

Community Analysis Report

No. # 8

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

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To Project Directors:

The "Kibei problem" is one of the most complex encountered by the War Relocation Authority in its nearly two years of wrestling with complex problems. From the very start of the relocation program, when the Kibei category was suggested as a basis for segregation, until the recent events at Tule Lake, much attention has been paid to this little understood segment of our evacuee population. The Manzanar incident increased our awareness of the problem. Registration helped greatly to clarify most of the elements involved. An interpretive analysis of registration results at Manzanar, made by members of the staff, presented the dilemma of those Kibei who, having almost nothing in common with other second generation Japanese Americans, may be called "citizens in name only".

However, not all Kibei are in this plight. There is but a part of the problem of the fate of about 9,000 American citizens who have received education in Japan. The present evaluation of available material by the Community Analysis Section gives an idea of the variety of individuals who are technically classifiable as Kibei. It should help us to get behind the label of "Kibei" to the problems of several thousand human beings. There is not a single Kibei problem with a single solution.

R. L. Meyer
Director

OM-860

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

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JAPANESE AMERICANS EDUCATED IN JAPAN

The Kibei

What happened to a boy or girl who grew up for awhile in a California town, then went to school in Tokyo or Kumamoto, and finally returned to the California town? What effect did living and going to school in two such different places have on his speech, his manners and daily behavior, his family and friendship relations, his purposes in life, and his sense of national loyalty? Did such a child grow up to think and act like a Japanese or like an American?

A general answer to these questions is not difficult. The young men and women who straddled these different civilizations were affected in different, and sometimes opposite, ways; some grew up to be like Americans, some like Japanese, some wavered in their thoughts and behavior between the two. What kinds of men and women they turned out to be depended on the age at which they went to Japan, the length of time they spent there, whether they lived in city or country, how well adjusted and happy they were there, how much education they had in the United States before and after they went, how they were received by family and friends when they returned. It also depended on what Japan was like when they were there, whether it was before the Manchurian invasion or after, for the teaching in the schools in Japan has varied at different periods.

These factors have operated in such varying ways that it is more dangerous to generalize, particularly in regard to loyalty, about the Japanese Americans educated in Japan than it is about any other part of the population of the Japanese in America. These persons, called Kibei in Japanese, contain among their number individuals representing the extremes in loyalty and devotion to the ways of Japan and America. There is, however, something which most Kibei have in common. That is conflict within themselves. At some time in their lives, most have found themselves "facing two ways". Some have made clean-cut decisions to go in one direction or another, while others have been pushed by many circumstances in this way or that. The experience of growing up in two cultures has given rise to this common characteristic of the Kibei -- conflict in their personal adjustment.

Definitions of Kibei

The literal meaning of "Kibei" is "returned to America". Literally, therefore, the term could be taken to include any individual who has gone to Japan from America, for however short a time, and

then returned to this country. For the term to be useful in defining a type of person, however, it must be narrowed. Children of Japanese parents in the United States were sent to Japan under two different kinds of circumstances. Many went for brief visits to see relatives or as tourists sight-seeing in their parents' native land. Some went to receive all or a portion of their education there. Those in the former class usually spent no more than from a few months to a year in Japan; those in the latter anywhere from two years to twenty. It is the latter group to whom the term Kibei should apply, if it is to have much use as designating a distinct type of Japanese American. It is such persons whose lives have been influenced in important ways by the stay in Japan.

Japanese Americans use the term Kibei to apply to those educated in whole or in part in Japan. Usage, however, among the second generation Japanese in America (the Nisei) has given a special meaning to the word "Kibei". It is applied to individuals not merely because they have been to school in Japan. It is reserved for those whose behavior is not like that of American youths, young men and women in the Japanese American communities who spoke Japanese among themselves preferably to English and who otherwise behaved in what the Nisei regarded as a "Japanesy" manner. In this usage it set off a group as culturally distinct from the English-using Nisei. These connotations of "Kibei" developed extensively during evacuation and, in the relocation centers, groups of youths were designated "Kibei" regardless of the fact that they included many Nisei who had never seen Japan.

The Nisei usage corresponds more nearly with what most non-Japanese think they are designating when they use the term Kibei: namely, a group which does not behave as American youths behave and which is devoted to Japanese ways of life. However, in the Nisei usage it has no necessary implication of loyalty to Japan.

Reasons for Studying in Japan

Among Japanese families in the United States, a decision to send a child to study in Japan was not uncommon. Strong, in his studies of California Japanese Americans conducted about 1930, found that 665 out of 5,100, or 13 per cent, second generation youths had all or part of their schooling in Japan.^{1/} Strong thought that there had been a decline in the practice of sending children to Japan during the period preceding his study.

A sample of Japanese Americans studied in 1942 indicates that 72.7 per cent of the American born had never been in Japan.^{2/}

^{1/} Strong, Edward J., The Second Generation Japanese Problem, 1934, p.207

^{2/} Figures based on a 25% sample taken at the relocation centers in the summer and fall of 1942. This does not include the Hawaiian groups.

Of the 27.3 percent who had been in Japan, there were 14.4 percent of the total who had no schooling there, having gone for brief visits only. There were thus 12.9 percent who had received some education there, and the great majority of these, 12.2 percent of the total American born, had three or more years of schooling in Japan. The following table gives more detail:

AMERICAN BORN RESIDENTS OF TEN RELOCATION CENTERS
(Sample of 17,956 Individuals)

Residence and Schooling In Japan	Percent of American Born			
	Total	Under 20 yrs	20-39 yrs	40 yrs & over
Total American Born	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Never in Japan	72.7	86.8	54.1	46.9
No Schooling in Japan	14.4	11.1	18.6	25.8
1-2 yrs Schooling	.7	.3	1.3	.5
3 or more yrs Schooling	12.2	1.8	26.0	26.8
Elementary School	5.6			
Elementary & High School	5.6			
High School	.1			
Other	.9			

Of the Total American Born, 7.8 percent had 3 or more years schooling in Japan, ending in 1930 or later.

Children were sent to Japan for many reasons. The child was usually sent to live with a relative, while receiving a formal Japanese education. Sometimes parents returned to Japan with the child, bringing him up there. Some children later returned to the United States alone. Some parents felt that for success in business and in the professions in the United States, it was essential that an individual have a knowledge of the Japanese language and customs. Also with economic security in mind, some thought that if opportunities were scarce in this country, the combination of an American and Japanese education would fit a son for work in Japan, Manchuria, or some of the Japanese colonies.

Girls were sometimes sent back for another reason. Not only would they learn the traditional moral behavior, but they would find wider marriage opportunities. Some parents were motivated by little more than a sentiment that their children should know the customs of their parents' country of birth. Other parents wanted their relatives to know their children. A few probably felt it was more economical for

them to send their children to Japan to be cared for by relatives. The expense of rearing their children there was much less because American money had high exchange value and relatives would contribute to the children's support. There were probably a few parents who felt guilty about leaving their families in Japan and took this way of making it up.

Reasons for Returning to America

The reasons of Kibei for returning to the United States have varied with individual situations. When they had completed their studies, in the normal course of events many returned to their families. There were some who left their parents in Japan and returned to the United States by preference or to earn some money, planning to return to Japan later. Others wished to escape Japanese military service. (These Kibei may be regarded as ones who had not absorbed the viewpoint taught in Japanese schools. If they had, they would have regarded army service as an honor and a privilege.) Some Kibei returned because they frankly preferred the freedom of American ways to the more rigid Japanese society. Others displayed the normal reaction of an American citizen and returned when the United States State Department in 1940 advised its citizens to leave Japan because of the threat of war.

In Japan many of the Kibei, especially those who had previous education in the United States, were regarded as foreigners. Those who went to Japan during or subsequent to adolescence spoke Japanese with an American accent. Furthermore, their American upbringing made them different in many minor, but to their Japanese associates, very noticeable, ways. Ironically, when anti-American feeling was particularly high there it was not always comfortable for them to remain. Because of such attitudes, many were pleased and relieved to return to the United States. At first glad to return to this country, they almost immediately found themselves under suspicion by federal officers who assumed that schooling in Japan had indoctrinated them as Japanese sympathizers or even agents. Furthermore, they found the Nisei often antagonistic, looking upon them as foreigners and queer. Thus, many found themselves in much the same position in either country, distrusted in Japan because they were Americans, and then suspected again in the United States because they were Japanese.

Pre-Evacuation Social Adjustment

The greater number of Kibei seem to have returned to the United States in their late teens. This was true at all periods and points either to plans for higher education in the United States or decisions to begin their careers in this country. Kibei have been returning to the United States, a few every year, for the past twenty-five years. There are some Kibei who served with the American Army in World War I. There are several hundred Kibei who have during the past twenty years

married and built up businesses and become indistinguishable from their Nisei contemporaries who have never studied in Japan. There are many others, still under twenty-five, who came back during the 1930's and had not yet established themselves with family or business before evacuation. In addition, there is a group, far from a majority of the Kibei, who came back to the United States in 1940 and 1941. These teen age youths came as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions on Japan by the United States. They were urged, as American citizens, by the State Department and other American interests in Japan to return because of the strained relations between the countries and the threat of war. These recent arrivals were caught by evacuation at the very beginning of their readjustment to life in the United States.

In some ways the Kibei may be regarded as a new immigrant group. The majority of them had spent their formative years in Japan. They had learned Japanese customs and spoke the Japanese language. They had therefore the usual difficulties of an immigrant in school, in finding jobs, in finding wives and husbands. However, there was another and peculiar factor in their adjustment. They were different not only from the majority of Americans in speech and custom, but they were even different from young people of their own age and of their own stock, the Japanese Americans. As has been pointed out, only a small proportion of the second generation Japanese were sent to Japan; often only the eldest child in a family of several. Thus, the Kibei were a minority group within a minority.

The relation of Kibei to other second generation Japanese and the difference in their relations with parents were important factors in their lives in the United States. These relations have had as much effect on the course they have taken in the United States as has their schooling in Japan.

The returning Kibei came back to various kinds of family situations. A considerable number came back to no family at all. Others came back to the bitter experience of poverty and low social status in a context of racial discrimination. Many others returned to situations better in most ways than those they had left in Japan. The following experience is not untypical of that of Kibei who returned in the prosperous 1930's:

"We came to San Pedro. My father was there (to meet me at the dock). Then we got in the car. I watched him drive, looked at the speedometer, 40-50 miles an hour. How could you go that fast? And all the cars driving along just that fast. Then we got home and they had fixed up my room for me. They had a bureau for me and everything laid out nice there. They had brushes laid out for me and everything so nice. I went over and sat down on the bed, and I went down deep. It was like heaven. You didn't have these things in Japan unless you are very rich."

But even when the introduction was as pleasant as that just described, there were for all Kibei who had spent many years in Japan the troubles of language, of getting along with a family who were almost strangers, and of learning American ways in the schools and out. Family life was more difficult when there were other children in the family who had not been in Japan. The Kibei son was sometimes closer to the parents because of the special pride taken in him as Japanese-educated. The closer relationship between Kibei and parents widened the gulf between Kibei and brother or sister. Resentments against the Kibei member of the family on the part of the other sons were sometimes intense. But more often it was the Kibei member of the family who, as a virtual outsider, nursed resentment. A Nisei has described the family conflict:

[The bad] home adjustment in many instances was overcome by the passage of time, by greater assimilation; but when the boys and girls were past 16 or 18 years of age the family adjustment did not always take place, unless the parents understood the situation and made a special effort to remember the circumstances themselves whenever the bitter or resentful occasion arose. The child in the meantime seemed to have lost that natural attachment to the family and did not seem close to the parents or to his own brothers and sisters.

In school the Kibei teen age youths had a much more difficult time than in the family. Here family affections which helped to soften the differences did not operate. Some Kibei were forced to go to school whether they wished to or not, being of compulsory school age, but the majority wanted to go at first to fit themselves better to make a living in the United States. They experienced the agonies of older youths placed in classes of younger children because of their language handicaps. "When I came over here, I went to school for awhile, and they put me with smaller kids. Little kids all around me. I was tall and didn't like that so much. I didn't go on." The extreme in school experiences is indicated in the following account by a Japanese American who observed Kibei in school at Terminal Island:

They constituted a problem in one of the elementary schoolsBecause by their age (12 to 16), they definitely belonged with the junior and even in some cases the senior high school group. (But) they were lacking in ease of social adjustment and showed a language handicap....(so that they) belonged in the elementary school somewhere from the first grade up through the sixth.

The school principal and teachers immediately protested against placing these "teen" age pupils in with their normally progressing younger children for many reasons: physical size, their various stages of language handicap, and in some instances their advancement mentally in current events, elementary social problems, and fundamentals of arithmetic.

A special group was therefore created composed of Kibei who thus ceased to associate in any normal way with the other students. The observer continues:

As I recall these boys and girls lacked initiative, were shy in oral response, and if sent to the office on an errand, always seemed to come in "two's". Whenever found outside of the classroom, they resorted to conversing in Japanese. They further seemed to be unwilling to accept criticism without the teacher first using a great deal of patience and tact, and their feelings were easily hurt.

Points of view absorbed during their Japanese schooling persisted and influenced their participation in school activities:

During a certain school program, all the school children participated in getting the school yard in order, carrying benches to use for seats, decorating the platform, making scenery, etc. The "regular" children had fun...in the preparations, while the foreign boys and girls resented taking part as well as assisting in the physical preparation. The boys in particular felt that they came to school to study, and that such physical manual labor should be done by some such person as a custodian or even by the teacher, and not by themselves.

Thus, in the home and in the school, the groundwork of maladjustment was laid, and Kibei were set apart from family and from those of their own age. To some this was merely a challenge to work harder at being accepted: "I always tried to go with Nisei, so I would learn the language better." In the Young Buddhists groups in Southern California and elsewhere, there were many Kibei who worked out their adjustment through religious activities. Here they came into association with second generation youths who had not been to Japan, who used English like any other Americans, and who were often willing to accept Kibei leadership in church affairs.

However, it was in the attempt to adjust to the wider community that Kibei met the most serious rebuffs. Outside the church groups, in the field of recreation they were seriously lacking in American skills such as dancing. Inability to participate in such activities often resulted in the formation of their own clubs and recreational groups. As they withdrew from Nisei society, they came to be regarded as a group apart. Some constituted small but definite cliques in most of the Coast cities, with a recreational life regarded as rough, or at least strange, by Nisei. They were shunned and often ridiculed by Nisei. Kibei girls tended to marry Kibei and Issei men rather than Nisei. Among the Kibei men were many bachelors who could find no wives who would take them. They drifted off into their own society, going the way of non-assimilation. The abler found some refuge in jobs with Japanese firms. The less able became casual unskilled laborers, and associated chiefly with Issei migratory workers. Their maladjustment in terms of family, social, and economic life was often extreme.

They were pariahs within the larger minority group of the Japanese Americans.

Prominent in this group of Kibei were the recent comers at the time of evacuation -- those who entered the United States after 1940 -- here for too short a time to have weathered the usual early difficulties in adjustment common to all Kibei and then suddenly segregated in the relocation centers.

Relocation Center Adjustment

Since Pearl Harbor the term Kibei has become more familiar to other Americans; it has moreover acquired a sinister meaning. Kibei in the American Army were discharged when war broke out and many were picked up as suspects by the FBI. They have been pointed to by popular writers as the most dangerous of the Japanese Americans. In this, as is usual in the application of a label to any considerable group of people, a part has been mistaken for the whole. Enough has already been said to indicate that the Kibei followed widely different lines of development in American life before evacuation.

During evacuation and the events following Pearl Harbor, the forces pushing Kibei in various directions were intensified. The conflicts involved in their lives were sharpened, and as a result many moved more definitely than they had before to link their futures either with the United States or with Japan. Kibei who had been back from Japan the longest and had families and businesses sometimes leaned over backward to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. A few became rabidly pro-American and "flag wavers" in their efforts to demonstrate loyalty. In every relocation center there have been some Kibei who knew their minds very definitely, who were imbued with a deep dislike for Japan, and who were determined to continue as loyal Americans despite evacuation and other rebuffs in America. They knew from experience what Japan was like and chose to identify themselves with America. As one Kibei, returned in 1934 from a sixteen year stay in Japan, put it: "This evacuation business is bad and it makes me mad, but I never can understand those Kibeis who want to go back to Japan. Every Kibei I know who went always came back to this country in a hurry because he couldn't stand it there. There everything you do is for the government, not for yourself. It's no good there." This was said with the unmistakable accent of the Kibei of long residence in Japan. The point of view is that of the conscious-American who has chosen and knows why. Such individuals behaved in the relocation centers very much as the more progressive Nisei did. They sought jobs as near their capabilities as possible and worked cooperatively with the WRA administration. Except for their speech, there was little difference between them and the majority of the Nisei. Like the latter, they were assimilated. It is interesting to note also that there were among these always a few of the more recently returned to the United States.

Another type of Kibei, often having a background of activity for a few years in Christian or Puddhist young peoples groups in the pre-evacuation Japanese community, found a very significant role in the relocation centers. Some of these individuals, in their late twenties, were elected to office in the Temporary Community Councils. They were closer to the first generation parents and were elected as a result of the confidence which the Issei had in them because of their ability to speak and understand Japanese. A number of them continued to be prominent in relocation center affairs, assuming a definite role in the new situation. This role was as liaison between Nisei and Issei in community affairs. Their knowledge of the two languages and differing viewpoints were utilized. They found themselves in useful roles and with new status in the developing community structure. A similar function developed for Kibei in connection with the internal security force, where again the knowledge of Japanese was important. This second type of Kibei, usually devoted to different aspects of both the cultures he knew, found it possible to utilize his divergent background experience and thus to find function and status. They have been an implement of constructive action in the centers.

There are two other types of Kibei whose role in the relocation centers was quite different. One group tended to withdraw from community affairs, partly because of poor knowledge of English and partly because they felt they should assume the proper role of the young man in a Japanese community, deferring thus to their elders. These men and women lived pretty much within their blocks, avoiding contact with the Caucasian administrators and constituting a group apart from those of their own age in their blocks. They often sought jobs in the mess halls, which allowed them to remain aloof from the general community life. They were noticeably Japanese in manner, bowing with the politeness of the Issei and the women deferring publicly to the men in formal Japanese fashion. This led to their being singled out by the first generation parents and pointed to as models of behavior, a fact much resented by the Nisei. These unobtrusive Kibei were usually the older of the more recently returned. A few had married just before evacuation and many of them married in the relocation centers, where they suddenly had a wider choice of mates than they had ever had before.

The fourth type of Kibei is the one who has given his reputation to the whole. These are a mixed group composed of those who had never accepted American ways and those who had not had time to adjust to America because of the recency of their return; also with them were older Kibei who reacted like many loyal Nisei to the evacuation, who were strongly bitter and resentful. Among them, too, were a number of the Hawaiian Kibei, more recently returned from Japan and some with military service there, whose evacuation experiences had been severe.

On the one hand were those who had never intended to remain in the United States. They were devoted to Japanese ways and had identified their future with Japan. They were patriotic Japanese who wished to behave in this country in a manner which would not jeopardize their

future there. Some of these were disdainful of the Nisei, regarding them as shallow and thoughtless. In some centers there were early movements to "Japanize the Nisei". They came to little because of the majority sentiment against such trend. A few Kibei rose to leadership briefly on such platforms and then retired into frustrated unimportance as the sentiment of the centers swung in a different direction. The followers of such men were mostly the younger Kibei (and also some Nisei) who found relocation center life tiresome and unpleasant and sought any means of asserting themselves and passing their time in an exciting manner. The articulate leaders of this type often had great prestige, as high-ranking Judo men, or ones who spoke authoritatively of Japan's expected future greatness in the Pacific. Their young followers were for the most part peaceful, but they could be persuaded to unsocial acts of various kinds. Some beatings in the centers were carried out by these groups. They were generally disapproved by the peace-loving mass of the center and were looked askance at by the majority of Nisei who saw them as a rowdy and uncontrollable group, and labelled them "Kibei" despite the presence among them of Nisei who had never been in Japan.

The Kibei at Registration. During registration a peculiarly Kibei point of view became apparent. This was expressed at Topaz and Manzanar especially, but was present among other Kibei, particularly of the last two groups mentioned, in all the centers. This was the view that forswearing allegiance to the Emperor, involved in question No. 28, would affect not only themselves but also their relatives in Japan. The following indicates the nature of this view:

We can't say or put down in writing that we forswear allegiance to the Emperor, no matter how we feel about it personally. We have relatives in Japan. If our relatives ever found out that we did this, even if they found out after the war, they could not hold up their heads in the village. If it came out, they would be treated with contempt by all their neighbors and they would have to disown us. We could never go back to that part of the country or secure our rights there.

This was a factor in the refusal of many Kibei to register or to answer "yes" to the loyalty question. They were generally ones who had retained dual citizenship and who often had never planned to remain permanently in the United States. Such Kibei, however, frequently said that they would be willing to be drafted and would serve honorably if it were put on an involuntary basis. The following illustrates this point of view:

A good Japanese citizen will make the best American citizen.
If I am here, I must go to war and fight for the United States. I am born here. I must do my very best for my country. I told my girl friend that a long time ago. She

never understand me. If I am a soldier, I told her, and if I am told to bomb Tokio, I do it, but I don't expect to come back. That is how I make it up to my race... There is some fellows think you should wait to get all the citizens right back before going into the army. I don't think so. I say do what the government tells you to do. That is the way you are trained if you are brought up like me in Japan. ...but they say I am crazy.

The result of being required to answer the loyalty question regardless of the dilemma it put them in was twofold. On the one hand, it resulted immediately in gang tactics on the part of some Kibei to interfere with the carrying out of the registration process. It must be said, however, that such demonstrations were never exclusively Kibei and in Tule Lake were definitely not Kibei organized; many Nisei, protesting the registration on other grounds, also joined such force groups.

On the other hand, once registration was over, those Kibei who had answered "no" immediately felt a new insecurity. At Manzanar there were rumors from then on that it would be the Kibei who would be segregated. They felt that the Kibei had been singled out for special retaliatory action by the United States government and expected the worst. Thus a sense of persecution grew up in the centers on the part of the Kibei and contributed still further to the disorganization of those who were already confused and badly adjusted.

This created a group within the centers who became a source of discord, moving steadily in the direction of rebellious action. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that some Nisei joined with the rebellious Kibei, especially relatively unassimilated Nisei from rural districts. They were regarded as violent in their behavior by other evacuees. They seemed unduly belligerent and excitable to Nisei and most Issei. The direction in which they were heading is indicated by what happened when they came together in concentrated lots at Tule Lake after segregation. "This is Japan", became a slogan by which they justified rough treatment of girls and broke up Nisei dances. Young Nisei girls in Tule Lake became afraid to go out at night because of the behavior of these gangs, composed in large part of Kibei. They threatened adults as well, using strong-arm actions, and established an atmosphere in the newly disorganized center which gave them the ascendancy. As one Nisei expressed it, "you certainly have to show a lot of respect for these Kibeis". They used their conception of Japan as a justification for their revolt against restraint of whatever kind.

These groups were an end-product of a process which had been going on before evacuation, was intensified in the relocation centers, and reached its maximum in the segregation center. It was the development of a type of behavior which resulted from the straddling of two cultures in such a way as to make a fit impossible in either. It was behavior arising out of being rebuffed repeatedly, of frustration and

lack of status in any society. A portion of the Kibei had reacted in this process in the manner of the third type of Kibei mentioned above — they withdrew insofar as they could, accepting a limited sphere of action in a society where rebuffs were less possible and where approval of Issei at least could be won. There are many of them still in the relocation centers.

Another portion did not accept the rejection but sought compensations of various sorts. Instead of submitting to the rejection they combated it, found a symbol of solidarity and an aim in their concept of Japan and became aggressively active in the name of that symbol. They have been called the uncontrollables by other evacuees. They became members of goon squads and aggressively asserted themselves against the Nisei and against America, the scene of their most recent rejection. They enjoyed a brief hour in the segregation center, where it was a little longer at least than it had been in any of the relocation centers. They have become now men without a country who will probably find that they have devoted themselves to an ideal that does not exist, namely, a Japan of their own over-heated imaginations, nursed in unhappiness and lack of status in any society.

The Kibei and Administration

A little more than one-tenth of the second generation Japanese Americans have had schooling in Japan. A rough estimate as to their number in the United States would be between 8000 and 9000 persons. The great majority are still in the relocation centers or in the segregation center. If what has been said be accepted, there are at least four kinds of Kibei. Each of these are quite distinct in their relation to the management of projects and in regard to what their futures may be expected to be. They call for very different administrative approaches.

The first type of Kibei mentioned, the conscious-Americans, do not constitute a special problem. They fall into the group of Nisei who are resettling steadily from the centers. Since, however, they have certain characteristics which place them technically in the Kibei class, their major problem is that of leave clearance. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the determination of the Kibei's fitness for leave must not become mechanical. Labels and slogans must not be substituted for careful evaluation in terms of the factors mentioned at the beginning of this paper. There are loyal "1940 Kibei" and disloyal "1930 Kibei". Moreover, the degree of Americanization is by no means directly correlated with loyalty. They are rather distinct qualities, a fact which comes out most clearly in connection with this first type of Kibei, many of whom retain Japanese speech and cultural characteristics. No formula can be used to discover loyalty. On the other hand we can come close to a formula for determining degree of Americanization. If any of the influences which make a Kibei what he

is may be classed as more significant than others, they are the following: the relative amounts of education in the two countries and which preceded the other. These, however, must be recognized only as indicators of degree of Americanization, not of loyalty necessarily.

It is important to recognize that there have been in every center Kibei who have been of immense value to the community. They have smoothed over relations between Issei and Nisei and between Issei and administration. They have been go-betweens and have interpreted one group to the other. These men have for the most part been those of the second-class mentioned. A number have left the centers, but there are others who can continue to fill this role. The habit of administrators has been to tend to forget that such cooperative persons are Kibei. It would be well to remember the fact and to seek out and give opportunity to such men for fulfilling this special role.

The two remaining types of Kibei constitute definite problems for the WRA program. It is important to distinguish clearly between the two types. One group has been called the "unobtrusive" Kibei. It is unlikely that many of them will develop into community leaders. They will remain as long as possible in the retirement of block life. They will not respond to relocation and in their planning for the future will go along with the majority of Issei. Yet they are not Issei; they are young and have their lives before them. Poorly or not at all Americanized as they may be, it is nevertheless begging the question to assume that they are destined to go back to Japan or that, if they should, they would fit any better there than they have in the United States. Most of them are out of touch with American life not so much from choice as from language barrier. Many are and have been in the past anxious to surmount that barrier. There is here a special, and an unusually challenging, field for adult education.

Finally, there are the un-Americanized Kibei who are so by conviction and choice. Probably a majority are now in the segregation center. They must be recognized for what they are, regardless of by what process they have been led to their present position. They have demonstrated that they will resort to force to secure their ends. They have shown that they will be the first to join in and support demonstrations against whatever constituted authority exists. They, together with young Nisei of similar outlook, are constant threats to the peace of the segregation center. Methods must be worked out for controlling them. Effective dealing with such individuals may be in terms either of force, of providing activities which give them status in the community, or of appeal to what they regard as Japanese values. Administrators may use the first two methods; the last must be left to Issei and other peaceful Kibei in the context of an organized community.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
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BUDDHISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The attention focused on people of Japanese ancestry in the United States has aroused interest -- and misunderstanding -- as to what Buddhism, the religion of more than half these people, stands for, what it stood for in Japan in relation to Shintoism or "emperor-worship", and what it stands for in the United States in relation to American and Christian institutions.

Buddhism and Shintoism in Japan.

In the United States the principal differences between Buddhism and Shintoism are not always clearly understood.

Buddha, from which the name Buddhism comes, is a title meaning the Knower or the Fully Enlightened One. Gautama, a prince of India, was the Buddha who, at the age of 35 after six years of seeking truth, founded the religion in the sixth century before Christ. On reaching manhood he renounced the life of a prince for that of a wandering ascetic to seek a way to help humanity. Finally, he gave up his ascetic ways and sat down under the now famous Bo-tree until he attained the enlightenment he sought. Then until he died, at the age of 80, he taught his belief that the best kind of life avoided extremes of pleasure and self-mortification, and took the "Middle Way" which leads to calmness and understanding, and eventually to the apex of perfection, Nirvana. "The Eight-Fold Path" of the Middle Way is a code of ethics for good living.

Around these beliefs, various rites and symbols have developed. The lotus whose blossoms rise above their muddy roots; the picture of Buddha as visualized by the artists among his followers; the candles bringing light into darkness; the burning incense which symbolizes the worthlessness of man until he realizes his potentialities; a gong and meditation beads to help in meditating on the Middle Way and the Wheel of Life above which the Buddhist aspires to rise, are all part of the religion.

In Japan, as a whole, there are some eight major sects which are subdivided into innumerable lesser groups, each with slightly different rites and beliefs. Buddhism, very popular among all classes of society, contributed much to the culture and well-being of Japan. Besides influencing the arts, social life, morals, and ethics, it worked in the fields of social welfare and secular education.

Buddhism entered Japan through Korea about the sixth century after some eleven centuries of spreading from one oriental country to another. Ever since, Shintoism and Buddhism have been closely intertwined in Japanese history and have constituted a source of differences among political groups. After Buddhism had entered Japan, the name Shinto, meaning "way of the gods",

was adopted to distinguish the old native religion from the new arrival. Of the three major kinds of Shintoism found in Japan, the most popular among the common people centers about the old native beliefs in gods of the household, fields, and wayside. Though Buddhism and this popular form of Shinto took over rites and beliefs from each other, they have never completely fused at any time. The common man, for instance, believes in Buddhism for the sake of his soul and in the Shinto gods to protect and guide him in daily affairs.

Besides this popular and relatively unorganized Shintoism, there is a more exclusive kind which is organized into sects. These sects, many of which believe in healing by faith, are not likely to tolerate a belief in Buddhism among their followers.

The third kind of Shintoism is that best known to the American public as "emperor-worship". This is State Shintoism, carefully fostered by the national government, united with the political system of Japan and taught in its schools. Based on traditions that the emperor is descended from the Sun Goddess and that the gods created the Japanese and their islands, State Shintoism fosters belief in the divinity of the emperor and the purity of the Japanese race. Of relatively late development in Japan, it did not become the official national cult until about 1868. The same political upheaval which made this form of Shintoism the State religion gave Buddhism a severe setback. As a consequence of the political conflict, the royal family withdrew from the Buddhist order; temples and priests were attacked; and efforts were made to destroy Buddhism. However, the people of the nation so resisted governmental efforts to eliminate Buddhism that it was permitted to exist, but only as one of several religions subordinate to State Shintoism.

After this period of hardship, Buddhism revived, undertook new missionary and welfare activities, and began to evolve methods of cooperation among its sects. Three of the sects, for example, founded The United Buddhist University, and in 1918 The Interdenominational Association was organized to represent all leading Buddhist sects, except the Nichiren, in their dealings with the imperial government. The Nichiren sect, which is weakly represented in the United States, has more Shinto symbolism and nationalistic tendency than other sects. The Shin and the Zen sects, on the other hand, resisted State Shintoism. Both the Shin and the Zen are represented among the American Buddhist sects.

Buddhism in the United States Before Evacuation.

Buddhism was introduced into the United States and Hawaii by Japanese immigrants. In 1940, of an estimated 56,000 Buddhists in the United States, 55,000 were of Japanese ancestry. The remainder included Caucasians, who, in the 1930's founded The Buddhist Brotherhood in America at Los Angeles, where most Caucasian Buddhists live. The Brotherhood is non-sectarian but has cooperated in religious affairs with Japanese Buddhist sects and has won converts to non-sectarian Buddhism among young Buddhists of Japanese ancestry. Another prominent non-sectarian organization of Buddhists is

The International Buddhist Institute, founded in 1927 by Buddhists of varied racial and national backgrounds.

Of the eight major Buddhist sects found in Japan, six are represented in the United States and Hawaii. The six are Shin, Shingon, Zen, Nichiren, Tendai, and Jodo. Only the first four sects named are numerically important in the United States, and of them the Shin is by far the strongest, having a membership that is estimated to include three-fourths of the Buddhists in this country. Next in order of size to the Shin are the Shingon, Zen, and Nichiren sects. The four maintained separate organizations in the United States, and until evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry from the west coast were often out of touch with each other.

The Shin sect. The importance in the United States of the Shin sect reflects its strength in Japan, for it was, and still is, strong in the rural districts whence many Japanese came to this country. The simplicity of this sect, the so-called Protestantism of Buddhism, has appealed to the common people since St. Shinran founded it in 1224. He believed that only faith in Amida Buddha and frequent repetition of the formula, Namu Amida Butsu, (Homage to Amida Buddha), were necessary for the salvation of the soul. The minimum of ceremony and little stress on metaphysical doctrine in the Shin sect contrast with the formality and ritual of other sects. For instance, the Shin use tablets instead of images of Buddha, and its priests are allowed to eat meat and marry.

The Shin denomination, especially as operating through the organization of the Nishi subsect in The Buddhist Mission Church, has maintained itself and become the leading sect in the United States for several reasons. Besides maintaining its membership among the foreign-born who had belonged to the denomination in Japan, the Shin sect seems to have been more adaptable, probably because of the simplicity of its ceremonies and doctrines, to the culture of the United States and so more appealing to members of the second generation. However, it has suffered disorganization as a result of evacuation and its membership has declined.

In 1936 the Census of Religious Bodies reported that the Shin had 14,388 adult members. An estimated average of three members of each Buddhist family belonged to the church; which would have given the Shin sect in 1936 a total of about 43,164 members.

Though the Shin denomination has ten subsects in Japan, only two are represented in the United States. They are the Nishi Hongwanji (West Mission) and the Higashi Hongwanji (East Mission), and of them the Nishi subsect has by far the greater number of members.

In 1898, all members of the Nishi were united into The Buddhist Mission of North America by the Reverends Sonada and Nishijima of Kyoto, Japan. Then, in 1905, when the first Buddhist church in the United States was built in San Francisco, the Kyoto headquarters of the Nishi chose Reverend Sonada as the first Bishop. The Kyoto headquarters has continued to select the bishops, the fifth of whom is the Reverend R. Matsukage, who is now at the Central Utah Relocation Center in Topaz but maintains contact

as head of The Buddhist Mission, with six Nishi churches located in the free zone. They are in Denver and Fort Lupton, Colorado; Mesa, Arizona; Salt Lake City and Ogden, Utah; and New York City.

Besides appointing the Bishop, the Kyoto headquarters has also contributed 3000 yen a year toward his salary and has trained young men from the United States for the priesthood. However, few Nishi followed the Japanese custom of the eldest son of a priest adopting his father's profession. Most of the priests in the American Buddhist churches were born in Japan, and after being trained there for the priesthood were sent to the United States to conduct congregations. These priests are supported by their congregations, not by the denomination as a whole, or, as in the case of the Bishop, by the Kyoto headquarters.

The Buddhist Mission of North America is organized into a hierarchy with the Bishop at the head. The principal Mission temple is at 1381 Pine Street in San Francisco. Under the Bishop are two deans and seventy-one lesser bishops and clergymen of whom six are Caucasians. At the time of evacuation, the Mission consisted of about 35 temples and churches and more than double that number of less formally organized congregations, which were divided into seven dioceses, each with a temple and bishop subordinate to the Chief Bishop in San Francisco. Four of the dioceses are in California, while the other three are in the states to the north and east. The seven dioceses of the Buddhist Mission and their headquarters are as follows:

<u>Diocese</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Northern California	San Francisco
Southern California	Los Angeles
Central California	Fresno
Coastal California	Guadalupe
Northern	Seattle
Middle eastern	Salt Lake City
Denver	Denver

In Japan, the priests have complete responsibility for financing and maintaining the temples, but in the United States the Buddhist churches are incorporated under state laws with the church officers responsible for finances, policies, and administration. Although some churches encouraged the appointment of American citizens as officers, the churches were actually controlled by priests and Issai leaders.

The Shingon or Odaishi sect. The sect next in size to the Shin in the United States is the Shingon, which was founded in 806 by Kobo Daishi. More highly ritualized and metaphysical than the Shin sect, the Shingon denomination has attracted the more conservative, older people, who also depend, especially in Hawaii, on the priests as faith healers. The influence of popular Shintoism is apparent in its tendency toward pantheism and its doctrine that the "Great Sun" is the source of all.

The Zen sect. The Zen sect is small in the United States, although

a subsect, the Soto, is practiced to some extent in Hawaii. Encouraged as a religion for the Samurai, the warrior class, the Zen sect emphasizes stoicism, meditation, and stern self-discipline through which, the followers believe, a man can save himself without depending on the gods. Though it strongly influenced philosophical thought after its founding in 1191, it was not a sect for the common people.

The Nichiren sect. The Nichiren sect is the weakest of the denominations in the United States and Hawaii. Established in Japan in 1253, it represented a rebellion against older sects, and tended to attract zealots. Unlike other Buddhist sects, it did not dissociate itself from Japanese nationalistic thought and its symbolism combines the Sun of Shintoism with the Lotus of Buddhism.

Sectarianism and Non-Sectarianism after Evacuation.

Conflicts among sects and between sectarians and non-sectarians were stimulated among the Buddhists as a result of evacuation from the west coast. Before evacuation, the sects had little contact with each other, but at the relocation centers they came together to form the United Buddhist Church. The board of trustees was made up of representatives from all groups. Priests of the different groups took turns in conducting services, but at each service the peculiar ritual needs of each sect were given consideration. The tendency was not toward the elimination of all sectarian differences of doctrine and rites. Still the fear that such a leveling might occur as the result of the newly organized United Buddhist Church led to anxieties and conflicts.

In Poston, for instance, the four Buddhist sects and the non-sectarians agreed at first that none would hold separate services but all would participate in the services of the United Buddhist Church. Later, however, members of the numerically dominant Shin sect withdrew from the United Church to resume their former sectarian rites.

At the Heart Mountain Relocation Center, splits also occurred in The United Buddhist Church despite the vigorous resistance of its board of trustees. Not only did this center have doctrinal differences as at Poston, but also financial problems which developed among the priests.

Both subsects of the Shin denomination, the numerically large Nishi and the less prominent Higashi, are represented at Heart Mountain. However, since Nishi leadership was weakened at the time of evacuation by the internment of many of its priests and outstanding laymen, it happened that the ranking member of the Shin priesthood at the center was a Higashi. Gaining the support of a Nishi priest, he proposed that the financial contributions from the congregations of The United Buddhist Church be pooled and equally divided among the priests. The congregation itself, not the denomination as a whole, it will be recalled, pays the salaries of the priests. Other priests with a larger following than the two mentioned objected that such an arrangement would cheat them out of the salaries they were entitled to and withdrew from The United Buddhist Church.

Doctrinal differences at Heart Mountain were due to the Nichiren sect, which after a time withdrew from the United Church. This sect, as mentioned above, has a nationalistic tendency, and later its priest went to the segregation center.

At the Jerome Center, the split in The United Buddhist Church was due neither to financial or doctrinal differences but to a political schism. Until registration for the army occurred, the course of the Church was fairly smooth, but at that time twelve of the trustees of the Church requested three other board members to resign. The twelve members feared that the hostility of the three to registration would make Buddhism appear to be a pro-Japanese religion. The three dissenters resigned, and with three priests and a following of about 300 people established the Daijo Bukkyo Church. Most of them were repatriates and were suspiciously regarded as pro-Japan by other evacuees. When segregation took place, this Church disbanded.

In all centers, the general tendency is for the older Buddhists to cling to the pre-evacuation sectarian lines. Their services, though conducted by Japanese priests, show many Christian influences.

The growth of non-sectarianism was favored by life at the centers. Indications are that it is getting further stimulus from the relocation of young Buddhists outside the centers, for they tend to favor non-sectarianism in planning new services. Though the young group is financially weak, its experiences in organization are greater than before evacuation. It was the young Buddhists who, after evacuation had disorganized Buddhism, took the initiative in establishing the Buddhist church at the centers. At first many evacuees hesitated to admit being Buddhists for fear of being thought "foreign", but reassurances from the War Relocation Authority of the freedom of religion soon drew Buddhists together again and The United Buddhist Church was organized. Later as the old people became more secure, they took control of the church administration as formerly, but the position of the young Buddhists was stronger.

The non-sectarian Buddhist Brotherhood of America, an organization led by Rev. Julius Goldwater of Los Angeles, has offered to absorb the Young Buddhist Association. Although the Association has been unwilling to accept affiliation with the Brotherhood, it has a closer informal relationship with the non-sectarian Brotherhood since evacuation.

The future for sectarian Buddhism in the United States seems uncertain at present. It faces threats to its continuance not only from the inclination of young Buddhists to favor non-sectarianism or greatly modified sectarianism but from the preference of an increasing number for Christianity. Besides the loss of young members, the Issei Buddhists have another problem, a dilemma immediately involving themselves. Until they begin to relocate, the center of Buddhism in the United States will continue to be the relocation centers, and yet one of the reasons for their hesitation to relocate is the lack of Buddhist churches "outside". Another problem is to fill the ranks of the priests. Before evacuation most sectarian priests were born and educated in Japan, the priesthood did not attract

Nisei before the war, and now there is a marked trend among the Nisei to follow less sectarian lines or to leave Buddhism altogether.

Life at the centers profited the sectarian Buddhists in some respects. Whereas the four sects, the Shin, Shingon, Zen, and Nichiren, had maintained almost no contact with each other before evacuation, project life has brought members of different denominations into contact with each other and created some cooperation among them in religious matters. Because most Buddhists in America are of Japanese ancestry and most are at the centers, they know they cannot depend on "outside" financial aid as do the Christian congregations at the center to maintain their religious existence. This realization makes the members of the different sects more aware of the need for cooperation. Center life also accelerated the trend, which until Pearl Harbor had been gradual, of modifying the sects to compete with Christianity and to adapt themselves to the culture of the United States.

The following percentages indicate the relative place of those in the relocation centers claiming Buddhism, Christianity, other religions, or no religion, and the proportion of Issei and Nisei in each group. The figures are based on approximately 25% of the individual records from each of the ten relocation centers.

Religious Membership in Relocation Centers

Buddhism	55.3%
Shinto	0.4
Catholic	2.0
Protestant	28.8
Mormon	0.1
None or not answered	13.4
N = 27, 180	100 %

Relationship of Nativity and Religious Membership in Relocation Centers

<u>Religion</u>	<u>Nativity</u>	
	<u>American born</u>	<u>Foreign born</u>
Buddhism	48.5%	68.5%
Shinto	0.2	0.7
Seicho-no-Iye	*	0.1
Catholic	2.4	1.2
Protestant	32.4	21.8
Mormon	0.2	0.1
None or not answered	16.3	7.6
	100%	100%

N = 18,064

N = 9,116

*Less than 0.5%

BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES

Especially as regards young, unmarried people, the Buddhist Church has faced competition with the Christian Church from the early days of Japanese immigration to the present and has undergone many changes under the influence of its contacts with Christianity and American life. The effect of the adjustments of Buddhism to occidental culture and competition with Christianity was to make it a strong force in assimilating the Japanese into American life. After losing ground in the early days of immigration, Buddhism firmly established itself and increased its congregations. Now the Buddhists are again losing ground to the Christians. Old people are today more likely to cling to Buddhism than are the young; and residents of rural areas seem to maintain Buddhist membership more than do those of city areas.

During the first years of immigration, young unmarried males turned to Christianity instead of to Buddhism because the Christian churches offered opportunities for Americanization, which, together with the employment bureaus that the churches set up, gave the immigrants hopes for better jobs and a quicker return to Japan. Also, the Christian churches undertook to meet the needs of these men for social life, even setting up marriage bureaus. Later when the immigrants began to raise families, the kindergartens which the churches organized for children of working parents gave both children and parents opportunities to familiarize themselves with American customs and language.

Because in Japan social opportunities of the kind offered in the United States by Christian churches had been a function of the family system and not of religious organizations, the Buddhist churches, when first established in the United States, did not offer their members the attractions and benefits that the Christian churches did. To the immigrant, therefore, the Christian church, not his traditional native religion, was doing for him some of the things his family would have done in the homeland.

However, as Buddhist churches were built and the men married and had families, some returned to their former religion, drawn by sentimental attachment to memories of their youth, familiarity with Buddhist rites, a desire to have Buddhist birth ceremonies for their children, and the satisfaction of hearing services in Japanese.

This early experience of the Issei with the Christian churches left its mark, for they later used it to good effect in fitting American social techniques into the Buddhist Church. Though the major purpose in doing this was to draw the second generation to Buddhism and thus insure its survival in America, parents made relatively little objection when the children, as many still do, attended both Buddhist and Christian churches, or under the influence of friends would become Christians while their brothers and sisters or parents remained Buddhists. Since American public schools usually do not give religious instruction, parents of Japanese ancestry were eager that their children have organized training in ethics, whether on a Buddhist or Christian doctrinal foundation.

Adaptability to other cultures and religions is a trait that Buddhism has shown since it spread from India through Asia to Japan and then to the United States. Just as it competed in Japan with Shintoism, so it competed

in the United States with Christianity to hold its members and gain converts. American Buddhist churches and Christian churches in Japanese American communities have adopted ideas and customs from each other as popular Shintoism and Buddhism did in Japan.

A new sect, which became popular among older people in California in the 1930's, is the Seicho-no-Iye. It combines Christianity and Buddhism around the faith that health and happiness can be attained by the proper mental attitude. The literature of the sect refers to both Gautama Buddha and Mary Baker Eddy. This sect is represented in the relocation centers by a negligible percentage.

The principal change which American Buddhists made under the influence of Christianity was to add to the original religious purpose of their church the functions of providing recreation and education for its younger members. The American Buddhist societies carrying out these functions were patterned after those in the Christian churches.

Buddhist children had Sunday Schools established for them, and in 1936 The Buddhist Mission of North America, the organization of the Nishi subsect of the Shin, had 6332 children enrolled in Sunday Schools. Young people had the Young Men's Buddhist Association and the Young Women's Buddhist Association, comparable in organization and function to the Young Men's Christian Association and the Young Women's Christian Association. In 1926 these associations united into the Young Buddhists Association, which was to become an important force after evacuation in reuniting both old and young Buddhists. Older Buddhist women had the Women's Buddhist Association, corresponding to the Ladies Aid, which sponsored church socials and bazaars with other church societies, fostered work in social service, and conducted study groups on domestic subjects.

Buddhist church calendars took over American and Christian holidays and adapted them to their congregations. Programs were held for Mother's Day and Father's Day. On Memorial Day, Buddhists held services at graveyards similar to Christian services. At some relocation centers, Buddhists and Christians have held joint Memorial Day services at the graves of those who have died since evacuation. On Christmas eve, Buddhists usually hold an "End of the Year" celebration with features taken from the Christian one, such as children receiving gifts and the Sunday School classes presenting plays. Besides these new holidays, the Buddhists observed some of their former holidays, such as, for example, the birthday of Buddha, (which comes at about Easter time), and Bon celebrations at which the dead are honored and the living exchange gifts.

Under the influence of Christianity, Buddhists modified several aspects of their religious activities. They adopted Sunday as a special day for religious observances, and took over the singing of hymns (and even adapted Christian hymns), choirs, choir robes, congregational responses, and the program arrangements followed in Christian churches. Most of the Buddhist buildings became known as churches instead of temples, the term temple being reserved for the principal structure in a diocese headquarters.

A function which Buddhists added to their American organization was the teaching of Japanese language and culture to the younger generation in schools conducted by priests or by laymen.

However, despite the many efforts of the Buddhist Church to attract children into their congregations, less than half of the Nisei have become members. Many Nisei, despite the language schools, do not know enough Japanese to follow the services led by priests so unfamiliar with English as to be unable to translate from Japanese for the benefit of the younger members of the congregation. Then too as the young people marry, they tend to withdraw from the church societies, thus breaking the social and recreational tie which had been stronger than the religious bond in holding them to the Buddhist Church.

Many Buddhists wished to accelerate the Americanization process in their church, but the change was gradual until Pearl Harbor. Then many changes came rapidly as a reaction to the hysteria which swept the West Coast. The Buddhist Mission of North America made up of Nishi members of the Shin sect changed its name to The Buddhist Mission of America and incorporated under the laws of California. The Mission urged its members to "Americanize your organizations and all its activities," and issued statements declaring, "United we stand for democracy." Services, especially for young people, were conducted in English. Members of the Mission were urged to buy bonds and to join the Red Cross and other patriotic organizations. Churches sponsored dances to raise money for patriotic purposes and gave parties for draftees.

Progressive Buddhists hailed this move, which had led young Buddhists to assume a more dominant role in the church. However, the Issei still retained actual control until the church organization collapsed upon the evacuation of the West Coast members and the internment of some of the Issei churchmen. After arrival in the relocation centers, the young Buddhists assumed control until the older generation recovered from the shock of evacuation. The younger members reestablished not only the church but the program of social activities which, in the United States, had become such an integral part of the Buddhist Church.

Those who had formerly attended both Christian and Buddhist services continued to do so in the centers, but the trend among some of them has been toward more complete identification with the Christian denominations due to the concentrated community life in the centers. Among others, the pull has been toward Buddhism for the sake of family solidarity.

The members of the Young Buddhist Association feel that if Buddhism is to continue to exist in this country the burden rests with them. In May, 1943, an inter-project meeting of members of the Association was held in Salt Lake City for the first time since evacuation. Although the local associations and the central organization have been able to maintain their existence, the members feel they are in a difficult position. Because of the war they hesitate to become too prominent and conspicuous. Many are being dispersed throughout the country into areas where there are no Buddhist churches. Four of the only six Nisei ministers of Buddhism are in the army; there is no American seminary to train lay Buddhist ministers. The Young Buddhists are divided among themselves. Some wish to cling to the sects of their parents and, though recognizing the need for change, do not want it to come quickly. Others wish to reject the remaining Japanese influence in the Buddhist church in the United States and establish an American Buddhist Church completely divorced from Japan. It is only in this way, they feel, that the present drift of young Buddhists to Christianity can be halted.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section
October 28, 1944
Community Analysis Report No. 10

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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

In this paper, labor relations in the relocation centers have been analyzed to show:

1. What the dynamic factors are;
2. How they create a pattern, the recurrent elements of which are traceable in several centers; and
3. How the growing manpower shortage in the centers has put a superficially different aspect upon familiar factors involved in labor relations.

Suggestions are added which may be helpful to those concerned with center labor problems.

The information available about center labor relations has both shaped and limited much of the material presented here. Because certain examples of poor labor relations are referred to over and over again does not mean that the centers involved have more labor trouble than others. It is merely that the examples quoted are documented.

The use of only negative illustrations is also the fault of documentation. There are many instances of good supervisor-worker relations, and many competent, hard-working labor crews in the centers. Much could be learned from such positive illustrations that would be helpful in improving labor relations if we had material about them.

Dynamic factors. Both the underlying and immediate causes of labor trouble stem from the unusual structure of the center community and the relation of workers to it; the peculiar social and economic status of the residents; and relations between evacuees and appointed personnel on the job.

Because relocation centers differ from normal communities "outside", they have an unusual employment situation fraught with labor difficulties. Every center has had at least one work stoppage and some have had many.

Unlike residents of normal communities, evacuees are restricted in movement unless they relocate; and they must take up all matters, whether concerned with labor relations or daily needs with the center administration, headed by the Project Director. Evacuees, unlike people outside the centers, lack freedom of economic competition since all their work is for the center and reimbursed by a small cash allotment, a weak bargaining point. As most center

work serves essential needs only, labor trouble more often than "outside" directly affects the entire community and not just the work unit with the grievance.

Resentment over evacuation from their homes in normal communities to relocation centers and their changed social and economic status make not only workers but the whole community sensitive to any suspected or actual indication of prejudice or domineering attitudes among the appointed personnel. Dissatisfied workers often find that they can count on these basic grievances to get the community behind them in a labor dispute with the administration. The community strikes at the administration and releases some of its tensions by supporting the dispute. However, it may then strongly favor a return to a peaceful equilibrium even before the direct or indirect causes of the labor friction have been eliminated. Either through public opinion or mediating bodies or both, it will work to settle the trouble.

Some labor disputes originate because evacuee workers feel that the community does not sufficiently recognize the contribution they make to public welfare. They may then strike as much at the community as at the administration and get the community to placate them with money gifts and verbal appreciation.

Pattern of labor disputes. Trouble may develop in any unit, though the hospital, the mess, janitorial services and the farm tend to have more difficulty than other units. An analysis of three, fairly well documented labor crises shows that resentment against evacuation and certain administrative steps as well as long standing conflicts between evacuees and the appointed personnel require only a very small igniting incident to cause them to flare into serious trouble. A few tactless words of a supervisor are frequently the precipitating factor. Two of the communities at first sided with the workers; the third community did not because the walkout endangered the care of hospital patients. Later the two which favored the workers withdrew their support and sought to end the trouble so that the center would be quiet again.

Manpower shortage. The major problem now in center labor relations is the manpower shortage caused by relocation, seasonal leaves, and selective service and worsened by poor distribution of available labor, low efficiency, and the accumulated, unsolved grievances of the past.

Washington has recommended Manpower Commissions composed of both evacuees and appointed personnel to study and seek solutions of the problems. They are now being formed.

Suggestions. Analysis of labor relations before crises develop is recommended to find and eliminate, when possible, sources of friction which may lead to serious trouble. Study of supervisory attitudes and relations with evacuees, improved information channels, cooperation with evacuees, particularly foremen, will also help to promote better relations.

In the event of a dispute, well stabilized channels of appeal and mediating committees should be available as well as face-saving means for both the administration and the evacuees. The administration will find it an advantage to watch for community efforts to aid in restoring center peace.

but include special political, occupational, or other interests.

In certain conflicts, however, the block does form the unit to mold opinion and mobilize support. This appeared occasionally during registration when blocks held meetings to thresh out the matter of "yes" versus "no" answers until each block could register solidly one way or the other.

Although not the result of a labor grievance, the organization of the general strike at Colorado River in November, 1942, illustrates the role of the blocks in crises. The purpose of the general strike was to effect the release of two evacuees arrested on suspicion of beating up a man thought to be a stool pigeon.

Committees representing a few blocks, after an unsatisfactory meeting with the Project Director and FBI representatives, returned to their blocks and organized to resist the removal of the two prisoners from the center. Block groups picketed the jail while their leaders drew other people into the demonstration. They held meetings to discuss the issues, petitioned Councilmen for action, and finally instructed evacuee administrative workers to strike.

Then the Council resigned in protest against the continued detention of the two men. Block leaders who had planned the demonstration mobilized the community under Issci leadership. The demonstration was on a block basis with residents assigned specific block stations.

Community response in labor disputes over prestige. Some strikes are directed not only at the administration but at an indifferent community which has not recognized the contribution of certain workers. Because workers lack satisfactory financial and perhaps supervisory recognition, they depend heavily on community appreciation as an incentive to work. Jobs with no prestige, such as janitorial work, are unpopular and difficult to keep filled. Comparing available center jobs with pre-evacuation jobs adds to the workers' disgruntled attitude and feeling of being unappreciated. Trouble easily flares up which forces the neglectful public to take note of its oversight. Minidoka janitorial workers went on a strike through which they hit as much at the community for not appreciating their contribution in low-prestige jobs as at the administration. In several centers, the community has eventually had to placate workers who felt that their hard work earned them little in wages or recognition.

For instance, at Granada in the spring of 1944, the joint Agricultural Committee of the Community Council and the Block Managers contacted slaughterhouse workers individually to smooth out misunderstandings. Then they gave these workers a testimonial dinner and money collected to supplement wages from the Authority.

While workers in jobs with little prestige usually have to command public attention to their discontent, the public spontaneously shows appreciation to workers in positions of high prestige. Hospital personnel, the outstanding example of such workers, receive both private gifts and community funds to add to their WRA wages.

Evacuee attitudes toward certain work can accentuate community cleavages. For instance, conflict between Issei and Nisei has carried over into labor relations. In the early days at Manzanar, some Issei resented Nisei getting the good office and supervisory jobs. Although this was due to education and language ability, it rankled with Issei in low-prestige jobs as laborers.

Community urge for settlement of disputes. After first supporting a dispute and letting off steam, the community tends to shift its point of view and desire a return to an organized and peaceful environment. It then participates in helping to settle labor grievances either through spontaneously expressing its opinion or through organized units of the community government.

Public opinion is important in restoring peace, even when it does not support an effective, organized mediating body. Influencing quick settlement are the public's lack of sympathy for the strikers, its withdrawal of favorable recognition or its outright condemnation.

At several centers, disputes have been mediated, with varying effectiveness, by the Labor and Fair Labor Practice Committees. Their success depends on to what extent evacuees and appointed personnel recognize the value of such committees. Without a favorable milieu, neither committee can function successfully.

Influence of Economic and Social Status on Labor Problems

Status before and after evacuation. The difference in the economic and social status of the Japanese before and after evacuation affects labor relations. Many who were self-employed on the West Coast in businesses or on farms find it hard to adjust to their new role as employees. Many who had been

employees before evacuation had worked only for Japanese.

Events since Pearl Harbor have made evacuees very sensitive to any differentiation from other people. In the centers, they are keenly aware, for example, of the sharp distinctions between themselves and the appointed personnel who are invariably in supervisory positions, receive higher salaries and special privileges, eat apart from evacuees, live in better houses, and go in and out of the center gate at will.

Evacuees are quick to react against prejudice, whether actually observed or merely suspected. A Caucasian supervisor's prejudice or discrimination leads to friction and tension which may develop into serious trouble. Workers in relocation centers will not "take things" from a disagreeable supervisor. Not only is the economic motive for doing so lacking, but workers know that if they strike their basic necessities will still be met.

Cash allotments and status. Though rarely raised as the main issue in any labor dispute, the cash allotment of \$16 or \$19 per month to workers is an extremely important element in their dissatisfaction.

Unlike in a normal community where wages are a bargaining point, the cash allotments in the centers are a weak basis for special negotiations because of their uniformity and seeming unchangeability.

The scant sum, besides being a weak bargaining point and making workers less inclined to overlook real or fancied discrimination or dominating attitudes, constantly reminds them of their reduced economic status and subordinate role in the employment hierarchy of the centers.

The wage differential between evacuees and appointed personnel is most strongly felt in regard to evacuee doctors. That evacuee doctors should receive only \$19 a month has caused much shock to the community which has made greater effort to increase the salary from their own pockets than in the case of any other occupation represented in the centers.

Because the wage differentials are so small, men often do not want to do strenuous or unpopular work for the same wage paid to office workers and others in what are regarded as "soft" jobs.

In Minidoka, for instance, farmers complained that they earned the same amount as office workers but worked harder and under less pleasant conditions. In several centers, jobs on the coal and garbage crews have been unpopular for the same reason.

Professional workers among the evacuees also feel the slight of the small wage differential. In this connection the following statement was made by an evacuee:

Supposing all the appointed personnel in the relocation center should work on the same wage scale; if the Project Director (who has heavy responsibilities) should get the same pay as the farm foreman, would there be any type of efficiency? The same applies to us.

Work habits and status. To many evacuees (but by no means all), the low wages justify poor work habits such as not putting in the full 8-hour day, slowness, sociability, and lack of seriousness. Feeling that center life is not real life and what is done in the center does not count, they do not see why "outside" rules of conduct should be carried over. A large number of evacuees firmly believe that the government has the sole responsibility of providing them with food, clothing and shelter. One man expressed this attitude clearly:

We did not ask to come here. We were forced to leave our legitimate type of work for the Caucasians to take over and make money on during the war. Therefore, if we choose not to work the government still has the obligation to see to it that we are treated right.

The attitude that evacuees are the creditors, not the debtors, in employment is strengthened by the frequent calls for volunteer labor in some centers.

At one center, at least, it is becoming nearly impossible to get any volunteer workers in making center improvements (such as building a new gym). The evacuees feel that such labor is exploitation; the following statements express this attitude:

WRA is trying to get work done for nothing in order to keep a good record for some of the administrators.

The more we volunteer, the more we will be expected to work for nothing, and it's little enough we get for what we do, as it is.

Evacuees who are concerned about the poor work habits feel, nevertheless, that they are a purely center reaction which will disappear with the center situation. Among the appointed personnel, some regard low efficiency as evidence of a subversive attitude, while others fear that poor work habits may be permanently adopted. The major complaint of the administration about evacuee labor is its inefficiency.

Evacuees have resented administrative efforts to insist on better working habits. Illustrative of the resentment is a worker's reply to a supervisor's plea for more efficiency on the basis of patriotism:

Don't give us the loyalty talk again! What the hell do you expect for \$16?

Another instance comes from Minidoka. During the boilermen's dispute, a Block Manager explained:

These men aren't working for the \$16 or \$19 that they are getting paid. They are doing it for the service of the people in this place..... A man isn't going to work his head off for \$16 or \$19.

Occasionally, indignation at pressure for more efficiency explodes into labor walkouts.

For example, at Rohwer in April, 1945, the tractor drivers of the agricultural section quit work when the timekeeping system was changed from a daily to an hourly basis and the hours worked each day were more strictly observed. The drivers, claiming that the new system did not provide for time lost by bad weather, went on strike. They returned the next day but continued to express their resentment.

At Minidoka, in July, 1945, stricter enforcement of the 8-hour day also led to a walkout. The farm field crew, already dissatisfied with working conditions, struck because the new policy was the last straw. Though they returned to work, trouble continued with a big turnover in the agricultural section.

Influence of Evacuee-Staff Relations on Labor Problems

Present labor force. In the early history of the centers, many adult Nisei were employed. As relocation got underway, however, and the most able Nisei left, supervisors had to rely more and more on Issei and young Nisei for labor. They have not found it as easy to achieve a meeting ground with Issei employees as with Nisei, and most of the younger employees are inexperienced and just out of school.

Troublesome negative attitudes of supervisors. Actual relations on the job are affected by the characteristics of the labor force, the economic and social status of workers which has made many resentful and sensitive, and the organization

of the community.

Community morale and tensions are such that a supervisor ordering men to "quit if you don't like it," or "work or get off the lot" is the final touch needed to precipitate a strike. The Minidoka boilermens' discontent, for example, was aggravated by the supervisor telling the men he could replace them and adding that "anytime you want to quit, you quit." The men quit but nobody appeared to replace them.

In Jerome, in May, 1943, administrative demands for more efficiency and the reputed prejudice of the Caucasian supervisor against evacuees led to a Motor Pool strike. The rumor that the supervisor was prejudiced because his son or brother-in-law had been killed in the Pacific war later proved untrue. The immediate cause of the strike was the supervisor's discovery of the men resting after they had agreed to cooperate with him. Without pausing to investigate (~~it later turned out they had worked through their lunch period~~), the supervisor told them that he could get as many greenhorns who would do more work. The workers, after inviting him to go ahead and get them, walked out.

A staff member's arbitrary or overbearing manner often leads to his being accused of being anti-evacuee. Because the staff represents the government and symbolizes the Caucasians who evicted them from their homes, the community may rally around workers lined up against appointed personnel.

An instance from Jerome in the fall of 1943 illustrates this feeling against the appointed personnel. To protest against chopping wood for both the Caucasian staff and themselves and to demand the weeding out of anti-evacuee personnel, a few workers threatened to call a general strike.

Lack of positive attitudes among supervisors. Workers resent not only the negative attitudes of their supervisors but also the lack of positive attitudes and actions. An important factor in poor work efficiency, according to a manpower survey in one center, is the workers' feeling of not being appreciated when they do work hard and well. Recognition of ability and effort is vital to job morale.

Supervisors do not assign appropriate responsibility, according to evacuees, to evacuee foremen. When given, they say, the authority to back it up may not accompany it. Some supervisors consistently overlook their foremen in their relations with work crews. Or, they may suddenly interrupt the work habits established by the crew with their foreman without

consulting the foreman first. The prestige of key workers is thus hurt, and snubbing them may seem to the community the equivalent of a snub to it.

At Minidoka, in the spring of 1944, when terminations left the property-control crew short of the number called for by a new plan of distributing labor, carpenters, utility crews, and warehouse workers were asked to help the property-control crew do some unloading. They refused and were terminated.

During negotiations to reinstate the men, complaints about unsatisfactory labor relations came to the fore. Certain staff members, including supervisors, were, the workers said, not only extremely uncooperative, anti-evacuee, and domineering but used offensive language in giving orders. Evacuee foremen were not taken into the confidence of the administration on rules about working conditions and jobs to be done.

Evacuee sensitivity had probably been increased before this labor trouble by a staff member's verbal attack on the chairman of the Community Council. When evacuee leaders are disrespectfully treated or not consulted for action and cooperation, the community comes to their support. Community solidarity rests largely on its loyalty to leaders and the leaders' loyalty to the people.

Complicating the friction in the case of the property-control unit was the lack of clarity in the new labor regulations. Workers said that they did not know which division they worked for and whose orders they should take.

Influence of Informational Policies on Labor Problems

Unrecognized necessity for regulations. Workers have been both irritated and amused by the "red tape" involved in working in a government organization. Some of the misunderstanding in labor trouble comes from workers not recognizing why certain regulations are necessary. Had supervisors explained the regulations and the reasons for them some misunderstanding might have been averted.

Need for explaining regulations. Because rules and regulations about center employment are made by Washington and the local administration, evacuees are frequently unaware of approaching changes of policy until they are put into effect. With no hand in the changes and insufficient explanations for them, workers feel the action to be arbitrary and against their

best interests.

An example is the labor reduction program adopted in 1943 to meet budget requirements and eliminate "made work" jobs. It aroused much evacuee resistance and anxiety. Many believed it was a method to force relocation. Those who had worked out what they considered a fair relationship between the amount of work they did and the amount of money they received regarded the employment cut as a threat to the ratio.

Although the new policy was presented in the centers as a plan already decided upon, the method of making the cuts and the extent to which evacuee opinion was consulted varied from one center to another.

At Minidoka, rumors circulated about the possibility of a cut before the announcement was made. Evacuees assumed that with fewer workers there would be increased pay. Those without other sources of income worried about possible termination.

When the cut was finally announced, it was put into effect in two weeks instead of the three months allowed. The impact on the community was heavy. Evacuees held meetings to discuss the cuts. Few understood the reason for the cut, the most accepted explanation being that relocation was being pushed.

An early decision to have Community Enterprises close the movie houses, flower shops, fish shop, dry goods store, and newspaper delivery service was especially resented.

The Stewards Division was a major spot of dissatisfaction; evacuee kitchen supervisors mobilized the chefs to back them in protesting the terminations, especially of supervisors. It was finally agreed to base terminations in that division on age, marital status, number of dependents, previous occupation, and plans for relocation. When the administration decided to cut the Block Manager group in half, the news unfortunately appeared in the center paper with the names of the terminated Block Managers before the matter had been mentioned to the Block Managers themselves.

Following the cuts, a Central Services section was set up as a labor pool. Coal Division workers resisted merger with this new section for some time because of their desire to retain group identity.

Another center illustrating the effect of the 1943 labor reduction program is Granada.

The Granada administration, like that at Minidoka, found the Mess Division to be one of the most able to take reductions. The mess workers, however, refused to accept reductions without increased pay. They evidently feared that acceptance would lead to further cuts. Farm workers also held out for no cuts. To discuss the whole problem, the administration met with the Community Council and later with the Council and the Block Managers.

After consulting evacuee staff workers as to the number of workers needed in each section, the administration finally arrived at a compromise labor cut. Many were only paper cuts as the positions had been vacant. Although stokers, janitors, and runners for Block Managers were to have been cut, fear of undesirable complications led to their number remaining the same.

PATTERN OF LABOR CRISES

Immediate Causes and Areas of Flare-ups

Igniting incidents. Both the underlying and immediate causes of labor trouble in a center originate from the factors discussed above. Always active, the volcanic tensions and pressures caused by life in an abnormal community quickly erupt into quarrels and strikes when a provocative incident or remark intensifies the antagonism between evacuees and appointed personnel and heightens the resentment and unrest which started with evacuation.

For example, a superintendent may give his men a brusque order or ultimatum. Being under no economic compulsion to accept this treatment and discontented with their work status anyway, the men may walk off the job.

Trouble areas. Labor disputes can and do occur anywhere in a project. However, certain labor units, such as the mess, the hospital, janitorial services and the farm, smolder more than others. Although attempts to reduce the number of workers account for much of their difficulty, these units have been susceptible to labor disputes for other reasons also.

Because mess halls are very important in block life, the workers there are continually exposed to cross currents of block antagonisms. Trouble has originated not only over suspected favoritism by evacuees or appointed personnel in distributing food but over the preparation of food and the personalities of the chief cook and other kitchen workers.

In all centers, hospitals have been focal points for anxieties and diffuse insecurities which crystallize as concern for the health of the community. The community interests itself in these tensions among the hospital personnel which revolve around the use of young, inexperienced evacuees on the staffs and the contrast between the professional status of evacuee doctors before evacuation and their present position and authority particularly in relation to Caucasian chief nurses.

Janitors, like mess workers, are especially liable to block conflicts. They have created labor trouble because they are unwilling to work outside their blocks and are dissatisfied with the low prestige of their jobs.

Farm crews walk out because of difficult working conditions or because they want to be consulted more often about farm methods and plans. They resent being given orders rather than explanations about their work.

Since the community shares with the workers the psychological scars from evacuation and center life, it at first frequently backs up labor disputes through sympathy strikes, pressure group activities or generalized sanction. However, after the initial explosion relieves tension, the community swings toward restoring peace with the administration. The dispute may then fade away though the fundamental irritants and even the explosive factor may still exist.

Three Labor Crises

The three histories below from Central Utah, Heart Mountain, and Minidoka illustrate common elements in center labor disputes and the similar pattern these elements form.

Central Utah garage-repair strike. In September, 1945, the garage-repair crew at the Central Utah Relocation Center stopped work for eleven days and was followed by workers in units functionally unrelated to transportation services. The strike seemed to have much community approval, as there was danger for a while of the stoppage spreading to still other crews.

Before the strike, an atmosphere of uneasiness had prevailed in the center. One cause was the approaching movement of segregants to Tule Lake. Another was the announcement of an employment cut; workers were left uncertain of how it would affect them. Also contributing to the mounting tension were the anti-administration activities of a small group who believed that the government had caused the plight of the evacuees and should, therefore, be solely responsible for supplying their needs. To this group, work on the center was much the same as forced labor.

The immediate cause of the strike was the stationing, through a misunderstanding, of a military guard instead of the customary WRA man at the gate to inspect incoming freight for smuggled liquor. The garage-repair crew refused to pass this guard and brought the matter up with their superintendent. They were indignant too about prohibiting evacuees from bringing liquor into the center when the appointed personnel could. Tired of the discussion, the superintendent told the men either to go to work or get off the lot. Resenting his manner, the repair crew protested by stopping work and demanding first

a written apology and then his resignation.

The administration met with representatives of the crew to discuss the grievance. Meanwhile, the focus had shifted from the military guard (who had been replaced by a civilian) to the relations between the crew and their superintendent. The crew charged that the superintendent was discriminatory, played favorites, and did not give his evacuee foreman sufficient responsibility. After a meeting with the superintendent, the crew was about to return to work when strike leadership passed to agricultural workers who insisted on holding out for a written apology from the superintendent.

Two hundred agricultural workers along with the carpenters, maintenance and operations men, plumbers, and the transport and supply crew went out on a sympathy strike. There was danger that the strike would become centerwide and prolong or hinder the coming transfer of segregants.

At the suggestion of the administration, the Labor Committee of the Community Council negotiated with the administration and representatives of the striking crews. The latter continued to insist on either a written apology from the superintendent or his dismissal. While negotiations proceeded, the Labor Committee tried to get the strikers back to work. Aided by public opinion which now disapproved of the stoppage, the Committee carried its point and the strike ended.

Investigation of the charges against the superintendent were dropped when he left the center after receiving his draft call. Later, on his return after being rejected, the investigation was resumed. The matter ended after the Legal Committee of the Council announced that most of the charges were unsubstantiated.

Heart Mountain hospital walkout. In June, 1943, hospital employees at the Heart Mountain Relocation Center walked out, leaving only a skeleton crew to care for the patients. Though the walkout involved many tensions, it lacked concrete issues and organization.

Three major factors contributed to pile up the tensions which finally exploded in the walkout.

1. The hospital had become the center of employee social life to the extent of interfering with the comfort of the patients and relaxing professional standards. As life was more interesting at the hospital than in barrack homes, employees spent leisure hours there to visit with friends and hold parties.

2. A personal feud and professional rivalry between two evacuee doctors became a struggle between them for prestige in the community. Other employees, preoccupied with hospital problems and accustomed to participate in its life, took sides and fed information to the rest of the community.
3. Many employees were antagonistic toward the appointed personnel on the staff, principally the Chief Medical Officer and the Chief Nurse. The latter was accused of dictatorial behavior.

Striking had already been established at Heart Mountain as the way to express dissatisfaction, for evacuees had struck previously to attain the removal of the project steward, of a fire-protection and police officer, and of an appointive employee in the Motor Pool. Moreover, they had frequently threatened to strike and had spontaneously walked out several times.

The immediate cause of the hospital walkout seems to have been an intensified dislike of the Chief Nurse. However, no particular incident can be pointed to as directly precipitating the action. The strike was poorly organized, for no leaders came forward to discuss grievances and no petitions or demands were received by the administration. Many strikers were vague as to why they were on strike. Some were expressing displeasure with hospital discipline; others were afraid of intimidation from fellow strikers.

The Hospital Committee of the Community Council was disappointed to find no concrete issue to negotiate and no inclination for either side to use its services. Because popular sentiment was with the hospital patients, sympathy for the strikers was at a minimum. The workers finding themselves with neither rallying point nor support ended the walkout. In reinstating them, the administration took the opportunity to reduce the hospital staff.

Minidoka boilermen's dispute. In January, 1944, the difficulties of the boilermen at Minidoka Relocation Center culminated in a six-day suspension of janitorial and boilerman services, which involved the entire community.

The dispute took place against a background of community resentment built up over a year and a half against the local administration. It had, however, more direct roots. The igniting incident began to develop in July, 1943, when the number of maintenance workers was substantially reduced as part of a general cut in employment. At the time an attempt was made to merge the duties of boilermen, janitors, and

stove tenders. The dissatisfaction over the changes, nevertheless, did not become serious until cold weather and winter increased the work of boilermen. Adding to the trouble was dislike for the superintendent of maintenance whom workers felt to be prejudiced against evacuees.

The actual stoppage occurred when the administration, fearing the danger of fires in boiler rooms left untended at night, tried to institute a 24-hour working schedule for maintenance workers. The workers, unamenable to staggering their hours and doubling up on the functions they performed, asked for extra men for the extra work. Because they had developed a rigid status definition of the job titles of boilerman, janitor, and stove tender, the boilermen refused to do janitorial or stove-tending jobs. The attitude that it was unnecessary to work a full 8-hour day for WRA wages undoubtedly increased the resistance to the proposed program. Stating that the maintenance quota was filled and there were enough to do the work, the administration refused the extra help. The matter remained a deadlock for over a month until colder weather forced the issue. The workers then received a memorandum ordering the 24-hour schedule and changing the title of all sanitation workers to janitors. All except three of the boilermen and janitors quit.

The lack of hot water and other inconvenient results of the work stoppage drew the community into the dispute. Other evacuees went out on a sympathy strike, and a group of from 25 to 30 young men used intimidation to keep the strike going and strengthen anti-administration attitudes. Warning fire tenders in the administrative area to stay off the job, they made the rounds of the center putting out laundry and lavatory fires and threatening people who resisted.

Numerous negotiations were held between the administration and representatives of the workers and the community. The administration asked the Block Managers to recruit a new janitorial crew but were told that this was out of the question. Evacuees asked Washington for permission to add extra manpower but were refused. Tired of not having hot water, they began to press the administration to settle the dispute and finally started to build fires themselves.

The work stoppage ended when the local administration withdrew the 24-hour schedule and accepted as its own the responsibility of safeguarding government property outside of the janitors' working hours.

No provisions were made in the agreement, however, for tending laundry and lavatory fires; the problem was left to each block to work out with its janitors. In some blocks it was solved by volunteer workers (not entirely happily); in others

with janitorial cooperation.

Recurrent Elements in the Three Disputes

Although representing three distinct situations, the disputes discussed above have certain common elements.

Resentment against evacuation and administrative action. All three disputes had a background of resentment due to evacuation, and at Central Utah and Minidoka, there were additional tensions which had resulted from certain administrative steps.

Conflicts between evacuees and appointed personnel. In each dispute, conflicts between the appointed personnel and the evacuees were important. The Central Utah garage-repair crew believed their superintendent to be anti-evacuee. At Heart Mountain, the hospital staff rebelled against the Chief Nurse's discipline; and at Minidoka the janitorial workers resented their supervisor's attitude toward them.

Resentment against a supervisor, the igniting incident. A very small thing unimportant in itself may cause a labor flare-up when workers, conscious of a subordinate social status and an unusual economic condition, feel that the community will sanction sharp protests. Workers might overlook such a thing in a normal community in ordinary times, but in an abnormal community under intense strain, it quickly results in a strike or other labor dispute.

The igniting incident in the three labor disputes described was resentment toward an immediate supervisor. The Central Utah garage-repair crew went on strike after being peremptorily told to work or get off the lot. Besides the concrete issue of the 24-hour schedule, Minidoka workers objected to the undiplomatically written memorandum in which their superintendent announced the new schedule. The Heart Mountain walkout seems to have resulted from resentment toward the Chief Nurse.

This case differs, however, in that no particular incident can be pointed to which touched off the trouble. The strike resulted from a general swelling of the existing hostility toward the appointed personnel at the hospital. Here the underlying tensions and grudges were strong enough to produce a break between the workers and the administration without a specific final incident.

Community participation in labor disputes and settlement. The community participated in the three disputes described. In Central Utah and Minidoka it first supported the workers'

protest, but after the initial outburst which let off steam, it reacted in favor of restoring peace and effected a settlement with the administration, although the underlying and even the immediate causes remained uncorrected. Evacuee desire for peace and quiet was reasserting itself when the Community Council at Central Utah acted effectively, when the Minidoka residents pressed the administration to solve the boilermen's dispute, and when the Heart Mountain hospital walkout ended because of community disapproval.

Local conditions lead to peculiar labor conflicts. Most labor crises in the centers follow a pattern with elements similar to those outlined above. However, labor situations peculiar to local conditions result in unique problems. At Jerome, voluntary evacuee labor was depended on for cutting wood for fuel. This dependence set loose conflicts between evacuees and appointed personnel and among the evacuees themselves. At Central Utah, the almost continual repair of the pipeline has led to numerous labor difficulties.

For example, in October, 1943, strained relations between two evacuee groups led to the pipeline crew resigning. Most of the crew were ex-Tuleans who had taken the pipeline work because old Topazans had the more attractive jobs. The Tuleans felt that the more sophisticated urbanites of Topaz looked down on them because of their predominantly agricultural origin. The igniting factor in this tense situation was an article in the Topaz Times which seemed to assign pipeline workers an inferior status and intimate that their work was unsatisfactory. The crew, feeling that they had been making the best of a poor job, resigned. They did not return to the pipeline until the writer of the article explained that he had been completely misinterpreted and that no slur of the crew had been intended.

MANPOWER SHORTAGE

Relocation, seasonal leaves, and selective service have gradually made the manpower shortage the major problem in center employment. While increased efficiency and improved distribution of labor would partly solve the difficulty, neither can be achieved without cooperation from evacuees. Labor relations bear directly, therefore, on the manpower shortage.

History of the Employment Policy

In the early days, the War Relocation Authority attempted, through encouraging small industries, public works, agriculture, and seasonal labor, to provide work for all evacuees who desired it. It hoped by making each center as self-sufficient as possible not only to furnish jobs but to lower administrative costs. However, as early as the summer of 1942, seasonal labor was causing a labor shortage in some centers.

Emphasizing relocation more and more, the Authority substituted a maintenance program for its attempt at self-sufficiency. Then, in the spring of 1943, after reexamining the luxury jobs established in the early days, it introduced the policy of eliminating jobs unnecessary to community welfare. Labor reduction was achieved partly through terminating workers of low efficiency.

Before the cuts were made, evacuees, especially those who were afraid of being terminated, felt very insecure. Some resisted the cuts and secured compromises with the administration. Many interpreted the labor reduction as an administrative instrument to push relocation and as an economy measure rather than as a device to get greater efficiency and better distribution of manpower.

Unemployment resulting from the reduction has been counteracted by adjusting the program and by draining off manpower through seasonal work, relocation, selective service, and segregation. Actually it is the manpower shortage, not unemployment, which is serious.

Factors in the Manpower Shortage

The seriousness of the present shortage of manpower has been intensified by the character of the labor force. As the more experienced male Nisei have left the centers, supervisors have

had to depend more and more on Issei and younger Nisei men and women. Further aggravating the problem are workers' inexperience, their different standards for center work, lack of seriousness on the job, and evacuee-appointed personnel relations. The experiences of one center illustrate some of the difficulties aroused by the manpower shortage.

Shortage at Central Utah. During the spring of 1944, Central Utah evacuees and appointed personnel became worried about maintaining necessary services. The available manpower was threatened by selective service and seasonal leaves for cannery or railroad work. Seasonal leaves during the summer of 1943 had created a labor shortage, and the situation promised to be more acute in 1944.

The shortage first became serious in the mess halls, a work area where trouble might be expected. Some cooks left on seasonal leave and others were reluctant to work in the hot kitchens during the summer. In April, two kitchens operated with volunteer labor.

Some evacuees regarded the shortage as purely an administrative problem of no concern to them. Others, however, took the opposite point of view. The Labor Committee of the Community Council, becoming concerned, tried to acquaint evacuees with the problem by asking representatives of the Block Managers and the Interfaith Group to weekly labor meetings. It also suggested that the Project Director and his assistants take part in order to get better understanding between evacuees and administration.

The stewards decided, at an emergency meeting, to close three mess halls and perhaps others if further consolidation proved necessary. They asked the blocks either to cooperate in operating their own mess halls or to be prepared for closure. Families relieved the workload somewhat by taking the prepared food to their own apartments and eating it there.

Other shortages became more acute. There was a lack of school teachers, welfare workers (nine clerks relocated in one month), typists, laboratory technicians, secretaries, farm hands, and plumbers. Since they do not involve such direct needs as mess work, these services were not of the same interest to the center. Evacuee leaders were concerned, however.

Pipeline repair became a pressing problem; leaks throughout the center endangered health, sanitation, and water conservation. Because of the history of the pipeline and the general manpower shortage, enough workers could not be recruited to repair the breaks.

During the Tulo Lake transfer, an emergency pipeline was constructed. As Tulcan labor was plentiful, the work progressed rapidly until the job neared completion when the pay was lowered from \$19 to \$16. Crews disliked the job but were willing to see it through. Then the Caucasian foreman told one of his crews to terminate because it was too lazy. Sympathy for the discharged crew and dislike of the work led other pipeline crews to resign. Evacuees became reluctant to work on the line, and though the pay was put at \$19 again, few would accept employment when the new emergency arose in 1944.

The administration then tried to get volunteers on an overtime basis. The overtime was to be used within ninety days or the balance paid in cash. However, the first ruling that overtime accumulated before January 1, 1944, was not valid had aroused centerwide controversy between evacuees and administration. Consequently, prospective workers on the pipeline were wary of the plan. Finally the administration got high school students to work temporarily on the line.

Effect of low efficiency on the labor shortage. Members of the appointed personnel have pointed out that poor efficiency has made the manpower shortage worse than it otherwise would be and that greater efficiency would lessen the seriousness. Affecting the efficiency of the workers, however, is their economic status, their particular characteristics as a labor force, and their relations with the appointed personnel and the rest of the community, as discussed above.

Effect of poor distribution on the labor shortage. Both appointed personnel and evacuees have recognized that poor distribution of the available manpower also contributes to the problem. Evacuees have pointed to jobs that they consider unjustified since they are peripheral to the functioning of the community. Two cases are cited below.

In the winter of 1944, Granada evacuees protested labor cuts in the mess halls and agricultural units. They suggested to the Project Director that if cuts had to be made, they should be among the silk screen workers who make recruiting posters for the Navy and perform no essential service for the evacuees.

At Poston I, in the spring of 1945, it was realized that although the available labor was sufficient, it was ineffectively distributed so that some departments suffered from a shortage. The Temporary Community Council sponsored a manpower conference of

both evacuees and appointed personnel. The conference recommended that a joint manpower commission be formed of six evacuees and six appointed personnel. The commission was formed and graded center jobs according to how essential they were to the security, life, and health of the center.

For example, Class A jobs of high priority included agriculture, food production, essential maintenance services, hospital, school, and Block Managers. Excluded were positions in garden landscaping, flower nurseries, road construction, land levelling, and the like. Class A jobs were put in the "19" category, with the hope that evacuees wishing jobs would prefer those paying the most money and performing the most essential services.

A year later, the Labor Commission, which was composed of administrative and evacuee representatives, recommended that work on fish culture and land subjugation also end, and that women replace men as janitors in the administrative barracks and in some jobs in the seed nurseries.

The Proposed Manpower Commissions

Pointing out the impossibility of recruiting additional appointed personnel to replace evacuee workers, the national office of the War Relocation Authority has advised centers to seek the solution to their labor shortage in the joint planning of evacuees and administration.

The national office suggested that Project Directors appoint a staff committee to work with an evacuee committee in forming a Manpower Commission similar to that which operated a year ago at Colorado River. After a comparative analysis of labor resources and vacant positions, the Commissions were to make recommendations for securing labor necessary to essential services. Efficiency, labor distribution, improvement in work techniques, and the use of part-time workers were suggested as considerations in studying the manpower problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Basic Principles in Labor Relations

Good labor relations in the centers stem from certain fundamental principles applicable in any business enterprise and from understanding the situation in relocation centers.

General principles important in labor relations are:

1. Mutual understanding by labor and management of goals and problems,
2. Free interchange of ideas about plans and procedures.
3. Adequate machinery, fully accepted by both parties, to handle grievances as they develop.

Analysis of Labor Relations Before Crises Develop

It might be helpful for administrative personnel dealing with workers to take stock of labor relations within their sections or work units.

1. It is important to examine labor relations critically before they develop.
2. It is easier to correct weaknesses which analysis may reveal and thereby prevent strikes and other labor disputes at their origin than to coast along until open conflict occurs.
3. It is fundamental to take into account the larger setting of the community, the attitudes of both evacuees and appointed personnel, and the nature of not only the jobs to be done but the available labor force.

Improvement of Existing Labor Relations

Some factors discovered to be contributing to poor labor relations will be out of the power of staff members to modify; others will be modifiable.

Unmodifiable factors. Certain events and conditions while extremely important in molding evacuee attitudes can neither be crased nor acted upon directly. Evacuation and the administrative history of the centers are such events. However,

studying the unmodifiable factors in a situation does assist in understanding those factors which can be affected.

Wages constitute another unmodifiable factor. But if the supervisor recognizes that the wage incentive for center work is very weak, he will realize the importance of stressing other incentives, such as the community and the supervisor recognizing the worker's contribution, and encouraging the worker's participation in planning work goals and how to achieve them.

Modifiable factors. Appointed personnel-employee relations in general, and supervisor-worker relations in particular, can be directly affected. It is in these two kinds of relations that much labor friction originates.

1. Particular labor relations should be carefully studied for hints of appointed personnel assuming a domineering or contemptuous attitude. Whether such an attitude derives from actual prejudice against employees or from the personality of the staff member, it is dangerous in view of employee sensitivity and their changed economic and social status.
2. Good informational channels from the administration to employees are essential.
3. Cooperation with employee representatives in evolving labor plans and procedures are helpful in achieving harmonious working relations.
4. Foreman responsibility, in particular, should be encouraged.

Factors Helpful in Treating a Labor Crisis

When a labor crisis does occur, analysis of the situation including the part played by the community in the conflict will help reveal the basic causes as well as clarify the immediate issue.

1. Well stabilized channels of appeal should be available for workers.
2. In settling labor disputes, the administration should take advantage of the drive within the community for restoring peaceful relations. The community may send out feelers which, if seized upon, will hasten a settlement.
3. Employee machinery for mediation should be recognized

and encouraged to function, whether it be a Community Council Labor Committee or a Fair Labor Practices Committee.

Administrative bargaining with single individuals should be avoided because if the compromise is not accepted by the community, nothing is really settled.

4. When Issei are involved in negotiations, allowances should be made if they find it difficult to express their point of view in English.
5. Finally, in arriving at a settlement, the necessity of saving face on the part of the evacuees as well as the administration should be recognized.

Manpower problems are accentuated by poor labor relations and may be relieved by establishing good relations and redistributing the available labor with the cooperation of the community.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

Community Analysis Report No. 11
April 4, 1945

EXPLORATORY SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE RETURN OF THE JAPANESE

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

To learn something about West Coast attitudes and problems connected with the return of the Japanese in the period immediately following the rescinding of the exclusion ban on December 17, 1944, two Community Analysts, who had previous experience in sampling public opinion, were assigned to do intensive interviewing in selected communities in Washington, Oregon, and California. One Analyst was in California from December 5, 1944, to February 13, 1945. The other Analyst was in Oregon and Washington from around January 10 to March 15.

California Localities Studied

This summary report deals only with California and primarily with the San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys (Central Valley). The Central Valley counties surveyed were selected because they were pre-evacuation population centers of the Japanese.

Of the ten counties comprising Sacramento Valley, interviews were taken in Sacramento, Sutter, Yolo, and Yuba Counties.

Of the eight San Joaquin Valley counties, the following six were surveyed: San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Merced, Fresno, Tulare, and Kern.

Also obtained were reports on some other Central Valley counties than those formally surveyed. References to other parts of California were also secured.

Because San Francisco was used as headquarters, the interviewer informally acquired some attitudinal data in the Bay Area. Southern California, which with the Bay Area and the Central Valley make up the three major pre-evacuation centers of the Japanese, was not visited.

As the result of time and travel limitations, the interviewer usually worked in the county seat though it did not always coincide with the Japanese population center of the county. Central Valley towns officially visited and surveyed were: Sacramento, Woodland, Yuba City, Marysville, Stockton, Modesto, Merced, Fresno, Visalia, and Bakersfield.

Selection of Respondents

Since a cross-section of the population cannot be obtained in a scouting study, the interviewer tried to select respondents who because of having many feelers in the community were in a position to report on and evaluate attitudes in their county. Over 60 persons were formally interviewed in the Central Valley.

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Interviews tended to run at least an hour but almost all were longer. In addition, many other people, as well as some evacuee scouts, were informally contacted. Within limits of time, the interviewer also tried to collect as much available background data as possible from newspapers, Chambers of Commerce, and similar sources.

Questionnaire

Though a formal questionnaire was prepared, the interviewer had little use for it. The introduction accompanied by showing a WRA identification card was usually sufficient to start and keep people talking. The usual introduction was: "I'm from the War Relocation Authority and talk to community leaders up and down the coast as to what problems in the way of housing, jobs, sentiment and the like are expected to develop in each community as the Japanese start coming back."

SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1. The return of the Japanese is but one of California's many wartime problems.

California population has increased in precisely those areas where Japanese concentrated before evacuation and where it is expected they will return. Towns have mushroomed and big-city problems have been dumped into the laps of small-town people. Not all the great emotion evoked by rescission was due to anti-Japanese feeling. Some of it resulted from blowing off steam over getting one more unsolved problem.

Among California's pre-rescission headaches were the housing shortage; local public transportation snarls; occasional breakdowns in food distribution; tensions resulting from the great influxes, before and during the war, of in-migrants, especially of minority groups; problems arising from the wartime industrial expansion and development of the state for military training camps, hospitals, and embarkation; and most constant of all, anxiety over the future of California after the war.

2. Trouble was expected only from an irresponsible minority.

Though respondents said the majority of people are unfavorable to rescission, they expected illegal resistance, mostly terrorism, from only a few people drawn from such categories as drunks, crackpots, relatives of Bataan heroes, evicted tenants, Filipinos, hoodlums of any race, high school students inflamed by parents, and 4-F's.

3. Organized opposition groups seem rare in the Central Valley.

Yolo, Colusa, and Solano Counties have been organized by Assemblyman Lloyd Lowrey (it was not ascertained whether he was the author of the Lowrey Act to get evacuee farm equipment). Other Valley counties do not seem to have publicly known groups specifically organized against evacuees.

The interviewer found it unjust to categorize any known namable group of people or any town as anti-Japanese. Friendly people among the Filipinos, American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and Visalians asked the interviewer for help in reaching negative people.

4. Attempts to organize economic boycotts have fallen flat except in small, isolated communities.

Conservative business leaders have pointed out to hotheads that only a 100% boycott is effective, that in areas near a metropolitan shopping district or with many towns it is impossible to boycott without spiting oneself. Winters (Yolo County) which signed up to a 100% boycott is small and isolated; individuals were high-pressured to sign.

Opponents, outside the crackpot minority described above, have had legal advice as to how far they can go in fighting the return without running afoul of the law.

5. The West Coast, including California, differs from other relocation areas.

Unlike eastern relocation areas, California and the rest of the West Coast was the home of most Japanese. They were evacuated from there, an experience which has left scars not only on the Japanese who were removed but on their neighbors and business associates.

Every West Coast community has people who remember the first Japanese, helped plant and cultivate prejudice, kept it alive through quiet periods, and fanned it when they thought the public in a mood for it. Every community also has people who were friendly to the first Japanese, have encouraged community participation and worked for community acceptance.

6. Great intensity of emotion over the question of Japanese return, whether the person favored or opposed rescission, was an outstanding phenomenon after rescission.

This intensity of feeling contrasted with that observed by the interviewer while surveying public attitudes on the same subject in February and March, 1942. Then most people interviewed were confused and shaken over whether good old Yuki, the gardener, was a Japanese admiral in disguise and whether "schoolboy" Tom of whose cooking and scholastic honors they boasted was getting code messages from Tokyo on his short wave set. Uncertainty precluded decisive pro and con attitudes. The intervening years and rescission have removed much uncertainty, and many people now determinedly take one side or the other.

7. California feels misunderstood by WRA and critics of its attitudes toward the Japanese.

Californians feel that only Californians really understand them. Complete understanding, one resident of the state for 50 years tartly said, can be achieved only if one had been born there. However, reference to any period of residence in California makes Californians feel there is a chance of their being understood.

California is very sensitive about criticism. Guilt feelings over the singling out of one group of its people as a wartime scapegoat make criticism salt for its wounds. Respondents would say, "I can remember in the last war how the Germans around here were treated." This sensitivity and guilt feeling explain in part why headline writers accuse Mr. Ickes or Mr. Myer of "again slapping Californians in the face." Drawing the analogy with attitudes toward the Germans in World War I makes people feel their anti-Japanese hysteria is excusable during a war for even decent people like themselves. Excesses of others have now engendered in these people a feeling of revulsion and disgust which leads to a desire to make amends if WRA or the government will stop rubbing in the salt and reassure them that California is a wonderful state.

Just as WRA has learned to take into account evacuee attitudes in the centers and the sources of these attitudes, it must now take into account Californian attitudes and their sources in the history and the social structure of particular communities in the state.

Attitudes of some Californians toward WRA vividly recall those of evacuees toward the agency, particularly during crises that develop over center labor troubles. After a period of intense emotion when everyone has recalled old injuries and taken sides on the new issue, people then unite against the Administration through memory of common bonds (in California, being a Californian; in centers, being an evacuee). Feeling reaches a climax and then the urge for peace returns and people drift away leaving the trouble-starters isolated or forcing them to compromise.

8. Attitudes of individual friends and opponents are in a rapid state of change, the general direction being toward meeting on a common middle ground.

At first, friendly people rejoiced over rescission as a victory, while conservative, negative people in the public eye modified their opposition like good losers to fall into step behind Governor Earl Warren, Superintendent of Schools Water Dexter, Attorney General Robert Kenney, and from the University of California, President Robert Sproul and Dean Monroe Deutsch. The words of these state leaders outweighed those of the Army and national figures in their influence on California attitudes. Within particular communities, statements of respected local leaders affected sentiment. For example, in Yuba and Sutter Counties, State Senator W. P. Rich at the Marysville Presbyterian Men's Forum on December 29 was an important influence. After bluntly reminding his audience of the Constitutional rights of the Japanese, he said, in part:

"The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken and no matter what individual personal opinions may exist, they no longer are the issue... All this reckless talk of people taking the law into their own hands has its perils."

Later, as practical problems like housing, responsibility for protection, and giving advice to evacuees began to loom up, the line between friends and opponents blurred even more. They began to meet on a middle ground and say,

"Evacuation was a mistake, but since it happened and people are in the camps, maybe it would be best for them not to come back just yet, maybe not for a couple of months or until after the war."

Concern for evacuees became the new angle. Opponents quickly seized and worked it. Evacuee scouts and evacuee letters describing their resistance to resettlement further confused friends who already were feeling sunk at finding the Yamamotos a house and worried about bad reception. They began to take the opposition line and to criticize WRA heartlessness.

9. The outlines of a pressure bloc to keep WRA and the centers in existence indefinitely and to demand that WRA assume more and more responsibility for resettlement gradually took shape.

Each week of interviewing saw the outlines get a little sharper.

Former opponents, now disguised as humanitarian friends of the evacuees, had another angle, which troubled old-time friends also echoed. Some people want to forget the anti-Japanese hysteria in California before evacuation, and since the Army has said evacuation was necessary for military reasons, these people use the statement of the Army to hold the national government responsible for all California resettlement problems. It gives them a scapegoat. They say,

"You are responsible for the Japanese not having homes now, for their having to go on relief, etc., so you build them houses and foot the relief bill."

At the time of rescission, scarcely a respondent, however intimately associated with the process of evacuation, fully appreciated the financial losses of the evacuees or that center life might have changed them. They thought of the evacuees returning slightly embittered ("but not as much as WE would have been after the same experience") to the identical place in the community they had left.

Then devoted friends began to hear from scouts how old and disabled the Watanabes had become in the center. They asked each other,

"How can the Watanabes start the nursery over again at their age? How can anyone think of the Watanabes on relief? Why the younger daughter can't even explain the word to them because she doesn't know enough Japanese and they don't want to understand either. How can WRA force them to leave? The government did this to the Watanabes, so why doesn't it keep a center open for an old people's home?"

10. The amount of evacuee communication with California is enormous.

Nearly every respondent had been consulted by scouts or letters or by Caucasian friends of evacuees about the best course of action. Every respondent mentioned other people similarly consulted.

Some evacuees have been writing back ever since they left whether they received an answer or not. Their letters have been carefully read. The

interviewer was impressed by the effectiveness of these letters in creating awareness of another point of view, if not actual sympathy, among conservative and discreet townspeople who now put in a calming word of good sense with hometown hotheads. As stated above, some hometowners adopt the evacuee point of view presented in these letters. It probably enters into their advice to other evacuee consultants.

11. Every county visited has a number of people of good will; in every county visited except Tulare County they are either formally organized under a name to help evacuees or they work so closely together that only an organizational name is lacking.

This contrasts with the rarity of publicly known opposition organizations in the Central Valley. Of course, some opponents work through organizations already established for other purposes, but so do the friends. The latter, however, have in addition special organizations to aid evacuees.

How well organized and determined people of good will are can be judged from their having got together at the Inter-racial Conference in San Francisco in January to work out plans to aid returning evacuees. (The interviewer believes that in a year of many great victories and important conferences, this was one of the outstanding in its implications for the future of the United States and the least appreciated.)

Besides the organized people of good will, every community has people who object to being organized. Usually they are conservative, politically shrewd, and influential town leaders who hold a wet finger up to the wind before they make a move. Until the wind is right, they work behind the scenes and get people who are just to the left or right out of difficulties their enthusiasm has got them into. They avoid being linked with some of the evacuee-supporting organizations in their hometown because many were originally set up, and are often chairmanned, by the "town radical". They work for compromise, stabilization, and prevention of any change in the status quo until it can be done without risk. They have great pride in their personal prestige, exclusiveness, and influence. If they do organize, it is an informal coterie of persons like themselves; they might agree to call themselves the "Governor's Committee" or the "Mayor's Committee." They believe "the less said the better" about evacuee return and say, "Let these things (race problems) work themselves out; don't stir them up, the police can handle it or I'll just speak to the person leading the troublemaking."

The organized friends start an argument at the flicker of an eyelash and believe "the more publicity the better"; some have taken plenty of beating in the last three years; a few can't take any more through risks to their job, social position, or spirits and drop out of the fray. On the other hand, an occasional conservative reaches the boiling point and jumps into the fight with both hands.

12. The tide had not yet turned in California in February so that all the friends of evacuees could speak out.

Many people therefore want the WRA (or the Army or the "government") to take a more forceful stand for the evacuees so that their California

friends can feel secure enough to employ them or speak up in their defense.

Of incalculable importance, though often forgotten, is civic pride or hometown loyalty and how strong community pressures are on the individual. Just asking hometowners to tell you how they see the return of the Japanese in terms of their community and its problems creates rapport. Negatively used, civic pride leads to suppression of differences and the fear of people through danger of job loss or social ostracism to speak up for evacuee friends. Positively used, civic pride is an unforgettable demonstration of Democracy at work in what Washington likes to call the "grass roots" of America. Marysville had a burst of it when the President of the Chamber of Commerce got mad at being misquoted all over the United States as anti-Japanese and started in to clean up the firebrands, declaring that Vigilantism was Hitlerism (and would give Marysville a bad name) and that if Constitutional rights were denied the evacuees, one group after another would lose their rights as in Germany. One is frequently struck how much the battle is between long existent factions in the community. This is one more problem on which to take sides.

The argument of Constitutional rights is perhaps the most effective argument of all from a public relations point of view. People who "just don't like the Japs" or never knew any are fighting for these rights, while cautious friends of evacuees can fight for them indirectly by concentrating on the Constitution. There are people who say, "Change the Constitution; it was written before the Japs came here," or "For the last 12 years no one in the U. S. has had Constitutional rights," but these people are a minority, though strong.

13. Counties differ as to how near they are to the turn of the tide.

Tulare County seems the farthest away because the forces of resistance are in the saddle and the goodwill people have not even begun to work together. The latter say, "The time isn't ripe." It took far less lawlessness in other counties than has already occurred in Tulare to anger conservative citizens to fight back for American principles, regardless of their feeling about Japanese. Each county has its own boiling point which it seems to have to reach before people start saying generally, "Well, I don't want to see them back either, but things are going too far around here to my taste."

14. The energy of the goodwill groups who have faithfully worked over since evacuation has not been fully utilized by WRA.

The opportunity presented at the Inter-racial Conference was not fully utilized. WRA could work itself out of existence sooner and, negatively, prevent the rising demand for WRA to extend its existence and assume more responsibilities by giving these groups some dynamic encouragement, explaining WRA's present policy to them, and telling concretely how to pass on to evacuees helpful advice, offers of jobs and housing, etc. Just to say "Let WRA know" as was done at the conference when over and over at different times friends asked, "What should I do if--" is unsatisfactory and frustrating.

Already some of this goodwill energy has been dissipated in a negative direction. It is like after Pearl Harbor when America was ready to do anything to help but the government was not quick enough to capitalize on this energy with suggestions for things that really would help. Leadership is needed, and many respondents definitely feel that WRA should supply it.

These goodwill groups can prevent new Little Tokyos ("Japtown" is the current term) and Little Tokyo orientation. Their eagerness to smooth the path of evacuees is a force to achieve better integration in the community than before evacuation. Evacuees would do well to accept invitations for community participation extended by friendly persons.

It would hasten the center-closing program as well as do the United States a great service to guide these goodwill groups in their efforts to re-integrate evacuees. A job too short-sightedly done now may mean that the job may need to be done again in later years. WRA may feel that other minority groups are not its concern, but they are to people in California communities. To some of these people a good job on the evacuees is a step forward to help solve other problems. Many Californians talk about how what they do now will affect what goes on at the peace table. The San Francisco News has already tied in the evacuee return with the San Francisco World Security Conference.

15. Newspapers are closely watched by both friends and opponents in Central Valley to determine attitudinal trends.

People weight the amount of space given to pro and con views to determine the direction of the tide. They count the number of pro and con letters sent to the editor and write answering letters. The McClatchy papers in Central Valley (the Sacramento Bee, the Modesto Bee, and the Fresno Bee) certainly receive letters from a pretty good cross-section of the people; the representativeness of their selection for publication is not known. Their section devoted to letters to the editor usually consists of two full columns and is a very popular feature. Respondents tend to feel that their news stories on the Japanese return are accurate. Friendly people therefore are all the more determined to try to change the editorial policy and that of adverse letter writers. In Stockton, the Record prints letters only occasionally. The Bakersfield Californian, a daily, has a columnist, Jim Day, who writes about soldiers of all races; all Bakersfield respondents spoke of him with much respect. In Bakersfield, the Los Angeles Examiner takes the place of the McClatchy papers in promoting an anti-evacuee editorial policy. Northward, in the McClatchy paper radius the San Francisco News and the San Francisco Chronicle constitute a counteractive influence.

Weeklies or dailies in the small towns vary in the amount of coverage of the subject and their attitude. The Selma Enterprise in Fresno County has taken a firm stand in favor of the Constitutional rights of evacuees.

16. Old familiar facts still need to be repeated over and over.

Friends who have spearheaded the campaign for evacuee return would often say apologetically and hesitantly near the end of an interview, "There's something that's always bothered me. Did Japanese really signal from the hills to the submarine at Santa Barbara? Did they get in the middle

of the road so officers couldn't get to Pearl Harbor? What about the local man with maps of all the county power stations whom the FBI picked up?"

17. Some people on the middle ground distinguish sharply between the old people (Issei) and the young folks.

They say it is all right for the young people to come back, but the aliens, never. The publicity about Nisei soldiers has borne fruit, but perhaps even more important in California is that people got to know Nisei as individuals through their participation in the Rotary, Merchant's Association, Scouts, 4-H, and other community activities outside the Little Tokyos.

The interviewer would ask, "Would you break up a family? These old people you don't want back are the parents of these young people." There is a last ditch resistance in accepting Japanese which will not permit the person to "know" that this relationship exists. A troubled Issei scout who had already learned of the distinction being drawn asked the interviewer, "Don't they know we raised these soldiers, sent them to school, taught them to be good citizens of the United States. Don't they know we are their parents?"

The interviewer believes it is time to begin bringing an elementary biological fact home to these people, perhaps through the medium of mentioning the parents and a little about them in descriptions of Nisei soldier accomplishments. Also, more stress should be placed on the fact that Nisei do feel they have more of a stake in the war than many Caucasians. Some people still say, "I don't think these Japanese-American boys are doing anything so wonderful. Anyone would fight back at the point of the enemy's bayonet. It's human nature."

18. The term "Nisei" is a headline word that a few interested people may recognize in reading, but do not use in conversation.

Some interested people have never noticed it. However, many friendly people want a word for the young people. They would fumble through an interview and finally say, "I don't know what to call them; I don't like to call these kids Japanese." One man said he had many times advised the young people to drop the use of the term Japanese and to refer to themselves as Americans of Japanese descent. When the interviewer suggested the term "Nisei" as having no emotional connotations, the respondent thought its use would be a good idea.

California is near enough to Hawaii to feel the effect of Hawaii's use of the term AJA or in less symbolic form, Americans of Japanese Ancestry. Hawaiian newspapers do not use the term Nisei and it is rarely used in ordinary conversation.

If a publicity campaign were developed for the parents of Nisei, the terms Issei and Nisei might be popularized through using the words in association.