


CA Report #1

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

To WRA Staff Members;

The successful administration of the WRA program, especially in the relocation centers, will be dependent to a great extent upon an understanding of the cultural background of the Japanese people and their American children and grandchildren. John F. Embree, who recently has assumed responsibility for documentation of the WRA program, in the Office of Reports, has conducted studies in both Japan and Hawaii, and is recognized by his colleagues as being well qualified to report on Japanese race and culture. The accompanying notes on, Dealing with Japanese Americans, are commended to the attention of all WRA staff members. Additional notes of similar nature will be prepared from time to time.


Director

Attachments

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Documents Section, Office of Reports

Community Analysis Report No. 1
October 1942

DEALING WITH JAPANESE AMERICANS
By John F. Embree

1. Race and Culture.

The only thing evacuees in relocation centers have in common is their ancestry, i.e., their race. Because of this fact both the evacuees and members of the WRA staff are likely to assume many things to be racial which are in actual fact not racial but cultural.

What is race anyway? The basic element in race is heredity. A number of people of the same ancestry may be termed a race. Pure races, that is, large numbers of people descended from the same stock, do not exist. All present-day groups of people such as Japanese, English, Germans, Americans, are of mixed racial stock. One consequence of this is that individuals of any so-called racial group differ greatly among themselves in regard to stature, hair form, skin color, head shape, etc. This means that race can only be considered on a statistical basis. Japanese, for instance, are on the average shorter, darker-skinned, and more often round-headed than are Caucasians. But individual Japanese are often taller or lighter or more long-headed than individual Caucasians with whom they may be compared.

A look around any relocation center will demonstrate these points. Some Japanese you will notice to be rather short, but every now and then you will meet a tall man; some will have the characteristic straight black hair of the "Mongol" type, but others have wavy hair; some have an epicanthic fold on the inner part of the eye opening (which partly accounts for the so-called slant eye), but many do not. Observe your Japanese acquaintances closely and you will soon have to discard any mythical "Japanese type" you have built up in your mind.

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Physical features of parents are transmitted to their children, racial types persist through generations. But cultural traits are not; they are acquired through learning and education.

Thus, a Japanese born in California grows up speaking English, something his cousin in Japan may never learn. And even though he attends a Japanese language school, he will never learn to speak Japanese properly unless he goes to Japan to live. President Roosevelt is of Dutch descent, but he cannot discourse in Dutch. To understand his

personality you must know his cultural background as an American brought up in eastern New York. Mr. Willkie is of German descent, but he does not speak German, and his culturally determined personality is typically American.

Psychologists and anthropologists have made many studies in regard to intelligence and race, and temperament and race. There is general agreement that as between the major "races" of man there is no positive evidence to show that a given individual of one race may not develop as far mentally as an individual of another, given the same cultural background. Similarly, in regard to temperament, it is culture rather than race that is the predominant factor. Thus, the "lazy" Negro of rural United States is not lazy because of race but because of social status; his cousin in Nigeria is a very energetic individual and one capable of complex political development and strong individual leadership. Similarly, Japanese in California are known to be hard-working, self-sacrificing people with strong family loyalties. These useful traits are not biological and there is a real danger of their disappearing soon under relocation center conditions. (Remember, the Crow and Blackfoot Indians whose cultures stressed individual initiative and personal bravery and what has happened to these brilliant warriors under Reservation conditions where all the old cultural values have been undermined and many are today lacking in individual initiative and possessed of a typical wards-of-the-government-outlook in life.)

The importance of culture in determining behavior may be seen further in the fact that frequently you will find a young Nisei to have a similar temperament and outlook on life as yourself in contrast to his father who may appear to you to be "very Japanese". Of course, under center conditions of life, the administrator, with his security and dominant social position will have so many advantages over any Nisei, insecure as to his future, and in a subservient social position, that the two are bound to look upon problems in the center from different points of view. This social and economic difference in position should always be remembered by a "Caucasian" administrator or teacher when trying to settle some problem with an evacuee.

To Summarize:

Race is hereditary and culture acquired. Races of man today are not "pure" and there is great variability in physical appearance and intelligence within any racial group. The all important factor in determining adult behavior is early education, i.e., the cultural background of an individual. Further, even in what is regarded as one culture (e.g. American) important differences in personality develop as a result of growth in different regional areas and in different social levels of society.

2. Behavior Patterns as Found Among Issei and Some Others in Relocation

Centers.

In order to deal successfully with any group of people, it is well to know something about them. A friendly attitude goes a long way, but that is not enough, for good will without knowledge may result in more harm than good.

The older Japanese (Issei)* have a number of fixed ways of living together and dealing with social situations about which it is useful to know.

The Go-Between

First of all, no Japanese (and here is meant no persons of Japanese culture) likes to meet face-to-face with his social equal or superior in a situation that might cause embarrassment to the latter. Instead, a go-between is preferred, some common friend who will carry the message or conduct the negotiations. In this way, if the negotiations fall through or one party has to say "No", face-to-face embarrassment is avoided. The best known example of this is in marriage where the two families involved wish to inquire into one another's social backgrounds. This, of course, could lead to considerable embarrassment and so a go-between is very convenient. Even some Japanese Americans who object to marriage arrangements by families do like to have a friend do the proposing, John Alden style.

Similarly, if an important business deal is being carried out, negotiations are often by means of a go-between.

On a relocation center, you may find that if some program or suggestion is not liked, no one will object at first but later through some third party you will hear that there is objection to it. This is the go-between system in operation. You may often get better results in work with older evacuees by working through a go-between than by working directly, since each of you can speak more freely and express your ideas more fully to a go-between without fear of hurting anyone's feelings than if you were dealing face-to-face.

*Much has been said of the differences between Issei, Kibei, and Nisei. On the whole it is safe to assume that older Issei are Japanese in culture and outlook and younger Nisei are American in culture and outlook. (If a Nisei is bitter and anti-administration in attitude, this is simply evidence that he is American and strongly resents his loss of liberty without trial.) The Kibei, Nisei who have been educated in Japan, have been much written of as a dangerous pro-Japanese element. Probably many Kibei are culturally Japanese, but by no means all. Furthermore, some Issei, born in Japan but educated in the United States, are American in point of view. So, while Issei, Kibei, and Nisei are convenient terms of classification, it is worth remembering that generalizations concerning these groups are subject to many individual exceptions.

Sharing Responsibility

Another characteristic of older Japanese is a desire to avoid personal responsibility for something that may make him unpopular with his associates. As a result committees are more popular than chairmen. Further, any final decision for action by a committee is usually unanimous, thus making all members equally responsible for it. If people are dissatisfied with some aspect of project life, instead of using a single go-between, a committee may be chosen and that committee will wait upon some member of the staff with its complaints or proposals.

Where a single man must serve, as in the case of block representatives, he will probably either be unanimously nominated or men will rotate in office either by resignations or through having different men elected each election.

(For a comparison, note that in Japan while a certain body of men rule Japan through the years, those who are openly and formally responsible for government change frequently. No single man stands out as responsible for government for long at a time in the manner of Hitler or Mussolini.)

Project Head's Position

As the man responsible for the whole community, the project head in each center has great authority and prestige — an authority and prestige recognized by the older Japanese in the same way in which they recognize the authority of a village headman.

When a new policy is announced or anything affecting the whole center is inaugurated, it should be made by the project head himself. Furthermore, the project head should make it a point to from time to time meet with the people of the center (or of each camp where there is more than one in a center) in order to discuss new developments, answer questions and so make sure that people understand. Only in this way will the people believe what is said, because it comes from the highest authority. Talks of this sort by the project director should be as specific as possible — if necessary, deal with such seemingly minor but very real things as toilets, soap supply, food distribution, etc., if these questions are raised by the evacuees. Only the project head can effectively kill some rumors. Furthermore, this first-hand word from the highest authority should be given not once a year, but at least once a month. Such duties cannot be deputized. The project head, like the village headman, is expected to be responsible for taking an active interest in the welfare of his community by traditional Japanese custom. (Resentment of questions implying criticism of administration is not, of course, the best means of answering them, or solving the underlying problems and anxieties that give rise to them.)

After a new policy has been explained by the project head to

responsible evacuees involved, later discussions of it may be made by the appropriate division head.

Modes of Employment

Employment problems form an important aspect of center life and need patient and personal attention by conscientious administrators. With Japanese (as indeed with any people), to simply ask for a turnout of 300 men on a work project is not likely to be successful. Instead, first the nature of the work must be considered, then a number of experienced evacuees contacted. To them the nature and purpose of the work must be explained. When they understand what it is all about, they can suggest the people to be employed on it, and make useful suggestions on carrying out the project. In this way a corps of workers with close rapport and good morale can be built up. If any change in conditions of work is made, this also should be carefully explained to and fully understood by the work leaders who can in turn explain it to their work crews.

Sitdowns, strikes and riots are not the result of cussedness, but are the results of misunderstandings and dissatisfactions; in the centers they are likely to be accentuated by anxieties, but the administrator who is careful to develop understanding by the evacuees of the programs he proposes to initiate probably will be favored with their cooperation.

Anxieties

All evacuees in relocation centers have an uneasy feeling of insecurity that determines many of their actions. This insecurity is due to the war, and especially to the relocation program whereby families often had to move, not once but twice or three times, from, say, Berkeley to Zone Two, from Zone Two to an assembly center, from an assembly center to a relocation center. All of this in a few weeks or months. The newspapers carry stories of threats to deport Japanese after the war, threats to deprive Nisei of citizenship, threats to prevent the return of evacuees to California after the war.

WRA policy in the relocation center differs from WCCA policy, and this WRA policy itself has often changed since it was first established. Small wonder, then, that an evacuee wonders, "What next?" He is worried and insecure in regard to what will happen after the war, what will become of his children's manners and morals as a result of life in center barracks, with the common mess halls and lavatories; he is worried about tomorrow's food, tomorrow's health, tomorrow's children.

It is this basic insecurity and multitude of anxieties that cause so many alarmist rumors to fly through the centers and cause so many people to become apathetic toward work.

For the present, the best way to deal with this situation is for everyone from project head down to make sure that he understands and has explained clearly and definitely just what any new policy or new activity means in terms of life in the center. Furthermore, within his sphere of activity, each staff member should make every effort to know personally and well as many evacuees of as many social types as he can. Only in this way can some of the fears and rumors prevalent among the evacuees be brought to light and so killed off just as darkness-loving bacteria die when exposed to sunshine.

Food

In regard to food, any regular eating in common mess halls is unsatisfactory and the food is inevitably going to be criticized whether it is good or not. But it is important to realize the great importance of the slightest change in diet to the evacuees and that anything that even looks like unfair practice by the chefs and the chief steward is going to cause a great deal of dissatisfaction. Unless the chief steward has the confidence of his cooks, who in turn have the respect of the blocks, food riots or strikes are going to occur sooner or later on the project.

Most of these last suggestions all add up to the same thing, a need for staff members to be well acquainted with evacuees with whom they are concerned so that they can observe any growth of a critical situation and deal with it on a personal basis and in a peaceful manner before it gets out of hand.

Evacuee Attitudes

There are certain attitudes among evacuees which are fairly common. First, there is a tendency to take sides in the war, to be pro- or anti-axis. These two attitudes are often related to pro- and anti-project administration attitudes. Thus, the more successful the staff is in arousing the confidence of evacuees in its integrity, the more converts to the anti-axis group among evacuees.

On the whole, older single men who are aliens and who have few ties in America are most likely to be pro-axis in any aggressive way, such as criticizing pro-American Nisei and telling them their American citizenship is useless.

Japanese born in this country but educated in Japan, especially for several years and since 1935 are, like the old bachelors, a group likely to actively favor Japan.

Parents of children who have made some success in American life are more likely to be neutral in action if not in attitude. Their loyalties are likely to be divided, since, up to December 7 at any rate,

they realized that their children's future lay in America and America had given them a chance to rise in the world such as they would never have had in Japan.

Nisei, American born and American educated, are today of many attitudes. First, there are the very pro-American. These people are easy to deal with but are often regarded as apple-polishers and do not always have the respect of other evacuees, either Issei or Nisei. A large number are normal Americans who rather resent being transported and locked up just because their parents were born in Japan. A small minority are, like some Kibei, actively pro-axis.

On the whole, most older married evacuees will cooperate with any reasonable program of center management since they want center conditions to be peaceful and to improve rather than deteriorate. However, it is too much to expect Japanese who could never become citizens to actively participate in programs to celebrate the Four Freedoms or Independence Day. A democracy of works rather than of words is what will be most effective in influencing their attitudes.

Among Nisei, due to inactivity, many problems are going to arise in connection with work, with self-government, and with sex which have nothing to do with pro- or anti-axis attitudes, but if handled without human understanding may lead to anti-administration attitudes which because of center social conditions might soon be transferred to anti-American attitudes. This would be a tragedy for the individuals concerned and an indication of failure in the WRA.

To Summarize:

Older Japanese have a number of patterns of behavior, a knowledge of which is useful in project administration. First, there is the desire to avoid face-to-face embarrassment through the use of a go-between. Second, there is a desire to avoid personal responsibility (and so invoke censure against oneself) and a consequent tendency toward group responsibility and, in committees, unanimous decisions, and rotating office holding. Thirdly, there is the tradition of accepting as true what the government head (in this case the project head) says in regard to government policy — but to be a successful government head one must give out the policy personally and so accept responsibility for it.

Finally, in all dealings with evacuees, it is well to be aware of the anxieties and attitudes which are prevalent in the center among all groups; and the need to become personally acquainted with those in order to lessen tensions that might lead to serious consequences.

Community Analysis Report

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION

To WRA Staff Members

File No. 1.

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J. F. Embree
Director

Attachment

October 1942

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By John F. Embree
Documents Section, Office of Reports

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CA Report # 2

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

To WRA Staff Members:

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In that report some background facts of Japanese race and culture were discussed with special reference to relocation center conditions of life.

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RELOCATION CENTERS.

RESTRICTED

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by John Embree

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There are a number of factors inherent in the conditions of center life which may create difficulties regardless of how well the centers are administered. A recognition of these factors inherent in the situation may be of value because such a recognition may help administrators to understand critical situations as they arise, or before they arise, and to deal more intelligently with them.

Factors inherent in the situation.

1. A mass evacuation of people on the basis of Japanese ancestry, regardless of length of residence, citizenship, or past individual behavior, has created in many evacuees a sense of disillusionment or even bitterness in regard to American democracy. WRA personnel being the only government representatives with whom most evacuees now come in contact, it is this personnel that bears the brunt of evacuee criticism and resentment.
2. Another effect of relocation has been to create feelings of extreme social and financial insecurity as to the future. This may result in a reluctance to leave centers for outside employment. Anxieties associated with this feeling of insecurity form a fertile field for alarmist rumors.
3. The throwing together on the basis of racial lines of a group of people made up of a wide range of interests, educational background, and social class has caused many unfortunate situations, such as putting people with little in common together as neighbors in the same block.

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Nisei who were becoming Americanized in California are now subjected to strong Japanese influences. A racial solidarity vis-a-vis the Caucasian administrative staff is another inevitable result of center life.

4. Experiences in assembly centers. Most residents in relocation centers spent weeks and even months in assembly centers before finally moving to their present "homes". This long uncertain waiting period, during which they had little opportunity or incentive for reorganizing community life has had a demoralizing effect on the individual and a disorganizing effect on traditional forms of community life and social control. (It should be remembered that evacuees in some assembly centers were subjected to many affronts to their self-respect -- government people entered their homes without permission; informers and government agents made everyone's life uncertain; one could talk to a visiting friend only for a short time and with a guard present. The psychological shock of being housed in stables is still far from overcome.

5. Physical conditions of life in the centers have also contributed to social disorganization. Eating in common mess halls has had the effect of weakening family solidarity and parental authority. The weakening of parental authority, in turn, has made it more difficult for law-abiding parents to restrain the activities of young men who may form gangs which can easily drift from anti-project administration to anti-American in attitude.

The lack of privacy and overcrowding within the barracks has a demoralizing effect on many evacuees -- again especially the younger generation. Added to this is the fact that latrines and showers are separate from the barracks and there is a lack of privacy therein. To a Japanese the lack of a deep bath is a great privation.

These living conditions are similar in some respects to those of slums and we may expect social phenomena similar to those found in slums to appear -- gangs, anti-police attitudes, and delinquency. The lack of adequate recreation facilities is also a factor in this situation.

6. Conditions of security controls. Armed guards, barbed wire fences, search lights, visits of government agents, all engender the feeling of being in a concentration camp. To expect people to be receptive to

lectures on democracy and freedom under such conditions is too much to ask of anyone, especially any American.

7. In general the speed of settlement in the centers, the heterogeneous population, and the artificial social and economic situations of center life have created a new society with no regular system of social controls. As with the old boomtowns of the West, the law is taken in one's own hands simply for the lack of any integrated set of social controls as represented by family and community organization, public opinion and folkways.

8. The factors inherent in the situations are different in the restricted areas of the Western Defense Command than in other areas. The greater restrictions imposed by the Western Defense Command area and the very hostile attitude of surrounding communities in Arizona and California makes life for the evacuees in these centers more difficult and unhappy. It is not simply coincidence that the only serious incidents have occurred in centers in the restricted area.

Factors related to project administration.

In contrast to the above listed conditions inherent in the situation, there are others which, being related to project administration, can be affected by WRA policy. Some of the points listed here may now be past history in some projects, but in others they are still more or less acute problems.

1. Out-groups. At many projects, as things were first organized, it was the volunteer nisei with a good command of English who landed most of the good jobs. Late-comers and those less fluent in English tended to be left out as well as those who regarded the boasting of one's abilities to be vulgar. These last, when they found that the administrative personnel accepted the volunteers at face value and made no attempt to search for other less forward talent, became disillusioned in some of the project administrators. The excessive attention given to JACL, an organization which for one reason or another has many enemies, has simply corroborated this attitude.

Thus, in one way or another, there has grown up on most projects a large "out-group", which is dissatisfied, has little responsibility, and is consequently uncooperative with WRA administration, especially with nisei office holders.

The undermining of the authority of issai and of the social control functions of Japanese societies such as the Kenjinkai contributed to this uncooperative atti-

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Special efforts should be made to enlist members of out-groups to useful work, and through a recognition of their abilities give them a feeling of responsibility for the welfare of the center. The traditional leadership and responsibility of older men (whether issei or nisei) should also be recognized.

2. Many WRA promises to evacuees have, for one reason or another, not been fulfilled. Work payments have often been delayed, and leave clearances slow. Sometimes people at projects have made promises in these matters which they have been unable to keep. This undermines faith in project administration as well as in the sincerity of the Federal Government.

3. Related to (1) and (2) are a number of unhappy situations which have developed as a result of a changing or uncertain employment policy, both at the project and national level. Frequently individuals have been assigned to jobs they felt unqualified for, others have had their special training in one field or another ignored; work payments, as noted above, have not always been prompt.

4. Growth of caste attitudes. This is related to a factor inherent in the situation, i.e. the fact that the WRA administrative staff is "Caucasian", while the evacuees are "Oriental". Too often this gives rise to attitudes of superiority on the part of the administrative personnel. Citizen evacuees feel the distinction keenly.

5. Affronts to evacuee ideas of propriety. Among older Japanese it is not considered proper to slap one another on the back. They also look askance upon WRA staff members acting in too friendly a way with evacuee assistants, whereby they call one another by their first names, etc. Together with this traditional, (and useful) Japanese culture patters are something ignored -- e. g. use of the go-between, use of committees of older men for responsible work in local government, respect for age in Japanese society (placing young men in responsible positions on the police force, for instance, is not always a good policy).

6. Division of authority and an openly discussed disagreement among administrative personnel. This is always bad and under conditions of center life undermines respect for WRA.

7. Inefficient use of agricultural machinery, of evacuee workers, etc. also leads to disrespect of the administrative staff by evacuees who in California were very careful and efficient users of both manpower and machines.

Signs of trouble.

There are a number of symptoms of impending trouble. When they appear it is well to look behind them for motivation. It is also well to consider the consequence of any move to deal with what may appear on the surface to be a simple situation.

1. Beatings. A man may be assaulted for what appears to be simply a personal grudge. Often, however, the man beaten is looked upon as an informer or in some way has come to serve as an attackable symbol of WRA administration, which in turn symbolizes the forces that caused evacuation. In such a situation it is extremely unwise to arrest a man simply on suspicion.

2. The growth of young men's gangs. These are probably the result of conditions inherent in center life. Every effort should be made to turn the activities of such groups to constructive ends in order to counteract a natural tendency for them to indulge in anti-administration activities.

3. Labor troubles. If conditions are ripe for it, the firing of a single man may result in a general strike. Care should be taken in times of unrest to be sure to dismiss employees only for a very good cause. In fact, employment policies can be very important -- making for the smooth running of a project, or being a constant source of trouble. The comments on caste attitudes apply here.

4. Mess hall troubles. These are more likely to be due to personal squabbles than are employment troubles, but if not carefully handled they can also become a focal point for a large-scale demonstration.

The causes of events such as those listed above should be discussed and analyzed with a number of evacuees of different groups, e.g. anti-JACL nisei as well as JACL members, issei without as well as those with strategic jobs (e.g. chefs or foremen), men from special backgrounds such as fishermen, farmers, retailers. Representatives of such social groups can be very helpful in getting at the basic causes of frustration and dissatisfaction among center residents. The very discussion of some of their problems will provide a means of releasing pent-up grudges and so help in creating a more cooperative attitude.

Attention should also be paid to any other relevant factors that might create or contribute toward an incident: the building of a barbed wire fence, the visits of FBI men, long delay in providing some promised item to the residents.

At present the sincerity of the Government, as represented by WRA, is seriously questioned by many evacuees. The things that were done to them in California, and the effects of assembly center life, will not be forgotten for many years to come. For this reason it is unwise to assume that just because WRA is sincere in its efforts to solve the problems created by evacuation, that the evacuees should accept protestations of sincerity at face value. There is, however, a continuity of direction in WRA policy which it is worth bringing out from time to time: a direction away from restriction and loss of civil rights towards a full restoration of civil rights and racial democracy. The facts of history show a continuous trend in this direction:

- (1) The inauguration of the leave policy.
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Fitzsimmon

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
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Attention should also be paid to any other relevant factors that might create or contribute toward an incident: the building of a barbed wire fence, the visits of FBI men, long delay in providing some promised item to the residents.

At present the sincerity of the Government, as represented by WRA, is seriously questioned by many evacuees. The things that were done to them in California, and the effects of assembly center life, will not be forgotten for many years to come. For this reason it is unwise to assume that just because WRA is sincere in its efforts to solve the problems created by evacuation, that the evacuees should accept protestations of sincerity at face value. There is, however, a continuity of direction in WRA policy which it is worth bringing out from time to time: a direction away from restriction and loss of civil rights towards a full restoration of civil rights and racial democracy. The facts of history show a continuous trend in this direction:

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#2

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

To WRA Staff Members:

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H. L. Meyer
Director

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

Community Analysis Report No. 2
by John F. Embree

CAUSES OF UNREST AT RELOCATION CENTERS

The incidents of last November and December at Poston and Manzanar brought into sharper focus a number of problems in social relations and administration at the project level. In particular, these incidents have demonstrated a need for all WRA personnel to look more carefully into the underlying causes of such flare-ups.

There are a number of factors inherent in the conditions of center life which may create difficulties regardless of how well the centers are administered. A recognition of these factors inherent in the situation may be of value because such a recognition may help administrators to understand critical situations as they arise, or before they arise, and to deal more intelligently with them.

Factors Inherent in the Situation

1. A mass evacuation of people on the basis of Japanese ancestry, regardless of length of residence, citizenship, or past individual behavior, has created in many evacuees a sense of disillusionment or even bitterness in regard to American democracy. WRA personnel being the only government representatives with whom most evacuees now come in contact, it is this personnel that bears the brunt of evacuee criticism and resentment.
2. Another effect of relocation has been to create feelings of extreme social and financial insecurity as to the future. This may result in a reluctance to leave centers for outside employment. Anxieties associated with this feeling of insecurity form a fertile field for alarmist rumors.
3. The throwing together on the basis of racial lines of a group of people made up of a wide range of interests, educational background, and social class has caused many unfortunate situations such as putting people with little in common together as neighbors in the same block. Nisei who were becoming Americanized in California are now subjected to strong Japanese influences. A racial solidarity vis-a-vis the Caucasian administrative staff is another inevitable result of center life.
4. Experiences in assembly centers. Most residents in relocation centers spent weeks and even months in assembly centers before finally moving to their present "homes". This long uncertain waiting period, during which they had little opportunity or incentive for reorganizing community life has had a demoralizing effect on the individual, and a disorganizing effect on traditional forms of community life and social

control. (It should be remembered that evacuees in some assembly centers were subjected to many affronts to their self-respect — government people entered their homes without permission; informers and government agents made everyone's life uncertain; one could talk to a visiting friend only for a short time and with a guard present. The psychological shock of being housed in stables is still far from overcome.

5. Physical conditions of life in the centers have also contributed to social disorganization. Eating in common mess halls has had the effect of weakening family solidarity and parental authority. The weakening of parental authority, in turn, has made it more difficult for law-abiding parents to restrain the activities of young men who may form gangs which can easily drift from anti-project administration to anti-American in attitude.

The lack of privacy and overcrowding within the barracks has a demoralizing effect on many evacuees — again especially the younger generation. Added to this is the fact that latrines and showers are separate from the barracks and there is a lack of privacy therein. To a Japanese the lack of a deep bath is a great privation.

These living conditions are similar in some respects to those of slums and we may expect social phenomena similar to those found in slums to appear — gangs, anti-police attitudes, and delinquency. The lack of adequate recreation facilities is also a factor in this situation.

6. Conditions of security controls. Armed guards, barbed wire fences, searchlights, visits of government agents, all engender the feeling of being in a concentration camp. To expect people to be receptive to lectures on democracy and freedom under such conditions is too much to ask of anyone, especially any American.

7. In general the speed of settlement in the centers, the heterogeneous population, and the artificial social and economic situations of center life have created a new society with no regular system of social controls. As with the old boomtowns of the West, the law is taken in one's own hands simply for the lack of any integrated set of social controls as represented by family and community organization, public opinion and folkways.

8. The factors inherent in the situation are different in the restricted areas of the Western Defense Command than in other areas. The greater restrictions imposed by the Western Defense Command area and the very hostile attitude of surrounding communities in Arizona and California makes life for the evacuees in these centers more difficult and unhappy. It is not simply coincidence that the only serious incidents have occurred in centers in the restricted area.

Factors Related to Project Administration.

In contrast to the above listed conditions inherent in the situation, there are others which, being related to project administration, can be affected by WRA policy. Some of the points listed here may now be past history in some projects, but in others they are still more or less acute problems.

1. Out-groups. At many projects, as things were first organized, it was the volunteer Nisei with a good command of English who landed most of the good jobs. Latecomers and those less fluent in English tended to be left out as well as those who regarded the boasting of one's abilities to be vulgar. These last, when they found that the administrative personnel accepted the volunteers at face value and made no attempt to search for other less forward talent, became disillusioned in some of the project administrators. The excessive attention given to JAACL, an organization which for one reason or another has many enemies, has simply corroborated this attitude.

Thus, in one way or another, there has grown up on most projects a large "out-group", which is dissatisfied, has little responsibility, and is consequently uncooperative with WRA administration, especially with Nisei office-holders.

The undermining of the authority of Issei and of the social control functions of Japanese societies such as the Kenjinkai contributed to this uncooperative attitude in the first generation. The Issei having lost both economic and social predominance tend to be uncooperative with the administration, and some even go so far as to encourage Nisei non-cooperation.

Special efforts should be made to enlist members of out-groups to useful work, and through a recognition of their abilities give them a feeling of responsibility for the welfare of the center. The traditional leadership and responsibility of older men (whether Issei or Nisei) should also be recognized.

2. Many WRA promises to evacuees have, for one reason or another, not been fulfilled. Work payments have often been delayed, and leave clearance slow. Sometimes people at projects have made promises in these matters which they have been unable to keep. This undermines faith in project administration as well as in the sincerity of the federal government.

3. Related to (1) and (2) are a number of unhappy situations which have developed as a result of a changing or uncertain employment policy, both at the project and national level. Frequently individuals have been assigned to jobs they felt unqualified for, others have had their special training in one field or another ignored; work payments, as noted above, have not always been prompt.

4. Growth of caste attitudes. This is related to a factor inherent in

the situation, i.e., the fact that the WRA administrative staff is "Caucasian", while the evacuees are "Oriental". Too often this gives rise to attitudes of superiority on the part of the administrative personnel. Citizen evacuees feel the distinction keenly.

5. Affronts to evacuee ideas of propriety. Among older Japanese it is not considered proper to slap one another on the back. They also look askance upon WRA staff members acting in too friendly a way with evacuee assistants, whereby they call one another by their first names, etc. Together with this traditional, (and useful) Japanese culture patterns are sometimes ignored -- e.g., for responsible work in local government, respect for age in Japanese society (placing young men in responsible positions on the police force, for instance, is not always a good policy).

6. Division of authority and an openly discussed disagreement among administrative personnel. This is always bad and under conditions of center life undermines respect for WRA.

7. Inefficient use of agricultural machinery, of evacuee workers, etc., also leads to disrespect of the administrative staff by evacuees who in California were very careful and efficient users of both manpower and machines.

Signs of Trouble.

There are a number of symptoms of impending trouble. When they appear it is well to look behind them for motivation. It is also well to consider the consequence of any move to deal with what may appear on the surface to be a simple situation.

1. Beatings. A man may be assaulted for what appears to be simply a personal grudge. Often, however, the man beaten is looked upon as an informer or in some way has come to serve as an attackable symbol of WRA administration, which in turn symbolizes the forces that caused evacuation. In such a situation it is extremely unwise to arrest a man simply on suspicion. The troubles at both Poston and Manzanar came out of just such arrests on suspicion.

2. The growth of young men's gangs. These are probably the result of conditions inherent in center life. Every effort should be made to turn the activities of such groups to constructive ends in order to counteract a natural tendency for them to indulge in anti-administration activities.

3. Labor troubles. If conditions are ripe for it, the firing of a single man may result in a general strike. Care should be taken in times of unrest to be sure to dismiss employees only for a very good cause. In fact, employment policies can be very important -- making for the smooth running of a project, or being a constant source of trouble. The comments on caste attitudes apply here.

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY


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Director

Attachment

February 1943

CAUSES OF UNREST AT
RELOCATION CENTERS.

RESTRICTED

Community Analysis Report No. 2
by John Embree

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JAPANESE GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Community Analysis Report No. 3
March 1948

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

From time to time the question arises as to the significance of the various Japanese groups and organizations in the United States. Does membership in a Kenjinkai indicate subversion, or is the organization simply a social group? What about the officers of such organizations? What is the difference between Buddhism and Shinto?

A few of the more important groups and associations are discussed here in order to provide a factual background for understanding these Japanese groups.

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Kenjinkai or Prefectural Associations
Junior Kenjinkai
Nihonjinkai or Japanese Associations
Seinenkai or Young People's Societies
Fujinkai or Women's Societies

II. ECONOMIC

Japanese Chambers of Commerce
Hotel Associations
California Farmers' Association
Japanese Labor Association
Ko or Tonomoshi Credit Clubs

III. RELIGIOUS

Buddhism
Shinshu (Hongwanji)
Zen
Nichiren
Odaishi

Shinto

Seicho No Iye

IV. MILITARY-NATIONALISTIC

Budokai
Heimusha Kai and Patriotic Contribution Societies
Veterans' Societies
Japanese Language Schools

I. SOCIAL

Many Japanese associations are primarily social in nature, made up of people with common interests who meet from time to time for the sake of sociability. Such associations are also often mutual aid societies so that any member in need, financial or otherwise, may receive assistance from the society. Japanese social groups are very numerous, so that only some of the more important ones are mentioned here.

Kenjinkai or Prefectural Associations

The older Japanese, when they arrived in this country, mingled most readily with other Japanese from their own home prefectures or provinces. As was almost inevitable, when there were a fair number of people from one prefecture or one area, they formed a Prefectural Association, or Kenjinkai. These societies meet from time to time for sociability and at New Year's usually celebrate with a large banquet. Members of the group help out fellow members in distress. So far as the older people are concerned, the Kenjinkai is simply a mutual interest and friendship society, with no particular nationalistic connotations. The more important of the Kenjinkai are as follows:

Fukuoka
Hiroshima
Kumamoto
Tohoku
Yamaguchi

Junior Kenjinkai

Occasionally Junior Kenjinkai are formed, made up of Japanese-Americans whose parents are from the same ken or prefecture. Whereas with the older people the Kenjinkai is simply a common interest group, when a group of young people become members of a Junior Kenjinkai their motives are of a somewhat different nature, since a Junior Kenjinkai is an artificially built up common interest group which can serve only to maintain ties with Japan. The Junior Kenjinkai thus falls into a somewhat different class from that of the ordinary Kenjinkai, and young people who actively belong to such groups tend to look to Japan for their cultural values.

Nihonjinkai or Japanese Association

Practically all of the older Japanese in Hawaii and the West Coast belong to one or another Nihonjinkai. The Japanese Consul when dealing with matters concerning Japanese nationals in this country usually did so through some officer of the local Nihonjinkai. Similarly, when a prominent visitor from Japan came to this country hospitality was customarily shown to him locally through officers of the Nihonjinkai. However, membership in the Society is not in itself an indication of anything more than mutual interest with other Japanese nationals who have settled in this country. Just as the Kenjinkai is a social group on a small prefectural scale, the

Nihonjinkai is a mutual interest association using as its base all those of Japanese ancestry, or, more specifically, those of Japanese nationality. The officers of the Nihonjinkai are usually men of substance in the community who are old residents and have the respect of the older people. While they may be actively pro-Japanese in point of view, they are not necessarily so.

Seinenkai or Young People's Societies

In itself, membership in a Young People's Society does not mean much, since there are all kinds. For instance, there are Buddhist young people's societies such as the Chikaranokai, which are not very different in function from Y.M.C.A. groups. On the other hand, a young people's society with "Dai Nippon" (Great Japan) as part of its title might be looked upon with some suspicion.

Fujinkai or Women's Societies

As with the Seinenkai, there are several varieties of Fujinkai. Most of the older Japanese women belong to some Fujinkai, which is partly social and partly civic in function. They are often associated with religious groups and sponsored by the local Buddhist priest.

II. ECONOMIC

A number of mutual interest societies have been formed along occupational lines among the Japanese in this country, just as they have been organized among other ethnic groups. The Kenjinkai and Nihonjinkai in their mutual aid aspects, are economic groups. Other associations more purely economic in nature are given here.

Japanese Chamber of Commerce

Most large cities of the West Coast and in Hawaii have their Japanese Chambers of Commerce, which function more or less like other chambers of commerce. As a rule, they serve the interests of the local business men of Japanese ancestry, being primarily local and economic in function.

Hotel Associations

In places such as Seattle, where many Japanese owned or managed hotels, there were organized Japanese associations of hotel managers. These also served primarily economic ends.

California Farmers' Association

This and other farmer organizations have been organized primarily for mutual aid among farmers of Japanese ancestry. They correspond in general aims to hotel associations and other occupational groups. The farmers' associations tend to be patterned along more Japanese lines than some of the others, simply because the farmers on the whole are less well adapted to American ways than are the Japanese in cities.

Japanese Labor Association

This is one of the few Leftist organizations among Japanese in this country. In general, it may be said that anyone who belongs to it is definitely American rather than Japanese in his attitudes, because to join such an association is to incur the disapproval of the average Japanese family in this country. It is, as its name indicates, a workers' labor group.

Ko or Tanomoshi Credit Clubs

Cooperative credit clubs of one sort or another are very common in Japan and China and have been retained among the Japanese in Hawaii and the West Coast. They are called variously ko, tanomoshi, or mujin, and are made up as a rule of 20 or 30 people in a community. The group comes into existence when one person borrows a sum of money. Each member of the newly formed group gives an equal part. If the man needs \$200, 20 people may each give \$10. Then at subsequent meetings every month or so the debtor pays into the club part of his debt, say \$10, plus interest, and other members also \$10. Then by a system of bidding or drawing lots, a member other than the debtor "wins" the pot of \$200 plus the debtor's interest. When everyone has received the pot once, several of the members have made a profit, the original borrower has been tided over an emergency, and the group has had a series of social gatherings.

III. RELIGIOUS

The Japanese, when they came to America, felt the need almost immediately for some religious organization in order to look after the problems of life and death such as funerals and memorial services. In the early days informal prayer meeting groups were established, and it was not long before most immigrant communities had full-fledged priests and churches. Japanese religious groups in the United States are many, but the main ones are indicated in the following broad categories.

Buddhism

Japanese Buddhism, like Protestant Christianity, consists of a number of sects or denominations. The most popular of the Buddhist sects, both in Japan and in this country, is that of Shinshu.

Shinshu (Hongwanji) is a special form of Buddhism in which the followers have faith in a savior, known as Amida. To live a good life and to have faith in Amida is the best road to the Western Paradise. Most of the Japanese in this country, and many of the American born as well, are members of the Shinshu Buddhist Church. On the whole, it is safe to say that a person in good standing in this church is probably also a law-abiding resident. The younger people who are members of young people's Buddhist societies are for the most part also good citizens, and their activities resemble those of young people's Christian societies.

Shinshu has two main divisions, popularly known as Nishi Hongwanji and Higashi Hongwanji (i.e., West and East Hongwanji), the one most common in this country is Higoshi Hongwanji.

Some other Buddhist sects which are fairly common, but which do not approach Shinshu in popularity, are as follows:

Zen A sect in which the followers attain enlightenment through their own efforts of spiritual and physical self-discipline, rather than depending upon a savior as in Shinshu.

Nichiren A sect the followers of which tend on the whole to be rather ardent in their beliefs. Nichiren (1222-1282 A.D.), the founder of this sect some centuries ago, was himself rather a nationalist, and some of the Nichiren people in Japan today are notable for their nationalistic attitudes. This, however, is no guarantee that a Nichiren follower in this country would be a Japanese nationalist.

Odaishi This is a popular form of the Shingon sect founded by Kobo Daishi (died 816 A.D.) a famous teacher and religious leader. In this country older Japanese frequently form a little group of Odaishi followers who meet together for prayer and sociability once a month. Odaishi priests often act as faith healers and most of the devotees are older men and women who have faith in Odaishi's healing powers. Tanomoshi with monthly payments of a dollar or so more or less on a lottery basis are often associated with Daishi and similar regular meeting groups.

Shinto

The first thing to know about Shinto is that there are several different kinds. There is first of all the nationalistic "emperor-worshipping" type of State Shinto, secondly there are a series of Shinto sects which in actual practice are much the same as some of the ordinary Buddhist sects, and finally there are innumerable popular Shinto deities of nature which are believed in and celebrated by the masses. One of the most popular of these deities is Inari, god of good crops and prosperity, who is often represented by a fox messenger. Observances in honor of Inari are in Japan and in this country rather similar in nature to those in honor of the Buddhist Odaishi.

A man who has been a priest in one of the shrines of the nationalistic Shinto, such as, for instance, the Sun Goddess or Daijingu Shrine in San Francisco or Seattle, might fairly be regarded as being definitely interested in promoting a Japanese war victory, even because of his trips to and training in Japan, be strongly pro-Japanese. Older people who are simply members of the sects are not to be regarded in this way. On the other hand, older people who are simply members of some of the ordinary Shinto sects and followers of popular deities such as Inari, are to be looked upon in much the same light as members of Buddhist sects or followers of Odaishi. The two commonest Shinto sects are Tenrikyo and Konkokyo, both of which stress ritual and faith healing.

Seicho No Iye

Seicho No Iye is a sect combining Buddhist and Christian beliefs. One of the sacred books of the sect for instance, contains references to Gautama Buddha and Mary Baker Eddy. Seicho No Iye teachers stress happiness and health and maintain that by the proper attitude one can overcome any illness. This sect gained quite a following in California in the 1930's and most of its adherents are older people. It should be looked upon in the same light as some of the ordinary Buddhist and Shinto sects.

* * *

On the whole it may be said that most of the older Japanese, the Issei, belong to one or another of the above religious groups. It is to be expected that the law-abiding Issei would do so. Religious priests, on the other hand, may be and often are conscious Japanese nationalists; this is especially true of Shinto priests, even sect Shinto priests.

Younger people born in this country are less likely to be members of Japanese religious groups, though Shinshu Buddhism in a rather Americanized form, remains quite popular. The Shinto sects, however, are not Americanized and the ritual remains Japanese, so that Japanese-Americans who are active members of such religious groups may be regarded as less assimilated to American life than those who belong to the Shinshu sect or those who are Christians.

IV. MILITARY-NATIONALISTIC

There are a number of societies which have been formed on the West Coast and in Hawaii of a military and nationalistic nature. Some of these, such as the Budokai, are made up pretty exclusively of people who are Japanese in culture and loyalty, whereas others, such as the Heimusha Kai, are simply organizations which were formed in connection with raising money for the China war and, as explained below, are of a somewhat different type.

Budokai Or Japanese Spirit Association

The Budokai, where it is found, is usually organized by persons who were educated in Japan and who are interested in maintaining the Japanese spirit among young people in this country. The Budokai, for instance, sponsors such Japanese things as Judo and Kendo classes (Japanese wrestling and fencing). In general, it may be assumed that anyone who is a member of such a society, or who has been an active participant in Judo and Kendo exercises, is rather on the Japanese side of the fence. Teachers of Judo, for instance, stress its spiritual value, and young people who participate are often those who feel more akin to Japan than to the United States.

Heimusha Kai and Patriotic Contribution Societies

These societies functioned before the war primarily as a means of raising money for sending overseas to aid Japan in the China war. They also sponsored the making of consolation bags (imombukuro) for Japanese soldiers. The organizers of such societies may be regarded as Japanese nationalists. However, ordinary contributors, and even prominent residents who were on Boards of Trustees of such societies, are not necessarily to be regarded in the same light as the organizers. There was strong social pressure placed upon older Japanese residents in most communities to contribute their share when contributions were taken, in much the same way as pressure has been put upon individual Chinese in this country to send money to China.

Veterans' Societies

Many of the early Japanese immigrants were men who had served in the Russo-Japanese War and who came to this country to seek their fortunes. Most such men automatically became veterans of the Japanese Army and are likely to be members of some veterans' organization. In itself, such membership is not very significant. However, there are certain military societies, one of which goes under the name of Hinomaru, which are probably more strongly nationalistic in character. Officers of such societies, in contrast to passive members, may be regarded as actively interested in a Japanese victory.

Japanese Language Schools

The Japanese, soon after they arrived in the United States, established language schools for their children. (The Chinese, Norwegians, and other ethnic groups in this country have done the same.) On the West Coast and in Hawaii these language schools were supported locally by the Japanese communities. Before the war, children attended an hour a day after public school but, as a rule, when children reached high school age they rebelled against this extra schooling and ceased to attend.

The active sponsors of the language schools, and especially the language school teachers themselves, may be regarded as being Japanese in sympathy and point of view, just as are the sponsors of Budokai and the Judo clubs. On the other hand, parents who sent their children to school, and especially the children themselves, are not, simply because of this fact, to be regarded as anti-American. The parents wanted their children to know something of the Japanese language and culture; the children attended partly because of parental pressure and partly because some knowledge of Japanese was (and is) an economic asset.

#3

JAPANESE GROUPS AND ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Community Analysis Report No. 3
March 1943

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

From time to time the question arises as to the significance of the various Japanese groups and organizations in the United States. Does membership in a Kenjinkai indicate subversion, or is the organization simply a social group? What about the officers of such organizations? What is the difference between Buddhism and Shinto?

A few of the more important groups and associations are discussed here in order to provide a factual background for understanding these Japanese groups.

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Junior Kenjinkai
Nihonjinkai or Japanese Associations
Seinenkai or Young People's Societies
Fujinkai or Women's Societies

II. ECONOMIC

Japanese Chambers of Commerce
Hotel Associations
California Farmers' Association
Japanese Labor Association
Ko or Tonomoshi Credit Clubs

III. RELIGIOUS

Buddhism
Shinshu (Hongwanji)
Zen
Nichiren
Odaishi

Shinto

Seicho No Iye

IV. MILITARY-NATIONALISTIC

Budokai
Heimusha Kai and Patriotic Contribution Societies
Veterans' Societies
Japanese Language Schools

I. SOCIAL

Many Japanese associations are primarily social in nature, made up of people with common interests who meet from time to time for the sake of sociability. Such associations are also often mutual aid societies so that any member in need, financial or otherwise, may receive assistance from the society. Japanese social groups are very numerous, so that only some of the more important ones are mentioned here.

Kenjinkai or Prefectural Associations

The older Japanese, when they arrived in this country, mingled most readily with other Japanese from their own home prefectures or provinces. As was almost inevitable, when there were a fair number of people from one prefecture or one area, they formed a Prefectural Association, or Kenjinkai. These societies meet from time to time for sociability and at New Year's usually celebrate with a large banquet. Members of the group help out fellow members in distress. So far as the older people are concerned, the Kenjinkai is simply a mutual interest and friendship society, with no particular nationalistic connotations. The more important of the Kenjinkai are as follows:

Fukuoka
Hiroshima
Kumamoto
Tohoku
Yamaguchi

Junior Kenjinkai

Occasionally Junior Kenjinkai are formed, made up of Japanese-Americans whose parents are from the same ken or prefecture. Whereas with the older people the Kenjinkai is simply a common interest group, when a group of young people become members of a Junior Kenjinkai their motives are of a somewhat different nature, since a Junior Kenjinkai is an artificially built up common interest group which can serve only to maintain ties with Japan. The Junior Kenjinkai thus falls into a somewhat different class from that of the ordinary Kenjinkai, and young people who actively belong to such groups tend to look to Japan for their cultural values.

Nihonjinkai or Japanese Association

Practically all of the older Japanese in Hawaii and the West Coast belong to one or another Nihonjinkai. The Japanese Consul when dealing with matters concerning Japanese nationals in this country usually did so through some officer of the local Nihonjinkai. Similarly, when a prominent visitor from Japan came to this country hospitality was customarily shown to him locally through officers of the Nihonjinkai. However, membership in the Society is not in itself an indication of anything more than mutual interest with other Japanese nationals who have settled in this country. Just as the Kenjinkai is a social group on a small prefectural scale, the

Nihonjinkai is a mutual interest association using as its base all those of Japanese ancestry, or, more specifically, those of Japanese nationality. The officers of the Nihonjinkai are usually men of substance in the community who are old residents and have the respect of the older people. While they may be actively pro-Japanese in point of view, they are not necessarily so.

Seinenkai or Young People's Societies

In itself, membership in a Young People's Society does not mean much, since there are all kinds. For instance, there are Buddhist young people's societies such as the Chikaranokai, which are not very different in function from Y.M.C.A. groups. On the other hand, a young people's society with "Dai Nippon" (Great Japan) as part of its title might be looked upon with some suspicion.

Fujinkai or Women's Societies

As with the Seinenkai, there are several varieties of Fujinkai. Most of the older Japanese women belong to some Fujinkai, which is partly social and partly civic in function. They are often associated with religious groups and sponsored by the local Buddhist priest.

II. ECONOMIC

A number of mutual interest societies have been formed along occupational lines among the Japanese in this country, just as they have been organized among other ethnic groups. The Kenjinkai and Nihonjinkai in their mutual aid aspects, are economic groups. Other associations more purely economic in nature are given here.

Japanese Chamber of Commerce

Most large cities of the West Coast and in Hawaii have their Japanese Chambers of Commerce, which function more or less like other chambers of commerce. As a rule, they serve the interests of the local business men of Japanese ancestry, being primarily local and economic in function.

Hotel Associations

In places such as Seattle, where many Japanese owned or managed hotels, there were organized Japanese associations of hotel managers. These also served primarily economic ends.

California Farmers' Association

This and other farmer organizations have been organized primarily for mutual aid among farmers of Japanese ancestry. They correspond in general aims to hotel associations and other occupational groups. The farmers' associations tend to be patterned along more Japanese lines than some of the others, simply because the farmers on the whole are less well adapted to American ways than are the Japanese in cities.

Japanese Labor Association

This is one of the few Leftist organizations among Japanese in this country. In general, it may be said that anyone who belongs to it is definitely American rather than Japanese in his attitudes, because to join such an association is to incur the disapproval of the average Japanese family in this country. It is, as its name indicates, a workers' labor group.

Ko or Tanomoshi Credit Clubs

Cooperative credit clubs of one sort or another are very common in Japan and China and have been retained among the Japanese in Hawaii and the West Coast. They are called variously ko, tanomoshi, or mujin, and are made up as a rule of 20 or 30 people in a community. The group comes into existence when one person borrows a sum of money. Each member of the newly formed group gives an equal part. If the man needs \$200, 20 people may each give \$10. Then at subsequent meetings every month or so the debtor pays into the club part of his debt, say \$10, plus interest, and other members also \$10. Then by a system of bidding or drawing lots, a member other than the debtor "wins" the pot of \$200 plus the debtor's interest. When everyone has received the pot once, several of the members have made a profit, the original borrower has been tided over an emergency, and the group has had a series of social gatherings.

III. RELIGIOUS

The Japanese, when they came to America, felt the need almost immediately for some religious organization in order to look after the problems of life and death such as funerals and memorial services. In the early days informal prayer meeting groups were established, and it was not long before most immigrant communities had full-fledged priests and churches. Japanese religious groups in the United States are many, but the main ones are indicated in the following broad categories.

Buddhism

Japanese Buddhism, like Protestant Christianity, consists of a number of sects or denominations. The most popular of the Buddhist sects, both in Japan and in this country, is that of Shinshu.

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CA Report #4
24.013

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

TO: Project Staff

APR 2 1943

SUBJECT: Japanese Holidays

On some of the centers the question has arisen as to what Japanese holidays are of special importance and in particular what if any Japanese holidays should be recognized as relocation center holidays. Under present policy no Japanese holiday shall be recognized as such by declaring a holiday from work because of it. However, if center residents desire to observe certain festivals after working hours there is no reason why they should not do so. In this way relocation center practice may be on the same basis as that of ordinary American communities including those of California and Hawaii before the war.

For your information, a summary list and description of the chief Japanese holidays is attached. Some of the dates are of little social importance in this country but are listed because they appear in the Japanese official calendar. Other days, such as Boy Day (May 5), or Goshoki (November 22-28), not on the official calendar, may be important as family or religious festivals.

D. J. Myer
Director

Attachment

NOTES ON JAPANESE HOLIDAYS

Community Analysis Report No. 4

April 2, 1943

January 1 - New Year's Day (Shogatsu)

This is the biggest holiday of the year in both Japan and China. The Japanese overseas also like to celebrate New Year's with banquets and the drinking of rice wine (sake). It is traditional to make rice dumplings (mochi) for New Year's Day and for friends and relatives to visit one another at this time. Older people may visit the local Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines to make an offering and recite a prayer. Graveyards may be visited and sometimes a priest is called in to purify the house for the coming year.

Debts for the old year are traditionally paid up before midnight on December 31.

New Year's festivities usually last 3 days.

January 15 - Small New Year's (Koshogatsu)

This is not generally observed by the Japanese in this country. In rural areas of Japan ceremonies associated with good crops for the coming year are practiced at this time.

February - First Day of the Horse (calculated by the Asiatic zodiac)

This is a folk holiday in honor of Inari, the diety of good crops and prosperity. In Japan and in parts of Hawaii and the West Coast shrines to Inari may be found, attended chiefly by older people. Inari's messenger is the fox and the diety himself is sometimes miscalled the fox god. While Inari is a Shinto diety, Inari priests are more faith healers than practitioners of the nationalistic types of Shinto.

February 11 - Empire Foundation Day (Kigensetsu)

This is an official holiday in Japan honoring the ascension to the throne of Jimmu Tenno on February 11, 660 B.C. Emperor Jimmu, according to official Japanese historians, was the first "historic" ruler of Japan. This date is not important among the Japanese in this country.

March 3 - Girl Day or Doll Festival (Hina Matsuri)

This is a family holiday for people with girl children, especially girls born during the past year. The family may invite friends and relatives to a party in honor of their daughters. The guests send gifts of dolls which are put together with other dolls on display before a special alcove, the tokonoma.

Girl Day is one of a series of special holidays called sekku, which occur on odd numbered months. The third of the third month (Girl Day), the fifth of the fifth month (Boy Day), and the seventh of the seventh month (Tanabate) are the most important of these sekku. Girl Day is sometimes called "Momo Sekku" or Peach Festival, the peach being a Japanese symbol for women.

March 21 - Spring Equinox Festival

The Shinto observance of this is called Shunki Korei Sai and the Buddhist holiday is called Higan. The Higan observances are more important in most Japanese communities. There are usually special services in the Buddhist temples at this time. In this country the Spring Higan is usually celebrated in Buddhist temples on the nearest Sunday.

April 3 - The Death Day of Jimmu Tenno (Jimmu Tenno Sai)

A Japanese official holiday, but of no importance in Japanese communities in this country.

April 8 - Buddha's Birthday

This is a Buddhist holiday of some importance. In Japan at this time many Buddhist temples set up small figures of Buddha over which an herbal liquid called sweet tea (amacha) is poured. Visitors to the temple may take home some of the liquid as a cure for aches and pains. Buddha's birthday is often observed by special services and ceremonies in Buddhist churches in this country also.

April 23 - The Emperor's Birthday (Tencho Setsu)

This is an official holiday in Japan. The date, of course, varies with the birthday of the reigning emperor. The Emperor's birthday used to be fairly widely observed in Japanese communities on the West Coast, but this practice was on the wane during recent years. Undoubtedly a number of families will observe it privately in the centers.

May 5 - Boy Day (Tango No Sekku or Koi Nobori)

This is a family festival in honor of boys, similar in nature to Girl Day for girls. In both Japan and the United States families with boys observe the holiday by flying colored banners and large red paper carp from poles outside their houses. The carp is a symbol of the Japanese male because it swims upstream, overcoming all obstacles in its way; when about to die it does not wriggle.

July 7 - Tanabate (another of the Sekku)

This holiday is in honor of the stars Vega and Altair, which figure in a story of two lovers who meet on this day. The holiday is not generally observed by Japanese in this country.

July 15 - Bon or Obon

This is a festival almost equal in importance to New Year's Day. At this time, by Japanese Buddhist tradition, the spirits of the dead return to their former homes. There are special services at the temples and in the homes. Graveyards are visited and tidied up and special offerings are made before the ancestral tablets (ikai) in the household Buddhist shelf (butsudan).

Neighbors call on families observing Hatsu Bon or first Bon, i.e., families that have lost a member through death during the past year.

In most parts of Japan special dances called Bon Odori are performed at this time which usually commence early in the evening and last many hours. These dances are the occasion of much festivity, older people drinking freely and young people often finding occasion to flirt with their sweethearts.

In the United States Bon is also observed in Japanese communities, and special services may be held at the Buddhist temple. The Bon dances have also been maintained but the night chosen for a dance in a particular community may be any time in late July or August for economic convenience.

It may be expected that residents of relocation centers will desire to celebrate the Bon season just as they wish to observe New Year's.

September 5 - Moon Festival

This is chiefly observed in rural areas in Japan and is of little importance among Japanese communities in this country.

September 23 - Autumn Equinox Festival

The Shinto observance of this is called Shunki Korei Sai and the Buddhist Higan (the same terms as are used for the Spring Equinox Festival). Fall Higan is an important Buddhist holiday in Japan and is also observed by the Buddhists in this country. Special ceremonies are held in the Buddhist churches, usually on the nearest Sunday.

October 17 - Harvest Thanksgiving to the Dieties of Ise (Kanname Sai)

An official holiday in Japan but of little importance to the Japanese in this country.

November 3 - Meiji's Birthday (Meiji Setsu)

Meiji was one of the outstanding emperors of Japan. He held office from 1868 to 1912, a period which began with the overthrow of the old feudal regime and during which great changes occurred in Japan. The day is an important one in Japan, especially in the schools where Meiji's rescript on education is read during special ceremonies in Meiji's honor.

In this country Meiji Day is not marked by any special activity.

November 23 - Harvest Festival of the Imperial House (Niiname Sai)

An official holiday in Japan but of little importance to the people in this country.

November 22-28 - Goshoki

This is an important religious week to the Shinshu Buddhists in honor of St. Shinran (1173 - 1262 A.D.), the founder of the sect. Special services are held at Buddhist temples during this period. Shinshu (Hongwanji) is the most important of the Japanese Buddhist sects in this country.

December 8 - Bodi Day

A Buddhist holiday in honor of St. Bodi Dharma, the founder of Zen Buddhism.

December 14 - The Anniversary of the Raid on Lord Kira's Residence by the Forty-Seven Ronin

The historic tale often recited in story and acted out in drama is briefly as follows: A feudal lord, Asano, was to be instructed in the proper etiquette for an audience with the Shogun by one Lord Kira. Lord Kira, however, deliberately mis-instructed Asano so that when he had his audience with the Shogun, his behavior was shamefully wrong. As a result Asano had to commit ceremonial suicide in order to save his honor, but just before doing so he told his followers of Lord Kira's treachery. The followers, now ronin, or masterless Samurai, resolved to take vengeance on Lord Kira who was, however, on guard against Asano's men. The leader of the ronin, according to a plan arranged with the rest, allowed himself to be seen in the company of prostitutes and drunkards, while the rest of the men dispersed and found themselves various jobs. Then years later when Lord Kira was convinced that all danger of retribution was past and that the leader had lost all self-respect and gone to the dogs the company gathered according to plan, stormed Kira's house and killed him. After doing so they committed suicide. These men are all heroes in Japan because of their great demonstration of loyalty.

December 25 - Death Day of the Emperor Taisho (Teisho Tenno Sai)

An official holiday simply as the death day of the emperor who reigned just previously to the one now in office. It is of little importance in Japan and none at all in this country.

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The historic tale often recited in story and acted out in drama is briefly as follows: A feudal lord, Asano, was to be instructed in the proper etiquette for an audience with the Shogun by one Lord Kira. Lord Kira, however, deliberately mis-instructed Asano so that when he had his audience with the Shogun, his behavior was shamefully wrong. As a result Asano had to commit ceremonial suicide in order to save his honor, but just before doing so he told his followers of Lord Kira's treachery. The followers, now ronin, or masterless Samurai, resolved to take vengeance on Lord Kira who was, however, on guard against Asano's men. The leader of the ronin, according to a plan arranged with the rest, allowed himself to be seen in the company of prostitutes and drunkards, while the rest of the men dispersed and found themselves various jobs. Then years later when Lord Kira was convinced that all danger of retribution was past and that the leader had lost all self-respect and gone to the dogs the company gathered according to plan, stormed Kira's house and killed him. After doing so they committed suicide. These men are all heroes in Japan because of their great demonstration of loyalty.

December 25 - Death Day of the Emperor Taisho (Taisho Tenno Sai)

An official holiday simply as the death day of the emperor who reigned just previously to the one now in office. It is of little importance in Japan and none at all in this country.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington

June 8, 1943

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D. S. Myer
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Director

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Report No. 5
June 1943

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

EVACUEE RESISTANCES TO RELOCATION

Reasons for the Relocation Program

Any discussion of the relocation program should begin with the basic reasons why relocation is a fundamental policy of the War Relocation Authority. As the Director has said on more than one occasion, there are three fundamental reasons for this emphasis on relocation.

1. Most of the aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry in the United States are going to continue living in this country after the war.
2. The rights of citizenship and the rights of law-abiding aliens are closely associated with what we are fighting for in this war.
3. Assimilation, which includes the development of attitudes of loyalty, cannot develop in an atmosphere of hate, suspicion and fear.

If these assumptions are correct, then relocation is the only constructive program open to the Authority.

Ideal Program

An ideal relocation program would have every one relocated before June 30, 1944, that is, within the next year. To do this would require the relocation of center residents at the rate of about 7500 per month. During April and May of this year, an average of about 2000 people per month have been leaving the centers. A tabulation by projects of the number of indefinite leaves granted during this period is given below.

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Recent procedures have made departure from centers a relatively simple matter, e.g. grants in aid, and the new rule that project directors may issue leaves. It should be remembered however that the interpretation of cash grants varies between the centers, some leaves officers feeling that it saves the government money to give a small grant even if this results in slowing down relocation and so perpetuating the cost of maintaining evacuees who do not relocate.

Causes of Resistance to Relocation

With leave clearance made easy, the problem arises as to why more people do not leave the centers. The reasons are many and complicated, involving administrative procedures, public

attitudes and employment problems. In this paper, attention will be devoted to one aspect of relocation, one which is very important and will probably increase in importance, i.e. the evacuee resistances to relocation.

Put briefly we may trace much of this resistance to relocation to the shock of evacuation and the consequent social and psychic disorganization of Issei and Nisei alike, and to the months of life in the centers as wards of the government in a condition which has halted the assimilation process and stunted initiative.

Feelings of Insecurity

Most of the evacuee reluctance to relocate is due to deep-seated feelings of insecurity in regard to life "outside", together with another set of resistances due to a newly developed social organization within the center.

The whole evacuation and relocation center experience has resulted in a drastic social disorganization followed by a gradual reorganization. Those of us not on the receiving end of it tend to forget the profound personal and social disorganization that resulted from evacuation. On short notice, after weeks of acute uncertainty, when the West Coast was filled with fear and hatred of Japan and all Japanese, Issei and Nisei alike were suddenly ordered to be rounded up like prisoners of war and herded into "assembly centers". This order, together with the internment of many Issei community leaders, left the social organization of the people badly broken up. In addition, the Nisei lost at the stroke of a pen the security they thought they had in their citizenship. For the older people, economic security was gone and the gains of years of work cultivating a farm or building up a trade or profession were wiped out. In addition, they had their hopes for their children's future in this country badly shaken.

This evacuation experience has just about knocked out the initiative of the older Issei. They are tired. They were just about to retire when the war broke out and today they want nothing better than to be let alone.

The Nisei, the majority of whom are between 16 and 24 years of age, have also been greatly affected by evacuation, but due to their youth they form better prospects for relocation than their parents. However they feel insecure in many ways and still feel the need of their parents' guidance and advice.

Social Reorganization

Relocation centers began, then, with a badly disorganized lot of people. But human society abhors a vacuum, and in the course of the months since last summer, new social forms have

developed and old ones have been recreated.

The family in particular has gained strength as a result of evacuation, in the sense that family members depend upon one another for the lack of other stable groups. Thus the Issei-Nisei cleavage which was growing before evacuation has been in some ways reduced.

After the initial shocks and the early unhappy JACL attempts to run the centers, Issei control has re-emerged. With a Nisei population, young and inexperienced, this was bound to occur. The strike at Poston was, according to the analysts there, a crisis which ended with a reorganization of the society along more stable lines. Local block and neighborhood public opinion is re-emerging to control individual behavior.

There is thus a new social structure replacing the disorganization of last summer which has grown up in the projects. That means a new stability and cohesiveness. The relocation program threatens this new equilibrium and the society is bound to resist this threat to its existence, just as it resisted registration which carried in it the suggestion of relocation and segregation; i.e. the suggestion of a new moving of people and breaking of social ties.

Importance of Issei Influence

All this means, among other things, that the views of the Issei need serious consideration in any War Relocation program whether it be relocation or recreation. By influencing them in favor of a program, the whole center is influenced. That means attention to a relatively small number of older males since the women will follow their lead, but it also means patience and long discussion over extended periods of time. No newspaper announcement or brief statement before a meeting can be considered as informing the center about a new program and its meaning.

The price of neglecting this fundamental social fact is evacuee resistance to administration, bad feelings between evacuees and administration and thus an impeding of the relocation program.

Thus it is the Issei who need to be convinced of the desirability of relocation and their children's future. Through their leadership and their parental relationships they can counsel their children in favor of relocation. This can only be done if they are convinced of the good faith of the War Relocation Authority if they believe that the local project staff is with them, not against them.

Reasons for not Relocating

On the basis of this background, what are some of the

specific factors behind reluctance to evacuate?

1. The problem of making up one's mind. For the resident of a relocation center, the decision to relocate is an important one; one which he realizes will affect his whole future. Relocation, like marriage, is not to be undertaken lightly. It requires much talking over and family consultations. Coming to a final decision is made more difficult by the fact that all recent decisions of a similar nature have been made for him by the government - i.e. the moves to assembly centers and to relocation centers. The basic feeling of insecurity resulting from evacuation also contributes to the difficulty of arriving quickly at a final decision on a matter so important to the future life of the individual concerned.

2. Fear of breaking up the family. As already indicated, with the initial breaking up of so many social ties, individuals turned to family relationships as something stable. Many individuals are reluctant to relocate for fear of breaking this tie as well. The older parents are reluctant to let their children leave them, especially their daughters. It is against the Japanese tradition of parental duty to let a daughter leave home before the day of her marriage. The results of the Manzanar registration provided dramatic evidence of this family interdependence when it comes to making decisions which might result in family separation. There is an obvious need here for the parents to be better informed on the aims and methods of relocation in order that they may be better qualified to advise their children in discussions concerning relocation.

3. Fear of losing companionship and status. The center, bad as it is in many ways, does give companionship. The evacuee is one of a group of evacuees in the same boat. In the center he is, in a limited sense, one of a majority, whereas on the outside, he is one of a minority. On the outside he will be alone and will lack the companionship of others with the like experience of evacuation behind them. This lack of companionship is especially felt by those who are young and unmarried. Within the center, one also has a status, a position in society as a block manager, a council member, a judo expert, etc. All of this is lost on relocation outside the center. Thus the center provides, in a broad sense, a social security for the individual.

4. Fear of discrimination. Stories of discrimination come back to the centers. Not only are the Nisei fearful of discrimination they may meet, but also their parents are fearful for them remembering what they have been through themselves and realizing that the nation is now at war.

News stories in the press add to this fear of discrimination. In the same category are resolutions in Congress, in State Legislatures, and by organizations such as the American Legion.

5. Financial insecurity. While it is true that some evacuees are wealthy, the majority have suffered severe financial losses as a result of evacuation and are still having their resources depleted so long as they have to maintain any reasonable standard of living on sixteen or nineteen dollars a month. In addition, extreme stories of the rise in prices on the outside and the complications of rationing, cause people to hesitate before deciding to relocate.

This financial worry is a serious matter. The Issei in particular, who managed to overcome financial insecurity over 20 or 30 years, are old and have not the heart to begin over again. Many Nisei are willing to take the financial risk for themselves if they can rest assured that the government will provide security for their parents but they are not sure of this. We have promised to push no one out of the centers but the registration has raised strong doubts about this in many evacuee minds.

6. Uncertainties of resettlement. Then again Nisei who might be willing to relocate and bring their families with them are uncertain about the draft. If Selective Service is reinstated, what would happen to parents, wives and children on the outside? Could they come back to the center? They are not sure and the War Relocation Authority policy has appeared to them to be rather uncertain on this point.

Aliens are uncertain as to their fate after the war. Hence they are reluctant to try to relocate. Why undertake relocation with all its risks if one is going to be moved again in a year or so?

The WRA policy appears to many evacuees to be unpredictable. "Once they said centers for the duration, now they say relocate. Next year they may say come back to the centers again." Recent agitation in Congress and elsewhere against relocation simply increases these fears.

The deep sense of insecurity reflected in items 1 to 6 is a basic force retarding relocation. Many other reasons for not relocating exist as described below, but many of them are simply rationalizations of one aspect or another of this basic personal insecurity.

It will not be overcome by adding new insecurities by creating unemployment in the centers or by large scale segregation moves. In this connection, it is worth quoting from Project Analysis No. 5 (Jerome):

"Cracking down on conditions at the center might cause increase in the number leaving, but it would tend to increase the sullenness and demoralization of many of the evacuees. A gradual change in employment practices probably is desirable, in order to give more incentives

"to efficient work, but a policy of making center life 'as tough as possible' would have repercussions much more serious than present so-called pampering. 'Get 'em out at any cost' may cost too much in terms of breaking the spirit of a proud, and, on the whole, a still loyal people."

7. Reluctance to settle away from the West Coast. The West Coast represents the known, the rest of the country, the unknown. Rumors about California being reopened have added to the motives for just sitting it out until this happens.

This general objection to relocation is in part rationalization as evidenced by the few Arizona people who have left Poston since the restricted area line was moved back. Furthermore, a fear of strange lands has never been a real hindrance to migration, Japanese or otherwise, if the incentives are strong enough.

8. Organized opposition by pro-Japanese elements. In some centers this may exist. If relocation is a United States Government program, then it is logical for the Japanese government to oppose it. There are reported radio broadcasts to this effect in one or two of the Western centers. These broadcasts, or the rumors of them, are possibly made by certain center residents since the FCC monitorings of Japanese radio broadcasts show no evidence of specific statements about the internal affairs of relocation centers. The statement that the Japanese government will look after its own may be the work of a small group of actively subversive individuals in one or two of the centers.

There is also a fear on the part of some of the individuals of adverse public opinions in their blocks if they relocate. This is similar to the public opinion controls that were in evidence at registration. On the whole, such adverse opinion is chiefly to the effect that one is foolish to relocate after all that has happened to the Japanese in this country since the war began. Better to sit it out and await the peace.

9. Citizenship worries. There are some socially conscious individuals concerned with the problems of citizenship status. Is it more likely to be protected by relocating and dispersing or by remaining as a group in the center? It might be pointed out in this connection that relocation and assimilation are much more likely to assure citizenship status than isolation from American life in a center where life is abnormal and which is the object of constant criticism.

10. Jobs offered. There is a current attitude that the only jobs available are domestic and unskilled labor. The formerly independent entrepreneur or farmer does not care to apply for such work.

11. Ignorance and rumors. Many of the evacuee fears are increased by ignorance and rumor. Too often, under the present organization, evacuees are ignorant of WRA policy and intention. They have no voice in that policy so it seems to them arbitrary and unpredictable.

This situation brings out the need for greater coordination of WRA activities and better communication. There is also a need for better and more frequent face-to-face contact between evacuee representatives of various social groups and the responsible members of the project and Washington staff.

Rumor plays its role in giving strength to many of the fears listed above. Some characteristic rumors are:

- a. The only reason the government wants us to leave is to save money.
- b. A number of Japanese-Americans were killed in Utah in reprisal for the execution of the Doolittle fliers.
- c. Wages and working conditions seldom turn out to be as good as represented.
- d. Housing is impossible to find and evacuees are often evicted from rooms or apartments.
- e. The people of this center are going to be moved soon.

12. Effects of registration. The shock and after-effects of registration are still with us and have created serious rifts between evacuees and staff at some projects. The shadow of segregation has also hung over the centers since the beginning. The Nisei fear leaving parents behind in the centers with an increasing bad name after all the "good" people leave.

To summarize, there are two chief conditions within the centers hindering relocation so far as the evacuees are concerned:

1. A deep feeling of insecurity exists in the average evacuee as a result of evacuation. He is afraid of discrimination; he is afraid of the high cost of living; he is afraid for his wife and children.
2. A new social organization is growing up giving position and status to the individual. The evacuee as a member of this group is reluctant to leave it.

Taken together, these considerations make many evacuees, especially the Issei, reluctant to leave the centers. As to the Nisei who are more likely to leave, it will be necessary to overcome their feelings of insecurity and loss of status.

Note on Administrative Attitudes

The relocation centers are made up of interdependent and inter-acting social units. One cannot isolate the attitudes and activities of the evacuees from those of the appointed personnel since they are interacting forces and the attitudes of the project personnel have their effects on those of the residents.

As is well known, the evacuees are very sensitive to prejudice. They have been sensitized to it over the years and especially since evacuation. Attitudes of superiority and prejudice^{1/} on the part of staff members where these exist may hinder, for instance, any real or open meeting of the minds between project administration and evacuee leadership, especially Issei leadership. This, of course, interferes with the need to get WRA policies across to evacuee leaders in such a way that they can see their value and support them (or point out their faults and change them).

Fears of discrimination to be met with on the outside are only intensified when antagonistic attitudes are met with in WRA project personnel, whether in the foremen, the teachers, or the project director. It is remarkable how a man's reputation for prejudice can spread even beyond his own project. Such a reputation does not create respect for that man. Attitudes of social prejudice breed an atmosphere of hate, suspicion and fear, an atmosphere not conducive to creating respect for American democracy. They are attitudes which, if prevalent or existent in high places on the project, lead to resistances to administration either active or passive; they inevitably interfere with any constructive program of relocation.

^{1/}

A brief discussion of race and culture may be found in Community Analysis Report No. 1, entitled Dealing with Japanese-Americans.

#5

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This general objection to relocation is in part rationalization as evidenced by the few Arizona people who have left Poston since the restricted area line was moved back. Furthermore, a fear of strange lands has never been a real hindrance to migration, Japanese or otherwise, if the incentives are strong enough.

8. Organized opposition by pro-Japanese elements. In some centers this may exist. If relocation is a United States Government program, then it is logical for the Japanese government to oppose it. There are reported radio broadcasts to this effect in one or two of the Western centers. These broadcasts, or the rumors of them, are possibly made by certain center residents since the FCC monitorings of Japanese radio broadcasts show no evidence of specific statements about the internal affairs of relocation centers. The statement that the Japanese government will look after its own may be the work of a small group of actively subversive individuals in one or two of the centers.

There is also a fear on the part of some of the individuals of adverse public opinions in their blocks if they relocate. This is similar to the public opinion controls that were in evidence at registration. On the whole, such adverse opinion is chiefly to the effect that one is foolish to relocate after all that has happened to the Japanese in this country since the war began. Better to sit it out and await the peace.

9. Citizenship worries. There are some socially conscious individuals concerned with the problems of citizenship status. Is it more likely to be protected by relocating and dispersing or by remaining as a group in the center? It might be pointed out in this connection that relocation and assimilation are much more likely to assure citizenship status than isolation from American life in a center where life is abnormal and which is the object of constant criticism.

10. Jobs offered. There is a current attitude that the only jobs available are domestic and unskilled labor. The formerly independent entrepreneur or farmer does not care to apply for such work.

11. Ignorance and rumors. Many of the evacuee fears are increased by ignorance and rumor. Too often, under the present organization, evacuees are ignorant of WRA policy and intention. They have no voice in that policy so it seems to them arbitrary and unpredictable.

This situation brings out the need for greater coordination of WRA activities and better communication. There is also a need for better and more frequent face-to-face contact between evacuee representatives of various social groups and the responsible members of the project and Washington staff.

Rumor plays its role in giving strength to many of the fears listed above. Some characteristic rumors are:

- a. The only reason the government wants us to leave is to save money.
- b. A number of Japanese-Americans were killed in Utah in reprisal for the execution of the Doolittle fliers.
- c. Wages and working conditions seldom turn out to be as good as represented.
- d. Housing is impossible to find and evacuees are often evicted from rooms or apartments.
- e. The people of this center are going to be moved soon.

12. Effects of registration. The shock and after-effects of registration are still with us and have created serious rifts between evacuees and staff at some projects. The shadow of segregation has also hung over the centers since the beginning. The Nisei fear leaving parents behind in the centers with an increasing bad name after all the "good" people leave.

To summarize, there are two chief conditions within the centers hindering relocation so far as the evacuees are concerned:

1. A deep feeling of insecurity exists in the average evacuee as a result of evacuation. He is afraid of discrimination; he is afraid of the high cost of living; he is afraid for his wife and children.
2. A new social organization is growing up giving position and status to the individual. The evacuee as a member of this group is reluctant to leave it.

Taken together, these considerations make many evacuees, especially the Issei, reluctant to leave the centers. As to the Nisei who are more likely to leave, it will be necessary to overcome their feelings of insecurity and loss of status.

Note on Administrative Attitudes

The relocation centers are made up of interdependent and inter-acting social units. One cannot isolate the attitudes and activities of the evacuees from those of the appointed personnel since they are interacting forces and the attitudes of the project personnel have their effects on those of the residents.

As is well known, the evacuees are very sensitive to prejudice. They have been sensitized to it over the years and especially since evacuation. Attitudes of superiority and prejudice^{1/} on the part of staff members where these exist may hinder, for instance, any real or open meeting of the minds between project administration and evacuee leadership, especially Issei leadership. This, of course, interferes with the need to get WRA policies across to evacuee leaders in such a way that they can see their value and support them (or point out their faults and change them).

Fears of discrimination to be met with on the outside are only intensified when antagonistic attitudes are met with in WRA project personnel, whether in the foremen, the teachers, or the project director. It is remarkable how a man's reputation for prejudice can spread even beyond his own project. Such a reputation does not create respect for that man. Attitudes of social prejudice breed an atmosphere of hate, suspicion and fear, an atmosphere not conducive to creating respect for American democracy. They are attitudes which, if prevalent or existent in high places on the project, lead to resistances to administration either active or passive; they inevitably interfere with any constructive program of relocation.

^{1/}

A brief discussion of race and culture may be found in Community Analysis Report No. 1, entitled Dealing with Japanese-Americans.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

Community Analysis Report No. 6
July 21, 1943

NISEI ASSIMILATION

I. Are the Nisei Assimilated?

The old question as to whether the Oriental peoples are readily assimilable, or are not assimilable at all--has been cropping up here and there lately, and seems largely to have gone unanswered. For this reason, the Community Analysis Section feels obligated to inform WRA staff members of facts bearing on the problem and to point out that so far as Japanese Americans are concerned, they have proven their assimilability by actually becoming as American in their thinking and in their behavior as have other second generation immigrant groups, not ordinarily regarded as "unassimilable". Many people have accepted the "unassimilability" charge without question, having been influenced by a long tradition in American popular thought characterizing the Oriental as "mysterious" or "inscrutable" - and by an unspoken assumption that a racial difference necessarily indicates deep, psychological differences. Actually, of course, the Issei differ in their mental sets from, say, people born and bred in Maine or Texas; but the differences derive from differences in culture, not from differences in race. Also, it is true, there are psychological differences which set the Nisei off from young people in the same age groups whose families have a long history, covering several generations, in this country.

Most of these last differences are also characteristic of second generation Americans of other racial stocks. They are derived from the minority group status of Japanese Americans and are comparable to the psychological peculiarities of all second generation immigrant groups whose parents migrated here as young adults, bringing with them the language and many of the customs of their homeland. So it is with such groups as the Italian Americans, Greek Americans, or Spanish Americans, that the Japanese Americans with their conflicts of two cultures, exposed to one at home and a second outside the home, must be compared. With them, as with other children of immigrants from foreign lands, the most serious kinds of conflicts with parents have arisen over such issues as the use of the foreign language at home, the degree of freedom and independence which should be allowed to young people, the conditions under which marriages should be contracted, the kinds of careers or the sorts of education which ought to be pursued. With them, just as with the other second generation groups, the pull of the majority, American culture has proven far the stronger, with the result that most

Japanese Americans have grown up in the United States, have gone or are going through our school system and are thoroughly Americanized and exceedingly well assimilated.

The few thousand Kibei who have been sent to Japan for a part of their education because of their parents' desire to see them acquire a better appreciation of Japan are likely, if their period of Japanese education was long, to be considerably less American in their thinking and behavior than are other Japanese Americans. It must be remembered, however, that one of the reasons for the educational pilgrimage of some second generation Japanese to Japan has been the lack of Japanese schools--except for the short session language schools--in this country. Many other second generation groups have been privileged to attend special "nationality" schools in the United States. These have usually been parochial schools, but they have quite frequently served single nationality groups. In Burlington, Vermont, for example, there are separate elementary schools for Irish and for French-Canadian children, in addition to the public elementary schools. In the school for French-Canadians, the first two hours are devoted either to the study of French, or to subjects taught in French (E. L. Anderson, We Americans, 1938, p.114). Thus the tendency of some Japanese parents to seek a partly Japanese education for their children is closely paralleled by the similar efforts of other immigrant parents to utilize the schools as a means of imparting some of the old country's values to their children, and need not indicate that the Japanese and their children are any less willing to adopt American ways than are many other immigrant groups. Rather, it is evidence of the similar reactions of the Japanese and other groups to similar situations.

Assimilation may most easily be defined as the acquisition of the culture traits of a particular society by people of foreign origin or parentage. That Japanese Americans have gone far in their acquisition of American traits is obvious to all who have made comparative studies on the subject, but because the false impression that they are not well assimilated is so widely encountered, a brief review of some of the more important evidences of assimilation is given here.

II. Evidences of Assimilation

A. Material Culture and Manners

The Nisei dress in American clothes, eat American foods, buy American furniture, use American cooking and eating utensils, have permanent waves, live in American-style houses, and in every life activity utilize as a matter of custom and habit the appropriate American gadget rather than its Japanese type counterpart. Of course, the Nisei are likely to know more about the use of chopsticks or the proper method of wrapping a kimono sash than

do other Americans--just as Scotch Americans understand better the wearing of a highland costume or the significance of tartans. But for them, chopsticks and the kimono are unnatural, foreign objects, suitable enough for the old-fashioned Issei or for a costume affair, but wholly inappropriate for usage in daily life where American articles of clothing, American utensils, etc., are natural and comfortable. With food habits, the situation is much the same: the Nisei prefer American foods but quite naturally know more of Japanese foods than do New Englanders.

American manners are second nature to the Nisei. In greeting each other they shake hands and say "hello" and "how're you doing?" rather than going through the elaborate bowing ritual of Japanese greeting. Relations between Nisei of opposite sexes follow the informal American pattern--much to the distress, be it said, of some of the Issei. While Nisei may be more likely to consult their parents regarding marriage than is the average American, they accept with little reservation the American conception that marriage is largely the business of the young people concerned, and marriages are frequently contracted despite parental objections. In many other ways, Nisei girls and women are emancipated, like their American contemporaries of other ancestry. All this is in sharp contrast to traditional Japanese custom.

Again, it is true that a Nisei can usually give a fair imitation of the Japanese forms of courtesy; but in doing so, most Nisei feel awkward and embarrassed, if only because they feel the forms to be foreignisms and because they well know that their imitation is shamefully imperfect in the eyes of their parents.

The recreational activities of Nisei are also characteristically American. Even in the relocation centers, where segregation from the wider American society and enforced close association with Issei and Kibei have tended to slow down the processes of assimilation, this is conspicuously evident. The two most popular sports in the centers are baseball and basketball, with ping-pong, volley ball, and (in season) football also very popular. Not only do the Nisei play these American games but they play them skillfully, hundreds of them having achieved prominence as members of high school athletic teams prior to evacuation.

Young Nisei, especially the girls, belong to social clubs, modeled exactly after those of other 'teen-aged Americans, which give teas, organize dances, help out in Red Cross drives and perform other social services. Many Nisei are members of the YWCA or YMCA, and some have become outstanding Y workers.

A favorite recreation for younger Nisei is dancing, and the dances are the same as those popular among all young Americans. Danced to the same music, they follow American conventions, including the types of refreshments, styles of hall decoration,

and shyness between girls and boys. Even so typically an American trait as jitterbugging is to be found among the Nisei - a trait which represents a conspicuous break with the Japanese tradition of reserved and decorous behavior.

The listing of American material traits and manners which have become the Nisei's own could be indefinitely extended, always leading to the same inevitable conclusion. As one authority put it prior to evacuation, "...the typical behavior of the second generation Japanese Americans is clearly much more characteristic of American culture than it is of Japanese culture. Beyond a doubt, if present tendencies continue, the Japanese will continue to become increasingly American until they achieve complete acculturation....." ^{1/} (Evacuation of course, represents a discontinuance of pre-evacuation tendencies, but resettlement allows for their resumption.)

B. Language

The language of the Nisei is English. In spite of persistent efforts on the part of the Issei to encourage the learning of Japanese through special language schools, or through the use of Japanese at home, very few Nisei have any real proficiency in Japanese.^{2/} Those who do know Japanese are likely to have spent some time in Japan or to have grown up in the more isolated rural regions of California. Even most of the latter have a better command of English than of Japanese.

The continuing use of Japanese by many Issei is not a sign of Oriental unassimilability but also characterizes first generation immigrant groups of European origin. A recent study of language use in the homes of a group of American-born high school boys of Italian origin in New York led to the following conclusions:

- "1. Two distinct languages are still used in Italian homes: the parents use Italian, and the boys use English.
- "2. The 593 boys who had chosen Italian as their foreign language in high school used that language with their parents and grandparents.

^{1/} J.A. Rademaker, "Japanese Americans", in Brown and Roucek, Our Racial and National Minorities, p. 439.

^{2/} In the same way, the Russian Dolokans in Los Angeles sought-- unsuccessfully--to perpetuate the use of Russian in the second generation. So also the Norwegians established Norwegian language schools in the prairies. Thus late afternoon "language schools" are scarcely an exclusive Japanese trait. See, for instance, P.V. Young, The Pilgrims of Russian Town, pp. 114 n. and 269.

- "3. The language of exchange in the home is still Italian or an Italian dialect. The boy may speak English because he lacks facility in Italian or in the dialect of his family, but the older folk answer in Italian or in the dialect.
- "4. The parents speak to each other in their own language. Only 9 per cent of them speak English exclusively." 1/

Except for No. 2, which is obviously irrelevant to Japanese Americans, these comments become a good description of the language situation in Japanese and Japanese American homes in the United States, if the word 'Japanese' be substituted for 'Italian' throughout. The special significance of this illustration is that neither race nor Oriental origin are of any special importance in the production of the partially bilingual home; on the contrary, it is the consequence of the living together of two generations, the first of which possesses facility in a foreign language, while the second is much more at home in English.

Direct evidence of the prevalence of English usage among the Nisei is seen in the fact that most Japanese language dailies in the United States had added an English language page in an effort to reach the Nisei (who were inaccessible through Japanese) by 1932. Most Nisei associations conduct their meetings in English, the language is used naturally and as a matter of course among school children throughout the grades and in high school (although some children from "Japanesey" homes tend to prefer Japanese at the nursery school or kindergarten level). In short, the Nisei use English quite as naturally as do other Americans, and very nearly all of them feel uncomfortable when compelled to communicate in Japanese, largely because they can speak it only haltingly. (It must be pointed out that one of the effects of relocation center life has been to lead to an increase in the use of Japanese by some Nisei; nevertheless, the above statements are quite accurate as applied to the pre-evacuation situation and need not as yet be much discounted as applied to relocation centers.)

C. Religion

When the Issei first arrived in the United States, they were, with a few exceptions, non-Christian in religion, and even today, over two-thirds of them are Buddhists. In contrast, less than half of the Nisei are Buddhists, and 35 per cent of them (as against 22 per cent of their parents) are Christians, largely Protestant. Perhaps even more significant is the large proportion

1/ From the chapter on "Language and Social Adjustment", in Our Racial and National Minorities, pp. 694-695.

of Nisei who profess no particular religion: over 16 per cent of the Nisei in relocation centers declined, as of November, 1942, to identify themselves with any religious group. ^{1/} Thus, the Nisei are seen to have gone far in the direction of taking over the religious practices prevalent in the United States, even including, apparently, a fair amount of agnosticism. This contrast between the Nisei and Issei is of especial importance as an evidence of assimilation, for, as is well known to social scientists, the taking over of a new material culture is relatively easy, but the abandonment of a traditional religion in favor of a new one is very difficult---except for people who have come to identify themselves much more thoroughly with the new culture than with the old.

Moreover, although nearly half of the Nisei remain Buddhists, they are not by that token, unassimilated. Buddhism among the Japanese and their children in America has itself become Americanized in important respects. Buddhist churches have taken over the Sunday School-Young Peoples' Club complex typical of American Protestantism. Many of them, in an effort to hold Nisei members, use English in part of their services or conduct some services in English. Representatives of the Young Buddhists Association from relocation centers who recently met at Salt Lake City, decided to establish a national headquarters, separate from the Hongwanji Mission, as a purely American religious organization. Buddhist churches in relocation centers organize their activities along lines quite like those followed by the Christian groups. An interesting example is the Buddhist observation of Father's Day at Jerome. There is no basis, then, for the supposition that Buddhist Nisei are ill-assimilated. On the average the Christians may be better assimilated, but very many of the young Buddhist Nisei are well assimilated, also, and are members of a church which, though bearing a foreign name, is in fact much closer to American religious traditions than to those of Japan in many significant ways.

D. Ideals and Ambitions.

The most telling evidence of Nisei assimilation is the extent to which they have accepted as their own American ideals and standards of success. Their adoption of Christianity and the Americanizing of Buddhism are illustrations of the Nisei acceptance of American values, and there are many more. American standards of success, and ideas of desirable occupations are a part of the Nisei value system. Born of parents whose tradition is one of fixed classes, with sons' and daughters' social status defined by the class of the parents, the Nisei have struggled valiently to

1/ Figures supplied by the Relocation Planning Division.

move upward in the relatively open class system of America. To this end they have sought education, especially on the secondary and college level, as a means to improved status. Census figures for 1940 show this clearly. The Nisei population of the four West Coast states 25 years of age and older is conspicuously better educated than is the native-born white population of the country at large. In terms of years of school completed, there is relatively little difference for grade school, although approximately 93 per cent of the Japanese Americans as compared to 83 per cent of the native whites have completed the 7th grade. But 57 per cent of the Nisei have completed 4 years of high school as compared to only 29 per cent of the native white group. More Nisei relatively have completed 4 years or more of college, too, although here the contrast is less, the figure for Nisei being 7 per cent, and for the native white population 5 per cent.^{1/} Impressive as these figures are, the differential indicated would be even more striking if comparisons were made according to the occupations of the parental groups, since as is well known, the native whites whose children carry their education farthest are those whose occupational status is higher than that of the average Issei.

In connection with the Nisei drive for education, one of the most important grounds for contending that their assimilation has been as thorough-going as that of most children of immigrants may be mentioned. The pattern of school achievement for immigrant's children is often one of relatively poor performance. In a general discussion of "The School and the Immigrant", (in Brown and Roucek, Our Racial and National Minorities, (p. 605-606), E. George Payne develops the thesis that elementary and secondary school programs are not at all well adjusted to the needs of immigrant children, and that this is the explanation of the fact that, as in Bridgeport, Connecticut, children of immigrants fail much more frequently than do those of native-born parents. In contrast, the Japanese Americans on the Pacific Coast have performed at least as well, and quite often better in school than have their classmates.^{2/} In a Seattle high school, for example, they have nearly three times as many high school valedictorians and honor students as their percentage in the school population would indicate (J.F. Steiner, Behind the Japanese Mask, p.61); there is evidence, too, that Japanese American "membership in honorary fraternities is disproportionately higher than that of any other group" (R. W. O'Brien, "Student Relocation", Common Ground, Summer 1943, p. 74).

The Nisei, then, not only attend American schools in disproportionately large numbers, but are unusually successful in

^{1/} Based on a chart prepared by the WCCA.

^{2/} See Reginald Bell, Public School Education of Second Generation Japanese in California, 1935, especially pp. 407-433.

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their scholastic achievement--all of which is evidence of a high degree of assimilation.

Nisei adherence to democratic political ideals is general, as was demonstrated clearly in the recent registration, when in spite of the most adverse circumstances, [see various Community Analysis reports on registration] 79.1 per cent of the Nisei registered expressed their willingness to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States.

III. Conclusion

Significant evidence of the high degree of Nisei assimilation of American ways, comparing favorably with the attainments of other groups of immigrants' children, has been briefly reviewed. It is necessary to add two qualifications at this point. First, there is considerable variation in the extent to which individual Nisei are typically American in personality. In general, those who have grown up in rural areas, in relative isolation from the main currents of American life, are less thoroughly Americanized than those reared in urban situations which constantly have brought them into contact with the wider American society. Those who have carried their education further are likely to be more completely assimilated. Second, even the most thoroughly assimilated are to some extent influenced by their parents' culture; but usually by facets of it which correspond with American patterns--as in respect for law, or for education. (It is important to note that similar qualifications must be made regarding the Americanization of other second generation groups.)

To summarize, then, the Nisei as a group are American in their dress, in their eating, in their manners, in their recreational preferences, in their ambitions, in their religious tendencies, in their language, and--crucially--in their ways of thinking, their ideals and values. Although life in relocation centers is impeding the further assimilation of many Nisei, and is even driving some back toward the culture of their parents, most of them today are as thoroughly American as the average immigrant's child.

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WAR Report #7

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Washington

October 23, 1943

To Project Directors:

The experience we have had in administering the segregation program and bringing it to a successful conclusion is something which we must apply in solving the remaining problems which the War Relocation Authority and the evacuees face. This report summarizes some of the most important lessons to be learned from our experience with segregation. It points out the difference in our handling of the registration and the segregation programs, and shows that we learned much from the former which we were able to apply in the latter. One of the important points made is that the participation of representative evacuee groups in the segregation program played a major part in its smooth and successful execution. This ought not to be forgotten. I believe that this brief analysis will be helpful in our thinking and planning for problems, such as resettlement, which lie ahead.

H. L. Myer
Director

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Community Analysis Section

Community Analysis Report No. 7
October 16, 1943

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SEGREGATION PROGRAM

(Note: This paper is based on reports by Community Analysts from the ten centers. It does not pretend to be a complete analysis of the segregation program at all centers, but rather is an attempt to highlight some of the most significant developments. It intentionally sets aside the special case of the Tule Lake Center, which had during segregation and will continue to have in the future its own distinct set of problems. An analysis of the unique conditions at Tule Lake at the close of segregation is in preparation.)

The segregation program has been completed practically on schedule, with few misunderstandings of policy and purpose, with no organized resistance, with no residue of wholly unexpected major problems, and with little, if any, backwash of bad feeling and strained relations on the projects. Measured against the earlier program of registration — which had a comparable major policy significance — segregation has moved smoothly to a successful conclusion.

The success of the segregation program calls for an analysis to determine (1) those features of it which were most closely related to its satisfactory execution, and (2) the new picture which the centers present, particularly in regard to the attitudes and outlook of the people on the projects, at the close of segregation. An analysis with these aims should provide implementation for future programs, in the same way that analysis of registration experience aided the formulation of segregation procedure and policy.

I. Analysis of Segregation Procedure.

The unsatisfactory character of the registration program was tied up with at least three things: (a) insufficient careful planning, (b) poor communication between Washington and the projects, and (c) inadequate understanding of evacuee attitudes and problems. Awareness of these deficiencies and their relation to the failures of registration resulted in efforts to avoid them in segregation. It can be said that there was detailed planning, good communication, and adequate recognition of evacuee attitudes in setting up the segregation program. In addition a fourth principle of procedure was adopted and must be regarded as an important element making for success, namely, evacuee participation.

Over-all Planning. The planning in Washington which preceded segregation aimed at uniformity for all projects in respect to the interpretation of policy and the execution of specific procedures. To this end

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the Segregation Manual was prepared which set forth in detail a uniform conception of the purposes and processes of segregation. However, considerable freedom was allowed project directors in the organization of the work. In this way the procedure was adjusted to the special circumstances, personalities, and administrative history of the various projects. At six projects a new organization, almost comparable to a "Segregation Division", was created. In two, the project directors assigned and coordinated the work themselves. In the others it was coordinated through the Community Management Division. Thus the principle followed was one of uniformity in essential detail, latitude in project organization.

Communication. The variations in procedure and interpretation which characterized registration were in large part due to the failure of communication between Washington and the projects. In contrast, segregation was initiated only after steps had been taken to insure adequate informing of project directors. This was accomplished not only through distribution of the Segregation Manual, but also through the conference of project directors at Denver, where the whole program was thoroughly discussed on the eve of putting it into execution.

It was not only inadequate communication between Washington and the projects which produced breakdowns in the registration program. Communication was equally poor within the projects — between evacuees and staff, and also among staff members. The segregation procedure took into consideration the need for both a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population. Following the Denver conference project directors, on their return to their projects, not only held staff meetings but also met almost immediately with some recognized evacuee group and informed them fully of the nature of the program. This was true at all projects of which we have record.

These initial moves to inform evacuees were followed up in various ways at the different projects. In all there was continued emphasis on channeling of information about all details of segregation out into the blocks. Information offices were established in the blocks in some projects. Project newspapers were utilized, often devoting special attention to checking rumors. At every project evacuees were brought into the business of disseminating information.

Evacuee Participation. The suggestion was made in the Segregation Manual that evacuee leadership be utilized in carrying out the program. Committees of evacuees were established at every center. They varied in their composition and in their functions, but in general, it may be said that they acted in an advisory capacity to the appointed staff as well as to evacuees. Usually they met at regular times for consultation with the staff on current needs and reactions in the community. In most projects the committees had the important function of disseminating information back to evacuees. At three centers the Community Council was the active evacuee participating body. At the others some form of representative body was utilized, either based on some old organization

or growing up at the moment to meet the need. At a number of centers, though apparently not all, evacuee representation was carried to the point of including segregants in the committees. At two centers evacuees were appointed as observers of the Hearing Board interviews. Thus, although evacuees were not included in the planning of the program they were brought in in an advisory capacity during its execution.

Recognition of Evacuee Attitudes and Problems. Efforts were made to estimate evacuee reactions to the program. Washington planning, for example, took into consideration the need for preparing evacuees some time in advance. There were preliminary announcements in all centers, and the process of segregation was begun only after evacuees had lived for some weeks with the definite knowledge that it was to take place. The suddenness of registration with its evil effects was thus avoided. Also it was recognized that the circumstances of registration were such that "no" answers to question 23 could not always be taken at their face value. This situation was taken into account and re-hearings of persons who had answered were conducted. The importance of family ties and influence for the evacuees was also recognized as a factor in decisions on loyalty and repatriation. In addition, the conception of loyalty to Japan as something right and natural in many cases was admitted, and the general policy of segregation as a non-punitive measure was laid down.

The more immediate problems arising out of the process of segregation itself were also taken into consideration. Plans were carried out in all centers which permitted friends and neighbors to move out together, crating of household goods was carefully taken care of, work terminations were timed to permit the winding up of personal affairs, and the need for farewell ceremonies and the observance of departure customs was recognized. Details about the nature of Tule Lake were disseminated. Attention to such small matters eliminated the possibility of resentments growing up around small issues.

Other Factors. Segregation moved to completion with a smoothness which had been hoped for but not generally expected. The four elements just described undoubtedly played an important part in this smoothness, and help to explain the contrast with the registration program. It would be a mistake to assume that they were the sole causes of success. The long expectation of segregation on the part of the evacuees, the considerable support given the program by many evacuees themselves, the months of experience of the staffs with evacuees, the smallness of the groups directly affected in all centers except Tule Lake, and the fact that many centers had already during registration or other periods found release for accumulated tensions were all factors. It can only be said that these favorable circumstances were enhanced rather than altered for the worse by the procedure adopted.

II. Staff and Evacuee Attitudes.

The meaning of segregation to the people on the projects may be

discovered through an examination of their reactions during the process. It meant different things to different groups at different times. How they reacted to this program gives important clues to their general feeling about WRA policy, about their jobs, and about their conception of what the relocation centers will be from now on. It is important to know these things because of their bearing on future programs, such as relocation.

Staff Viewpoints. The official position taken by project directors and staffs followed very closely the interpretation given at the Denver conference. It was stated at all, and emphasized at most, centers that segregation did not imply punishment. This emphasis was particularly strong at Topaz where the project director refused to use the word, segregation, in any official statements and constantly referred to the program as one of "Transfer".

The element of national loyalty was given varying emphasis. It was stressed at a few centers and played down at others. In general, the emphasis was about as suggested at Denver, namely, on separating those who wanted "to be American" from those who wanted "to be Japanese".

However, it is also clear that staff members at various projects regarded segregation as a means to weeding out potentially dangerous people, trouble-makers and agitators. This attitude was especially apparent at three centers. Coupled with this was the view that centers other than Tule Lake would operate more smoothly after segregation. At the centers where staff members expressed this view, there was also a general feeling at the beginning that there would be considerable trouble and perhaps incidents in connection with segregation.

As segregation progressed, staff members began to distinguish between different types of segregants. In a few centers, there was still the feeling that Kibei were most dangerous, although in most there was little tendency to single out Kibei. There were expressions of respect for evacuees who frankly stated their loyalty to Japan. A sympathetic feeling for Nisei who apparently were forced to go to Tule Lake with their parents seemed universal among staff members, and attempts are recorded of efforts on the part of some staff members to assist Nisei in breaking off from their families. The departure of individuals who had been regarded by staff members as both bad and good tended to spread the feeling that segregation was not a simple process which was ridding the center of any one type of person.

A view point expressed at one center probably characterizes that of a segment of appointed personnel at all centers. A staff member, on observing most of the loyal evacuees out to see off the first train and wave farewells to the group going to Tule Lake, said, "This proves that they are all alike; they are all Japanese at heart." At any rate, the conviction as to clear-cut results in terms of loyalty or sorting good from bad declined among the staff as segregation proceeded.

Evacuee Attitudes. Segregation had various shades of meaning for evacuees

from center to center and from time to time within the ten centers. Basic attitudes probably characteristic at the beginning of the process are indicated in a survey made at Jerome. Here 30 out of 76 Issei and Nisei (including repatriates, expatriates, and Kibei) interviewed felt very much as did most of the staff, that segregation would be a good thing and would have the good result of making center life more harmonious in the future. An almost equal number (26), however, felt that segregation had little significance. Most of these felt that it would make no difference in center life and that it would be a waste of money. Some were opposed definitely on the ground of disruption of families and friends, because "the Nisei who will segregate will lose touch with America", and for other reasons. Twenty of the 76 interviewed could not make up their minds as to whether segregation was good or bad. There are indications from this survey as well as other data that those evacuees who favored segregation were for the most part the extremists of both the loyal and the repatriate groups.

The view which the great majority of evacuees at all the centers took of segregation was that it was an inescapable move which would have to be complied with. There was never any organized resistance to it, although it must be emphasized that there were resistances of various types at a few centers. Decisions to go to Tule Lake or to stay in relocation centers were made for the most part with reference to questions of security rather than political allegiance. For the majority of segregants who made their decisions during the segregation period at least, there were two dominant considerations in connection with future security. One was the need for clinging to the family group as the last remaining source of help and status. The other was a practical weighing of chances for making a living. For some this also was tied up with family, that is, relatives in Japan who could be counted on to help. Many, both Issei and Nisei, regarded their present situation as demonstrating finally that there was no chance in America. For a small proportion, defiance and hatred of America were motivating factors. In all cases probably Tule Lake was regarded as a place of definite immediate security, where further decisions would not have to be made for the duration.

While Tule Lake thus came to be regarded as a place where certain definite securities might be found, it is evident that the relocation centers came to be regarded as places of somewhat less security than before. The rumors which circulated through the centers during the segregation period indicate the swirl of anxieties in which the non-segregant evacuees were living and will continue to live. Doubts and anxieties as to what "the government" intends to do next with the people are indicated in the rumors that all Issei non-segregants were to be given hearings, that all Kibei would be sent to Tule Lake, that Nisei were to be drafted immediately after segregation, that Nisei already in the army had been presented with question 28. Finally there was the whole series of rumors connected with the concept of "forced relocation", ranging from that of the immediate closing of three centers to the one that all refusing to relocate would henceforth be sent to

Tule Lake.

The anxieties as revealed in these rumors are probably indicative of a general state of mind in the centers at present. Segregation was generally interpreted as a major preliminary to furthering the relocation program. By many it is welcomed as such. By others, it is regarded with foreboding. The fact that "forced" is prefixed to relocation indicates a widespread sentiment that relocation is regarded as against rather than in the interest of the evacuees.

Summary

This preliminary analysis of the segregation program is based chiefly on Community Analysis reports. It seeks to outline some of the points, significant for administrative policy generally, which the experience with segregation has made clear. They may be summarized as follows:

1. Successful execution of the program was closely connected with:
 - (a) Detailed over-all planning of procedure which allowed, however, for latitude in project organization,
 - (b) Careful attention to maintaining communication channels from Washington to projects and among staff and evacuees on the projects,
 - (c) Organized participation of evacuee representative bodies,
 - (d) Adjustment of procedure to evacuee viewpoints, customs, and problems.
2. The program shed some light on how the people of the projects, both staff and evacuee, are thinking:
 - (a) Attitudes of staff members became more favorable towards evacuees as a result of segregation through closer cooperation and greater familiarity with their viewpoints.
 - (b) Many staff members do not believe that segregation has resulted in as clear-cut or significant changes in the character of the relocation center populations as they had at first thought it would.
 - (c) The program was carried through in much smoother fashion than most staff members expected that it could be, a situation which is being attributed to some or all of the points of procedure mentioned above.

- (d) The evacuees showed a readiness to comply without resistance with a large-scale movement policy at least equal to the readiness with which they complied with evacuation itself.
- (e) Evacuees are making decisions chiefly in terms of a short view of economic and family security.
- (f) There is a general expectation that actions to promote relocation will now be taken swiftly and drastically.

The expectation of relocation is probably as clear-cut a result of segregation as the expectation of segregation was following registration. It should not be concluded from this that evacuees are ready to embrace an accelerated relocation program. An expectation of coercion is also involved which can crystallize readily into resistance. Any program of resettlement must be conceived with as much respect for evacuee viewpoints and problems as was segregation. Otherwise it would be easy to repeat the experience of registration.