeles and Orange Counties. Farmers paid an annual membership fee for which they received a daily newspaper and daily radio broadcasts on produce prices. The Federation was not a marketing organization but an interest group serving its member associations, some of which were genuine marketing organizations. These associations also obtained a reduced price to members on purchases of fertilizer and other farm supplies. They worked closely with the 20 Japanese wholesale produce merchants although there was apparently no official association with them. Although there are no exact figures, seemingly most of the produce in the southern part of Los Angeles County, from which Rohwer people came, was taken from farm to Terminal Market or Ninth Street Market by haulers hired by produce merchants (commission merchants). The Japanese produce companies had an average annual gross business of \$750,000, according to those in the business. The Southern California Flower Market, Inc. had, at the time of evacuation, 159 grower-members. It owned and operated in the wholesale flower district in Los Angeles a large market building having space for 200 tables for flower growers; and it provided various services for its members.

In San Joaquin County the farmers' associations seem to have operated independently, without being organized into any such large economic structure as the Southern California Farm Federation.

The marketing associations were usually but not always incorporated, with at least two paid employes (manager and secretary) and additional employes as needed for packing and shipping. Financing was by sale of shares and by assessment per unit of produce marketed. Member-growers held shares and voted on officers and policy. However, the managerial personnel often seems to have made decisions independently of the membership. Perhaps because of this tendency of the business man to be patronizing toward the farmer and to disregard him, perhaps because of the inability of the smaller farmers to comprehend the produce shipping and brokerage system, or because of actual dishonesty in a few cases, surprisingly often the members were suspicious of their leaders. Most of the associations were not more than 15 years old, some of them only five years old at the time of evacuation. Hence one can expect that with further experience and the gradual assumption of authority by Nisei who would have more nearly equal education and comprehension of American economic organization, many of the earlier bickerings within the associations would disappear. In spite of internal troubles, the fact remains that the association was felt to be needed and justified.

It must not be assumed that the Japanese never took part in general community

enterprises and agreements. In San Joaquin County, for example, all the tomato growers of a locality met with cannery representatives to establish the price per ton of tomatoes in the coming season. The Japanese cooperated and were in fact rather proud to be able to produce on a large scale and to have the security of a cannery contract. Also, as members of water districts they had to cooperate in the use of irrigation water. Probably no one really understood it, but most farmers felt themselves part of an intricate system, even before the war emergency and federal regulations further systematized agriculture.

Although many Japanese farmers had experience as members of marketing cooperatives and growers' agreements, very few ever actually farmed cooperatively. The individual family enterprise was the typical one.

Also it must not be assumed that Japanese farmers rarely marketed their crops through private companies. In many neighborhoods from which crops went to the local fresh-produce market, there were direct dealings with the consumer or with private wholesale companies and large retail grocery chains. In some cases the individual farmer, in other cases his association, sold to the chain. In Los Angeles the wholesale companies dealt with were usually Japanese. In much of San Joaquin County and in other places where there was a concentration on a few large commercial crops (prune plums or table grapes, for example) and where the Japanese associations had not developed to the point of having good outlets among wholesalers in the Midwest and East, then the privately-owned shipping companies provided the chief outlet.

#### Financing

The strong private company, Japanese or Caucasian, served in another important capacity, namely, as a loan bank. It was the custom of the Japanese farmers, in almost all crops, to borrow money annually to finance each year's principal crop if not the entire production. Farmers rarely dug into their capital to finance production because they reserved it for capital improvements in the farm business. It might cost a man \$7,000 annually to produce 10 acres of strawberries and about the same for celery. In addition to the usual costs of irrigation, fertilizer and the like, there were special costs for new plants, for crates and flats, for harvest labor, and for haulers. The shipping company or cannery would advance enough money to cover such expenses, taking a crop mortgage, making a contract, or both, whereby the farmer agreed to bring his crop to that cannery or packing shed.

Financing was often a difficult problem for the Japanese farmer. Banks were reluctant to advance money to a Japanese for expansion of his farm business. In some cases they did not know individual Japanese and their business dealings well enough to judge their credit; in other cases they simply were not interested in helping Japanese establish themselves; and in general, they did not dare indulge in the risky business of making crop loans to many farmers. Sometimes, however, they would loan money to a well established association when they would not loan to individual members of that association. To a few big farmers, loans were available from local banks and from the National Farm Loan Association. For the repayment of individual loans,

Japanese farmers had a good reputation. Nevertheless, if a man - especially a young man whose reputation was not yet established - wanted money for the purchase of land, he probably would have to ask some businessman or well-to-do farmer and furthermore might pay 10% or more interest.

Table 1 shows that 21.4% of non-white farm owners were paying 7% - 7½% interest on farm mortgages, whereas only 12.4% of all owners regardless of race were paying such high interest. However, in the percentage of farms reported free of mortgage, there was little difference between white and non-white owners, according to the 1940 Census of Agriculture:

	<u>Percent of Farms Free from Mortgage</u>
Full owners: white	46.1
non-white	45.5
Part owners: white	36.7
non-white	38.1

In financing as in marketing, the Japanese farmer turned in upon his own group, seeking loans from fellow countrymen. It is true that the tanomoshi, or old-country type of credit club, could not provide the large sums needed by a man to put in a \$3000 well and pump or to build his own packing shed; they served primarily in personal emergencies or to help a farmer get a small start in some new venture. Also modern Japanese loan associations existed, but did not begin to cover the Japanese farm business in California which produced truck crops totaling \$30,000,000 annually. So the farmer not infrequently borrowed from more wealthy members of his own racial community.

#### Japanese Farmers' Relationships with Government Agencies

Some of the financially poorer farmers obtained Rural Rehabilitation loans from the Farm Security Administration. These were available to both Issei and Nisei before evacuation. Fortunately, not many Japanese could qualify for these loans which went to only those farmers unable to get credit elsewhere.

Relationships with government agencies varied from area to area. For example, many of the farmers planting large acreages in the San Joaquin Delta took advantage of the Soil Conservation Service payments for planting a cover crop. In Los Angeles County, even though the Soil Conservation Service set the per-acre payment at a high figure, few farmers could forego the income from the two or three truck crops per year on a given piece of land in order to keep that land under a cover crop.

Similarly in regard to the Extension Service, wherever farmers were well established in ownership of orchards and other long-term forms of agriculture, and particularly in communities where there was not a high concentration of Japanese population, the Japanese farmers were known individually to the Farm Advisers (County Agents) and even to the Home Advisers although the latter occurrence was less frequent. In communities where there were many Japanese farmers with small acreages, they were not likely to participate in government programs.

SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF  
JAPANESE FARMING IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Some of the differences between Los Angeles and San Joaquin Counties have become apparent already, especially the difference in degree of marketing organization. Other special characteristics of the life of the Japanese in each area and the background for the differences need to be cited.

Relations between City and Country

As early as 1910 there was, as Table 2 shows, a concentrated Japanese population in Los Angeles County. Although in the next ten years both counties more than doubled their Japanese population, since 1920 Los Angeles County has increased much more rapidly. All the increase in the last decade has taken place in the City of Los Angeles; an actual decrease in the Japanese population outside the metropolis has occurred. Whereas the number of Japanese has increased not much more than 100 in San Joaquin County in twenty years (1920-40), it has grown 17,000 in Los Angeles County. In other words, a much higher proportion of the Japanese population of San Joaquin County consists of old residents. (There has not been much turnover, so that one can assume approximately the original population figure as a proportion of the 1940 population.) The influx of people, especially of urban dwellers, has produced anomalies and contradictions in the life of the Japanese in Southern California, particularly for those living on the fringes of Los Angeles City.

Table 2

Comparison of Rural and Urban Populations  
in Los Angeles and San Joaquin Counties

J Japanese Population*	1910	1920	1930	1940
Los Angeles County	8,461	19,911	35,390	36,866
Los Angeles City	4,238	11,618	21,081	23,321
San Joaquin County	1,804	4,354	4,339	4,484
Stockton	475	840	1,336	1,259

\* According to the United States Census of Population.

In 1940 Los Angeles County had 29.1% of all the Japanese in the United States, and 29.7% of all Japanese farm operators in California. Even though so many were city residents with urban occupations, more than 13,000 lived in the smaller towns and open country, and some farmers lived within the city limits. The communities from which Rohrer people come are Gardena, Hawthorne, Whittier, Torrance, Norwalk, Downey, Lawndale, Montebello, Maywood, Southgate, Clearwater, Bellflower, Artesia, and Compton. The racial concentration here can be gauged by the fact that there were 250 Japanese Americans in Gardena High School. (Gardena City is a suburb south of Los Angeles City, actually within the city school system but always regarded as a distinct community.) There were of course even more Nisei children in the grammar schools

of Gardena. There were approximately 1,450 Japanese in Compton Township, 1,150 in Downey Township, and 3,900 in Inglewood Township which includes the Gardena rural community.

With such a population concentration, with Little Tokyo to provide a core for many Japanese interests and activities, and with a marketing system centered in the city, the Japanese were able to maintain their own socio-economic system, as many people have pointed out. What usually was not stated was that the general population density immediately south of Los Angeles and the proximity to a big city also made possible an urbanization and Americanization of the young people that counterbalanced their Japanese-ization. Many sought their recreation in the city, watching the Angels or Hollywood play baseball, bowling, going to shows in the movie palaces, or going to the "Y". At least this is what some of them did and what many wanted to do. The only factors that might prevent such participation in city life were poverty and strict parental supervision. Actually, these two did prevent assumption of urban ways by many Nisei, but not without resistance and conflict.

With the more exciting life so temptingly close, yet often denied to them, the young people sought various escapes. Some became quiet, dutiful young Japanese, to avoid conflict with conservative parents. Most took great interest in athletic and social clubs, either Buddhist or Christian sponsored (whichever was most available), in an effort to combine American and Japanese ways. A few "went Hollywood" to avoid conflicts with the dominant culture and avoid the difficult transition process. When divorces and other un-Japanese ways appeared among the young people, the rural Issei tried harder than ever to resist the Hollywood influence, as the young people themselves called it but which better could be called simply an urban influence. Inevitably conflicts developed in spite of efforts to avoid them.

#### Community Relationships

The routine of the truck growers' daily life did not leave much time for social participation. Haulers would make the rounds of the little farms in the early evening, requiring that the day's harvest be picked, sorted, washed, crated, and stacked by 6:30 or 7:00 or perhaps a little later at some farms. Even if the farmer hauled his own produce, he still had to follow this schedule. Children were required to hurry home from school to work in the fields. As the mother usually also worked in the fields, no one prepared a meal until the day's harvest was complete. By the time supper and bath were finished, it was bedtime. The children were given some time for school work but little time for anything else. Girls especially were watched closely. Even when there was not the urgency of harvest, there was always hand work in the mild climate of Los Angeles County: weeding, clearing irrigation ditches, transplanting, stringing up climbing plants, reseeding for the second or third crop of the year, capping young plants with paper caps, and thinning.

Saturday was rest day for the truck farmers. As there was no wholesale trade on Sunday, there was no harvest on Saturday. The children went off to Japanese language school. The old folks dressed in their rather dowdy best, the young people dressed in as thoroughly American style as possible,

and they went to town, occasionally going clear down town to Little Tokyo. This visit meant much more to the older people than to the young ones who, not having a language handicap, did not need to shop in Japanese stores and showed an obvious preference for American stores.

Saturday evening the Issei went to church, especially if they were Christians. Because produce had to go to market Sunday for the Monday trade, the truck farmer and his family worked in the fields on Sunday, to the disgust of some of the older Americans who had got away from this practice. Mission churches adapted themselves to this schedule, holding services for adults Saturday night. The Sunday School for children was held at the usual time. As parents were busy, Caucasian women church workers would drive around the neighborhood, gathering up the Nisei youngsters and taking them to Sunday School. Sometimes prayer meetings would be held in a farmer's home. Or films from Japan would be shown in his local language school or community hall. He was open to both Japanese and American influences, but seldom was a vigorous promoter of either because he did not have time for organizational work.

Young People's Meeting or Fellowship, held on Sunday evening in most of the churches, was a social function of some importance. The young Buddhists also met regularly on Sunday, but adults ordinarily attended service only once a month. Of the two groups evacuated to Rohwer, the Los Angeles people had experienced a stronger Christian influence than had the Stockton and Lodi people. That is, more people were affected by it and some for a much longer time. Even so, most of the farmers were reluctant to take part in the larger community affairs in a town like Whittier for example, let alone Los Angeles. The life of the farmer "with ten acres, five kids, and a horse" was a strange combination of rural isolation and urbanism.

#### Types of Farming

Conditions of living of course varied from farm to farm, depending upon the degree of specialization in one crop. The melon growers, for example, worked differently from the bean growers.

The cut-flower growers had their own schedule and characteristics. Market was held in Los Angeles every day at 6:00 a.m., preparations being made, of course, the preceding day. A member of the family took flowers to the market and sold them personally. Greenhouse owners were usually well-to-do since it requires much capital to build and maintain a greenhouse of ten to fourteen frames, the size of some of the largest owned by Rohwer men. At least two of the prize-winning greenhouse specialists of Southern California were evacuated to Rohwer. Those who raised flowers outdoors ranged from poor to well-to-do. Raising common annuals was like growing carrots; raising bulb flowers was like growing choice strawberries.

The original Rohwer population was classified as to pre-evacuation occupation according to the U. S. Employment Service coding of occupation. Such general categories as "truck farmer" and "general farmer" apply equally to Los Angeles and San Joaquin Counties, but since there were few nursery and greenhouse people in the San Joaquin group, undoubtedly most of the 180 listed in this category (of whom 40 were women) were from Los Angeles County,

and the same is true of other specialists like the chick sexers.

As the whole adult population was not canvassed, this and other figures of occupational groups at Rohwer are an understatement but they probably show relative numbers in each category. Since Tule Lake and Jerome people have come to Rohwer, these figures are out of date so far as Rohwer Center is concerned; however, they are the best available for the original localities before the mixing of locality groups.

The only other noteworthy agricultural group comprised the chick sexers and poultry farmers. Of 138 certified chick sexers in California, 96 were Japanese. Seven are known to have come to Rohwer, most or all of them from Los Angeles County. One of them was characterized by several poultry men as the most accurate and fastest worker in Southern California. These specially trained people usually received a good income, and were in other ways not typical of the Japanese farm population. The 21 poultry farmers, listed in the past-employment classification, also were not typical. Their small number should be compared with 446 truck, 30 fruit, 39 general, 7 livestock farmers, and one dairyman, not including farm hands. (Those who could call themselves specifically fruit farmers came principally from San Joaquin County.)

One more characteristic of Los Angeles farmers provides a contrast with the northern farmers: Only one-thirteenth of Japanese farm operators in Los Angeles County were farm owners whereas one-fourth of San Joaquin County operators were owners.

#### Summary

In the South in relation to total Japanese population, there were fewer old residents, more small farmers and fewer prosperous farmers, fewer land-owners, more of the stoop labor that bunch crops require, proximity to a large city and greater influence from the city, and more influence by Christian denominations.

SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF JAPANESE FARMING  
IN SAN JOAQUIN COUNTY

Self-sufficiency and Stability

The "Stockton farmers" as San Joaquin men are often called, in reference particularly to the Delta farmers, showed a conservatism different from that of Los Angeles people. They had a self-sufficiency and stability based on one-crop-a-year agriculture (field crops, vineyards, orchards), distance from a large city (Stockton had only 60,000 people and San Francisco was three hours away or more), land ownership or long-term lease, and good income. Many Stockton and Lodi families were well established in Caucasian rural neighborhoods, with high personal, financial and agricultural reputation. The result was the social behavior of the solid citizen, even if he were a Japanese alien. Even the young people tended to dress in clothes of conservative color and cut but of good quality, and to maintain in their social affairs an air of propriety in harmony with prosperous rural respectability.

Another factor accounting for this pride and respectability lies in the unusual history of the San Joaquin Delta. The Delta, which is identified with Stockton, considered itself in World War I the potato capital of the world; and the controlling figure in this potato empire was a Japanese. George Shima (his Americanized name), probably the most famous Japanese resident in the history of California, was often called the Potato King. Although his power was lost in the '20s and he is now dead, the men who observed his methods of farming and in some cases worked with him have continued to raise potatoes and continued his reputation of shrewd farming. Of course, this is numerically a small element in the Japanese population but it is big in prestige.

San Joaquin Delta

Few small farmers have a chance in the Delta today. Sugar beets are grown there now and this mass-production crop has strengthened the big companies. Such names as Fleishacker, Zuckerman, Hoover, MacLean and Kelley have authority now. The Japanese have not entirely lost out, however. They have divided into upper and lower classes with only a small middle class, the upper composed of owners and of managers for the large operators, the lower composed of field laborers.

Potatoes were not the only crop grown by Japanese in the Delta and on other fertile land west of Stockton. Cannery tomatoes and other vegetables for processing, dry onions, celery and hay also were produced. (In this area the big celery growers were not Japanese.)

People in all these types of farming belonged to the Japanese community of Stockton. The Nisei attended high school there; men came in regularly

to conduct business, women to shop or consult the doctor. Both upper and lower classes of farmers lived in Stockton at least part of the year; a few had homes there the year around. Here the combination of rural and urban life was different from that of Los Angeles partly because the little city and the Delta had common interests, namely, the crops; thus, conflict between town and country was lessened.

Other Communities: Isleton, Walnut Grove and French Camp

Two localities were on the borders of the area evacuated to Rohwer. Both constitute exceptions to most of the generalizations regarding San Joaquin County.

One was at the northwest corner of the County where it touches Sacramento County and where the San Joaquin Delta merges into the Sacramento River Delta. Here among the very large ranches were such villages as Isleton and Walnut Grove in which the Japanese lived the year around; and here was a cultural isolation fostered by life in labor camps on the big ranches and by the maintenance in the public school system of separate schools for Oriental children. (Some of these people were evacuated to Tule Lake.)

The other locality was French Camp on the highway south of Stockton, from which farmers went to Manzanar and Gila as well as Rohwer. These were truck farmers, hence spent much hand labor on their crops. Also, although the children attended Stockton High School, most of the French Camp Japanese were not so much a part of Stockton society, probably because they could not compete with the more famous and wealthy "Stockton farmers." Probably farmers of French Camp and other communities south of Stockton can be more accurately classified as middle class (within Japanese society) than those in the Delta.

Lodi

Lodi agriculture was not quite so unusual and pretentious as that in the Delta but it was more like the Delta than like French Camp. For example, its orchards, vineyards and field crops did not require so much hand work until the harvest season, especially not so much work by children. The pruning and spraying of vineyards and orchards were work for adults. Then in the harvest, extra hands were hired.

The younger men, supervising cultivation and doing some of it themselves, rounding up labor, hauling the produce to market, perhaps as far as San Francisco, and making business arrangements for production contracts, labor contracts or marketing contracts on other people's farms, were about the busiest farmers in California. There is an ur-

gency in fruit picking and marketing that transcends the usual urgency of any harvest. Moreover, there was keen competition to be first into market with a particular product from a particular neighborhood. Nisei farmers, enjoying the excitement of the competition as well as the profits, pushed themselves and their workers. They farmed shrewdly and hard and tried to play the market the same way. On the whole, in spite of the hazards in their type of agriculture, Japanese operators around Lodi were in good financial condition.

Regarding these farmers' social position, it is difficult to generalize. They did not form an obvious racial colony like that farther north at Florin in Sacramento County. They were proud of membership in the Farm Bureau and of the activities of their children in Boy Scouts and school affairs. They knew their Caucasian neighbors better than in many rural districts. Yet the children attended language school or returned to Japan for education, as elsewhere; very few families were Christian; and Japanese habits in regard to food and other daily customs were maintained probably just as strongly as at Florin. One difference, however, was that Lodi people had an air of self-sufficiency and pride, for which they had good reason. In addition to this class of independent farmers, there was a class of Japanese farm workers living in labor camps like those in the Delta and their cultural isolation seems to have been nearly as great.

#### Marketing in San Joaquin County

One explanation of Lodi farmers' sound economic condition, in addition to excellent soil well cared for, must have been good marketing facilities. The Japanese marketing associations and the trucking business have not been studied in detail. It is known, however, that the associations did not control the marketing of Japanese produce, two alternative means of marketing being utilized; sale in the public market directly to consumers and sale to processors and large packers for shipment east. Using the first method, the smaller truck farmers tended to market their vegetables and berries in the Stockton public market. Regarding the second method, in this County an intricate commission-merchant system, such as existed in Los Angeles, was not highly developed because there were not many farmers sending small quantities day by day to the wholesalers. San Joaquin County's 25,000 acres of processing tomatoes went to the canneries in ton measures. Fruit and nuts went to wineries, canneries and large shipping companies. Cabbage, onions, beans and similar bulk produce went to pickle factories or other processing plants or to shippers.

As for trucking, the Lodi Japanese farmers not only hauled their own produce but occasionally their neighbors' as well, sometimes by buying the crop and marketing it, sometimes by hiring out as truckers. French Corp was also seen to have hauled their produce themselves. In the Delta, at least one of the Japanese potato-growers shipped potatoes under his own brand name. In some cases the potato wholesalers hauled their commodity, the specially-adapted, long, uncovered trailers with their

stacks of sacked potatoes rolling ponderously into Stockton. Here one does not see the earth-covered potato-storage sheds that are prominent in the rural landscape near the Tule Lake and Minidoka Centers. The Delta was boggy in wet weather and gave off a fine, itchy dust in dry weather. Hence potatoes were stored - and people lived - in town.

#### Labor

Tomatoes, like other fruit, still must be picked by hand even in this day of the mechanized farm. The particular crops of San Joaquin County required hundreds of harvest laborers. These were principally Japanese and Filipinos, with some Mexicans, Hindus and Afghans and Americans.

Los Angeles and San Joaquin Counties had approximately the same number of male foreign-born Japanese farm laborers, i.e. between 600 and 700 but this number was a much higher proportion of the total Japanese population of the total Japanese population in San Joaquin County.

Many of the farm hands who came to Rohwer are in that group always referred to as "the old bachelors" although some had been married at one time. In any case they were single men, given to drinking and gambling, improvident, growing old, but good farm hands, nevertheless. They lived on the ranches in what were called "camps", buildings of permanent but bare construction, often resembling long sheds (some of the poorer families in the hired-labor class also lived in these camps); or in Japanese rooming-houses and cheap hotels in town. Some of the big farmers paid part of the bachelors' wages directly to the rooming-houses and restaurants so that the old men would have at least subsistence through idle months.

Those who, in the Rohwer Center listing of past employment, have called themselves foreman were in most cases bosses of labor crews consisting of some one nationality, usually but not necessarily Japanese. On the whole, the Japanese farm operators and foremen seem to have been as good bosses as any, on a human as well as agricultural score. The Japanese came to know their workers better personally than did most farmers and adjusted their dealings, such as methods of payment, to the habits of the various groups. Furthermore, the wiser farmers would pay pickers half a cent or a cent a box (of berries, for example) more than others were paying in order to get a good reputation among the workers and so be sure of having enough hands at the peak of the harvest. Some, on the other hand, would hold back half a cent or a cent a box, refusing to pay it until the harvest was complete, in order to retain labor. Although there is no evidence one way or another, possibly it was true that the Japanese labor contractors paid their own nationals less than the prevailing wage. The farm operator, whether Japanese or Caucasian, often did not know what the contractor paid his crews.

The foremen themselves, in both Southern and Northern California, constituted an interesting group. Some were pure "Japanese" and little

more than straw bosses of equally old-world field laborers. Some spoke fair English, could deal with Caucasians and could take responsibility for varied operations, yet never had had enough initiative or capital to farm on their own. Others had lost their farms for one reason or another. As a group, they knew good cultivation methods and knew how to direct field labor but they did not know all the business aspects of farming, an essential knowledge if a man is to get ahead in California.

#### Summary

San Joaquin County contained some of the most fertile farming land in the State and some of the most successful and secure Japanese farmers, notably the potato growers of the Delta and the orchardists and vineyardists of Lodi. Others, although they did not belong to this elite, nevertheless were good farmers. Finally, there were small communities of Japanese farmers who, because of poor land or isolation or other factors, fell below the high agricultural standards of the County. Most Japanese in this county were Buddhist and social conservative but agriculturally progressive. One-fourth were farm owners. Dependent upon these farm operators was a relatively large population of laborers. On the large farms of the Delta especially, such laborers were essential.

## RECENT TRENDS AND CHANGES IN THE JAPANESE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN CALIFORNIA

Here we shall see what changes were occurring before evacuation and probably would have occurred or continued if the evacuation had not happened, and which yet may occur.

### Rising Standard of Living

A Japanese high esthetic standard in regard to some aspects of everyday life, such as the interest in flowers and keeping of fancy goldfish or birds, was combined with California's high material standards which require that even a poor farm home have piped water and electricity. Of 5,692 non-white farm homes in California enumerated in the 1940 Census of Agriculture, 5,361 had electric lighting in the dwelling. Since more than 5,000 were Japanese homes, we can assume that the typical Japanese farm home had electricity. Nevertheless, very many poor farmers and even some with good income had poor clothes, furniture, and houses. The "bowl of rice a day" theme in the California campaign against its Japanese is an unjustified exaggeration; but it was true that the typical Japanese farm home was not attractive, inside or out. On the other hand, some of the well-to-do farmers in both the northern and southern groups had good homes in the styles of "Sunset Magazine" and "Better Homes and Gardens."

The claim of the Issei was that he could not own the property. The claim of all the Japanese was that the renter's tenure was not secure and that the tenant was not justified in spending money on the property of someone else. This is the attitude of tenants of all races in most parts of the United States, probably intensified by the past experience of the Issei. However, the Nisei, seeing an opportunity to own land or get better tenent contracts and being more aware of American standards of living, were taking an interest in home betterment. As they married and obtained some authority in the family, they were able to fix up the old house or induce the family to move into a better one. Modern furniture and modern American living took on symbolic significance for many. As this development was recent and apparently still a cause of some disagreement within the family, the deprivation of one's home by the evacuation was a particular blow to ambitious Nisei farmers with new homes. They became more emotional over the loss of the home than for loss of the land. If obtaining the nice home had been symbolic, then losing it was symbolic, too.

### Nisei in Agriculture

Both north and south, the older men belonged to the Japanese Association and to the ken or prefecture societies, with the prominent farmers holding positions of authority. Both north and south, the young people belonged to the Japanese American Citizens' League and the prominent Nisei farmers to the Farm Bureau. Some belonged to the Nisei Farmers' League. As for the 4H Clubs, Nisei youngsters were limited in participation by the nature of their fathers' crops. It was not popular to have a project to raise better green onions. Nor could a teen-age boy raise an expensive crop like sugarbeets

or have even a piece of a vineyard. Boys whose fathers were poultrymen were in the best position to carry on projects of their own. The girls with mothers who could not read the recipes in an American cookbook also did not have much help at home and tended not to take part in 4H club work.

Nevertheless, generally throughout California the sons and daughters as they reached maturity took over the business dealings of the farm family, simply because they could read English and understood American legal forms. Ordinarily one member of the family acted as liaison between the family and the business world, and not infrequently other members were surprisingly ignorant of details of farm transactions. If no boys had reached their majority, the eldest daughter read contracts and advised her father, occasionally finding as she or her brother took over this duty that the father had been deceived for years, sometimes by Caucasians, sometimes by Japanese.

Wealthy Issei farmers functioned differently. They usually would turn over business dealings to Caucasian lawyers or businessmen even if they had sons who could handle the business. (The eldest son gradually would take over supervision of the farm or greenhouse while a younger son and daughter went off to college.) Whether the lawyers were honest, it would be difficult to say definitely. The available evidence indicates that as a group they were honest, although expectably a few individuals did take advantage of their clients' unfamiliarity with American law. In any case, without the evacuation which greatly increased Japanese dependence upon Caucasian proxies, this phase of Japanese-Caucasian relationships would have passed.

The young people, denied a range of opportunity in the professions and in Caucasian urban business firms and under constant pressure from their parents to take over the farm, get married and settle down, also lacking any vocational guidance, had to turn to farming or produce marketing. Not a few were bitterly disappointed at this turn of events and settled down grimly to "beat the game." There was an "I'll show 'em" attitude that drove ambitious young farmers to a tremendous output of energy, a constant searching of opportunity to expand economic activity, and a sharpness in business dealings that less ambitious competitors found irritating. Not a few Nisei would have preferred to be second-rate engineers to being first-rate farmers, but since they could not be the former, they would be the latter.

Another field of conflict was that of produce marketing. Some competitors of the Japanese had been growers but were leaving actual farming and concentrating on the commercial aspects of agriculture. The Italians were prominent in this group. Other competitors never had been farmers. The Japanese were left with a grower-merchant combination that was disconcerting to the old-resident Caucasian farmers and produce men, who begrudged any such development to newcomers.

In the Stockton-Lodi area where marketing was well organized by Caucasian companies, the trend was somewhat different. A number of the young Japanese farmers were becoming interested in farm management on a large scale (for example, leasing or making a share agreement for neglected or absentee-owned pieces of land and then building them up) and in buying up crops on a speculative basis, on the side, rather than in growing crops themselves. They

were just beginning to take the path which the Italians already were traveling quite successfully. The extent to which the young people would have broken away from stoop labor, without the interruption of evacuation, would have depended upon the concentration of Japanese in a given area, size and cash return of their farming operations, and type of crop. One cannot speculate much on a few heads of cauliflower and a few bunches of carrots sold daily in the fresh-vegetable market. But on a year's grape harvest sold to a winery, one can sometimes bargain very profitably.

#### Change in Tenure Status

Probably the most important change in the decade preceding the evacuation was the shift of the Japanese from the manager-laborer to the owner-tenant classes, as shown by the U. S. Census of Agriculture.

California Japanese Farm Tenure	No. in 1930*	No. in 1940
Managers	1816	249
Tenants	1580	3596
Owners (full or part)	560	1290

\* Even though the 1930 figures undoubtedly were inaccurate, in that actual tenants sometimes were listed as managers because of prejudice and fear following passage of the 1924 laws, nevertheless not all the difference between the 1930 and 1940 figures can be accounted for in this way.

Not just the fact that such a shift had occurred, but the fact that it had occurred so recently, affected both Caucasian and Japanese attitudes at the time of evacuation. When operating as managers, Japanese farmers had been under pressure to produce heavily and cheaply. Now as new tenants and owners, they felt under even greater pressure to be successful farmers and, having learned the necessary techniques in the past thirty years, they were remarkably successful. Now, however, their good farming methods and industry worked in competition with, rather than to the benefit of, the Caucasian farmer.

The interest in (a) marketing and the speculative aspects of farming, which finally drew some men completely away from actual farming, and (b) the purchase of land, which held others on the farm, were both phases in an historical cycle of (1) hired farm labor, (2) general farming, usually with insecure tenure as a foreman, share-tenant, year-to-year cash tenant, or small owner, (3) experimentation, culminating in specialization in one or two crops, as farm supervisors, long-term tenant, or owner, (4) maintenance of several operations at once, on crop contracts, in partnerships, and by other arrangements, with specialization in one crop on each piece of land.

#### Agricultural Changes

The lines of competition between various agricultural areas and economic interests in California were pulling tighter, and the Japanese were participating in the general changes in California agriculture. In some areas

the soil fertility was wearing out. In other places it never had been rich enough to support the increasing demand for high production, for example in the Florin district near Sacramento. Finally, throughout the great Central Valley of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers the water table was falling, making irrigation from wells more and more expensive. The large Central Valley Water Project has been planned to remedy this last ailment and the Soil Conservation Service programs have helped relieve the former. However, the effects of a big program like the Central Valley Water Project are felt only in the long run. Meanwhile, the farmers go broke.

Small farmers are out of luck without large capital to make the necessary adaptations, such as setting out new fruit trees and grapevines (some vineyards whose vines are now 60 years old are deteriorating) or making an expensive shift from one major crop to another, as was necessary in Imperial Valley. Some in the Delta and many in Imperial Valley have been forced out of agriculture or into a more grubby agriculture by factors in the State's economy beyond their control, such as increase in operations by corporation farms. At the same time those who were more adaptable, who could shift successfully into neighborhoods new to the Japanese where they were without such aids as the Japanese marketing association, were becoming more secure. In other words there is good evidence that in another generation they would have become typical California farmers.

#### Possible Withdrawal from Agriculture

The propaganda regarding cheap labor, like that on low standard of living, was out of date. The only occupation in which the Japanese since 1910 might have functioned as a sizable body of cheap labor was agriculture. But the Japanese had begun to leave agriculture before 1920. Although it is difficult to get exact figures, apparently between 10,000 and 15,000 fewer Japanese were in agriculture in 1920 than in 1910. Some returned to Japan; some went into the West Coast cities. This trend away from agriculture continued in the decade 1920-30, although not so noticeably.

However, the acreage which Japanese farmed as responsible operators, not as laborers, increased as the remaining immigrants settled down in the new country, although it still was small compared with the total cultivated acreage of California. Acres owned or leased according to the Japanese Association and Japanese-American Yearbook were as follows:

1910	194,797 A.
1920	458,056
1925	304,956

Following passage of the Alien Land Law, both acreage and farmers decreased so that by 1930 there were only 3,956 avowed farm operators among the California Japanese, according to the U. S. Census of Agriculture.

In 1940 there were 5,135 Japanese farm operators, showing a reversal of the previous downward trend so far as heads of families were concerned. In other words, there was increasing security for them. As for the

estimated 7,500 to 8,000 wage laborers and foremen, there seems to have been no significant change in numbers, status, or concentration in one locality in the past ten years. As for the estimated 4,000 unpaid family workers in agriculture, objective Japanese insist that many young people were trying to leave the farm, and the Census figures do indicate a continuing drift into the cities. Encouragingly, there is no indication that more Japanese were moving into agriculture in Los Angeles County, locale of greatest concentration and greatest competition.

#### Weakening of Influence of Little Tokyo

Little Tokyo in Los Angeles was showing signs of weakness long before the evacuation, both as an economic center and as a center of Japanese cultural influence. The young people preferred Bullock's Wilshire or some imitation of it as a place to learn manners, dress, and homemaking. This shift of trade was symbolic of other shifts. Although the process was slower and more difficult than in the case of the Poles or Italians or Norwegians, the breakup of the old-world colony was occurring just the same.

#### Urbanization of Farmers

Although California agriculture as an industry still had in 1942 the old rural feature of much hand labor, it nevertheless had, as a way of living, many urban characteristics. Not only did the farm homes have electricity and piped water, not only were they often of suburban-bungalow style (rather than the big old farmhouses of many other parts of the country), but also the life in those homes had elements of crowded city life. This was especially true on the southern fringes of Los Angeles City.

On his small piece of land, the farmer, nurseryman, or poultryman lived close to his neighbors. Great trucks and buses passed his house day and night. He was perhaps only a mile or less from a settlement consisting of super-market, automobile junkyard, drive-in hamburger stand or "chicken shack," frequented by his sons, tavern (with neon lights), drug stores, filling stations, and the other modern appurtenances of a wide place in the road. His children went to an impressive town high school, like those in Whittier and Gardena, with a plant consisting of three or four buildings that would be adequate for many a small college. His view and his work space were bounded by a fine-mesh network of irrigation ditches, roads, and suburban electric tracks, and by a checkerboard of orchards. These with their evenly-spaced trees all cut to the same size might remind the imaginative person of great modern industrial plants — broad, flat, and neat.

The less tangible aspects of the economy had been urbanized, too, with the kind of industrial urbanization of thirty years ago: intensive production with peaks of employment and seasonal unemployment, many unskilled and semi-skilled wage laborers, a throat-cutting underbidding among individual operators and among associations, and an uncertain and quickly fluctuating market. It is difficult for any people to be socially and economically successful in such a situation, and it was especially difficult for the Japanese.

The first generation coming to a place that is strange to it always has a

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
February 22, 1945

Project Analysis Series No. 21

RELOCATION AT ROHWER CENTER

Part IV. Prospects for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers  
By Margaret L. Lantis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Foreword
- II. Review of Pre-evacuation Experience
- III. Evacuation: Leaving the Farm
- IV. Assembly Center Experience
- V. New Community: Rohwer Center
  - Early Developments in the Center
  - Formal Participation in Center Life by Farmers
  - Informal Participation by Farm Families
  - The Farm Family in Rohwer Center
    - Issei problem
    - Nisei problem
    - Role of the eldest son
    - Influence of the mother
  - Comparison of the Depression and the Present Japanese Situation
- VI. Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers
  - Sources of Information
  - Pattern of Relocation from Rohwer
  - Factors Affecting Resettlement
    - Events
    - Social conditions
    - Agricultural conditions
  - Objections to Resettlement as Indices of Legitimate Problems
    - Reasons for lack of self-confidence
    - Relocation as an escape
    - Practical opportunism
- VII. Trends in Rural Resettlement from Rohwer
  - Changes in the Japanese Farm Family
  - Trend Toward Planned Colony Resettlement
  - Trend Toward Unplanned Colonization
  - Trend Toward Urban Resettlement of Former Farmers
  - Geographic Trend
- VIII. Summary
  - From Evacuation to Resettlement

Table of Contents (Cont.)

Economic condition  
Social condition  
Fundamental reactions to evacuation and to relocation  
center life  
Relocation  
Pattern of resettlement  
Complexity of influences upon relocation  
Fundamental need in resettlement  
Implications in the resettlement program of the War  
Relocation Authority  
Conclusion

## FOREWORD

This is the fourth of a series of articles called "Relocation at Rohwer Center." This report draws together and interprets in a larger frame of reference the data presented in the earlier studies.

Part I, "The Relocated Population," (issued on July 24, 1944, as Project Analysis Series No. 17) described, in general, the composition of the entire Rohwer population and, in particular, the characteristics of that part of the population which had resettled.

Part II, "Issei Relocation Problems," (issued on September 2, 1944, as Project Analysis Series No. 18) concerned primarily the effects of Issei physical and cultural characteristics on their attitudes toward rebuilding their lives outside Rohwer Center. These characteristics and attitudes were considered in relation to the history of the Issei, their origin in Japan, immigration to the United States, settlement on the West Coast, and evacuation from there to Rohwer Center, Arkansas, by way of Stockton and Santa Anita Assembly Centers.

Part III, "Background for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers," (issued on February 7, 1945, as Project Analysis Series No. 20) gave in detail the social and economic position that the rural population of Los Angeles and San Joaquin Counties, from which most Rohwer residents came, had created for themselves in California agriculture before evacuation, and the changes developing in that position in the years immediately before 1942.

This study, Part IV, deals more specifically than the other reports with the social and economic effects of evacuation and assembly center detention on the farm population, the influence of life at Rohwer Center, and the outlook for the future resettlement of these former farmers of Northern and Southern California.

This series of four studies has, it is hoped, significance beyond adding to our knowledge and understanding of the complex attitudes and the social and economic history of the population of one of several relocation centers. Much that has been presented is applicable in a broad way to the population of other centers and constitutes a general outline of one of the immigrant groups in the United States and their descendants.\*

---

\* Most of the material of this report was collected as part of a study on the adjustment of rural families to planned resettlement. The study was undertaken on a Post-doctoral Fellowship granted by the Social Science Research Council in 1942-43. Final data were obtained and the report was written while the author was working in the Community Analysis Section of the War Relocation Authority in 1944. Gratitude is expressed to all people in both organizations who have given generous and effective assistance.

REVIEW OF PRE-EVACUATION EXPERIENCE\*

The original rural population at Rohwer Center came from two of the most productive agricultural areas in the United States, San Joaquin County in Northern California and Los Angeles County in Southern California. Although not all communities represented were equally prosperous, most of the original rural group, and also that which came to Rohwer subsequently, illustrate outstanding characteristics of California agriculture. In fact, the average for Japanese farm operators surpassed the State averages on several points:

Average per-acre value of Japanese farms was higher than California average, for wholly irrigated land.

Average cash rent per acre was much higher.

A larger percent of farm owners paid a high interest rate (over 7%) on mortgages. Their ratio of debt to value of farm was a little higher.

The effect of the high valuation of Japanese farm land was pressure to reduce labor and marketing costs in order to pay high rents and taxes. The Japanese formed their own marketing associations and used the labor resources of their own group, but they did not exclusively hire Japanese.

Their chief agricultural products in Los Angeles County were vegetables for processing and for the fresh market (principally the latter), berries, melons, cut flowers, and nursery stock. There were a few poultrymen and chick sexers. In San Joaquin County, the products of Japanese farms were potatoes, tomatoes (chiefly for processing), onions and other dry vegetables, some fresh vegetables, and orchard fruits, including grapes.

In comparison with San Joaquin farmers, more of the Los Angeles farmers had small acreages; fewer were land owners; and many more lived in communities with a concentrated Japanese population. Many of the San Joaquin operators were old residents, well established and respected. In addition, there was a class of farm laborers.

Before the war, the following trends were apparent among the Japanese farm families:

- Rising standard of living;
- Shift from manager and laborer to owner and renter class;
- Assumption of responsibility by American-born;
- Increasing interest of American-born in farm management and marketing, by taking over farms or making production and marketing contracts on specific crops;

---

\* This subject is discussed more fully in Project Analysis Series No. 20, "Relocation at Rohwer Center. Part III. Background for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers," Feb. 7, 1945.

Weakening of specific influence of Little Tokyo in Los Angeles but an increase in general urban influence from the metropolis;

Increase of competition in farming because of general changes in California agriculture outside any Japanese influence;

Some withdrawal of Japanese from agriculture because of competition and because of a general and gradual urbanization and Americanization of the rural group.

Although some rural Nisei turned back to the farm reluctantly after being frustrated in their desire to go into urban occupations, others were enthusiastic about their prospects as they began to make a respectable place for themselves in California agriculture.

Evacuation ended all these trends.

EVACUATION: LEAVING THE FARM

The Japanese farmers made an excellent record for cooperation and response to government orders. The Farm Security Administration, designated by the Wartime Civil Control Administration to assist farmers in disposing of their farms, found no authentic cases of crop destruction and surprisingly few cases of crop curtailment. Because of general concern over greatly increased demands for food in 1942 and over probable decrease in production by evacuation of Japanese farmers, the community and the Department of Agriculture exerted pressure not to cut production. Also, most farmers hoped until the last day that because of this public concern, they would be exempt from evacuation. Farmer after farmer relates that he worked in his fields until the day before evacuation, often at the last minute frantically instructing and directing his successor.

Evacuated farmers also showed a good record in the voluntary payment of debts. For most, this probably was a matter of self-interest to insure that property and good will would be waiting for the returning farmer. Nevertheless, whatever the motive, the farmers did show good judgment in long-range planning in spite of the stampede effect of evacuation orders. They generally were ready to receive much less income from property than formerly, in order to get reliable renters who would take good care of the farm.

To keep the farms in production, loans from War Food Administration and Farm Security Administration were available to other farmers who would take over the evacuated land and farm it according to plan. Both evacuees and government agencies lost money on some of the deals (although not a large amount) because the new lessees were inexperienced, perhaps had undertaken to do too much, had labor troubles, or falsified to the owner the report of crop sales.

The exact loss suffered by the Japanese farmers undoubtedly never will be known. However, the experience of the Farm Security Administration and other evidence indicate that the loss was not so great as evacuees think. That there should have been any loss - especially any through duplicity and breach of contract by Caucasians - is disheartening. But probably the evacuees have somewhat exaggerated their individual losses and even more exaggerated the loss to the whole rural group. This occurred naturally by a generalization from the experience in a few districts where an unusually antagonistic public, quick evacuation, and panic led to the Japanese virtually throwing away leases, crops, and equipment.

Even without money loss, there was confusion and delay arising from the practice in California, and especially among the Japanese, of holding various small pieces of land in different people's names and of making different share and payment arrangements for each piece. Also, there was the unwillingness of farmers and their lawyers to admit that they had circumvented the Alien Land Laws. In most cases, the farmers simply made bad deals; in extreme cases, they lost their property entirely.

• On the whole, of the two groups at Rohwer, the San Joaquin County farmers

seem to have suffered less panic and to have disposed of their property better than did the Los Angeles County farmers. Among the latter, the much greater differences in type of farming and in income (between small truck farmers and big greenhouse men, between big truck farmers and small poultry men) make it difficult to generalize. Some seem to have made entirely satisfactory arrangements; some "lost everything," as they describe it.

In the following respects the two areas were alike.

1. Both the Los Angeles and San Joaquin County people had been too busy farming to spend much time on Japanese or any other organizations. Political and social leaders within the Japanese rural community were scarce.
2. Both groups of farmers had good Caucasian-Japanese relations in their immediate neighborhoods before the war and neither suffered virulent antagonism after war was declared.
3. Neither group saw whatever leaders it did have all interned in a hasty sweep of the community. Some men were interned, but several of them were released in 1942.
4. Both Northern and Southern California elements have shown the farmer's slowness in making important decisions. Although some farmers have been less able than city people to judge the truth of rumors and have made quick decisions because of frightening rumors, nevertheless the general rural reaction to rumors and events has been to wait and see.

In sum, the country people had lived on the farm and by themselves too long to unite suddenly into an articulate and forceful group. They were unaccustomed to fighting for their rights or of thinking that as a group they ever could fight for them. Very many were old and tired; all were abashed and overwhelmed by the American haste and decisiveness of orders. Within them may have been bewilderment and turmoil, but outwardly they were quiet and stoical.

### ASSEMBLY CENTER EXPERIENCE

In the assembly centers the Stockton people apparently fared better than the Los Angeles people, who went to Santa Anita. Stockton Assembly Center seems to have been neither the best nor the worst. Santa Anita, over four times as large and probably four times as diverse in population, must have been a highly unpleasant experience to the Issei especially. The large number of somewhat backward farmers in Los Angeles County had had no experience with such mass activities, not to mention mass living, and such completely American customs (for example, crude shower-baths) as they encountered in the assembly center. It is doubtful whether the chance to rest, which pleased them in the relocation center later, also appealed to them in the assembly center. The confinement, rules governing visitors and receipt of gifts, low pay, inability to get decent clothing, uncertainty regarding the future, and general physical inconvenience outweighed any pleasure the older and poorer farmers might have felt in being able to take a rest from their 30-year backbreaking labor.

The well-to-do had worked hard also, but they scarcely enjoyed the enforced rest, for they had lost prestige as well as livelihood. Their former outstanding position brought nothing to them now except apprehension through the knowledge that other leaders had been "picked up" and the fear that they themselves might yet be interned.

Contrasting with the Issei reactions were those of the eighteen-year-olds. At both Santa Anita and Stockton, many who for the first time had been almost completely released from the restraints imposed on rural adolescents actually had a good time.

Despite many differences, Stockton and Santa Anita people transferred to Rohwer were alike in being among the last to leave assembly centers, both groups having spent approximately five months in their first barrack homes. The period was long enough to try out and establish interests, social relationships, and activities that later became everyday experience in the relocation center. This long stay in the temporary centers probably was important in the psychological development of the whole group. People somewhat recovered from the first shock, making their compromises with their situation and settling into a routine. They resented moving again and particularly having to move so far away as Arkansas. However, their attitudes had become clearer and more stable, and most of the people could accept another removal now as inevitable.

NEW COMMUNITY: ROHWER CENTER

Rohwer has been called a quiet center. Both the administration and residents have contributed to that quietness. As for the residents, the specific rural background of 53% of them undoubtedly has been important. The traits and circumstances referred to on p. 4 continued to operate at Rohwer, namely,

a memory of many good relations with former Caucasian neighbors and absence of much personal affront from them since the outbreak of war;

the habit of attention to the practical matters at hand rather than to political or organizational matters;

the slow conservative wait-and-see attitude of the farmer.

Early Developments in the Center

By the end of 1942 the evacuees were settled and just beginning to feel at home in the relocation center, having arrived there in October. This arrival approximately coincided with the institution of the relocation program. In other words, the people had scarcely settled at Rohwer before some members of administration and evacuee population, especially the Christian organizations, began talking about resettlement. The reaction was at least one of impersonal curiosity about the resettlement possibilities although not actively and personally favorable.

Through most of December and January, the weather was not bad, and little plots of onions and lettuce around the edges of some blocks looked promising. The climate was pleasant then; the swamps had plenty of water; the soil looked good. Then there was a freeze. Some people replanted immediately and saw their little gardens frozen out again.

Although still frightened and depressed by evacuation and removal to assembly centers and Rohwer, the farmers seemed more uncertain than determined to resist relocation. They seemed willing to consider the possibilities of farming in the Mississippi Valley until the view of Valley agriculture which they got from Rohwer, the publicity of Arkansas anti-Japanese sentiment and passage of an anti-Japanese law discouraged their few tentative plans for Midwest farming. Other developments in 1943, such as the continuation - even increase - of antagonism in California and the process of segregation of "loyal" and "disloyal" provided a rigorous test of personal initiative in resettling and adjusting to American life, a test that most people were not capable of meeting at that time.

Also, the gradual worsening of their financial condition discouraged them. All, of course, had not suffered financially in the same way. Although the initial losses through evacuation were probably not so great as farmers thought, some had so little that when they lost even a little, they lost everything. This was true of wage laborers, paid managers not owning or

leasing additional property, and those renting or sharecropping on a year-to-year basis, usually without contract.

Most of the people had neither income nor realizable assets left after evacuation. Farm foremen and even many managers, although the latter were socially in the same class as owners, had lost their whole income. Along with the laborers and those renters who had farmed only 10 or 15 acres on a year-to-year basis with no hold on the property, these foremen and managers became entirely dependent upon the War Relocation Authority. They had no legal and financial claims or ties with their old homes. They had only personal acquaintances, to which they have clung though the war has weakened or disrupted them.

Very poor families have fared relatively better while in the center than any other class, but they have less with which to start again than those who lost heavily but still kept a little something of their pre-evacuation assets.

Among those who salvaged capital were some farm owners and long-term leaseholders. Apparently few of these owners and leaseholders who managed to keep their property through 1942 have sold it since then. They want to hold on to any California land they have. With many land owners, this idea is still so strong that they are satisfied if they can merely hold the land and break even. Some have gone so far as to dip into savings to pay taxes.

Those few (especially Lodi men) with farms not heavily in debt and with a fair rental agreement now in effect still receive an income from California property. Some of the larger supervisors have investments bringing them also a steady income. But this group is small. (Exact numbers are unknown because people are reluctant to discuss income.)

In those early days at Rohwer Center, in the winter of 1942-43, when the people began to relax and appreciate the physical security of the center, those families who had lost all their California income appreciated the income from jobs in the center. Big families with four or more members working and all members receiving clothing allowances might have combined receipts of more than \$100 a month, undoubtedly more cash than some of the families had received in California. This condition did not last long, however.

After employment was cut in the summer of 1943, it was nearly a year before several members of one family again could be employed at one time. This occurred only when a labor shortage developed in the center in 1944, due to relocation of workers. Meanwhile, cash income from center sources would range from approximately \$40 to \$60 a month in a family with seven children and one or two adults working, and from approximately \$28 to \$50 a month in a family with five children and one or two persons working. This, added to subsistence and medical care, was adequate. But the early hopeful, experimental days were gone.

In regard to local influences from outside the center gates, the difference between Rohwer and Minidoka, for example, is significant. Minidoka farmers,

seeing around them a fine agriculture, resettled in the surrounding region and resettled more quickly than men from other centers. By contrast, the Rohwer people, even though they did not have a really bad attitude, had no local encouragement. The condition of sharecroppers, of livestock, fences, and roads in the vicinity intensified their conviction that even the supposedly rich Mississippi Delta was far from offering an adequate substitute for California.

Also the farm news in Midwest papers gave the Rohwer farmers the condescending attitude that a man who worked for wages "got nothing for his labor" and the man who farmed on his own "got nothing for his crops," in comparison of course with California. If they had put together these two "facts," they would have realized that although a farmer did not receive high wages, neither did he spend much for his living. But the California dream possessed them, and they were not yet ready to face reality.

Strangely, developments in California itself further brightened the aura of the Golden State. As the evacuated farmers got farther away from their land in both space and time, they began to piece together a picture of their rural homeland from former neighbors' letters, newspaper stories, and especially from produce prices and other agricultural items in California newspapers.

As they saw the price of melons, onions, or berries go up and up and heard stories of pickers receiving \$10, then \$20, finally \$30 a day, the more bitter ones suffered contradictory emotions: on the one hand, resentment that they had been denied a share in the high prices or wages, scarcely realizing that the combination of these two in some cases might not be so good, and on the other hand, satisfaction that the loss of their services had been felt in the produce market. Those who better understood the situation were not so bitter and angry, but they were at least frustrated in being denied - through no individual fault - the chance to operate their farms to capacity and show what they could do in their communities.

The general result was a greater appreciation by the farmer of what he had lost and a stronger determination not to start again in what he considered the unrewarding agriculture of the Midwest. It is natural that when the loss of something is keenly felt that thing appears more and more valuable and desirable as the loss is realized more and more vividly. As stated at the beginning of this paper, the evacuated farmers really had lost a business of high valuation.

With the world outside the center, that is, the world they were allowed to enter, appearing uninviting, the center itself was a haven. Almost everyone settled down to make it a livable community.

#### Formal Participation in Center Life by Farmers

The farmers were not indifferent to center interests though momentarily they rejected life outside. They participated in its government and recreation; they worked in their gardens and cut wood.

Although tending to be conservative, slow, and reluctant in making decisions and assuming leadership, Rohwer farmers did take part in the public affairs of the center. In March and April, 1943, before much resettlement had taken place and when the center still had a normal population, farmer participation in center leadership was studied.

Of 33 block managers, 14 were farmers and nursery or greenhouse men. Five other managers from urban occupations had farmer assistant managers (before the employment cutback abolishing assistant managers). Thus only 14 blocks had both urban manager and assistant.

Of 33 Council members, 12 were farmers or nurserymen.

Of 15 on the Board of Directors of the Rohwer Co-operative Enterprises, 2 were farmers.

Of 6 Scoutmasters and Cubmasters, 5 were farmers. The Commissioner and Assistant District Commissioner were among the latter.

Of 9 Girl Scout leaders, 4 young women had farmer fathers.

Of 9 paid directors of Community Activities, none was a farmer immediately before evacuation.

All men in responsible positions on the center farm were farmers. This condition balances the number of business men among the Directors of the Co-op.

However, although there were Issei among both rural and urban members of the Council and Block Managers, they usually were younger Issei. Older men with what often has been called at Rohwer "the typical Issei viewpoint" did not take positions of leadership openly although they took a strong part in block affairs and tried to influence all center affairs. In the early days at least, they spoke somewhat derisively of any men who accepted positions that would in any way represent the administration. Such men, they said, had not been leaders in California and were only opportunists anxious to get a little authority under the protection of the Caucasian personnel. With a few exceptions, the higher leaders of California communities, even when not interned, did not figure in similar positions at Rohwer. However, the Block managers, Councilmen and others from the farm group were men who had been individually respected in California and were respected at Rohwer despite slurs on their office. Climbers, if there were any, must have been in the urban group from which more of the genuine leaders had been interned.

#### Informal Participation by Farm Families

The rural people participated freely in athletic events, talent shows (not as experienced performers but as the most enthusiastic arrangers and audience of such performances), and handicraft classes and exhibits. Their restlessness and enthusiasm for tasks entirely new to them were amazing. Of 1600 enrolled in adult classes in the spring of 1943, the woodcarving classes

had 300, of whom most were Issei men.

Although quiet in that they caused little trouble to the administration, the farmers were not lethargic. They were slow, however, and usually talked a lot before taking any action. Then, after the Issei had approved an innovation, there was a mass movement toward the activity, whether it was the peeling of decorative cypress roots or attendance at meetings of the Parent-Teachers Association. Moreover, although these mass interests were often only escapes from serious problems, they were escapes of a material nature--woodcarving rather than the ouija board--and therein appear psychologically healthy.

#### The Farm Family in Rohwer Center

With their constructiveness, why did not the farmers resettle more readily? To answer this, a closer study must be made of the Rohwer farm family. Since the center residents are not engaged in economic competition, their social characteristics and problems appear more clearly than when complicated by economic struggles. And the social problems themselves are intensified.

Issei problem. The farm family is characterized by a wide gap in age between the Issei father and his children, and a difference of about ten years between the Issei father and mother. A large number of children also means considerable age difference between older and younger children, especially if the eldest was born in Japan. These age factors mean wide differences in assimilation in American life between father and mother, between parents and children, between older and younger siblings. These are particularly noticeable when fortified by sex differences, personality differences, and contrasts in amount of education. Inevitably, there are conflicts which set up natural barriers to family agreement regarding resettlement.

The Issei are an elderly, Japanese-speaking group with about a grade school level of education. Nine-tenths of the Issei are over 40 and constitute 36% of the total Rohwer population; approximately three-fifths of all Rohwer Issei are over 50 years old. About seven-tenths of the Issei speak Japanese only.

Although 58% finished grade school, personal acquaintance with the group suggests that a smaller proportion of the farm men progressed so far in school. The percent would be raised by business men, priests, and others in the urban group who were well educated in Japan and by the farmers' own wives, who are younger than their husbands, remained in Japan longer and had more opportunity for schooling there. Only 3% of the total Rohwer population has graduated from college; the percentage in the rural group, although not known exactly, would not be higher.

Since so many of the older rural Issei are in the old-bachelor laborer class, the weighting of statistics by this group must be balanced by information on the family element of the rural population.

The difference in the ages of the father and mother is sociologically and psychologically significant. The nature of the original migration to the United States and the picture-bride custom account for the greater age of

the father. Even among the younger Issei in the 40-50 year old group who are still begetting children, the discrepancy in age is apparent. A survey of all births in the first six-and-a-half months of residence at Rohwer for both urban and rural families showed that in families in which a new infant had a foreign-born father the average difference in age between the father and mother was nine years, whereas Nisei parents were only five years apart. Issei fathers who were farmers or gardeners had an average age of 40 and had an average of five children including the newborn baby. In the resettlement of rural families, these are significant figures. Although only 13 rural Issei fathers had children born during this period, they seem to be typical of the Rohwer farm population.

That the Issei domination over young adults which has been apparent at Rohwer will continue for some time is indicated by a survey of high school students in the spring of 1943. Of 640 students in the three years of senior high school, only 17 boys and 16 girls, representing 33 families, had citizen parents. Of the junior high students entering senior high school in the middle of '43, none had a citizen father.

One can easily imagine the personal relationships within the many farm families with an Issei head:

1. Young children still in grammar school have a middle-aged father who probably speaks poor English.
2. High school students have a middle-aged mother and a father already referred to occasionally as an old man and very "Japanesy."
3. Young people just reaching adulthood have a father ready to retire and uninclined to approve any new farming ventures by his family, even in California, for fear of jeopardizing the savings that he hopes will give him security in his old age.

Nisei problem. If Rohwer has had an Issei problem, it also has had a youth problem. Whereas their parents were almost uniformly conservative, the 20-year-olds were full of conflicting desires, as they had been in California in lesser degree.

The ones who probably have had to make the greatest adjustments, and in some cases suffered the most, have been the farm girls. Apparently they were quite unsophisticated. However, for the first time in their lives the country girls as a group have been able to compete with the city girls in attractiveness. All in the center had the same amount of time to spend on hair and clothes; they all bought their clothes from a mail-order catalogue, and they could imitate each other. Now, too, the country girls could meet many young men whom they could never have become acquainted with in their old homes, and moreover in natural situations within the center (but outside the home) which the parents could not control. It was an exciting experience to the boys and girls but a disturbing one to their parents. One might think that many parents would resettle in order to take their sons and daughters from such a situation. But there was no uniform reaction by

the Issei.

A few did insist that their children get out of the center as soon as possible. A few others finally decided reluctantly that a girl kept busy doing housework, living in a suburban home isolated from other Japanese, was better off than in the center. Still others agreed to marriages at Rohwer which they might not have approved in California. The majority, however, just nagged at their children and tried to set family curfews in an effort to control them.

Role of the eldest son. Farm families show almost complete unanimity in insisting that one of the Nisei, usually the eldest son, assume full responsibility for family welfare. Preserved in American life by the requirements of farm life and farm management, the Japanese concept of a clearly designated head of the family requires that there always be someone who can fill this position, a person on whom the others can depend. An Issei father who doubts his ability to maintain his family alone in an American community and who has no son to take the responsibility is a poor resettlement prospect.

The personal habits and wishes of the eldest son are humored when he is little. The mother speaks fondly of the naughtiness of her boy (perhaps it is a sign of vigor); yet when that boy reaches maturity, he is surrounded by an inflexible demand that he consider only the family and not himself. At first he must carry out the plans of his elders and accept directions both in large plans and in details of their operation. Gradually the operation of the family business is turned over to him, but he still must accept advice in planning. Finally, he takes the whole burden as true head of the family.

Appeal to the family responsibilities of the eldest son, and you have him. If a given location will be comfortable for his parents, provide work for his younger married brother, provide a good high school for his eldest sister's son and a Sunday School for his own young children, besides a secure job for himself, then he decides to resettle. If he disregards these responsibilities, as occasionally happens nowadays, he commits a sin against family morality.

Influence of the mother. In any important family decision, such as resettlement, much depends upon the personality of the mother although her personal role usually is not apparent in relations between the family and the outside world. Not only have the women as a group been in America a shorter time than their husbands and are unable to speak English, but also a surprising number of them have returned to Japan to visit without their husbands. Hence many are quite old-world, unwilling to undertake new ventures, and exemplars of the classic character of the passive wife, though often more resistant than passive.

Strong conflicts have arisen between some of these women and the husbands who have been in America a long time, too long to return to a Japan in which all close relatives have died. By contrast, other women, also younger than their husbands and possibly better educated, think less about returning

to Japan to die (or even to California) and more about having sons, who are successful business men or big farm owners. They may be possessive in regard to their children, trying to control their decisions, but those decisions are not necessarily reactionary. Between these women who are younger in spirit and more ambitious than their conservative husbands, also unpleasant conflicts have developed. Of course, if the husband is insistent upon having his way, almost any Japanese wife will give in. However, if he is undecided, then she can make the final decision.

#### Comparison of the Depression and the Present Japanese Situation

The present situation of the Japanese at Rohwer resembles that of the general population during the Depression of the '30's in the following ways:

(1) Latent tensions within the family have become acute due to crowding (in the Depression, to save rent) and return to the parental household after the young people had begun to go on their own, to loss of income by the father, and to insecurity regarding the future. On the one hand, parents have up-braided their grown children, have withdrawn adult responsibility from them, and taken an I-told-you-so attitude which the young people have resented but from which they could not readily escape. On the other hand, through the inability of parents to provide fully for their families, protect them from injustice, and adapt to a seriously altered family situation, the children have lost respect for their parents.

A story told at Rohwer illustrates the feeling about family changes, whether it relates a true incident or not: A father insisted that his adolescent son eat with his family rather than with other boys who formed an undisciplined gang, in the opinion of the father. The youth replied, "You can't make me eat with you. You're not providing my food. The government's feeding me." Similar attitudes developed during the Depression. That there was not more juvenile delinquency then and not more now in the centers probably is due to family supervision and to lack of money.

(2) Individuals and families suffer because serious and down-grade decisions must be made. Familiar to center residents are experiences of cashing on on the life insurance, accepting the loss of real property, having to give up former friendships and social memberships, deciding to make a physical removal, to take a different and poorer job than the old one, all of which characterized the Depression.

(3) Dependence upon the federal government: Because there is a general feeling that the States and local communities cannot be depended upon and because the federal government has helped the people in their distress, they have come to think that it must do everything for them, even while they criticize its every act.

(4) At first people longed for the old life and tried to continue it or re-establish it exactly as it was, without adaptation to a new situation. They had a painful fear of any new developments. The individual ventured into new conditions only when his situation had grown desperate and he had

come to think that anything would be better than his present circumstances, or when he had had forceful and convincing demonstration that the new life was not so bad.

(5) As in any crisis, there has been a return to competition and elimination by natural selection. In the Depression, the old, the physically handicapped, and others not perfectly qualified for the few available jobs were unable to support themselves without government assistance. Faced with resettlement, again the old people and the generally untrained and unadaptable people cannot meet the competition inherent in the life of the new settler.

(6) Increased concern over health: Cults that cost little money and promise complete recovery, the public clinic where one can pass the time, visit, and feel that one is doing something worthwhile, all flourish when people are idle and insecure.

(7) The depressing, sometimes terrifying effect of rumors: Rumors that certain groups would be cut off WPA (and occasionally actual orders to such effect) functioned in the '30's as rumors and government orders function at Rohwer today.

Unfortunately, evacuees have had to suffer still other developments which were not present for most people in the Depression. However, the above will remind all Caucasians who went through the Depression of just what the Japanese in America are going through now.

## RESETTLEMENT OF ROHWER FARMERS

### Sources of Information

The ensuing discussion of rural resettlement is based on the following sources of information:

1. Statistical studies of resettlement from Rohwer, such as "Relocation from Rohwer. The Relocated Population," Project Analysis Series No. 17.
2. A case study of 25 agricultural families, including interviews and observation in four and one-half months' residence at Rohwer Center, visits to the families' home communities in California to check general background, and visits to both resettled and non-resettled families in this group in the summer of 1944.
3. Interviews with farmers in four centers besides Rohwer to discuss the individuals' pre-evacuation farm business and their attitudes toward resettlement on other farms.
4. Visits to ten local and regional relocation offices from Utah to New York, and interviews with relocation officers from five other localities.
5. General reports on resettlement prepared by the Authority.

The more intimate acquaintance with a few families was sought in order to see the problems of adjustment to removal from California and resettlement elsewhere from the standpoint of the whole family unit.

### Pattern of Relocation from Rohwer

An earlier study\* has shown that, at least through the spring of 1944, greater numbers have relocated from the following, often overlapping groups than from their opposites: the Christian; urban; better educated; English speaking; professional and laboring classes (in contrast with the middle class); from Southern California.

Not many farmers relocated during the period covered by that study, from October 1942 through January 1944; but those farmers who had left the Center evidently were doing well enough to remain out. Of the individuals who returned from indefinite leave for any reasons of occupational and personal difficulty other than illness, apparently none had been on a farm in a position of responsibility, that is, above laborer status.

Regarding the destination of people resettling from Rohwer, three-fourths went to five states: Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, Colorado, and Utah.

---

\*Project Analysis Series No. 17.

Factors Affecting Resettlement

Two large categories of factors affecting resettlement are:

1. events; initiated outside the group and largely or wholly outside its control or immediate responsibility;
2. conditions; either socio-economic or psycho-social, for which the affected individuals must take some responsibility because the conditions have existed in their group or in their environment for some time.

Events. Some of the following factors may seem to the evacuees to be continuing conditions, but actually they have more the aspect of events. Although not necessarily deterrents of resettlement, they are more likely to hinder than facilitate it.

1. Incidents during evacuation.
2. Internment.
3. Burning or confiscation of California property after evacuation.
4. Land or other assets inherited in Japan, or lost in Japan.
5. Announcements from Japan.
6. Personal experiences in the Center resulting from antagonism between groups, as, for example, between the Japanese-American Citizens League and other groups.
7. Death or serious illness of family members at Rohwer.
8. Family occurrences in Hawaii, in another center, or among relocated members.
9. The draft and events of the war specifically affecting families in the Center.
10. WRA orders on employment, relief, etc.

The detailed histories of the 25 families and their friends show how events like those listed above have affected attitudes toward resettlement, and they answer the question of whether or not a specific occurrence has determined an important family decision. The conclusion after studying each of the 25 families is that one "event" cannot cause a given reaction without the presence of other conducive factors. The question is not simply "What has happened?" but "To whom has something happened?" Pouring salt into pure water does not have the same result as pouring salt into an acid or into a salt solution. Two families, described below, illustrate this point.

Events in a non-resettling family. The case of one farmer who requested repatriation or expatriation for all members of his family would seem to represent a clear-cut instance of misfortune influencing, if not determining, the America-rejection decision, for the farmer told at the hearings for his removal to Tule Lake of his father's death, the accidental burning of his house, and the assets he had in Japan.

Yet acquaintance with the family revealed that it had twice failed in economic ventures in the past 25 years and resentfully blamed the "big fellows." Just before evacuation, it was occupying poor land with no realistic prospect of improvement. Furthermore, the mother was exerting pressure to return to her family in Japan, and the children, who were unusually dependent on their parents, were frightened by the idea of relocating without them. Nevertheless, the family was attractive and friendly and had shown enterprise, for the eldest son had been sent to college for awhile and the father had developed his hobby into a commercial side line.

When all these factors are considered together, who can say exactly why this family wants to go to Japan? Perhaps the most immediate determinants, to which other factors contribute, are the grandfather's death, loss of the home, possession of assets in Japan; the mother's will prevailing over the family; and the dependent attitude of the young people. Not one but many events influenced the family's decision to go to Tule Lake Segregation Center.

Events in a resettling family. In another family, incurable illness which has appeared since evacuation - and due to it, the family believes - and unusually high financial loss at evacuation have not deterred members from resettling. But this family shows many fine qualities of personal ability, cooperation, graciousness, and enterprise; has a background of success in business and agriculture; and, although losing a lot, still has a money capital of several thousand dollars.

The effect on relocation of a specific event can be predicted (or understood) only when one considers large situations in which the event occurs. The appearance of a particular combination of factors in more than one family is significant. The announcement of selective service for Nisei early in 1944 is an example of an event which influenced the attitudes of many families toward resettlement; but all did not react in the same way and were not affected in the same way. Furthermore, the same family might be affected by the draft in more than one way at different times.

There were four types of reaction to the announcement of the draft.

1. No strong feeling, no change of plans. This uncommon reaction occurred in families with no member likely to be drafted, with other interests and slight response to propaganda regarding the racial or international significance of the draft of Nisei. In these families, resettlement plans were unaffected by the announcement of selective service.

2. Strong reactions for or against the United States; shown principally by families also not personally affected but nevertheless responsive to others' opinions regarding the draft. This group has tended to use the draft as a rationalization for or against resettlement, not as a valid individual reason.
3. Decision not to resettle because one or more sons who would be needed on a farm were drafted or seemed likely to be.
4. Decision to relocate and obtain agricultural or war-industry deferment for men who otherwise might be drafted.

In those Rohwer families who reacted to the draft announcement in a different way at different times, the usual first reaction was to abandon any plan for settling on a farm in 1944. The next decision was to send out the draft-age sons, and perhaps other members of the family, when experience showed that deferment might be obtained.

Social conditions. As in the case of events, no one aspect of the social condition of the Japanese farmers leads any person to resettle or not resettle. This can be seen in weighing evacuee objections, other than those immediately concerned with agricultural problems, to relocating in Midwestern or Eastern rural areas. Frequent objections to resettlement are:

1. Isolation from Buddhist communion.
2. Inability of old people to speak English and their consequent social isolation.
3. Isolation of Nisei and consequent inability to marry.
4. Resentment over evacuation and discrimination in general, and unwillingness to suffer possible further loss without restitution by the Government.
5. Position (and attitude) of neutrality of the Issei, who are really between Japan and the United States, not quite belonging to either.

Nevertheless, Buddhists have relocated satisfactorily and without any regrets although in a year in the new locality they have been unable to attend a single service. Some women especially claim that they would be miserable without their Buddhist community and perhaps would be. Their fundamental difficulty seems to be that they have no other interests. Often what they miss is not the religious service but the place of meeting with other women. The resourceful woman who can enthusiastically fix up her new home, raise flowers and chickens, and help her children is less likely to miss the church or the use of the Japanese language.

Incidents in two families at the Center will illustrate these differences between women. The two families are from the same neighborhood in California and have been living in the same block at Ronwer. Both families are Buddhist; the eldest sons of both women have relocated; both women have sons in the Army; both are without a husband, and both eventually will take the whole family out of the center if the relocated sons are not drafted and can continue in their present farming. One, however, will be lonely and unadjusted and may even resist relocation, while the other will go along with her children's plans pleasantly, even eagerly.

In one incident, when the visitor called, the mother and two daughters were present. One girl was a high school senior, the other a junior high school student. The mother greeted the visitor with an even more friendly attitude than usual. At first she sat with the group and looked interested in the conversation. However, as she understood no English and did not ask her girls to explain or translate and they did not offer to do it, her expression gradually became dull and uninterested. Finally, she sat facing the stove, half turned away from the others, hunched over and looking dejected.

In the other family, the mother greeted the visitor with a handshake rather than a bow and introduced her to all present, repeating the names although she did not know all the necessary English phrases. She took an interest in the conversation as always, asking her daughter-in-law or high school son to translate back and forth. For her, there was a language handicap but not a language barrier.

Regarding the third objection, the young people, like their elders, do shun complete isolation from other Japanese. However, it is no longer necessary for every resettler to be a lone pioneer, as in the early days of the relocation program. And one hears this argument less often in 1944-45 than in 1943.

The fourth social situation listed above, involving discrimination, concerns the Nisei particularly. They argue that their rights as American citizens were ignored in the evacuation and confinement in assembly centers, and that they should be indemnified for losses suffered as a result of this discriminatory action. However, many of the far-sighted Nisei have realized that relocation is not a part of this issue of indemnity claims, that evacuees still can make their legal claims even though they have resettled.

Some who are honestly and seriously perturbed by this issue say that their being in the Center may attract attention to and gain sympathy for the Nisei claims. Other Nisei feel that they will get a more favorable attention and a more active sympathy by showing and acting friends in typical American communities.

In connection with relocation, most of the young people disregard moral issues and legal claims. They do or do not resettle on the basis of

practical considerations, of their liking for or dislike of Center life, and their parents' demands. The few who, at the other extreme, make a great to-do over moral and legal issues are, unfortunately, not all genuinely interested in such issues. Some are disregarding the practical demands of their situation and using moral issues merely as their justification.

The position of the Nisei as citizens in a racial minority subject to discrimination is a social condition more fundamental and more important than the current indemnity issue. (In other words, the latter is only a phase of the former.) However, in relation to the relocation question, the racial minority problem does not influence all evacuees alike because they have not all suffered alike, nor have all Nisei been brought up to expect the same things in America. How much particular individuals have suffered from discrimination and how much they may have been intimidated by it are results of a complex combination of events, personalities, and local situations. Although no two individuals have received quite the same treatment or responded in quite the same way, undoubtedly all evacuees want some measure of acceptance in the country where they have lived for many years. No Nisei, especially, really wants to be rejected.

Regarding the effect upon relocation of this factor, racial discrimination, the conclusion is this: With the exception of a few who are purposefully making themselves symbols of a cause and a few who have become indifferent, the Nisei will resettle if offered any degree of social acceptance.

Regarding the fifth objection, namely, the peculiar position of the Issei in American life, the Issei argument runs about as follows: Denied citizenship and, on the West Coast, the right to own property, they have had legal status only as Japanese citizens. Hence, of necessity they remained Japanese. On the other hand, they had a certain economic status in the United States. Moreover, their children had a clearly defined legal position and a half defined social position. Therefore, in their economic life the Issei were American, with expectations of even greater identification with America in the future.

The relative influence of the two national identifications of course varied from person to person, but almost all Issei felt themselves moving somewhere between the Japanese and American cultures, or unsuccessfully trying to combine the two.

The evacuation and placement in relocation centers, which removed them from American life but did not return them to Japanese life, seemed to most Issei to offer them - furthermore, to require of them - complete neutrality. They would not be expected to work for or against Japan or the United States. Although the evacuation was unpleasant and not all Issei accepted it as inevitable, most of them did seem to think that it was not legally objectionable except on these grounds: it had included also American citizens who were committed to America; and it had affected only Japanese among all enemy aliens. In any case, there seemed to be only one thing to do: accept their anomalous position and wait quietly until their two warring countries had fought out their conflicts.

In the face of this attitude, the relocation program demanded that everyone abandon the effort at neutrality and identify himself completely with

America. It looked to the average Issei as if the War Relocation Authority was demanding the responsibilities of American citizens without giving the usual accompanying rights, which were of course beyond its power to give.

Some Issei had already abandoned a psychological neutrality, either by asking for repatriation to Japan or by resettling with the expectation of making a new place in America. To the average American, this probably looks like a simple choice. But the fundamental attitude of the Issei was against the making of any choice. The Issei was satisfied that his position was defined for the duration of the war and should not be re-defined until relations between Japan and the United States had changed.

Probably the least harmful way of leading the Issei to abandon his attempted neutrality is to prove that his children really are American and will be accepted as American. The War Relocation Authority alone cannot do this; but the trend of the war, the work of idealistic groups and opportunistic interests, and the Nisei themselves may demonstrate that time does not stand still.

Agricultural conditions. Evacuee objections relating to agriculture\* are as follows:

1. Fear of cold climates and unknown types of soil.
2. Fear of the one-crop-a-year system.
3. Lack of money and equipment needed for relocation or fear of risking savings, as well as fear that financing will be unavailable in the new community.
4. Difficulty of marketing produce.
5. General labor shortage.
6. Fear of relocating without experienced farm owners as leaders.
7. Desire to return to the West Coast where property is still owned.

Just as the need for a Japanese social life does not, on close inspection, seem impressive as a reason for not resettling, so the specific agricultural needs do not seem quite so important as at first statement. However, they do provide stronger arguments than the purely social ones. Evacuee objections to rural resettlement are evaluated below.

Unknown climates, soils, and types of agriculture. A man would need capital, experience, and personal self-confidence to undertake farming in a region entirely unknown to him, as much as if he were starting a business in a city that he had never seen before. Farming today is a business, not just a manner of living. Some men do have the necessary self-confidence, but most do not.

---

\*These objections are discussed more fully in "Relocation at Rohwer Center. Part II. Issei Relocation Problems," Project Analysis Series No. 18.

When a feeling of desperation is added to the farmer's situation, as it was in 1942, he may plunge into a new venture; but whether he succeeds will depend upon his own qualifications and the farm community's qualifications regarding land, marketing, and other aspects of farming. Desperation and desire to succeed will not alone make a man succeed; he still must have the know-how.

The argument which does refute the objections to going into an unknown type of agriculture has been advanced by the Relocation Division of the WRA, and has been substantiated by observation of the actual progress of rural relocation: a farmer need not go into farming of a type and in a place entirely unknown to him. In the following ways, a drive to succeed does operate, not as a substitute for knowledge but in helping the farmer get the necessary knowledge. If he is willing to begin as a laborer or on a share-crop basis under the supervision of the farm owner, if he or his son can get a job in a small city, using his spare time to get acquainted with the surrounding area, or if his son in college can look around and make the necessary connections, he need not risk everything in a blind financial venture. In short, these objections have strength only when there are other ones to bolster them, such as poor health, lack of any capital whatever, or the unavowed objection: lack of motivation.

Financial difficulties are important. In California the farmer financed himself by borrowing money annually. This was possible because there was a system adapted to big-money crops. Even though there may be a system of loans and crop mortgages in the farmer's new locality, one cannot assume that it will be available to the Japanese who is at best a stranger and at worst an alien and a suspect character. The Japanese farmer will receive as much rainfall as his competitors and supposedly on the same kind of land, but he undoubtedly will not have the credit that his competitors have.

Any type of agriculture that a Japanese farmer is likely to go into requires much labor, special packing, and quick marketing, all of which take money. Money overcomes great difficulties, for example, the fear of resident farmers that the newcomer will engage in "cheap" farming, or the necessity of sending away for seed, plant stock, or other things not obtainable at all locally or not obtainable without conflict.

Before the evacuation, Farm Security Administration rehabilitation loans were available to both Issei and Nisei. Now they are available only to American citizens. Tenant-purchase loans always have been restricted to citizens. Although the Farm Security Administration is willing to make these loans to Japanese-Americans on an equal footing with other citizens, there still is one possible obstacle: a committee of three local farmers must pass on each applicant. In most communities these committee members are responsible and reasonable men. Nevertheless, even without racial prejudice, they may be reluctant to recommend a loan to an outsider without previous knowledge of local farming. Although not an unsurmountable obstacle, this is one that must be recognized and dealt with.

In regard to the Farm Credit Administration and other possible sources of financing, there are difficulties, also. The little farmer seldom is well enough known, has sufficient resources, has a large enough operation to be a good risk.

Leadership and marketing problems. Objections involving marketing organization and the settlement of a number of farmers together, with well-to-do men to serve as leaders, all grow directly and obviously from the California background of the Rohwer farmers. (See Part III. "Background for the Resettlement of Rohwer Farmers.") Such farm leaders can establish credit unions and marketing associations, make contacts with the Caucasian marketing agencies, and direct the pooling of equipment, experience and other non-monetary assets. In spite of their personal suspicions, the small farmers always have depended upon a few leaders. Probably it is more important to give the leaders assurance and motives for resettling rather than to plan a mass resettlement and all its mechanics.

Labor shortage alone need not deter Rohwer farmers since they have a pool of experienced farm labor in the Center from which they can draw out a stream of workers, namely, young men not in military service and especially the old bachelors. Two of the 25 Rohwer farm families given special study are known to have taken already about 35 of these men, and so far only one man has caused any trouble.

Ownership of land or other capital in California and desire to return there will not alone prevent resettlement. Of the 25 families, all but one in the landowner class have sent out at least some family members; and four of the six families who have relocated in toto are owners of land in California. Some of these and other landowners have gone out on a frankly experimental and temporary basis. However, this tendency is not to be deplored or disparaged, as these men will accumulate, by relocating on any basis whatsoever, that store of local knowledge needed by their more dependent relatives and friends.

By scrutinizing realistically and in detail the local financing and marketing facilities and by giving information on them to prospective farmers, probably through their own leaders, the WRA field men can take the place of the former Japanese marketing association managers and others in California who kept the Japanese farmers informed. Although there are difficulties in such a procedure, with tact it can be done.

### Objections to Resettlement Used as Indices of Legitimate Problems

No single factor determines or deters resettlement, though certain constellations of factors do. Moreover, singly or in combination, they may be indices of complex situations or conditions which affect the resettlement decision. The whole family situation with its past successes and failures, its ties with Japan or California, antagonisms within the family, and its expectations and fears is, naturally, seldom presented by the evacuee. What he presents is a specific objection: "My boy has been drafted. Without his help, I cannot farm. Too old." The man who says this may be 50 or 55 years old and in good health. Or he says, "Too many young kids. How I know I make enough to feed five kids?" Yet farmers in all races in the United States have large families, the successful as well as the unsuccessful ones.

As indicators of the legitimate problems, however, such objections stated by the evacuated farmers, and others which they do not state, are worth attention by anyone working on resettlement. The following indices have not been tested and standardized statistically because the sample that was used was not large enough. They are given merely as cues to look for and follow up. In the form in which stated, they are favorable to relocation. Stated in negative form, the list would constitute a series of disadvantages to resettlement. They are not given in the order of their importance.

In all of them, there seems to be a common element, namely, personal self-assurance independent of group assurance.

1. Length of time in the United States if a family head with children; the longer the time, the better.
2. A son over 20, available and interested in farming.
3. Physical adequacy: good health, age under 60. A man over 60 can relocate if he has sons to take the burden from him.
4. Some use of English language; still better if also Christian.
5. A large farming operation before evacuation. Although the large farmer may not want to resettle, he can do so better than the small farmer.
6. Personal experience in wholesale produce marketing as well as farming.
7. Experience in growing three or more types of crops; perhaps the further qualification of successful experience.
8. Unencumbered capital. The city business man might have made money in the import-export business, dealing directly with Japan and remaining un-Americanized, but the rural businessman obtained his products in America and sold them in America. Also he was not so likely to invest his profits in Japan.

9. Intimacy of relations with former Caucasian neighbors.
10. Social position of Caucasians who were known personally in California.
11. Lack of any disillusioning experience in specific personal relations, resulting from war and evacuation.
12. Immediate participation with administration in the relocation center.
13. Unwillingness to believe common rumors; other indications of independent judgment.
14. Many friends already relocated.

Caucasian relationships (9 and 10) seem to be good indices of adaptability and range of social experience. Some Buddhists who were prominent in Japanese organizations were also closely associated with Caucasians and see their future in Caucasian communities. Of course, some in the group who have limited their future to California do not want to resettle elsewhere. However, when they do resettle, they have good prospects of success.

These indices (9 and 10) can be used on the assumption that old California friends have not turned against their evacuee friends (Index 11). If bitterness has developed between particular individuals who formerly were friends, this has been more difficult for many evacuees to bear than a general public rejection of their race.

Despite the early Issei suspicion of the administration of the Authority and of those evacuees who cooperated with it, such participation (Index 12) indicates a lack of resentment or quick recovery from it, assumption of responsibility, realism, and independence of the dominant group whose opinion up to now has been reactionary. The significance of cooperation with the administration as an index has declined due to increased Issei relocation and their changing attitude toward participating in the administration of the center. On the other hand, the number of relocated friends an evacuee has (Index 14) grows in value as an indication of the possibilities of an individual resettling.

Reasons for lack of self-confidence. As stated above, these indices, which were presented in the form favorable to relocation, involve an attitude of self-confidence and independence of a Japanese group assurance on the part of the prospective resettler. Were these same indices given in their negative form, they would show lack of self-confidence about resettlement. The principal reasons for lack of self-assurance on the part of some evacuees are:

1. Several economically unsuccessful or socially unhappy experiences in the past, especially in the immediate past, causing fear of recurrent failure.

2. Complete lack of material resources.
3. Too many dependents in relation to resources possessed.
4. Personal qualities, such as less than average ability, an attitude of dependence, or inability to plan and organize.
5. Mental or physical illness of the family member having the principal responsibility.
6. Uncertainty regarding the draft and other future developments. People may have self-assurance today but are unsure of keeping it.

These are fundamental, long-term conditions, hence exceedingly difficult to change or eliminate. There are many people who are not recognized dependency, medical, or mental cases, but who nevertheless are inadequate in relation to the extra demands made in a crisis like evacuation and resettlement.

Relocation as an escape. Certain common exceptions to the operation of the above factors are mentioned below. In all these factors, relocation is an escape.

1. Desire to start over again if the person has been unsuccessful in the Japanese community in California or unsuccessful in his former occupation.
2. Willingness to leave the Center in search of better health for some member of the family at the cost of loneliness or other difficulties.
3. Escape from gossip or other unpleasantness in the Center.

Practical opportunism. Another factor, quite different from those discussed, is practical opportunism. Some capable middle-aged men with good prospects of success in resettlement think that it is common sense to accept the subsistence provided in the relocation center, where they can save that money they have and take their time to find a location that offers the most security.

However does not seem much influenced by the group seeking indemnity for losses suffered during and since evacuation. However, leaders may have led some to believe that if they wait, they will be indemnified. This group also is not resettling although it may be able to do so.

Back of such reasoning has been the expectation that the war would be long and that evacuees would not be permitted to return to California until the end of the war. Hence they could take their time in deciding about resettlement or making pleas to the Government. However, as rapid developments of the war have weakened such arguments, all those capable of relocating will be under pressure to do so. Therefore, the current questions are not "Who will resettle?" but "Where?" and "Into what jobs?"

## TRENDS IN RURAL RESETTLEMENT FROM ROYER

### Changes in the Japanese Farm Family

About 1940 the Japanese farmers were drifting along as most people drift when decisions are not forced upon them. Until some crisis becomes unavoidably clear, everyone is likely to accept daily developments as mere incidents to be dealt with individually. Then when the crisis comes, those little day-to-day developments are judged in relation to it and its possible outcome. Some are overlooked, while others suddenly become significant and important.

The Japanese family in California was psychologically rural but drifting toward urban ways. The Caucasian farm family in the United States, according to rural sociologists, has more guidance and domination by adults and is in general a more cohesive unit than is the city family. The Japanese family went even farther than the Caucasian in seeking to hold the young people. Nevertheless, without full awareness of the trend, Issei and Nisei were drifting apart.

Apparently the two generations - the Nisei especially - did not realize how great was the gap between them until the war and the evacuation suddenly made each generation harshly aware of its condition, of conflicts in the family and conflicts between the Japanese and the older residents in America. The fearful Issei were more conscious of the possible break-up of the family, remembering that they themselves had left their parents. Knowing that promises to return can be so easily broken, they have not been reassured by protestations of their children that relocation would not break up the family.

Then their parents grew fearful, querulous, dominating and insistent, the young people sometimes in turn became more resistant and assertive than they would have been if allowed to drift. Also, when the Nisei leave their families now, they must go much farther away than they would have gone in California, in miles and in experience.

Thus where there was one wobbling trend previously, there are now two opposing ones:

1. Young people stay close to the family emotionally (actually a retrogressive movement); they ask for expatriation when parents seek repatriation, or accept only the resettlement opportunity that will provide for the whole family immediately.
2. They cut loose from the family by relocating alone and not providing for future relocation of the whole family, or by refusing to accompany or stay with the family in Tule Lake Center.

So far, the former trend has been strong in the four families. This undoubtedly is a normal reaction. After the evacuation, the Nisei quickly came to feel that there was no place where they really "belonged." The one situation in which they had a recognized place and a sense of "belonging" was the

family. Probably they will continue to feel this way until evacuees are sure they can get genuine acceptance and protection from other sources than their own families. However, for the farm family there will remain a practical argument for family resettlement, namely, the operation of the farm.

Those who are trying to assist farm families to resettle doubtless find that no one line of reasoning reassures these families or answers their questions. Some parents cannot face the reality of their children living differently from them or from their conception of what is proper for the Nisei. Usually for them, relocation as a complete family is the only solution. When resettled, the young people and their elders will make their adjustments little by little; and if after a few years they find themselves thinking very differently, they will not know quite how it has happened. However, if the Nisei do not accompany their children through the resettlement period, then the break between them seems irrevocable and bitter.

Unfortunately, people who cannot accept the facts in their own families often cannot accept the realities of their total situation. They do not like to see their children resettle; and they themselves do not want to resettle at all until the end of the war or else not without many others like them, in colony resettlement. They probably cannot consider the relations between parents and children separately from their other specific problems, which become all confused.

The stronger parents who can accept the differences between the generations can face the personal realities of their particular family. Some let their children go out alone, counting on reunion through the Nisei gradually realizing their need for their parents. Some parents can adjust themselves to their children's changing ideas and needs. Others let the older Nisei go their way while they plan for themselves. But these last two groups are very small.

#### Trend Toward Planned Colony Resettlement

Many farmers at Rohwer who are materially or psychologically unable to start farming alone are receptive to talk of colony resettlement. These resettlement schemes have an element common in the older religious sectarian farm colonies: a self-conscious withdrawal from community life outside the colony and an effort to be self-contained. It is a natural but perhaps shortsighted reaction to prejudice.

One of the 25 farm families whose personal histories were obtained belonged to one of the very few groups of Japanese engaged in cooperative farming in California. Their ranch, operated by five families, was successful. One other, about which only a little information is available, had also a small number of operators and also seems to have been successful. In general, though, the Japanese have not had experience in cooperative farming. It should be noted that the more recent and more realistic plans proposed in the centers do not call for actual cooperative farming; but for a colony of independent farmers, who will have cooperative enterprises in marketing and supply. In other words, agriculture cut to a California pattern.

There are two substitutes for experience in cooperative farming:

1. That people have basically the same viewpoint and the same background in farming experience; as one thoughtful farmer at Rohwer said, "that they all know the same things;"
2. That they have a common motivation regardless of differences in background.

This motivation must be focused on two things: a strong need and a strong leader. Whenever backgrounds and expectations differ, there will be conflict between leaders and followers and among leaders themselves, unless their need is desperate, their antagonism to the out-group greater than their antagonisms in the in-group, and unless good leadership expresses the common elements in the various farmers' situations, thus minimizing the difference between them.

Two circumstances in the Rohwer farmers' experience work against successful cooperative resettlement. One that appeared in the Japanese cooperative marketing associations in California is suspicion regarding leaders. Associations have died through mismanagement or through economic conditions that were too strong for the weak co-op, and through lack of faith. Though most Japanese seem to be responsive to mass pressure, they may resist coercion on their individually, exerted by individual leaders.

The second circumstance is that competent leaders with wide personal appeal have not appeared among bona fide farmers at Rohwer. Leaders in the cooperative resettlement movement have been town businessmen with farm interests and a rural following that in most cases was formed in California. Furthermore, this leadership has tended to fall into two categories: the unrealistic, almost crackpot planner, and the reactionary, let's-sit-tight type.

Apart from genuine cooperative farming by Japanese, for which the prospects are not good, there is the possibility of some sort of group farming which we shall call colony settlement. According to a study of resettlement and colonization projects in Europe and America,\* colonizers must have the following qualifications:

1. First-hand knowledge of the particular type of agriculture to be practiced in the new settlement. Lacking knowledge and experience, the following substitutes will help: training on the project, intelligence, strong desire to learn and succeed, capital.
2. Formal education in proportion to the difficulty of the new situation. (Education not such an important factor.)

---

\*J. B. Holt: An Analysis of Methods and Criteria Used in Selecting Families for Colonization Projects; Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1937.

3. Cooperative and harmonious family life. Wife and children must help willingly. (Important.)
4. "A size and age-sex composition of the family that is adjusted to the size and type of farm."
5. Health. (Very important.)
6. Character, stability, sense of responsibility.
7. Intelligence, alertness, resourcefulness, judgment.
8. Strong drive to succeed: willingness to sacrifice comforts.
9. Good adjustment toward community cooperation.
10. "Religiosity or loyalty to an idealistic group, if it tends to sanctify the above agricultural virtues, and if the membership in the religious or other group tends to bind the individual to the group with which his interests are identified, rather than to separate him from it." (Important.)
11. Capital. (Depends upon type of project.)

Most Japanese farmers could meet the first eight requirements, meeting some of them quite outstandingly and satisfying other requirements by selecting families and matching families with various projects in regard to size, type of crop, etc. On community cooperation as on knowledge of new types of agriculture, they would need education and supervised experience. The eleventh criterion (capital) would depend upon the tenth (common interest and loyalty). The Japanese farmers themselves could command sufficient capital if they were willing to start in a small way without big capital and if the well-to-do, respected and responsible leaders were willing to establish colony financing for the benefit of all. Definitely, however, this will not happen unless the Japanese are driven against a higher wall than they have faced so far.

For many, the test of all the qualities listed above will come when they return to California rather than when they relocate in the Midwest or East. Then a strong drive to succeed, to prove oneself, and a loyalty to their group undoubtedly will appear. Fighting for a moral right, for a lost homeland will have both personal and group meaning that resettlement elsewhere has not had. What most of the Japanese lack now in relocation is a driving moral conviction.

The conclusion is that the trend toward colony settlement, a trend in thinking if not in practice, represents an effort to obtain a haven from prejudice and to provide the kind of facilities, especially in marketing, which were available to the Japanese in California. It is not impossible that these could be

obtained by a colony. However, if it were demonstrated that these social and economic needs could be satisfied through the institutions already in the community, planned colony settlement would have little drive and justification.

#### Trend Toward Unplanned Colonization

Several developments in the resettlement of Rohrer farmers demonstrate that the need for economic and social protection does exist and that there is a natural trend toward a congregation of Japanese in particular areas to satisfy these needs, but not on planned projects.

1. Some farmers have relocated close to such cities as Chicago, Cincinnati, and Philadelphia on farms belonging to business and professional men. Such farms offer advantages. The owner's prestige, social position and capital eliminate or ease the Japanese farmer's struggle to obtain these; the salaried job and housing eliminate the need for equipment. Finally, proximity to a big city provides association with one's own kind and freedom from the suspicious and embarrassing personal attention that may occur in a rural neighborhood. As such farms usually are separated from each other, there probably never will be Japanese farm colonies on the outskirts of Eastern cities such as existed on the West Coast. However, this trend represents a weak continuation of the old tendency to congregate around Los Angeles, for example. Psychologically it represents a realized need for sponsorship and protection in the community.

2. Settlement on corporation farms, of which the Seabrook development in New Jersey is only one, is not new either. In the big interior valleys of California where fruit-shipping companies and other large landowners needed farm managers, bosses for their labor, and the laborers themselves, the Japanese were a prominent part of this agricultural element. They worked on a percentage (i.e. on shares), for a salary, on a flat contract, or for a piece-work wage. They are accustomed to being part of a large operation for which they do not have ultimate responsibility; to working in a group, and working for cash. In this situation the corporation - like the urban landowner mentioned above - gives the Japanese farmer a place already established in the community and to some extent shields him from the community.

These are not deplorable developments since the new settler in the course of time will make his own place, especially if he has children. Actually, even this protection is not always necessary.

3. Families from Rohrer and other centers have resettled in one fertile locality in Colorado where they raise potatoes, sugarbeets, spinach and other vegetables on a large scale. Soon after arrival, they talked of forming a potato-growers' association, taking for granted that this would be limited to Japanese farmers even though some of them were farming in partnership with Caucasians. Fortunately, a couple of their leaders decided, with vigorous approval from the local WRA representative, that the association should include all potato growers in the valley. One Wisco farmer said,

"We don't like the percentage to be paid by the owner and the percentage paid by the share-cropper [i.e. paid to the association] that the farmers around here propose. It isn't what we're used to in California. But everyone says it's the customary arrangement here, - I guess they aren't trying to put anything over on us. So we're all going into the association but we'll keep on trying and maybe some day we'll get a better deal for the sharecropper."

This shows how people can resettle successfully. Shutting oneself away from the farm community and its established customs puts off ultimate economic assimilation. On the other hand, the above type of adjustment with old resident and newcomer each gradually giving up something of his old expectations means good adjustment.

#### Trend Toward Urban Resettlement of Former Farmers

Two types of farmers are taking urban positions:

1. Nisei (not only the young ones but also some in their 30's) who were drifting toward urban life in California.
2. Nisei with heavy family responsibilities and therefore a desire to escape the draft, who have taken temporary war-industry jobs. An eldest son, perhaps 26 years old, with parents, young brothers and sisters, and his own small children as moral dependents, even if not financial dependents, is under terrific pressure from the entire family. Some men in this position have resettled on farms. Working on a farm or in a factory is the current toss-up. Ultimately a few may remain in urban occupations. Most will return to agriculture.

A study of Denver County, Colorado, in the early spring of 1944\* showed that not only had most of the evacuees who formerly were in agriculture now resettled in other occupations, but also two-thirds of the old Denver County Japanese farmers had left agriculture. This movement is part of a national trend which probably will slow down after the war.

Commerce and various aspects of urban living are not new to California farmers but the experience in heavy industry and in the retail parts fabrication industries is new to the Japanese rural group. One Nisei farm owner said after only two months in Chicago heavy industry, "I never used to be in favor of the unions, in California; but I sure know now why you have to have unions." The fact that many, like this man, have gone into the smaller non-union shops has increased their appreciation of labor unions but has not given them much opportunity to see just how unions operate. It will be interesting to see how much of this knowledge and attitude they carry elsewhere in permanent resettlement or back to California.

---

\*"A Study of the Japanese Population of the City and County of Denver, February, 1944." The Denver Bureau of Public Welfare; May 1944.

In summary, a cityward trend is not now among the Japanese in the United States, but the nature of the present rural-urban movement may institute other changes among them, such as greater interest in industrial unionism.

#### Geographic Trend

The resettlement in the particular few states to which Rohrer people have gone is like a natural migration, illustrating principles of Nature.

In moving outward from Rohrer Center, evacuee farmers went first to Idaho, Utah, and Colorado, states with irrigation agriculture and some of the particular crops with which they were familiar already, such as sugarbeets, potatoes, and cannerly vegetables.

Next they went to the Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi states that have a fruit-and-vegetable industry and a cut-flower industry already well established. Again, this is similar to California agriculture except that there is little or no irrigation.

The third wave is into New York and New Jersey, with at least an interest shown in the Southeast. Whether the Japanese farmers will swing back finally into Texas and the Southwest seems doubtful, now that California is open to them. However, the lines of further migration are clearly northeast and southeast from Arkansas. It is expectable that a people will seek a familiar habitat in a natural-history sense, or, in human terms, a familiar economic base, because they know what to do in the familiar habitat and feel sure of themselves. Phrased differently, if they do in the new location what they already know how to do, then the results will be similar to those in the old location. On the other hand, if the new location is an entirely different environment, the migrant is bewildered. A different behavior obviously is called for; but how different, and different in what way?

The natural trends of migration and settlement that have been mentioned here (natural in not being enforced) should be understood from the standpoint of the needs of the settlers. They have not done what any outside agency made them do; they have done whatever their own psychological and social needs drove them into.

SUMMARY

From Evacuation to Resettlement

Economic condition. In 1940 there were in California approximately 5500 Japanese farm operators, of whom only about 1300 were owners, 4000 unpaid adult family workers, and 7500-8000 hired farm laborers. This small labor force always seemed bigger than it was because it was concentrated on a few crops, producing high percentages of such things as fresh beans, peas, tomatoes, and strawberries.

Rehwer farmers, evacuated from Los Angeles and San Joaquin Counties, had raised vegetables and fruits like the other Japanese farmers of California; but there were also local specialties. Although the majority of Los Angeles County farmers had been making a fair living, only a few were in the class of the "big farmers" from San Joaquin County, with all that this term implies in social status. Those in Los Angeles County who might match the big potato growers of the San Joaquin Delta and the orchardists of Lodi were the large greenhouse owners, commercial seed growers, and celery growers. These men became in due course a constructive element in the center population.

The evacuation of the farmers was outwardly quiet but inwardly shocking and disillusioning. Even so, the full shock apparently did not come during the evacuation period.

Many could not believe that they would be evacuated, hence delayed so long in disposing of their property that they had to make hasty deals under pressure, with resultant loss. In other cases, the evacuation orders allowed very little time for preparations for removal. However, the Farm Security Administration workers, who assisted the farmers, noted their consistent efforts to pay debts, especially land debts, and to make sound arrangements for the operation of their farms (efforts which, unfortunately, were often unsuccessful). Also, the evacuees have tried to hold on to their farms since 1942.

In contrast with the big farmers, almost all of them managed to keep much of their capital, many rural evacuees lost all sources of income. Those who salvaged only a little savings or perhaps money obtained from the sale of a tractor, but no income to look forward to, came from two large groups:

the wage workers, even including the higher paid farm foremen;

the share-croppers and annual renters who had usually no way of holding their farms except by friendly verbal promises.

Those who were poor in California have fared better while in the center, relative to previous income, than those who had been economically secure. However, they have very little or nothing with which to start an independent economic life again.

Social condition. Although the assembly centers in which the Rohwer people spent the first months of their confinement, namely, Santa Anita and Stockton, were no worse than most other centers, nevertheless they were a disconcerting experience for both Issei and Nisei, especially the former. There the full social implication and practical effect of the evacuation hit them in the form of barbed wire and searchlights, big mess halls and stall-like living quarters. However, those who came to Rohwer and Jerome Centers perhaps had an advantage over other evacuees in being among the last people transferred to a relocation center. During five months at Santa Anita and Stockton, they had learned center life very well; and it was actually a relief to settle at Rohwer and build a more satisfactory community on the barrack-and-block plan.

In the relocation center, surprisingly few mature farmers were morose or lethargic. They made many decorative objects, prepared gardens, attended talent shows, made kites for kite-flying contests, discussed the Co-op, and served as Block Manager or in other offices. Although very reluctant to re-settle, many young Issei and older Nisei had an impersonal curiosity about local farming and about the places suggested for relocation. This outside interest, coupled with their interest in Rohwer Center affairs, indicates remarkably good morale within the limits which the evacuees set themselves. Their whole attitude was "wait and see"; but while they were waiting, they kept busy in the center.

The younger members of the farm families entered even more exuberantly into popularity queen contests, young men's social and athletic clubs (many of which were reconstituted on the old Los Angeles or Lodi form), and women's craft classes.

Political factions were quiet or unorganized (seemingly for lack of leadership, particularly in the farm group), while social groupings received support. However, these social organizations were not so strong and were not taken so seriously that they disrupted the community.

Hence the chief area of conflict was not community life, except occasionally, but family life. Japanese farmers, like most other rural people, believed in family unity and close control of the younger members. However, in California and in the center, the generations were drifting apart, despite the elders' efforts. In fact, after evacuation a choice was presented to the young people even more dramatically than in the old California situation because the differences between life in a relocation center and in an unforced, unsupervised community are more dramatic. Young people had to choose whether to remain with their parents (few families resettled as complete units, at least through 1944) or to leave them to enter a different social world.

Probably one basis of conflict was the ideal of Japanese family unity itself. In the greater age difference (compared with the Caucasian family in the United States) between foreign-born husband and wife, between father and children, there were inevitable differences of experience, formal education,

expectations, and interest in the future. These, added to personality differences, have made it difficult, if not impossible, for all members of a family to achieve the required unity. Yet they always were conscious of their deviation from it and could not avoid feeling guilty.

To understand what seem to be contradictions in the behavior of the individual, for example, his good-natured participation in some activities of the center and his adamant refusal to participate in others, one must consider three fundamental characteristics of relocation center residents.

- A. The evacuees are suffering an economic depression.
- B. There is a high proportion of old people.
- C. The foreign-born have returned to some of the characteristic behavior of the early immigrant, in many cases carrying their citizen children with them.

Fundamental reactions to evacuation and to relocation center life.

A. Difficulties that appeared after evacuation, especially within families, are reminiscent of the Depression of the 1930's in several respects.

Loss of economic security.

Loss of personal security: self-doubt.

Lack of respect for and trust in parents by children, or trust in the children by their parents, because neither can support and protect the other. At least, there is fear that they cannot give support.

Reluctance to make decisions that might move one down-grade economically or socially or decisions that require taking a risk.

Increased dependence upon the Federal Government.

Increased worry over health, family conflicts, and other common anxieties.

Tendency to accept rumor, rationalization, or any escape from facing a genuinely unpleasant reality.

B. Many reactions can be explained by the age of the Issei. In 1944, nine-tenths of the Issei of Rohwer Center were over 40 years old, approximately 60% were over 50. A large segment of the Rohwer population, as in other centers, has shown the following traits which are explained partly by old age:

Slowness of reactions.

Reluctance to start life again in an entirely new situation.

Cynicism and suspicion of motives of those who plan new things and offer help.

Enjoyment of association with other old people who have had similar experience in past years.

Efforts to direct the thinking and outward behavior of young people.

C. When the evacuees were removed from Caucasian communities and placed in Japanese communities (the relocation centers), they subconsciously reverted to the ways of thinking of the immigrant alien colony.

One trait illustrating this process is slowness of response to any program or issue. In the Japanese community, even more than in most rural communities, the individualist is not esteemed. There is no advantage in sticking one's neck out. Hence each person waits to see what everyone else will do, and any concerted action develops very slowly.

This old-country trait was maintained among many Japanese in California because, being afraid or at least unsure of Caucasian expectations and reactions, they would not make decisions until they had observed the experience or received the advice of others who knew Caucasians much better. Whereas in the early days of immigration the rural Japanese were unsure but hopeful, after evacuation they were convinced of the unfavorable attitude of the majority race and became even more cautious of committing themselves to any action in the center or of venturing out into a Caucasian community.

Many farmers who have expected all along to continue their life in America, nevertheless have wanted to be absolutely sure that they would not make a serious mistake in the way they started life again after the thorough dislocation caused by evacuation. In other words, they have not been in a position to gamble. Thus, the Issei's old tendencies are strengthened: it is even more difficult and takes a longer time than ever to discover what is the safe investment during their Depression.

Another trait of relocation center residents is only another phase of this movement to draw the head in and protect oneself, namely, group solidarity. It has appeared not only in the struggles to maintain family unity and in the desire to associate with people speaking one's language, mentioned above, but also in the unwillingness to reveal plans and attitudes to the Caucasian personnel in the center.

When some of the immigrant psychology reappeared after the evacuation, the Japanese turned to their kinsmen and fellow countrymen as if they were strangers in a foreign land. The difference between foreign-born and native-born was especially apparent here. Young people felt that they could confide in Caucasian teachers, recreation leaders, or job supervisors; but their parents typically confided only in each other, even when they could speak English.

There also appeared an effort to maintain status in the Japanese community, regardless of status in the larger American community. Every immigrant

colony, whether Mennonite, Syrian, or Yugo-Slav, has found satisfaction in the esteem of fellow nationals, no matter how much the older residents around them might look down on them or ignore them. It becomes very important to the non-citizen to maintain social status in his colony.

Unfortunately, it has appeared to some evacuees, especially the poorer ones, that they would jeopardize this status by relocating in Caucasian communities. They may have been poor in California, but somehow they were a little richer if they maintained their pride, refusing to take a poor-paying or uncertain job outside the center. This attitude may not be rational, but pride and social position seldom are rational.

Supporting this fear-induced withdrawal into the immigrant colony and its psychology was the Issei's rational analysis of his position as one requiring strict neutrality toward both Japan and the United States. Satisfaction regarding the solidarity and unity of their group and the rational rightness of their behavior in the center explains some Rohwer farmers' good morale in the face of a very difficult and discouraging problem.

#### Relocation

##### Pattern of Resettlement

The types of people who resettled from Rohwer up to 1945, that is, prior to the lifting of West Coast exclusion and announcement of a terminal date for closing the centers, indicate, when classified on the basis of religion, language, amount of education, and other formal criteria, that two fundamentally different types have found the outside more inviting or more essential to them than the inside of the center. The two types are:

those who are more assimilated in American culture, including most of the Nisei and the Christianized, English-speaking, city-experienced Issei;

those who are not assimilated at all in terms of language and participation in Caucasian organizations, including principally Issei in the laboring class.

The former group is more easily explained, being motivated by a general need to escape the confinement of a semi-Japanese community and to get into normal American life that "feels familiar." The second group probably has been motivated by more miscellaneous individual needs. The old single men who have become dishwashers in big hotels in Chicago, the Issei couples who have gone to work in hemp factories west of the Great Lakes, or the somewhat timid families who have lately joined the Seabrook Farm community in New Jersey are illustrations of this group. Some were bored in the center. Some, being poor farm laborers and never having had an estimable position in Japanese society, would not be deterred from relocating by considerations of status. Others followed their children out of the center.

The areas where Rohwer people have resettled illustrate the tendency of most people everywhere to seek a new place as much like the old one as possible.

Rehwer farmers, like the town people, settled principally (to the summer of 1944) in Utah, Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, and Ohio, seeking irrigated land or perhaps muck land where the familiar crops of California could be grown. Just as they have sought a familiar social environment, so they have sought also a familiar economic structure in a geographical habitat similar to the old one.

#### Complexity of Influences upon Relocation

The most obvious conclusion from this survey of resettlement from Rehwer, especially of the factors retarding it, is that there is no one immediate reason why any individual or family does or does not resettle of his own volition.

For example, many of the Issei are slow to join any new activity in the center, and particularly slow to relocate, for all these reasons:

They are old and not so energetic as they were 25 years ago when the Alien Land Laws hit them hard.

As aliens, they are unsure of themselves and intimidated when confronted by the vigorous demands of the nation's majority race.

They are rural people unaccustomed to making fundamental decisions quickly.

They are still influenced by kinsmen's attitudes and expectations, as many Americans no longer are influenced.

On top of such fundamental reactions are many immediate practical considerations, for example how to communicate with one's neighbors if one's English is not good; how to be sure that one's crops will be properly marketed and so ensure income; how to decide the amount of capital one dare put into a new venture when there still is a mortgage in California to be paid. Finally, some one argument wins the resettlement debate. Whether the winning argument is pro or con depends upon these:

1. Events in the individual's experience, perhaps far back in his past.
2. The individual's personality, his basic attitudes, and his sensitivity to group opinion.
3. His own resources, relative to the demands upon him and to the resources which he can command to supplement his own; in other words, the immediate situation in which he finds himself in relation to a larger socio-economic situation to which he must adjust.

### Fundamental Need in Resettlement: Personal Self-confidence

The genuinely important factors operating in relocation seem to be at opposite extremes:

basic attitudes;

immediate and specific practical matters.

Those who have a deep-down hopefulness will not be intimidated by ordinary practical difficulties, especially if these are encountered one at a time. However, finally even such people may be overcome by an accumulation of many difficulties. On the other hand, those who feel hopeless or antagonistic may develop confidence slowly from many little things just as effectively as from a sudden fundamental change in their life-situation. Either confidence or despair can be built up bit by bit.

Unfortunately, there is little prospect of any large spectacular occurrence big enough to neutralize all the suspicion, disillusionment, and defeatism of the evacuation, not even the opening of the West Coast being sufficiently convincing in itself. Therefore, a feeling of self-confidence, even in the face of America's racial prejudices and practical wartime difficulties, must be built by a hundred different reassurances, concretely demonstrated. Gradually the weight of evidence is strong enough to move one person and then another from a state of indecision. Then these people make up a group opinion and exert pressure on the more negativistic. One family is reassured by the action of another family, and finally a group movement is under way.

The objections to relocation recorded in this series of papers on Rohwer Center and its arguments replying to the objections show that the need of every prospective resettler (now including almost the entire remaining population of the centers) is self-confidence, as much personal self-confidence independent of group reassurance as possible.

Yet many evacuees, especially the older people, have not had for a long time and will not have now very much individual confidence. They rely upon the judgment, resources, and reassuring solidarity of their own group. Nevertheless, a psychologically sound principle in dealing with a psychologically depressed people is to build individual and family confidence. Factions and age groups, neighborhoods (blocks) and even communities may grow weak or break up entirely; but the individual and his family must go on somehow.

The problems of financing and marketing are examples of specific points on which the farmer needs reassuring proof, not words of reassurance.

Many Japanese farmers in California had small acreages, which nevertheless had a high money-value. To make a profit on expensive land, the farm operator had to farm intensively and shrewdly. Also, the Nisei, who were beginning to assume responsibility by purchasing land or making long-term contracts, were under special pressure to make their farm business pay. Financing and marketing therefore became crucial considerations for all farmers, big and little.

Japanese farmers marketed most fresh produce through Japanese wholesalers or cooperative marketing associations. To produce their crops almost all borrowed money annually, usually from produce merchants. The big crops for processing also depended upon a well organized system of relationships between producer and marketer, the latter being a cannery company, winery, or other Caucasian business.

Thinking of his past experience, the relocating farmer is not reassured by a statement that "community acceptance is good." He surmises that the "community" comprises a few Christian ministers, a greenhouse owner or head of some other small business who needs labor desperately and will employ 10 men, the president of a woman's club who would like to have a girl take care of her children, and the high school principal. All well and good; but can these people guarantee that he, the resettling Japanese farmer, as well as the "old customers," will get seeds and crates? Several kinds of vegetable seeds and materials for packing have been scarce. Will the local bank or shipper consider him a safe risk for a loan? He is a stranger with, possibly, no co-signers and no collateral except an intention to farm and the promise of a piece of land. The best evidence answering his question is a specific statement on one Japanese farmer whose needs have been satisfied, telling exactly how.

When these questions on financing and marketing are answered, questions on other topics arise. If they also can be answered satisfactorily, gradually the settler understands what his particular position in the community can be.

If the individual cannot see how all the essential relationships of his life can be established in some community in New York or Georgia or California, he then wants to take his community with him when he resettles or he insists on staying in the center. Unsatisfactory as it may be, at least the evacuee knows his status in the colony community of the relocation center.

#### Implications in the Resettlement Program of the War Relocation Authority

The particular form and problems in the resettlement of the evacuated Japanese and Japanese Americans pre-figure a type of resettlement that will occur in Europe and Asia after the present war, entailing

removal of people from a government-enforced camp or government-sponsored colony, and

provision of services helping resettlers establish themselves individually in normal civilian life.

The War Relocation Authority has not made loans to resettlers, or provided land on which they can settle. It has not relocated people in a mass movement, with trainloads of colonizers or returning evacuees. It has not guaranteed to return them to the specific homes and jobs which they left.

It has offered services of information and counselling, and has given small cash grants. It has itself made part of the investigation of housing, jobs, and other facilities on which the information and counselling services rest. It also has given a service of information to the public, about resettling evacuees; and it has sought from other agencies protection for the resettlers.

Perhaps the experiences of WRA can help other resettlement agencies, if one condition is kept in mind.

Although there may be similarities in the resettlement techniques between the relocation of Japanese evacuees and of evacuated populations in war-torn countries, there is perhaps a fundamental difference in the psychology of the evacuees themselves. Most of the displaced peoples of Europe, for example, will return to home communities physically disrupted but not antagonistic to them. The Japanese evacuees, in contrast, have the psychological traits of a minority people who have been and probably will continue to be discriminated against. One analogy is the situation of the Jewish refugees who may hesitate to return to parts of Central Europe. Another analogy is provided by people in territories that have been transferred from one nation to another and are now or will be under a new dominant people.

Even so, it can be expected that almost all resettlers in battlefield nations will have the characteristic of the great migrations of modern times: a desperate past but a tremendous hope for the future. The difficult task of the War Relocation Authority has been the building of a realistic hope, and especially the building of hope when so little material help is given.

#### Conclusion

The evacuees' need to have reassurance of security in the present and hence hope in the future is shown by their bitterness over changes in administrative policy or anything that seems to them inconsistent, even when new policies are intended to help them; their efforts to maintain group unity; their anxiety to hold to what they have and risk nothing on the future. Therefore, two parts of the War Relocation Authority's present relocation program seem especially good in satisfying this need, although other parts of it are recognized as valuable, also. Since the Authority is a service agency so far as resettlement is concerned and since its resettlers are a special ethnic problem, the following services are essential, no matter how difficult it may be to provide them.

- A. As consistently honest and concrete information as possible should be given on as many subjects as the evacuee is interested in; given directly to the individual and in a form that he can use. Since the important prospective resettler now is Issei, the information must relate to Issei experience and be well written in his language.
- B. Family counselling is sound and should be continued, as the family now is the basic unit in relocation. Since the counselling must avoid superficiality, it should be adroit in reaching into fundamental personal problems without giving offense. The counsellor should be aware constantly of the resettler's basic needs.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section

Project Analysis Series No. 22  
April 17, 1945

A TYPICAL BLOCK AT TULE LAKE CENTER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction
- II. Segregation and Old Tule Lake
- III. Block Government
- IV. Block Statistics
- V. Block Socials
- VI. Block Religion
- VII. Block Sports
- VIII. Block Messhall Organization
- IX. Three Groups of Block Opinion
  - Relocation Prospects, One Group
  - Two Different Groups of Expatriates or Repatriates
    - Radical Group
    - Conservative Group
- X. Final Note

INTRODUCTION

The block, more than the ward or project-as-a-whole, is the important unit at Tule Lake. Covering the period from segregation in August, 1943, to February, 1945, this report was written by a former resident of Jerome Relocation Center who now resides in the Tule Lake Center in the block which he has here selected to describe as an average or typical block at Tule Lake. The author is on the staff of the Community Analysis Section at the center.

The block selected is called an average block because

1. It is centrally located in the old area
2. Contains people from all centers -- Jeromers, Topazeans, and old Tuleans
3. Is predominantly Buddhist and rural, though not exclusively so
4. Has an average percentage of Issei, Nisei, and Kibei, married and single
5. Has responded in an average way to the affairs of the center

SEGREGATION AND OLD TULE LAKE

In general, compared with recent developments Tule Lake prior to segregation was a moderate center in spite of an incident caused by the Army registration during the early part of 1943. Those Tuleans who remained behind after segregation were in the main a more conservative group who refrained from active participation in such radical movements as later occurred.

Segregation was not just another mass movement of evacuees from place to place. It was similar to the movements from Assembly Center to Relocation Center except that this time there was a fixed program whereby all so-called disloyal elements were transferred from other centers to Tule Lake and then scattered among the various blocks.

Because the majority of the segregees had requested either repatriation or expatriation, Tule Lake represented a welcome refuge for them as so-called disbyals where everyone had "a common ambition." The incoming segregees were a mixed group of farmers, fishermen, laborers, teachers, business and professional men. Having come from widely separated places, a variety of social, economic and political differences were involved.

The newcomers, as a whole, spoke constantly at first of the inactiveness and coolness of the Tuleans toward the earlier and "long-standing inefficient management of the center." Whether in Mess Operations, Housing, Sanitation or other facilities, Tule Lake was said to be far below the standard of other centers. Ostensibly, because of these reasons, the more aggressive elements organized to bring improvements to Tule Lake by negotiating with center administration. This rude awakening of old Tule Lake eventually brought a series of social and political changes to the colonists.

#### BLOCK GOVERNMENT

At first, the blocks had no unity because of their settlement by total strangers from different centers. Later, the blocks were split by "factional politics." In time, the block came to be an independent community governed by an elective body chosen by the block residents. These elections were held semi-annually and were usually organized by Issei residents or family heads. Interested Nisei of voting age were also invited. Furthermore, in some blocks, Nisei managed to take an active part in block government. This elected committee of the block was responsible to the block residents, and all block activities were carried on with their sanction, advice and supervision. Notices of meetings of any sort were communicated to the people of the block through announcements by the Block Manager in the messhall. (Block Managers are generally considered more or less as messengers on the WRA payroll.) The Block Manager in this specific block did not take any action without first conferring with the committee of block advisors. Sports activities alone were left to the younger people to do as they wished, but otherwise Issei opinion dominated the block.

Although women did not participate in politics, they could attend meetings if they wished, and on special occasions women and children were asked to attend.

BLOCK STATISTICS

1. Among the 235 people in the block are 50 families and 26 bachelors.
2. Of the 165 residents over 18 years, 90 are male and 75 are female.
3. Of the 70 residents under 18 years, 25 are male and 45 are female.
4. Of the 4 relocated persons to date, one is male and 3 are female.
5. There are 5 soldiers on active duty related to residents in the block.
6. Of the 4 ex-stockaders in the block, one is a Tulean Issei, another is a Topazean Kibei, and two are Hawaiian Kibei.
7. As the result of the November incident\* in 1943, one Tulean family of 5 members in the block was transferred to Santa Fe.
8. Hoshidan-Hokoku\* radicals transferred from the block to Santa Fe numbered 12. Of the 7 Nisei, 4 were Jeromers, 3 were Tulcans; of the 3 Issai, 2 were Jeromers, 1 was Tulean; and of the 2 Kibei, one was a Jeromer, the other was Tulean.
9. Block members of the Hoshidan-Hokoku radical group number 53. Of the 14 families among them, 7 are Jeromers, 6 are Tuleans, and 1 came from Granada. There is 1 bachelor, a Tulean.  
  
24 of the 53 are Issei (13 males, 11 females); 26 are Nisei (7 males and 7 females over 18 years; 6 males and 7 females under 18 years).
10. 5 marriages have taken place in the block to date.
  - a. Wife Nisei 21 years  
Husband Kibei 26 years
  - b. Wife Nisei 20 years  
Husband Kibei 29 years
  - c. Wife Kibei 23 years  
Husband Kibei 24 years
  - d. Wife Nisei 21 years  
Husband Nisei 23 years
  - e. Wife Nisei 21 years  
Husband Kibei 25 years
11. Places of origin represented in the block population in order of numerical importance are: Clarksburg, Sacramento, Stockton, and San Francisco (all in California); Seattle, Washington; Los Angeles, California; and Hawaii.

---

\*See "The Tule Lake Incident," Project Analysis Series No. 14, March 27, 1944, Community Analysis Section.

\*Japanese patriotic organization in Tule Lake.

### BLOCK SOCIALS

The Issei men spend a great deal of time playing "Goh" (Japanese checkers) or "Shogi" (similar to chess). Some belong to the "Utai Kai", a singing and dramatics society. Another popular pass-time, if one is not working, is to gather in groups at someone's home, or on cold days in the washroom or boiler-room, or in pleasant weather on the outside benches to discuss current events. Usually, center social conditions, world politics, and news are discussed.

### BLOCK RELIGION

The majority of the block residents are Buddhists as are the majority of the people of this center. Services are held on Saturdays and Sundays in the ward church situated in the middle of the ward. The majority of the people are of the Shin sect of Buddhism which is also the largest in the center. A small group belongs to the Nichiren sect and has services on Sundays in the block recreation hall. Christians are very few and far between, at the most only two or three families. There are seldom block discussions or quarrels resulting from religious differences.

In the center are 28 Shinshu Buddhist Reverends and 3 Nichiren; of the 4 Christian ministers in the center, two are Japanese and two are Caucasian.

Some of the residents attend a special five o'clock Sunday morning service held by a well-known Reverend in the center. The service is only one hour long but sometimes it is held at a place a mile or so away at the other end of the center from Block X. Even in below-zero weather, the people attend faithfully. This Reverend speaks of matters of daily significance. He is a very broad-minded liberal person of good social background. He holds these special services because of popular demand. His services are always non-political sessions.

### BLOCK SPORTS

The block elders are sometimes the backbone of sports activities. They give financial assistance and act as advisors. They also have their fun (when they do) and they take their families and friends with them to the athletic events.

The following is a sample of what actually happens in this one block:

During the summer of 1943, the blocks had organized some Old Men's Soft-ball Teams. Only gray-haired and middle-aged men were the participants. They had to compete center-wide on a block basis. With donations collected, a block team bought balls, caps, and T-shirts plus all the other necessary equipment. Though the team from Block X practiced as hard as time permitted, they could never win a game. Although this team did not gain any honors that season, the people in the block supported them, following the team wherever it played. They even went so far as to change the regular meal-time hours so that the games would not be missed. Sometimes lunches were prepared by the mess crew for the entire block population so that they could witness the game. They had a slogan -- "Let's hope today isn't just another picnic." They lost so often, it wasn't funny, but they all enjoyed it.

The sports activities of the residents in order of preference are hard ball, soft ball, basket ball, ping pong, tennis, volley ball, weight lifting, and football. These games are either played on the block lot, in the High School gymnasium, or between the firebreaks. Recreation halls are used for games like Goh and Shogi that do not take up too much space. In some blocks, there are out-standing teams in baseball or basket ball. This block, however, is just average. It has no block Seinen-dan as the basis for teams and activities -- a situation found in the minority of other blocks.

#### BLOCK MESSHALL ORGANIZATION

The operation of the mess is considered the most important activity of the block residents, for it is from the mess only that daily food supplies can be obtained rationally. Contacts with the block residents are continuous at this point. To have a friendly mess crew is important for one has to go to the messhall at least three times daily. Bearing the circumstances of being fenced in makes one feel very small and crowded; little things which in ordinary daily life would not matter at all seem to irritate and bother everyone.

Camp life is dull and monotonous since working more hours or exerting more energy will not bring in return a larger income or amusement. Everything is routine which makes the people very high-strung, rebellious, and aggressive. These people should be handled as spoiled children and very diplomatically, for camp life has made of them a keg of walking dynamite. These facts can only be understood by living in the environment. The mess, being the central point of organization of the block used by everyone, makes the control of this department very important. The group which commands the respect of the mess chief and crew, or wields authority over them more or less becomes the leading control of the block, morally, socially and physically, and sways the block's every action.

In general, the blocks in the center have three distinct groups all with differences of opinion and ideals based on future plans. These different groups try to obtain control of the mess by having their members hired into leading positions. During segregation a complete reorganization and restaffing of the messhall was effected. The majority of the mess workers were terminated with the approval of the WRA when reasonable evidence by the block people was accumulated against them. The chief and his subordinates were charged with pilfering and using for their own personal use food supplies rationed out to the block people; and with taking extra privileges without the people's consent. As a penalty, some of the more shady characters were blacklisted by the WRA from obtaining work for a time. The chief cook, feeling uncomfortable and guilty over his actions and fearing reprisals by the center people, made a hasty relocation exit soon thereafter. Some of the innocent workers were retained and are working in the present mess crew.

The present crew includes people who want to expatriate to Japan, but have no radical ideas or hostile feeling towards the administration (this is also true of the majority of the residents in this block). Until the day of exchange comes along, it is the wish of the people, of the majority, to abide by the laws of the government and make their stay here as pleasant as possible. They understand that there is a war on and that many are sacrificing their lives and property all over the world. About ninety per cent of the adults are in the group which has the controlling voice in the block and its mess. A few of the crew joined the radical movement but were recently picked up and shipped out of the center by the Justice

1944 - 1945

Department for disturbing the peace of the center and indulging in the activities of an illegal organization. The policy now is to treat all residents alike no matter what their status. No preference is given to any individual or group.

Though there are complaints concerning food every once in a while, the residents know that this does not concern the mess crew. Supported by the people, the mess-hall has been running smoothly and continuously improving as its crew gathers more experience.

### THREE GROUPS OF BLOCK OPINION

Below is an attempt to indicate three groupings, or shadings, of block opinion. The classification of opinions has grown out of over a year of observing block-resident thought on the subject.

#### Relocation Prospects, One Group

This block, like all others, has a few people who might be called relocation prospects. Because people are loyal to the United States, have property or other holdings "outside", or believe that democracy is the proper form of government, they will eventually desire to relocate and start life anew. Now they are waiting for the present war hysteria and racial prejudice to subside or be controlled. They are a minority group in the block, but so far as their loyalty is concerned, there can be no doubt. Many of these families have already given their sons to the war effort of this country. They are willing to fight and stand by their principles, which are democratic. Some are bachelors who have relatives elsewhere. These people are cool towards all actions aggressively aimed at the WRA, and they consistently follow the group that is conservative if "political" pressure makes it seem necessary to follow a given course. Sometimes these people are referred to as the fence-sitters, who are waiting for the clouds to clear.

#### Two Different Groups of Expatriates or Repatriates

Then there are the two groups, called "disloyal", which consist of people who have expressed their desire to repatriate or to expatriate to Japan; the majority of these desire to be included at the earliest possible date in an exchange if possible. These two groups do not under any circumstances desire to relocate. Because they fear forced relocation and compulsory draft, they are taking whatever action they believe helpful to prevent such situations. They frequently state that such action on their part is necessary because of inconsistencies in the policies of the U. S. government which they claim to have experienced. They will probably continue to be distrustful of future policies of the U. S. government. Though both groups have similar ideals in mind, their means of attaining their goals are altogether opposite. These two elements constitute the majority who command the respect of the people of the center. Of the two, one is radical in its views and actions, while the other is conservative and law-abiding.

Radical Group. These people show their complete hate and distrust of the U. S. government by drastic actions which are both detrimental to other law-abiding Japanese within the center and also undesirable from the point of view of the

rules and regulations of the WRA and the Justice Department. Although it is the minority group when compared with the "conservative" disloyal group, the individuals are very high-strung and uncontrollable. Their stock remark is that they are the only "true Japanese", although the great majority of the residents hardly agree. The radicals even go to the extent of using force and violence within their own group to hold it intact by putting pressure upon its members. They seem unreasonable and "one-track" and appear to care not in the least for the welfare of their fellow-residents. They further exhibit hostile and disagreeable attitudes which make social functions impossible in many blocks. The majority of the membership in the radical group consists of mild country folk who respond to the pressure of a few extreme leaders -- name-mongers -- who seem to be immune to common sense and gentlemanly ways, but who, in some cases, carry the country people along with them.

The recent order by the Justice Department for the group to disband and cease activity has greatly diminished its membership, especially since the ranks have been depleted by shipping the majority of the influential members out of the center. The strength of the present organization is questionable. Many of its members are quietly withdrawing, either afraid of reprisals by the Justice Department or becoming aware of the foolishness of their previous actions. Though they believe themselves to be the only "true Japanese" in the center, this claim is received with skepticism on the part of the majority of residents who believe their actions contrary to their words. Indeed, their antics are frequently contrasted with the ways of the old Japanese samurais (warriors) "who kept their word once it was spoken, and never drew a sword unless for a purpose." Parading and flag-waving in a center still under lenient care is looked upon as cheap exhibitionism and a disgrace to the Japanese people. The majority believe in working things out in a gentlemanly fashion "as proud people of a first-class nation."

Conservative Group. In this group are the people who have requested repatriation or expatriation to Japan. They would prefer an exchange, if possible, at the earliest date. About three-fifths of the people of the center fall in this category. Although there is no question of their loyalty to Japan, they feel that the countries involved are at war and that people are sacrificing their lives to protect their respective nations. While many were evacuated from their homes in a sudden action which often resulted in losing practically everything they had, they figure that this is now so much water under the bridge and that it's too late to do much about the past. Now that they have chosen to become Japanese subjects, they believe it is up to them to comport themselves in peaceful and law-abiding fashion. Being thankful for the shelter and food provided by the government, and realizing that the tax-paying citizens of this country are being deprived of many luxuries, this group is anything but wilfully antagonistic. As long as the policies of the WRA make for livable conditions here, this group sees no reason why they should act in a manner hostile to their guardian. They ask no favor but to be left alone to pursue their ambition of returning to Japan. But should the attitude of the WRA or the Justice Department change in such a way as to interfere with their possibility of remaining in the center as disloyals waiting for exchange, they will no doubt respond in a manner of utmost hostility to whatever administration exists at the time. These people are complying with every request which is reasonable. They are "taking their medicine" quietly. But if aroused by unfair treatment, they will certainly respond. If this law-abiding, conservative group is aroused, it would easily enlist the sympathy of the center.

1944 - 1945  
22

Because of their desire to be pleasant and understanding, these people keep the block on an even keel and earn the respect of all concerned. They desire to aid the majority of their fellow-residents and at the same time wish to respect and be respected by the people of this nation and its administration. These people want to say when they do go to Japan that they left friends in the United States who regarded them as decent, self-respecting individuals. They think hopefully of a better future abroad, but do not turn away from this nation in hate and passion.

FINAL NOTE

This discussion of an "average block" is Tule Lake in the microcosm. Multiply it by 75 blocks, add the peculiarities of blocks "less average", and one has, I think, the outlines of opinion and community organization for Tule Lake as a whole.