

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
March 27, 1944

038  
RESTRICTED

Project Analysis Series No. 14

THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Less than a month after the last trainload of segregees from the relocation centers had arrived at Tule Lake, the Army moved in to take control of the center. This followed a four day period of crisis in evacuee-administration relations, during which the whole administrative staff as well as the evacuee population were stirred and some violence broke out.

The Crisis of November 1 - 4

The Demonstration. The first and most significant event of the crisis took place on the afternoon of November 1, 1943. On the morning of that day the National Director of the War Relocation Authority arrived at Tule Lake on a routine visit. At noon announcements were made in many of the mess halls urging the residents to go to the administration building immediately after lunch. Some announcers said that the Director would make a speech to the assembled evacuees. Others said that the people should go "to back up the committee" which would present some demands for the betterment of the project. These announcements were not authorized by any member of the administration. They were conceived and carried out by a group of evacuees.

Young men were posted in each of the blocks, some with whistles, who directed persons as they came out of the mess halls to go to the administration buildings. A group of some 200 men preceded the crowd up out of the center and stationed themselves at the motor pool and around the administration area. As the people walked up they were directed by these men to gather around the main administration building. By shortly after 1 o'clock there were about 4,000 people concentrated around the building and between it and the hospital. Several hundred more came up during the next half hour. Young men who stood at the edges of the crowd throughout the afternoon kept people from leaving. Only a few, as they wearied during the long wait, managed to straggle back through the cordon of evacuee guards.

All afternoon the 5,000 evacuee men, women, and children remained in the administration area. The children played. The men and women chatted or stood silently. Some boys clambered over parked cars; a couple of boys put dirt in gas tanks; some radio aerials were bent and stolen. Other than this sort of minor damage to parked cars, there was no destruction of property. The crowd was quiet for more than three hours, waiting for the appearance of the National Director.

The evacuee organizers of the crowd worked to a very definite plan. Their first objective was to bring as many evacuees as possible around the administration building. The second was to keep the appointed personnel

of the project inside the administration building and to prevent anyone from entering or leaving the project. Partially successful attempts were made to obstruct the exits from the project, and a few were at first prevented from leaving, though some eventually got through.

Evacuee men, going about in small groups, told Caucasians working in the warehouses to go up to the administration building. Caucasians shopping at the Cooperative store and others encountered anywhere in the administration area were told to go to the main administration building. Those who were inside the building were, with a few exceptions, not allowed to come out. They were met at the doors and told politely, but firmly, to stay inside. So long as the Caucasians did not insist on going out, there was no violence. A few who did resist were pushed or threatened and eventually went back in. Several Caucasians through careful diplomacy or presentation of reasonable excuses were permitted to pass unmolested through the crowd. The main objective, however, of concentrating almost all the appointed personnel in the main administration building was accomplished. Throughout the afternoon they remained there going about their usual duties or looking out at the evacuees.

The third objective of the organizers of the crowd was to present, in the midst of this situation, a number of requests to the National Director of the War Relocation Authority. He, along with members of the local project staff, had heard of the unauthorized gathering of the crowd almost as soon as it began to form and went to the Project Director's office in the administration building to await developments. After the crowd had assembled, a group of seventeen evacuees -- the evacuee committee -- appeared at the Project Director's office and asked for an audience. They were admitted and sat down with the WRA officials for a meeting. At the same time a loud speaker system was set up by evacuees at the front of the building. The meeting with the committee continued for three hours, while the crowd stood outside.

The situation was later described as tense by a majority of the Caucasians who went through it. For the most part they stayed at their desks and worked, but there were several flurries of excitement inside the administration building and some said that the Army should be called in. The announcements in the evacuee mess halls included an admonition not to take weapons or anything that might be regarded as such, because "trouble" was not desired. There had also been warnings to do nothing that might bring the Army into the picture. There were definite efforts on the part of the cordon of evacuee guards to keep people away from the fence bordering the Army compound, especially when early in the afternoon the tanks within the compound were warmed up. What the Army would do was thus in the minds of many, and contributed to the tenseness of the situation. One of the project officials kept in close touch by telephone with the Commander of the Military Police and was prepared to sound a signal to bring the soldiers in at a moment's notice.

The meeting continued in the Project Director's office. It, too, was quiet, except for one incident which will be described below. The

spokesman for the evacuee committee presented from a written paper a number of demands dealing with (1) the legal status of Tule Lake residents, (2) the termination of farm workers, (3) evacuees from other centers working on the harvest of Tule Lake crops, (4) the administration of the hospital, (5) improvement of the food supply, (6) the construction of porches for the barracks and other physical improvements, (7) recognition of an evacuee governing body, and (8) the removal of six project officials.

The evacuee spokesman, a young American citizen from San Diego with a good command of English, was forceful in his presentation of the committee's points. In the course of this, he referred frequently to the crowd outside, indicating the committee's purpose in bringing them there during the discussion.

I, for one, know that if we are to make such a report (that termination of farm workers would not be retracted) to the people outside, we, as a committee, cannot very well guarantee what the reaction might be. I want you to give me an answer to this question.....that I can transmit to the people outside.

Let me say this, .....I don't want to see any violence; however, unless you don't remove these people I have mentioned from the hospital until such time as an investigation has been held, I cannot guarantee the actions of the people. ....It is not a threat, it is a fact. I am just explaining the actual tension.

While the discussion went on inside, there were occasional announcements to the crowd over the loud-speaker. "Be patient," "The Committee is negotiating," "The Director of WRA will speak, be patient," etc. The crowd waited obediently through the three hours required for the presentation of the demands. Finally the Director said that he would greet the people briefly. He went to the front of the building and spoke, saying that he would study the recommendations of the committee. There was applause. Then the evacuee spokesman summarized the afternoon's discussion. Another speaker addressed the crowd reminding them that they were Japanese citizens and should conduct themselves in a manner worthy of the Emperor's subjects. As the people began to disperse, one of the organizers stepped up and gave a command in Japanese to bow. Most of the men did so, as they faced toward the speakers. Then all turned and went peacefully back to their barracks.

The Aftermath. The effect on the appointed staff of the enforced detention in the administration building was immediate and profound. Rumors spread rapidly that evening. There were reports that the evacuees had been armed with knives and clubs. A boy playing mumbly-peg with a jack-knife was magnified into a determined guard wielding a vicious weapon. Persons thought they had seen attempts to burn the administration building, the personnel garage, and the parked automobiles. Oil-soaked straw was believed to have been carried about during the demonstration. The rumor spread that there had been a great deal of destruction of property. Distorted stories in local and other newspapers contributed to the misinterpretation of the demonstration during the next few days. Fear grew among the staff, although many refused to regard the demonstration as anything but a peaceful affair

not offering threat to anyone.

The concrete effect of the rumors and the fear that had developed was a series of meetings on the following day. A request for a fence between the administration and the evacuee areas (which had been made by some of the staff during segregation) was revived and presented to the Project Director. The installation of this fence was immediately begun. One of the meetings of the staff was scheduled to be held in the hospital, but many now regarded this as dangerous territory, and the meeting was held elsewhere. In addition, the appointed personnel working in the hospital were withdrawn, leaving only an evacuee staff there. An order was issued prohibiting gatherings of evacuees in the administration area. Thus the demonstration had resulted immediately in sharp changes in the relations between staff and evacuees.

The reactions of the evacuees to the demonstration were varied. Some regarded it as an achievement which would lead to improvement of the center; others were dismayed by it and thought it would lead to trouble. The concrete immediate effects were twofold. In the first place it seemed to constitute a signal for one faction to proceed with open exhibition of pro-Japanese sentiments. This was manifested chiefly in the holding of a ceremony to commemorate the birthday of the Emperor Meiji, the grandfather of the present Emperor of Japan. On the morning of November 3, without any authorization by the administration, workers were requested by other evacuees to leave their jobs. Many did so, remaining away from their work for a half hour or so.

The second important effect was to stimulate another group to violence in opposing administration actions. During the demonstration there had been one instance of real violence. About the time the meeting with the committee began, the Chief Medical Officer had been severely beaten by a group of young men and dragged from the hospital. This could have been a part of the plan of demonstration, but it is more likely that it was not premeditated by the organizers of the crowd and represented an unexpected outbreak of young men stimulated by the peculiar conditions of the afternoon.

The second instance of violence occurred on the night of November 4. A number of evacuee men, possibly 150, entered the administration area against the orders of the Project Director. Some were armed with clubs and their plan was to stop some trucks which they mistakenly thought were taking food from the project warehouses to evacuee workers from other centers who had been brought in to harvest the Tule Lake crops. In the course of their unsuccessful efforts to stop the trucks, they engaged in a fight with WRA Internal Security officers and threatened the Project Director. One of the Internal Security men was severely injured. At this point the Military Police were called in, eighteen evacuees were picked up in the administration area, and the Army took over the administration of the center. Relations between the evacuees and the WRA administration thus broke down completely, and a long period of reorganization of these relations set in.

### The Background of the Demonstration

Tule Lake had been designated the segregation center in July. Movements of segregees from other centers into Tule Lake began about the first of September. The majority of the segregees had arrived by the first week in October but a few more trainloads came in during the next two weeks. Most of the significant events connected with the demonstration took place in the short space of two weeks from October 15 to November 1, at the time the newcomers were getting settled.

#### Three Trends

On September 30, the last trainload of segregees from Topaz arrived in the center. On the evening of the arrival a group of young Topaz men gathered at the induction area, built a bonfire, and gave welcoming "Banzais" to the other incoming Topazeans. Some of them grabbed benches which had been placed there for the newcomers and threw them on the fire. This little happening was indicative of a new development in the Tule Lake Center -- the rise of rowdyism.

During the next few weeks groups of such young men thrust themselves on the attention of the center in many ways. One night, three or four went into a noodle shop, ordered food, ate it, and then walked out, saying, "charge it to the government". Another night a similar group walked into a Nisei dance, intimidated the evacuee wardens present, and ordered the dance stopped, saying that they didn't like that sort of recreation. The Nisei present were frightened and stopped the dance. On a few occasions these young men were more violent. An evacuee girl clerk who worked in the housing office was slapped by a young man. An ink bottle was thrown at another in the same office. A third was threatened. These events at the housing office were followed by the breaking of windows in the office -- a piece of destruction which on top of the other incidents led to the closing of the office for a week. The same night windows in the branch office of the Bank of America were broken.

The rise of rowdyism was attributed by the Nisei in the center to "Kibei". It was carried out by young men who spoke Japanese among themselves and who sometimes committed their actions in the name of Japan. There were rumors that some walked into women's latrines, saying, "This is Japan", implying that men and women here should bathe together as in Japan. Young girls became frightened of going out in the evening, and it was obvious for at least a couple of weeks before November 1 that the rowdies were intimidating other young people. Many were undoubtedly Kibei, that is, had been educated in Japan, but it is also certain that many were simply young Americans who had never been in Japan and who had gone wild in the newly disorganized community.

As this development of rowdyism proceeded, there was a trend toward encouragement of the Japanese language and Japanese customs on the part of evacuee groups. Japanese language schools were organized in systematic fashion. There were two types of language schools. The majority represented a conservative movement for better adjustment of young people to

their future life in Japan. There were others, however, sponsored by more radical individuals which represented a strong movement for indoctrination of young people in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere propaganda. This latter type of school came into conflict with both the majority language school organization and the English schools when their hours conflicted with the latter. There was pressure in many blocks on Nisei who knew little or no Japanese to go to these schools. Those who had come to Tule Lake for family reasons rather than cultural preference felt the pressure with distaste.

There was an effort to give Community Activities a Japanese direction and the Nisei coordinator found himself in a political struggle to maintain the American character of the activities. The conflict here culminated on November 1 in a forcible entrance to the Community Activities office, the smashing of the glass plate on the coordinator's desk and the cutting of typewriter ribbons. This movement toward "Japanizing" the center found its most spectacular and public expression in the celebration of the Emperor's birthday (Meiji Setsu) ceremony on November 3, just before the entry of the Army.

Rowdyism and Japanization alone would not have resulted in the general clash with administration. The precipitation of the crisis was a result of the political organization of the center which proceeded concurrently with the two developments just described. Toward the end of the segregation movements there was trouble between the crew which unloaded coal and its supervisor. The crew wanted gloves, a lunch to supplement poor breakfasts, coveralls to protect clothes, and an adjustment of hours. The dispute was not settled and the crew were terminated. During the discussion three men from Topaz attempted to inject themselves into the situation. They were not members of the coal crew, but they wanted a part in settling it; they claimed to "represent the community". To a young Nisei who had been in Tule Lake since the beginning and who was attempting to help settle the dispute they seemed to be "agitators". They spoke for a four-hour day for the crew. The crew paid little attention to them and eventually agreed to a settlement with no four-hour day. This was the beginning of an effort on the part of some newcomers to organize the center and to act as spokesmen for the community. This time they were unsuccessful.

At about the time the coal strike was settled, a new labor difficulty arose. On October 15 a truck carrying farm workers overturned and one of the men (from Topaz) was killed. This became the focal point around which the new political organization developed. No negotiations were carried out until after the funeral of the dead Topaz man.

The funeral was not handled as a private affair, but became the occasion for a public ceremony. Permission was requested for use of the project open-air stage, which was not granted. An evacuee group went ahead with the organization of the ceremony and it was held on October 23 as a public affair, with about 2,000 evacuees attending. The event was obviously being utilized by some group among the evacuees for the purpose

of providing a symbol around which the community might be unified. The few members of the appointed staff who attended were made to feel uncomfortable, and the reports officer who took some pictures of the event was roughed up by a group of young men. Young men also patrolled the crowd at the funeral, and some were stationed in the blocks to direct evacuees to the ceremony. It represented an organized effort to bring the community together.

A few days after the public funeral, arrangements were made for the beginning of negotiations on the farm difficulties. Meanwhile, the harvest had been arranged for by bringing evacuee workers from other centers to get in the crops. On October 26 a committee of evacuees met with the Project Director to discuss the farm situation. They presented a series of proposals and complaints ranging from hospital to farm, which were discussed at length. No settlement was reached, but it was agreed by the Project Director that discussions would be carried on and the committee would develop plans for some of the improvements in physical conditions in the project proposed by the committee.

During the following week, the committee made plans for the demonstration of November 1. There were meetings in various blocks and the organization of the crowd for the demonstration was worked out in some detail. This planning was kept from the knowledge of the administration, but rumors appeared and several evacuees mentioned to appointed personnel that something crucial was in the air, although they did not indicate when it would take place.

An organization had been worked out and definite objectives had been formulated by an evacuee leadership. This was the third significant trend in the pre-demonstration period — a political organization. The rowdyism, the Japanization movement, and the political organization were all integrated by the leadership which had developed.

The Leadership. The leaders who had formed the committee were men not well known to the old residents of Tule Lake. They were newcomers, but most of them had been prominent in one way or another in the relocation centers from which they came. Important were men from Jerome, Poston, and Heart Mountain. Two of the strongest came from Jerome, where they had been organizers of a schism in the United Buddhist Church and had become leaders of an off-shoot group just before segregation. Another had taken a similar part in a split of the Buddhist Church at Heart Mountain. A fourth had been prominent in Poston, first as a leader of the general strike in November, 1942, and subsequently (after falling from favor with both evacuees and administration there) as a leader of minor opposition to the constituted community government. It is important to note the history of these men. They had been leaders of minorities in the relocation centers, and several of them had descended from fairly high positions to places of relative unimportance. Their previous experiences undoubtedly played a part in their efforts to establish themselves quickly in the new center. They probably felt sincerely, in many instances, that they were now qualified to lead the people as a whole in the belief that the

minorities which they represented before had now become the majority in the segregation center.

Another factor of importance in the background of some of the leaders was the failure in ambitions of leadership before evacuation. Two of the individuals most prominent in the new political organization had been regarded by the Japanese communities from which they came in California as radical, and perhaps peculiar, persons. One had been unable to maintain popularity in the Buddhist congregation which he served, and the other had failed in his efforts to become a young Buddhist leader. The latter had come to regard himself as somewhat of a lone wolf and felt that his ideas were "not understood or appreciated by others." The frustrations of these individuals in their pre-evacuation experience had not been relieved by thorough-going successes in the relocation centers, but their positions as minority leaders had probably whetted their appetites for greater prominence.

Whatever their frustrations, the leaders were men experienced in the politics of relocation centers. They had made bids for prominence and attained a measure of it. They had been through the mill of church or community government politics. They knew how a center was organized and they knew how evacuees thought about and reacted to the conditions of the centers. They were able to locate quickly the points of dissatisfaction in the segregation center and to capitalize on them to build a following. This they did with speed and efficiency. Moreover, it was easier for them to develop their organization among people who had not yet got their bearings in the new center. With their plans formulated before arrival, and with their knowledge of how to organize based on experience in the centers, they were able to achieve dominance in the short space of a month. As their strength grew they influenced a few old Tuleans to cooperate with them, but the Tuleans were not of the inner circle.

Evacuee Groups and Their Points of View. The rowdyism of the weeks after segregation was a symptom of the social disorganization of the center. The throwing together of people from various parts of the West Coast and Hawaii created a situation comparable to that in each of the centers just after evacuation. Tule Lake now contained a more heterogeneous population than had any of the centers at their start; the latter had been filled in so far as possible with people from the same or neighboring localities on the West Coast. Moreover, as a result of registration and segregation in the relocation centers, viewpoints had been crystallized; many people knew more clearly than they had during evacuation what they thought and where they stood. But segregation itself had not concentrated in Tule Lake all those who thought in one way. Decisions to come there had been based for the majority not so much on crystallized thought as to a future in Japan as on desire for immediate security through remaining close to the family group and not having to resettle. Consequently Tule Lake had a population just as diverse in its feelings and attitudes as any relocation center. The chief difference was the presence of a larger proportion of persons who had been driven by the paper decisions of the relocation centers to a definite position of affiliation with Japan.



It was largely from this last group that the leadership came. They had been thinking and talking about the organization of Tule Lake before they arrived. Reports from one center indicate that there was talk among segegees just before departure for Tule Lake of intimidating other evacuees into accepting a program of Japanization and making a series of demonstrations. These men and women who were talking about organizing Tule Lake were not all of the same kind. There were roughnecks who were disgruntled about everything. There were studious young men who had been brooding over evacuation in the relocation centers and trying to think out a future for themselves; they were studying English, the history of Japan, political ideologies and tactics, and international relations, intent on finding a field of action for themselves at the war's end. There were a few both young and old who had become fanatically patriotic to Japan and who saw a chance to aid their future in that country by heroic actions in the United States. There were older men anxious to deliver a group of Nisei and Kibei to the Japanese fatherland during or after the war, and to achieve leadership and reputations for themselves which might spread overseas. This last group constituted the flying wedge of the leadership, but all who worked with them were not thinking in such broad terms. There were a few older men who were concerned merely about the improvement of conditions in the center; they shortsightedly went along with the others, unable to see clearly that it was leading to trouble, or if by chance they did see hoping that they could head off the trouble.

The group of leaders, dominated if not entirely composed of hot-headed or nearly fanatic men, worked carefully. They seized on the death of the farm-worker as something with broad popular appeal. They assigned a man experienced in the steward's department to make a study of the food and its distribution in the center. They compared the center in all its physical details with the centers from which they had come and pointed out Tule Lake's shortcomings, wherever there were any. The new leaders got in touch with each other quickly. They made a map of the center with the residences of those who were sympathetic to them marked on it. In addition, speeches were made at block meetings on the theme of Japanese patriotism. The feelings of young men were stepped up to support the new leadership with action. Steadily an organization was built up of those who were thinking alike, while the main mass of the people went on trying to get settled in the barracks of the strange new center.

An effort was made to have the organization appear as being based on popular representation. A great many meetings were held in the blocks. Block delegates were selected, apparently on the basis of personal choice by a few of the leaders. Then seven ward representatives were chosen, consisting of the most prominent of the new leaders from other centers. The people gradually became aware that there was a group of representatives and many came to believe that they had been elected, although they did not know for sure by whom. It was this "elected" committee which appeared as the people's representatives at the November 1 demonstration.

Was this, then, a representative group? What sort of community backing did it have? The question cannot be dismissed by saying that a

small minority only of the people were back of the demonstration. That is by no means true. The committee and the demonstration had large community support. But the nature of this support and the motives behind it must be analyzed further.

In the first place, there is no question that the support was in some measure enforced. The leaders were making conscious use of the excited young men who were ready "to work for the cause". At the public funeral of the Topaz farm worker, the young men were organized into a patrol of the crowd and were ready for rough stuff. It is not likely that all the little instances of rowdiness that have been noted were planned by the leaders, but the latter were ready to make use of the rough tactics of the rowdies to gain their ends. They organized them for control of the crowd and the appointed personnel during the demonstration. The committee was utilizing what force it could muster to further its program.

People do not, however, allow themselves except in the face of overwhelming force to be pushed into actions wholly alien to their interests. The objectives of the committee had much meaning for the segregees. The appeal of the leaders was twofold. On the one hand, they appealed on the basis of specific improvement of living conditions: food, housing, dust control, and working conditions. All the dissatisfactions of center life were touched on, and in at least one block the demonstration itself was believed to be specifically a demonstration against the "bad food". On the other hand, the appeal was on a moral basis. It was easy to point to evacuation and the further enforced movement to the segregation center and say, "Why do we put up with this treatment? We must assert ourselves. Let us not lie down and take it any longer. We must be strong." This was an appeal especially for the younger people, a challenge to do something and to support the committee when it should set out to do things. Interwoven with both these appeals was the theme of solidarity -- an old one which had appeared from the very beginning in the relocation centers. It was the position that all the evacuees, young and old, male and female, were in the same boat and should therefore stick together: "We are all Japanese together". Innumerable times they had heard that in the blocks whenever any issue came up involving a grievance against the administration. It was a difficult appeal to stand up against in a block meeting in a relocation center. It was all the more difficult to stand out against in the segregation center where the label of "Japanese" had been officially assigned. Whether or not an individual felt Japanese, he did feel set off against the administration and felt a loyalty to the evacuee community. Thus, personal comfort, individual courage, and group solidarity were involved and various segments of the population felt the appeal in one or all of these terms.

What the demonstration meant to some who were heartily in sympathy with it is indicated in the following statement, written on November 3 by a young man:

"For the past three weeks negotiations have failed between the colonists and administration as to the farm case. The Project Director retaliated by firing over 1,000 men, all connected with

"the farm, and decided to ship [in] around 300 loyal evacuees..... There exists within the center a common idea of unity that no other center can achieve. The leaders are all men of ability, high calibre and possess diplomatic talents. [On Monday, a crowd went to the administration building] similar to the crowd that occurred during the Santa Anita riot. During the three hours 20,000 of us waited eagerly, as from time to time one of the representatives would state, "Now's the time for united spirit; we must not fail or else the whites will take advantage." We should be proud of our race. He sure brought up the morale. At the end, the results were presented by the Japanese leaders and [the National Director]. It seems that our committee of eight had won the first round.

It would be a mistake to assume that the majority in Tule Lake by the time of the demonstration felt in this way.

There was opposition all through the center, although it was submerged by the superimposed organization. To many Nisei who had come to Tule Lake simply to be with parents and with no plans whatever for ultimately going to Japan, the atmosphere of the center became intolerable. They felt they did not belong in Tule Lake:

(November 3 entry from a young evacuee's diary:)  
 Here it is November already. The changes in the Tule Lake Center has been so radical that my interest in residing [here] no longer prevails. I'm now at a loss as to why I did not leave the center during the train movements..... It is best to play safe and try to keep one's mouth tightly scaled.

(Written by a Nisei girl on November 1:)  
 Anything can happen in this dump. It's almost as bad as being in Germany. You wonder why you were born. No fooling, these guys have no respect for women, and boy, do they believe in Gestapo methods. You can't use your own mind. You gotta be on the alert of what you say, and on top of that you gotta respect the ibeikays. (The last word is pig latin for Kibeis)

There were older people who resented being forced into line and ordered about by brash young men whom they did not even know. They felt that they were losing their dignity to the young men of the storm troops. They were resentful and wondered how these unreasonable young men could be controlled, but they did not do anything about it because they did not know what to do. Moreover, and this was a very important factor, they feared to increase the strife within the center. They kept hoping that things would work themselves out peacefully. Their loyalty to their own group kept them from promoting any discord, especially if there were any chance it might come to the attention of the out-group -- the administration. Some of the conservative older men cooperated gingerly with the new leadership, hoping to be able to influence it in some way. The real nature and extent of the opposition did not become clear until after the Army moved in and control by the storm troopers became impossible.

The crisis grew out of a situation compounded of a newly disorganized community, of youth running wild, of a long-disgruntled and pent-up people, of uncertain and unestablished evacuee-administration relationships, of a purposeful and nearly fanatical leadership, of real discomforts in the daily routine of living, and of visions nourished during a year and a half of separation from the realities of normal life.

#### Evacuees vs. Administration

Although a large number of evacuees appeared to act with unity on November 1 to carry out the demonstration at the administration building, it is apparent from an examination of the background of the event that the whole evacuee community was not united at the time, nor even fully aware of what was taking place. We cannot speak of a single evacuee viewpoint of the matter. There were many and opposite views. It is, however, possible to discuss an evacuee viewpoint which was dominant at the time through the controls exerted by the "committee". In its leadership was crystallized a very definite position in regard to conditions at the center. It was this group which attempted to act directly on the administration. They formulated a number of issues and sought settlement by presenting them to the administration. Their view of the issues was clearly indicated in a meeting with the Project Director on October 26, in the meeting with the National Director on November 1, and at a meeting with the Spanish Consul on November 8.

The Issues. The administration was not aware of the program of the leaders until it was presented to them formally on October 26. This presentation was made by a group of evacuees who represented themselves as a committee growing out of the farm troubles, who claimed a block representation base, although they referred to this basis casually and seemed to feel that it was no concern of the administration as to how they came into existence. They met with the Project Director and presented their position quite clearly. They discussed at length five major points:

1. Status of the Segregues. The first of these was the matter of the legal status of the people segregated in Tule Lake. The spokesman said that they wanted this cleared up and made several recommendations connected with the question: The committee wanted a re-segregation, the separation of those in Tule Lake who wished to return to Japan from those who did not and recommended that that be carried out. It was also maintained by the committee that they wished to be distinct from the people in the relocation centers. They did not want to produce anything at Tule Lake which would be used by the Army or Navy, the evacuees in the relocation centers, or by anyone in the United States other than segregues who wished to go to Japan in the future. It later came out in a meeting with the Spanish Consul that this group wanted to find a way by which the Nisei in Tule Lake who wished to return to Japan could renounce their U. S. citizenship and be assured of acceptance by Japan. A number of other statements at this meeting indicated the point of view involved. They were concerned about children having to make a flag salute in the Tule Lake schools and they were determined not to be involved in any activity which could be construed as helping

the American war effort. In other words, the committee which was speaking with the Project Director was concerned to establish, in accordance with the segregation program, a group of evacuees within the center (later they presented the number as 10,000 to the Spanish Consul) as definitely and irrevocably Japanese and to make sure that they would not in any way be in the position of aiding Japan's enemy — the United States.

This was a point of view which was not new among the evacuees. It had appeared among Issei in the relocation centers before in the form of a demand for internment camp, or prisoner of war status, carrying with that the implication of being forcibly neutralized in the war. It was motivated no doubt by a desire to "keep their records clean" on the part of those who regarded themselves as Japanese subjects and who either wished, or felt they had no other course except to return to Japan.

2. The Settlement of the Farm Situation. In the minds of the leaders this matter was closely tied up with the first point. In their opinion it was not to be settled apart from the question of the relation of Tule Lake farm production to the relocation centers and the rest of the United States. They did not wish the Tule Lake farm to contribute to the upkeep of loyal Americans, nor did they wish to receive any food produced by the loyal evacuees of the relocation centers. They were quite definite on these points. Tule Lake farm production, they thought, should be confined exclusively to the needs of those evacuees who wished to return to Japan. If the farm production were to be so limited, then they thought that plans should be made for taking care of those Tuleans who would be thrown out of work. They asked that this aspect of employment be cleared up and that plans for unemployment compensation be made clear. These were the wider aspects of the farm situation as they saw it.

Other aspects (and ones which they said had become important issues among evacuees in the center) were: (1) compensation for the dependents of the Topaz man who had been killed in the truck accident, (2) feeling that there was negligence in allowing young and irresponsible men to drive trucks transporting evacuees, and (3) failure of the administration to express formal regrets concerning the death of the Topaz man. In addition to these points, they held that the administration had refused to deal with farm workers and allow a settlement to be made.

3. The Establishment of an Evacuee Government Body. Toward the end of the discussion on October 26, the committee brought up a request for the development of an evacuee organization to plan and regulate community affairs and to "deal with the administration". They felt that this should be worked out among the evacuees themselves and, as has been said, were very casual in informing the Project Director as to how they themselves had come into existence as a committee. They explained that they had been selected from a group of block representatives, one from a block, to discuss the questions growing out of the farm trouble. They requested specifically that there be a re-election of block managers so that men able to speak and understand Japanese could be selected. They also asked for approval to go ahead with the development of the organization that they had

begun.

4. Improvement of Food. The chief complaint in this connection concerned the distribution of food to the mess halls. They maintained, for example, that although eggs were being produced on the project farm, none were distributed to the mess halls. They compared Tule Lake food unfavorably with that on "other projects." They implied that there was mis-handling in the distribution of food and requested the Project Director to look into the matter and render a report on it.

5. Other Physical Improvements of Center. There was also expression of dissatisfaction with the nondescript porches which had been built on the barracks by evacuees at Tule Lake and with the crowded housing and latrine facilities. They requested that a plan for building uniform porches on the barracks, as had been done at Jerome, for example, be worked out and carried to completion.

These points were presented one by one and each was individually discussed. The status of segregation was held by the administration to be a matter to be decided elsewhere, but it was agreed that Tule Lake farm production would be limited to the needs of that center only. It was also pointed out that no flag salute would be required in the schools, in view of the fact that Tule Lake was set aside for persons not loyal to the United States. The administration held that no committee had presented itself to settle the farm workers' dispute until the arrival of the present one, that compensation for the dead man's family was effected through regular workmen's compensation channels, and that arrangements had already been made to limit truck drivers to men over 21 years. The administration gave its approval for the committee to work on plans for a governing body, and the present committee was invited to come up again and discuss its suggestions with the administration. The food distribution question was recommended back to the committee to work on, as were plans for uniform porches, and it was pointed out that construction was under way which would relieve the housing conditions.

During the discussion a vague suggestion was made by the committee spokesman that a strike or a demonstration by evacuees might result in settling some of the points at issue.

The committee apparently then went back and worked out its plan for the demonstration before the National Director. It also developed further the five points just discussed. In the meeting with the Director during the demonstration these were brought up and amplified. In addition, there were two further points, both recommendations concerning appointed personnel. The first new point was in regard to the hospital. Just before the demonstration a child, who had fallen into scalding water, died after treatment in the hospital. There was a rumor in the center that this death had resulted from negligence on the part of a Caucasian doctor. Other cases were brought up in which negligence was charged. The hospital had been a point of friction for some time on the project; the recent death served to bring it forcibly to the attention of the committee of newcomers seeking grievances to voice. The committee recommended that the hospital be manned

entirely by evacuee staff.

The second new point was a flat recommendation that six of the appointed staff be removed. These included the Chief and an Assistant Steward, the Chief of Internal Security, the Chief Medical Officer (who was beaten during the demonstration), an Assistant Project Director, and the Project Director himself.

The committee had moved, since the October 26 meeting, to a more uncompromising ground. They had refined their basic points. In addition, they threw in all the current grievances they could find. Finally they sought to assume some direct voice in the selection of project administrators. The new points were presented in a positive and sometimes personal fashion. It was evident that the committee spokesman was being driven to the strongest sort of statement. His presentation was of a kind which might be expected from a man who either felt that he had real power at his back or was desperate and ready to draw the issue whatever the result. There was no uncertainty and no opening of the way to negotiation. The leadership was evidently staking itself on the effects of the demonstration.

The Course of Administration. The issue which the administration had wanted settled and had been willing to negotiate was the return of the farm workers to harvest the crops. They failed, however, to make the necessary contacts with any evacuee group for such a settlement. The new leadership stopped in immediately after the death of the farm worker and began its organization around the issue of the farm. They held off, however, from coming forward for negotiation until after the public funeral of the farm worker had been held.

The administration meanwhile was faced with the concrete problem of getting the crops harvested before frosts should spoil them. The evacuee leadership was thinking in terms of the internal affairs of the Tule Lake Project and was perfecting its organization as a preliminary to negotiation. The administration, on the other hand, could not regard the harvest as a wholly internal affair. The crop could not be permitted to spoil. Public opinion outside the center, the investment of government funds involved, the need in the country generally had to be considered. Consequently, the administration felt it necessary to harvest the crops by whatever means possible. A public request was issued calling for representatives of the farm workers to discuss the matter. When no one appeared by the date set (October 21), the farm workers were terminated and plans were laid for harvesting with outside help. It was thought at first that soldiers might be used. When this did not work out, another plan was developed. This was the recruitment of evacuees from other centers. The recruiting was successful, and by the time the new committee had arranged for its first meeting with the administration on October 26, the harvesting was already under way with the outside evacuee labor. The Tule Lake committee had lost its opportunity to bring about a resettlement of the farm trouble within the framework of its own community. The original central issue could only be discussed now in terms of future policy.

Administration and evacuees had thus begun to move apart. So far

as the administration was concerned, the immediate pressing issue was already settled. The issues which the evacuees now brought up were, in a sense, academic ones. At least they were not so urgent and could be discussed at leisure while the community settled down. The administration had moved rapidly to settle the farm trouble from its point of view. The evacuee committee, on the other hand, was just beginning to gather momentum behind the whole complex of issues which the farm question had brought up in their minds. Administration and evacuees were out of step and they continued to become more so.

The administration itself, for the most part, almost as new to the project as the evacuee leadership, wanted to move slowly. It constantly expressed willingness to discuss issues and even recommended that the committee go ahead with its planning, but definite commitments were not made either as to recognition of the committee or as to precisely when or how the evacuee organization which the administration had in mind would be worked out. Meanwhile the evacuees organized with extreme rapidity behind the leaders' issues. The tempo of the evacuee organization was far ahead of that of the administration. This was an important weak spot in the situation that was developing.

A fundamental factor contributing to this situation was the necessity for utilizing all available staff on the immediate and pressing problems of the segregation process as it affected Tule Lake. Community activities, schools, and the normal functions of social welfare were suspended, while the staffs of those departments as well as of others received, housed, and helped in the first adjustments of the incoming trainloads of segregationees. The attention of staff was, in other words, focussed on these problems in the conversion to a segregation center and their time was consumed in these activities.

A further weak element lay in the fact that no definite basis for discussion, understood by both groups, was being developed. The evacuee committee thought that it need be no concern of the administration how they were "elected". They felt their existence was a purely internal affair. Only after questioning was there any effort to indicate their relationship to the community. The administration, not being ready to go ahead, did not insist on seeing credentials and hence had no way of determining whom the committee actually represented. The weakness here was not so much failure to recognize this particular committee as failure to recognize that, whether desired or not, there was a strong movement toward organization among the segregationees.

Here again there was a reason for lack of attention to the evacuee organization that was developing. In addition to the fact of time and attention of staff being taken up with the immediate practicalities of segregation, there was uncertainty on the part of administration as to what policy for community organization at Tule Lake would be. A tentative policy had been formulated in Washington and was discussed in Denver, which included the provision that community government as it existed at relocation centers would not be instituted at Tule Lake but a representative advisory council was to be established. The local administration was inhibited by



uncertainty in its dealings with the evacuee committee. This must be regarded as a major cause for the lag in the administration's actions.

The drawing apart of evacuees and administration was hastened also by clash of personalities. Some individuals on both sides who were sitting together for discussion increasingly antagonized each other. There were violent dislikes. The clash was sometimes translated into bickering over words, drawing attention away from constructive talk. Only the establishment of formal channels, through organization on both sides, thus bringing a wider variety of individuals into what discussion there was, could have softened the clash and thus diminished its tendency to separate the two groups more widely.

While the evacuee leaders drew apart from the local administration and conceived their plan of appealing to the National Director and the Spanish Consul, the evacuees from other centers arrived to harvest the crops. They were housed at the farm and had no contact with the residents of Tule Lake. Their presence nevertheless precipitated the final break. The belief grew up that the people of Tule Lake were being deprived of food for the purpose of feeding the outsiders who were, in addition, the instrument for removing from Tule Lake the crops which Tuleans had raised. The result was direct action taken by a group of the hotter heads on the night of November 4. It is doubtful that violence was advocated by the committee.

#### Causes of the Incident

What happened at Tule Lake was an extreme development of what had happened at some other centers. The Tule Lake incident had its origins in Santa Anita, Poston, and Manzanar. This is not to say that certain individuals who were in those centers constituted the cause of the incident. It is rather to say that the pattern of organization at Tule Lake was based on experience and knowledge of how other centers had been organized for demonstrations. The operation of squads of young men for the intimidation of other evacuees, the exploitation of physical discomforts to gain popular support, the utilization of the rallying call: "We are all Japanese together"; the desperate efforts to create the appearance of a unanimous community protest — all these techniques were used much as they had been at the other centers. A major difference in the Tule Lake affair was the application of direct control over the Caucasian staff by the squads of young men. Such control had been rumored and, no doubt, proposed during other incidents, but it had never materialized. At Tule Lake the control exerted over Caucasians was indicative of the extremes to which the previously developed type of appeal and of organization can carry the evacuee population.

To point out the similarities between the Tule Lake and other incidents is not, however, to discuss the fundamental causes of such demonstrations. They have not only taken on similar forms, but they have also had similar basic causes. Conditions necessary for demonstrations of the kind that developed at Poston, Manzanar, and Tule Lake may be listed as

follows:

1. A disorganized community in which people are not sure of the character, beliefs, or intentions of their neighbors;
2. Widespread and persistent dissatisfactions arising out of physical discomforts, such as crowded housing conditions or unsatisfactory food;
3. Widespread tensions arising out of restrictions on freedom of movement and choice of residence, and fears arising from removal of individuals without warning or explanation from the community;
4. The presence of leaders with a conception of how the community can be organized to follow their leadership.

Given all these conditions, however, it is still not inevitable that a demonstration will develop.

The essential feature of a demonstration, as conceived by evacuees, has been the mobilization of the whole group for an exhibition of protest against the authority controlling their lives. At Poston it was passive resistance to a particular administrative act, namely, the arrest of two men. At Tule Lake it was an effort to convince the national administration that the local administration was generally unsatisfactory. In both cases there were organized efforts to show that the whole community was concerned about the situation. Notwithstanding the temporary restrictions imposed at Tule Lake on the movements of the appointed personnel, what was involved was basically a passive behavior in relation to the administration. The demonstration was not at all a physical attack; it was a method of showing as convincingly as possible disapproval of administrative actions and policies. The mobilization of evacuees for the demonstration led, however, as it did at other projects, to fear and distrust among the appointed personnel and stimulated violence among the evacuees. These were the dangers in the demonstration and the elements which led to complete breakdown of working relations.

The fundamental relationship between evacuees and administration in any center involves the subordination of evacuees. At all times there is the feeling among some evacuees that their fates are being decided arbitrarily. Whether or not these feelings turn into ones of desperation depends on how evacuees and administrators deal with each other. The mode of dealing, rather than the specific subjects of grievances, is the vital factor determining whether or not evacuee groups become desperate enough to carry out a demonstration.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
April 1, 1944

*Mr. Fischer*  
0075

Project Analysis Series No. 15

THE REACTION OF HEART MOUNTAIN TO THE OPENING OF  
SELECTIVE SERVICE TO NISEI.

Reinstitution of selective service for the Nisei has been met by various evacuee reactions. That these have been strongly influenced by the isolation and peculiar nature of center life is illustrated by the developments at Heart Mountain. The experience at this center is particularly relevant because there the two main Nisei points of view about selective service -- i.e., unconditional compliance with the draft laws accompanied by requests for restoration of civil rights, and compliance conditional on restoration of these rights -- are represented by two well-organized bodies: the moderates by the Community Council, and the extremes by the Fair Play Committee.

Early Reactions

The announcement that selective service had been opened to the Nisei did not produce a strong reaction of any kind at first. It seems to have been taken largely as a statement of intent. It was something that lay in the future, something not quite concrete or real. There was some discussion, some wondering and questioning, but the response was notably mild compared to what happened later when notices from draft boards began to arrive in the community.

This initial period of relative quiescence is an indication of the very considerable isolation of the residents of Heart Mountain. True, many of them read newspapers and listen to the radio, but they get a sketchy view of the outside world. Their chief preoccupation is with the immediate events and problems of their local life -- the quality of the food, the supply of coal, the policy with reference to project employment and the possibility of changes of policy, and the trivia of social activities. The war has not touched them in the same intimate, continuous, detailed way that it has touched other communities in America. In terms of selective service, Heart Mountaineers have not had the experience of seeing their friends and neighbors depart for military service. They knew this was happening outside, but it was, in their minds, a rather abstract process that did not quite involve real people. The announcement that they were to be included in the process caused vague forebodings, but it was not sufficiently tangible and pressing to force them to grapple with the implications for themselves: to make them rationalize their attitudes, think out their plans, and prepare themselves psychologically and practically. It is probable, however, that as they waited for the announcement to materialize in actual draft calls, they developed a state of unease and emotional potential that did not appear on the surface. This would

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
April 1, 1944

Project Analysis Series No. 15

THE REACTION OF HEART MOUNTAIN TO THE OPENING OF  
SELECTIVE SERVICE TO NISEI.

Reinstitution of selective service for the Nisei has been met by various evacuee reactions. That these have been strongly influenced by the isolation and peculiar nature of center life is illustrated by the developments at Heart Mountain. The experience at this center is particularly relevant because there the two main Nisei points of view about selective service -- i.e., unconditional compliance with the draft laws accompanied by requests for restoration of civil rights, and compliance conditional on restoration of these rights -- are represented by two well-organized bodies: the moderates by the Community Council, and the extremes by the Fair Play Committee.

Early Reactions

The announcement that selective service had been opened to the Nisei did not produce a strong reaction of any kind at first. It seems to have been taken largely as a statement of intent. It was something that lay in the future, something not quite concrete or real. There was some discussion, some wondering and questioning, but the response was notably mild compared to what happened later when notices from draft boards began to arrive in the community.

This initial period of relative quiescence is an indication of the very considerable isolation of the residents of Heart Mountain. True, many of them read newspapers and listen to the radio, but they get a sketchy view of the outside world. Their chief preoccupation is with the immediate events and problems of their local life -- the quality of the food, the supply of coal, the policy with reference to project employment and the possibility of changes of policy, and the trivia of social activities. The war has not touched them in the same intimate, continuous, detailed way that it has touched other communities in America. In terms of selective service, Heart Mountaineers have not had the experience of seeing their friends and neighbors depart for military service. They knew this was happening outside, but it was, in their minds, a rather abstract process that did not quite involve real people. The announcement that they were to be included in the process caused vague forebodings, but it was not sufficiently tangible and pressing to force them to grapple with the implications for themselves: to make them rationalize their attitudes, think out their plans, and prepare themselves psychologically and practically. It is probable, however, that as they waited for the announcement to materialize in actual draft calls, they developed a state of unease and emotional potential that did not appear on the surface. This would

help to account for what took place later.

When the first notices of reclassification and orders to report for physical examination arrived, the news spread rapidly. Selective service suddenly became close, real, and certain. Soon it was almost the only subject of conversation. Responses were extremely varied. Earlier there had been a great deal of joking about the draft among young fellows. This declined. It was a serious matter now and grew more serious. One woman reported conversations with her friends to the effect that women should get out of the center, get jobs and make some contribution, not sit in the camp while the men went away to war. A man with a wife said he wanted to relocate. He did not like the idea of being in the army and thinking of his wife shut up here. A few single men decided to request leave so they could have a brief fling on the outside before their calls came. But expressions of this sort were rare. It was much more common for people who had plans to relocate to drop them, to decide the simplest and safest thing to do was to do nothing.

Much thinking and talking concerned the adverse effect of the draft on individuals and families. Wives and elderly parents were disturbed about the threat to their security. Men of draft-age manifested greatly increased interest in agriculture as a possible way of obtaining occupational deferment. Many of these responses showed a good deal of ignorance of the operation of selective service and unawareness of how hard it had borne on the rest of America. A man with two children was sure that persons in his situation were not drafted on the outside, and he assumed that he had been put in 1-A only because he was a Nisei. How difficult it was for anyone anywhere to obtain deferment was not clearly understood. There was resentment that evacuation had put evacuees at a disadvantage. While they were locked up, other people were working themselves into essential jobs.

Other reactions dealt not with questions of individual and family security but with questions of the justice and fairness of selective service as it affected evacuees. The emphasis here was ideological rather than practical. In this field three points of view emerged that can be defined roughly. A very few persons adopted what may be termed the "official" viewpoint. That is, that the opening of selective service, even with its discriminatory features, was an important and desirable step in the right direction: that it should be accepted without protest or objection, and that the problem of removing the discriminations should be left for the future. At the other extreme was a group that took the stand that the government had no right to demand military service of Nisei until all of the injustices of evacuation had been erased. Some of the leaders urged prospective draftees to refuse induction until justice had been done. This, too, was a minority, a very small one if we include only those who were solidly behind the idea and willing to support it in action. Many more people were sympathetic in that this program represented their feelings, but they doubted its feasibility and hesitated to "stick their necks out". Between these extremes was perhaps the majority of the residents.

They considered selective service as announced unfair to evacuees. They wanted to protest but could see no way to make their protests effective. So they felt frustrated and unhappy and griped to each other vigorously and frequently while, at the same time, they anticipated following the orders of the government because to do anything else would expose them to punishment and stir up more anti-Japanese prejudice in the already prejudiced outside.

In the many "gripe sessions", the questions most often asked were: "Why do Nisei have to sign the special form 304A which was used during registration", and, "Why are we limited to one branch of service and organized into separate units", and then the more general, "Why are we called to fight while we and our families are detained behind a barbed wire fence". The same questions were put over and over again and the same unsatisfactory answers, or lack of answers, remained. Discussion increased and feeling grew more intense steadily. People often began to talk calmly and ended in a heated exchange of opinions. They started the next discussion more stirred up and finished it still more excited. This process went on all over the center day after day.

The content of the discussions became more standardized or stereotyped. People's ideas were becoming organized. There was decreasing concern with the varied practical individual and family problems that selective service would create, and more concern with the injustice being done evacuees as a whole. Personal anxieties were gradually merged with collective anxieties and were at least partially resolved by collective rationalizations.

#### The Growth of Opposition

Opposition to the draft became stronger and more widespread. The most tangible and purposeful expression of this was an organization, the Fair Play Committee. It had existed, at least in name, for some time before to champion the rights of evacuees, but it had little importance and few members. In more tranquil times, its guiding spirit was generally considered too immoderate. Now the Committee took up the draft and the leader soon had a following. Although there may have been gatherings earlier, the first well-attended meeting occurred in the evening of February 8 in one of the mess halls. Other meetings followed almost nightly in different parts of the camp. Evacuees who were known not to agree with the Committee's program were unwelcome. The Committee sought members actively at a fee of two dollars each in order to build up a fund. The position assumed was that Nisei should refuse to be drafted until all discrimination and special treatment were eliminated. The idea at first (the strategy appears to have been changed later) was to get a test case by having someone not report when called and to fight the case through the courts for the purpose of establishing the illegality of evacuation and all that has gone with it. There follow a few approximately verbatim fragments reported from the speech of the leader mentioned above in a block meeting: "The Committee does not want to do anything contrary to

the law, but we are guaranteed freedom of speech by the Constitution and we want to present all sides of the question". And later on, "Any Nisei who reports for physical examination or induction is worse than Benedict Arnold; he is a traitor to the Nisei cause". He had another angle in which he compared the relocation camp with prison, in which the prison was presented as preferable. When one gets leave from a relocation camp, he receives his railway fee and \$25; a prison gives a person all of this and a suit of clothes to boot.

How many persons actually joined and paid their money is not known. The figure 200 was mentioned. And when one of the leaders later appeared before the Community Council seeking support for the Committee's program, he claimed "several hundred".

Opposition to the draft was much wider than this organized manifestation. Many who considered the Committee's position extreme and condemned its program as inexpedient and dangerous nevertheless felt a strong sense of resentment. They expressed their feelings in verbal attacks on the draft policy, evacuation, and the unfair and unhappy state of things in general. Of course not everyone felt this way but it was the prevailing sentiment of the camp. Persons who earlier had been dissatisfied but disposed to view the situation philosophically were caught in the wave of oppositionist sentiment. They lost their objective calm and participated in the emotional negativism and rebellion of their fellows.

It may be added that in the resistance to and resentment of the draft there were two points of view. Everyone ostensibly opposed selective service on the grounds that it was unfair only because of its discriminatory aspects. This was a sincere expression of the attitudes of some people; if Nisei were treated as other Americans and if Issei were dealt with in the same way as other enemy aliens, they would accept the draft without question. Other evacuees were opposed to the draft - period. References to discrimination served them only as convenient and, they hoped, convincing rationalizations. They would have been content to have Nisei keep their 4-C classification and let the war go on without them. Among people who felt thus, there were those who thought that if they talked of discrimination vigorously enough, the government might decide to abandon the program of applying selective service to Nisei.

The line between those who felt and expressed opposition to the draft and those who continued to think that it should be accepted and responded to willingly grew sharper. Persons who persisted in the latter view came to sense that they were in the minority and that the majority was increasingly critical and even hostile to them. An individual who made some pro-draft remarks in a meeting of the Fair Play Committee was almost shouted down. Arguments in favor of accepting selective service were heard less often in the camp as people holding this position became more cautious in airing their opinions. Only in very private conversations, where group pressure would not be evoked, did such persons continue to talk and to inject their point of view into the thinking of the community.

Community Feeling

The thinking of people became increasingly "Heart Mountain-community-centered" and "evacuee-centered." About all they heard were their own arguments and discussions. Their faces were toward each other; their backs toward the rest of the country and the government. They tended to lose touch with larger reality, to half-forget that the machinery of selective service was grinding on inexorably. Their opinions, reiterated and reenforced constantly, seemed so utterly reasonable and correct that they ought to make some difference. It was almost as if they believed that, if they felt hard enough and talked hard enough, the operations of selective service would somehow stop or be modified in the direction of their wishes.

A feeling of hyper-excitability began to characterize the center. Rumors became more numerous and more persistent. It was reported that the leader of the Fair Play Committee had been picked up by Internal Security. This was accepted as a fact for three or four days by those who did not actually see the man or receive contrary information from somebody who had seen him. A variation of the rumor was that he had been apprehended and then released. The fact: He was not even approached by Internal Security.

Another rumor that achieved wide currency was that the decision to draft Nisei had been abandoned. This rumor was connected in some way to an alleged communication from Italy that a contingent of Nisei troops had advanced too rapidly and had been annihilated by their own artillery fire. It was also stated that three Washington groups or agencies which were concerned with the problem of drafting Nisei had disagreed as to how it should be done and had decided to call the whole thing off as a result. It is noteworthy that while the rumor was developing and spreading, the project selective service office was busy handling the cases of men who had been reclassified and called for physical examination. That is, actual evidence contrary to the rumor was very apparent. At first the analyst was disposed to account for the rumor simply as an expression of wishful thinking, but there is one possible concrete basis for it. It may be that some of the early draft notices from California boards were sent out before the boards had thoroughly digested the selective service release giving detailed instructions regarding the calling of Nisei and that subsequently these orders had to be changed. In one verified case, a boy received instructions to report for physical examination and a little later got a notice to do nothing until further orders. Such an occurrence might have been interpreted as evidence that the announced program had been reversed.

Another rumor was that Heart Mountaineers were to be taken in batches of 300, "to save gas and tires". The implication here was that it was all right for Nisei to die for the country, but that the country wanted to do as little as possible for them. Still another was that a resident of Heart Mountain had been arrested by the FBI for failing to report as ordered. Nothing of this sort had happened.



During this period of high tension, a lawyer from Denver visited the project at the invitation of the Fair Play Committee and met with the Committee that night. The object was to obtain some advice in concrete terms on what sort of case one who failed to respond to a selective service order could make. It is reported that the lawyer gave them no encouragement.

The Community Council finally appointed a committee of six members to study the problems raised by selective service. News of action by Community Councils in other relocation centers was the probable stimulus to this step. It is doubtful whether the Council would have done anything except for this outside influence.

Public excitement regarding the draft tended to subside somewhat. Feeling remained deep, intense, and community-wide, but it was less fervid than in the period just discussed. It seemed that many residents had reached a condition of partial emotional exhaustion. Most of the factors which had produced the extreme response earlier were still operating. People continued to react, but their reaction was subdued by weariness. It may be also that arrests in other centers introduced a note of grim realism, caused people to pause and reexamine their attitudes, and induced them to be somewhat less open in expressing their antagonism to selective service.

However, events continued to center around the draft. It was the subject of discussion in most, probably all, block meetings. Attendance in one block was more than double that of an average meeting, and included about twenty-five Nisei. This was unusual. According to the block manager, he is often the only Nisei present. A similar situation seems to have held in other meetings.

#### The Council Takes the Moderate Position

A representative of the Fair Play Committee appeared before the Community Council to ask the Council to sponsor its program. The Council replied that it had a committee of its own studying the question but offered to consider a memorandum from the Fair Play Committee if it were presented in writing in proper form. The action was meant and accepted as a polite rejection.

The Assistant Project Director appeared before the Community Council almost immediately after the Fair Play Committee representative. He called the attention of the Council to the adverse effect that strong resistance to the draft within the center would have on the outside and on the future position of evacuees in the United States. He suggested that a dignified protest would be right and proper, but emphasized that actual interference with the operation of selective service would have many unfortunate consequences.

About this time news of the arrests of a man at Poston in connection with selective service agitation and of five boys at Granada for failing to respond to selective service orders, began to reach the center. The project

newspaper carried a story on the arrests, and in the same issue requested a considerable list of persons subject to selective service who had been negligent to call at the project selective service office as soon as possible. The next day practically all of them came in and the rest did the following day.

The Fair Play Committee distributed a mimeographed circular in English and Japanese throughout the community. This was the first written evidence of the existence of the Committee. It needed the Community Council for its inaction and called attention to Topaz and Rohwer where the Councils are "genuinely interested in clarifying the draft issue"; it suggested that such action as the Community Council Committee contemplated was just to "save face"; it asserted that JACL and "many Nisei writers" would like the Fair Play Committee to shut up, accused them of "employing moral intimidations via propaganda, the FBI, etc.", and claimed the right to freedom of expression.

According to another mimeographed bulletin issued by the Fair Play Committee, the Committee was organized (by citizens only) to watch over the rights of the evacuees and fight discrimination and prejudice. While on the one hand asking that they be given all of their civil rights "before being drafted", on the other the Committee claimed that they were not an "objector's group", but merely wanted to present all sides of the draft question. The policy of the Fair Play Committee finally developed into one of doing everything short of open violation of the draft law — appealing and re-appealing classifications to the limit, and writing Attorney-General Biddle and other officials.

The Park County Selective Service Board met with the Community Council and the block managers. The Chairman of the Board gave a talk regarding the operation of selective service and answered questions afterwards. His presentation was detailed, fair, and frank. He asserted that personally he thought evacuation was a mistake, but the draft was the law of the land and had to be obeyed. His speech seemed to create a rather favorable impression, but one item in it caused more confusion and discussion than any other. He said there were Nisei in every branch of military service, that no rule prevented more Nisei from being assigned to any of them, and that if few of them made the Navy, Marines, and Air Force, it would be only because the standards of those branches were high.

The next day the Sentinel carried a headline, "NO RULES PROHIBIT NISEI FROM ANY SERVICE BRANCH", in reporting the speech. If this was designed to make the evacuees feel good, it failed. They had read a presumably official communication in the Sentinel of January 2, "Inductions are authorized only for the Army. Inductees will not be assigned with the air force or the armored forces." People wished they could believe that the policy had changed, but most of them did not. They were not interested in the presence or absence of technical rules excluding them from certain branches of service; they were concerned with what would actually happen to them when they were inducted. They took the statements in the speech as either an indication of the speaker's ignorance of the

facts or as a bit of technical word-juggling intended to impress their simple minds. It had the effect of further discrediting information and advice that come from any hakuji.

The Community Council in the meantime had decided to ignore the needling of the Fair Play Committee and carry on their own program. Its selective service committee issued two petitions addressed to the President of the United States, one to be signed by the Nisei, the other by Issei. The first, after reaffirming their loyalty and calling attention to the fortunes of evacuation, asked for universal application of the draft without segregation, induction into all branches of the armed services, permission to return to the West Coast, government aid to abolish anti-Japanese propaganda, full restoration of civil rights, protection of families in the centers, and the same treatment for Nisei soldiers as other American soldiers receive. The Issei petition simply commended the Nisei one to the consideration of the President.

With the Community Council's moderate protest weakening the extremists' position, it looked as if the crisis with reference to selective service were past. Official notices were sent to prospective inductees, and all of the first group called up reported for their pre-induction physicals. Public feeling while still strong was not overtly expressed.

#### The Fair Play Committee Gathers Strength

However, during this apparent calm the Fair Play Committee was strengthening its position, mobilizing the support of the community, and preparing for more vigorous future action. The scare effect of arrests at other centers wore off, and resistance to selective service began to come into the open. Twelve men, out of a total of 64, failed to report for their pre-induction physical examinations: two on Monday, three on Tuesday, seven on Wednesday. This increase was a significant index of what was happening to the community. But before we go on, we need to go back a little.

Confusion preceded the calling of these three groups. The list of names to be checked for addresses did not arrive from the Park County Draft Board until Tuesday, February 29. This meant less than a week remained for the official notices to the men to come. On Friday, notices for the contingent leaving Tuesday reached the center. By Saturday noon the rest had not arrived. This delay created much uncertainty and some justified griping. The men wanted to know if they would have to report even if their notices did not come. The answer given them was, "No". When their notices did finally arrive Saturday afternoon, they had to be specially delivered by one of the appointed personnel. This action did not make those who were to leave on Monday overjoyed, because they had about decided that they would not need to go. Subsequently, some of the block managers questioned the right of the man who took the notices around Saturday to make such a special delivery.

The unfortunate psychological effect of this confusion was sharpened by the fact that many evacuees had read or heard of a statement by the head

of selective service in California to the effect that draftees were notified ten days in advance of the date for reporting for pre-induction physical. To the evacuees, this was evidence that even in the mechanical details of selective service, they were not being treated as other Americans were.

The Community Council petitions ran into considerable difficulty and left few people feeling particularly satisfied — unless it were the Fair Play Committee. Special block meetings were called Saturday evening to present the petitions and get signatures. In three blocks, the program went off all right, in some others moderately well. In three, the meetings blew up, due apparently to Fair Play Committee interference, and no signatures were obtained. In another, trouble developed subsequently, the Councilman resigned, and no signatures came in from that block although many had signed Saturday evening. In one other, there were none for undetermined reasons. In still others, there were such low totals for both petitions combined as 12, 15, 52. All in all, there were no signatures from five blocks, less than 53 from three others. A further evidence of lack of support is that on Monday a number of signers came into the Council office and scratched their names. Perhaps more would have done so if the Council had not closed the doors and sent off the petitions.

The objections of the Fair Play Committee were that the petitions were too mild. Of course, there was the additional, probably unstated, objection that the Committee wanted the job to be done its way.

There was a small amount of opposition from the opposite direction as well. At least one man refused to sign the Nisei petition because it asked for some things that had already been granted, e.g., admission to Civil Service. A few others did not think it wise to appear to be bargaining with the government.

There is reason to believe that the petition does not indicate the real feelings and wishes of very many residents. It may have fallen between the opposers and cooperators, and hit very few people. The total result looks quite impressive, 922 Nisei names and 1208 Issei names, but it is not a very accurate expression of community sentiment.

There is evidence that the Council itself was never very enthusiastic about the petitions, that it took action only because Councils in other relocation centers were doing so and it felt a certain compulsion to keep in step. The reluctance was due: (1) to a sense of futility, to the belief that petitions do not accomplish anything; (2) to divisions within the Council so marked that it could agree only on a compromise that satisfied few members; and (3) to the position of the Council as a buffer between the community and the administration in a situation in which there was intense feeling with strong anti-administration connotations. Under these conditions, it would have been pleasanter to have just ignored the subject.

The activities of the Fair Play Committee have been referred to a

number of times. After distributing the circular already mentioned, stating the intention to refuse military service until discrimination had been abolished and the injustices of evacuation erased, a series of meetings were held. Also, representatives of the Committee met with the Community Council and criticized the Council's handling of the petitions. One Fair Play Committee meeting was particularly significant. First, the five men who had failed to report for their physical examinations were in attendance. They told the assemblage that they were questioned and then released. Those in charge of the gatherings are reported to have taken the attitude of, "You see, nothing really happens if you don't report; the Fair Play Committee will take care of you." The next morning seven men did not show up to go for their physicals. At this same meeting a man asked one of the leaders of the Fair Play Committee point blank if the leader would advise him to report or not to report the following morning. The leader is said to have stalled for a minute or two and then to have told the questioner he would see him privately afterwards. Thereupon, he proceeded with his well-worn diatribe about evacuation and injustice. This suggests the care that leaders of the Fair Play Committee were trying to exercise in their public utterances.

Heart Mountaineers, increasingly well-impressed by the Fair Play Committee, were probably further reassured by an article favorable to its activities appearing in the Rocky Shimpo; it made the Fair Play Committee seem almost respectable and less dangerous than it had seemed earlier. Fair Play Committee leaders also began to feel more secure, less fearful. Their activities came more and more into the open, and there was less recourse to frequent "dog" and "stool-pigeon" accusations.

An incorrect report of the results of the physical examinations became current in the community. A telegram from one of the examinees had arrived saying, "Everybody rejected, be home....." People were perplexed. The Fair Play Committee had an explanation. Their protest to the Attorney-General and the Secretary of War, made a week earlier, had borne fruit. The draft was being stopped by blanket rejections at first, but there would soon be an announcement. This interpretation was swallowed hook-line-and-sinker by large numbers of residents. The prestige of the Fair Play Committee reached its peak. It was truly wonderful. A Nisei commented somewhat bitterly, "This (leader of Fair Play Committee) has the Issei eating out of his hand." Many Nisei were doing the same.

One other explanation arose to account for the blanket rejections. It was that the Japanese Government had threatened to use American war prisoners in its army if the United States Government insisted on drafting Nisei and that the United States had heeded the warning.

Soon, however, came at least the beginning of disillusionment. A wire came stating that some Heart Mountaineers had been accepted, six out of the third contingent after the blanket objections were supposed to be the order. News that some men had passed their physical examinations spread rapidly during the day and was reaffirmed by the next issue of the Sentinel. The same issue carried material from the Acting Project Director on the

mechanics of enforcement of the selective service law. This was similar to the information he had already given the Community Council. It provided an explanation of why the men who had failed to report were still at large in the center. What was almost elation changed to questioning, fear, and resentment. Meetings, however, continued. According to one of the leaders of the Fair Play Committee, the organization had difficulty keeping up with requests from different blocks for someone to come and explain its program.

The Rocky Shampo published another article on the Heart Mountain selective service situation, indicating that the authorities were "stumped" by the refusal of some Heart Mountain boys to appear for their physicals on the grounds that they did not know if they were citizens or not. The tone of the article was that the Fair Play Committee, in opposing the draft, had met with no effective governmental action. An article in the Sentinel tried to counteract this by explaining that action would inevitably be taken against draft evaders. The indications are that while a substantial minority accepts the Sentinel version, the majority believe the Rocky Shampo article.

What action was it expected the government would take in the case of Nisei who evaded the draft? In spite of the fact that the provisions and penalties of the law have been published and distributed throughout the community so that every individual could know them, it was widely held that one of three things would happen to those who failed to respond to their selective service orders: (1) they could just stay in the relocation center; (2) they would be sent to Tule Lake; (3) they would be sent to a camp to do work in National Forests or on roads. In conversation these camps were usually referred to as CCC camps, though some spoke of CO camps. This third alternative was often introduced with, "The worst that can happen....." That is, it was viewed as the most severe possible consequence. It may be added that it was thought that evaders might have to spend three or four months in jail while their cases were being settled.

It is probable that these interpretations of the working of the draft law were formulated and promulgated by the Fair Play Committee. Many evacuees found them pleasant to believe and soon they had the status of facts. This should not be too surprising if we recall (1) the center-limited lives many people lead, (2) the very strong wish-to-believe they have, and (3) the frequency with which the Fair Play Committee can urge its interpretation. The administration has alluded to or quoted from the law as it is written four or five times in almost two months, and has presented the material in cold print. Only the Community Council has heard detailed oral explanations. The Fair Play Committee, on the other hand, has held almost nightly meetings. Out from these meetings people have gone to carry the glad tidings. Others were pleased to listen and hoped what they heard was true. Of course, Councilmen have taken their information to the community, also, as have others who were sufficiently oriented in reality to remember the facts of the law. But what they had to say did not arouse a warm response among their friends and neighbors. Their message was disagreeable. If they felt impelled to pass on their knowledge

because they were convinced it was true, their action might be interpreted as approving the harshness of the law. This, in turn, might lead to an unhappy argument on the merits of the government's draft policy as applied to Nisei. That is, the subject was shifted from the facts of the law to the justice of drafting evacuees under the conditions announced. Many residents who knew that a large section of the community entertained erroneous notions regarding the penalties for draft evasion found it easier to say little and to allow people to keep on enjoying their errors.

Although the rumor that all Nisei were being rejected came to an end when the news arrived that some had passed their physical examinations, the high percentage of rejections remained a subject for speculation. Even the men who had been examined could not understand. Several of them assumed that they would pass when they saw the doctors' reports marked "normal" on all except three items on which there was some delay in getting results from the laboratory. Or, at most, they thought that only an occasional person would be turned down on the basis of these three items. They could not figure it out when one after another of such individuals were rejected.

The explanations varied: (1) For some reason the Army had decided to apply special standards to the Nisei and to take only the cream of the crop. (2) This reason was race prejudice. (3) The government wanted to create the impression that most persons would be rejected so that there would be fewer failures to report for physical examinations. Then, when everybody showed up willingly, they would be examined according to the usual standards. That is, the high percentage of rejections was bait. (4) There were several Navy doctors on the examining board and they applied very rigorous standards. These have now been replaced by Army doctors. Hereafter, the examinations will be more lenient and many more will be taken. It is rumored, moreover, that those who were rejected will be recalled for another examination.

The clash between the Fair Play Committee and the Community Council, which began over the petitions to the President, continues. Councilmen have been criticized by their constituents with the result that two of them have resigned on the grounds that they no longer have the confidence of the voters. Others have defended their actions until it is probable that they are more convinced than they were earlier of the desirability of having prepared and transmitted the petitions. Another angle to this may be mentioned. This is the first time since the announcement of January 21 that the Fair Play Committee and its sympathizers face an articulate opposition within the community itself. Hitherto, those who were disposed to accept the draft have tended to keep their own counsel in their contacts with neighbors and friends and have done little in the way of banding together to defend their point of view.

According to a few sources, the present strategy of the Fair Play Committee is to attempt to discredit the Council, to force it out of office, as being a misrepresentative body, and to stir up a local crisis generally. Fair Play Committee leaders never miss an opportunity to

complain about the method of making clothing allowances, the conditions of project employment, and any other matters on which they suspect that there are already existing sentiments of dissatisfaction that can be exploited to create more dissatisfaction. The idea is that this will provide a smoke-screen and draw attention away from the anti-draft activities of the organization. The leaders are a little afraid that it has become too closely identified with the movement to refuse to report for physical examinations and induction.

A further evidence that such fear exists is a letter written by one of the leaders to the editor of the Sentinel on March 13. In it he piously asserts that the Fair Play Committee is concerned only with the general principles of justice involved and does not advise prospective draftees to fail to respond to their calls. This same man is presumably the author of four published statements to the contrary, i.e., statements that said in one way or another that the policy advocated by the Fair Play Committee was not to accept military service unless or until the government did certain things. Apparently the tactics are to leave as tortuous a trail as possible. Some persons suggest that another motive for the Fair Play Committee campaign to stir up a crisis is to broaden its base, to establish itself as the champion of the rights of evacuees in all fields, and thus to bolster its position in the community.

Even if this is so, it should be stated that the Fair Play Committee still enjoys widespread support and sympathy. Probably nothing will seriously shake the confidence that many residents have in the organization and its program, except some actual arrests of those who failed to report.



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
April 19, 1944

*W. Day Johnson*

Project Analysis Series No. 16

THE SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN REQUESTS FOR  
REPATRIATION AND EXPATRIATION

During the past few months there has been an increase in requests for repatriation and expatriation. At Manzanar, for example, on January 1, 1944 there were on record 684 requests, which had not been cancelled. These requests were from persons scheduled to go to Tule Lake as soon as housing was ready for them there. In February almost all of them were transferred to the segregation center. Between January 1 and April 15, approximately 377 more individuals signed with the Spanish Consul and later with the WRA for repatriation. The total number of requests by people of Manzanar thus rose to more than 1000. This continuation of requests after the segregation process had supposedly been completed has by no means been confined to Manzanar. It may be stated that it has been a general trend in the relocation centers. It poses the question of just what asking for repatriation means to evacuees. In what follows the Community Analyst at Manzanar has tried to explain the trend by showing the motives of those who have requested repatriation.

---

During the last weeks I have given considerable attention to the upsurge of requests for repatriation and expatriation. I have discussed the matter with expatriates and repatriates and also with those who have toyed with the idea of repatriating or expatriating but who have rejected it. I have consulted the records of segregation hearings, leave clearance hearings, and have brought together other records which bear on the situation. The significant factors involved, as I have come to understand them, are as follows:

1. The Rumors of the Closing of Manzanar. Segregation, with the decrease in population of the center which it brought, led to an increase in rumors that Manzanar was to close. There was an air of certainty and conviction about these rumors which had been lacking before. Persons who feared relocation or "a move that will just be one of a series of further moves" began to feel that they had made a mistake by remaining in the "yes" column. The one avenue leading to Tule Lake which was now open to them was that of expatriation and repatriation, and some of them took this route. It is not likely that many would have expatriated or repatriated for this reason alone. But the panic engendered by the conviction that the center would close, together with other motivations that will be cited, exerted considerable influence. The assurance that the center will not be abandoned came after the wave of expatriations and repatriations had been in full swing for some time. In other words the sequence of events was unfortunate.

2. The Length of the War. By the time the segregation movement was a reality, the war had already entered its third year. Those who had

hoped for a quick decision one way or another were now reconciled to a long struggle. Among the old are many who, although they have said "yes" to the revised alien question 28 for religious, family, or sentimental reasons, wish to end their days in Japan. Tule Lake now seemed to them the only place from which they could return to Japan during the war. Then there are others who feel responsible for relatives in Japan. Sometimes this responsibility has been an economic one. As the prospects of a long conflict increased, these persons grew determined to seek a reunion with relatives in Japan or to resume responsibilities in Japan at the earliest possible moment. Repatriation and expatriation were seen as the only means of accomplishing their aims at this time. The segregation program and the over-optimistic insistence of many of the segregants that they would be on their way to Japan in a few months had considerable influence on the group in question.

3. The Kibei Myth. Because Kibei, even though they had given "yes" answers from the beginning, were required to have leave clearance hearings and were closely questioned concerning their loyalties and attitudes, the story arose that Kibei could not secure leave clearance on any terms. A garbled version of what Mr. Myer said on one occasion was passed around to prove that RA and the government were hostile and unsympathetic to Kibei and intended to find excuses for segregating them all. As a result a good many of the Kibei who had survived the segregation hearings became discouraged, assured that they would never be accepted in America and decided to expatriate. Also, when they had convinced themselves or had been convinced by others that they were doomed to segregation and deportation to Japan, they decided that the safest way to make their peace with the Japanese government and assure their acceptance at the other end was to relinquish American citizenship.

The most serious aspect of the Kibei myth is that it has affected the fate and fortunes of many who are not Kibei. When a Kibei decided that he was being persecuted, "would not be given a chance," and might as well expatriate, his parents and his siblings, (and often the latter were not educated abroad) had to choose between letting the family member head for Japan alone or keeping the family together by following the same path. Thus we have a continuation of the pattern of family action which swelled the total of those who went to Tule Lake at the time of segregation.

4. Delay in Leave Clearances. Formal segregation hearings actually began in April 1943 at Manzanar with the Kibei review. The larger number of segregation hearings took place in August. Leave clearance hearings began in October but the majority of them were heard in November 1943. Despite the months which have elapsed hundreds of persons have not yet received final clearance and live in fear that leave clearance will be denied and that they will be forced to go to Tule Lake and thence to Japan. These people have their minds directed toward Tule Lake, consequently, since it may be their future home. They are receptive to the arguments and the tales of grievance of those who have gone to Tule Lake because they appreciate the possible parallel between those people and themselves. The human mind reaches out for answers and certainties. The answers do not necessarily have to be logical, correct, or good. In human thinking and behavior, if knowledge and truth are not available, superstition and illogicality are

substituted, as long as they are emotionally satisfying. The failure to give thoughtful and prompt decisions in these cases has been a standing invitation to reactions and actions based on rumor, frustration, and emotionalism. For instance, the fact that leave clearance decisions have not been rendered in the order in which the hearings were taken has led to many misunderstandings.

Persons whose cases were heard early but who have received no word of the outcome, assume the worst when friends whose hearings were held much later receive leave clearance. At the very least they suppose that they are under grave suspicion for something and think that they may as well cease trying to maintain their place in this country.

5. The Tule Lake Magnet. It has become clear from other studies that there is no vast gulf, in background, in attitudes, in experience, between the residents of Manzanar who went to Tule Lake and those who did not. Those who went to Tule Lake left neighbors, friends, and relatives at Manzanar. Those who remained in Manzanar are intensely interested in the experiences of those who have segregated. One of the main topics of discussion in Manzanar is the message carried by the daily load of mail that comes from Tule Lake. People here are trying desperately to get copies of the March 20 issue of Life which carried pictures of Tule Lake. In a sense those who went to Tule Lake are considered heroes. More than once lately I have heard the expression, "I guess the really loyal ones went to Tule Lake!" Those who say this are not thinking about pro-American or pro-Japanese political sentiment particularly. All evacuees have some sense of being abused and betrayed by the United States government. The Tule Lake contingent, in the eyes of most, is the group which took a stand against "being pushed around" or "being pushed here and there."

From this point of view, those at Tule Lake are the ones who have done something decisive; who have acted. At the time of segregation I saw the amazing spectacle of a girl who was to leave for Tule Lake bidding farewell to her friends and urging them to join her soon. "What are you going to do?" she asked them with spirit. "Are you going to stay here and rot?" The fact that they were infinitely more free than she was never occurred to her or to her hearers. Psychologically she had made a decision and was therefore, at least temporarily, "free" -- free from the doubts and misgivings which had perplexed her during the long train of crises which the months in the center had brought. The others, to her mind and apparently to theirs, had settled nothing and were simply floundering; they had not relocated, they had no definite assurances of their future, they had all the trials to endure which would confront those of Japanese ancestry who tried to make an adjustment in post-evacuation and post-war America. To a population to whom evacuation has brought such change and flux in status, in holdings, in location, in living conditions, Tule Lake can easily be conceived of as the stable element in the situation, and the magnet which draws when anger or doubt or disillusionment strike. The friends there, the "better housing", the promise of permanency during wartime -- all act as convenient rationalizations for the step of expatriation or repatriation.

6. The Effects of Center Life. The linguistic handicap, the difficulty in appreciating and understanding the customs of a land in which they are a tiny minority, have always been a source of worry and concern to

a great many Japanese immigrants. Stories have been told to me of how Issei have tolerated injustice and unfair treatment at the hands of Caucasian neighbors rather than appeal to the law, so uncertain were they about their rights and their ability to present their case adequately.

A large number of old people, then, have inevitably settled down into a comfortable, Japanized existence. Many of them freely admit that it is a relief not to have to struggle with an unfamiliar tongue, not to be forced to worry continually about diversity in appearance and customs between themselves and those with whom they must necessarily come in contact at some plane or another. "It's so nice to be where everyone is like you and understands what you say," frankly admitted an Issei to a Japanese-speaking Caucasian church worker the other day. And this is not atypical. This was one of the great attractions of little Tokyo, of course. And a relocation center is, by order of the Fourth Defense Command and of necessity, a Japanese community with a vengeance.

The Issei are loath to bring this center interlude, so restful to them on this particular score, to a close. The prospect of being scattered all over the country gives them no pleasure. To break away from the convenient world of language, practice, thought, activity, and understandings which they have rebuilt and now attempt to carry forward the difficult march toward assimilation and Americanization, particularly when they are enemy aliens, seems too dismal and trying a task. Some of them have come to believe, particularly in the light of what has happened to them and to their property, that the endeavor to remain in this country all these years has been a mistake and a failure. There are two places where they feel that the life to which they have been returned and which is most congenial to their declining years, may be carried on without criticism, reproach or objection, namely Tule Lake and Japan. Consequently, a number of Issei have sought to escape any pressure from American authorities and to guarantee their future existence in a Japanese community, by repatriation.

Their American-born children constitute a more serious problem, but the children too, have been influenced, often unconsciously, by the atmosphere in which they have spent over two years. The children have become used to being exclusively with those of Mongoloid physical type. They have been separated from their Caucasian friends and from the former locale. They consequently magnify the difficulties of adjustment in predominantly Caucasian communities. Like most mortals they look no farther than the present situation to which they have made some type of adjustment. When the parents propose expatriation, though many children protest and even rebel, they do not put up the struggle which they would have precipitated if they were on the outside and if they had continued in meaningful contact with normal American life.

7. The Parent-Child Relationship. The Japanese family is strongly patriarchal. The children, like all children of some oriental cultural background, have been taught filial obedience. When evacuation brought economic and social insecurity to the Japanese community and to the individual, there was an attempt to gain some kind of strength and assurance by emphasizing family solidarity. Moreover, at the time of evacuation the

children were on the average quite young and were used to the supervision that family heads ordinarily exercise over minors. It is true, also, that children of Japanese ancestry feel a special responsibility for remaining with parents and in aiding them. They are used to acting as the "ears" and "mouths" of the parents, interpreting the American business and political world to the elders and representing them in their contacts with the English-speaking community. They feel the obligation to help and watch over their parents particularly keenly at this time. Their parents are old, they are "enemy aliens", they are under press and political attack, and most of them have been impoverished. The youngsters therefore feel an obligation to shield them from further emotional and moral hurt, and to stay by them at least until this grave crisis in their lives is past. Thus we have a possessive attitude on the part of the Issei and more than ordinary compliance on the part of the Nisei.

The Issei tend to think in family, not in individual terms. When they decide that the family fortunes have been so seriously depleted that rehabilitation in America is unlikely or that prejudice is so great that social and economic adjustment in this country will be impossible, their impulse is to repatriate and expatriate all family members. Since they feel that their age and family position entitles them to make such a move, and since they believe that what they are doing is best for the entire family, the children are often not consulted or are simply advised of a course on which a decision has already been made. Pathetic tales are told, for instance, of children who did not know until the time for departure was approaching that they were to leave for Tule Lake.

A few days ago a 16 year old boy came to ask me whether his parents had expatriated him. He knew they had been discussing repatriation for themselves and the expatriation of an older brother, but he had no idea of what had been done in his case, and he was afraid to ask. It turned out that the parents had repatriated, the older brother had been listed as an expatriate, and nothing thus far had been done about this 16 year old boy. Presumably he will go to Tule Lake with the others as a family member. My guess is that if the family have the opportunity to return to Japan during the war, they will convince this youth that he should expatriate and accompany them.

Another case is that of a boy who learned from me that he had been listed as an expatriate in a letter sent by his father to the Spanish Consul. He greeted the news with a long string of eloquent oaths. He had heard his parents discussing the wisdom of such a letter but he did not know that they had actually written and sent it. "You can't argue with the old folks about these things," he said in explanation of his inability to prevent the action. However, he has felt strongly enough about the matter to request cancellation of expatriation for himself. But others in a similar position are more pliant. Whatever their own feelings, they finally accept the parental decision rather than cause family conflict or family separation. Once the deed is done, appeals to family loyalty, and descriptions of filial obligations, parental needs, the past sacrifices of the elders, etc., are usually effective.

Then there are those young people who are, after a fashion,

"consulted" by the parents. But the "consultation" is mostly a matter of pressure tactics. Thus, one Nisei of my acquaintance for some time resisted the appeals of his parents that he sign up for expatriation. Finally, when he had suffered personal unhappiness and his moral resistance was low, he yielded. Now he is trying to extricate himself and the family from the morass in which his momentary weakness has involved them.

Not long ago a young man visited me who admitted that he came less because he sought my company than because he dreaded to go home. His parents were "after him all the time to agree to expatriation", and he knew that as soon as he entered the apartment "the argument would begin all over again." So far he has held out against this parental pressure, but he admits that he has thought at times of "giving up and having some peace."

8. The Delicate Balance That Exists. Studies and case histories of individuals and of groups that have been segregated as a result of past repatriation or expatriation requests or because of the maintenance of "no" answers to question 28; of those who, although they did not give an unqualified "yes" answer in the February registration, changed to "yes" before the segregation board; and of those who have said "yes" from the beginning indicate that the majority of persons in these three groups have much the same grievances, complaints, and basic attitudes. They are all deeply wounded by the implications of evacuation and detention, they are angered over property losses, they are bitter over press attacks and hostile legislation. The reason why one family or person said "yes" or changed to "yes" while another maintained the "no" is often scarcely definable. A little property in Japan when all holdings in the United States have been lost; the age of the parents; a fairly recent pleasant visit to Japan; personality differences which enable one individual to throw off property losses and blows to prestige while another continues to burn with resentment — these are the things which tip the balance one way or another. The division in thinking between the "yes", the "no", and the doubtful, is often narrow and is none too stable. A significant personal experience or any important shift in the national policy toward evacuees is certain to upset this delicate balance and to throw uncertain individuals in one camp or another.

9. The Draft. In my opinion the draft has figured so prominently in this picture because it did precisely that, because it upset the delicate balance of attitude toward their future of a substantial section of the evacuee population which is in an uncertain and perplexed state of mind.

The centers are now crowded with Issei who look to the future with foreboding. They have not found it difficult truthfully to say "yes" to the revised alien question. But they are not sure that they will not be deported at the end of the war, and, because of their age and reduced circumstances, they are not sure that they can make a living if they are permitted to stay. They cannot believe that the antagonism toward Japanese which has been fed by this war will not lead to post-war social and economic retaliation. In short, though they did not go to Tule Lake and

though, until the Nisei draft was announced, they did not request repatriation, they look upon a future in America with doubt and with reservations. They had come to feel that their ultimate destination depended on the length, course, and outcome of the war, the intensity of feeling that it generated, the legislation that may be passed, the willingness of the United States government to allow them to remain, the resources left at the end of the war, the comparative economic conditions in Japan and the United States after the war, and a number of other factors about which they felt there was little use speculating at the present time.

The draft forced a crisis and an unwelcome decision upon them. They are frank to say that they have not wanted to see their sons fight or die for a country in which their own position is so untenable and in which they may not be able to continue to live. They fear, and this is most important, that if their sons fight in the army of an enemy of Japan and if then the family is forced to go to Japan because Congress so rules or because of economic necessity, they and their children will be persona non grata in Nippon and will be harried by all the difficulties that "disgraced" families face in that country.

This feeling that they do not wish to see their sons fighting for a country in which they cannot be sure of a stake and a future, though it is basic, is reinforced by other objections to the draft, such as the dislike for segregated units, the reluctance to be drafted from centers, and the many other elements which have been discussed in previous reports of this section. The unfortunate letter of the Spanish Consul to a Manzanar resident did not help matters.

The young men were not slow in reflecting the mood of their elders. With segregation barely over, they felt trapped. After two years of crisis and uncertainty they felt that they had been cleared finally just to make them available for warfare. Those who had hoped to relocate and recoup their losses felt cheated once more. All the deprivations in regard to citizenship, opportunity, freedom, and property were rehearsed. They were much more congenial to plans of their parents for repatriation and expatriation.


I believe that in respect to this center at least, the tide of expatriations and repatriations has been arrested and even reversed. There are a number of reasons for this:

1. Prompt action to correct the misunderstanding that arose from the letter of the Spanish Consul.
2. The announcement that requests for expatriation filed after the notice of the Nisei draft would be considered draft-dodging.
3. When it became apparent that feeling was rising and that it would be expressed in expatriation and repatriation requests or in some real explosion unless an outlet were found, Nisei were encouraged to meet to draft a petition which the Project Director might carry to Washington.

That he was able to return with what are considered some real concessions has eased the tension somewhat.

4. Also it is my opinion that Registration was made the real demonstration of feeling in this center. Coming so soon after the riot here, the impact was terrific and the opposition flamed. Consequently the segregation process here was particularly thorough and many of those who would have been candidates for expatriation or repatriation at this time are already at Tule Lake.

While the situation seems to be under control at the present time the crisis of the first actual induction is not yet past. And there will continue to be individual requests for repatriation or expatriation even if the mass movement subsides. As long as some of the factors which I have mentioned are operative, cases of expatriation and repatriation may be expected.





WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
July 24, 1944

Project Analysis Series No. 17

RELOCATION AT ROHWER CENTER  
Part I: The Relocated Population

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction and Summary
- II. Description of the Population of Rohwer Center  
Rural Origin and Occupation  
Language and Education  
Citizenship and Age  
Similar Origin and Background of Block Residents
- III. Description of Those Who Relocated  
1500 Indefinite Leaves in 15 Months  
Origin from contiguous Blocks  
Similar Cultural Traits of Blocks High in Relocation  
Use of English  
Urban origin in California  
Urban origin in Japan  
High level of education  
Membership in the Christian church  
Businessmen or unskilled laborers  
Influence of Block Managers on Resettlement  
Influence of Letters and Reports from Resettlers  
Individual versus Family Relocation  
Resettlement from the Center and from "Outside"  
Numerical Superiority of Nisei in Resettlement  
Numerical Superiority of Men in Relocation  
Numerical Superiority of the 20-29 Age Group in Relocation
- IV. Months Preferred for Relocation  
Influence of Movement from Assembly Centers and Registration
- V. States to Which Evacuees Relocated  
Five States with Three-fourths of the Resettlers  
Illinois  
Michigan  
Ohio  
Colorado and Utah
- VI. Returns from Indefinite Leave  
Successful Relocation of Ninety-four Percent

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
July 24, 1944

Project Analysis Series No. 17

RELOCATION AT ROHWER CENTER  
Part I: The Relocated Population

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction and Summary
- II. Description of the Population of Rohwer Center
  - Rural Origin and Occupation
  - Language and Education
  - Citizenship and Age
  - Similar Origin and Background of Block Residents
- III. Description of Those Who Relocated
  - 1500 Indefinite Leaves in 15 Months
  - Origin from contiguous Blocks
  - Similar Cultural Traits of Blocks High in Relocation
    - Use of English
    - Urban origin in California
    - Urban origin in Japan
    - High level of education
    - Membership in the Christian church
    - Businessmen or unskilled laborers
  - Influence of Block Managers on Resettlement
  - Influence of Letters and Reports from Resettlers
  - Individual versus Family Relocation
  - Resettlement from the Center and from "Outside"
  - Numerical Superiority of Nisei in Resettlement
  - Numerical Superiority of Men in Relocation
  - Numerical Superiority of the 20-29 Age Group in Relocation
- IV. Months Preferred for Relocation
  - Influence of Movement from Assembly Centers and Registration
- V. States to Which Evacuees Relocated
  - Five States with Three-fourths of the Resettlers
    - Illinois
    - Michigan
    - Ohio
    - Colorado and Utah
- VI. Returns from Indefinite Leave
  - Successful Relocation of Ninety-four Percent

Table of Contents (Cont.)

Description of the Six Percent Who Failed  
Their expectations before attempting relocation  
Their reasons for failure to relocate  
The failures by month, state, and length of stay  
The return of more Nisei than Issei

RELOCATION AT ROHWER RELOCATION CENTER  
Part I: The Relocated Population

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This article summarizes the principal findings of a project study called "Statistical Report on Relocation at Rohwer Relocation Center", a detailed analysis of the indefinite leaves granted at this Arkansas center in the 15-months period from the opening of the center in October, 1942, to January 29, 1944.

The results of the analysis are of interest because in relation to other centers Rohwer falls in the middle group with respect to rate of relocation. Being fourth among the nine centers as to resettlement, it is just slightly above average. For all centers, the total average rate of relocation per 1000 population is 194. For Rohwer, the average relocation rate is 211 per 1000 population.

The analysis reveals that 1441 residents of Rohwer have relocated in the 15-months period. Most of those who relocated formerly lived in contiguous blocks, many of which had block managers or other leaders who energetically promoted relocation. In these blocks, former residents who were successful outside also encouraged resettlement by sending back favorable reports of their experiences.

Many who took indefinite leave came from blocks in which the majority of residents had an effective command of English or were bilingual, had good education, and were of the Christian faith. Furthermore, the residents of these blocks had usually come from urban communities in California, and, if they were Issei, they had immigrated from towns and cities of Japan to the United States. Many of the residents had been businessmen or unskilled laborers before evacuation.

Of the 1441 who relocated, 83% were Nisei, 14% were Issei, and 3% were Kibei. The majority of those relocating were Nisei men from 20 to 29 years of age; Issei were much slower and more cautious than Nisei in planning to resettle.

At first, more people went out alone than with their families, but now there is a growing tendency for family heads to take their dependents with them instead of sending back for them. There are still, however, more people going out individually than with relatives. Few women have relocated alone. If they relocate, it is usually with their families.

The peak months of relocation in this 15-months period were April, May, June, July, and August. Three-fifths of the 1441 resettlers left Rohwer in the late spring and summer months of 1943. Relocation then declined during the autumn and winter months.

Three-fourths of those who left the center went to Illinois, Michigan,

Ohio, Utah, and Colorado. Former residents of Rohwer are now to be found in 35 states.

Of the 1441, about 3% failed in their attempt to relocate and had to return to the center. Of these failures, more than half experienced difficulties in regard to employment; others returned primarily for personal or family reasons. More Nisei than Issei returned, partly because of the larger number of Nisei who took indefinite-leave. Only one of the 172 families that went out returned to the center.

DESCRIPTION OF THE POPULATION OF ROHWER CENTER\*

Information about the cultural background of the population helps in understanding the situation regarding relocation at Rohwer Center, Arkansas. When the center opened in October, 1942, the population was estimated to be about 8000. By October, 1943, transfers and relocation had reduced the number to 6673.

Rural Origin and Occupation

Most of the residents of Rohwer Center came from rural communities where they worked as farmers. Although the largest proportion of them were farmers, few actually owned farms in California. The majority worked as ranch laborers, managers, or overseers. A fourth of the Rohwer population is made up of unattached persons without families, most of whom are elderly bachelors who, before evacuation, worked around Stockton as migratory farm laborers. The non-rural residents of Rohwer are, for the most part, former small businessmen, who owned or worked as employees of markets or service establishments in Japanese American districts.

Before evacuation from California, 53% of the evacuees at Rohwer lived in rural communities; 5% resided in towns of less than 2500 population, while 42% had homes and businesses in towns of more than 2500.

In general, the residents of Rohwer came from either the area around Stockton or that of Los Angeles and arrived in Arkansas by way of the Stockton or the Santa Anita Assembly Centers.

The agricultural background of the residents of the center goes back to Japan. Four-fifths of the foreign-born evacuees originally came to the United States from rural prefectures in Japan; only one-fifth came from urban areas. Hiroshima, a rural prefecture, is better represented in the center than any other prefecture.

Language and Education

More than half of the population at Rohwer is bilingual. Usually, however, it is the second-generation resident rather than the foreign-born who can speak both English and Japanese. More foreign-born women than men speak only Japanese and have no practical command of English.

57% of the Rohwer population speaks both  
English and Japanese  
31% speaks Japanese only  
7% speaks English only  
5% is too young to speak any language

---

\* Based on "Report on a Survey of the Population of Rohwer Relocation Center", October, 1943.

The level of education at Rohwer is high, for the majority has had at least a grade school education. While less than four-tenths of one percent never went to school, only one-tenth of one percent cannot read or write. Many without schooling who, nevertheless, are literate were taught by Issei who had come to America before them.

47% of the Rohwer population graduated from  
high school  
40% graduated from grade school  
10% had some grade school education but did not  
finish  
3% graduated from college

In religion, about 77% of the population is Buddhist; 21% is Christian; and 2%, as far as is known, has no religion or stated no preference.

#### Citizenship and Age

In citizenship, 59% of the Rohwer population are citizens; 40% are aliens; and 1% are dual citizens.

Fifty-four percent of the population is Nisei; 40% is Issei; and 6% is Kibei. The age distribution somewhat resembles that of the rest of the population of Japanese descent in the United States. There are few, either foreign- or American-born, in the 30-39 age group. Most of those under thirty years are Nisei, and most of those over forty are Issei. At Rohwer in 1943, more than half of the population was under 29 years of age and consisted mostly of Nisei.

#### Distribution of Rohwer Residents by Age Groups

<u>Age</u>	<u>Percent</u>
0-9	16%
10-19	21
20-29	18
30-39	9
40-49	12
50-59	12
60 and over	12
	<hr/>
N=6673	100%

#### Similar Origin and Background of Block Residents

At the time of the Rohwer census, the population was frequently distributed in the 33 residential blocks in such a way that people from the same part of California and with similar educational, occupational, and religious backgrounds lived in the same block. After arriving in Rohwer,

some residents moved from their original blocks to those where they had relatives, former neighbors from the West Coast, or new friends made at the assembly centers. The character of particular blocks, as this relocation study shows, has influenced the rate at which their residents leave the center to resettle outside.



## DESCRIPTION OF THOSE WHO RELOCATED

### Fifteen Hundred Indefinite Leaves in 15-Months

From the opening of the center in October, 1942, to January 29, 1944, indefinite leave was taken by 1500 people, or about 18% of the original population at Rohwer which has been estimated at 8000. Actually, only 1441 of those who relocated had resided at the center. The remaining 59 never lived there, but took field leave directly from assembly centers and later transferred to indefinite leave through Rohwer, their official relocation center.

### Origin from Contiguous Blocks

A marked characteristic of many who have relocated from Rohwer is that they lived in neighboring blocks at the center. Groups of these blocks tend to form districts which have a high, medium, or low number of relocated residents. Occasional blocks, however, are isolated from their characteristic district. (Map 1)

A high district of five blocks (3, 4, 5, 14, and 19) exists on the southern side of the center. At the southwestern corner, two blocks (7 and 9) form a small high district. One high block (16), although isolated on the eastern side, is surrounded by medium blocks. These eight blocks had from 55 to 84 indefinite leaves per block in the 15-months period.

A medium district of 18 blocks, which had from 23 to 52 indefinite leaves per block, is made up of the entire central and northern portions of the center (except for 14 and 19 which are high); and the entire eastern portion (except for Block 16 which is high). Block 8, an isolated medium block, is surrounded by high blocks. In all, 19 blocks are medium in relocation.

A low district of 6 blocks (6, 10, 23, 24, 25, and 26) is on the western side of the center. These blocks had from 6 to 17 indefinite leaves per block.

### Similar Cultural Traits of Blocks High in Relocation

A study of the population makeup of those blocks from which people have resettled shows that the residents tend to have the cultural characteristics listed below. Because other sources indicate that evacuees with these traits have been relocating in proportionately high numbers, it is interesting to find support in the population character of the blocks formerly inhabited by the resettlers.




The cultural characteristics of the residents of the blocks which have many indefinite leaves are:


MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF INDEFINITE LEAVES BY BLOCKS  
(From 11-1-42 to 1-29-44)

ROHMER  
RELOCATION  
CENTER  
Desha County  
Arkansas

N  
W E  
S

Legend

-  -- 17 or less Leaves
-  -- 23 to 52 Leaves
-  -- 55 to 84 Leaves



1. They speak English, or both English and Japanese
2. They lived in urban localities on the West Coast
3. The Issei came from urban localities in Japan
4. They have high education
5. They are Christians
6. They are former businessmen or unskilled laborers

Conversely, among the resettlers were very few who came from blocks where the residents speak only Japanese or are Kibei. In blocks from which resettlers have left, few have lived in rural communities either in Japan or on the West Coast, or have been professional workers, skilled laborers, farmers, or fishermen. Other sources also indicate that relatively few with these traits have relocated.

1. Use of English. Relocation was mainly by those who used English effectively and practically. Most resettlers, regardless of age, spoke English. Nearly all older, non-English speaking Issei who left the center have resettled with Nisei sons and daughters. Evacuees believe that most of the Issei who speak only Japanese simply will not or cannot relocate individually. Issei, they say, will probably choose to sit it out in the center until something resembling colony resettlement is possible for them. Evacuees, especially those beyond middle age, who speak only Japanese, have talked in this vein for many months.

Blocks with the highest proportion of those who speak only English are all either high or medium in relocation. Blocks with the highest proportion of bilingual speakers are also high or medium in relocation. Contrarily, however, one of the lowest relocation blocks has only bilingual residents. Blocks that are predominantly Japanese in speech are usually low or medium in resettlement.

2. Urban origin in California. According to evacuees, the resettlers tend to have an urban background, while people with a farming and rural background are inclined to remain in the center. Evacuees also believe that most of the Nisei who went out to work on farms were not farmers before evacuation but came from towns and cities. Supporting the evacuee belief is the fact that nearly all Rohwer blocks with a high or medium number of relocatees have a population that was predominantly urban on the West Coast. Residents of blocks low or medium in resettlement were largely rural in California. However, two high blocks are exceptional in that their residents were very rural. Another unusual block is low in relocation though very high in former urban dwellers.

3. Urban origin in Japan. Blocks high or medium in relocation have the greatest proportion of Issei from urban places in Japan. Low blocks, on the other hand, have Issei who were largely rural in Japan. Still, there are several exceptions. One high block, for example, has only those Issei who were rural in Japan and in California. Since very few of the resettlers themselves were Issei, it is likely that the Issei in these unusual rural blocks having a larger number of resettlers make their influence felt, not by relocating themselves, but by persuading Nisei to leave the center and by permitting Nisei members of their families to relocate individually.
4. High level of education. The largest numbers of college and high school graduates are in the blocks highest in resettlement. Nearly all the blocks that are lowest in indefinite leaves have a low level of education. In them are the fewest high school and college graduates and the largest numbers of those whose education stopped in, or at the end of, grade school. This confirms a belief that evacuees with no more than two or three years of public school tend to hold back from relocation because of their handicap in education. It is not so much true of those who already have relocated or intend to relocate as farmers, but rather of those who want industrial jobs in towns and cities.

An evacuee probably feels a lack of education to be a handicap because he is faced with resettlement as an individual apart from Japanese communities. He will, as an individual resettler, be at a disadvantage in competing with better educated Caucasians. His lack of a purely American education was naturally not so serious a handicap on the West Coast where his social and economic life was carried on almost exclusively in Japanese surroundings. There, at least as an individual, he was more isolated from Caucasian competition.

5. Membership in the Christian church. On the whole, Christian blocks have furnished a greater number of resettlers than have the Buddhist. Blocks predominantly Christian are either high or medium, while blocks predominantly Buddhist are low or medium in relocation.

Some Issei have observed that, other things being equal, the average Buddhist is less inclined than the Christian to relocate. Even if this is the case, it does not follow, of course, that Christians are more desirous and innately capable of relocating than are Buddhists. It is more likely that they expect to feel less out of place in Christian

Caucasian communities. Also, the help and acceptance extended by Christian individuals and groups wherever Christian evacuees settle gives them added confidence.

6. Businessmen or unskilled laborers. With few exceptions, blocks highest in relocation have the greatest proportion of former businessmen or unskilled laborers, or both, and the fewest skilled workers, farmers, or fishermen. Three exceptional blocks that have many farmers are high in relocation, while, on the other hand, one block with many businessmen has few indefinite leaves.

Farmers, most of whom are Issei, have not relocated from Rohwer in any large number. It is very likely that they will not do so until they are permitted to relocate in fairly large Japanese communities and on contiguous tracts of land. Many skilled workers have not relocated because they firmly believe that even if they manage to get jobs using their skill they will be paid far less than Caucasians in the same jobs.

Unskilled laborers, who have long been accustomed to menial jobs, seem to have no particular work preference. This makes resettlement easier for them. Also the prospect of low wages does not deter them from relocating, for they are accustomed to them.

#### Influence of Block Managers on Resettlement

An important influence on the number of relocatees in a block originates from the block manager and other block leaders.

Managers of most of the blocks lowest in relocation have, it is reported, little faith or interest in relocation. These blocks are thought to be low only for this reason. Some managers, it is said, either oppose resettlement outright or else merely do not give it active support. A few are said to be incapable men who perhaps mean well but are entirely lacking in vision and in qualities making for leadership. It is undoubtedly true that many of the blocks would have more people relocating if the block managers and other leaders would more actively persuade their block residents to resettle and if they would show less of the passive "let's wait and see" attitude so characteristic of some of the older Issei.

The block that is highest in relocation is first partly because its former manager actively promoted resettlement from the opening of the center until a short time ago when he himself relocated. He constantly harassed his residents with, "What do you want to stick around here for," and, "This is no place for a man like you." Issei strongly criticized him for having apparently adopted the "WRA" attitude that the first consideration of all evacuees should be to get out of the center and resettle as soon as

possible. Issei pointed out that relocation is presumed to be a strictly voluntary matter, which is to be decided by each person for himself without pressure from WRA or evacuees. They considered it unseemly for a Japanese to push the government's argument to the point where it actually conflicted with the wishes and plans of most Issei. This manager in spite of adverse criticism is reported to have been very successful in persuading many undecided Nisei to relocate. His own successful resettlement influenced others to follow him later. At least two other high blocks have had managers who similarly promoted relocation.

#### Influence of Letters and Reports from Resettlers

Letters and reports from relocated block residents also influence their former block neighbors to resettle. Naturally these reports circulate very quickly over the entire center and are immediately effective in molding general sentiment toward relocation. However, they are most effective in blocks where the letter-writers formerly lived.

Interest in relocation has constantly fluctuated. A few unfavorable reports at a given time dampen enthusiasm for a short period, but this effect is offset by later favorable reports. If all or nearly all who relocate from a block are successful on the outside and write no unfavorable letters to the center, interest of that block in relocation soars and remains high. More and more of its residents then take a chance on resettlement. But a single unfavorable letter creates a bad impression. If a block gets many unfavorable letters, its residents constantly quote them as their chief reason for not relocating. Managers of several low blocks claim that the receipt of too many unfavorable reports from their few relocated residents keeps down their resettlement figures. Two of the highest blocks in the center are said to have received very few unfavorable reports from their former residents.

#### Individual versus Family Relocation

Of the 1441 actual residents who left Rohwer Center, 64% relocated singly while 36% went out in family groups.

The difference between percentages of family relocation and of individual relocation is largely due to the many problems and fears that a family must overcome before it relocates. But once it has made the decision to resettle and has made the move, it is very successful. Only one of the 172 relocated families has returned to Rohwer.

Earlier, a family head tended to go out alone because he doubted his ability to support his family during the first few months outside. He was also uncertain of being accepted in a new community. Now, though, the tendency is increasing for family heads to take their dependents with them when they first leave the center.

Many who went out alone have since sent back for their families, but others have not sent for them because they regard the center as a haven for

dependents until jobs and acceptance in outside localities are better established. For political reasons, older evacuees tend to be apprehensive of their reception outside. They fear that Japanese successes in the Pacific from time to time may undermine the good work of relocation offices. They also fear that while Japanese may be accepted at any given time they may later suffer social ostracism, exclusion from public schools, and loss of jobs or any land they may lease or rent.

The 172 families that relocated constitute approximately 12% of the total number of families originally at Rohwer when the center opened.

#### Resettlement from the Center and from "Outside"

More than nine-tenths of the 1441 Rohwer residents who relocated had indefinite leave when they left the center. Less than one-tenth decided while outside the center on temporary leave to resettle and apply for indefinite leave.

Most of those changing from seasonal to indefinite leave were Nisei men in the 20-29 age group. No women changed from seasonal to indefinite leave. More Issei than Nisei, and about as many women as men, changed from short-term to indefinite leave. Most of the Issei who changed were between 25 and 40 years of age. Although more Nisei than Issei have taken short-term leave, Issei have taken it for the serious purpose of looking into relocation possibilities. Nisei who take short-term leave tend to return to the center. They regard short-term leave as a "vacation" from the center and a money-earning period.

As an inducement to take indefinite leave, the temporary-leave program would seem to have had indifferent success. Its real value may be in providing evacuees with a taste of the more abundant life outside and in building up their confidence. The result may have been that many who returned to the center after short-term and seasonal leave found their life too narrow and meaningless and subsequently relocated.

#### Numerical Superiority of Nisei in Resettlement

More than four-fifths of those who relocated from Rohwer were Nisei. About one-fifth were Issei and Kibei. On the basis of their number in the total population as of October, 1943, the Nisei are proportionately high in relocation while the Issei and Kibei are low.

Of the 1441 residents of Rohwer who resettled,  
83% were Nisei; 14% were Issei; and 3% were Kibei.

Nisei constituted 87% of the 927 residents of Rohwer who resettled individually, and 77% of the 514 who went out as members of a family.

Issei made up 11% of those who resettled singly, and 19% of those going out with their families. They did not begin to relocate in any sizeable

number until April, 1943. No doubt they were biding their time until they could get reports from the more adventurous Nisei who had taken the chance on relocation. Being, by and large, less fluent than Nisei in English and less familiar with Americans and American customs, the Issei were no doubt wary of losing themselves in purely Caucasian communities. After April, 1943, however, the older evacuees began to relocate, although not in any month in as great a number as the Nisei.

Kibei have been slow to relocate. Of residents relocating singly from Rohwer, only 2% were Kibei; of those going out with their families, 4% were Kibei. Like some Issei, they tend to have a deterring influence on relocation in the blocks where they are heavily concentrated. Blocks with the greatest number of Kibei are low in relocation, while blocks high in indefinite leaves have few, if any, Kibei. One block, however, is exceptional. Though 15% of its residents are Kibei, it has a large number of relocatees. This is largely due to the influence of its block manager and the encouraging reports on relocation experiences sent back by previous residents of the block.

#### Numerical Superiority of Men in Relocation

Of the 1441 who took indefinite leave, 64% were men and 36% were women. The preponderance of men among those relocating from Rohwer is accentuated by the number of Issei bachelors, of which the center has many, who took indefinite leave.

More women went out as members of family groups than individually. Of the 927 residents of Rohwer who went out alone, 71% were men and 29% were women. In the group of 514 who resettled with members of their family, there were about as many women as men (51% men, 49% women). Young Nisei women have less inclination and liberty than do the young Nisei men to relocate on their own. If they go out, it is usually with their families or they go to join the family member who has already resettled.

#### Numerical Superiority of the 20-29 Age Group in Relocation

More than half of those who relocated singly or in family groups were in the 20-29 age group. The majority of the resettlers in this age group were Nisei. Most of those in the older age groups were Nisei. Most of those in the older age groups were Issei, while most of those in the lower age groups were Nisei. Kibei who took indefinite leave were either in the 30-39, 20-29, or the 10-19 age groups.



Distribution of Relocates by Age Groups

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
60 plus	2%
50-59	4
40-49	6
30-39	12
20-29	52
10-19	16
0-9	8
	<hr/>
N= 1441	100%

All children under 10 years of age who relocated left the center with their families. For the most part, their parents were younger Issei who were just old enough to be family heads and ambitious for themselves and children but not too old to be afraid of the responsibilities and dangers of relocation.

Nearly all settlers in the 10-19 and 20-29 age groups were unattached Nisei, most of whom went out singly. In the 30-39 and 40-49 age groups, more people went out as members of a family group than as unattached individuals, but in the group over 50 years of age, more people went out singly than as members of a family group.

## MONTHS PREFERRED FOR RELOCATION

### Influence of Movement from Assembly Centers and Registration

Because November and December, 1942, were so hectic at Rohwer Center, it is surprising that any evacuees were able to relocate. Evacuation from the West Coast assembly centers was not completed until some time in November, and it took the evacuees most of December to get settled down in their new home.

Nevertheless, relocation probably would have seriously got under way in January, 1943, had not the attention of evacuees been distracted by the expected program of registration. Registration was carried out on a voluntary basis in February, when, despite the general objection to it and the excitement it caused, as many as 35 people managed to relocate. In March, the army conducted a compulsory registration, which, however, did not deter 78 people from relocating. Because once it was consummated, registration did not seem as terrible and dangerous as when it was only a possibility, concern about it died down by the end of March, and so we find a serious interest in relocation appearing for the first time in April.

Three-fifths of the indefinite leaves granted in the 15-months period from October, 1942, to January 29, 1944, were taken in the period from April to August, 1943. Representative of middlewestern firms visited the center during these months and persuaded evacuees to take jobs with them. Relocation slumped slightly in June and July during this high period because evacuees felt that midsummer was a "bad" time to resettle. Farmers regarded the late summer or early fall as a more propitious time than midsummer to get farm jobs or to acquire leased land. Also it was thought job offers were un plentiful at that time in most cities.

The number of men relocating was highest in May, next highest in April, and third highest in August, while the number of women relocating was highest in August, with May in second and June in third place.

November, 1942, which was just after the opening of the center, had the fewest indefinite leaves, but during the following winter months there was a gradual increase until April when the number rose steeply. It reached a peak in May, declined slightly in June and July, as described above, rose again in August, and then fell sharply in September. It then steadily declined until it reached a low point in December, 1943. In January, 1944, the number of indefinite leaves began once more to increase, largely due to students leaving the center to go back to college after Christmas vacation.

## STATES TO WHICH EVACUEES RELOCATED

### Five States with Three-fourths of the Resettlers

Though Rohwer residents have relocated in 35 states, 75% of them are concentrated in the five states of Illinois (30%), Michigan (15%), Ohio (9%), Colorado (12%), and Utah (9%). The remaining are dispersed through 30 other states. Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have no representatives from Rohwer.

Illinois leads the list of states in the number of relocations from Rohwer. Though many have settled in Chicago, this city is not especially liked because of its size and its cold, winter climate. However, many evacuees choose it because of the greater opportunities which it, like other large cities, afford.

Michigan has attracted many. Several Issei and Nisei, who took seasonal leave to work in Michigan fruit orchards, changed to indefinite leave and settled in the state. Detroit and Ann Arbor have drawn a number of evacuees. Ann Arbor, in particular, attracts Nisei because of its being a university town. But of late it has lost in favor because of several unpleasant incidents there. A Rohwer group, established in the university dormitory as working students and part-time instructors, wrote back that they had to do so much menial work they had no time for study and recreation. This soured many on going out to finish their education by taking part-time university jobs.

Most resettlers in Ohio have been Nisei who took city jobs and brought their families with them. Cincinnati is considered to be far and away the best city in the United States for relocation. This evacuee belief was strengthened by glowing accounts sent back by the first few to relocate there. They described their acceptance, their ease in finding jobs and making Caucasian friends, and the lack of unpleasant incidents in their contacts with the public. It is reported in the center that Cincinnati, before Pearl Harbor, had only four Japanese families. They were well-to-do, highly respected, and listed in the social "blue book" of the city. Returning Nisei give this as the reason for the city's easy acceptance and lack of antipathy toward them. They consider Cleveland and one or two other Ohio cities as being fairly good for relocation, but far below Cincinnati in preference.

Because Colorado and Utah are so much devoted to truck farming, they have long appealed to Issei farmers as second choice after California. Many settlers in these states are younger Issei who relocated on farms near former Japanese friends and relatives. The small numbers of Japanese farming families already there attract others to the states. Many Japanese farmers moved from California to these two states immediately after the voluntary evacuation order and more followed until the "freezing" order of the army in March, 1942, stopped voluntary migration. Later on,

a number who had planned earlier to move did so as soon as Rohwer Center granted them leave clearance. A sizeable portion of those relocating to Colorado and Utah are Nisei who first took seasonal leave to work at farm jobs there, and later changed to indefinite leave without returning to Rohwer.

## RETURNS FROM INDEFINITE LEAVE

### Successful Relocation of Ninety-four Percent

Successful resettlement was achieved by 94% of those who took indefinite leave. Of the 6% who had returned to Rohwer by the end of January, 1944, 3% came back for personal reasons that were not connected with relocation. Only the remaining 3% failed after seriously attempting to resettle.

The Relocation Office had expected the proportion of serious failures to be much higher than the 3% that actually occurred. Evacuee resentment toward evacuation and the anti-social attitudes bred of this resentment were expected to handicap relocation. Another hindrance was that the evacuees are racially and, to much of the public, culturally identical with the enemy. That so many resettled successfully indicates that since Pearl Harbor the public has become increasingly aware that Japanese Americans must be distinguished from the enemy in Japan and accorded different treatment. Resettlement also shows that the Japanese are far more capable than Caucasians have supposed of integrating themselves into American life and of establishing themselves individually in Caucasian communities.

From April, 1943, when people began coming back, at least one person returned each month. December was the highest month because of high school and college students returning for the Christmas holidays. August, September, and October were the next highest months.

Though people had gone out to 35 states, they returned from only 16. The largest number returned from Michigan. Next, in order, were Illinois, Arkansas, and Ohio. However, Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois were among the states to which the largest numbers of people went to resettle.

### Description of the Six Percent Who Failed

Of the 6% who returned to Rohwer, the Relocation Office at the center regarded 2% as not having left with the definite intention of staying away, and 4% as having gone out with the intention of relocating permanently.

Except for a handful that went out for medical reasons, nearly all who left expecting to return were students going to college and school. While they may have seriously desired to escape center life and pursue their education when they took indefinite leave, they escaped, however, only to the sheltered life of school to continue a process begun before evacuation. Their taking indefinite leave does not constitute, as with workers, an attempt to start life completely anew in a competitive and perhaps hostile environment.

Most of those (4% or 63 people) whom the Relocation Office regarded as having left determined to relocate permanently went out to take promised jobs or to seek work. A few went to join families already relocated or to enlist in the army.

Of the 63,

21 came back to Rohwer temporarily for personal reasons and not because of unsuccessful relocation.

42 returned because they had failed after seriously attempting to relocate.

Their expectations before attempting relocation

36 of the 42 failures had relocated for employment. 25 were unskilled laborers; 5 were skilled; 4 were farm laborers; 2 were job hunters of unstated training or skill.

1 relocated to join the army;  
2 relocated to join their families;  
2 accompanied their families;  
1 relocated on a hospitality offer.

Their reasons for failing to relocate

Employment difficulty		
Job not available when arrived .....	1	
Wages too low .....	3	
Job not satisfactory .....	15	
No jobs available after searching .....	4	
No jobs to his liking .....	1	24
Unpleasant social environment .....	3	3
Personal and family reasons		
To get married .....	1	
To help solve family problems .....	1	
Could not settle down .....	3	
To give birth to baby .....	1	6
Own illness .....	3	3
Discharged from army .....	1	1
Repatriation to Tule Lake .....	3	3
Poor housing .....	2	2

---

42

The failures by month, state, and length of stay. From April, 1943, to January, 1944, at least one attempt to relocate failed each month. Peak months for failure were October, August, November, and December.

Michigan had by far the largest number of failures (19); the next highest were Illinois (9), Ohio (4), Arkansas (3), Colorado (2), and Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, and Utah (1 each). Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin had no relocation failures among their returns.

The number of days spent on indefinite leave by the 42 who returned varied from 8 to 259. Twenty stayed out more than 100 days.

The return of more Nisei than Issei. Of the 42 failures, 40 were Nisei and only two were Issei. Most of the returning Nisei were in 20-29 age group. It will be recalled, however, that Nisei of this age group made up the largest portion of the evacuees who relocated.

The number of returning Nisei is large for several reasons. They have relocated in much greater numbers than have the Issei; and, because they have relocated singly as a rule, they are in the habit of returning to visit their families which are still in the center. Many more of the Issei who have left the center have taken their families with them and so have less reason to return for visiting. Because the Issei are older, they tend to prepare themselves more thoroughly than do the Nisei for permanent resettlement. Of course, they are also far less inclined to look upon relocation as a lark and a happy escape from the boredom of center life.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
September 2, 1944

30007

Project Analysis Series No. 18

RELOCATION AT ROHWER CENTER

Part II: Issei Relocation Problems

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction and Summary
- II. The Relocated Issei
  - The Number of Relocatees
  - Reasons for Relocation
- III. Issei Relocation Problems
  - Origin of Problems Before and After Evacuation
  - Influence of Pre-evacuation Life on Relocation
    - Period of immigration
    - Establishment of Japanese communities on the West Coast
  - Influence of Race on Relocation
    - Racial antipathy
    - Nisei marriage
  - Influence of Culture on Relocation
    - Social acceptance
    - Religion
    - Education
    - Language
  - Influence of Citizenship and Attitudes Toward the United States
    - Citizenship
    - Attitudes toward the United States
    - Origin of attitudes
    - Nisei draft
    - Repatriation and expatriation
  - Influence of Attachment to West Coast on Relocation
    - Sentimental attachment to California
    - Economic attachment to California
    - Ignorance of United States geography
  - Influence of Occupation on Relocation
    - Farmers
    - Business, clerical, and professional workers
    - Financial problems of all occupations
  - Influence of Age and Marital Status on Relocation
    - Age
    - Attitude of younger and older evacuees toward each other
    - Elderly familyless Issei
    - Issei with families



WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY  
Community Analysis Section  
September 2, 1944

Project Analysis Series No. 18

RELOCATION AT ROHWER CENTER

Part II: Issei Relocation Problems

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. Introduction and Summary
- II. The Relocated Issei  
The Number of Relocates  
Reasons for Relocation
- III. Issei Relocation Problems  
Origin of Problems Before and After Evacuation  
Influence of Pre-evacuation Life on Relocation  
Period of immigration  
Establishment of Japanese communities on the West Coast  
Influence of Race on Relocation  
Racial antipathy  
Nisei marriage  
Influence of Culture on Relocation  
Social acceptance  
Religion  
Education  
Language  
Influence of Citizenship and Attitudes Toward the United States  
Citizenship  
Attitudes toward the United States  
Origin of attitudes  
Nisei draft  
Repatriation and expatriation  
Influence of Attachment to West Coast on Relocation  
Sentimental attachment to California  
Economic attachment to California  
Ignorance of United States geography  
Influence of Occupation on Relocation  
Farmers  
Business, clerical, and professional workers  
Financial problems of all occupations  
Influence of Age and Marital Status on Relocation  
Age  
Attitude of younger and older evacuees toward each other  
Elderly familyless Issei  
Issei with families

Table of Contents (Cont.)

- IV. Issai Suggestions for Solving their Relocation Problems  
Financial Aid  
Establishment of Three Japanese Communities  
Rohwer Center as a Permanent Community

- V. Temporary and Permanent Adjustment to Center Life  
Temporary Postponement of Relocation to Stay in the Center  
Permanent Postponement of Relocation to Stay in the Center

## RELOCATION AT ROHWER RELOCATION CENTER

### Part II. Issei Relocation Problems

#### INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The present study presents (1) difficulties to which Issei of Rohwer Relocation Center ascribe their slowness in relocating as individual families or small groups of families, and (2) plans they offer as solutions to their relocation problems.

Except perhaps for differences in emphasis, the problems of relocation that Issei at Rohwer face are much the same as those confronting Issei in other relocation centers.

In the 19 months from the opening of Rohwer Center in October, 1942, to April, 1944, only 282 (17%) of the 1653 relocatees were Issei, the majority of them being men who left for employment reasons. The few Issei women relocating joined family heads who had gone out alone earlier.

Many of the present obstacles to Issei individual relocation reach back to conditions on the West Coast before evacuation. These include denial of citizenship to orientals of foreign birth, anti-oriental sentiment among Caucasians, immigrant inability to speak English, lack of American education and knowledge of the United States east of California, and preservation of Japanese customs, manners, language, and physical type. Disadvantages incurred by these handicaps were minimized by living in large, self-sufficient Japanese communities. Group solidarity, thus created, led to a certain amount of social and economic security, while at the same time further hindering assimilation into American life, as Issei now realize.

The most basic fear of Issei whether actually formulated or not is that dispersal through individual relocation will lose them the social and economic advantages of these communities without solving the difficulties which led to their formation and the non-integration of Issei into occidental culture. Wartime conditions have increased the difficulties caused by the original handicaps by adding Issei loss of property, funds, prestige, and self-confidence as well as the total Japanese community structure through evacuation from the West Coast to relocation centers; the necessity for crystallizing complex feelings aggravated by family differences and tensions in order to choose between Japan and the United States; selective service which has drawn off Nisei sons and thus prevents them from acting as intermediaries with Caucasians when Issei parents attempt to relocate individually; advanced age and physical debility of Issei complicated by evacuation-shock and doubts of ever attaining economic and social acceptance in the United States; and the specific problems peculiar to farmers, white-collar workers, large families of dependents, or aged bachelors.

As partial solutions for their relocation problems, some Issei would like the United States government to divide the cost of operating Rohwer Center

for one year among evacuees to use the money for relocation. Issei hope that within one year all would be out of the center.

Another plan, highly developed, is to establish three different communities, each to contain about 15,000 Japanese and to be administered very much like Rohwer but by evacuees. A third solution is to use Rohwer Center itself as a basis for forming a permanent community for persons of Japanese ancestry.

However, Issei feel completely stymied as they realize that nothing may come of these plans and that dispersal is the only method of relocation open to them. Their natural reaction is to do nothing and hold on to life in the center and its advantages of freedom from discrimination, severe competition, and economic and social insecurity.

The majority of Issei want to stay at Rohwer only until a number of conditions to relocation have been satisfied, such as, for example, the war being over, anti-oriental feeling subsiding, California being opened, or the family agreeing at last on a relocation plan. There are other Issei, mostly among the very old, the poor, the less aggressive, and the women, who do not want to leave Rohwer under any circumstances to go anywhere but are settling down to spend the rest of their life enjoying the simple but secure necessities and pleasures afforded by a predominantly Japanese milieu.

THE RELOCATED ISSEI

The purpose of this report<sup>1/</sup> is to present the obstacles to individual relocation as felt by Issei at Rohwer Relocation Center, Arkansas. As a previous study<sup>2/</sup> shows, the majority of persons relocating from Rohwer are Nisei. Issei, who regard individual relocation as undesirable, are slow to relocate.

The Number of Relocates

The total number of evacuees relocating in the 15-months period from the opening of the center in October, 1942, to January 31, 1944, was 1500. Of them only 228 (15%) were Issei; most of the others were Nisei, and a few were Kibei. By April 1, 1944, the relocation figure reached 1653, of which 282 (17%) were Issei. Included among the 282 relocatees are 254 who were actual residents of Rohwer and 28 who resettled directly from assembly centers but were credited to Rohwer for relocation purposes.

The number of men and women relocating in each age group during the 19-months period from October, 1942, to April 1, 1944, is shown in the table below. Of the 282 resettling Issei, 77% were men and only 13% were women.

Sex and Age Distribution of Issei Relocatees  
at Rohwer Center

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>No. of Men</u>	<u>No. of Women</u>	<u>Total</u>
0-9	0	0	0
10-19	1	1	2
20-29	8	6	14
30-39	24	13	37
40-49	62	27	89
50-59	68	15	83
60#	53	4	57
	<u>216</u>	<u>66</u>	<u>282</u>

Monthly figures show that by October 30, 1943, a year after the center had opened, 65% of the relocating Issei had left Rohwer. The remaining 35% left in the 5-months period from November, 1943, to April 1, 1944; the distribution is shown below.

- ( 14% left in March, 1943, during this 5-months period
- ( 7% left in November
- 35% ( 7% left in February
- ( 4% left in December
- ( 4% left in January

<sup>1/</sup> Based on a longer project report, "Issei Relocation Problems at Rohwer Relocation Center," June, 1944.

<sup>2/</sup> Relocation at Rohwer Center. Part I. "The Relocated Population," Project Analysis Series No. 17, July, 1944, a summary of a project report, "Statistical Report on Relocation at Rohwer Relocation Center."

Reasons for Relocation

Employment drew out of the center nearly three-fourths of the relocating Issei, as the table below indicates. The remaining one-fourth consisted mainly of wives and children of relocated family heads who felt in a position to bring out their dependents; a few were Issei parents joining Nisei children who had resettled earlier.

Reasons for Issei Relocation from Rohwer

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Employment	
Unskilled labor	26% )
Farming	23 )
Seeking employment	12 ) 73%
Skilled labor	8 )
Business	2 )
Professional	2 )
Join family	19
Hostel offer	8
Education	*
Medical treatment	*
	<hr/>
N=232	100 %

\*Less than 1%

In the unskilled labor group, domestics in private homes and kitchen workers predominated. Also in this group were janitors, butlers, waiters and waitresses in restaurants, pantrymen, mine laborers, cannery workers, soda dispensers, laundry helpers, box and carton finishers, paper-mill hands, and railroad section hands.

Most skilled laborers went as warehouse foremen, gardeners, cooks, greenhouse workers, and mechanics. Cooks and greenhouse workers predominated.

Professional people relocating were physicians, dentists, and pastors. The kinds of business to which businessmen relocated has not been ascertained.

## ISSEI RELOCATION PROBLEMS

### Origin of Problems Before and After Evacuation

Before evacuation, foreign-born Japanese who now live at Rohwer were but little integrated into occidental American culture and society. In the main, they felt excluded and unidentified in any real sense with things American. Older Issei now realize how their life on the West Coast isolated them from assimilation into the American way of life. With this realization has come the fear that they will be wholly unable, now that they are middle-aged or older, to relocate and live individually in a non-Japanese environment.

Some of the same cultural and physical factors in their background which led to their non-integration into American life and to its concomitant, the establishment of Japanese communities in the western states, will continue to handicap Issei when they attempt to relocate individually from Rohwer Center.

Had Japanese families succeeded in living in partial isolation, socially, economically, and physically, from one another on the West Coast, they would have had to face the same problems as now that originate from their ignorance of English; non-citizenship; formal education in Japan; possession of a non-Christian religion, and habits and manners different from those of occidentals; and Caucasian discrimination against people of oriental culture and race.

Evacuation, Nisei draft, and various other wartime conditions have increased the problems originating from these handicaps to assimilation into American life. New difficulties have arisen from the strong attachment of Issei to the West Coast, their loss of funds, possessions, and prestige through evacuation, their increasing age and physical debility, and their growing doubt of finding emotional and financial security in this country.

Groups among the Rohwer Issei that have these problems in a particularly difficult and unique form include farmers; clerical, business, and professional people; families with dependents (especially those of marriageable age); and old men without families

### Influence of Pre-evacuation Life on Relocation

The most basic fear that Rohwer Issei have, perhaps, is that dispersal through individual relocation will lose them the benefits derived from the group identity and solidarity which Japanese established and maintained in the United States during the fifty years from about 1890, when they were evacuated as a wartime measure from their West Coast homes to assembly and then to relocation centers.

Period of immigration. Relatively few Rohwer Issei emigrated to continental United States before 1901. Then from 1901 to 1920, when Japanese

immigration was at its height, three-fourths of them came to this country. From 1921 to 1930, immigration declined to half of what it had been in the preceding ten years and became a mere trickle between 1931 and 1940.

Half the Rohwer Issei men came between 1901 and 1910, while half the Issei women came from 1911 to 1920, ten years later. After establishing finances, and communities and institutions for persons of Japanese ancestry, the men began to bring over wives. Many women came alone as "picture brides;" others came with the later immigrants; especially the urban people, who, unlike most rural immigrants, brought their families with them.

Distribution by 10-year Periods of the Arrival of  
Japanese Men and Women in the United States

<u>10-yr Period</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Both Men &amp; Women</u>
1881-1890	*	0%	*
1891-1900	13%	2	9%
1901-1910	50	16	38
1911-1920	28	52	37
1921-1930	9	28	15
1931-1940	**	2	1
	100%	100%	100%
	N=1668	N=968	N=2636

\*Less than 1% (8 arrivals)

\*\*Less than 1% (10 arrivals)

Although from 1911 to 1940 the number of Japanese women arriving in continental United States exceeded that of men, the disproportion between the number of men and of women caused by the early lag in female immigration was never eliminated. Of Rohwer Issei, 63% are men and 37% are women. Among the Issei, 25% are elderly, unattached men, most of them bachelors.

Although 47 of 50 Japanese prefectures are represented among Rohwer Issei, nearly two-thirds of the Issei came from six of the most overcrowded and highly agricultural prefectures, namely, Hiroshima (27%), Kumamoto and Yamaguchi (9% each), Wakayama and Fukuoka (8% each), and Okayama (4%). The remaining one-third came from 41 different prefectures, each of which sent less than 4% of the Rohwer Issei.

In all six prefectures named, the Japanese government many years ago set up committees to induce poor families to emigrate, especially to the United States. Hiroshima, which is almost entirely rural with a peasant population, is said to have been economically depressed most of the time.

These rural, agricultural people formed the first Japanese communities



on the West Coast of the United States and paved the way for the urban and professional people who came later.

Few Rohwer Issei came from urbanized and industrialized prefectures which have never been as overcrowded and poverty-afflicted as the rural prefectures. Urban Japanese had more to lose and less to gain by emigrating than had the landless peasants. Taiwan (Formosa) and Chosen (Korea) furnished no Japanese immigrants among Rohwer Issei; Japan has long been interested in sending people to these places, not away from them. The third prefecture from which no Rohwer Issei came is Karafuto.

Establishment of Japanese communities on the West Coast. The majority of the Rohwer Issei had, then, a rural background in Japan. Nearly all Issei immigrants worked at farming during their first years in the United States and congregated in small rural communities. By 1910, and certainly by 1920, Japanese communities were large and prosperous and Japanese cultural life and institutions established. Rural people sent back to Japan for wives, and immigrants of professional and white collar occupations were attracted to the United States. These later immigrants naturally tended to live in the towns near large concentrations of Japanese farmers upon whom they largely depended for their livelihood.

Many urban Japanese on the West Coast, however, were early farming immigrants with more business sense than most who had saved enough money to go into the produce business. Before evacuation, there was a marked tendency for Issei to become an urban people in the United States.

81% of the 2636 Rohwer Issei came from rural areas in Japan,  
19% from urban Japanese areas;  
but at the time of evacuation,  
53% of these same Issei lived in rural areas in the United States,  
41% in cities of more than 2500 population,  
5% in villages of less than 2500 population.

On the West Coast, Japanese immigrants and their descendants established and preserved their group solidarity through concentrating in a few large communities and through the social and economic cooperation made possible by physical contiguity. Rohwer Issei are either from around the Stockton area or from around Los Angeles as their assembly center origin suggests.

48% came to Rohwer from the Stockton Assembly Center  
50% came from the Santa Anita Center  
2% came from other assembly centers

An advantage of living in these large Japanese American communities was the preservation of aspects of Japanese cultural life. Near their homes, Issei had churches with Japanese priests and stores with Japanese foods. They had communal celebrations of Japanese holidays, festivals, and dances like bon odori, as well as language schools, sports like judo and kendo, and arts like woodcarving and flower arrangement. Life in these

communities also provided marriage opportunities for the young people.

Economic interdependence manifested itself in the communities among individuals and families as well as in an institutional manner. The needy and destitute were provided for by other Japanese, so that few cases of need came to the public welfare service. Issei at Rohwer are proud that their needy have always been cared for by "their own people," and that no Japanese has ever been forced to accept "public charity." "Public" means, of course, Caucasian.

Economic interdependence was also shown in the financial and advisory assistance which older, established businessmen gave to younger men just starting out. Before evacuation, Japanese merchants got together to finance young men, help them get a stock of goods, and advise them how to operate retail stores successfully. Several Issei claim that this practice originated through the reluctance of California banks to lend money to Japanese.

Producer-cooperatives, which can be organized only if farmers live in large, concentrated groups, were another aspect of Japanese economic interdependence on the West Coast. Although Japanese farmers joined and worked with general cooperatives whenever possible, they had to establish their own also because Caucasian cooperatives tended to discriminate against them.

Rohwer Issei feel that dispersal through relocating isolated families, or even small groups of families, will result in the loss of the advantages described above which they gained from their social and economic cohesion. Individual families, when they relocate, will have to solve problems of adjustment and discrimination without the aid which Japanese communities on the West Coast furnished Issei before evacuation.

#### Influence of Race on Relocation

Issei fear (probably more than Caucasians realize) that their oriental background and appearance will prevent successful individual relocation and their ever being completely integrated into societies and communities dominated by occidentals.

Racial antipathy. Convinced that the war with Japan is a "racial" one, Issei declare that the really basic cause for antipathy toward Japanese is their race.

Although the attack on Pearl Harbor, newspaper accounts of Japanese atrocities, and other recent events increased Caucasian antipathy toward them, it did not cause it, according to Issei. They offer as proof the fact that even though as many or more equally revolting German atrocities have been reported, most Americans do not consider Germans revolting or demand their defeat for any than military and political reasons. Germans may even be only temporary enemies, Issei say, if the rapid change toward them following the last war is an indication. Among alien and

naturalized Germans in the United States, there is a record of sabotage whereas the Japanese in America, whether alien or native born, have no record of sabotage or obstructionism. Race is not involved, Issei contend, in the war with Germans. Their being Caucasian and occidental makes American differences with them temporary and remediable. Not so in the war with Japan. Issei say that the Japanese will still be unacceptable orientals regardless of how many political and military differences the war settles and removes from American thinking.

Many Issei question whether the anti-oriental sentiment general in the United States will prevent them from ever establishing a fairly secure economic and social position anywhere in this country. They wish particularly to avoid resettlement in southern states where they think the "caste" system may categorically place them in a position inferior to that of Caucasians.

Nisei marriage. Issei are pretty certain that even Nisei will never be accepted in the United States to the point where they can lead a happy life and make a decent living, or where, even if temporarily accepted, their social and economic status can be predicted many years ahead.

The matter of race is of marked concern to Issei with marriageable Nisei children. They are aware of the growing number of Japanese, especially those now relocated in large cities, who are marrying Caucasians. They strenuously object to mixed marriages because they believe that on the West Coast they did not prove happy and successful. Also, the Japanese who married a non-Japanese has "contaminated" his own racial strain, some Issei say, so that the children are not really Japanese.

Issei with marriageable children are afraid that once they leave the Japanese congregation in the center and relocate as isolated families, there will be few, if any, marriage opportunities for their Nisei sons and daughters. Marriage opportunities, never too plentiful at Rohwer, have fast decreased with Nisei male relocation or induction into the army. Issei fear that if they relocate even in small groups of a dozen families or so, marriage opportunities will be almost non-existent for their children.

#### Influence of Culture on Relocation

Social acceptance. Issei hesitate to give up the emotional security of the center because they anticipate that non-acceptance and its consequences, loneliness and dejection, will assail them if they relocate individually.

They lack the peculiar social graces, mannerisms, and etiquette which Americans deem proper; at the same time they are extremely Japanese. The cumulative effect of these small traits, Issei feel, will prevent Caucasians from going beyond mere tolerance to accept them totally and cordially. An Issei isolated from other Japanese wants more than tolerance, particularly if he expects to spend the rest of his life in the community. He wants intimate companionship, preferably from people of

his own racial and cultural type, but, if he is living alone among them, from Caucasians and other non-Japanese.

The relocation center, whatever its shortcomings, is a shield from loneliness while they are there. It has no caste system to relegate them to an inferior status because of their oriental appearance and culture traits. They find no social ostracism except, perhaps, that encountered during occasional buying trips outside the center and unimportant because the basic social life is in the center and completely independent of Caucasian attitudes. Besides, Issei feel that so long as they are not an integral part of any Caucasian community they will not be forced into any caste or class but will be accepted with the distant but not unpleasant toleration usually accorded complete outsiders.

The social security of the center is increasingly attractive to Issei, the older people in particular. Elderly Issei seem to be adapting themselves to continued existence there until conditions outside become more favorable for their resettlement.

Religion. Though aware that religious freedom is more than a slogan and that average Americans will not persecute them as non-Christians, certain Buddhist Issei, who fear the enforced social separatism of Japanese as an isolated, cultural group, are apprehensive that Buddhism may be regarded by some Caucasians as another antipathy-arousing, oriental characteristic.

Issei are also concerned that through dispersal they will not be able to build and maintain Buddhist churches, of which few exist east of the Rockies.

Nearly 85% of Rohwer Issei are Buddhists or adherents of other oriental religions; about 15% are Christians, mainly Protestants. The proportion of Buddhists to Christians underscores the great importance of Buddhism and its extreme predominance over Christianity among Issei.

Education. The willingness of many Issei to sacrifice much to insure their children's educational advancement reflects their determination to provide Nisei with the power and prestige of American education which they themselves had no opportunity to acquire.

They show some concern that their own education is Japanese and not American and feel that it may hinder successful individual relocation. Their knowledge of American history and cultural background is almost nil, for more than 99% spent their childhood and adolescence in Japan and received their education there; less than 1%, most of them younger Issei men and women, grew up and went to school on the West Coast or in Hawaii.

Nine-tenths of the Rohwer Issei emigrated directly from Japan to continental United States. Slightly less than one-tenth came to the mainland by way of Hawaii; an infinitesimal proportion entered through other countries, like, for example, Canada.

A few in the larger group managed to get in a little schooling on the West Coast shortly after arriving in this country, or they were taught to read and write Japanese by earlier immigrants.

Of the 2636 Issei, 2626 are over 20 years of age and presumably have finished school. Of them,

.7% had no schooling  
16.7% had some grade school  
57.8% finished grade school  
22.9% finished high school  
1.7% finished college  
.2% had postgraduate study

---

100 %

At Rohwer only 6 persons (3 Issei, 3 Nisei) are reported as completely illiterate. Although 17 Issei, nearly all over 60 years of age, never went to school, only three are illiterate.

Most college Issei, who now are from 40 to 60 years of age, no doubt came to the United States to obtain an American higher education, and not as did the majority of Issei, to improve their economic condition and escape military service in Japan.

Language. Without spoken English the individual Issei is isolated from the daily social and business contacts with Caucasians which make resettlement not only possible but quicker and less painful. Issei who speak only Japanese will have tremendous difficulty in reestablishing normal social intercourse between themselves and English-speaking neighbors. For them, finding and holding jobs with English-speaking employers will be nearly impossible.

On the West Coast, the problem of English seldom came up because some of these non-English speaking Issei owned land and employed Japanese or Filipino laborers, while others worked for Japanese employers. Also their social life was almost entirely Japanese. Consequently, few acquired an effective use of English, and now they feel too old to learn it.

Because of inability to attend school during their early years in the United States and rarity of American social contacts, nearly seven-tenths of the Rohwer Issei cannot speak English well enough for it to be of any practical value. Possibly half of this group is familiar with a few dozen English words; the other half knows perhaps many more English words but either cannot form sentences or pronounce well enough to be understood by Caucasians or even by Nisei. Japanese is really their only language. The remaining three-tenths use both English and Japanese effectively. Two Issei young men do not know Japanese; English is their only language.

Opportunities for learning to speak both languages have always been

greater than for learning to read and write them. It is not surprising then to find that more Issei men and women at Rohwer speak both English and Japanese than can read and write both languages. Speaking English is naturally more important than reading and writing it; the latter can be done for Issei at home by Nisei of their own families, as is the custom at Rohwer.

Of 2636 Issei men and women at Rohwer  
68% speak only Japanese  
32% speak both Japanese and English

However, of these same Issei,  
78% read and write only Japanese  
22% read and write both Japanese and English

The earlier the date of immigration to this country, the less opportunity the Japanese immigrant had to learn to speak, read, or write any language other than his native one. In each 10-year age group from 30-39 up, a greater percentage of Issei men and women speaks only Japanese than speaks both Japanese and English. In each group under 30-39, however, the situation is reversed, for the percentage of dual speakers is greater than that of Japanese-only speakers. A similar situation prevails in regard to knowledge of reading and writing these languages, except that in the 0-9 age group, the Issei children read and write only English but speak both languages.

Older Issei have, therefore, not only the problem of advanced age and foreign ways to contend with in individual relocation but also the handicap of not being able to speak, read, or write English fluently. The problem is greater for women than for men. Issei believe, however, that the Japanese language will not be objected to after the war, and that various unpleasant recent incidents partly traceable to public use of the language are manifestations of war hysteria.

#### Influence of Citizenship and Attitudes Toward the United States

Citizenship. Lack of citizenship is keenly felt by Rohwer Issei, only four of whom (3 men, 1 woman) are American citizens. Since Issei feel that Americans dislike them more now than formerly, they do not anticipate, as some Nisei do, that after the war the United States will reverse its policy to grant citizenship to foreign-born Japanese with a favorable record in the United States.

American laws excluding Issei from citizenship, which operated since the arrival of the first Japanese immigrants, are largely responsible for their living in isolated, protective communities and preserving their racial and cultural identity. How many Issei might have Americanized themselves, both legally and socially, had they been permitted to do so is unknown, however.

To Issei, lack of citizenship was difficult enough before the war even

though they lived in large, self-sufficient communities. It will be much more difficult, they say, if they relocate individually, for the Nisei men of their families, who were their intermediaries with the Caucasian world, are subject to the draft and cannot be depended on, therefore, to aid Issei relocation.

Attitudes toward the United States. On the whole, Issei are opportunistic about relocation and their attachment to the United States. Their thinking is almost entirely economic and familial. Many applied for repatriation for themselves and expatriation for their children only because they felt that Japan would offer more economic security than the United States. Other reasons, which are not regarded as hopelessly insurmountable handicaps, are fear of social and educational ostracism of themselves and children and continued exclusion from citizenship.

Issei reiterate that they have no real desire to return to Japan. They have lived too long away from Japan after leaving it to avoid governmental restrictions, military service, low wages, and poverty. Everything else being equal they prefer the United States. But the country where they live and work must provide some economic security for their families.

Issei attachment to this country, being based on economic interest and advancement, is essentially practical and utilitarian rather than emotional and patriotic. This attachment becomes stronger or weaker as chances for economic security seem to increase or decrease. Issei talk less of returning to Japan and more of relocation possibilities when neutral countries stiffen toward Axis countries as they lose and when relocatees write that relocation chances are improving. Then when the grapevine reports Japanese military successes and instances of antipathy and persecution by Caucasians in this country, they talk of escaping to the haven of Japan and of the impossibility of their ever successfully relocating.

Origin of attitudes. Older, well-educated Issei, in explaining Issei attitudes toward the United States, point out that by age-old custom in Japan the individual, particularly if he was of rural and agricultural habitat, pledged his loyalty not to the country of Japan but to the lord upon whose land he lived and to whom his labor belonged. The individual directed his feelings solely to a person, with no notion of belonging and being attached to a large impersonal entity like a nation.

This personal attachment to a lord functioned at the time Issei left Japan for the United States. Immigrants, upon leaving the homeland, transferred their loyalty to the new authority, the "lord" of the new country. Issei state that it is the duty and honor of true Japanese to abide by the laws, to contribute to the welfare of the new lord, and to do nothing prejudicial to his interests. During a conflict between the two lords it is the duty of Japanese to maintain loyalty to the new lord regardless of whatever secret sympathy they may have for the old lord.

Issei explain, for example, that Japanese honor would lead the Japanese

army to treat captured Nisei soldiers with respect since Nisei would be observing "loyalty" to the new lord. Apparently the United States Army disagrees with this interpretation, for it tries to protect Nisei by sending very few to the Pacific war theatre. Issei, however, believe the army is merely screening its real objection to Japanese American soldiers, the objection to them being that they are oriental and non-Caucasian.

Nisei draft. Issei have a mixed reaction to the drafting of Nisei. On the one hand, they speak with pride of sons in the armed forces; of willingness to have them exposed to the same dangers as other young Americans; and of the fact that being evacuated under suspicion has not made them less interested than citizen Americans in national welfare. On the other hand, they see no justice in drafting citizens while they are still in a form of custody and while non-citizen members of their families are still confined to camps and faced with the enormous job of readjusting their lives unaided among a none too friendly people.

They feel that at most the government has a legal and moral right to draft only relocated Nisei. In a stricter sense it has no right, they state, to draft any Japanese American until relocation is completed and the centers closed. To them the draft is unfair so long as any person of Japanese descent is confined to a restricted camp merely because he is of such descent and so long as any Nisei must carry into battle the despairing thought that his family is denied the freedom he risks his life to preserve.

According to Issei, the loyalty of Issei and Nisei differs only in the deep-seated emotional attachment of Issei to Japan, the country of their childhood and citizenship. Though the citizen Nisei has more patriotic sentiment than the non-citizen Issei for this country, both desire to be completely law-abiding and law-respecting citizens. They are equally determined to do nothing to hinder the war effort. They point to the Japanese record before evacuation of very low crime and delinquency rates and lack of sabotage. They regard as even more significant that it is contrary to Japanese character, early training in Japan, and general mentality to obstruct community aims and laws, or to offend civic standards of behavior.

It exasperates Rohwer Issei that Caucasians do not recognize this but harp on loyalty and assume that Issei are and will be overtly disloyal because they are alien and have, unfortunately, never made a complete transfer of attachment from their former homeland to this country.

Repatriation and Expatriation. For the reasons given above, Issei believe that no real difference exists between the loyalty of citizens or aliens who choose to go to Tule Lake and the loyalty of those who remain at Rohwer. Japanese choose Tule Lake for individual reasons or are sent there because of suspected disloyalty. In neither case, Issei contend, will these Tule Lake evacuees be more actively disloyal than those left at Rohwer. Most evacuees do not see the trains leaving for Tule Lake as a procedure to separate disloyal from loyal Japanese but simply as a



separation of friends, the breaking up of family groups, and the sending of a helpless few of their own people into an uncertain and mysterious future. By choosing or having a choice forced upon them, these people have irreparably cut themselves loose from the country at hand without assurance of return to the only country which will have them. Those at Tule Lake and Rohwer correspond and maintain former ties without any distinction which WRA, through segregation, may have made between them.

Rohwer families deterred from relocation by inability of members to agree on a single plan must be numerous. Many families have had a year or more of tug-of-war between Issei parents and Nisei children. It becomes more acute before segregation trains depart when the subject of future planning is most strongly and officially forced on evacuee attention. As a result, disagreements arise between Issei parents who prefer Tule Lake and Nisei children who want to avoid Tule Lake at any cost.

Issei going to Tule Lake either definitely chose it; had it forced on them through denial of leave clearance; or accepted it as a last resort, an escape from complete assimilation into American society through individual relocation. Seeing no happy future for Japanese in the United States or opportunity for identification with Caucasian communities, this latter group of Issei who accept Tule Lake as a last resort would really prefer to remain at Rohwer indefinitely with the chance of relocating if pre-war conditions should again prevail. But when train lists are made up, they feel an inescapable necessity to declare once and for all for this country or for Japan. Unable to declare wholeheartedly and irrevocably for either, they seize upon Tule Lake as an immediate escape from the problem. Internment there, they realize, is an interim condition, not too unpleasant for a while and with an avenue of escape before they are actually sent to Japan. By going to Tule Lake they are not completely cut off from the American scene and committed to Japan. But at the same time the problem of relocation is comfortably relegated to the future. After a year or two when, they suppose, the result of the war and the status of Japanese in the United States will take final shape, they can make their decision.

However, because of the opposite pull of the Nisei, many Issei fail to achieve a united front in their families. They never get to the point of requesting transfers to Tule Lake either for themselves or their family in time to board the trains. They stay on at Rohwer and drop the subject only to resume it when train lists once more are being made up and a decision must again be reached.

#### Influence of Attachment to the West Coast on Relocation

Sentimental attachment to California. Most Rohwer Issei, when asked where they would like to relocate, unhesitatingly mention California. As the result of an average of 35 years residence there and its climatic and agricultural resemblance to Japan, they have transferred to California some of their sentimental attachment to the old country. For many, California is the homeland now. Few will give a second relocation choice,

because if they cannot return to California, they do not particularly care where they go. They hardly listen to discussions of alternative places to settle, so strong is the attachment built up over several decades. Their first question about relocation is, "When do you think I can return to California?" They ask "when" and not "do".

They cannot understand why and how California could have so turned against them and now be so determined to prevent their return. Their mood becomes despairing and hopeless when anyone suggests that California may never accept them again. While some believe that they may never be permitted to return, others think that talk of complete and eternal Japanese exclusion from California is not too serious, that drastic steps were taken merely because of the war, and that California will again reclaim its Japanese for their industry, frugality, and law-abiding character.

Issei life in California, despite its hardships, is very much idealized in the center. One way that the artificial life of the center is made to resemble this ideal life is by a return to agriculture in the form of intensively tilling the available land within each block. The produce is of little practical value because there is a center farm. The tilling is more a hobby than anything else, a continuation on a small scale of the only mode of economic life many Rohwer Issei have ever known.

Most Issei vehemently deny experiencing discrimination in California. When the subject is brought up, they defend the state, asking, "What's wrong with California? I lived there most of my life, made money, and got along well. I don't want to live anywhere else."

Younger Issei, however, state that the West Coast (certain sections more than others) always had a degree of antipathy toward Japanese, which was obvious to those who left the Japanese communities and attempted to mingle and compete with Caucasians. Most Issei seem to have lived too long and too much in a purely Japanese circle to realize fully their standing among many western Caucasians and to appreciate the social and economic difficulties they would have faced even in California before the war had they lived apart from Japanese communities.

The return-to-the-happy-homeland complex precludes planning seriously to settle anywhere else in the United States regardless of how favorable conditions may be outside California. Issei are unable to consider relocation to other states seriously because of the wishful expectation that somehow, someday, the California public and legislature will relax their hostility and exclusion acts to allow them to return. Were there any possibility of returning to California in the near future, even fewer would leave Rohwer Center than have.

Economic attachment to California. Permanent relocation of Issei anywhere except on the West Coast is hindered not only by sentimental devotion to California but by financial considerations as well. Most of the Issei who have relocated required little or no investment in land and property and could therefore proceed without delay to California should that become possible. Issei tend to regard relocation to any other area as

only a temporary expedient; an escape from the futility of center life; an answer to public insistence to get out and relocate; an attempt to profit from present high wages; and the first stage of the long trek back to permanent resettlement on the West Coast.

Issei with small savings, especially Issei with dependent children, hesitate to relocate individually. Even if such an Issei invested well and successfully resettled individually, it might be possible later to return to California where he would prefer to live. In that case, though, his money would already be invested; his business started; and his home established. It might be years then before he could pick up and make a new start in the California homeland.

Farmers particularly want to return to the West Coast, for many still own land and equipment there--all they will ever need, they say--and the question of its disposal is not settled. They find it hard to think of resettling on any except their former land. They claim to have received very little to date in the form of purchase payments or rents from their West Coast property.

One ex-farmer said,

"How can WRA expect me to want to buy land and tools when I've already got all I need? I suppose I'll never get it again, but as long as it's supposed to be mine I think about it all the time. It would be better for me if I didn't have anything. Then I could begin to think about what I'm going to do now."

Issei farmers are vague, but nonetheless apprehensive, about cold climates and unknown types of soil. Having lived only in Japan and California, they are a little terrified of braving sub-zero weather in a new home. They are determined to do truck farming or none at all, but believe it to be impossible for them except on the West Coast. Relocation officers repeatedly point out to the relief of Issei farmers that they might easily truck farm in the central states and that they need not enter big-scale farming.

Issei also dread the one-crop-a-year system, for if that crop is lost, the farmer has to go on extremely short rations for a whole year before another can be produced. On the West Coast if a crop were lost, it was unnecessary to wait long for another. While the one-crop-a-year system might eventually provide sufficient income after the farmer has settled and accustomed himself to new farming methods, it would not meet his needs for the first two or three years after relocation.

Like the farmers, many former Issei businessmen also want to return to California to salvage what they can of property left there. Some of it was left in doubtful hands or secured with loosely-drawn contracts because of Japanese having to be out of the defense zone on the deadline date. Businessmen claim, as do the farmers, to have received very inadequate returns. According to the Evacuee Property Section, many

claims of receiving nothing, or only a pittance, for real estate or equipment are not entirely correct except in some cases. These the Section has remedied. Claims are no doubt exaggerated through evacuation resentment or sympathy for those who actually suffered losses.

Ignorance of United States geography. Issei expect their ignorance of the United States east of the West Coast to handicap their relocation anywhere except in the western states. Older Issei find the prospect of individual relocation among strange people in a completely unknown locale rather terrifying. Few have traveled outside California or know very much even of California outside the Stockton or Los Angeles areas from which most of them come. Interest in the rest of the United States has increased, however, during the past several months probably because of a growing belief that middlewestern and eastern states are becoming more hospitable and less resistant to Issei resettlement.

#### Influence of Occupation on Relocation

Farmers. The relocation problems most talked of among Issei are those which farmers will experience. As stated earlier, Rohwer Issei were predominantly rural in occupation and habitat in California and of rural origin in Japan.

The table below shows the predominantly rural character of the 1837 Issei who, before evacuation, were gainfully employed or retired from gainful employment. They constituted 72% of the total worker group at Rohwer, while Nisei and Kibei made up 28%. There was no significant difference between Issei men and women with regard to the general types of former occupation. Few of those engaged in farming were owners; most were occupied as laborers, managers, or supervisors. Originally Rohwer had 30 Issei fishermen with their families, 3 of these families have since left the center.

#### Occupations of Issei Men and Women Before Evacuation

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>
Farming and fishing	41%	38%
Business	27	30
Unskilled labor	7	4
Skilled labor	24	25
Professional	1	3
	100%	100%
	N=1557	N=280

The majority of these Issei workers are in the older age groups.

Distribution of Issei Workers by Age Groups

<u>Age Group*</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
20-29	1 %
30-39	8
40-49	23
50-59	31
60 <sup>##</sup>	37
	<hr/>
N=1837	100 %

\*No Issei workers in 0-9, 10-19 age groups.

According to some Issei, few of the farmers could earn a living at any other work or could even be persuaded to attempt it because of their complete devotion to the soil and to truck farming.

Farmers, who constitute two-fifths of the Rohwer Issei, face seven important relocation problems. Three which were discussed in the section, "Attachment to the West Coast," are:

1. Desire to return to the West Coast where land and equipment is owned
2. Fear of the one-crop-a-year system of colder climates
3. Fear of cold climates and new, unknown soils.

The remaining four problems are:

4. Lack of money and equipment
5. Difficulty of marketing produce
6. General labor shortage
7. Fear of relocating without experienced farm leaders.

Some very successful evacee farmers at Rohwer believe that the farm laborers, who constitute a large part of the Rohwer rural population, do not have sufficient initiative and experience in the business and supervising aspects of farming to relocate to farms except in large groups captained by Issei leaders. Nisei farmers are said to believe that only Issei really know how to farm and that Nisei make good farmers only if they have an older Issei to aid and supervise them. Evacees tend to believe that farm relocation will never really get under way until the natural leaders go out with groups of the untrained and less adventurous farmers.

The labor shortage was first seriously raised as a relocation problem when it was announced that Nisei were to be drafted. Issei farmers had looked to Nisei sons to fill in for the general labor shortage, to help build homes and start farm operations, and to act as intermediaries with Caucasian neighbors and firms. Nisei with their knowledge of English, American ways, and ability to create a favorable first impression among Caucasians were considered invaluable for the first years of resettlement in new, non-Japanese communities. When Issei found that they could not

count on Nisei, their little enthusiasm for relocation was dampened. Many older people began to consider waiting it out in the center until the war was over, feeling against them had cooled off, and Nisei could be depended on to relocate with them.

The proper marketing of produce concerns the more practical-minded farmers who formerly owned land and expect to own it again. They believe that public opinion, as well as state and local governments, will never allow them to settle in any number in communities where truck farming is a vested interest of local Caucasian farmers. Issei farmers do not want to settle individually in such communities because they fear that antipathy and competition will freeze out a lone Japanese farmer.

They wish to resettle in sizeable communities where Japanese social and economic cooperation can be maintained. Even if they were to resettle where the absence of truck farming might make local citizens willing to receive fairly large numbers of Japanese truck farmers, they anticipate that such areas will not have facilities for marketing perishable produce or any Caucasian truck farmers with whom Japanese could cooperate in marketing.

Lack of money and farm equipment slows the relocation of some farmers. The United States government, they feel, should advance them a fairly large sum of money to pay initial expenses and underwrite them against crop failure for the first few years because it forced them to evacuate their houses and land in so little time that they made unwise deals with Caucasian neighbors. The present shortage of farming equipment is also a source of anxiety. Older Issei have not been much convinced by representatives of midwestern farm equipment firms that restrictions on equipment are constantly being relaxed.

Business, clerical, professional workers. Issei believe that former business, clerical, and professional workers will have greater difficulty than any other occupational group in reestablishing their social and economic life and in acquiring even a measure of social integration and financial independence by individual relocation in Caucasian-dominated communities.

Because of financial problems, absence of public good will, and overwhelming competition from established Caucasian business and professional practices in communities where they might resettle, it is feared that non-laboring Issei will never successfully relocate. While some former businessmen at Rohwer have sufficient capital and large stocks of goods stored in West Coast warehouses, most will have to start nearly from scratch if they relocate. All will have the job of building up public good will.

The possibility that the non-labor group will encounter more Caucasian opposition and competition than will farmers and unskilled laborers seems well-founded. The Caucasian wholesaler buying from the Japanese farmer is more interested in the price of produce than in the producer's cultural background, native language, and appearance. For professional

clerical, and business Japanese, however, physical and cultural characteristics are tremendously important, for the seller is, perhaps, as much evaluated on the basis of his personal qualities as on the utilitarian basis of the quality of his goods and services.

Although some Rohwer businessmen, in particular produce men, were farmers before setting up a business, few probably will relocate as farmers, if need be, to acquire sufficient capital to go into business again and look for localities where Japanese merchants will be patronized.

Financial problems of all occupations. Insufficient funds to keep a re-settlement venture going is a common reason for holding back from leaving the center. It is not always a matter of enough money to defray initial expenses or to get a job or business opportunity. Sometimes it is doubt of ability to continue to be self-supporting after a start has been made and the economic support of the center cut off.

The well-to-do, of course, are able to care for themselves financially, while the very poor despair of ever being able to relocate without aid from their children or other sources. The middle group, however, is most concerned about maintaining itself outside the center. To get started, a person of this group has the little money salvaged from former possessions but no financial reserves for future needs or emergencies. He hesitates to risk his little nest-egg and, in case of failure, have to return with loss of face to the center. It will be taken as proof of his inability to make his way in the world. Also he will be without funds for any later relocation attempt unless he receives financial assistance. While not too averse to accepting this from WRA, he will not feel as free to plan as with his own money.

Even the more aggressive and better trained tend to hold on to the economic security of Rohwer until the possibility that resettlement will be dangerous and unsuccessful is at a minimum. They say,

"Well, I hope to go out pretty soon, but things don't look so good yet, do they? I guess I better stay here for a while. Maybe it will get better later on."

At Rohwer there is no killing competition with Caucasians; no possibility of eviction from one's land, job, or home, when economic competition is more acute; and no likelihood of starving or of going without necessities which Issei fear may come during the first year or two of resettlement before they have established themselves. Once farmers and business and professional men have decided to remain, they can ignore their relocation problems.

Fear of wartime-economic conditions also slows Issei relocation from Rohwer. Housing; restricted buying of food, clothing, and other necessities; and difficulties for persons of Japanese descent in finding suitable jobs are three wartime problems of which Issei are acutely aware. They believe that if ordinary Americans find the first two so difficult, it is certain the Japanese will find them far more so.

Issei magnify these conditions beyond their actual importance since much of the information they accept as authentic comes from relocatees who are sometimes disgruntled and unhappy or from an indirect and distorted grapevine. Many conclusions are formed by comparing this bit of news or information with that and by discounting one news item slightly in favor of another. Their composite notion of the world at large, the progress of the war, and the norm of present -day American life and thought is based pretty much, therefore, upon wishful thinking and pure deduction.

Influence of Age and Marital Status on Relocation

Age.<sup>1/</sup> Because three-fifths of the Rohwer Issei are 50 or more years of age, many are obviously too old to think of relocation in adventurous terms of younger men and women, or to accept with equanimity the prospect of resettling themselves individually in Caucasian communities which they expect will be hostile or, at best, indifferent to their needs.

The following table shows that most Rohwer Issei are middle-aged or elderly. Nine-tenths of them are over 40 or more years of age.

Distribution of Age Groups of Rohwer Issei,  
Men and Women

<u>Age Group</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Men and Women</u>
0-9	0%	*	*
10-19	*	0%	*
20-29	*	1	1%
30-39	7	13	9
40-49	19	47	29
50-59	32	29	31
60#	42	10	30
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>
	N=1668	N=968	N=2636

\*Less than 1%

The inactivity and lack of economic competition in center life have bent Issei toward introversion and made them conscious of their age and physical debility. Younger evacuees feel that Issei in general have noticeably aged in the center and that they seem older than their years, preoccupied, and somewhat withdrawn from outside activities into the protective circle of their families. Younger Issei are convinced that the shock of evacuation and two years of effortless center life have caused this aging

---

<sup>1/</sup>"In 1940 the median age of foreign-born Japanese in the Pacific States was 50.1 years, and the median age of native-born Japanese is estimated at about 19 years." S.F. Miyamoto, "Immigrants and Citizens of Japanese Origin," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, September, 1942.



process.

Older Issei, especially women, have enjoyed during their nearly two years in the center almost complete freedom from the farm drudgery and long hours characteristic of their life on the West Coast. They are beginning to accept exemption from further work as a natural concomitant to old age. Older men among the former farm laborers have little desire to be again hard-working and poorly-paid farm hands shunted from one farm employer to another throughout the year and earning just enough to live on.

Issei who achieved financial independence and social advancement on the West Coast are not inclined to start from the bottom to rebuild their fortunes. They are now, they say, just where they were 20, 30, or 40 years ago, but with the added handicaps of greater age and less enthusiasm about reacquiring status and independence. Without the youthful buoyancy and optimism which enabled them many years ago to overcome obstacles they are deeply pessimistic about rebuilding what they lost almost overnight. The formerly successful farmer used to the employer role sees with distaste the prospect of being reduced to a sharecropper. It is partly a question of age with its loss of mental and physical vigor and partly a matter of individual self-respect and prestige.

Attitude of younger and older evacuees toward each other. Problems of older Issei also affect the younger foreign-born Japanese who feel morally compelled to stick it out in the center with "these old people" and not desert them when they most need spokesmen and the aid of younger men. Some younger evacuees, Nisei and Issei, have all along championed the older, less Americanized Issei, but only of late have so many publicly and quite sincerely adopted the missionary role that they can help elderly Issei more from the center than from outside.

They accuse younger Nisei of abandoning their elders. They are aware, however, of the great psychological and cultural gulf separating Nisei from their parents. The two generations, according to missionary Issei, are worlds apart though living in the same room. They have no common ground of interest, no bonds uniting them, no common ambitions, or even a satisfactory medium of communication. Nevertheless, many Nisei are interested in Issei problems. They realize that until some solution is found their parents will not leave the center and become financially independent of their children. Other Nisei, however, are concerned almost altogether with relocation problems peculiar to themselves. Issei fear that if the Japanese are dispersed through individual relocation, Issei dominance and authority over Nisei will be lost and they will be relegated to an inferior role.

Many younger Issei and older Nisei feel it their duty, therefore, to remain in the center to help older people work out their relocation problems, assist in interpreting the Issei case against individual relocation to WRA and Caucasians in general, and lend moral support to Issei plans for future resettlement.

Elderly, familyless Issei. Old age handicaps the individual relocation

of the unmarried, familyless Issei in particular. Younger Issei think these familyless men too old to relocate successfully on their own in non-Japanese communities.

Besides their old age, they are handicapped by not being educated or speaking English. Few have had any significant social experience in non-Japanese living. Before evacuation, the majority concentrated in the Stockton area where they worked for Japanese farmers. At Rohwer they have congregated in whole barracks in about 10 blocks. Three blocks containing the greatest numbers are commonly referred to as "old men's blocks" or "bachelor blocks."

Most of them, especially those over 60, spent their marriageable years in this country when few Japanese women were available for marriage and the picture-bride custom had not become general. Later a few of the early immigrants took wives younger than themselves, but most, being farm laborers, had little to offer a young wife and so lost out in competing with younger men.

Of the 2636 Issei men and women about three-fourths belong to some kind of family group; about one-fourth are unattached.

Issei without families constitute about one-tenth of the total Rohwer population.

Three-fourths of the familyless Issei are men over 50 years of age. On the basis of the total number of Issei males (1668), the proportion of unmarried Issei increases as age increases while the proportion of married Issei decreases, as the table below shows.

Proportion of Married to Unmarried Issei Men  
in Each Age Group

<u>Marital Status</u>	<u>Age Group</u>					
	<u>10-19</u>	<u>20-39</u>	<u>30-39</u>	<u>40-49</u>	<u>50-59</u>	<u>60#</u>
Married Issei Men		100%	85%	74%	65%	44%
Unmarried Issei Men	100%		15	26	35	56
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N(Total, 1668)=	3	8	112	311	530	704

Issei with families. Issei fathers of large families invariably comment on their peculiar relocation problems relative to economic and social security. Most Issei with dependent children are in their thirties and forties; older Issei usually have children who are grown up and possibly married. Relocation, younger Issei fathers declare, is easier for Nisei than for themselves because the Nisei are young and without dependents.

If they are married, they generally do not have more than one child, whereas Issei usually have more and older children.

Issei are more concerned over the economic and social integration of their children into Caucasian communities than over their own. They frequently state, "We don't care what happens to us but we don't want our children to suffer."

In individual and isolated relocation, the intra-group economic assistance which was part of their former life is unavailable. To accept charity from non-Japanese reflects upon the integrity and ability of the Japanese as a group and the individual receiving aid. Determination to avoid poverty and public aid is found especially among Issei with large families of dependent children.

They worry over lack of money to support their families properly. As many Issei fathers are none too able to get and hold good jobs and cannot count on financial help from their wives who speak no English and have to care for the home, they naturally proceed very cautiously before giving up the guaranteed support of their dependents in the center for an uncertain financial situation outside.

Like other older Issei, they fear sickness and sudden physical inability to work. They often speak of the possibility of their children getting sick and needing hospitalization, of the possible unavailability of physicians in an emergency, and of the danger of not getting medical attention because of discrimination by physicians or lack of funds.

Those who plan for urban employment worry over suddenly losing their jobs for any of many possible reasons and of being unable to find another before family savings run out. Although some have concluded that relocating alone at first may be the wiser course, they are unreconciled to living without their families for even a short period.

Issei fathers also worry lest their children be banned from public schools, ostracized by Caucasian children, and ignored by teachers. Many who fear that their children will not be permitted to finish outside remain in the center until their children have graduated from high school. Others who wait for more favorable acceptance of Japanese outside want their children to get as much schooling as possible at Rohwer, where, of course, they face no social ostracism in the schools, churches, or playgrounds.

## ISSEI SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLVING THEIR RELOCATION PROBLEMS

### Financial Aid

Some Issei suggest that an aid to relocation would be to divide the total cost of operating Rohwer Center for one year among all evacuees. After each evacuee takes his share and relocates, the center can be closed. Such a procedure, Issei argue, will cost the government only a year's operation cost and increase the relocation of Issei, particularly the more timid ones, by providing the much-needed initial expense money.

A disadvantage of the plan is that many evacuees will not relocate during that year and the center will have to remain open. Consequently, the annual expenses of the center will not be reduced by an amount equal to the annual cost of maintaining an evacuee. As a matter of fact, the over-all cost of operating the center is reduced very little even when a great many persons go out.

Many Issei appreciate that public opinion very likely will strongly oppose giving large sums outright to evacuees, especially if the money is an inducement to relocate. They know the public does not object to spending large sums to "detain" or deprive them of their normal freedom and to provide them with day-to-day living expenses. They do not understand that the public may object to their receiving "gifts." Needed as the money may be to make individual relocation possible, the public may easily conclude that the government is actually paying evacuees to take a step any American would feel obliged to take without financial inducement.

### Establishment of Three Japanese Communities

The best developed plan of certain Rohwer Issei envisions three different communities, each to contain about 15,000 Japanese. These communities will, therefore, accommodate the 40,000 or so Japanese which an article in "Fortune" magazine predicts will constitute the final residue of un-relocatable evacuees.

Issei plan one of the three communities to be in South Texas, one in Colorado, and one perhaps in the tri-county irrigation development in Nebraska.

Each colony is to be administered very much like Rohwer but by evacuees only. Personnel will be similar (including even a community analyst). The cost to be paid by the government will be repaid with a low interest rate.

Some of the middle-aged Issei who support this plan of three different communities suspect it will never materialize, yet they believe that short of being allowed to return to their former homes, property, and way of life in California, resettlement in large Japanese communities is the only solution to their relocation problems. The problems described

earlier will almost cease to exist for any Issei if he can live in a Japanese American community.

In such communities, differences in language, education, religion, citizenship, appearance, and customs will not constantly cause discrimination and social unpleasantness. The area in which the community is developed will constitute all of the United States that Issei ignorant of national geography need to know. The pathetic longing to return to California some day may evaporate if the resettlement resembles former California group life.

Farmers feel they can operate successfully from the beginning of resettlement if a group settles on adjoining tracts of land. Bogies of the one-crop-a-year system, cold climate, unknown types of soil, shortages of labor, machinery and finances, and problems of marketing will be less frightening because the more capable Issei can help mediocre farmers solve their problems. The principal advantage to farmers in group resettlement is the group marketing of produce without dependence on Caucasians who may be uncooperative. Railroads and truckers, farmers believe, will gladly move perishable produce in carlot quantities at the proper time if the number of Japanese farmers is large enough.

In such communities, business and professional men can earn their living by providing services to Japanese only. Elderly, unattached Issei will find the colony setup an escape from problems of life in individualistic America, for Japanese employers and residents will provide them with jobs, assistance, and care. Issei hope to absorb their post-war unemployed in the community; they anticipate greater discrimination when servicemen return.

Establishing large, self-sufficient communities is, of course, in evacuee interest only. The American public undoubtedly does not desire to see Japanese culture maintained in this country nor communities re-established on the pre-Pearl Harbor pattern. Perhaps the public will not object to preserving aspects of Japanese culture in a vestigial form compatible with American traditions and patterns of loyalty. They will object, however, to preserving the culture in complete and functional form.

#### Rohwer Center as a Permanent Community

A third type of Issei plan for solving their relocation problems involves using Rohwer Center itself as a substitute colony. However, most Issei prefer a large community "outside," independent of government influence and support and more free to function and grow as its members choose.

#### TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT ADJUSTMENT TO CENTER LIFE

Issei feel completely stymied as they realize that they may never be allowed to resettle in large colonies and that the only method of relocation open is the dispersal of isolated families and individuals. Not even day-to-day social life with other Japanese will be possible, and, of course, Japanese community life will cease. Small groups of families living contiguously can maintain social intercourse and Japanese institutional and community activity in a limited way. But, for the most part, benefits derived from social and economic cohesion and cooperation will be gone. Instead they will face the many problems of individual relocation described above.

In their mental state of mild group-frustration, their natural reaction is to do nothing and simply to hold what they already have. Rohwer, after all, is a Japanese colony in all the more important respects. It is self-sufficient and completely isolated from the host of social and economic difficulties Issei necessarily encounter in cutting loose from its protection and relocating on their own.

#### Temporary Postponement of Relocation to Stay in the Center

An ever-growing number decide that only Rohwer Center itself will provide them with social and economic security, freedom from discrimination and severe competition, and the enjoyment of some leisure and recreation. The shock of evacuation and the conditioning of center life have led older Issei to compare the undesirability of individual relocation with the safety and security of the center. The appeal of center life increases as the war continues and as more and more Nisei disappear on relocation or into the army.

Many have decided, therefore, to stay in the center and hold its advantages until the war is over, until the feeling against Japanese has abated, until the family can agree on relocation plans, until the children graduate from center schools, until California opens, until older Issei are cared for, and until any number of other conditions have been met.

These conditions to relocation are primarily the result of evacuation and subsequent relocation center experience. They discourage the relocation of some Issei temporarily and indefinitely, and lead them to weigh the advantages of avoiding individual relocation and preserving the colony life of the center.

These Issei who postpone relocation temporarily are probably in the majority, but there is a group of Issei putting off relocation permanently. They are settling down in the center with no thought of relocating anywhere at any time.

### Permanent Postponement of Relocation to Stay in the Center

The very old, the poor, the less aggressive, and the women are in the forefront of those who do not wish to relocate under any circumstances or in any manner. They will choose, if possible, to remain at Rohwer indefinitely.

A number of signs in center life indicate that these unrellocatable Issai are permanently settling down. Being mostly of farming background, they are still preoccupied with plants and the soil. They have meticulously divided the tillable ground within each block among themselves, and each considers himself the owner of his plot. From a piece of ground no bigger than a room, they get an astonishing amount of vegetables. Having so little land, they work it intensively, and are able to provide themselves and their friends with vegetables during much of the year.

Other signs of settling down are the beautifying and rearranging of barrack units as much as possible to resemble permanent homes; reluctance to discuss definite relocation plans and set a date; desire to get and hold WRA jobs which require little labor and look permanent; and decreased interest since a year ago in learning English.

Life at Rohwer to them is attractive, ideal, and suited to their declining years. In contrast with pre-evacuation life, they have very little hard work to do. They are fed, clothed, and provided with facilities for spending leisure time whether they work or not. Some Japanese arts, crafts, and games are carried on at Rohwer so that they are reluctant to exchange this Japanese milieu for a life and locale in which old cultural forms are entirely absent. The prospect of starting their lives anew on their own resources, even in a colony of their own people, is a little terrifying.

The economic security of the center appeals, of course, mostly to the less aggressive, the less financially independent, and those who lack the education and social experience to make individual relocation possible. Rohwer has become home to familyless Issai, who do not merely toy with the notion of remaining in the center but appear to have made up their minds not to relocate individually as isolated individuals. Being elderly they seem to have no desire for more than the basic necessities they get at Rohwer. Life there is secure, pleasant, non-competitive, and free of the never-ending struggle to scrape up a bare living as a farm hand.

Issai women especially seem determined not to return to their former field and household drudgery. Men and older children, having much more free time than formerly, help at household chores and thus lighten the drudgery of housework for the women. Both men and women have more time than before evacuation to devote themselves to their children and to homemaking. Issai women, in general, have more leisure and lighter duties now, although more are working in the center than were gainfully employed on the West Coast.

Before evacuation, 85% of the 1837 Issei gainfully employed were men, while 15% were women. Now the number of employed men has decreased among the Issei, but the number of employed women has increased. There are 357 fewer Issei men employed since evacuation, whereas 167 more Issei women are working in the center than were gainfully employed formerly. Of the 1647 Issei now working, 73% are men and 27% are women.

Many women comment on how happy and serene their lives have been at Rohwer. The men, they say, may talk a great deal of how they wish to get away from the center and of how angry and resentful they are over evacuation, but as for themselves they will choose to live here until WRA or family circumstances force them to leave.

They are fond of the extra-familial and organizational activities in which they have learned to indulge at Rohwer. For a long time they had no interest in organizing and working with the Parent-Teachers' Association, and seemed to have no notion of what it existed for in the first place. Having had no experience with it on the West Coast, they had never imagined a situation in which they could meet as equals with Caucasian teachers to discuss their mutual educational problems. At first they were shy at meetings, but now they are quite articulate partly because the meetings are conducted mainly in Japanese. Not available before evacuation were WRA-sponsored classes in sewing, knitting, cooking, candy-making, and English. These classes are attended perhaps more as little social meetings than for the serious business of learning.

On the West Coast they were too busy with housework and farming for this kind of life. What is more important and gratifying to them, however, is the absence of discrimination against them for their participation in the activities of mixed groups. If relocated as isolated families in Caucasian communities, these women do not expect to find a similar social life and activity. They anticipate instead the monotony and drabness of pre-evacuation life.