

Rosemond B. Spier I
Room 821

**FIRST
QUARTERLY REPORT**

**March 18 to June 30
1942**

**WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

FIRST QUARTERLY REPORT

March 18 - June 30, 1942

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A CHRONOLOGY
OF EVACUATION AND RELOCATION

- 1941 -

- December 7 -- The attack on Pearl Harbor
- December 8 -- Declaration of war against Japan.

- 1942 -

- January 29 -- First order issued by Attorney General Biddle establishing prohibited and restricted zones along West Coast and regulating the movement of enemy aliens therein. Subsequent orders were issued by the Attorney General on January 31, February 2, February 4, February 5, and February 7.
- February 13 -- Letter to the President from the Pacific Coast congressional delegation recommending the evacuation from strategic areas of all persons of Japanese ancestry, and others, both aliens and citizens, whose presence might jeopardize or hinder the Nation's war effort.
- February 19 -- Executive order of the President authorizing the Secretary of War or designated military commanders to prescribe military areas from which any or all persons may be excluded, or in which their movements may be restricted. Period of voluntary evacuation begun.
- February 21 -- Hearings of House Committee on National Defense Migration (the Tolan Committee) begun on the Pacific Coast with regard to problems involved in dealing with enemy aliens and other persons living in that area.
- February 23 -- Telegram from the Tolan Committee to the President, cabinet members, and congressional leaders urging establishment of a regional office of the Alien Property Custodian in the Pacific Coast area.
- March 2 -- Proclamation issued by Lieut. Gen. J. L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, designating military areas in the States of Washington, Oregon, California, and Arizona from which certain persons or classes of persons including Japanese, German, or Italian aliens might be excluded. Military Area No. 1 included roughly the western half of the three coastal States and the southern half of Arizona. Military Area No. 2 comprised the remaining portions of all four states.

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- March 6 -- Federal Reserve Bank acting as the agent of the Treasury Department designated as a co-operating agency to assist persons to be evacuated in disposing of their property. The Farm Security Administration was later authorized to render similar assistance with respect to agricultural property and to help in placing non-Japanese operators on farms that had been vacated.
- March 14 -- The Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) established as an agency of the Western Defense Command, under Col. Karl R. Bendetsen, to have direct supervision of the evacuation program.
- March 14 -- Proclamation issued designating the States of Idaho, Montana, Nevada and Utah as military areas No. 3, 4, 5, and 6, respectively.
- March 16 -- Work started on clearing land and erection of housing for evacuee assembly center at Manzanar, California, under direction of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers.
- March 18 -- Executive Order (9102) issued by President Roosevelt creating the War Relocation Authority, a non-military agency, with authority to formulate and carry out a program for a planned and orderly relocation of persons evacuated from military areas. Milton S. Eisenhower appointed director.
- March 19 -- Telegrams sent by Tolan Committee to 15 Western Governors to determine attitude of States toward receiving Japanese evacuees; all but one of the replies unfavorable.
- March 21 -- Enactment of Congressional legislation (HR 6758) providing penalties for persons violating orders as to entering, remaining in, or leaving military areas.
- March 23 -- Movement of first contingent of evacuees of Japanese ancestry-- 1,000 volunteers from Los Angeles--to the assembly center at Manzanar to assist in preparing the new community for the later arrival of 9,000 others.
- March 23 -- Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 issued by Lieut. Gen. J. L. DeWitt directing all persons of Japanese ancestry both aliens and citizens, to evacuate Bainbridge Island near Seattle, Washington, on or before March 30.
- March 27 -- Effective date of curfew order covering German and Italian aliens and all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1, requiring them to be in their places of residence

between the hours of 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.; forbidding possession of firearms, explosives, cameras, radio transmitting sets or shortwave receiving sets, and barring travel more than five miles from home without permit.

- March 29 -- Further voluntary evacuation from Military Area No. 1 by Japanese, aliens or American-born, prohibited after this date by order of Lieut. General DeWitt.
- March 30 -- Three thousand people of Japanese ancestry ordered to evacuate the Terminal Island area in Los Angeles harbor by April 5 and move to the assembly center at Santa Anita.
- April 2 -- Announcement by Director Eisenhower of a five-point program for employment of evacuees and of a meeting to be held at Salt Lake City on April 7 with officials of 10 western States. The employment program, as announced, included: (1) public works such as land development; (2) agricultural production within relocation areas; (3) manufacturing within relocation areas; (4) private employment; and (5) private resettlement.
- April 7 -- Meeting held by WRA at Salt Lake City and attended by 10 western governors or their representatives plus other State and Federal officials. States represented were Utah, Arizona, Nevada, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, New Mexico, Washington, Oregon, and Wyoming. As a result of the views expressed by State officials at this conference, the fifth point of the WRA employment program--private resettlement of evacuees--was temporarily laid aside.
- April 16 -- Construction started on Gila River Relocation Center near Sacaton, Arizona.
- April 17 -- Appointment of E. R. Fryer as Regional Director of the War Relocation Authority at San Francisco announced.
- May 7 -- Organization of National Student Relocation Council, a non-government agency, initiated at suggestion of the War Relocation Authority and with approval of the War Department, to assist in a program by which evacuee students are enabled to continue their education at colleges outside the evacuated area.
- May 8 -- Arrival of first contingent of evacuees at the Colorado River Relocation Center near Parker, Arizona.
- May 8 -- Evacuation of Japanese in Arizona completed.

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- May 8 -- Evacuation of Japanese in Arizona completed.

- May 16 -- Appointment of Thomas W. Holland as Employment Officer of the War Relocation Authority charged with the responsibility of finding employment for evacuees which will most effectively utilize their talents in the national war program.
- May 16 -- Atlantic Coast designated a military area by the Eastern Defense Command.
- May 19 -- Civilian Restriction Order No. 1 issued by the Western Defense Command establishing all assembly centers and relocation centers in the eight far western States as military areas and forbidding evacuee residents to leave these areas without express approval of the Western Defense Command.
- May 21 -- Departure of first group of evacuees from Portland Assembly Center for agricultural work in Malheur County, Oregon, under assurances from Governor and local authorities that law and order would be maintained.
- May 27 -- Opening by War Relocation Authority of Relocation Center at Tule Lake, California, near the Oregon boundary.
- June 1 -- Control of Manzanar, which had been operated as an assembly center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, transferred to the War Relocation Authority.
- June 2 -- First step in evacuating people of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 2 in California (roughly the eastern half of the state) taken by Lieut. General DeWitt with issuance of Proclamation No. 6 forbidding the people of Japanese descent to leave this area.
- June 3 -- Evacuation of 100,000 people of Japanese ancestry from their homes in Military Area No. 1 completed.
- June 10 -- Plans announced to establish field offices of the War Relocation Authority at Denver and Little Rock in addition to the one at San Francisco.
- June 17 -- Dillon S. Myer appointed national director of the War Relocation Authority succeeding M. S. Eisenhower.
- June 20 -- Appointment of Joseph H. Smart as regional director at Denver announced.
- June 26 -- Opening of trial at San Francisco on suit brought by the Native Sons of the Golden West to bar Japanese-Americans from voting.

June 29

- Announcement that a total of 1,600 evacuee workers had been recruited from assembly and relocation centers to help relieve an acute labor shortage in sugar-beet areas in eastern Oregon, Utah, Idaho, and Montana.

QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

March 18 to June 30, 1942

Created on March 18, 1942 by Executive Order of the President as a specialized wartime resettlement agency, the War Relocation Authority was concerned during the first quarter-year of its existence almost exclusively with people of Japanese birth or Japanese ancestry removed by order of the Army from military areas of California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona.

Under terms of the Executive Order, the Authority was charged with the responsibility of relocating or re-establishing 110,000 of these people away from the military zones. Largely as an expedient--to provide places where the evacuees might live and work in relative seclusion pending development of orderly plans for their re-assimilation into American life--efforts were directed during the first quarter toward establishment of Federal relocation centers at inland points. At ten sites spotted across the vast territory between the Sierra Nevada Mountains and the Mississippi River, a substantial start was made on the development of these pioneer communities. By June 30, roughly one-fourth of the people involved in the Pacific Coast evacuation had been received at three of these centers and were beginning to settle down and adjust themselves to their new surroundings. Meanwhile, definite plans were being drawn up for making positive use of evacuee skills and energies in the battle of production that is taking place behind the fighting fronts of the war.

The Pacific Coast Evacuation

From the beginning, the events of evacuation and relocation moved with almost incredible speed. On March 2 the Commanding General of the Nation's western defenses decided that military security required the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry from areas to be designated in California, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona. Less than two weeks later, on March 14, the Wartime Civil Control Administration was created by the Western Defense Command to employ designated military personnel and enlist the cooperation of civilian agencies in carrying on the evacuation. Within four days after that action, the War Relocation Authority was established as a civilian agency to handle the long-range job of resettling people evacuated from military areas. And by March 23 the first contingent of 1,000 voluntary evacuees from the Los Angeles area was on its way to the Manzanar Reception Center (as it was then called) in the Owens Valley section of eastern California. From that time forward throughout the first quarter, relocation efforts were aimed primarily at keeping pace with the swift, steady progress of widening evacuation.

Following issuance of the Executive Order of February 19 (authorizing the designation of military areas for evacuation), the Western Defense Command urged the people of Japanese descent in the western half of the Pacific Coast States and the southern part of Arizona to evacuate voluntarily and to relocate outside the military

zones on their own initiative. During the latter part of February and throughout most of March approximately 8,000 responded to this urging and moved out--some to eastern portions of the coastal States and others to the intermountain region of Utah, Colorado, and neighboring States. Developments quickly revealed, however, that voluntary evacuation would not be a feasible solution to the problem. The situation which developed was vividly described by Director Eisenhower in testifying before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on June 15:

"There was wide-spread and bitter opposition in the intermountain States for a number of reasons: First, the States did not wish the evacuees to acquire real property, as some did. Evacuees moved to localities where there had previously been a small Japanese population and difficulties arose there. Second, demands arose that the Government should guarantee that evacuees would be removed from the States to which they were going as soon as the war was over. Third, the demand was made that evacuees be permitted to move only under military guard. Serious trouble was threatened. At one location in Oregon and at another in Nevada Japanese were arrested. In Utah a stick of dynamite was set off in protest against the arrival of 25 evacuees. In Colorado and other places mass meetings were held in protest.

"Practically every governor of the Western States protested the dispersal of the Japanese. I think their feeling was, as expressed publicly, that if a danger existed in the military zone, then a similar danger existed in the intermountain States where there are a number of strategic works."

By March 27 the situation had become so acute, particularly in the intermountain States, that the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command decided to halt all further voluntary evacuation. At midnight March 29, after two days' warning, all people of Japanese descent in Military Area No. 1 (roughly the western half of the Coastal

States and the southern half of Arizona) were forbidden to leave the Area until ordered to leave by the Army. Since that time the evacuation has been carried forward under a series of civilian exclusion orders issued by the Army in accordance with an orderly and systematic plan.

The first area to be evacuated under civilian exclusion order was Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound. Next came Terminal Island in Los Angeles Harbor where hundreds of fishermen of Japanese descent had long made their base. Then followed in rapid succession more than 100 exclusion orders covering mainland areas all up and down the Coast and throughout the great interior valleys. By June 7, nearly 100,000 people of Japanese stock--both aliens and American-born--had been concentrated in assembly centers in Military Area No. 1. Five days earlier steps had been taken to evacuate the eastern half of California. Actual removal of evacuees from this area was about to begin at the end of June.

To provide temporary gathering places for the evacuees inside the Military Area, the Wartime Civil Control Administration swiftly established a chain of 15 assembly centers stretching from Puyallup, Washington, 20 miles south of Seattle to the small town of Mayer in central Arizona. The other 13 centers were located at North Portland in Oregon and at Fresno, Marysville, Merced, Pinedale, Pomona, Sacramento, San Bruno, Salinas, Arcadia, Stockton, Turlock, and Tulare in California.

Most of the assembly centers were set up at race tracks (e.g. the Santa Anita establishment in Arcadia and the Tanforan track in

San Bruno) or at fairgrounds (e.g. Stockton) where facilities such as water and electric power were readily available. Evacuee capacity of the centers ranged from Mayer with only 250 to Santa Anita with a potential capacity of almost 20,000. Although the great majority of evacuees were housed in assembly centers for a period of weeks or even months following their evacuation, several thousand (particularly in the eastern half of California) were transferred directly from their homes to relocation centers.

Virtually all qualified observers agree that the evacuation was carried out, on the whole, with extraordinary efficiency and real consideration for the people involved. Commenting on the attitude adopted by the evacuees themselves, Director Eisenhower in his testimony before the House subcommittee declared, "I just cannot say things too favorable about the way they have cooperated under the most adverse circumstances." Other officials have paid similar tribute to the Army and the various civilian agencies which cooperated in handling the enormous detail work attendant on the unprecedented movement.

In a movement of this kind, however, it was probably inevitable that some mistakes would be made and that some people would suffer. Perhaps the most serious difficulties arose in connection with disposal of the evacuees' property. On this subject, Director Eisenhower made the following statement to the House subcommittee:

"Before the War Relocation Authority was established the Treasury Department had accepted the responsibility for establishing, through the Federal Reserve bank on the coast, a voluntary system to aid the Japanese in disposing of their property in the military zone by sale, lease, storage, or otherwise. A little later the President signed an Executive order setting up an Alien Property Custodian. Rather than to have two agencies dealing with the property problem on the coast, the Alien Property Custodian delegated all of his authority to the Treasury and the Federal Reserve bank.

"When the War Relocation Authority was set up the Executive Order contained a brief section to enable the Authority to cooperate in handling the property problem. Again to avoid duplication, I also delegated such authority as I had to the Treasury. So the Treasury, through the Federal Reserve bank, has worked with the evacuees to the extent that the evacuees wished, in giving them a voluntary service in disposing of their property.¹ Those who owned land in most instances leased it. However, very serious problems were encountered, where there were verbal leases and complicated debtor-creditor situations. Some--in fact, a good portion--of the household furniture, was stored. Much other property was sold. There is no doubt that the evacuees made many financial sacrifices. That was inherent in the situation."

Selecting the Relocation Sites

While the evacuation was moving forward under supervision of the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the War Relocation Authority and the Army began an extensive search for areas where the evacuees might settle down to a more stable kind of life until plans could be developed for their permanent relocation in communities outside of the evacuated areas. Because of the very nature of the relocation program, the

¹ It should be noted that this statement applies only to evacuee properties of the urban type. Responsibility for assisting evacuees in the disposal of farm properties was delegated by the Treasury Department to the Farm Security Administration.

possibilities were sharply limited. Requirements for sites were announced by the Authority on April 13 as follows:

"1. All centers must be located on public land so that improvements at public expense become public, not private, assets. Any land required for this purpose will remain in public ownership.

"2. Because of manpower needs in the armed services and because the minimum guard unit can guard 5000 persons as easily as smaller groups, first attention will be given to sites adequate for large projects.

"3. Each center must provide work opportunities throughout the year for the available workers to be located there.

"4. All centers must be located at a safe distance from strategic works."

To aid in the job of site selection, the Authority enlisted the cooperation of technicians from a number of Federal and State agencies. More than 300 proposals were considered on paper and nearly 100 possible sites were actually examined by field inspection crews. Some were rejected because they were too small; others were turned down by the Army for military reasons; and still others were found unsuitable for a wide variety of causes.

By June 5, ten sites were selected for relocation areas; two in California, two in Arizona, two in Arkansas, and one each in Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado. By June 30, three of these were in partial operation; four were under construction; and the remaining three were in the contract-letting and blueprint stages.

Following is the list and status of the relocation areas as of June 30:

	<u>Name</u>	<u>State</u>	<u>Capacity</u>	<u>Population</u>
	Colorado River	Arizona	20,000	8,754
IN PARTIAL OPERATION	Tule Lake	California	16,000	9,308
	Manzanar	California	10,000	9,704
	Gila River	Arizona	15,000	. . .
UNDER CONSTRUCTION	Minidoka	Idaho	10,000	. . .
	Heart Mountain	Wyoming	10,000	. . .
	Granada	Colorado	8,000	. . .
AREAS APPROVED BUT NOT YET UNDER CONSTRUCTION	Central Utah	Utah	10,000	. . .
	Rohwer	Arkansas	10,000	. . .
	Jerome	Arkansas	<u>10,000</u>	. . .
TOTALS			119,000	27,766

The Ten Areas

Colorado River Relocation Area in extreme western Arizona is situated in dry, desert-type country on a previously undeveloped part of the Colorado River Indian Reservation. Comprising roughly 72,000 acres, it has a relatively rich soil and a warm climate which should provide good agricultural possibilities once the evacuees have cleared away the tall, tough mesquite and developed an irrigation system. The Center is divided into three communities, one with a capacity of 10,000

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evacuees and the other two with 5,000 each. Plans for this particular relocation center were developed by the Army and the Department of the Interior even before the War Relocation Authority was created. Under terms of an agreement between the Office of Indian Affairs and the Authority, the area has been administered since arrival of the first evacuees by the former agency under policies established by the latter.

Tule Lake Relocation Area in northeastern California lies in an old lake bed drained by the United States Reclamation Service. Like the Colorado River Area, it has limited rainfall and good soil. Because of the northern location and the elevation of nearly 4,000 feet, however, Tule Lake is much colder than Colorado River in winter and has a far shorter growing season. It includes about 26,000 acres and portions of it will be developed by the evacuees for irrigation in line with the plans of the Reclamation Service.

Manzanar Relocation Area in the Great Valley of east-central California is on land owned by the City of Los Angeles and is operated by War Relocation Authority under permit from the Army. First established by the Wartime Civil Control Administration as a reception center, it was transferred to the administration of the War Relocation Authority on June 1 and since has been operated as a relocation center. Although the area includes about 6,000 acres, agricultural possibilities are distinctly limited by the porous character of the soil and the comparatively high cost of irrigation water.

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Gila River Relocation Area is located in central Arizona not far from Phoenix and includes about 16,000 acres of the Gila River Indian Reservation. Like the Colorado River Area, it has a low rainfall, a mild climate, and a highly fertile soil. Nearly half of the land is already under irrigation and ready for immediate cultivation; all but about 1,800 acres of the remainder is suitable for development. Designed to accommodate a top population of 15,000 evacuees, the center is divided into two communities roughly four miles apart.

Minidoka Relocation Area is in south-central Idaho on a portion of the Minidoka Reclamation Project. Although the Relocation Area includes nearly 68,000 acres, it is broken up by lava outcroppings in such a way that only about 25 per cent of this land will be suitable for cultivation. Lying at an elevation of about 3,800 feet in one of the northernmost tier of States, Minidoka has a cold climate and a comparatively short growing season. Since precipitation averages only about 10 inches a year, irrigation development in accordance with the plans of the Reclamation Service will be necessary.

Heart Mountain Relocation Area in northwest Wyoming near the eastern gateway to Yellowstone National Park embraces some 45,000 acres of the Shoshone Reclamation Project. Probably the coldest of all the relocation areas in winter, it has a relatively brief growing season and a low average annual rainfall. Canals and laterals, however, have already been constructed for irrigation of nearly 10,000 acres (as soon

as the land is leveled) and ample water is available from Shoshone Reservoir for further development.

Granada Relocation Area in southeastern Colorado is one of the two WRA areas made up in large part of land formerly in private ownership and involving Federal purchase rather than agreement between public agencies. Of the 10,000 acres in the area, about 5,500 are already under irrigation and available for immediate cultivation. Repair and extension of the irrigation system should make it possible to grow crops on an additional 1,000 acres in 1943. Designed to accommodate 8,000 evacuees, Granada will be smallest of the relocation centers from the standpoint of population.

Central Utah Relocation Area, situated about 140 miles south of Salt Lake City, is the other WRA project involving purchase of a substantial acreage of privately-owned land. It contains nearly 20,000 acres and includes, in addition to the purchased tracts, State-owned land as well as public domain. Lying at an elevation of nearly 5,000 feet above sea level, it has a limited growing season and an average precipitation of about eight inches. Nearly half the acreage has been under cultivation at some time in the past.

Rehner Relocation Area in the Mississippi Delta Section of southeastern Arkansas comprises about 10,000 acres leased by the War Relocation Authority from a cooperative organization sponsored by the Farm Security Administration. In sharp contrast with the western

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relocation areas, it has an abundant rainfall and involves a problem of drainage. Most of the land is now covered with brush or second-growth timber and will have to be cleared before crop production can begin.

Jerome Relocation Area, situated in the same general section of Arkansas as Rohwer and about 35 miles farther south, is another area where drainage will be the principal agricultural problem. Like Rohwer, it has the rich agricultural soil characteristic of the Mississippi Delta section and a comparatively long frost-free growing season. The 9,500 acres that make up the area are being leased from an FSA-sponsored cooperative.

Establishment of the Centers

Once a site for relocation was selected and approved by both the War Relocation Authority and the Army, construction of basic facilities--evacuee living quarters, mess halls, recreation halls, bath-and-laundry buildings, hospitals, warehouses, water-supply and sewage-disposal systems--was undertaken by the Army Corps of Engineers. Type of construction was similar to that in assembly centers, and is essentially Army "Theatre of Operations" construction. Barracks 100 feet long and 20 feet wide, divided widthwise usually into four compartments, were built to provide 20 by 25 feet of space for each average-size family. Twelve of these barracks plus one community mess hall, one bath-and-laundry building, and one recreation hall made up a standard block.

Each family living compartment was provided with standard Army cots and with a stove for heating purposes.

Practically all construction and improvement work over and above this subsistence base was carried out by the evacuees themselves after their arrival at the center. The plan followed was to bring into each center first a small contingent of evacuee specialists--such as cooks, stewards, doctors, and nurses--in order to prepare for the mass arrivals later. Then, as the center began to fill up and the people had a chance to become settled, improvements on individual family quarters and on the community as a whole were undertaken.

During the initial construction period, each relocation center was under jurisdiction of the Army officer in charge of construction work. Once the basic housing was completed, however, each center (except Colorado River, which is managed by the Indian Service) was turned over to the War Relocation Authority for administration.

Evacuee Employment

The tenth of a million people involved in the West Coast evacuation--roughly two-thirds of whom are American citizens--have only one readily distinguishable characteristic in common: Japanese racial stock. In practically every other respect, they are as heterogeneous a group as--for example--the 110,000 residents of the State of Nevada. Occupationally, they run the gamut from learned doctors of philosophy

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to muscular young men without special training or skills. The group includes doctors, lawyers, and business executives as well as farmers, fishermen, and truck drivers. Despite a marked concentration in some occupations (such as agriculture and retail trade) and a subnormal proportion in others (such as engineering), the evacuee population as a whole embraces virtually every major occupational group.

Effective employment of this sizable reservoir of manpower and talent has been one of the most pressing tasks of the War Relocation Authority. Mass idleness, clearly, would be damaging to evacuee morale, costly to the taxpayer, and inexcusable in a national period of decreasing manpower and all-out production. Almost since March 18, the Authority has concentrated a major share of its attention on finding and creating suitable work opportunities for the evacuees and on gearing their activities into the war effort of the Nation. At first, as Director Eisenhower told the House subcommittee, the Authority

"...had in mind what might be thought of as a five-point program. We planned for relocation centers in such places that there would always be public works to do, such as conservation, subjugation of land, and so on.

"Second, there would be opportunities for producing agricultural crops.

"Third, we would establish some small industries.".....

"Fourth, if there developed definite labor shortages in the Western States, particularly in Montana, parts of Utah, Idaho, Colorado, eastern Oregon and elsewhere, we have hoped from the first that conditions could be worked out so it would be possible for the evacuees to engage in private employment during portions of the year particularly in agricultural work.

"And, fifth, certainly in the beginning, we hoped it would be possible for many of the evacuees to establish their own communities and to be entirely self supporting."

This was the program which was presented by the Authority for discussion at a conference held with officials of 10 western States at Salt Lake City on April 7. At that conference the trend of opinion among State officials was sharply against private resettlement and even antagonistic to private employment. Some of the officials present served notice that they would assume no responsibility for the safety of evacuees brought into their States unless the evacuees were kept under constant and vigilant guard. Others expressed serious concern that the evacuees might purchase land in their States and thus become permanently established.

As a result of this meeting and of similar comments made publicly by other State officials, the Authority decided to lay aside for the time being plans for private resettlement and to concentrate on the first four phases of the program.

In order to provide employment at the centers and hold down the costs of program administration, the Authority early determined that each relocation community should be as nearly self-sufficient as possible. One step in this direction was the selection of areas with distinct agricultural potentialities so that evacuees with farm experience might produce a maximum of the foods needed for their own community kitchens. Another was the planning of Government-sponsored manufacturing projects at relocation centers to turn out articles needed by the individual

to muscular young men without special training or skills. The group includes doctors, lawyers, and business executives as well as farmers, fishermen, and truck drivers. Despite a marked concentration in some occupations (such as agriculture and retail trade) and a subnormal proportion in others (such as engineering), the evacuee population as a whole embraces virtually every major occupational group.

Effective employment of this sizable reservoir of manpower and talent has been one of the most pressing tasks of the War Relocation Authority. Mass idleness, clearly, would be damaging to evacuee morale, costly to the taxpayer, and inexcusable in a national period of decreasing manpower and all-out production. Almost since March 18, the Authority has concentrated a major share of its attention on finding and creating suitable work opportunities for the evacuees and on gearing their activities into the war effort of the Nation. At first, as Director Eisenhower told the House subcommittee, the Authority

"...had in mind what might be thought of as a five-point program. We planned for relocation centers in such places that there would always be public works to do, such as conservation, subjugation of land, and so on.

"Second, there would be opportunities for producing agricultural crops.

"Third, we would establish some small industries.".....

"Fourth, if there developed definite labor shortages in the Western States, particularly in Montana, parts of Utah, Idaho, Colorado, eastern Oregon and elsewhere, we have hoped from the first that conditions could be worked out so it would be possible for the evacuees to engage in private employment during portions of the year particularly in agricultural work.

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WR: Durrig, Jan. 1945, 1946-1947

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evacuees (such as clothing) and goods required by the communities as a whole (such as school furniture). A third step along this line was the employment of evacuees in (1) construction of buildings other than basic housing, (2) a whole range of community service occupations at the centers, and (3) various clerical and other phases of project administration and maintenance.

The task of planning work projects at relocation centers was complicated to some extent by the peculiar age distribution of the American Japanese people. Because the early wave of immigration from Japan to the Western United States (before 1908) consisted mainly of single men and married workers who brought their wives over at a later date, there was a marked tendency among alien Japanese families to have children relatively late in life. This trend, combined with the virtual non-existence of Japanese immigration since 1924, has produced in 1942 a population with an abnormally heavy concentration of elderly people and adolescents or children and a marked sparseness of individuals in the supposedly most productive years of middle life. Because of this situation, it was necessary in planning the work program at relocation centers to place special emphasis on jobs requiring relatively limited skills and on tasks which the older evacuees could perform without undue physical hardships.

The question of compensation for evacuees working at relocation centers under War Relocation Authority supervision was one of the most difficult problems which the Authority faced in its early days. Purely

WRH: Quantity, same as above reports, 1942-1943

from a public relations standpoint, it seemed unwise to pay evacuees at the centers a higher wage than the minimum wage of the American soldier, which was then \$21 a month. On the other hand, in fairness to the evacuees, the scale had to be set sufficiently high to provide some incentive for productive work, and to enable the workers to purchase needed items not furnished by the Authority. After considering a variety of plans, the Authority finally decided to provide all evacuees with food, shelter, and medical care (plus education for the children) and to pay those who worked on relocation projects at the rate of \$12, \$16, or \$19 a month. Tentatively, the \$12 category was defined to cover unskilled or semi-skilled workers; the \$16 category to include the skilled workers; and the \$19 group those with professional skills or supervisory responsibilities.

Opportunities for private employment outside the centers first began to develop on a significant scale during the latter part of May and the early weeks of June. At that time the deepening manpower shortage in agricultural sections of the West was beginning to be acutely felt and the need for labor in the sugar beet fields was especially urgent. At the suggestion of public officials in some of the principal sugar-beet producing States, plans were developed by the Authority and the United States Employment Service to recruit groups of evacuees in assembly and relocation centers for agricultural work. Under the plans as developed, recruitment during May and June was handled on a wholly voluntary basis by the Employment Service in cooperation with representatives of the sugar companies.

In order to protect the interests of both the evacuee and of the general public, the War Relocation Authority and the Wartime Civil Control Administration established a number of definite requirements which had to be met before evacuees could be employed in any specific agricultural area. These were (1) written assurance from the State governor and local law enforcement officials that law and order would be maintained, (2) provision by the employer of transportation from the assembly or relocation center to the place of employment and return, (3) payment of prevailing wages, (4) no displacement of local labor, and (5) certification by the United States Employment Service that satisfactory housing would be provided to the evacuees without cost in the area of employment. Although these conditions were established jointly by the War Relocation Authority and the military authorities (because much of the recruiting took place in assembly centers), in actual operation compliance phases of the program were handled by the Authority.

By the end of June, more than 1,500 evacuees were at work in the best fields of eastern Oregon, Idaho, Utah, and Montana. Through their efforts, large acreages of a vitally needed crop were saved. In fact, this work was probably the most direct and forceful contribution to the war effort made by the evacuees during the first quarter-year of the relocation program.

Work Corps

The War Relocation Work Corps was established on March 18 by the same Executive Order which created the War Relocation Authority. Chief purpose contemplated for the Corps was to provide a means for mobilizing employable evacuees, for classifying their skills, and for safeguarding the interests of those who might leave the centers on private employment. During the first quarter-year of the program, enlistment in the Corps was actually carried forward at only one relocation center--Colorado River. At the other two operating centers--Manzanar and Tule Lake--evacuees requesting employment were simply assigned to work without the necessity of enlisting in the Corps. At the close of the quarter the Authority was engaged in a thorough re-examination of the whole concept of the Corps--its possible functions, structure, values, and limitations.¹

Public Works

Because most of the relocation centers are situated in wilderness-type areas, the principal public works activity planned for evacuees in the immediate future is the job of bringing raw, undeveloped land into agricultural production. Through this type of work, the residents of the relocation communities will make a valuable permanent contribution to the welfare of the sections in which the centers are located and to

¹ Under provisions of Administrative Instruction No. 27 issued on September 1, evacuees are now being automatically enrolled in the Work Corps--without necessity of enlistment--as they are assigned to specific jobs at relocation centers.

W.H.S. Quarterly, 1942-1943, pp. 1-11

the Nation as a whole. Eventually they should add many thousands of acres to the country's actively productive land resources.

Of the 10 centers, all but the two in Arkansas are in arid or semi-arid sections of the country and will need irrigation work. Tule Lake, Minidoka, and Heart Mountain, lying within the boundaries of projects of the Bureau of Reclamation, will be developed in line with the plans and specifications of that agency. Colorado River and Gila River, both located on Indian reservations, include lands that were earmarked for irrigation by the Indian Service before the outbreak of war. Manzanar, although limited in agricultural potentialities, will be irrigated so that subsistence crops may be produced on a few hundred of the most fertile acres. Granada and Central Utah already have irrigation systems which will require some repair, reconditioning, or extension to meet the agricultural needs of the evacuee populations.

The Arkansas areas--Rohwer and Jerome--lie in the fertile Mississippi Delta section where rainfall averages better than 50 inches a year. At both centers one of the major jobs planned for the evacuees is the construction of drainage systems to keep the community farms clear of surplus water. Like the western relocation areas, however, Rohwer and Jerome will also need clearing and levelling before crop production can move into full swing. Both areas are now covered in large part by rather dense stands of second-growth timber (in contrast to the brushy cover of the more arid western areas) and farm land will almost literally have to be hacked out of the woods.

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During the first quarter, possibilities for other useful public projects to be undertaken by the evacuees off the relocation areas (such as road construction, reforestation, soil conservation, flood control, and the like) were explored with a number of public agencies. No definite plans, however, were formulated for works of this kind.

Agriculture

Since nearly 45 per cent of all the gainfully employed evacuees were engaged in agriculture (as managers, operators, or laborers) prior to evacuation, farm work will naturally occupy a prominent place in the employment program at relocation centers. Primary aim of this activity at each center will be to produce a maximum proportion of the foods needed by the resident population. A secondary goal will be to raise a surplus for shipment to other relocation centers. And a third objective will be to grow crops especially needed in the Nation's war effort or for shipment under the Lend-Lease Program. Although some of the centers such as Manzanar will probably never be able to grow vegetables in sufficient quantity to meet the community needs, others such as Colorado River and Gila River are expected eventually to contribute substantial amounts of food and fiber toward the winning of the war.

In the first quarter-year of the program, the most active relocation center, agriculturally, was Tule Lake where much of the land was ready for planting when the first evacuees arrived toward the end of May. By June 30, about 2,500 acres of the area's fertile loamy soil had been planted in barley and a variety of table vegetables. Through-

out the fall of 1942, the Tule Lake farm lands were expected to supply all the needs of the community for cabbage, carrots, beets, potatoes, onions, rutabagas, turnips, parsnips, and spinach and to produce a surplus of most of these crops for shipment to other centers. To pick up the burden of food production in the latter months of the year when the harvest at Tule Lake begins to taper off, plans were made at Gil River for an intensive planting program during the winter season. Because of the warm, dry climate of this area and the existing irrigation system extending over nearly half the land, the prospects were that it would be one of the principal sources of winter vegetables for evacuee communities in the first year of the relocation program.

Due to the expense connected with establishment of dairy or beef herds at relocation centers, livestock plans for the evacuee communities were confined mainly to the raising of hogs and poultry. At some of the centers, however, shortages of local milk supply seemed to indicate the need for a dairy program within the centers, at least on a limited scale.

Manufacturing

To provide work opportunities for evacuees with manual skills, the Authority explored a wide range of comparatively simple industries which might be established at relocation centers. Here again, the primary objective was to meet requirements of the evacuee population.

A secondary goal was to produce items which are needed in the war effort and which are not now being turned out in sufficient quantity by the private industries of the Nation.

With only 27,000 evacuees in relocation centers on June 30, the industrial program of the Authority remained chiefly in the blueprint stage during the first quarter. The only industry in actual operation at the close of the fiscal year was a camouflage net factory at Manzanar developed in cooperation with the Army Corps of Engineers. Here, nearly 500 evacuees were employed in garnishing simple nets with colored pieces of fabric in summer, winter, and desert patterns at a rate of several thousand nets a month. Plans for expanding this project and for establishing net-garnishing factories at other centers were being formulated at the close of the quarter.

Aside from the Manzanar net factory, the three chief industrial projects in prospect on June 30 were (1) a clothing factory at Manzanar, (2) a furniture plant at Tule Lake, and (3) a tent-making establishment also at Tule Lake. Both the clothing and furniture factories will employ between 300 and 500 people and both will produce for relocation community needs. Tents produced at Tule Lake, however, will be sold to the Army.

In keeping with the Geneva Convention of 1929, alien evacuees were not permitted to work on projects involving production of goods

WRH: Quantity, same as previous reports, 1942-1943

for the Nation's armed services. Although the Geneva Convention applies only to prisoners of war and was not ratified by the Japanese government, both the United States and Japan have recently agreed through neutral diplomatic channels to extend its applicable provisions so as to cover alien civilians who are interned (in either country) as well as Japanese subjects in the United States who are quartered at relocation centers.¹

Community Consumer Enterprises

In addition to agriculture, manufacturing, and land development, community consumer enterprises provide a fourth major field for employment of evacuees at relocation centers. Like any other community with a population of 10,000 or 15,000 people, each relocation center will need a variety of establishments--such as retail stores, barber shops, beauty parlors, newspapers, motion picture theaters, and credit agencies--to provide goods and services over and above the subsistence items supplied by the War Relocation Authority. Community enterprises are defined to include all such undertakings.

¹ A sharp distinction should be drawn at all times between residents of relocation centers--even the aliens--and prisoners of war or civilian internees. The aliens residing at relocation centers have been found guilty of no crime and no acts or intentions against the security of the United States. They have simply been evacuated as a group, in the interest of military security, from specific military areas. Prisoners of war, on the other hand, are members of the enemy armed forces seized in combat operations. Civilian internees are aliens of enemy nationality--Japanese, German, or Italian--who have been apprehended by the FBI and found guilty by enemy alien control hearing boards of acts or intentions against the national security. They are confined in internment camps administered by the Army and not quartered at relocation centers.

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During the first three months of the relocation program, community enterprises of various kinds were established by the War Relocation Authority at all operating centers. By June 30, community stores or canteens were doing business at all three centers, with an average weekly turnover of several thousand dollars. At Manzanar and Tule Lake, mimeographed newspapers were being published daily by evacuee staffs of editors, reporters, and typists working under War Relocation Authority supervision. Barber shops and beauty parlors were also beginning to make their appearance. Through all such developments, life at the centers was beginning to rise slowly but steadily above the subsistence level.

At the same time plans were being made for eventual transfer of these enterprises to evacuee management and for the establishment of community enterprises in the future along consumer cooperative lines.

Community Services

As distinguished from community enterprises, the field of community services includes those jobs which are directly connected with operation and maintenance of the relocation centers. In accordance with established WRA policy, properly qualified evacuees are used to the greatest possible extent in all such occupations.

During the first quarter-year of the program, more evacuees were employed in community service jobs than in any other field of employment at relocation centers. While plans for agriculture, manufacturing, land development, and community enterprises were being developed and gradually

put into operation, the need for qualified people on operation and maintenance jobs began with arrival of the first contingent of evacuees. Accordingly, this initial contingent at each center was made up in large part of cooks and waiters for the dining halls, truck drivers and mechanics for the transportation and supply services, carpenters for construction work, stenographers and clerks for the administrative offices, and other evacuees who played an active part in getting the community ready for subsequent arrivals. As other contingents arrived to swell the population and the need for community services broadened, plans were made for carrying forward recruitment in this field until each center reached its population peak.

Some of these service jobs are basic to the whole scheme of community life at the centers and will continue as long as the centers remain in operation. Others, however, are important merely during the early stages of settlement and will provide employment opportunities only for a limited time.

Education

Because roughly one-fourth of the entire evacuee population is under 15 years of age, education occupies an unusually prominent place in the relocation program. Of necessity--because whole families were evacuated together--the schooling of thousands of evacuee youngsters ranging from kindergarten pupils to university graduate students was temporarily interrupted by the evacuation. From the very beginning,

however, the War Relocation Authority has worked actively to provide for resumption of normal educational processes both inside and outside the relocation centers.

Since the first three relocation centers were only beginning operations toward the very close of the academic year, chief attention was centered on development of plans for the opening of the fall term. To provide for the operation of elementary and high schools within the relocation centers, the Authority negotiated formal agreements with the Departments of Education of both California and Arizona. Under terms of the Arizona agreement, educational officials of the State will guide and assist the Authority in development of the curriculum and in recruitment of teachers for schools at both the Colorado River and Gila River centers. The California Department agreed to provide similar assistance in connection with the schools at Manzanar and Tule Lake and also-- provided necessary State legislation is enacted--to furnish funds for the purchase of text books and the payment of teachers' salaries. If the legislation is passed, the schools at Manzanar and Tule Lake will be incorporated (as special districts) within the regular California public school system.

Although the Authority planned to make fullest possible use of qualified evacuees in filling teaching positions at relocation center schools, the shortage of trained teachers among the evacuee population soon necessitated plans for recruitment of Caucasians. As a partial remedy for this situation, a teachers' training course for evacuees

was initiated at the Colorado River Center under Indian Service supervision and plans were made for similar courses at the other centers. Recruitment of teachers for all relocation centers--both evacuee and Caucasian--will be carried forward in accordance with standards prevailing in the State where each center is located.

Because school buildings are not among the basic housing units provided by the Army Corps of Engineers at relocation centers, arrangements were made directly by the War Relocation Authority to construct schools at all three operating centers.

With the War Relocation Authority providing education at relocation centers only through the high school level, special arrangements have been necessary to provide for continuance or initiation of college and university studies. Almost since the beginning of evacuation, a number of non-governmental organizations, most notably the American Friends Service Committee, have been working on this problem. With the formation of the National Student Relocation Council in the latter part of May, the efforts of these groups were amalgamated and brought into sharper focus.

The Council, established with the express approval of the War Relocation Authority and the War Department and composed of a number of college presidents and other prominent educators, rounded out its formal organization in a meeting held at Chicago on May 29. President John W. Mason of Swarthmore College was elected chairman and national headquarters were established in Philadelphia. During June the activities of the

Council were carried forward by two coordinate groups. The West Coast subcommittee, operating under the leadership of Joseph Conard, concentrated its efforts on registration of students wishing transfer and on investigation of their academic fitness and financial status. The eastern group, with President Robbins W. Barstow of Hartford (Conn.) Theological Seminary as executive secretary, meanwhile directed its efforts toward determining which colleges or universities outside the evacuated area would accept evacuee students and how many evacuees might thus be transferred. Clearance of colleges with the War and Navy Departments was handled by the War Relocation Authority.

At the same time the Authority was exploring with a number of college officials the possibilities of extension or correspondence courses in relocation centers so as to provide for the needs of students unwilling or unable to transfer to outside institutions.

Medical Care

Considered against the background of swift evacuation and wilderness-type surroundings, the health record at relocation communities during the first quarter year of the program has been highly encouraging. There have been no serious epidemics at any of the three operating centers. The most serious health problem has been eye strain caused by the glaring sun and blowing dust at all three centers.

Hospitals, ranging in size from 150 to 250 beds, were built at each of the operating centers by the Army Corps of Engineers and furnished by the Army with necessary supplies. In staffing the hospitals, the

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Wm. Dunnington

Authority (in line with its over-all employment policy) recruited as many doctors and nurses as possible from the evacuee population. Early in the program, however, it became apparent that there would be some shortage of doctors and a serious shortage of nurses among the evacuees. Caucasians will be recruited for the positions which cannot be filled by qualified persons of Japanese ancestry.

Since home medical facilities were almost completely lacking in relocation centers, the scope of hospital operations was considerably more extensive than would be expected in normal communities of similar size. Virtually every illness of any real consequence was, of necessity, a case requiring skilled medical attention. At Manzanar, for example, the hospital staff between March 22 and June 30 handled 568 in-patients, 6,528 out-patients, 116 surgical cases, 19 births, and 28,000 typhoid inoculations. The other two centers, established at a somewhat later date, produced a comparably heavy load for the medical staff.

Dental offices were also established at the three centers and staffed with evacuee dentists. Although the War Relocation Authority was unable to provide suitable facilities for these offices during the first quarter-year, the evacuee dentists at Manzanar brought their own equipment into the center and were able to provide comparatively high-quality treatment for approximately 2,500 patients.

In Washington the United States Public Health Service has provided technical guidance in development of the War Relocation Authority's over-all medical program. An Assistant Surgeon General, assigned to the Authority as medical consultant in late May, spent virtually full time

in June on organization of the medical program and on establishment of public health standards for the relocation centers.

Community Government

From the beginning, one of the basic aims of the War Relocation Authority has been to provide the evacuees with the fullest possible measure of autonomy in the conduct of their community affairs at relocation centers. Since only one of the centers--Manzanar--was occupied close to its full capacity during the first quarter, nothing more than a rough beginning on community government was possible. At all three of the operating centers, however, evacuee governments of a temporary nature were established and functioning by the end of June.

At Manzanar, the block (comprising roughly 250 evacuee residents) was the basic unit of the tentative governmental structure. As each block filled up, an election was held by all employable evacuees over 16 years of age to choose a representative. These block representatives performed two broad types of functions. As individuals, they cooperated with the administrative staff at the center in transmitting official instructions and policies to the residents of each block. As a group, they formed the temporary community council advising the administrative staff on all matters affecting community welfare and serving as an intermediary body between the official staff and the community at large. At this center alone, both alien and American-born evacuees were eligible for elective office, and the community council actually chosen contained a majority of older, non-citizen residents.

Protestants. Discussion groups were formed. A rough beginning was made on adult education. Steps were taken to establish local chapters of national organizations such as the Red Cross, the YMCA, the YWCA, the Boy Scouts, the Campfire Girls, and the American Legion.

But in these somewhat abnormal communities, where children and adolescents made up an uncommonly large part of the total population, the most striking manifestation of social life was the prominence of sports and recreation. Although facilities for organized recreation were not provided by the Federal government, the evacuees lost little time in organizing a program of leisure-time activities. Making use of equipment which they brought into the centers or simple facilities donated by church and welfare groups, the younger residents in particular were soon engaged in a variety of athletic contests and other forms of play. In firebreaks between the blocks, baseball diamonds and other playing fields were laid out, and baseball or softball teams were quickly organized by both the boys and girls. At Manzanar, for example, there were upwards of 100 such teams organized into approximately a dozen leagues by the end of June. In all three centers, evacuees formed dramatic clubs, presented vaudeville shows, dances, and wrestling contests, participated in public forums, and developed many other similar activities and organizations.

Fiscal and Personnel

Since the War Relocation Authority was established by executive

order rather than by Congressional enactment, funds for operation during the first quarter were provided from the President's Fund for Emergency Operations. Three allotments, totalling \$8,000,000 were made to the Authority from this fund before the end of June. To cover relocation operations in the fiscal year starting on July 1 and ending on June 30, 1942, an estimate of \$70,000,000 was presented to the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress for consideration.

As of June 30, the Authority's administrative staff was composed of 272 employees, at the following locations:

Washington Office	50
San Francisco Office	132
Denver Office	2
Manzanar*	21
Tule Lake	61
Colorado River**	6
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TOTAL	272

* Part of project staff still on payroll of Wartime Civil Control Administration.

** Bulk of staff on payroll of Indian Service.

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Raymond B. Spicer
Roma 821

II

S E C O N D

Q U A R T E R L Y R E P O R T

July 1 to September 30
1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

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SECOND QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

July 1 to September 30
1942

PROGRESS OF RELOCATION

When the War Relocation Authority began its second quarter-year of operations on July 1, 1942, only three of the ten relocation centers planned for West Coast evacuees of Japanese ancestry had actually been opened. One of these--at Manzanar, California--had nearly reached its population capacity. The other two, however, were still receiving contingents of evacuees by train almost every other day, and the great bulk of the evacuated people were still in assembly centers under jurisdiction of the Army awaiting transfer to WRA's relocation communities. Opportunities for private employment of evacuees outside the evacuated area were just beginning to open up in the sugar-beet fields of the intermountain States and a few other localities. Policies governing the relocation program had been laid down in broad outline only and many major questions of procedure still remained to be answered.

At the close of the quarter, three months later, all the relocation centers but one--Jerome in southeast Arkansas--had been opened. Five of them were close to their population capacities while the other four were still receiving contingents. Over 90,000 evacuees, or roughly 80 per cent of the evacuated population, had been transferred to the nine operating centers. Nearly 34,000

of these had already been assigned to jobs at the centers and another 5,000 had left the relocation areas temporarily for harvest work in the sugar-beet fields and other agricultural areas of the West.

Meanwhile, policies covering virtually all the major phases of relocation life--policies on evacuee employment and compensation, on self-government and internal security at the centers, on education, agricultural production, consumer enterprises, and a number of other subjects--had been hammered out and were swiftly going into effect. Regulations under which evacuees might leave the relocation centers indefinitely to resettle away from the evacuated area had been developed and were announced in the Federal Register on September 29. As the quarter ended, with most relocation centers either at or near their population capacities, the War Relocation Authority was already taking definite steps to promote their eventual depopulation and to encourage the gradual reabsorption of the evacuated people into the normal fabric of American life.

The Movement to Relocation Centers

By June 5, when the movement of evacuees from their homes in Military Area No. 1 into assembly centers was completed, the second stage of the evacuation process--transfer to relocation centers--was already under way. Throughout the summer and into the early fall, contingent after contingent of evacuees boarded

trains at the assembly centers and travelled hundreds of miles farther inland to the partially completed relocation centers. Meanwhile, on July 9 the Army started moving another 8,000 or 9,000 people of Japanese ancestry from their homes in the eastern half of California (the Military Area No. 2 portion of the State) directly into relocation communities.

In planning the movement to relocation centers, every effort was made to hold families intact and to bring together people who came originally from a common locality. Evacuees from the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, were first moved to the Tanforan and Santa Anita Assembly Centers and later reunited at the Central Utah Relocation Center. Colorado River Relocation Center drew its population largely from the Imperial Valley, from the Salinas and Pinedale Assembly Centers, and from Military Area No. 2. The two northern-most relocation centers--Minidoka in Idaho and Heart Mountain in Wyoming--received their contingents mainly from the assembly centers at Puyallup, Washington and at North Portland, Oregon. Gila River absorbed the whole population of the assembly centers at Tulare and Turlock, plus several contingents from Santa Anita and others from Military Area No. 2.

Despite this general pattern, however, some mingling of heterogeneous populations was inevitable. Evacuees at the big Santa Anita Assembly Center, for example, were widely dispersed in the movement to relocation centers. These people, most of whom were originally from Los Angeles, were scattered among the Gila River,

Granada, Central Utah, and Rohwer Relocation Centers. Another group was scheduled for movement into the Jerome Relocation Center during the month of October. At Granada, where the highly urban Santa Anita people were combined with predominantly rural contingents from the Merced Assembly Center, some minor tensions had already developed between the two groups before the close of the quarterly period. Sincere efforts were being made on both sides, however, to create a better mutual understanding and to develop greater community solidarity.

Community Construction

Seriously hampered by wartime shortages of materials and wartime transportation problems, construction of the relocation communities went busily forward under supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers throughout the summer months. At most centers, the building of evacuee barracks was finished on or very close to schedule. Installation of utilities, however, involved more critical materials and consequently moved forward at a considerably slower rate. At some of the centers, evacuees were forced temporarily to live in barracks without lights, laundry facilities, or adequate toilets. Mess halls planned to accommodate about 300 people had to handle twice and three times that number for short periods as evacuees poured in from assembly centers on schedule and shipment of stoves and other kitchen facilities lagged behind.

In a few cases, where cots were not delivered on time, some newly arriving evacuees spent their first night in relocation centers sleeping on barracks floors. At nearly all centers, evacuee living standards temporarily were forced, largely by inevitable wartime conditions, far below the level originally contemplated by the War Relocation Authority.

By the close of the period, most of these difficulties were either straightened out or well on the way to solution. At all the older centers, basic construction had been finished; and even in the newer communities, it was rapidly nearing completion. Still ahead for the War Relocation Authority and the evacuees, however, was the sizable job of constructing buildings which were not included in the agreement with the War Department--buildings such as school houses and living quarters on the relocation areas for the WRA administrative staff. On September 30, with the fall term already started at most public schools in the United States, evacuee children were getting ready to resume their education in barracks and other buildings which were never intended for classroom use. As the quarter closed, the Authority was still seeking priorities on building materials for schools and for staff living quarters at all the centers.

Evacuee Induction

As each group of evacuees arrived at a relocation center,

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Evacuee Induction

As each group of evacuees arrived at a relocation center,

its members were first registered (by family groups) and then assigned to living quarters. The procedure at the Granada Center, which was fairly typical, consisted of five principal steps: (1) a medical check, (2) issuance of registration and address forms to each family group, (3) assignment to quarters, (4) emergency recruitment of evacuees needed in the mess halls and other essential community services, and (5) delivery of hand baggage to individual families.

The induction process, with the exception of delivering the heavy baggage, consumed about two hours on the average, for each contingent. Particular care to house friends and relatives near each other required about thirty minutes more than would have been otherwise necessary.

Employment at the Centers

Once the members of an evacuee contingent were assigned to living quarters and reasonably well settled at a relocation center, the next step was to register them for employment. At the placement office, all evacuees over 15 years of age who wanted work were registered and given an occupational classification. At the same time, the placement office was constantly receiving requisitions for workers from the chief steward, the chief engineer, the internal security head, and other WRA staff members in charge of the many

branches of community operations. Every effort was made to assign each evacuee to a job for which he was fitted by previous experience, training, and special aptitudes.

The job of compiling a comprehensive personal and occupational record on every evacuee resident was completed during the quarter only at the three oldest centers--Manzanar, Colorado River, and Tule Lake. At all other operating centers, this record taking was still in progress on September 30.

At all centers, the biggest and most immediate need for workers was in the field of community operation--in food preparation, winterizing of living quarters, health and sanitation, internal security, fire protection, and similar activities. Only at the older centers were any substantial number of evacuees employed during the quarter on agricultural production, manufacturing projects, or consumer enterprises. The first job was to get people adequately fed and housed and to safeguard community health.

Toward the close of the quarter, the tentative policies which had governed evacuee employment and compensation at relocation centers since the beginning of the program were modified somewhat, spelled out in further detail, and more sharply defined. The longer-range policy adopted on September 1 carried the following main provisions:

1. All evacuees residing at relocation centers are to receive food, shelter, medical care, and education for their children without charge.

2. Those who work at the centers will be paid at the rate of \$12, \$16, and \$19 a month. Most working evacuees will receive \$16. The \$12 category will include only apprentice workers and those needing close and constant supervision. The \$19 group will consist of only professional or highly skilled workers and those carrying supervisory responsibilities or engaged in unusually difficult and essential jobs.
3. In addition, each working evacuee will receive nominal clothing allowances for himself and all his dependents. These allowances will vary somewhat for people of different ages and for centers with varying climates. At the four southerly centers (the two in Arizona and the two in Arkansas), the allowances will be \$3.50 per month for evacuees over 16 years, \$3 for those between 8 and 16 years, and \$2 for children under 8. At the six northerly centers, the monthly rate will be 25 cents higher in all three categories. Thus, a semi-skilled evacuee at the Minidoka Center in Idaho with a dependent wife, a dependent son aged 15, and a dependent daughter aged 5 would receive for his work each month a cash advance of \$16 plus a clothing allowance

of \$13, or a total of \$29 a month.

4. As each evacuee who applies for work is assigned to a specific job at a relocation center, he automatically becomes a member of the War Relocation Work Corps. All members of the Corps will be rated periodically on the quality of their work and those who carry out their duties with special diligence, efficiency, or skill will receive merit designations.
5. At each center, members of the Work Corps will elect a Fair Practice Committee of seven members or less to serve for a 6-month term. The job of this committee is to handle all complaints regarding employment classifications, conditions of work, and employment compensation. Wherever possible, the committee will try to adjust difficulties by direct consultation with the people involved. Where this fails, it will conduct an investigation and make recommendations to the WRA employment officer at the center.

As the quarter ended, these policies were rapidly being put into effect at all operating centers.

STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT AT RELOCATION CENTERS
September 30, 1942

<u>Name of Center</u>	<u>Number of Evacuees in Residence*</u>	<u>Number Employed At Center</u>	<u>Number Residing Outside Center on Seasonal Farm Work</u>
Manzanar	9,056	4,159	1,060
Colorado River	17,245	7,711	561
Tule Lake	14,646	6,000	822
Gila River	11,553	3,900	---
Minidoka	8,042	3,033	1,444
Heart Mountain	9,995	3,858	877
Granada	6,892	1,200	527
Central Utah	5,803	2,334	11
Rohwer	<u>2,264</u>	<u>815</u>	<u>--</u>
TOTALS.....	85,946	33,010	5,302

* Not including those away from the centers as members of agricultural work groups.

Employment Outside the Centers

As the manpower shortage in western agriculture grew constantly more acute, opportunities for private employment of evacuees outside relocation centers increased steadily throughout the summer months. At the beginning of the quarter, there were approximately 1,500 evacuees from both assembly and relocation centers at work in the sugar-beet fields and other agricultural areas of eastern Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Utah. As the summer wore on and the harvest season approached, new demands arose for evacuee labor not only in these four States but also in Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska, and Arizona. In late August and throughout September, recruitment was speeded up at all operating centers. By the close of the period, 5,302 evacuees had left the relocation centers for group agricultural work and another several hundred originally recruited from assembly centers were still at work on farms in the intermountain region.

During the late spring and early summer, recruitment of evacuees for seasonal farm work was handled at both assembly and relocation centers mainly by representatives of the beet-sugar companies in collaboration with the United States Employment Service. Recruitment for the fall harvest season, however, was carried forward chiefly by the War Relocation Authority. Under a procedure announced by the Authority on September 1 and actually initiated some weeks earlier, each farm operator in need of evacuee workers was required to fill out an "Offer of Employment" form indicating

definitely the type of work involved, its probable duration, the wages offered, and the housing facilities available. These forms were submitted by the farm operators to the nearest office of the Employment Service and then forwarded to relocation centers for submission to the evacuees. Prime advantage of the procedure was that it gave the individual evacuee a somewhat clearer picture of the conditions under which he might work and thus tended to accelerate the whole recruitment process.

Meanwhile employment opportunities began developing for evacuees in a variety of non-agricultural lines in many parts of the country. In September one group of twenty former railroad workers were permitted to return to their former occupations as maintenance workers on a railroad in eastern Oregon. During the same month two transcontinental railroads filed applications with the Authority for more than a thousand maintenance employees. Before the close of the quarter, the Authority had received requests for office workers in Chicago, social case workers in New York, seamen for Atlantic shipping, hotel workers in Salt Lake City, settlement house workers in Chicago, science teachers in North Dakota, an architect in Philadelphia, jiu-jitsu instructors at an eastern university, wine chemists in Oregon, linotype operators in Utah, diesel engineers in the Midwest, dental technicians in Cleveland, laboratory technicians in a hospital in Michigan, and many others.

Leave Regulations

As the Nation's manpower shortage grew steadily more widespread and acute throughout the summer months, increasing emphasis was placed by the War Relocation Authority on evacuee employment outside the relocation centers. With every passing week, it became more and more obvious that the productive energies of some 40,000 adult and able-bodied evacuees could not be used to maximum advantage within the boundaries of these government-operated communities. Accordingly, a program under which properly qualified evacuees might leave the centers indefinitely for private employment, higher education, and other purposes was gradually developed throughout the second quarter.

The first evacuees to leave the centers for group agricultural work in the sugar-beet fields were released under a series of civilian restrictive orders issued by the Western Defense Command. Each of these orders was issued only to cover one or more specific counties and only after the Governor of the state and county officials had given assurances that law and order would be maintained. In each case, the evacuee workers were required to stay at all times within the county or counties covered by the order and to return to the center at the termination of the job. In short, the procedure was designed merely to cover seasonal agricultural work; the problem of leaves for year-round employment and for higher education still remained.

The first step toward solution of this problem was taken on July 20 when the Authority adopted a tentative policy permitting indefinite leaves. Under this policy, only American-born evacuees who had never lived or studied in Japan were permitted to apply for indefinite leave; and such leaves were granted only to applicants who had definite offers of employment somewhere outside the eight western States (i.e. the seven westernmost States plus Montana) which are included in the Western Defense Command. Before an indefinite leave permit was granted by the National Director in any individual case, the applicant was carefully investigated by the WRA staff at the center and a record check was made with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Just before the close of the quarter, on September 26, the Authority issued a considerably more comprehensive and liberal set of leave regulations which appeared in the Federal Register of September 29 and were to become effective on October 1. Under these regulations, any evacuee--citizen or alien--may apply for leave to visit or reside in any locality outside the evacuated area. Three types of leave from relocation centers are covered by the regulations: (1) short-term; (2) work-group; and (3) indefinite.

Short-term leave is intended for the evacuee who wishes to leave the center for a period of a few weeks or so in order to consult a medical specialist, negotiate a property arrangement, or transact some other similar personal business. It is granted by

the Project Director (the WRA official in charge of the relocation center) for a definite period after careful investigation by the WRA staff at the center. In cases where the Project Director denies an application for short-term leave, appeal may be made to the National Director whose decision is final.

Work-group leave is designed for evacuees who wish to leave the center as a group for seasonal agricultural work. Like short-term leave, it is granted by the Project Director for a definite period (which may be extended) and is subject to investigation at the center. Wherever possible, a record check is made with FBI and the intelligence services on applicants for work-group leave. But such leave may be granted by the Project Director without this check if he feels that circumstances warrant.

Indefinite leave is granted to evacuees only by the National Director and only if four specific requirements are met: (1) the applicant for such leave must have a definite offer of a job or some other means of support; (2) he must agree to keep the WRA informed of any changes of job or changes of address; (3) his record at the relocation center and with the FBI and the intelligence services must contain no evidence of disloyalty to the United States; and (4) there must be reasonable evidence that his presence will be acceptable in the community where he proposes to make his new home.

All these types of leave may be granted subject to such

specific conditions as circumstances seem to warrant and may be revoked by the National Director in any case where the war effort or the public peace and security seem to be endangered.

With the adoption of the leave regulations, the movement of the Japanese-American people who formerly lived on the far western frontier entered its fourth, and perhaps its final phase. The first phase was the period of voluntary evacuation which occurred during late February and most of March when some 8,000 people of Japanese ancestry left the Pacific Coast military zones on their own initiative and resettled in the interior States. The second phase was the planned, orderly, supervised movement to assembly centers which took place between late March and early June. The third phase was the transfer to relocation centers which has already been described in this report and which was nearing completion as the second quarterly period closed on September 30. The fourth phase, made possible by the leave regulations, might be called the period of resettlement outside relocation centers.

As the quarter closed, the Authority was making definite plans for this phase of the program and placing special emphasis on it. In fact, resettlement outside relocation centers had become the primary aim of the relocation program. This does not mean that the Authority was contemplating an immediate and wholesale exodus from the centers. The somewhat elaborate machinery of checks and clearances involved in applications for indefinite leave, the

difficulties encountered by evacuees in arranging for jobs without the opportunity to deal with prospective employers in person, the still-evident anxieties felt by many communities toward all people of Japanese ancestry, the reluctance of many evacuees themselves to leave the sanctuary of relocation centers in time of war-- all these things suggested that individual resettlement would doubtless be a slow and gradual process. Within the limits prescribed by national security and administrative expediency, however, the Authority had determined to work toward a steady depopulation of the relocation centers and a widespread dispersal of evacuees throughout the interior sections of the country. This, in essence, is the real meaning of the leave regulations which became effective on October 1.

Student Relocation

Looking forward to the opening of the fall term at colleges and universities, the War Relocation Authority and the non-governmental National Student Relocation Council intensified their efforts throughout the summer to arrange for the attendance of properly qualified evacuee students at institutions outside the evacuated area. By September 30, a total of 143 colleges, universities, and junior colleges had been approved for student relocation by both the War and Navy Departments. Included were such liberal

arts colleges as Swarthmore, such state universities as Nebraska and Texas, such women's colleges as Smith and Radcliffe, such Catholic institutions as Gonzaga, such teachers' colleges as Colorado State College of Education, such theological seminaries as Union, such technical institutions as the Milwaukee College of Engineering, and such specialized schools as the Northern College of Optometry and the Oberlin Conservatory of Music.

Under the tentative leave policy adopted on July 20, a total of 250 students were granted educational leaves from assembly and relocation centers prior to September 30. Some of these students left during late July and August to attend summer sessions at various institutions, but the majority went on leave in September and resumed their educations with the opening of the fall academic term. A number of additional applications for educational leave were pending as the quarter ended.

Conservation of Evacuee Property

During the quarter, the responsibility for assisting evacuees in conservation of their property--a responsibility which was handled by the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and the Farm Security Administration at the time of evacuation -- was finally assumed by the War Relocation Authority. To carry this work forward, a Division of Evacuee Property was established in

the San Francisco office and small branch offices were set up in Los Angeles and Seattle. The Division made its services available to evacuees in connection with all property problems which arose subsequent to evacuation or all such problems which the evacuee could not handle himself or through an authorized agent.

The following list indicates the principal services which the Division of Evacuee Property was established to render for evacuees:

1. Secure tenants or operators for both agricultural and commercial properties.
2. Negotiate new leases or renewals of existing leases.
3. Obtain buyers for real or personal property of all kinds.
4. Effect settlement of claims for or against an evacuee.
5. Adjust differences arising out of inequitable, hastily made or indefinite agreements.
6. Obtain an accounting for amounts due, and facilitate collection thereof.
7. Ascertain whether property is being satisfactorily maintained or whether damage or waste is occurring.
8. Check inventories of goods and equipment, and recommend utilization of material for the best interests of the evacuee and the nation.

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8. Check inventories of goods and equipment, and recommend utilization of material for the best interests of the evacuee and the nation.

The Division works toward two main objectives: (1) conservation of property in behalf of the evacuee and (2) promotion of the use of that property in behalf of the national war effort. Usually these two objectives are intimately related. Farmlands, for instance, need to be kept in production to provide the food so much needed by America's armed forces at home and abroad and in discharging our obligations under the Lend-Lease program to our allies. Finding a competent tenant for an evacuee's farm, if the evacuee has been unable to do so, is thus a service both to the evacuee and to the nation at large. In much the same way, the finding of competent operators for residential properties--apartment buildings, hotels, and homes--in a city where war industries have created an acute housing shortage is a service in behalf of the owner, the community, and the national war program.

Around Los Angeles, most of the requests for property assistance received by the Authority involved the liquidation of small shops or the disposal of store furnishings and fixtures. In all such cases, bids were obtained and submitted to the owners. In the Seattle area, on the other hand, the problems were largely agricultural and presented serious difficulties because of the labor shortage that has interfered with harvesting the berry and fruit crops. In Seattle, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, there were many commercial property problems including the operations of hotels and rooming houses.

During the quarter, conferences were held with the Farm Security Administration, with officials of the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco, and with the Federal Reserve Branches in Seattle, Portland, and Los Angeles. Information gathered by both agencies on evacuee properties was made available to the Authority. Conferences were also held with San Francisco representatives of the Alien Property Custodian to clarify the understanding of each office as to the functions and activities of the other and to eliminate duplication and conflict.

Household goods and other personal properties which evacuees could not readily take with them to assembly and relocation centers presented a wholly different set of problems. At the time of evacuation, the Federal Reserve Bank at San Francisco and its branches on the West Coast acting for the War Department leased 19 warehouses (totalling 386,000 square feet of space) in the principal cities of the evacuated area and offered to store the household furnishings and similar properties of evacuee families without charge until such time as these goods could be shipped to relocation centers. Only 2,867 families, however, took advantage of this service. Hundreds of other families stored their furnishings in community churches, stores, private warehouses, and other buildings in widely scattered communities.

During the quarter, responsibility for the storage of evacuee personal property was transferred to the Authority by Federal Reserve and leases for all 19 warehouses were assigned to

the Evacuee Property Division. By September 30, seven of these warehouses with a total of 84,000 square feet of space had been cleared, either by shipments to relocation centers or by transfer to other warehouses not completely filled. Meanwhile, the Authority agreed to provide storage for evacuee personal properties stored in private buildings if the evacuee owner would first pay the cost of transportation to a government-leased warehouse where WRA could assume charge. At the close of the period, the Evacuee Property Division was making plans to reopen several of the cleared government warehouses in order to receive the property formerly stored by evacuees in private buildings.

Evacuee Self-Government

Under a tentative policy formulated by the War Relocation Authority in early June, evacuee residents at all operating relocation centers took steps to establish temporary community governments during the summer months. On August 24, the Authority adopted a more definite policy on this question and encouraged the evacuees to move toward a more stable form of government at the earliest feasible date. By the end of September, temporary community councils had been elected at all centers except the two in Arkansas. At the three oldest centers--Manzanar, Colorado River, and Tule Lake--the evacuees were already drawing up detailed plans for a long-range governmental structure.

Under the policy adopted on August 24, community government at the relocation centers will assume a form roughly comparable to municipal governments throughout the United States. Five main types of governmental bodies were suggested by the Authority to meet the needs of the centers.

1. The temporary community council is designed to serve as an interim point of contact between the WRA staff and the evacuee residents during the period when the community is getting settled and while evacuees are still arriving. Its function is to advise with and make recommendations to the Project Director pending establishment of a long-range governmental system. All residents 18 years or over are eligible to vote in the election for members of the temporary council. The general rule, however, is that members of the temporary council must be American citizens 21 years or over.
2. The organization commission is comparable to a constitutional convention. Selected by a variety of methods and generally including some of the more experienced alien residents as well as the younger American citizens, the commission is set

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up to draft a long-range plan of government for the center. The plan finally developed is first submitted to the Project Director (who makes certain that it is consistent with WRA policy) and then is laid before the whole community in a special referendum. If approved by the Project Director and by a majority of the qualified voters, it becomes, in effect, the official charter for the community government and can be amended only by a majority of the qualified voters. By the close of the quarter, such commissions had been selected and were conducting their deliberations at Manzanar, Colorado River, and Tule Lake.

3. The community council is the legislative and policy-forming body of the long-range governmental set-up. Under the policy of August 24, both the basis of representation and the method of selection of the council were left open for decision by the organization commission. In order to recognize the special status of American-citizen evacuees, the Authority decided to limit membership on the councils to citizen evacuees 21 years of age or over. All residents 18 years or over, however, are entitled to vote, to hold non-elective offices in the community, and to serve on committees of the community council.

At some of the centers, special advisory committees composed of alien residents will probably be formed to consult with the council on questions of community policy especially those affecting the alien group. The principal functions of the council are (a) to enact regulations in the interest of community welfare and security and prescribe penalties (but not fines) for their violation; (b) to present resolutions to the Project Director; (c) to solicit, receive, and administer funds and property for community purposes; and (d) to license and require reasonable license fees from evacuee-operated enterprises. The policy-forming functions of the council are, of course, in addition to and not in any sense a substitute for those exercised by the Project Director and the WRA administrative staff.

4. The judicial commission, composed ordinarily of three to nine evacuee members, will be analogous to a criminal court in an ordinary American community. It will try evacuees who are arrested for alleged violation of community statutes and will hand down decisions which will be promptly

submitted to the Project Director for review. Decisions which are not overruled by the Project Director within 24 hours after submission will become final. From a strictly legal standpoint, the judicial commissions at relocation centers will not have any status as courts. Although they will perform court-like functions, they will actually be administrative bodies making recommendations to the Project Director.

5. The arbitration commission is the relocation community counterpart of a civil court under American law. Its function is to hear any dispute of a civil nature between residents and to recommend a method of settlement to the Project Director. Composition of this commission and method of selecting its members are to be decided at each center by the organization commission and made a part of the community charter.

The position of block manager, which was established by the close of the quarter at nearly all operating centers, is quite distinct from the community council. In contrast to the council members, block managers are evacuee administrative officers, appointed generally by the Project Director, to serve as his personal liaison with the residents of the various blocks in the community.

They may be young American citizens but are more likely to be men of considerable maturity and therefore from the alien group. Among other duties, a typical block manager will (1) keep the residents of his block informed of official rules and policies announced by the Project Director; (2) see to it that the physical plant is kept in a state of repair; (3) collect and distribute mail; (4) assist in the adjustment of housing difficulties; (5) distribute supplies such as brooms, soap, and blankets; and (6) assist residents in emergency cases such as serious illness.

Consumer Enterprises

Under a policy adopted on August 25, evacuees at all relocation centers were definitely encouraged to set up consumer enterprises (such as stores, canteens, and barber shops) and to establish at each center an over-all consumer cooperative association organized along consumer cooperative lines. These associations, once organized and incorporated, will take over management of all stores and service enterprises previously established by the Authority and will assume full responsibility for setting up and managing any similar undertakings needed in the future. By the end of the period, considerable progress in the organization of such associations had been made at all the older centers. But only one center--Manzanar--had a fully organized association actually incorporated under state law.

At most centers, stores or canteens of one kind or another were established within a few days after arrival of the first evacuee contingent. Initial stocks of goods were purchased on credit usually from nearby wholesalers or occasionally from large retailers who offered a discount. From a range of only a few items, often quickly sold, these stocks increased rapidly as the population swelled and new demands became known.

Under the policy of August 25, the final organizational pattern of the consumer enterprise association at each center was left largely in the hands of the evacuees. Three basic principles, however, were established: (1) unlimited voluntary membership for all residents; (2) only one vote per member and no proxy voting; and (3) limited interest rates plus restricted capital investment. All enterprises were encouraged to make sales at prevailing market prices and to distribute earnings in the form of patronage dividends rather than in the form of price reductions. Exceptions to this principle, however, were expected especially in the case of service-type enterprises such as barber shops and beauty parlors. Privately-owned consumer enterprises at relocation centers were expressly prohibited and business of the enterprises was strictly limited to a cash basis.

Education

Despite a complete lack of construction materials for school buildings, a marked shortage of qualified teachers, and a scarcity

of school furniture and equipment, schools for evacuee children were either open or virtually on the point of opening at all centers (except the two in Arkansas) as the quarter ended.

At Manzanar the elementary schools opened on September 15 in unpartitioned recreational barracks without any lining on the walls or heat of any kind. Within two days a cold wave combined with dust storms at the center had forced the schools out of operation until the barracks could be lined and stoves could be installed. A reopening in early October was expected.

At Tule Lake both the elementary and high schools opened on September 14 with a total enrollment of more than 4,000 and classes were going forward as the quarter ended. At Heart Mountain on the final day of the period, one of the community's five elementary schools was opened and the others were getting ready for immediate operation. At most other centers, an opening in early or middle October was in prospect.

The most serious problem at all centers was the lack of construction materials. As indicated earlier, the Authority was trying to obtain priorities for such materials from the War Production Board when the quarter ended. During the period, however, not even a start was possible on school buildings at any of the centers, and there seemed little prospect that buildings would be completed and ready for occupancy anywhere before the beginning of the second school semester. At all centers barrack buildings intended for other

purposes were being converted into temporary schoolrooms by laying linoleum on the floors and providing additional wall insulation.

The problem of textbooks and equipment was somewhat less acute. Although laboratory and shop-course facilities were virtually unobtainable, considerable equipment of other kinds was obtained from surplus NYA and WPA stocks and shipped to the centers. At the two California centers--Manzanar and Tule Lake--plans made during the first quarter to obtain free textbooks by having the schools incorporated as special districts in the regular public school system of the State were frustrated through an adverse ruling by the State Attorney General. Thousands of used text books, however, were obtained from schools in California, such as those in Los Angeles, which formerly had rather heavy enrollments of Japanese-American children.

As the quarter closed, most high school teaching positions had been filled at the older centers, but there was still a definite need for more elementary teachers at these centers and for instructors at all levels in some of the newer relocation communities. Properly qualified teachers of science and mathematics proved especially difficult to find. At most centers, it was necessary to recruit some teachers who had been out of the profession for a number of years; and at all centers, training courses for evacuee teachers were either under way or definitely in prospect.

Day nurseries for the children of pre-school age were opened at all centers except the very newest ones during the summer months.

The opening of these nurseries enabled many of the younger mothers to accept jobs and replace men who had left the centers on sugar-beet employment. Teachers were recruited from the evacuee population and many had acquired a high degree of proficiency before the summer had ended.

Adult education classes were started at practically all operating centers during the summer and additional courses were being planned as the period ended. Some of the most popular courses were in sewing, costume design, dressmaking, current events, stenography, mathematics, and English.

College extension courses were in prospect at most centers when the quarter ended. Although 250 evacuee students had transferred by September 30 to institutions outside the evacuated area under the student relocation program and many more were awaiting transfer at a later date, there were still hundreds who were unable, principally because of inadequate funds, to continue their education outside the centers. With these evacuees especially in mind, the Authority attempted during the quarter to arrange with State universities for courses to be given at the centers in the basic college subjects either by correspondence or through extension lecturers. No such courses, however, were actually initiated during the period.

Health and Sanitation

Considering the handicaps, the health record at relocation

centers continued to be good throughout the second quarter. Especially at the older centers, definite improvements were made in community sanitation and in the hospital and clinical facilities for handling both in-patients and out-patients. Although housing and sanitary facilities were little above the standards established by the Geneva Convention, no serious epidemics occurred and the incidence of illness was no higher than would be expected in ordinary communities of similar size and age composition.

By September 30, the main hospital buildings constructed under supervision of the Army Engineers had been completed at Manzanar, Colorado River, Tule Lake, and Heart Mountain and were under construction at the other six centers. Additional buildings to handle out-patients were also under construction at Tule Lake and under consideration at Manzanar and Colorado River.

While shortages of some drugs and supplies were encountered, all those essential to the health of the evacuee patients were available. In some cases requiring special facilities which were not available, patients were transferred to hospitals outside the centers for suitable medical attention.

Lack of personnel was also a severe handicap. The number of available evacuee doctors and nurses, never completely adequate

for the needs of the population, had to be stretched even farther during the summer months as evacuees moved from assembly to relocation centers. As this movement went forward, it was necessary to maintain a reasonably adequate health staff not only at the assembly centers being evacuated, but also at relocation centers being established, and on the trains carrying evacuees. Assignment of doctors and nurses was made primarily with a view to establishing a well-rounded medical staff at each of the relocation centers but also with an eye to the personal wishes of the individuals involved. In some cases, it was necessary in the interest of adequate medical service to assign evacuee doctors and nurses to a particular center without regard for personal preferences.

Essentially, the health program at most centers was still on an emergency basis as the quarter ended. Tentative plans, however, were being formulated at all but the very newest centers for a long-range program involving all aspects of community health service.

Community Welfare

Although subsistence is provided without charge to all evacuee residents of relocation centers and work is made available as rapidly as possible, there are inevitably a considerable number of people left without adequate means to provide for all their minimum needs.

With such people especially in mind, the Authority during the second quarter established schedules and regulations covering both unemployment compensation and public assistance grants.

Under the employment and compensation policy of September 1, provision was made for unemployment compensation. Any evacuee who applies for work and is assigned to a job or who is laid off through no fault of his own may apply to the Authority for such compensation covering himself and his dependents. Rates of unemployment compensation were established at \$4.75 per month for men 18 and over; \$4.25 for women 18 and over; \$2.50 for dependent children between 13 and 17 inclusive; and \$1.50 for dependent children under 13.

Under a policy adopted just one week earlier, the Authority provided for public assistance grants to deserving evacuees who are not in a position to benefit either from the employment program or from unemployment compensation. These would include (1) evacuees who are unable to work because of illness or incapacity; (2) dependents of physically incapacitated evacuees; (3) orphans and other children under 18 without means of support; and (4) the heads of families which have a total income from all sources inadequate to meet their needs.

Mess Operations

The job of feeding nearly 100,000 evacuees was unquestionably the biggest single task faced by the War Relocation Authority during

the second quarterly period. It required more manpower than any other phase of the program, cost more money, and called for more detailed planning.

Menus at all centers were based on those prepared by the Subsistence Section of the Service of Supply Division of the Army. Approximate cost of food for evacuees averaged about 45 cents per person per day. Staple products were purchased through nearby quartermaster depots of the Army in sufficient quantity to last for a period of 30 to 45 days. Perishable commodities were bought generally on the open market.

At all centers an attempt was made to satisfy both the Americanized tastes of the second-generation evacuees and the predominantly Oriental appetites of their alien elders. Fancy grades of provisions, however, were expressly prohibited and rationing restrictions on sugar (the only food rationed during the quarterly period) were strictly observed.

At all operating centers, special facilities were established for the feeding of babies, nursing mothers, invalids, and hospital cases. Because of acute dairy shortages in the areas surrounding most of the centers, fluid milk was served ordinarily only to evacuees (such as those mentioned above) who had a need for special dietary treatment.

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Police and Fire Protection

With military police guarding the exterior boundaries of each relocation center, the War Relocation Authority took active steps during the quarter to set up police and fire protection activities within each operating community. Since these two fields of activity were second in importance only to mess operations, recruitment for the police and fire departments was usually started at each center immediately after arrival of the advance contingent. As subsequent contingents reached the center, recruitment was continued and training programs were initiated.

Although a policy covering internal security at the centers was not issued by the Authority until August 24, police departments at most centers were well on the road to organization prior to that date. Under the policy, the internal security force at each center is responsible for handling cases of misdemeanor while felonies are to be turned over to the proper outside authorities. Efforts were made during the quarter at all operating centers to establish patrols of evacuee wardens in three 8-hour shifts so that the communities would have constant police protection all around the clock. Violations of law and order at the centers during the period were confined mainly to misdemeanors.

In the field of fire protection, definite progress was made at all operating centers. During the quarter, three pumpers were

received at Tule Lake; three at Colorado River; two at Minidoka; two at Gila River; and one at Manzanar. A Fire Protection Adviser attached to the San Francisco office of WRA visited all five of these centers, inspected the equipment, and assisted the center fire departments in the removal of fire hazards. At most centers, fire prevention programs of an educational type were launched, and by the close of the period plans were well under way for observance of National Fire Prevention Week. No serious fires occurred at any of the centers. Perhaps the most costly outbreak was a blaze at Tule Lake which caused a total property damage of around \$4,000. A fire at Heart Mountain destroyed one of the laundry buildings.

Agriculture and Manufacturing

Although plans were made during the first quarter for rather extensive agricultural production and considerable manufacturing work at relocation centers, noteworthy progress in these two fields was possible during the second quarter only at the older centers and even there accomplishments fell somewhat below earlier expectations. Three main causes were responsible. First was the unsettled condition of the newer centers which compelled a concentration of attention on the primary job of community stabilization. Second was the exodus of many of the most able-bodied and productive evacuees for the sugar-beet harvest and other outside employment. Third was a very real shortage of adequate farm machinery and manufacturing equipment.

As the quarter ended, a few of the sugar-beet workers were beginning to filter back into the centers and others were expected in the later fall months. Adoption of the leave regulations, however, suggested the real possibility that many of the more productive evacuees would soon be leaving the centers permanently and that the agricultural and manufacturing programs should accordingly be revised further downward. Looking ahead to the future, it seemed distinctly possible that agricultural work at relocation centers might be confined largely to production of subsistence crops and that manufacturing work might occupy a considerably less prominent place than originally contemplated.

Religious Activities

A policy statement covering religious worship at the centers was issued by the Authority on August 24. Under this policy, evacuees of all denominations are permitted to hold services at the relocation centers and to invite outside pastors in for temporary visits with the approval of the Project Director and the community council. The Authority expressed a willingness, if construction materials should become available, to provide at least one house of worship for the use of all denominations at each relocation center. Qualified pastors among the evacuee residents are permitted to practice their religions and to hold services but are not entitled to work compensation from

the Authority for such activities. They may, however, hold other jobs at the centers on the same basis as all other evacuees. During the quarter, no church buildings were constructed at any center and services were held generally in the recreation barracks. At most centers, interfaith councils composed of Protestant, Catholic, and Buddhist representatives were organized and programs of coordinated religious activity initiated.

Evacuee Newspapers

As evacuees poured into the centers throughout the summer, those with journalistic experience or aspirations and especially those who had worked on mimeographed newspapers at the assembly centers quickly set about organizing similar papers in their new localities. By September 30, newspapers or information bulletins of some sort were being issued regularly at all centers except the two in Arkansas and the one in Colorado.

During the first quarter, mimeographed papers had been established at Manzanar and Tule Lake. The Manzanar Free Press, dating back to mid-April when the center was still under WCCA management, was the first relocation center paper to change its format and become an independent journal. On July 22, the members

of the Free Press staff, after negotiating with the manager of the Manzanar community store and the Chalfant Press in nearby Lone Pine, started publication of a four-page printed newspaper in tabloid form. In return for advertising space, the community store agreed to underwrite the cost of publication for a 90-day period. By the end of that period, it was hoped that the Free Press either would be self-supporting or could be incorporated into the regular consumer enterprise organization at the center.

All other relocation center papers being published at the close of the quarter were mimeographed and financed by WRA, but produced and edited by evasue staffs. The Authority agreed to provide each center with a mimeographed paper until such time as a consumer cooperative association could be organized and could assume responsibility for publication of a journal. The newspaper staffs were permitted freedom of expression on matters relating to community affairs.

The following papers were being published at relocation centers at the close of the quarter:

<u>Name of Paper</u>	<u>Frequency of Issue</u>
Manzanar Free Press	Three times a week
Tulean Dispatch	Daily
Poston Press Bulletin (Colorado River)	Daily

<u>Name of Paper (con'd.)</u>	<u>Frequency of Issue</u>
Gila News Courier	Twice a week
Minidoka Irrigator	Twice a week
Heart Mountain Information Bulletin	Twice or three times a week
Topaz Times (Central Utah)	Twice a week

In addition, a mimeographed magazine designed to provide an outlet for evacuee literary and graphic talents was being published monthly at Tule Lake.

Postal Facilities

To handle the large volume of incoming and outgoing mail, special branch postoffices were established at all operating centers, usually within a few days after arrival of the first evacuee contingent. These branch offices provided the residents with all the regular postal services such as money order, mail registry, C.O.D., and sales of United States war bonds. In addition, special sub-stations were set up in available barracks by the evacuees at some centers to handle distribution and collection of mail at various convenient points within the community. At other centers, internal distribution and collection of mail were handled by the block managers or by evacuee "mail carriers."

Evacuees handling mail were employed not by the Post Office

Department but by the War Relocation Authority under the regular employment program at the centers. These employees consequently were not bonded and were not permitted to sell money orders, register mail, or handle sales of war bonds and stamps. All such postal facilities were available only at the one main branch office where non-Japanese civil service employees of the Post Office Department were on duty.

Official addresses for the nine centers opened prior to September 30 are:

Manzanar	Manzanar, California
Colorado River	Poston, Arizona
Tule Lake	Newell, California
Gila River	Rivers, Arizona
Heart Mountain	Heart Mountain, Wyoming
Minidoka	Hunt, Idaho
Granada	Amache, Colorado
Central Utah	Topaz, Utah
Rohwer	Relocation Center McGehee, Arkansas

Individual Exclusion

During August and September, with the mass evacuation of people of Japanese ancestry virtually completed, the Army initiated

considerably smaller-gauge programs on both the East and West Coasts which brought new responsibilities to the War Relocation Authority. These programs, carried out under the same authority as the mass evacuation (Executive Order No. 9066), were aimed at excluding from designated military areas any individual--citizen or alien--whose presence was considered dangerous to the national security. Such a program was announced for the eight states of the Western Defense Command on August 19 and for the 16 Atlantic seaboard States of the Eastern Defense Command on September 10.

In connection with both programs, the Authority was called upon to assume responsibility for assisting in the relocation of the individual excludees. No attempt was made to provide special communities like the relocation centers where the excluded individuals could be temporarily quartered. Instead, the Authority merely undertook to assist them in making a purely personal type of transfer and adjustment. Once the excluder has become reasonably well settled outside the military area, responsibility for providing him and his dependents with any public assistance that may be necessary will rest with State welfare agencies and with the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Federal Security Agency.

Four types of assistance were contemplated by the Authority:
(1) advice and information to the excluder regarding employment opportunities and desirable work localities in unrestricted regions;

(2) transportation and subsistence during a temporary period of adjustment, usually not over four weeks; (3) assistance in connection with property problems; and (4) special guidance in connection with family difficulties. All these types of assistance will be made available only when requested by the excludee, and financial aid will be extended only in cases of actual need.

On the West Coast, the WRA end of individual exclusion was handled by the Division of Evacuee Property from its offices in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle. To handle the program on the Atlantic seaboard, special offices were established during the quarter at New York City and Baltimore and others were planned for Boston and possibly Atlanta.

Repatriation

Under arrangements conducted through neutral diplomatic channels, an exchange of nationals was effected during the summer of 1942 between the United States and Japan. On June 19, the Swedish Liner Gripsholm left New York Harbor with several hundred Japanese nationals aboard bound for the port of Lourenco Marques in Portuguese East Africa. At the African port the Gripsholm was met by 2 liners carrying American repatriates from Japan and Japanese occupied territory in the Far East; an exchange was effected, and the boats returned to their ports of departure.

Since the first sailing of the Gripsholm was given over largely to Japanese diplomatic representatives, consular officials, and their families and since it occurred during the midst of evacuation, only a limited number of West Coast evacuees could be included on the passenger list. Shortly before the sailing date, however, a number of alien evacuees whose repatriation had been requested by the Japanese government were interviewed at assembly and relocation centers and given an opportunity to book passage on the liner. A total of 47 people from various assembly centers and four from the Colorado River Relocation Center took advantage of this opportunity and were repatriated.

As the quarter ended, arrangements for repatriation of alien evacuees wishing to return to Japan on the next sailing of the Gripsholm (sailing date undetermined) were being handled by the War-time Civil Control Administration in collaboration with the State Department. Plans were being made, however, for the War Relocation Authority to take over the responsibilities carried by WCCA on this matter some time in the fall after all evacuees had been transferred to relocation centers.

Organization and Personnel

With national headquarters established in Washington, the War Relocation Authority had three main field offices during the

second quarterly period: San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rock.

The San Francisco office provided general supervision and administrative services to the six westernmost centers or those lying within the area of the Western Defense Command. The Denver office, with a much more limited staff, furnished similar supervision and service to the Heart Mountain and Granada Centers; and the Little Rock office, with nothing more than a skeleton staff, was set up to direct the work at the two centers in southeast Arkansas.

In addition, offices staffed simply by one or two men plus stenographers were set up at Los Angeles and Seattle to handle evacuee property problems and individual exclusion and at New York City and Baltimore to handle exclusion alone.

As the quarter ended, the Authority had in Washington, at the principal field offices, and at the relocation centers a total payroll of 1,157 full-time, regular employees. Of this total, somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 per cent were teachers recruited for duty at the relocation center schools. The staff was distributed as follows:

Washington	74
San Francisco	214
Denver	23
Little Rock	14
Manzanar	97
Colorado River	4*

* Bulk of staff on payroll of Office of Indian Affairs.

(continued)

Tule Lake	136
Gila River	125
Heart Mountain	115
Minidoka	69
Granada	106
Central Utah	56
Rohwer	46
Jerome	<u>78</u>
TOTAL	1,157

A CHRONOLOGY
OF EVACUATION AND RELOCATION

July 1---September 30

-1942-

- July 9 -- Evacuation of approximately 10,000 people of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 2 in California (eastern portion of the state) started, with movement direct to relocation centers instead of to assembly centers as in the evacuation of Military Area No. 1.
- July 9 -- Opening of WRA regional office at Little Rock, Arkansas.
- July 20 -- Adoption of WRA policy under which American-born evacuees who had never visited Japan were permitted to leave relocation centers for private employment especially in the Middle Western States.
- July 20 -- Opening of Gila River Relocation Center near Sacaton, Arizona.
- July 25 -- National Defense Appropriation Act including (among many other items) 70 million dollar appropriation for the War Relocation Authority for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943 signed by President Roosevelt.
- August 7 -- Evacuation of 110,000 people of Japanese ancestry from their homes in Military Area No. 1 and the California portion of Military Area No. 2 completed.
- August 10 -- Arrival of first contingent of evacuees to open the Minidoka Relocation Center near Eden, Idaho.
- August 12 -- Opening of Heart Mountain Relocation Center near Cody, Wyoming.
- August 18 -- War Department proclamation designating the four relocation centers outside the Western Defense Command as military areas issued by Secretary Stimson.

- August 19 -- Announcement by Lt. Gen. J. L. DeWitt of a program under which any persons deemed dangerous to military security would be excluded from vital areas in the Western Defense Command.
- August 24 -- Adoption of WRA policies on (1) internal security at relocation centers, (2) religion, (3) mess operations, (4) evacuee self-government, and (5) public assistance grants to evacuees.
- August 25 -- Policy adopted by WRA providing for the organization of evacuee consumer enterprises at relocation centers.
- August 27 -- Opening of Granada Relocation Center near Lamar, Colorado.
- September 1 -- Adoption of WRA policy on employment and compensation at relocation centers. Main provisions: (1) free subsistence for all evacuee residents of the centers; (2) a wage scale of \$16 a month for most evacuees working at the centers; \$19 for professional employees, and \$12 for apprentices; (3) clothing allowances for all working evacuees and their dependents; (4) automatic enrollment in the War Relocation Work Corps of all evacuees assigned to jobs at the centers; (5) establishment of Fair Practice Committee and Merit Rating Board within the Work Corps at each center; and (6) unemployment compensation for evacuees involuntarily unemployed.
- September 10 -- Individual exclusion program for 16 states in the Eastern Defense Command announced by Lt. Gen. Hugh A. Drum, providing for the exclusion of "any person whose presence in the Eastern Military area is deemed dangerous to the national defense." The War Relocation Authority was authorized to assist persons excluded from either the Western or Eastern military regions to re-establish themselves in non-prohibited areas.
- September 11 -- Opening of the Central Utah Relocation Center near Delta, Utah.

- September 13 -- Order issued by Western Defense Command permitting evacuee workers at the Poston and Gila River relocation centers to enter certain parts of Military Area No. 1 in Arizona to assist in the harvest of the long-staple cotton crop.
- September 15 -- Announcement made that the evacuee Property Division of WRA at San Francisco had set up branch offices in Seattle and Los Angeles and was responsible for the administration of evacuee property holdings valued at more than two-hundred million dollars.
- September 17 -- Opening of Rohwer Relocation Center near McGehee, Arkansas.
- September 21 -- Joint Resolution introduced in the United States Senate by Senator Rufus C. Holman of Oregon proposing amendment to the Constitution giving Congress the power to regulate conditions under which persons subject to dual citizenship may become citizens of the United States.
- September 25 -- Offices of the War Relocation Authority opened in New York City and Baltimore to assist persons excluded from Eastern Military areas in finding work and homes in non-restricted areas.
- September 26 -- Issuance of WRA regulations to become effective October 1 under which any evacuee--U. S. citizen or alien--may leave a relocation center for temporary or permanent residence outside the evacuated area provided four conditions are met: (1) the applicant must have a definite offer of a job or some other means of support; (2) there must be no evidence on his record to indicate disloyalty to the United States; (3) he must agree to keep the Authority informed of any change of job or change of address; and (4) there must be evidence that he will be acceptable in the community where he plans to make his new home.

EVACUEE ANXIETIES AND TENSIONS

Behind the outward appearance of activity and progress that prevailed during the summer at relocation centers, there were signs at most centers of a growing community unrest. In the main, evacuee anxieties and tensions remained below the surface and were difficult to analyze or detect. But at two of the older centers, these feelings were more openly expressed and resentments boiled up in the form of "incidents."

Neither of these incidents involved physical violence. In both cases, the things that were said were far more important than the things that were done. But both occurrences were quite obviously manifestations of deep-rooted and chronic maladjustments and discontents within the community.

Incidents

The first of these manifestations occurred in the form of a meeting called together by some of the evacuees at one of the older centers on the evening of August 8. This gathering, held in one of the mess halls, was conducted entirely in the Japanese language and was attended by approximately 600 people. It was featured by strong arguments and sharp denunciations of living conditions at the center. Late in the evening the tone became so stormy that residents of nearby blocks were aroused and a member of the WRA

administrative staff finally called upon the throng to disperse. The meeting broke up immediately thereafter but the incident left the whole community in a state of anxiety and nervousness that lasted for many days.

At another of the older centers, evacuee tensions reached a pitch in the last days of September when representatives of the Office of War Information visited the center with the suggestion that evacuee residents participate in making radio transcriptions on relocation center life for broadcast to the Far East. Shortly after the OWI men arrived at the center on the morning of September 28, the question of evacuee participation in the transcriptions was discussed at considerable length with the members of the temporary community council. The council members--all of them American citizens and most of them in their early twenties--were at first inclined to favor the project. On further deliberation, however, they decided that the matter should be submitted to a group of representative alien evacuees since the transcriptions were to be made in the Japanese language and would necessarily involve the participation of the alien residents. Accordingly, a joint meeting was arranged for the following morning between the council members and the predominantly alien block managers. This meeting, which lasted from early in the morning until 11 o'clock at night, was punctuated by frequent emotional outbursts and finally wound up with a decisive vote against participation in the transcription project.

Administrative Background

The fact that both of these incidents occurred at older centers is highly significant. Throughout the summer, while construction was going forward and evacuee contingents were being received at most relocation communities, the three centers established during the spring had passed through these phases and were in the process of settling down. Yet the relocation program had failed in some ways to keep pace with the development of these older centers. The War Relocation Authority, operating in a new and complex field of government administration where there were virtually no precedents or guideposts, was compelled to exercise extraordinary care in working out basic policies and procedures. Many of the most fundamental decisions were not made until the latter part of August. Meanwhile administrative staffs at the older centers were faced with the problem of managing rapidly maturing communities within a framework of policies that were only partially matured or wholly undetermined.

In terms of evacuee living, this situation, coupled with the shortage of materials, produced some highly undesirable results. As employment programs were gradually being developed, many of the older evacuees in particular were left without work. Men and women who had spent virtually their whole lives in hard physical labor found time hanging heavy on their hands. While fiscal procedures

were being worked out and put into operation, those who did find jobs often went weeks and even months without pay. Recreation programs for the children lagged for lack of equipment. Construction of school buildings, described by the War Relocation Authority in an early pamphlet for evacuees as "one of the first jobs" to be accomplished at the centers, was held up by the shortage of materials. Under such circumstances, it is scarcely surprising that resentment was openly expressed. The really surprising fact, perhaps, is that these expressions were not more frequent and more intemperate in tone.

Yet it would be erroneous to ascribe the incidents that occurred wholly to administrative difficulties. Behind both of these incidents and similar (though less dramatic) manifestations even at the newer centers, there was a highly complex pattern of influences inherent in the very nature of the relocation program. Some of the more readily discernible of these influences are discussed in the following sections.

Cleavages in the Evacuee Population

At all the older centers as soon as the bustle and turmoil of the construction and induction period had died down, cleavages (some of which had existed long before evacuation) began to develop or reappear among the evacuated people. One line of cleavage already

noted was between evacuees from the larger cities and those with predominantly rural backgrounds. Another and far more serious one was between the American-born younger generation (nisei) and their alien elders (issei).

This schism was carefully noted and described by an alien evacuee resident of one of the older centers. Highlights of his report on the subject are given below:

"The government of the United States has, in the process of evacuating the Japanese, made little, if any distinction between aliens of enemy nationality (issei) and American citizens of Japanese parentage (nisei). While these groups are racially alike, and are closely bound in family ties, their background and conditioning are as far apart as those found in any other immigrant group.

"The nisei, and here I am speaking of those citizens who have resided here since their birth and have received the major part of their education in this country, are conscious of their American citizenship, their training in American schools in American way of thinking, and are imbued with ideals of American institutions. Before the outbreak of the present war they had come a long way toward assimilation, politically and economically, if not socially, into the American scene. They were just arriving at a stage where they can assert independence from the family control by the issei.

"The issei's stand in this war, with few exceptions, has been that of passive non-resistance. They have faithfully conformed to all government regulations concerning aliens of enemy nationality during wartime. They have shown.....willingness to work and to cooperate with the administration. Whatever grievance they may have, they have never expressed

it openly to the administration. Therefore, it is very difficult for the administrators of this camp to determine the attitude and reactions of its issei population.

"The nisei as a group are dissatisfied with the treatment they have received from the government. They are disillusioned--bitter. Many of them are frustrated and desperate.....It is a known fact that we have in the camp today certain elements who are working upon the bitterness of the nisei. These individuals are making agitational talks privately and publicly to whip the nisei sentiment into an anti-American mob hysteria. They are finding a ready response from many dissatisfied nisei.

"I am convinced, based upon my observation, that there are certain irreconcilable differences between the issei and nisei--namely, the question of attachment to their respective countries. Of course, every immigrant stock faces a conflict between the first generation with its old world ideals, philosophy and customs and the second generation to become extremely Americanized. The Chinese, the Irish, the Italians, and the rest have gone through this experience. The only marked, but extremely important difference with the Japanese, is that at the present time this generation-conflict is closely tied up with the question of loyalty, since Japan and the United States are at war.

"There are some issei, who are technically enemy aliens, but are just as loyal and more so than many nisei.....These individuals, for the most part, have arrived in this country when very young and have been educated and raised as Americans. Were it not for the act of Congress forbidding their naturalization, they would have become citizens long ago. There are a few others, who, because of political convictions, were anti-fascist even before the outbreak of the present war, and can contribute substantially toward the American

war effort and are anxious that they be called upon to perform some service to this country. They are, in a sense, in a same category as German refugees in this country."

The fact that the writer of this statement is himself an alien of course lends additional weight to the point he makes in his final paragraph. In this connection, the comment of a trained observer at one of the relocation centers is highly pertinent. "It is natural," he writes, "that the older people, the native born Japanese, should have a sentimental attachment to Japan. There can be little doubt that the great majority of them do have such feelings, and that they deeply enjoy their own music, songs, drama, traditions, and customs. This enjoyment is probably increased and sought as a refuge under the present circumstances of suffering.... loss of income and possessions, and fear of the future. This is not the same thing as pro-Axis plotting, but rather the up-surge of sentimental feelings mixed with a certain childish defiance in people who in their calmer moments are perfectly willing to be 'neutral enemy-aliens' and collaborate with the Government."

Feelings of Fear and Insecurity

Perhaps the most common emotion noted among the evacuated people during the second quarter was a profound feeling of insecurity or rootlessness. This feeling, which was probably an inevitable

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result of evacuation and of living conditions at the centers, was manifest at all but the very newest relocation communities.

Fears About the Post-War Future

The overwhelming fear of the evacuees--the one which most deeply influenced their efforts toward adjustment--was their anxiety about the post-war future. Younger evacuees in particular were frequently heard asking questions such as: "Where shall we go from here after the war?" "How shall we earn a living?" "What will be the long-time effect of life here upon our character, and how will we be affected in our future adjustments?" Against the background of the immediate past, very few even among the American-citizen evacuees were able to provide themselves with encouraging answers for these questions.

While the younger residents worried about occupational status, the older evacuees were more inclined to fear the effects of relocation life on family savings. Families which entered the centers with only a few hundred dollars savings--and often far less--were constantly uneasy about the prospect that they would spend more money at the centers than could be justified in the light of future family needs. The result was an increase in intra-family bickering and a tendency on the part of many to resist the formation of certain consumer enterprises and other undertakings that would encourage family spending.

Fears About the Breakdown of Family Authority

Almost every aspect of relocation center life--the mass feeding, the close quartering, the thin partitions between family compartments, the occasional doubling up of small families in a single compartment, the absence of normal economic opportunities--tended almost inevitably to disintegrate the pre-war structure of evacuee family life. Housewives, freed of all responsibility for family cooking and largely relieved of other household burdens, began to assert themselves more openly and sought about to find new outlets for their energies. This tendency was particularly disruptive among the older people since the housewife in Japanese society has traditionally occupied a distinctly inferior status. At the same time, however, these housewives and mothers were themselves profoundly disturbed by the lessening of parental authority over the children. Along with the fathers, they frequently voiced concern about the bad table manners, the increasing frivolity, and even the occasional insolence which they had noted in their sons and daughters since the arrival at relocation centers. The teen-age youngsters of Japanese ancestry, who had established an admirably low record of juvenile delinquency in their former homes on the Pacific Coast, showed a marked tendency toward rowdiness in relocation centers. And in more than one center, the formation of rather distinct juvenile "gangs" was noted.

The effect of all these trends particularly on the minds of the older people trained in Japan--where the sanctity of family ties is tremendously significant--can scarcely be overstressed.

Fears About Food

The fear of food shortage was directly related, on the one hand, to the kind of food served in the messhalls, and on the other, to the anticipation of transportation difficulties due to bombing or winter stalling. Whenever the meals were poor, the people exhibited anxieties of food shortage, and even went to the extent of looking into the warehouses. This concern about a prospective food shortage also arose from the popular conception about railway problems of snow-covered passes and bombed out tracks, a conception that was reinforced by the minor difficulties actually experienced at some of the centers. Women in some centers took to drying left-over rice in the sun with the thought that it might be saved for the day when there would not be "enough to eat in the messhalls."

Fear of violence

Some instances of physical violence occurred at the older centers, and reports on them spread widely and rapidly with the usual exaggerations of details. Many who were leaders in their former communities were reluctant to assume positions of responsibility at the centers because of their fear of difficulties with fellow members of the community, or even of violence from them. Persons who did assume responsibility were frequently threatened and in

some cases actually beaten. Agitators and individuals given to violence appeared more frequently among the bachelor aliens and the American-born evacuees educated in Japan, but the tendency was not absent (as already noted) among the youngsters born and reared in this country.

Fear of the "Outside"

In view of the WRA aim to encourage employment of properly qualified evacuees outside relocation areas, perhaps the most disturbing of all the fears exhibited by evacuees during the second quarter was their grave apprehension about the American climate of public opinion. This feeling, of course, was not without foundation. During the period of voluntary evacuation in March of 1942, migrating families of Japanese descent were sullenly received and even threatened with mob violence in many communities of the intermountain States. Even after voluntary evacuation had been prohibited, high public officials and organized groups continued to voice sentiments of wholesale animosity against all people of Japanese origin regardless of birth, upbringing, or individual attitudes. In editorial columns, and in the "letters to the editor" of many an American newspaper, the evacuees found a dominant tone of hostility and condemnation directed toward them. In some quarters, there was talk of mass deportation to Japan at the close of the war.

By the close of the summer, with thousands of evacuees out in the beet fields, these feelings had begun to be modified in many localities. But the prevailing temper of public opinion as it reached the eyes and ears of the evacuees was still basically hostile. And the evacuee fear of public reaction was perhaps the most serious single obstacle to optimum utilization of evacuee manpower both inside and outside the relocation centers.

Conclusions:

Many of these anxieties and tensions, of course, arose from the very newness of the relocation program and from the fact that evacuees had been plunged into a situation unlike anything they had ever experienced before. In the future, as the relocation centers lose some of their pioneer character and as policies and procedures become better known and more firmly established, many of the apprehensions which loomed so large in evacuee minds during the summer of 1942 will perhaps be replaced by confidence based on experience.

It was clear, however, by the close of the second quarter that there are many aspects of relocation center life which will probably continue to cause unrest as long as the centers remain in operation. Relocation center life, by its very nature, will probably never provide sufficient opportunity and incentive to the younger and more capable evacuees, and it is quite likely in some cases to have a long-range demoralizing effect.

In the light of such considerations and in view of the national manpower situation, the leave regulations which became effective on October 1 take on additional point and purpose. Under these regulations, the best qualified evacuees, who are usually also the most restive under the restrictions of relocation center life, will presumably be among the first to leave. The net long-range effect should be salutary both for the relocation centers and for the nation as a whole.

SUMMARY REPORTS ON THE CENTERS

Manzanar

Oldest of all the relocation centers, dating back to March 23 (as a reception center under the WCCA), Manzanar in the Owens Valley section of California had by September 30 taken on many of the aspects of a settled community. In place of the dust and bareness of late March, there were hundreds of green lawns around the barracks and Victory gardens in the firebreaks. Family living quarters, originally laid out in all barracks to accommodate a "standard" family of seven persons, had been improved and reconstructed so as to accommodate families of varying sizes. A printed newspaper, the only one at relocation centers, was appearing in four-page tabloid form three times a week. A 250-bed hospital, staffed by six doctors and five registered nurses, was efficiently caring for the health needs of the community. A cooperative enterprise

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association, incorporated under the laws of California, had taken over management of the general store and canteen and was in the process of setting up a barber shop, beauty parlor, shoe repair establishment, and motion picture theater.

Of the 9,057 evacuees actually in residence on September 30, more than 4,000--or approximately 80 per cent of the employables--were engaged in full-time jobs at the center. By far the greatest number, 1,503, were working in the dining halls and kitchens on the enormous job of feeding the entire community. Some of the American citizens were occupied on the garnishing of camouflage nets for the Army, others, aliens as well as citizens, took part in the manufacture of garments for residents at all relocation centers, the production of guayule plants, and a variety of community service jobs ranging from the copy desk of the newspaper to the collection of community garbage. By the close of the quarter, more than 1,000 men and 30 women evacuees had left Manzanar for the sugar-beet fields of Montana and Idaho.

Despite the departure of so many younger residents for harvest work, sports and recreation continued to bulk large in the total life of the community. Over 100 softball teams (74 for men, 16 for boys, and 19 for girls) were actively playing contests that sometimes drew as many as 3,000 or 4,000 spectators. Track, wrestling, and volleyball were also prominent on the athletic calendar. Two evenings each week throughout the summer, the residents enjoyed a program of recorded music known as Symphony Under the Stars

which was made possible by the use of a public address system owned and operated by three of the evacuees. At more or less regular intervals the residents also arranged parties, dances, and a variety of other social gatherings. Meanwhile handicraft classes were being organized and Boy Scout activities were moving into full swing.

The Center's small-scale agricultural program moved forward with the clearing of 165 acres and the planting of 120. Nearly \$25,000 worth of vegetables, melons, and tomatoes were produced and four carloads were shipped to other relocation centers. The previously neglected orchard of 600 apple and 400 pear trees which the evacuees found when they first arrived at Manzanar was rehabilitated sufficiently to produce nearly \$2,000 worth of fruit.

An interesting and distinctive feature of the center was the Children's Village composed of three specially constructed buildings and inhabited by about 60 children of Japanese ancestry from welfare homes in Los Angeles and San Francisco. These children, ranging in age from one to eighteen years, had their own special dining hall and a well organized program of institutional care. Plans were being made, however, to have them enrolled with the other children when the regular schools opened at the center.

One of the peculiar problems at Manzanar arose from the fact that this center was operated for more than two months (from March 23

to June 1) as a reception center by the Wartime Civil Control Administration. In many ways, the "temporary" pattern of administration which was naturally characteristic of all WCCA centers carried over even after Manzanar had officially been transferred to War Relocation Authority management. By the close of the quarter, however, most of the difficulties which resulted from the administrative transfer had been ironed out and management of the center was being completely keyed in with the national policies of the War Relocation Authority.

Colorado River

The one relocation area not directly managed by the War Relocation Authority--the Colorado River Center administered by the Office of Indian Affairs in the desert of western Arizona--achieved noteworthy progress during the second quarter along many lines despite the wilting summer heat.

Of the 17,245 evacuees in residence at the close of the period, 7,711 were employed on a variety of jobs at the center and only 498 classified as employable were still without work. As at all relocation centers, the great majority of workers were engaged on dining hall operations and other jobs essential to operation and maintenance of the community. In addition, 284 had been assigned to agricultural work, 239 to land clearing and levelling, and 144 to manufacturing projects.

Agricultural work at the center was retarded by the extreme heat (temperatures of 120 degrees or more in the sun were frequent throughout the entire period), by the absence (due to personal injury) of the agricultural director, and by the lack of suitable farming equipment. Major developments included (1) establishment of a guayule nursery, (2) planting of 85 acres of vegetables, (3) clearing of 80 acres for a poultry farm, and (4) clearing of another 80 acres for a hog farm. In addition, 80 acres were cleared for establishment of a fish culture plant to handle the stocking and breeding of perch, bass, carp, and other edible fish.

Manufacturing work remained largely in the planning and construction stages. Under sponsorship of the U. S. Corps of Engineers, construction was started on three camouflage-net-garnishing plants, one for each of the three communities that make up the center in which some of the American citizens would be employed. A noodle factory, established on September 1, averaged between 700 and 800 pounds of noodles daily throughout the remainder of the period. Three adobe brick factories, set up about half way through the quarter to provide construction materials for the community schools, had turned out a total of 85,000 bricks by September 30.

Although a cooperative enterprise association was not formally organized at the center during the quarter, rather definite plans were developed for one and considerable educational work on cooperative principles was carried out among the residents. At the

close of the quarter, canteens were in operation at all three communities while the largest and oldest of the three also had a beauty parlor, barber shop, and general store. Total business of all these establishments was \$83,998.04 in August and \$79,087.48 in September. From the profits, the unincorporated enterprise association subsidized a number of community recreational activities, including the exhibition of 16 mm. sound movies on a weekly basis at all three communities.

Plans for community government, first formulated during May and June, were revised in July and August in line with national policies established by the War Relocation Authority. Temporary councils were elected during the quarter at all three Poston communities. In addition, an advisory council of nine alien evacuees was elected in Community No. 1 to meet with the temporary council and to participate in the work of the governmental committees. A judiciary committee of three evacuees, established in July to hear all cases involving violation of the community Code of Offenses, convened twice weekly throughout the remainder of the period.

By the close of the quarter, a total of 561 evacuees had left the center for the beet fields of Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, and Nebraska. During the period there were 63 births and 28 deaths at the center.

Tule Lake

Favored with a fertile soil and a considerable acreage immediately available for cultivation, Tule Lake in extreme northern California functioned as the chief agricultural producer among relocation centers during the second quarter. From the 2,600-acre farm, evacuee agricultural workers in August and September harvested nearly 400 tons of potatoes and approximately 900 tons of other root crops and table vegetables. Out of this total harvest, valued at roughly \$26,000, some \$8,000 worth of vegetables was consumed at the center; another \$15,500 worth was shipped to Minidoka, Colorado River, Gila River, Manzanar, and Central Utah; and \$2,700 worth was sold on the open market. A hog farm and a poultry farm were just getting under way at the close of the quarter.

With 802 men out in sugar beet work and another 20 working for the Great Northern Railroad in Oregon, the population of the center on September 30 stood at 14,646. Of this number, approximately 7,000 had been classified for employment and approximately 6,000 had actually been assigned to jobs. During the quarter, construction crews completed the interior lining of nearly all barracks for winter protection and made a substantial start on the erection of three factory buildings--one for the garment factory and two for the

tent-making plant. Excavation work was finished for all three buildings and concrete foundations were laid for two by September 30.

Schools were opened on September 14 in the recreation halls with an enrollment of 2,430 in the high school and 1,519 in the three elementary schools. Although a temporary furniture factory established in one of the warehouses managed to provide some equipment, there was a definite shortage of desks, chairs, and tables throughout the last two weeks of September. The teaching staff, originally planned to include 38 non-Japanese and 12 evacuee teachers in the high school and 30 non-Japanese and 8 evacuee teachers for the elementary schools, was short at the close of the quarter (due to resignations and recruitment difficulties) by 22 high school instructors and 8 grade school teachers.

Definite progress was made at the center in the organization and operation of community enterprises. On September 30, the community had four stores handling a variety of merchandise, a combined beauty and barber shop, a shoe repair establishment, a watch repair shop, a radio repair shop, and a laundry. Together, these enterprises in September had a combined payroll of 205 evacuees and did a total business of more than \$90,000. Throughout the latter part of the quarter, plans for the organization of a cooperative enterprise association to manage all these undertakings

were developed by a special congress of delegates composed of one representative elected by the residents of each block. On September 28, the congress met and nominated a panel of candidates for the association's board of directors. Election of the directors was scheduled for October 1, 2, and 3.

With completion of the base hospital in July, the health program at the center advanced rapidly. The medical staff, comprising both evacuee and non-Japanese doctors and nurses, handled over 9,000 clinic patients in July and August. During September the program was further expanded to include the immunization of children against whooping cough, diphtheria, and lockjaw.

On Labor Day, the residents of the center staged one of the largest outdoor shows held to date at any relocation community. The program, which featured a flag dedication ceremony, a parade, a beauty queen contest, exhibits, talent shows, and athletic contests, attracted nearly 14,000 spectators or roughly 90 per cent of the total population.

Gila River

On July 1, the Gila River Relocation Center in the desert of south-central Arizona was still in the throes of construction. Nineteen days later, when the advance contingent of evacuees arrived from Turlock Assembly Center, construction was badly behind schedule

and community utilities were operating on only a fractional basis. In the weeks that followed, as evacuees continued pouring in on schedule and the building program continued to lag, housing facilities were stretched almost to the breaking point. On August 8 Butte Camp--the smaller of the two communities that make up the center-- was completed. From August 12 through August 20, while construction on the other camp was getting under way, this community, with a capacity of only 5,000 evacuees, had to house between 6,000 and 7,000 people. Evacuees overflowed the barracks and were temporarily crowded into every available recreation hall, laundry, and ironing room. Postponement of evacuee arrivals during the latter part of August, however, eased the situation considerably and permitted the construction crew to narrow the gap between actual capacity and population on hand. At the close of the quarter, with the total population at 11,553, construction was still going forward on Canal Camp and utilities were still being installed. But the greatest housing difficulties had been overcome.

Scheduled to be the principal food producer among relocation areas during the late fall and winter months of 1942, Gila River had nearly 7,000 acres in alfalfa when the War Relocation Authority took over the land. In order to meet fall production schedules, the Authority was compelled to use non-Japanese labor in getting the land preparation and planting work under way. As rapidly as possible, however, evacuee workers were assigned to the farm. By

September 30, about 450 acres had been planted to carrots, broccoli, squash, radishes, and other vegetables. The only crops actually harvested during the quarter were radishes. Seventy-five crates of them were pulled during the latter part of September and distributed to the community kitchens.

Due to the acute shortage of labor for harvest work in the long-staple cotton area of central Arizona, arrangements were made in September to permit employment of evacuees from Gila River in Pinal and Maricopa Counties on a commuter basis. Since the cotton fields were located in Military Area No. 1, a special authorization was required from the Western Defense Command. This was granted by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt on September 13. By the close of the quarter, the average number of evacuees from Gila River commuting to the cotton fields daily was about 250.

Because of the turbulent condition of the center throughout much of the period, progress in the organization and development of many community activities was somewhat slower than at most relocation areas. By September 30, however, one store was functioning in each of the two communities and the combined daily sales were averaging around \$1800. A temporary community council had been elected in Canal Camp and had already held three meetings. A mimeographed newspaper was appearing twice weekly. Construction work was well

under way on the buildings for a camouflage-net factory. Only American citizens were employed on this enterprise. A Red Cross Chapter had been organized and was operating branches in both communities.

Minidoka

Located near the heart of the sugar-beet region in south-central Idaho, the Minidoka Relocation Center led all relocation communities in turnout of evacuees for outside harvest work. By September 30, a total of 1,444 residents had left the center on work-group leave and the sign-up was still continuing in full swing. Before the quarter closed, the center was already beginning to experience a marked shortage of available workers for essential community services.

Like Gila River, the Minidoka Center felt the pinch of war-time shortages rather sharply in its basic construction program. When the advance contingent of colonists arrived at the center on August 10, for example, the kitchen stoves in the mess halls where they were to cook their evening meal were just being installed. When the mass arrivals began, 6 days later, construction of living quarters was approximately on schedule, but only the barest beginning had been made on installation of necessary utilities. Throughout the remainder of the period, the community struggled along with inadequate lights, insufficient warehouse space, no sewerage,

no hot water and outdoor latrines. By September 30, the construction of the bare physical essentials of community life was 97 per cent complete, but utilities were still largely lacking.

In the light of these extremely trying construction difficulties and the large exodus of harvest workers, the center achieved a noteworthy degree of community stability during the period. Of the 8,042 evacuees actually in residence on September 30, more than 3,000 were at work and another 939 were awaiting assignment. Approximately 1,200 males and nearly 2,500 females were classed as unemployable. The 200-bed hospital, almost completely organized with a total staff of 200 people, was handling an average load of 77 patients. Schools were getting ready to open in the barracks in early October with a staff of 39 evacuee teachers and 36 non-evacuee instructors and an enrollment of nearly 2,000. Community enterprises, although not incorporated, were well under way with three stores, a watch repair shop, a laundry and dry-cleaning pick-up service, and a mail order service already in operation. Land development workers had completed a 6-mile canal connecting the center with the Milner-Gooding irrigation system and 9 blocks at the eastern edge of the community were planted in rye grass to tie down the dusty soil. Plans for the community agricultural program for 1943 were fairly well worked out.

First steps toward the organization of a community government were taken on September 29 when the residents of each block met in their respective dining halls and elected 72 delegates (two per block)

under way on the buildings for a camouflage-net factory. Only American citizens were employed on this enterprise. A Red Cross Chapter had been organized and was operating branches in both communities.

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no hot water and outdoor latrines. By September 30, the construction of the bare physical essentials of community life was 97 per cent complete, but utilities were still largely lacking.

In the light of these extremely trying construction difficulties and the large exodus of harvest workers, the center achieved a noteworthy degree of community stability during the period. Of the 8,042 evacuees actually in residence on September 30, more than 3,000 were at work and another 939 were awaiting assignment. Approximately 1,200 males and nearly 2,500 females were classed as unemployable. The 200-bed hospital, almost completely organized with a total staff of 200 people, was handling an average load of 77 patients. Schools were getting ready to open in the barracks in early October with a staff of 39 evacuee teachers and 36 non-evacuee instructors and an enrollment of nearly 2,000. Community enterprises, although not incorporated, were well under way with three stores, a watch repair shop, a laundry and dry-cleaning pick-up service, and a mail order service already in operation. Land development workers had completed a 6-mile canal connecting the center with the Milner-Gooding irrigation system and 9 blocks at the eastern edge of the community were planted in rye grass to tie down the dusty soil. Plans for the community agricultural program for 1943 were fairly well worked out.

First steps toward the organization of a community government were taken on September 29 when the residents of each block met in their respective dining halls and elected 72 delegates (two per block)

to a community congress. Under the plan, the delegates were scheduled to meet as a body early in October and choose seven members from their ranks as an organization commission. This commission would then draw up a comprehensive plan of government which would be submitted to the entire community for referendum vote.

Heart Mountain

On the benchland of northwest Wyoming, in an area planned for irrigation by "Buffalo Bill" Cody more than 50 years ago, the Heart Mountain Relocation Center received its first contingent of evacuees on August 12. By the time the last group of colonists arrived on September 17, basic construction work was completed and the community was already beginning to assume a tentative pattern of organization.

A temporary community council, composed of both alien and American-born Japanese, held its first meeting on September 8. Five days later a judicial committee of seven judges and two alternates was selected by the council and presented to the colonists for approval or rejection. After this slate had been overwhelmingly approved at an election held several days later, the court was scheduled to hold its first session on October 12.

A 150-bed hospital was completed by the Army engineers and turned over to the War Relocation Authority toward the middle of September. Operating with a staff of six doctors and one interne

plus nine registered nurses (seven of them evacuees), seven student nurses and 37 nurses' aides, the hospital handled a total of 178 in-patients during the latter part of September. Meanwhile the out-patients' clinic was treating an average of 65 patients a day and providing some medical service for the company of military police which guarded the exterior boundaries of the area.

The community schools were just getting ready to open as the quarter ended. On September 30, one of the center's five elementary schools started classes in a recreation hall with an enrollment of 205 pupils. The other four elementary schools and the junior-senior high school (grades 6 through 12) were scheduled to begin early in October.

A canteen, handling a wide variety of merchandise (exclusive of dry goods), was opened in one of the barracks on the very day the first contingent of evacuees reached the center. Before the close of the period, another canteen and a general department store were also in operation and plans were being laid for a barber shop, beauty parlor, watch repair shop, and dry cleaning and laundry service. The department store, which threw open its doors on September 28, handled \$2,000 worth of business and catered to nearly 3,000 customers on the first day of operations.

Unlike some of the earlier relocation centers which were built with uniform-sized living quarters for each family, Heart

Mountain had its barracks originally laid out in compartments of four different sizes. Even this plan, however, was not enough to provide satisfactory quarters for families which varied in size from two to fifteen persons, and considerable readjustment in the housing scheme was necessary during the period.

With 865 evacuees out in the sugar beet fields and 12 away from the center on potato harvest work, the population of Heart Mountain on September 30 stood at 9,995. Of this number, nearly 4,000 had been assigned to a variety of jobs at the center.

As the quarter closed, an embryonic pottery plant was getting under way in one of the garage buildings and a land subjugation crew of nearly 100 evacuees was preparing to rehabilitate the Heart Mountain Canal which brings irrigation water a distance of 28 miles from Shoshone Reservoir to the northeast corner of the relocation area. Because of the lateness of the center's opening, however, no plans were made for an active agricultural program until 1943.

Granada

When the Granada Relocation Center in southeastern Colorado received its first contingent of evacuees on August 27, construction of the community was a little better than half completed. On September 30, when the final contingent of colonists arrived from

Santa Anita, the evacuee barracks had been erected in all 30 blocks. Plumbing facilities, however, had been installed in only 12 of the blocks and mess halls were operating in only 19.

At the close of the period, 527 evacuees had left the center for group agricultural work and 90 others were commuting daily to and from jobs on nearby farms. Of the 6,892 evacuees in residence, approximately 1200 had been assigned to jobs at the center.

A temporary community council, composed originally of three aliens and two American-born evacuees, was elected when the community was only four days old. As other contingents arrived from assembly centers, new members were added and the council gradually developed into a well-rounded group serving as liaison between the WRA staff and the community at large. Election of a permanent council was scheduled to take place early in October.

Only a bare beginning was made on the organization of consumer enterprises. By the close of the period, however, there were two canteens and a variety store in operation and a shoe-repair shop was getting ready to open. Total sales at the three stores up to September 30 amounted to a little over \$11,000.

Although the hospital was not completed, a temporary clinic was established in one of the barracks to handle emergency cases. The medical staff included a non-Japanese doctor serving as director,

four evacuee doctors, six non-Japanese registered nurses, and 10 evacuee nurses' aides. No deaths occurred at the center prior to September 30 and there was only one birth.

With a total staff of 40 teachers either on the job or awaiting official appointment, the community school system was just getting ready to open at the close of the period. Pending procurement of construction materials for regular school buildings, one entire block was set aside to house the elementary school, the junior high school, and the senior high school. Classes were scheduled to start on October 12.

Central Utah

Populated mainly by evacuees who formerly lived in the San Francisco Bay area, the Central Utah Relocation Center officially began operations when the first evacuees arrived on September 11. Nineteen days later, at the close of the quarterly period, the community had a population of 5,803 evacuees and was already beginning to take on some semblance of organization.

Seven members had been elected to the temporary community council. A canteen was doing an average business of more than \$600 a day. An emergency hospital, established in one of the barracks had handled a total of 19 patients. More than 2,300 residents had been assigned to jobs at the center. Only 11 evacuees had gone out

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of the community for sugar-beet work, but an additional 55 had signed up with the sugar companies and recruitment was still going forward.

As the period closed, the center was still a scene of construction, excavation, and dust. Evacuee barracks had been completed in all but a few blocks. But the erection of other buildings necessary for project operation and the installation of utilities throughout the center was only barely under way.

Rohwer

Starting operations on September 17, the Rohwer Relocation Center in southeast Arkansas was concerned during the second quarterly period mainly with induction of evacuee contingents and with assignment of residents to essential service occupations. Of the 2,264 evacuees who arrived prior to the close of the period, 815 were classified for work and assigned to jobs at the center. On September 30, construction was 79 per cent complete on evacuee barracks, but only half of the community's 18 blocks were actually ready for occupancy.

Jerome

Although the Jerome Relocation Center, also in southeast Arkansas, received no evacuees during the second quarterly period, the administrative staff was on hand (along with the construction crew) during the latter part of September getting the community ready for an early October opening. Construction was reported about 60 per cent complete on September 30.

Rosamund B Spier
Room 821

III

QUARTERLY REPORT

October 1 to December 31

1942

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

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QUARTERLY REPORT OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

OCTOBER 1 to DECEMBER 31, 1942

PROGRESS OF RELOCATION

The third quarter-year of operations of the War Relocation Authority was marked by the final movement of West Coast evacuees from assembly centers to relocation centers, by the gearing up of a program under which evacuees might leave the centers for private employment, and by the upsurge of community unrest in the form of disorders at two of the older centers. It was a period of slow but steady physical progress and also of trial and error. At its close, the Authority was setting its sights more clearly than ever on restoring able-bodied and well-intentioned evacuees as rapidly as feasible to normal economic and social life in ordinary American towns and cities.

At the beginning of the quarter, seven of the ten relocation centers had received virtually their whole quotas of evacuees of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast military zone. During October Gila River Relocation Center in Arizona received its last large contingent of residents; Rohwer, in Arkansas, rounded out two-thirds of its population; and Jerome, also in Arkansas, received its full quota. As of October 1, the combined population of the centers was 86,915, not including 6,669 evacuees who had left the centers earlier to relieve the manpower shortage during the harvest season. By November 1 the movement from assembly centers to relocation centers

had been accomplished. During November and December, the seasonal workers returned from the harvest fields, a group of people of Japanese descent who had gone from their homes in eastern California directly to harvest fields voluntarily entered the centers, and an initial contingent of evacuees of Japanese descent from Hawaii arrived at the Jerome Center in Arkansas. As a result of this combined influx, the population of the ten centers by December 31 reached a high mark of 106,770 residents.

During this same period, the movement of evacuees out of the centers and back into private life outside the evacuated area began slowly gathering momentum. Prior to October 1, less than 100 residents had gone out of the centers on indefinite leave under the regulations adopted by WRA in mid-July. With adoption of the more liberal regulations toward the end of September, the Authority began tightening up its machinery to speed the handling of leave applications not only at the centers but also in Washington. By the close of the period, approximately 2,200 applications for advance clearance had been filed; 250 applications for indefinite leave had been granted; and 193 evacuees had actually left the centers and were-re-establishing themselves in normal communities mainly throughout the intermountain region.

The comparatively slow progress of the program was attributable in part to the time-consuming procedures governing leave clearance,

and in part to the reluctance of many evacuees to leave the sanctuary of the centers and face a public they believed to be hostile. As the quarter closed, WRA was beginning to realize that more assistance would have to be rendered evacuees seeking to enter private employment. Consequently, plans were made to establish relocation offices throughout the mid-western states to work with the United States Employment Service and other agencies seeking out work opportunities for the evacuees. As the year ended, one such office was on the verge of opening in Chicago, and plans were under way to set up other similar offices in Salt Lake City, Denver, Cleveland, Kansas City, and Omaha.

In late November and early December, signs of community unrest, which had been evident at several of the older centers during the summer, finally flared up in the form of disorders at Colorado River and Manzanar. Although the underlying causes and the concrete incidents precipitating the demonstrations were very similar at both centers, the pattern of the actual demonstrations differed. At Colorado River, the residents in one of the three communities making up the center conducted a number of protest meetings against the administration and promoted a strike in most of the community activities, but peace was restored without calling in the military guard. At Manzanar, the protests took a more violent form and had to be quelled by intervention of the military and finally at the cost of bloodshed

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION

After operating for nearly eight months with three levels of administration (in Washington, at the regional offices, and at the relocation centers) the War Relocation Authority on December 15 cut its organization back along simpler lines to two administrative levels. The three regional offices previously established in San Francisco, Denver, and Little Rock were abolished and new offices under the supervision of Field Assistant Directors were simultaneously set up in the same cities. The main difference is that each of the Field Assistant Directors will have only a skeleton staff and will serve as a personal representative of the National Director stationed in the field rather than as an administrator responsible for general supervision of a group of relocation centers. In short, the reorganization provided, for the first time, a direct line of administrative authority from national headquarters in Washington to the relocation centers.

Of the three regional offices, the one in San Francisco was most extensively affected. The offices in Denver and Little Rock had been established later and had only limited staffs at the time of reorganization. The San Francisco office, however, had been functioning since the very earliest days of the program, had supervised the work at six of the ten relocation centers, and at the beginning of the third quarter had a staff nearly three times as large as the Washington office. During the period of evacuation and movement

into relocation centers, when the WRA was working extremely closely with the Western Defense Command and the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the maintenance of a rather extensive staff in San Francisco (where headquarters of both WDC and WCCA were located) was virtually indispensable to effective operations. Later, as the evacuated population and the program emphasis shifted geographically eastward, this need gradually diminished. By December 15, when the entire evacuee group had been moved from assembly to relocation centers, it was possible to alter the status of the San Francisco office and to start transferring most of its personnel into Washington and out to the relocation centers. These transfers were only about half completed by the close of the year. Meanwhile, the function of the Denver and Little Rock offices was changed, but their personnel were only slightly affected.

Under the new set-up, the Field Assistant Director stationed in San Francisco will maintain contact for the National Director with the two centers in California (Manzanar and Tule Lake) and the two in Arizona (Colorado River and Gila River); the office in Denver will serve as liaison with the centers in the intermountain area (Minidoka, Central Utah, Granada, and Heart Mountain); and the Little Rock office will perform the same function with respect to the two centers in Arkansas (Rohwer and Jerome).

The following table shows the distribution of WRA staff as of October 1 and as of December 31, 1942:

<u>Location</u>	<u>October 1, 1942</u>	<u>December 31, 1942</u>
Washington	74	141
San Francisco	214	91
Denver	23	22
Little Rock	14	12
Manzanar	97	141
Colorado River	4*	4*
Tule Lake	136	161
Gila River	125	155
Heart Mountain	115	129
Minidoka	69	107
Granada	106	153
Central Utah	56	110
Kohwer	46	119
Jerome	<u>78</u>	<u>120</u>
Totals	1,157	1,467

* The Colorado River Relocation Center is under the jurisdiction of the Office of Indian Affairs. The center staff of appointed personnel, with the exception of the number listed above, are accordingly listed on the Indian Service payroll. The actual number of persons on the center staff as of December 31 is 224.

COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION

Conditions growing out of the wartime situation seriously affected all phases of the program to make the relocation centers livable and self-supporting. Throughout the quarter there were ever-mounting difficulties in getting basic materials and equipment. Housing, hospitalization, education, sanitation, recreation, and agriculture all shared handicaps. Nowhere was it possible to realize fully the plan originally made for well-rounded and productive evacuee communities. At all centers there were inevitable delays and compromises in almost every phase of community life.

Basic construction, as carried out by the Army Engineers, consisted of barracks for evacuee housing, mess halls, laundries, latrines and baths, and hospitals. At the beginning of the third quarter, this basic construction had been completed only at the three oldest centers--Colorado River, Manzanar, and Tule Lake. At the others, construction continued to lag behind evacuee arrivals. Even where basic construction had been accomplished, crowding was inevitable. At Manzanar, the oldest of the centers, there were at the end of the quarter 928 cases in which two families were obliged to share a single 20' x 25' apartment. Installation of utilities, involving the more critical equipment and materials, was even slower. At one center a serious health condition arose as a result of the lack of modern toilet facilities over an extended period of time.

Hospitals, a part of the basic construction, were as a rule lacking when the first evacuee contingents arrived at the centers. Yet the very conditions of transportation made facilities for hospitalization at the end of the journey a necessity. At the beginning of the quarter, carloads of evacuees were being taken a long distance through the heat and dust of the dry season; at the end they were being transported through winter cold. Every contingent had its chronic invalids, aged, new mothers and babies, and expectant mothers. In most cases an emergency station set up in a berrack intended for housing had to provide temporarily for the needs of patients. By the end of the quarter hospitals had been completed basically, though most of them suffered from a lack of equipment.

Aside from basic construction provided by the Army Engineers, there was also at all centers a considerable amount of construction to be accomplished by WRA. This consisted chiefly of school buildings, office quarters, and living quarters for the administrative staff. During the quarter priorities for the construction of high school buildings were granted for most centers, and in one or two instances contracts were let and construction was actually begun. Schools opened at practically all relocation centers during the period, but at a later date than in regular public schools and in buildings which were extremely ill adapted for classroom use. Administrative staff quarters were greatly delayed. At the end of the quarter, construction of living accommodations for Civil Service personnel was only barely

under way at most centers and many staff members were crowded together in inadequate and makeshift apartments.

Nevertheless, despite changing priorities and delays in shipments and transportation of supplies, commendable results in construction were achieved during the period. Office quarters, housing for personnel, rough equipment for school rooms, and recreational areas were prepared at nearly all centers. Essential winterization of barracks and mess halls was carried out and completed generally on schedule.

EMPLOYMENT

At the Centers

At every center, more evacuees are employed in the work of feeding the community than in any other single phase of project operations. Mess hall operations for the feeding of anywhere from 7,000 to 17,000 persons, transportation of foodstuff, warehouse handling, delivery to kitchens, and preparation and serving of food inevitably require large numbers of workers. Other community operations that engage considerable numbers of employables are maintenance and repair work, sanitation, and the safeguarding of health, fire protection, and internal security. These are primary, elemental services that must be maintained at any cost. They were maintained during the third quarter--a period when evacuee contingents were still being received at some of the centers and when manpower was being temporarily drained off for the harvest fields--at the expense of the agricultural program. One center, with a population

of about 10,000 had only 2600 males who fell into the generally employable age group, seventeen to fifty-five. Approximately half of these were at one time on work furloughs outside the center. This was an extreme case, but every center reported manpower shortage within the center during the harvest season. As the quarter ended, it was foreseen that as evacuees continued to leave the centers for private employment, increasing manpower problems within the centers would call for continual adjustment of plans and programs to the labor supply available.

During the period, comprehensive records of background, training and experience for each resident were completed at all centers. With such records on file, the placement offices were able to function with increased smoothness and efficiency.

Outside the Centers

The need for evacuee labor in the harvest fields of the intermountain and plains states increased steadily during the first half of the quarter. The first of October found 5419 center residents out on seasonal work leave. In addition, there were 1250 who had been recruited in spring and summer from assembly centers who were still at work in the fields. At the peak of the harvest season there were about 9,000 evacuees out on temporary agricultural jobs.

Distribution by states of those who went out from relocation centers is shown below as of October 1:

Idaho.....	1939
Montana.....	1532
Colorado.....	664
Nebraska.....	342
Wyoming.....	334
Arizona.....	300
Utah.....	277
Oregon.....	41

The three hundred employed in Arizona were engaged in picking long-staple cotton, working out of the centers on a "commuter" basis, but in the other states the majority of workers were employed in sugar-beet areas, and their transportation to and from the place of employment was provided by the employers.

In accordance with procedures established in the summer, each employer desiring to hire evacuees was obliged to fill out a form indicating the kind of work to be done, its approximate duration, the wages paid, and the housing facilities available. These forms were presented to the nearest office of the U. S. Employment Service, from which they were forwarded to relocation centers to be submitted to the evacuees. This gave the evacuee a somewhat more accurate idea of the conditions under which he might work. In some instances, however, potential earnings were overestimated by the farm operators and living facilities were misrepresented. In some locations, where lack of facilities at the place of employment necessitated eating

in restaurants in the closest town, evacuees occasionally encountered hostility and sometimes outright refusals of service.

Generally speaking, however, the living conditions of the evacuee crews were adequate and their relations with the nearby townspeople were reasonably satisfactory. Most farm operators were well satisfied with the quality of work performed by the evacuees, by their willingness to work in bad weather, and to work long hours when that was imperative to the saving of a crop. In some instances, groups of farm operators and local Chambers of Commerce expressed their appreciation of the services of the evacuees in formal letters and resolutions sent to the relocation centers.

The figures in the following table showing those employed outside the centers as of December 31 indicate the number of evacuees who went out on seasonal leaves and remained out because they obtained permanent employment. Leave regulations permitted extension of the seasonal leaves in such cases, pending the issuance of indefinite leave clearance.

STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT AT RELOCATION CENTERS
December 31, 1942, and at the Peak of the
Harvest Season

<u>Name of Center</u>	<u>Number of Residents</u>	<u>Employed at Center</u>	<u>Peak of seasonal Employment</u>	<u>Out on seasonal leave, December 31</u>
Central Utah	7,899	3,816	748	428
Colorado River	17,615	7,946	822	373
Gila River	13,320	6,148	200	57
Granada	6,805	2,332	1,116	550
Heart Mountain	10,722	4,618	1,500	287
Jerome	7,815	3,993	0*	0*
Manzanar	9,916	4,599	1,028	198
Minidoka	9,042	4,157	2,300	570
Rohwer	8,451	4,149	0*	0**
Tule Lake	<u>15,053</u>	<u>6,702</u>	<u>930</u>	<u>265</u>
Totals	106,038	48,460	8,444	2,728

Throughout the quarter opportunities for private employment outside the centers continued to develop. Although the majority of the requests continued to be for domestic or farm labor, there was a gradual but perceptible increase in demand for workers in trades, for clerical and professional workers, and for other types of employees. A small but significant number of requests came in from cities and town of the mountain and plains states for a wider variety

*The two Arkansas centers were not occupied until after the exodus to the harvest fields had taken place. At the close of the season, these two centers received several hundred workers who had gone directly from assembly centers to the harvest fields, but they sent none forth.

of occupations, such as nursery assistants, truck drivers, auto mechanics, service station attendants, beauty parlour operators, nurses, hospital attendants, radio repair men, social case workers, laboratory assistants, engineers, teachers, and chick-sexers.

EDUCATION

Hampered by lack of adequate teaching staff, lack of buildings, furniture, and text books, relocation center schools opened and functioned during the third quarter. In one or two instances, and at the older centers, schools opened before the end of September, but the majority started during the month of October. As the last centers to be occupied, the two Arkansas centers were even more delayed: Rohwer opened school in November, while Jerome was on the point of opening as the quarter closed.

With no exceptions, schools at the centers opened in unpartitioned barracks meant for other purposes and generally bare of furniture. Sometimes the teacher had a desk and chair; more often she had only a chair. In the first few weeks many of the children had no desks or chairs and for the most part were obliged to sit on the floor--or stand up all day. Linoleum laying and additional wall insulation were accomplished in these makeshift school rooms some time after the opening of school. At some centers cold waves struck before winterization could be started.

By the close of the quarter, it was no longer necessary for many pupils to sit on the floor, but seating was frequently of a

rudimentary character. Text books and other supplies were gradually arriving. Laboratory and shop equipment and facilities, however, were still lacking. No center had been able to obtain its full quota of teachers.

In spite of these handicaps, education managed to function on at least four different levels at the centers: nursery school, elementary school, high school, and adult education night classes. During the quarter grade and high schools progressed to the point where school clubs were organized and extra-curricular activities were shaping. Adult education classes, conducted by the evacuees without compensation, were increasing in number and variety. Classes in Americanization and in both oral and written English drew the greatest number of adults, but interest and demand also formed well attended classes in plant pathology, agricultural entomology, ethics, human relations, race relations, and a variety of commercial subjects. Most centers, furthermore, arranged with the state departments of education to have classes carried on for the benefit of assistant or student teachers among the evacuees. At the end of the quarter, efforts were being made to introduce certain university extension courses for those students whose college education was interrupted by evacuation and who have not the means to avail themselves of the privilege of student relocation.

STUDENT RELOCATION

Under the tentative leave policy adopted on July 20, students whose education had been interrupted by the evacuation program could,

if their financial resources allowed, apply for leave to attend colleges or universities where their attendance was accepted by the college authorities and approved by both the War and Navy Departments. As of December 31, there were 337 colleges and universities on the approved list, 414 student leaves had been granted, and 250 students were out of the centers and continuing their education at approximately 75 colleges and universities. Many applications were pending clearance, but a large number could not be cleared in time for the applicants to enroll for the first semester's work. The institutions that opened their doors to relocated students of Japanese ancestry were of many types: the list included the American Academy of Art in Chicago; Baker University in Baldwin, Kansas; Gem Business College in Quincy, Illinois; Kalamazoo College in Michigan; Redcliffe; Western Reserve University; Swarthmore; Vassar; Syracuse; Wellesley; and the State Universities of Texas, Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming.

AGRICULTURE

From the beginning, the aim of WRA has been to make every center as nearly self-supporting as possible. Just how far this aim could be realized in the first year of occupation depended upon the date of occupation, climatic conditions, and the amount of development work necessary before the land could be made to produce crops. At Tule Lake, where occupation began in May, the results were most impressive. There the evacuees produced vegetables not only for the

needs of that center, but also to contribute to the needs of other centers; in addition, some of the vegetables were sold in the commercial markets. Hay and grain, too, were raised at Tule Lake and used to feed a herd of hogs, which by the end of the quarter were beginning to supply the center with pork. The older centers all managed to produce crops of vegetables and some livestock feed. At Gila River planting of 820 acres to winter vegetables was accomplished before the close of the period. However, those centers which were occupied in late summer or early autumn, all in localities where the growing season was short, were unable to begin their agriculture programs at the time of occupation.

During the quarter the agricultural enterprises of the centers were seriously affected by the loss of many of the best workers to the outside harvests. In planning for the year ahead, it became increasingly evident that the more liberal leave policy is likely to remove more and more of the workers from the centers and that many of the experienced farmers will tend toward resettlement in private life. Because of this fact, plus the shortage of equipment and materials, the whole agricultural program had to be revised downward. As the period ended, plans at all centers called for raising vegetables for evacuee mess and feed for live stock, but only a limited amount of production for outside markets was contemplated.

INDUSTRY

Although original plans for establishment of industrial enterprises at relocation centers were modified downward during the second

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INDUSTRY

Although original plans for establishment of industrial enterprises at relocation centers were modified downward during the second

quarter, a number of industries continued operations or were established during the fall period. The camouflage net factory at Manzanar went on turning out nets for the Army under private management until the disturbance of December 5 and 6, after which it was permanently abandoned. Toward the close of the period, a considerably larger net factory began operations at Gila River and another was moving toward completion at Colorado River. In both of these establishments prevailing wages will be paid to evacuee workers. Sewing projects to renovate and repair work clothes for evacuees and woodworking establishments to produce furniture for the center schools and for other community needs were established at several of the newer centers. Both Manzanar and Colorado River began production of bean sprouts and soy sauce and were looking forward to increased production at the close of the year. Plans for a small plant to turn out ship models for the Navy (to be used in identification courses) moved nearer toward realization at Gila River, and a silk screen poster shop at Granada (also planned to serve the Navy) was almost ready to begin operations as the quarter ended. Looking ahead to 1943, the WRA was planning at the close of the year to follow through as fully as possible on commitments previously made for industrial enterprises but was contemplating no further expansion in this field.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

Although hospital buildings had been completed in only four centers at the beginning of the quarter and the medical program at

most centers was still functioning on an emergency basis, general health conditions continued to be good. In the face of many handicaps, marked progress was made by an understaffed and overworked medical and nursing organization in establishing and maintaining a broad and comprehensive health program in keeping with the standards in normal communities.

Instruction in preventive hygiene, first aid, and home nursing was given to residents. Through the work of the visiting nurses and the periodic physical check-up on school children, communicable diseases were kept well under control. Diphtheria immunization and tuberculin tests were among the first services undertaken after the center health department graduated from its emergency phase and began to render the additional services that public health authorities regard as a community responsibility. Formula kitchens for the preparation of infants rations were in operation at all centers during the quarter, and other diet kitchens functioned in the hospitals and for individuals whose health prevented them from eating the regular mess hall fare. Frequent and thorough inspection of mess halls, laundries, showers and latrines was a feature of the health program at all centers.

Problems of varying seriousness developed in connection with the water supply at some centers during the period. Basic utilities were incomplete at the time of occupation, and unfinished sewerage systems continued to be a hazard. At Jerome, where water was pure at the source, it became contaminated by the necessary, frequent

opening and closing of water mains, and diarrhea developed among the residents. Garbage disposal at some centers was another serious problem. Open pits in the period of warm weather and flies were a menace. Winter cold lessened the risk inherent in the situation, and it was hoped that basic materials and equipment for overcoming it altogether could be procured before the next warm season.

CONSUMER ENTERPRISES

Only Manzanar entered the quarter with an over-all consumer cooperative association fully organized and incorporated, and because of certain legal technicalities this first association to incorporate was unable to operate under incorporation until the end of the period. In the course of the three-month period, incorporated cooperative associations began to function at Central Utah, Tule Lake and Minidoka. The remaining centers were, at the end of the year, continuing under the temporary plan of community enterprises. All the unincorporated associations were working toward incorporation by the end of the quarter.

Typical enterprises include dry goods and grocery stores, shoe repair, radio repair, laundries, barber shops, and dry cleaning establishments. The two newest centers had the lowest number of enterprises functioning. At the end of the quarter, Jerome had three stores operating while Rohwer had a single canteen. The table

below indicates the status of consumer enterprises at the different centers:

<u>Center</u>	<u>No. of Enterprises as of December 31</u>	<u>Gross Business</u>	
		<u>September</u>	<u>December</u>
Central Utah	8	\$ 13,343.11	\$ 45,364.39
Colorado River	28	79,977.63	107,209.94
Gila River	9	42,000.00	115,200.47
Granada	7	11,152.63	33,214.98
Heart Mountain	10	44,901.89	86,750.34
Jerome	3 (Occupied in Oct.)		30,128.48
Manzanar	5	56,865.58	67,514.48
Minidoka	24	45,080.57	80,647.41
Rohwer	1	137.32	20,074.23
Tule Lake	<u>22</u>	<u>91,700.00</u>	<u>150,890.71</u>
	116	\$385,158.73	\$736,995.56

Toward the end of the period, the policy on community enterprises and cooperatives was spelled out by WRA in further detail, with the provision that the incorporated cooperative must pay rent and also clothing allowances for employees retroactively to the date of the establishment of the original enterprises. This ruling caused disturbance among the residents of the centers who protested that the rental rate was too high and the clothing allowance requirement discriminatory. Unquestionably the adoption of the policy by WRA delayed the progress of the cooperative movement, and at the close of the quarter, the Washington office was moving toward a modification of requirements.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

By the close of the year, evacuee government of one type or another was functioning at all except one of the relocation centers.

At Tule Lake and Central Utah, charters had been drawn up, submitted to referendum vote, and formally approved both by the evacuee residents and the WRA. At all other centers (except Minidoka) charters were either being drawn up by committees of evacuee residents or were under discussion while temporary governments continued in operation. At Minidoka, no attempt was made to establish a formal pattern of evacuee government, but the Project Director made a practice of consulting representative groups of evacuees whenever important decisions affecting the community had to be reached.

One of the most difficult problems that arose in connection with evacuee government was the question of participation by the alien residents. Under the policy on community government adopted by WRA in August, alien residents of the centers were allowed to hold appointive offices and to serve on committees created by the community council, but were not eligible for election to the council itself. Since the alien group at all centers includes most of the more mature and experienced residents, their exclusion from the council caused widespread discussion. As the period closed, the WRA was re-examining this particular phase of the policy on community government with a view to possible modification.

Another perplexing question was the degree of responsibility for community management which could and should be delegated to the evacuee government. The WRA, as a government agency responsible to the President and the Congress for the proper expenditure of government

funds, obviously had to retain ultimate control over the relocation centers. Yet, at the same time, the Authority was anxious for a variety of reasons to stimulate a maximum of evacuee participation in and responsibility for the management of community affairs. At each center, the attempts to resolve this question had to be worked out in the light of the social structure of the evacuee community, the work program under way and projected, the attitude held by neighboring communities toward the center and its residents, and other factors pertinent to the local situation.

COMMUNITY WELFARE

The very nature of center life--its crowded living conditions, inadequate facilities, and above all the lack of privacy--intensifies the complexity of the social welfare problem. This environment not only aggravates existing problems but breeds new ones that would probably never have arisen under normal living conditions. Marital difficulties, juvenile delinquency, inter-family quarrels, all find encouragement within the single-room apartment that contains married and unmarried, young and old, stable and unstable in undesired and undesirable proximity.

The welfare program of WRA began the quarter with a severe shortage of staff at the centers. In addition to the common difficulty of finding qualified persons who were willing to live at the centers,

there was also a salary problem involved. Since the original concept of the position of welfare counsellor at centers underestimated the administrative responsibilities actually involved in the position, it was extremely difficult to recruit properly qualified persons. As the quarter ended, however, the classification was raised, and there was hope that WRA could retain the services of competent welfare directors and acquire the needed supplementary personnel.

Much time was necessarily spent by welfare personnel in listening to personal and family troubles. Out of such conversations came information which concerned a number of other branches of the administration and also the well-being of the entire community. It was the welfare personnel, for example, who most frequently discovered the need for changes in housing, health conditions, mental conditions requiring attention, and who generally perceived the earliest signs of delinquency in young boys and girls.

During the quarter a new duty was added to the work of the welfare staff. At all centers, this branch of the administration was made responsible for handling the cash clothing allowances. At nearly all centers, the initial family survey necessary to determine the distribution of the allowances put a severe strain on welfare staffs. Because of this fact plus the complexity of the original procedures and the large amount of clerical work involved, distribution of the allowances was delayed at almost all relocation communities.

Aside from handling clothing allowances, the welfare staffs at the centers investigated and acted upon requests for public

assistance grants, arranged for transfer of evacuees from one center to another in instances where families were separated by the hazards of evacuation, and dealt with a miscellany of requests that might be grouped under the heading of "service cases". These included making funeral arrangements; trying to adjust marital problems; providing necessary assistance for the blind, the deaf, the dumb, the cripples; making provision for the care of orphans and illegitimate children, and attempting to prevent juvenile delinquency by operating on the factors that inevitably foster it.

CONSERVATION OF EVACUEE PROPERTY

By the beginning of October, enough time had passed to bring into prominence certain faults in arrangements the evacuees had made with private firms or individuals for the care of their property in the evacuated area. As accounts due the evacuees failed to materialize, or tenants abandoned premises without the formality of giving notice, or the evacuees wished to get their household goods out of private storage and have them shipped to the relocation centers, they turned in increasing numbers to WRA for assistance.

Existing regulations permitted WRA to transport free of charge such personal property as was stored in government warehouses to the owner in relocation; property that was privately stored could be shipped at government expense to the center only if the owner first had it transferred to a government warehouse. It soon became evident

that most of the evacuees who wished to take advantage of this offer were seriously handicapped by lack of funds to effect the transfer of their possessions to the government warehouses. Meanwhile, check-ups on personal property made by WRA at the request of evacuees revealed that in some instances, so-called "friends" of the evacuees had misused the possessions they had promised to guard, while in others, goods stored in churches or vacant stores had been injured by flood or fire or vandals.

The increasing tendency of the evacuees to seek relief from the misfortunes attendant upon absentee proprietorship through the Authority, and the growing inclination of many of the land-owners to sell their holdings through the Evacuee Property Office brought an accumulation of work to the Office which rendered expansion and reorganization necessary to effective performance. By the end of the quarter, plans were well under way to reorganize this branch of the Authority. These plans included enlargement of the staff, the creation of additional field offices at Portland, Oregon, and at Watsonville, California, and a liberalization of the regulations governing transportation to permit moving household goods from private storage at government expense.

RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES

The figures on church attendance at the centers during the quarter indicated that about 42.5 per cent are Buddhists, 42.5 per cent Protestants, and 15 per cent Catholics. Two centers

peopled by former residents of the Northwest had minority groups of Seventh Day Adventists. During the quarter, the three main religious bodies at the centers organized into numerous departments and entered into broad and energetic programs to answer the social, spiritual and cultural needs of the community. With expansion of activity, nearly all centers reported a substantial increase in church attendance. The societies and clubs common to these major religious groups in the average community flourished in the relocation centers and launched discussions and study groups that supplemented the activities of education and welfare divisions.

As the winter season approached, church groups and organizations throughout the country exhibited a deepening interest in the relocation centers and in the problems of evacuees. The Federal Council of Churches appointed a Committee to aid people of Japanese ancestry in relocation centers, and by the end of the year a campaign was underway to raise money for church-building purposes at the centers. During the period, however, all church services were held in recreation barracks.

Toward the end of December, the Heart Mountain Community Christian Church organization received an appropriation of \$10,000 from the Board of National Missions of the Presbyterian Church for the erection of an attractively planned church, but decided to postpone the actual construction until school buildings could be completed.

Specific churches lent to the centers--or, in many instances, donated outright--musical instruments, including pianos and organs,

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and considerable quantities of recreation material. Outside churches and affiliated societies provided Christmas gifts for the children at all the centers. As the period ended, with the increasing flow of evacuees back into normal life, religious organizations were taking an active part in finding work opportunities for the evacuees and in helping them to find suitable living quarters and to adjust to life in new environments.

LANGUAGE SCHOOL VOLUNTEERS

Recruiting of volunteers for a Japanese language school maintained by the Intelligence branch of the United States Army continued at the centers throughout most of the quarter. A recruiting officer visited each center for the purpose of interviewing and examining candidates. Loyal American citizens of Japanese descent were needed for teaching the fundamentals of the Japanese language to officers of Military Intelligence, and in other capacities as translators and interpreters. Keen interest was shown in the response to the appeal for recruits, but many candidates were rejected because their knowledge of the Japanese language was inadequate for the purpose.

Throughout the latter part of November and most of December, the successful candidates were departing from relocation centers to don the uniform of the United States Army and begin life as soldiers in the Intelligence service.

The numbers recruited from each center during the quarter were as follows:

Central Utah.....	9
Colorado River.....	8
Gila River.....	29
Granada.....	12
Heart Mountain.....	2
Jerome.....	17
Manzanar.....	21
Minidoka.....	21
Rohwer.....	5
Tule Lake.....	<u>43</u>
TOTAL	167

REPATRIATION

During the quarter, in anticipation of a second voyage of the Swedish liner Gripsholm to effect an exchange of nationals between the United States and Japan, the War Relocation Authority received from the State Department in Washington a series of lists naming persons desired by the Japanese Government. The persons named residing in the various relocation centers were notified that they had been so named, and were asked to indicate whether they desired to be exchanged to Japan or to remain in the United States. Out of a total of 2800 persons on these lists who were residents of relocation centers, only 290, or 10.4 per cent, stated that they wished to go to Japan;

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2422, or 86.5 per cent, of those notified, stated that they did not want to go to Japan and preferred to remain in the United States; the remainder failed to reply.

During the summer and fall, when some of the evacuees had arrived at relocation centers but while many were still in assembly centers, an opportunity was given to all to file applications for exchange or repatriation to Japan. When the lists of persons named by the Japanese Government were received from the State Department, it soon became evident that only a small proportion of the persons named were persons who had earlier applied on their own initiative for repatriation. Also, many evacuees who had not requested repatriation, when advised of their having been named by the Japanese Government, were torn between amazement and indignation. Some American citizens named by the Japanese Government, presumably because they were sons and daughters of aliens who were also named, were intensely indignant. A few even went so far as to refuse to sign a declination because they felt such an action would admit an interest in Japan which in fact they did not have. After the whole situation was explained, however, these people were, as a rule, willing to sign a declination so that the record might be complete.

The quarter ended with a total of 3,396 persons listed as having requested exchange to Japan (3106 of whom had never been included on a State Department list) and with the Gripsholm still awaiting sailing orders. The willingness of the Japanese Government to accept persons who had requested exchange or return to Japan but

who were not on the lists submitted by that government was still in considerable doubt at the end of 1942.

THE POSTON INCIDENT

The Colorado River Relocation Center consists of three separate communities set three miles apart. They are known as Poston I, II, and III. Unlike the other centers, Colorado River is administered by the Indian Service, but it follows general policies laid down by WRA. It was the scene of the first really serious demonstration carried on by evacuees at a relocation center.

On Saturday night, November 14, an evacuee resident of Poston I, while asleep in bed, was attacked and beaten with a piece of pipe by a group of unidentified men. The victim was a man who had made numerous enemies in the days before evacuation and who was suspected by many residents of the center of being an informer. Early Sunday morning the victim's former brother-in-law and another man, a popular Judo wrestling instructor, were arrested by the evacuee police on suspicion. The head of Internal Security called in the FBI, and an investigation was conducted over a period of several days. No charges were preferred, but the Poston police continued to hold the men at the request of the FBI.

On the second day of the suspects' detention, a group of older evacuees called on the Acting Project Director, attested to the good character of the suspects, offered evidence to prove them innocent, and asked for their release. The request was refused pending completion

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of investigation. The next day, a determined but orderly crowd of about a thousand older men assembled outside the jail and demanded the release of the prisoners, saying that they would not permit removal of the two from the community and calling for a general strike of all center employees. The temporary community council, composed of young American-born evacuees met to review the situation, consulting with delegates from the crowd and an evacuee lawyer who represented the suspects. The outcome of this session was a recommendation to the Acting Project Director that the men be released. The recommendation stressed two points: (1) the detention was illegal in view of the fact that the law stipulated that a man could not be held indefinitely without a charge being placed; (in Arizona the time limit is twenty-four hours); (2) the Council felt strongly that this beating was an internal problem that should be dealt with in the community court without interference from outside authorities.

Wishing to have the cooperation of FBI and believing that one of the men was definitely guilty, the Administration overruled the recommendation of the Council. The Council, having represented the desires of the community in the matter of the recommendation and being brought up thus sharply against the restriction of the Project Director's veto power, promptly resigned in a body.

After the FBI representatives had completed their investigations and left the center, the Administration released one of the suspects, against whom there was no evidence, but held the other and prepared to file charges against him in the County Court. Meanwhile the

evacuees had quickly formed an emergency committee to provide leadership and deal with the administration. This committee arranged to continue all services vital to the community: mess operations, police, fire protection, and hospital. Pickets, organized into eight-hour shifts, surrounded the center jail to prevent removal of the detained man from the community. No attempt was made to release him from the project jail, however, and in the conduct of the strike no damage was done to any person or property. Many bonfires were built at night in the picket area, and there was a touch of carnival spirit in the crowd.

On November 23 an agreement was reached with the emergency leaders, by the terms of which the prisoner was released to the custody of two evacuee lawyers pending trial within the center, and the emergency leaders assumed the responsibility of putting a stop to such beatings as initiated this incident, improving efficiency in center work, and establishing better collaboration with the Administration. No trial had been held up to the end of the quarter. The incident was wholly confined to Poston I and did not spread to Poston II or Poston III.

THE MANZANAR INCIDENT

In its early stages the Manzanar incident was strikingly similar to the disturbance which took place at Poston just a few weeks earlier. On Saturday evening, December 5, a former owner of a chain of restaurants, unpopular with many residents of the community

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even before evacuation because he was believed to be an informer, was assaulted in his apartment by six masked men. He attempted to fight off his assailants, but before the noise attracted the attention of neighbors and the men were frightened away, he was severely beaten with a club about the head and shoulders. In the hospital, he identified one of the masked men as an avowed enemy for a long period. Arrested and questioned by the center police, this man could not establish an alibi and was sent to the jail at the nearby town of Independence. Of several other suspects questioned during the night, only one was detained; he was kept in the center jail.

At about noon the following day, December 6, a large mass meeting was held in a fire break at the center. The Acting Chief of Internal Security sent a detail of evacuee policemen to the meeting, but they returned shortly, reporting that they were not wanted and had been asked to leave. The Project Director and the Acting Chief of Internal Security thereupon decided to attend the meeting. Meanwhile, the Assistant Project Director was instructed to ask the commanding officer of the military police company to stand by with his men in the event of trouble. The Project Director and internal security officer reached the meeting just as it was breaking up, and were informed that the purpose of the meeting was to protest the arrest of the suspect and demand his release. A committee of five had been appointed to confer with the Project Director.

Soon the Committee of Five, followed by a large group of men and boys, arrived at the Administration Building to talk to the Project Director. Simultaneously the military police commander and a dozen soldiers arrived and lined up between the police station and the Administration Building. Machine guns were mounted. The Committee of Five demanded the release of the suspect. For about an hour and a half the Project Director walked among the crowd and talked to the people. He refused to negotiate with the crowd and demanded that it disperse. Although the crowd was in general angry and sullen, it was respectful to the Project Director. The Committee of Five, however, were excited and spoke violently. Four young men kept the Project Director surrounded as he talked with the crowd, evidently to assure his safety. Agitators were circulating through the crowd working to keep sentiment at a high pitch.

As soon as the military police commander heard the demands of the Committee, he sent for more soldiers; during most of this period there were about 30 soldiers present. The crowd grew more unruly and threatened to get out of control. The soldiers were taunted, and some sticks and stones were thrown. A number of the non-evacuee school teachers and other personnel had mingled with the crowd and stood in danger if force were used to disperse the crowd. Finally, as a compromise measure, the Project Director took the Committee of Five around a corner of the building and after some discussion arrived at the following agreement:

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- (1) The detained man would be returned to Manzanar within an hour after the crowd dispersed, and would be tried in such manner as the Project Director decided;
- (2) The crowd would disperse immediately;
- (3) There would be no more mass meetings.
- (4) The residents would make no attempt to deliver the detainee from jail;
- (5) All future grievances would be taken up through recognized committees;
- (6) The Committee of Five would help find the assailants of the beaten man.

One member of the committee then addressed the crowd in Japanese to explain the terms of the agreement and to tell the people to go home. The speech was received with considerable enthusiasm and applause. The Project Director questioned the evacuee chief of police concerning the speech, and the man said it was "all right". It developed later, however, that this man knew very little Japanese and did not understand what had actually been said. As a matter of fact, the spokesman announced to the crowd that a victory had been won and that the crowd should disperse to reassemble at six o'clock and secure the release of the detained man from the center jail. With this understanding, the crowd dispersed, but not until all the soldiers had withdrawn to the road outside the center.

At the appointed hour the crowd gathered in a firebreak just across from the hospital. Several hundred men went to the hospital

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to demand the surrender of the beaten man, but he had hidden himself so effectively that the searchers left, convinced that he had been removed earlier. The main body of the crowd converged on the police station to demand the release of the prisoner. At this point the military police commander was requested to send in a military guard and to take responsibility for order in the center.

For a short time after the arrival of the soldiers the crowd was quiet. The commanding officer talked to the Committee of Five in the station, reminding them of their agreement made during the afternoon; then he addressed the crowd. Seeing that there was no hope of dispersing the crowd peacefully, he finally gave the order to throw gas grenades. The crowd scattered, but a strong wind minimized the effect of the gas, and in a few minutes the crowd came back. One of them started a car, headed it toward the mounted machine guns and jumped out. An officer of the military police, unable to see that the car was driverless, opened fire with his machine gun. The soldiers took the shots for a signal to start firing, and some of them discharged their shotguns into the crowd. When the smoke and dust cleared away, the injured were carried into the police station by the evacuees and were removed by ambulance to the hospital. One boy of seventeen was killed instantly. Another boy, twenty-one, shot through the stomach, died in the hospital several days later. One was not wounded but was treated for exposure and tear gas. Nine were wounded more or less seriously, but all of these recovered.

BACKGROUND OF THE INCIDENTS

Although both of these disturbances were referred to in the press as "pro-Axis" demonstrations, they were actually the culmination of grievances and tensions that had been accumulating over a period of months. There is absolutely no evidence to indicate that the Manzanar incident was in any sense a "celebration" of the anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

Though graver in development, the Manzanar incident paralleled basically the Poston incident of the preceding month. In both cases, the spark that touched off the conflagration was the arrest of an evacuee on suspicion of having taken part in the beating of an unpopular evacuee believed by the people to be an informer. At both Poston and Manzanar, it was clearly indicated that many evacuees refused to believe the detained suspect guilty, that the rest felt that even if he were guilty he should not be punished for assaulting an informer, and that practically all were firmly against his removal from the center for trial as they believed such matters should be handled within the relocation community. In both instances the basic causes underlying the incidents were similar. Any thoughtful analysis of these incidents should include consideration of the following influences and factors:

- (1) Loss of income and property as a result of evacuation;
- (2) Uncertainty about the future in this country;

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- (3) Dissatisfaction with some members of the administrative staff;
- (4) The policy on evacuee government excluding the aliens from membership on the community council;
- (5) The arrest of evacuees and their trial outside the relocation area;
- (6) The separation of Japanese aliens held in internment camps from their families, many of whom reside in the centers;
- (7) The variations in food between the kitchens of different blocks;
- (8) Delays in the payment of wages and clothing allowances;
- (9) Confusions about administrative policy;
- (10) Rumors of misappropriation of food;
- (11) Suspicions that informers were operating within the center;
- (12) Pre-evacuation quarrels and feuds between various factions of the Japanese-Americans;
- (13) Reliance by the administration upon young leaders who were not regarded as representative of the evacuees and upon other purported leaders who aided in the evacuation;
- (14) Discrimination against the aliens, and their exclusion from positions of importance in center administration.

As a result of analyzing the factors which contributed to these disturbances, WRA closed the quarter with plans shaping in two directions. First, the Administration, with heightened awareness of the complexity and grave significance of the human problems and attitudes arising from conditions of center life, was determined to enlist all possible assistance from qualified agencies and to employ all relevant techniques both in discovering the underlying causes

of community unrest and in bringing about their elimination. Second, the Administration was working toward the formulation of definite procedures for isolation in special camps of those who menace community living, and for segregation of those known to be disloyal to the United States; the retention in relocation centers of the first group jeopardizes the peace of the community, while the continued presence of the second menaces the status of the Japanese-American citizens.

INTERNAL SECURITY

Following the Poston and Manzanar incidents, extensive efforts were made to improve and tighten up the internal security or police organization at all relocation centers. As a first step in this direction, plans were made for appointing a national chief of internal security on the Washington staff; as a second, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was asked to survey the internal security problem at all centers and to make specific recommendations; as a third, the Civil Service internal security staff at each of the centers was revised to assure adequate training supervision for the evacuee police.

At each center, three jobs were set up in the Internal Security Division to be filled by non-evacuee Civil Service personnel; a Chief of Internal Security, an Associate, and an Assistant. Because of difficulties in recruiting properly qualified people, however, it was the exceptional center which managed to round out its internal

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security organization during the quarter. At the close of the period, most centers still had only one Civil Service employee in internal security work. Details of organization and size of evacuee staff at each center were determined by the local Chief in the light of the center's population and its individual needs for police protection. As of December 31, the size of the evacuee internal security staffs at the centers varied from 18 to 160.

Most centers experienced a shortage of men on the police force during the harvest season, but in general were able to fill vacancies by using older men, who have done very good work and are suited for their positions by maturity and the respect which they command in the communities. The quarter under discussion saw the establishment of training schools for police officers at most of the centers. In these courses the police learned tactics common to the best police departments in the country and were also instructed in first aid. The aim of the police departments was to function so thoroughly as crime preventors that the business of crime detection would be reduced to a minimum. As a practical step toward achieving this end, every center maintained patrols in three eight-hour shifts, so that at no time within the twenty-four hours was the community without adequate police protection. Violations of law or center regulation during the quarter were few and chiefly in the category of misdemeanors rather than of felonies.

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FIRE PROTECTION

At all centers marked progress was achieved in the field of fire protection. Two centers, Granada and Rohwer, reported that they were, by the end of the quarter, adequately equipped and manned to face any emergency which might arise. Most of the centers received at least the basic essentials of fire-fighting equipment and by the close of the period had completed construction of fire stations (though in some instances the stations were too small to house the equipment, or lacked heating facilities adequate to prevent the freezing of fire truck discharge valves, nozzles, and pumps); a few of the centers had installed communication systems so that fires could be brought more promptly to the attention of the proper authorities. There remained some disparity between the number of fire hydrants and the length of fire hose on hand, and at Manzanar a problem existed because the water pressure on one side of the center was too low to combat major conflagration or to allow the sprinkler system in the hospital to operate effectively. However, the very handicaps under which the departments labored served to develop ingenuity and resourcefulness on the part of the firemen, and gave additional point to the fire-prevention educational program for the residents.

Intensive training and constant vigilance on the part of the firemen, together with the full cooperation of the residents, proved highly successful in lessening fire hazards at the centers. Such

fires as occurred during the quarter were in almost every instance derived from faulty installation of stoves or water heaters (indicating a general hazard that could be promptly remedied) or from the less easily solved problem posed by the general use of sub-standard electrical wiring or the installation (particularly in the colder centers) of chimney flues inadequate for the type of heating required.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE RELOCATION PROGRAM

Litigation. During the quarter there were significant developments in litigation testing the constitutionality of the evacuation. Federal judges handed down two decisions during the quarter concerning the constitutionality of the Western Defense Command's curfew regulations and evacuation orders. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation orders in a criminal prosecution by the Government against Fred T. Korematsu, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry who had not obeyed the orders. On the other hand, the Federal District Court for the District of Oregon, in a similar prosecution against Minoru Yasui, a person of Japanese ancestry who violated the curfew regulations issued by General DeWitt, stated that the curfew orders were unconstitutional as to American citizens (although holding that Yasui was not a citizen and hence that he could be punished for disobeying the orders). At the close of the quarter these cases were awaiting appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Also

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in the process of appeal to the same court was the Hirabayashi case, a criminal prosecution against a citizen of Japanese ancestry who had violated the evacuation orders. In that case the Federal District Court for the District of Washington had, during the preceding quarter, upheld the constitutionality of the evacuation orders as to American citizens.

At the end of the quarter there were two cases pending in Federal District Courts in California which were of immediate concern to WRA because they challenged WRA's constitutional right to detain evacuee citizens in the relocation centers. In these cases, writs of habeas corpus were sought for Mr. and Mrs. Ernest Wakayama of the Manzanar Relocation Center and Mitsuye Endo of the Tule Lake Relocation Center.

One other case of indirect interest to WRA, decided during the preceding quarter by the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California, was Regan v. King, a case that attempted to compel the San Francisco registrar of voters to strike the names of citizens of Japanese ancestry from the election register, on the grounds that they were in fact not American citizens. The suit was dismissed on the authority of the Supreme Court decision in the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark. At the close of the quarter, an appeal of Regan v. King was pending before the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

The Office of the Solicitor kept in close touch with all litigation of interest to WRA or to evacuees, keeping WRA informed

of the implications to the relocation program of all judicial decisions handed down. In addition, the Solicitor's Office cooperated with the Department of Justice in the preparation of briefs on the constitutional questions raised and in the determination of litigation policy.

Project Attorneys. By the close of the quarter appointed Civil Service attorneys had been assigned to most of the relocation centers, as project attorneys, to assume responsibility under the Solicitor's supervision for all legal work at the centers. This legal work included: (1) legal advice to the project director and his staff in the administration of the center; (2) assistance in formulating plans for evacuee self-government and law enforcement; (3) participation in trial of cases involving law and order offenses by evacuees; (4) advice to evacuee-operated consumer enterprises on all legal aspects of their management and assistance in organizing them into cooperative associations; and (5) aid to evacuees seeking legal assistance in their personal affairs or property matters. There was a very noticeable increase in work in the last-named category, as the evacuees became more and more aware of the legal services available to them. Much of the evacuee property work required collaboration with the field offices of the Evacuee Property Office, research into tax and property law, and preparation of leases, contracts, powers of attorney, and various other types of legal instruments. In addition the project attorneys were active in establishing and maintaining good working relationships with State and local authorities whose duties impinge on project operations--

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judges, law enforcement officers, tax authorities, and various other State and local officials.

Evacuee lawyers who had been admitted to practice in some State, and, at some projects, law students and tax and insurance counsellors were assigned to the office of the project attorney to assist him in carrying out his functions. These staff members performed very valuable legal services, particularly in the field of assisting evacuees with their personal and business problems.

Over-all legal work. Until the reorganization of December 15, the regional attorneys at Denver, Little Rock, and San Francisco continued their activities in furnishing legal advice to the regional directors and their staffs and in reviewing the work of the project attorneys. Upon the discontinuance of the regional offices, the Washington office of the Solicitor assumed this review function, but established a field office in San Francisco for the purpose of assisting the Evacuee Property Office there in carrying out its functions.

In Washington, the Solicitor's Office continued to give legal advice to the Director and his staff, assisting in the preparation of procedural documents and doing all necessary legal research on problems raised by project operations and relocation policies. Twenty formal opinions were issued during the quarter, covering a broad range of legal problems, such as the legal basis for organization of evacuee self-government at relocation centers; the liability of consumer enterprises to pay Federal and State income taxes; the procedure for

organizing consumer cooperatives under the District of Columbia law, including the preparation of sample articles, by-laws, and other organization papers; the ways in which American citizenship might be lost by evacuees; the extent of WRA's authority under its executive order and appropriation language to buy real property or to extend assistance to persons other than those covered by evacuation orders; military censorship of photographs taken at relocation centers; and the applicability of Federal fiscal and other statutes to various activities proposed by WRA.

In addition to maintaining relationships with the Department of Justice on matters involving litigation (see above), the Solicitor's office continued its liaison with the Alien Enemy Control Unit, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation of that Department in legal matters relating to parolees from internment camps, deportees, and persons in relocation centers suspected of subversive activities; with the Alien Property Custodian and the Foreign Funds Control Unit of the Treasury Department on questions involving the vesting or freezing of evacuee funds and property; with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on tax matters affecting evacuees and evacuee-operated organizations; with the Department of the Interior in problems arising under the memoranda of understanding covering WRA use of reclamation and Indian lands for relocation center purposes; and with other Federal agencies whose programs affect WRA activities.

RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The final quarter of the year witnessed the development and expansion of leisure-time activities at all centers. Whereas the quarter opened with nearly half the centers lacking qualified non-evacuee advisors for the program, it ended with such supervisors on the job in all centers but one. The arrival of these qualified leaders gave impetus and needed direction to an important phase of the relocation program. Very few of the evacuees had training or experience adequate for the assumption of active and efficient leadership in the field of group activities; many were interested in taking part in the program, but their efforts were handicapped until the presence of an experienced supervisor allowed training and instruction.

Certain leisure-time programs common to all centers were established early in the period of occupation: athletics, social recreation, forum and discussion groups, and religious activities. Until winter weather interrupted outdoor sports, such as baseball, softball, touch football, and basketball were popular leisure-time pursuits. Only in the two Arizona centers, however, were such sports possible during the winter season. The indoor sports program was limited by the nature of the recreation halls--ordinary barracks with low ceilings--and by the fact that many recreation halls had to be converted to office, school room and other uses for which they were not intended. Lack of adequate recreational equipment at most centers continued throughout the quarter. Ping pong, judo, and boxing matches

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proved popular among the indoor sports that could be carried on in the available space during the winter. Social recreation included dancing, play production (both modern and occidental dramas and traditional Japanese plays), concerts and community sings, and the arrangement of card games, checkers, chess, go, shogi, and mah jong for interested groups.

During the quarter, the organization of clubs for young and old went forward at all relocation centers. These clubs fall into two categories: those that are chapters of national organizations, and those that are purely local in nature. During the autumn, representatives from the national organizations visited the different centers and helped with the formation of branch units. By the end of the quarter, most centers had chapters of the American Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts inaugurated. The local clubs showed a wide variety of interests and covered a range that begins with the purely recreational or social and ends with the definitely intellectual or sociological.

SUMMARY REPORTS ON THE CENTERS

Manzanar

The entire October-December quarter at Manzanar in California was over-shadowed by the disturbance of December 6. Prior to that date, the community was working up to the point of combustion; subsequent to it, the populace was recovering from the shock and violence of the incident. The demonstration seriously affected the

organization and size of the appointed staff. Conditions made it necessary to substitute non-Japanese in posts previously filled by evacuees. Until new personnel could be recruited and inducted, school teachers substituted in clerical and other jobs.

Throughout the autumn Manzanar experienced a shortage of workers. Slightly over 1,000 harvest workers went out in October, cutting the supply of internal workers from 5,200 to 4,200 and 500 students withdrew from labor to go to school. The disturbance disrupted employment except in divisions concerned with subsistence and hospital services, and even when all evacuees returned to work on December 19, drastic reorganization and reassignment took place because of the replacement of many evacuees by Civil Service personnel.

Manufacturing enterprises, with the exception of the short-lived camouflage net project, functioned satisfactorily during the period up to the time of the general strike. The garment factory, reconditioned during the quarter, received power machines of all types with consequent acceleration of production. Until November most work in the factory was done on domestic machines. The 25 employees manufactured camouflage masks, beauty shop smocks and uniforms, kitchen aprons, waitresses' uniforms, towels, denim coats and policemen's shirts. The soy sauce factory, installed in November and employing four men, was expected eventually to supply other centers in addition to Manzanar, but in December the disturbances

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at the center temporarily cut down production. The bean sprout project, which began production in October with four workers, produced an average of 1600 pounds weekly for delivery to the mess halls. A woodcraft undertaking was at the close of the quarter still in its formative stage. A shop had been reconditioned for its use, and tools and equipment had been set up. A temporary toy shop was functioning and had produced sample toys.

All crops planted at the center during the summer were harvested during the fall. About 717 tons of vegetables, melons, and pears were produced, with a value of \$43,500 as estimated on the basis of Los Angeles market reports. All products except three carloads of Swiss chard and two of watermelons sent to other centers were consumed at the center. No planting was possible after September because of early frost. One-third of available acreage was utilized in 1942. Shortage of farm implements, a makeshift irrigation system, and late planting prevented further development. At the close of the year plans were being made to plant 300 additional acres in the 1943 season.

Colorado River

With the return of cooler weather, the tempo of community progress at the Colorado River Relocation Center in western Arizona accelerated noticeably throughout the autumn months. In fact, just before the demonstration in late November, the center, despite

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unusual difficulties of supply and communication, appeared to be achieving a considerable measure of community stability. And the demonstration itself, for all its regrettable features, undoubtedly had a healthy effect by bringing certain basic difficulties into the open.

On the agricultural side, the center was forced during the period to lower considerably its previous estimates of future production but was able, because of favorable climate, to continue production of certain essential foods well into the winter. Toward the end of the quarter a plan for farm development in the undeveloped Parker Valley was drastically curtailed because of retarded development of the main irrigation canal from Headgate Rock Dam, twenty-five miles distant from the area. During October and November, however, reclaimed land was planted to spinach, lettuce, Copenhagen cabbage, onions, broccoli, and celery for early spring harvesting. By the end of the period, subjugation crews had cleared and prepared for cultivation an additional 140 acres of desert, bringing the total acreage of cleared land to 305 acres. Hog and chicken farms were in process of preparation for use early in the new year when stock purchases could best be made. Construction of pens and fences, however, awaited the procurement of lumber.

Industrially the quarter was a period of exploration. Surveys were made of production possibilities in a variety of enterprises ranging from ice cream manufacture to ceramics. In the established

undertakings of charcoal and Japanese food manufacture, production was stepped up by the end of the quarter. In the month of December the Moyashi (bean sprout) factories operating in two of the communities produced 6,205 pounds for consumption in the community mess halls.

The schools of Poston opened under the handicaps common to all relocation centers. Poston I, largest of the three communities, suffered the greatest inconvenience in that classes were scattered over a square mile (because it was impracticable to move any large mass of the residents), whereas at Poston II and III it was possible to allocate one entire block of barracks for school use. The library system was closely tied in with the school system, operating under the joint direction of the Superintendent of Education and the Director of Recreation and Adult Education.

The three police units of Poston functioned without an appointed non-evacuee supervisor until early in October when a former officer of the San Francisco Police Department took office as Chief of Internal Security. This man immediately founded a police academy which proceeded to train the evacuee force in modern police methods. During the disturbance in November in Poston I, the entire force of that unit walked out, but continued unofficially and voluntarily to perform their regular duties, patrolling the area, and cooperating with the Administration with such good effect that there was not a single instance of violence during the entire period of the disturbance.

During the quarter the center's official newspaper underwent changes in name, management, and program. When the Daily Press Bulletin became the Poston Daily Chronicle, it changed from complete WRA supervision to evacuee management. By the end of the quarter, the Chronicle was functioning on a sound financial basis, with a paid subscription list of 2542. In addition to the community-wide eight-page daily mimeographed paper, it issued the Poston Christian Church Weekly with a circulation of 500 copies; the Poston III High School News, a weekly for circulation to school children and appointed personnel; and the Poston Red Cross News, a monthly with a circulation of 500.

The Poston Community Enterprises, consisting of 28 business establishments, moved its program forward under a trust agreement between citizen evacuee trustees and the Project Director. Under the terms of the agreement, all profits must be used for the benefit of the community. As of December 31, \$4,965.25 had been expended for such public benefits as movies, recreation equipment, and materials for regularly sponsored clubs. Since the Enterprises were started without capital, it was necessary to retain most of the profits to keep sufficient reserve for operations and expansion. At the end of the quarter, plans were going forward to incorporate the enterprises as a cooperative.

Tule Lake

This center in the northeastern corner of California ended the quarter with two outstanding accomplishments: (1) the production

and harvesting of bumper agricultural crops, and (2) the establishment of a highly effective community government.

Tule Lake's success in agriculture can be attributed to two factors: early occupation of the center which allowed time to prepare land, plant, and harvest before the frosts; and the rich fertility of the soil in the area. The results were achieved, moreover, in the face of serious labor troubles which threatened for a time to stop all agricultural work at the center. These difficulties came to a head in mid-October, at the height of the harvest season, and were accompanied by the unexpectedly simultaneous maturing of many crops. To meet the situation, high school students and evacuee women volunteers were recruited for temporary work in the fields. Certain groups, as a gesture of civic pride, contributed labor without accepting pay: the councilmen, the recreation staff, the Boy Scouts, the newspaper staff, and many members of the administration. Eventually the labor difficulties were adjusted and the regular crews were returned to work in time to finish up the harvest.

By December only rutabagas were being harvested. The major crops were potatoes, cabbage, carrots, daikon, celery, beets, turnips, lettuce, spinach, Chinese lettuce, onions, parsnips and rutabagas. These crops provided food for the center mess halls, 95 carloads for shipment to other centers, and 55 carloads for the commercial markets, the latter bringing a price of \$75,935.75. In addition, 1,200 tons of vegetables were stored for winter consumption. The farm produced also 1,850 bushels of oats and 15,927 bushels of barley.

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After a rather turbulent period under a temporary system, a long-range community government was set up in early December and functioned throughout the remainder of the period with intelligence and efficiency. The election of the community council received the serious attention of the colony voters, who had had time to realize that the center should be run in the most efficient way for the good of the greatest number.

Closely allied with the government organization was the merit rating board. This board, chairmanned by the Assistant Project Director but otherwise composed of evacuees, made monthly checkups on all evacuee workers, grading them from A to E. These detailed reports were compiled to promote the efficiency of the individual and as a reference for investigations in connection with outside employment. The Fair Practice Committee, which formerly functioned under the Employment Division, showed toward the end of the quarter a tendency to divorce itself from all divisions in order that it might operate with complete lack of bias. This Committee of seven evacuees, each representing a different work division, investigated charges made against workers, looked into reasons for dismissal, and made recommendations according to the nature of the findings. Aside from having power to recommend reinstatement or dismissal, the committee was empowered to recommend a change in employment if that course seemed advisable.

The Planning Board, which came into existence October 1 exercised a dual function: (1) preparing research on major problems

likely to have an unfavorable repercussion among the residents as a whole, and (2) making recommendations for the institution of practices which would eliminate friction and promote general welfare. The committee was composed of seven male alien residents--one from each ward--an executive secretary, two members of the community council, and three technical research workers from the WRA administrative staff. Out of the discussions and reports held at planning board meetings came valuable decisions, the execution of which was definitely to the advantage of the community. The board stood behind the building of recreational facilities within each block to minimize opportunities for juvenile delinquency; it discovered the facts pertaining to the spoiling of a consignment of pork; it designated children who needed supplementary food; and it was responsible for requiring all mess and butcher shop workers to pass syphilitic and tuberculin tests.

Gila River

The Gila River Center, located in the desert of south-central Arizona and composed of two communities--Butte and Canal--was in the final stages of basic construction at the beginning of the quarter, and continued to receive large contingents of residents throughout the month of October. The confusion resulting from large inductions of evacuees for whom living quarters were incomplete lasted as long as induction took place. It was late in November

before the hospital unit was ready for use. November and December were given over to an extensive partitioning program to allow a modicum of privacy within the small apartments, and by the end of the quarter the greater part of this work had been finished.

The group leave program affected a very small percentage of workers at Gila because the only seasonal work readily available was located within the evacuated area. By special arrangement with the Western Defense Command, about two hundred evacuees were allowed to commute daily for a two-month period to the cotton fields of central Arizona. The fact that opportunities for seasonal work were limited had its compensations. Because of this situation, Gila River did not experience the labor shortage within the center that was common to other centers, and the farm program was successful during the quarter. The 820 acres under cultivation produced vegetables with an approximate total value of \$310,682, supplying the two Gila River camps and sending carloads to other centers. Two nurseries were in operation, propagating seeds and root stocks for vegetables, trees, flowers and shrubs. Since the acquisition of live stock was delayed until the new year, 5,000 acres of grazing land were leased, and some income derived.

The quarter saw complete organization of the Internal Security Division into policing platoons, juvenile officers and bicycle-mounted patrols, with a training program in progress. While the crime rate was low for the average municipality of 14,000 inhabitants,

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it was high in view of the law-abiding habits of Japanese Americans prior to evacuation, and this fact caused serious concern among the evacuee residents. Community leaders were especially concerned about the increasing problem of juvenile delinquency which took the form of vandalism, burglary, theft, and assault. With the Internal Security Division, Parent-Teacher groups, and recreation leaders deeply interested in the problem and combining forces to combat it with effective leisure-time planning, however, improvement in conditions was expected.

Community Government, at the close of the quarter, was still functioning on a temporary basis. A tentative draft of a charter for a long-range governmental organization, however, was in process of formation. The Community Enterprise Association continued to supply the center with dry goods, shoes, drugs, hardware and groceries, and was conducting a study of the organization and maintenance of a cooperative and expecting to reach the incorporation stage shortly. The camouflage net factory at Gila began production in the last two weeks of December, but wage and health problems made recruitment of workers very slow. The quarter ended with a plan under consideration which it was hoped would remedy the situation.

Minidoka

The Minidoka Center in south central Idaho sent 2300 residents to the harvest fields of the surrounding area, with the result that the number employed in activities within the center rose from about

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one-third to nearly all of the population between terminals of the quarter. To maintain essential services in the community it was necessary to train women as firemen, truck drivers, and warehousemen. One of the brighter aspects of this seasonal picture was to be found in the friendly relations established between evacuees and the farmers whose crops they saved. While the general public in some outlying towns continued to resent evacuees eating in restaurants, shopping, or attending moving picture shows while they were on seasonal leave, the farmers and business men who profited by the presence of the evacuees sought greater tolerance on the part of the public. Five Twin Falls farmers wrote to the Administration to voice their appreciation of the high quality of labor provided by the evacuees.

However, with such a severe shortage of labor on the center, it was especially hard to fill unpleasant and disagreeable jobs such as coal handling, land clearance, and garbage disposal. WRA was unable to provide gloves and footwear for the workers, two items worn out rapidly by those engaged in outside manual labor. As a result, the evacuees were reluctant to take on work that necessitated frequent clothing replacements where no means were provided with which to accuire such replacements.

Minidoka schools were late in opening, the elementary classes beginning on October 19 and the high school on November 16. The high school faced a curious problem in the fact that few of the students

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knew each other. The student body was derived from no less than 56 different and widely separated public schools in the evacuated area. As a result, it took time for the pupils to get acquainted, but by the end of the quarter, a school paper and various amalgamating student organizations were underway to help create a more normal school atmosphere.

The presence in the community of a number of experienced businessmen from Seattle and Portland encouraged a rapid and efficient organization of Community Enterprises and their conversion to an incorporated cooperative. The filing of Articles of Incorporation for the Minidoka Consumer's Cooperative took place on December 22. Many services were added during the quarter. Showing of motion pictures began, and flower, barber, watch repair, shoe repair, general radio repair, and beauty shops opened.

Although there was no outbreak or large-scale demonstration at Minidoka during the quarter, there existed anxiety, fear, and considerable resentment caused by three specific factors: (1) lack of indoor flush toilets, and the relation between this lack and a rather sinister infection which developed among mothers and new babies; (2) lack of coal for heating residences until mid-November, well after the arrival of cold weather; (3) the fact that first pay, for the month of September, was not distributed until mid-November. However, as stoves were installed in all barracks, delivery of food occurred on schedule, street lights were installed, winter moisture

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ended the dust condition, and as pay days and clothing grants arrived with some regularity, the morale of the people improved.

Heart Mountain

The first of October found Heart Mountain in northwestern Wyoming with the last large inductions accomplished and basic construction of the community completed. There was overcrowding in living quarters because the center received a larger allocation of evacuees than was originally intended. Miscalculation of the size of family units also resulted in considerable discomfort. Although an equal number of large and small apartments had been constructed, the center actually received nearly four times as many small families as large. Since the small rooms were all occupied before the last large contingents arrived and since such vacancies as existed were all in large apartments, it was necessary in many cases to put two families in a single apartment until the work of re-partitioning could be accomplished. The situation was aggravated in November and early December when 1200 people returned from work furloughs, usually arriving in large groups and late at night, requiring immediate assignment to quarters.

During the harvest season the center experienced a serious labor shortage. A survey of the 10,785 residents revealed only 2600 men between the ages of seventeen and fifty-five and it was from this group that practically all the harvest workers were recruited.

The shortage of workers at the center, however, served to prove the mettle of the firemen. With the fire department badly understaffed, the remaining firemen voluntarily worked anywhere from 65 to 100 hours per week to assure the community of round-the-clock protection.

In connection with community government, the question of alien participation was at Heart Mountain a particularly sore point. At this center, the aliens functioning as block managers commanded an unusual amount of community respect largely because of the effectiveness with which they solved many of the community's more serious problems. A succession of such problems arose during the quarter, any one of which might easily have developed into an "incident" had it not been for their discreet handling by the block managers. Agitation over clothing allowance dispensation before procedures were clarified, a walk-out strike of the entire police force, crises arising over the unloading of coal, collection of garbage, and recruiting of sugar beet workers were some of the situations dealt with by these "elder statesmen." The secret of their success was attributed to the fact that they had no fear of setting an example, even though it meant in one instance working with the coal crew without compensation until they had dignified a disagreeable but essential type of work. In another case, they took active responsibility for law and order during the police situation and personally guarded government property. The close cooperation developed, after the police force difficulty, between the block managers and the administration was a prime factor in maintaining peace in the community. One of the most conspicuous benefits achieved

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through this relationship was the control of the many boys' and young men's gangs, hold-overs from assembly center or even earlier days. By the end of the quarter, practically every gang had been transformed into a properly supervised boys' club with a healthy recreational program.

Industrially, Heart Mountain had cabinet, poster, canning, and sewing projects in production during the quarter. Early in December a sawmill was established in the Shoshone National Forest by WRA and timber cutting operations were begun under Forest Service permit. This mill, surrounded by a large tract of forest with trees marked for cutting by the forest rangers, gave promise of filling a need for an essential material at the center and also seemed likely to provide the evacuees an opportunity to acquire a new skill. From late October through the remainder of the quarter, a group of evacuees spent nearly full time preparing living quarters for the thirty men required to man the sawmill and repairing the road from the mill site to the center. Plans were made to operate the sawmill throughout the year, thus insuring the center of an adequate lumber supply.

Granada

Granada, in southeastern Colorado, began the quarter with induction just completed, and the 7600 people starting to settle down to community life. Beginning the quarter with evacuee barracks erected in all 30 blocks but with 18 of the blocks lacking plumbing

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facilities and ll lacking mess hall service, the community had advanced by the end of the quarter to the place where it could concern itself with maintenance rather than with fundamental construction work. During the harvest season, this center, with more than 1,000 able-bodied workers out on leave, experienced a particularly acute manpower shortage.

Community government was still in the hands of the Temporary Council, but the charter for a permanent government was written and revised and ready to be voted on. Community enterprises increased during the quarter in both number and business volume, grossing \$64,674.33 for the quarter. Plans were being made for incorporation as a cooperative as the period ended.

The Granada Center was particularly fortunate in the establishment of friendly relations with neighboring towns. A limited number of shopping passes were issued daily to evacuees who needed to make purchases in Lamar and Granada. Groups of merchants from both towns extended official invitations to the center residents to visit the towns, and many townsfolk came out to visit the center. Basketball games between the center and outside high schools and town teams increased the general friendliness, while local newspapers also helped to foster and strengthen the mutual respect and good will.

Central Utah

The first half of October brought from Santa Anita and Tanforan Assembly Centers the last of the large evacuee contingents. November

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represented the peak of outside employment with 748 engaged in seasonal work. At the end of December, when the harvest workers had returned to the center, the population totaled 7,909.

During the quarter, considerable progress was made in general construction and public works, and by the close of the year the scene had changed from one of dust and excavation and expectation of construction to one of settled community life. Barrack construction was complete with winterization of living quarters and dining halls; stoves had been installed in almost all buildings; the hospital had been dedicated; gravel and asphalt roads were laid; a new post office was finished; plumbing and carpentry crews were functioning efficiently, and a permanent telephone system was completed, connecting major points of administrative activity. Canals and diversion gates were made ready to function for cultivated land in spring, and irrigation plans were being developed for the care of the city's transplanted trees. In December workers on the landscaping project brought in by truck from the surrounding area 4,800 willow saplings, 1,000 tamarisks, 20 Utah junipers, and 24 Siberian elms.

Late in November plowing began on a 600-acre truck crop section, 150 acres of barley and sweet clover were planted, and brush clearing and plowing were to continue as long as the weather allowed. Hog and beef-cattle projects were started, and equipment was prepared for the introduction of a poultry section.

The Topaz Consumer Cooperative Enterprises incorporated during the quarter with a membership of 5,170 and a total, paid-in

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share capital of \$5,170. As of December 31, five main stores were operating with a total of 40 evectee employees. The association was also sponsoring moving picture showings, radio repair, laundries, and barber shops. Additional services planned for 1943 included dry cleaning, watch repair, and beauty shops.

On December 15, residents voted and ratified the constitution for community government by a large majority, and with the election of the Community Council on December 29, all steps in establishing community government had been accomplished.

The quarter saw the school program change from a formative stage to a well established system serving more than 2,000 pupils of grade and high school age, about 2,000 enrolled in adult education courses, and 182 enrolled in the 3 pre-school centers.

Community activities were varied and enthusiastically supported. The Topaz library, which opened in early December with more than 5,000 volumes, sponsored weekly recorded concerts which were well attended. There was a four-day harvest festival at Thanksgiving, and the Christmas holidays carried a program that included a dining hall decoration contest, a speedball exhibition, issei programs, special religious services, a pageant, dances, and distribution of gifts to children and the aged.

The center had weekly church services conducted by Buddhist, Catholic, Protestant, and Seventh Day Adventist clergymen, with a total average weekly attendance of 2,450. The Topaz Times, published

daily except Sunday, started issuing a magazine supplement each Saturday, and on Christmas Day put out a 30-page holiday magazine. As the quarter ended, the interest of the young was focused on plans for an ice skating rink.

Rohwer

The quarter opened at Rohwer with 2,434 people in residence and the bulk of the population yet to come. Most of the administrative staff had been appointed as of October 1, and a few hundred evacuees had been assigned to jobs; as the blocks were occupied, Block Managers were being selected to represent the people in the administration of the community. There was, however, no police force, and a fire department was still in process of organization; land development had not yet started; a project canteen had been operating one week; basic construction was only 75 per cent complete, and the scene was one of dust and confusion.

Employment difficulties arose from the rapid filling up of the center and also from the necessity of using inexperienced men on jobs calling for skilled workers. Of the evacuees recruited for construction work, only one had previous experience in the line. Evacuee foremen and supervisors also had to be trained. By December 31, physical construction was about 98 per cent complete, and the quarters for administrative personnel, constructed with evacuee labor, were 65 per cent complete. In October the majority of workers

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were employed in mess, transportation, and preparation of barracks for occupation by the contingents of evacuees that kept pouring into the camp. By November large numbers were employed in wood cutting and land clearance and advance work for construction of personnel apartments.

In mid-October the hospital opened, equipped to offer full service to the community, and by the end of the quarter the center's health staff was working on mosquito and fly control. Improvements in the drainage system being carried out at the close of the year were expected to aid malaria control. Schools opened in November without furniture, books, or enough teachers, but conditions had improved by the end of the year, and college extension courses in education for evacuee teachers were being started to enable these teachers to qualify for teaching certificates under state law. A well organized police force had functioned so ably in preventing crime or misdemeanor that up to December 31 it had not been necessary to make a single arrest. Interest in the approved plan of community government was limited because of the restrictions imposed, but in November a temporary council of citizen evacuees was elected, and 6 alien residents were selected as an advisory committee. Together these bodies made plans for incorporating the community enterprise association and appointed a commission to draw up a charter for a long-range government. This constitution was completed in December and approved by both the temporary council and the advisory board.

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Jerome

Jerome in southeastern Arkansas was the last center to be occupied. It was not until October 6 that the advance contingent of 200 evacuees arrived from Fresno Assembly Center. At the end of that month the population was close to the 7,000 mark. As of October 1, basic construction of buildings and services was 90 per cent complete, the unfinished portion being chiefly water, sewage, and hospital facilities. The quarter was drawing to a close before the final touches of construction--such as window screens, sills, doors, and insulation--approached actual completion.

Road work was an essential undertaking, as ingress and egress during the winter depended entirely on having roads surfaced and drainage ditches installed before the rains began. The other imperative task was the cutting of fir wood for heating residences. This work consisted of felling the trees, trimming them, and hauling logs by truck, wagon, and mud boat. The wood cutting was limited to land selected for spring planting of food and feed crops. Labor was slowed by the inexperience of the evacuees in lumbering work. Few, if any, of them had ever worked at felling trees or chopping wood before, and the entire crew had to be trained in the handling of the tools, axes, cut-off saws, and cross-cut saws.

Although schools were unable to open during the quarter, registration had been completed by December 31, with 1,188 assigned to the high school, 318 to the elementary schools, 96 to the kindergarten, and 1,200 adults to the night school. Schools were scheduled to open immediately after the beginning of the year.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

October 1 - December 31, 1942

- October 1 -- New leave regulations went into effect, making it possible for aliens as well as citizens, who met certain requirements, to reestablish themselves in private life.
- WRA opened a New York Office for the purpose of cooperating with the Second Service Command on the Individual Exclusion program.
- October 6 -- Jerome Relocation Center, last of the centers to be occupied, received its first contingent of evacuees.
- November 1 -- Final movement from Assembly Centers to Relocation Centers accomplished.
- November 5 -- General Emmons, in a Press Conference in Honolulu, announced a program of limited evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from Hawaii, explaining that there would be no mass evacuation and that only those not essential to the war effort would be affected, the evacuees to be sent to relocation centers on the mainland.
- November 14 -- The "Poston Incident" got off to a start with the night attack on an evacuee resident at the Colorado River Relocation Center.
- November 18 -- A Federal Judge in Portland ruled simultaneously that the curfew order was void with regard to American citizens, but that Minoru Yasui, 26, American-born Japanese, having lost his citizenship by reason of a former period of employment in the office of the Japanese Consulate, was guilty of violating the War Department's curfew order.
- November 23 -- The "Poston Incident" ended in an agreement between evacuees and administration.
- First contingent of evacuees from Hawaii, 107 in number, arrived at the Jerome Relocation Center in Arkansas.
- December 5 -- The night assault on an evacuee resident at Manzanar Relocation Center precipitated the "Manzanar Incident".
- December 6 -- The demonstration took place at Manzanar, the Military Police were called in, bloodshed followed, and a short period of military occupation began.
- December 15 -- Announcement was made of the abolishment of WRA Regional Offices and the transfer of the San Francisco staff to Washington and to the relocation centers.

WRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943

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WRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943

Reports Div.
Rosaund B. Spier
Room 821

V

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

July 1 to December 31

1943

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
July 1 - December 31, 1943

GENERAL SUMMARY

For the War Relocation Authority, the latter half of 1943 was dominated by the segregation program and the many problems implicit in its execution. In this period, the Tule Lake Relocation Center at Newell, California, was converted to use as a segregation center. The planning and execution of the major policy of segregation, which involved the mass movement of thousands of segregants from the 9 relocation centers to Tule Lake and thousands of non-segregants from Tule Lake to the other centers, absorbed the time and attention of the majority of the staff members at all 10 centers and affected in greater or lesser degree the activities of practically every division within the Authority. No sooner had the first, great mass movement been accomplished than an uprising of one faction among the segregants occurred at the Tule Lake Center and resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. Between the sensational publicity accorded this incident and the numerous official and unofficial investigations resulting from it, the segregation issue remained the focal point of attention throughout the entire six-months period and tended to overshadow the more routine and less spectacular developments of the WRA program.

Without the competition of the long awaited and widely publicized segregation movement and its somewhat sensational by-products, the progress of the relocation program would unquestionably have dominated any report on WRA for the latter half of the year. Relocation of the evacuated people to normal life and employment, always the primary objective of the Authority, had been given impetus by the speeding up of leave clearance machinery and the re-evaluation of WRA's relocation objectives in the first six months of 1943. In the second period, relocation continued to gain momentum and was further stimulated by the creation within the Authority of a special Relocation Division which could devote its entire attention to this increasingly vital function of WRA. Despite the distraction provided by the execution of the segregation program, 8,434 evacuees relocated during the July 1 to December 31 period, increasing the total number of relocated persons by 100 per cent.

SEGREGATION

Unquestionably the execution of the segregation program in the latter half of 1943 represented a milestone in WRA history. The only major policy of comparable significance in the existence of the agency was the mass registration program of the Previous spring, which had accented the need of separating the pro-Japanese minority from the pro-American majority of the evacuees. The registration program had also furnished the information essential to any equitable selection of

segregants, and had provided WRA with a backlog of experience invaluable to the planning and conducting of subsequent major programs. The importance of having such a backlog was demonstrated by the impressive smoothness with which the segregation operations were carried out. Not one of the administrative difficulties encountered during the mass registration arose during the execution of the segregation program.

It was generally agreed that the confusion and misunderstanding which characterized the mass registration at most centers were due to the fact that insufficient time was allowed between conception and execution of the policy to present its purposes and processes adequately to either appointive staff or evacuees. Pre-execution planning for segregation was complete and practical: it set forth in a manual a uniform conception of objectives and procedures, outlining a flexible plan of organization of the work entailed at the projects and providing the means of uniformity in essential detail while allowing latitude in project organization to accommodate special circumstances existing at the individual centers. The procedures recognized the need of a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population.

At a conference held in Denver, on July 26 and 27, the Director and key members of the Washington staff met with Project Directors and their key staff members to clarify by discussion and unify interpretation of the segregation policy. Thoroughly conversant with the program, the Project Directors returned to their centers to meet with staff members and with representatives of the evacuee population to inform them fully of the work to be accomplished. Information was channeled steadily to the blocks through evacuee committees; project newspapers disseminated information and performed a valuable service in checking rumors.

Three categories of evacuees were designated for segregation; (1) all persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted their requests; (2) all persons who had answered the loyalty question on the registration form in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it, and who showed no disposition to change their answers or, having shown disposition to change their answers, failed to satisfy the Project Director that the change was made in good faith; (3) all persons who were found ineligible for leave clearance on the basis of individual hearings held because (a) they were the subject of adverse reports from a Federal intelligence agency, (b) they changed their answers from the negative or qualified to the affirmative on the loyalty question, (c) they retracted applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, (d) they were not recommended for leave clearance by the Japanese-American Joint Board established in the Provost Marshal General's office, or (e) there were other factors bearing upon their potential danger to the national security which required investigation. In addition to these three groups was a fourth and considerable group composed of the families and dependent relatives of the actual segregants. The people of the first two groups with their dependents were

transferred in the mass movements of September and October. Those persons classified as Group III on the basis of subsequent hearings were scheduled for transfer as individuals or in small groups from time to time.

In August a special board of qualified staff members was set up at each center to hold individual hearings for those persons who had answered the loyalty question in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it. Only those persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted them were consigned to the segregation center at Tule Lake without individual hearing. Each person who had given a negative answer (or none at all) to the loyalty question was asked if he wished to change his answer. If he said he did not wish to change, the conversation was finished at that point. On the other hand, if he said that he wanted to change to an affirmative answer, he was questioned extensively as to his motives for changing, and at the close of the hearing the board made a recommendation to the Project Director for disposal of the case.

The Welfare Department conducted interviews with segregants concerning family matters and health problems. The Chief Medical Officer determined which transferees, by reason of age or infirmity, required pullman accommodations--the regulation accommodations being coach--and which cases, by reason of health conditions, justified deferment of transfer. Detailed plans for the packing and handling of checkable luggage and freight were worked out by the Evacuee Property Office and carried out with an exactness that permitted this phase of the operations to proceed without delay or confusion.

On August 19th a field station of WRA was set up at Fort Douglas, Utah, to act as liaison between the Ninth Service Command of the Army (which was handling the transportation) and WRA officials both in Washington and at the centers. Prior to the first entrainment, a two-day conference was held at Fort Douglas, during which all military personnel, train commanders, mess officers, medical officers and other staff members received detailed instruction regarding transportation operations. The efficiency and smoothness with which these operations were carried out were attributed to the adequacy of these instructions and to the excellent cooperation of military, WRA personnel and evacuees.

Between mid-September and mid-October, 33 train trips transported 14,825 persons, 6250 from Tule Lake to other centers and 8575 to Tule Lake from other centers. Each train trip of segregants was accompanied by a military detachment of 50 persons and a WRA staff member whose duty was to be alert to safety measures, take necessary health and sanitary precautions, answer questions, and delegate to evacuee train monitors and coach captains responsibilities of getting volunteers for work en route and for keeping the cars in a sanitary condition. Evacuee volunteers served the regular meals prepared by army cooks, operated the auxiliary diners which furnished meals for the ill and infirm in sleeping cars, and maintained a high standard of

sanitation and neatness in the coaches, kitchens, lavatories and diners; car mothers looked after children, and formula girls assisted the army nurses in the preparation of formulas and infant diets. Arrangements for meals en route were made by the Army, with WRA supplying perishables, fuel for the gasoline stoves, and ice for refrigeration. In the course of these movements, 129,846 meals were served. The Army showed every consideration in providing for the comfort and well-being of the aged, the sick, expectant mothers, and with small babies. Sickness en route was at a minimum. There were no deaths or births on any train. Six persons were removed from trains for hospitalization. No case of unrest, violence, disorderly conduct, or intentional resistance was observed by military personnel or WRA train rider on any trip. In view of wartime conditions, the service of the railroads was excellent in respect to both equipment and schedules. Although some trains were delayed in departure beyond scheduled time, only two arrived later than scheduled time.

At Tule Lake the mechanical details and coordination of necessary factors of transfer operations were worked out to a point where, at the end of the operation, departure trains were being loaded and evacuees counted in 30 minutes, while arrival trains accomplished the count and unloading in 21 minutes. Housing assignments and deliveries of baggage were made in record time.

With one exception the program was carried out according to plan; it was found that housing at Tule Lake could not accommodate the total number of segregants; consequently the transfer of approximately 1900 people from Manzanar was ordered postponed until additional housing units could be constructed. When it became apparent that the movement of the Manzanar people would be delayed until mid-winter, one trip was scheduled in early November to move 290 of the Manzanar segregants whose health required that they make the trip before the onslaught of severe winter weather.

Every step in the execution of this program demonstrated the value of adequate planning and effective dissemination of information, of having a well-informed community to work with and a well-informed staff to work with the community, and of utilizing evacuee leadership.

PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION AT TULE LAKE CENTER

Like the WRA program as a whole, segregation center administration had no precedent. In speeches, articles, reports and Congressional investigations, WRA has affirmed and reaffirmed that the management in the United States of America of a population in enforced evacuation, a population composed mostly of American citizens, poses a highly complex problem--and a problem with no proved answer. Attempts to simplify that problem have tended to boomerang. Segregation, which was regarded as a means of over-all simplification, offered two knotty problems in itself: first, the basis upon which to determine who should be segregated; second, how to administer the community of the segregated.

Type of Segregant By Nativity and Age By Nativity
 For 8561 Persons of Japanese Ancestry
 Moved from Nine Relocation Centers to Tule Lake ^{1/}
 September - October, 1943

Type of Segregant ^{2/} and Age	Number			Percent		
	Total	American Born	Foreign Born	Total	American Born	Foreign Born
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	100.0	100.0
Repatriate or Expatriate	4690	3050	1640	54.8	50.1	66.1
Registration	1790	1532	258	20.9	25.2	10.4
Other	2081	1499	582	24.3	24.7	23.5
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	71.0	29.0
Repatriate or Expatriate	4690	3050	1640	100.0	65.0	35.0
Registration	1790	1532	258	100.0	85.6	14.4
Other	2081	1499	582	100.0	72.0	28.0
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 17	2290	2278	12	26.7	37.5	0.5
17 - 19	665	662	3	7.8	10.9	0.1
20 - 24	1538	1519	19	17.9	24.9	0.8
25 - 29	1051	1035	16	12.3	17.0	0.6
30 - 34	390	353	37	4.6	5.8	1.5
35 - 39	383	157	226	4.5	2.6	9.1
40 - 44	473	49	424	5.5	0.8	17.1
45.-49	439	12	427	5.1	0.2	17.2
50 - 54	370	11	359	4.3	0.2	14.5
55 - 59	373	5	368	4.4	0.1	14.9
60 - 64	330	0	330	3.9	0.0	13.3
65 - 69	184	0	184	2.1	0.0	7.4
70 - 74	49	0	49	0.6	0.0	2.0
75 & over	26	0	26	0.3	0.0	1.0

^{1/} Tule Lake is excluded; figures not available.

^{2/} For Jerome and Minidoka the route lists contained only one code for each family, opposite the name of the first person listed; if R was the code entered, all members of the family were tallied as repatriates; if X was the code entered, members of the family 17 years of age or older were tallied as registration Segregates, and members under 17 tallied as "Other."

Source: Route lists for train trips. These figures are preliminary and subject to revision; they were obtained by hand tallies of the Segregation route lists compiled at the Central Utah Statistical Laboratory.

SUMMARY ^{1/}
 Type of Segregant By Nativity, Sex, and Age
 For 8561 Persons of Japanese Ancestry
 Moved from Nine Relocation Centers to Tule Lake
 September - October, 1943

Age and Sex	Total				American Born				Foreign Born			
	:Total:	:Repat- :or :Expat:	:Expat- :ration: :Other:	:Other:	:Total:	:Expat- :rate :ration:	:Regis- :ration: :Other:	:Other:	:Total:	:Repat- :rate :ration:	:Regis- :ration: :Other:	:Other:
Total	8561	4690	1790	2081	6081	3050	1532	1499	2480	1640	258	582
Under 17	2290	1205	171 ^{2/}	914	2278	1197	170	911	12	8	1	3
17 - 19	665	341	183	141	662	341	182	139	3	0	1	2
20 - 24	1538	732	540	266	1519	721	535	263	19	11	5	3
25 - 29	1051	507	407	137	1035	497	403	135	16	10	4	2
30 - 34	380	189	164	37	353	168	155	30	37	21	9	7
35 - 39	383	234	86	63	157	82	60	15	226	152	26	48
40 - 44	473	286	61	126	49	30	15	4	424	256	46	122
45 - 49	439	275	49	115	12	6	5	1	427	269	44	114
50 - 54	370	237	37	96	11	6	4	1	359	231	33	95
55 - 59	373	259	37	77	5	2	3	0	368	257	34	77
60 - 64	330	242	31	57	0	0	0	0	330	242	31	57
65 - 69	184	131	19	34	0	0	0	0	184	131	19	34
70 - 74	49	37	3	9	0	0	0	0	49	37	3	9
75 & Over	26	15	2	9	0	0	0	0	26	15	2	9
Male	5204	2933	1306	965	3632	1798	1137	697	1572	1135	169	268
Under 17	1147	610	76	461	1141	607	75	459	6	3	1	2
17 - 19	416	204	137	75	141	204	137	73	2	0	0	2
20 - 24	1016	478	426	112	1007	472	424	111	9	6	2	1
25 - 29	655	311	303	41	646	305	300	41	9	6	3	0
30 - 34	270	132	129	9	248	120	121	7	22	12	8	2
35 - 39	226	132	73	21	113	55	54	4	113	77	19	17
40 - 44	244	168	37	39	40	24	14	2	204	144	23	37
45 - 49	187	138	19	30	8	3	5	0	179	135	14	30
50 - 54	231	167	27	37	10	6	4	0	221	161	23	37
55 - 59	302	214	32	56	5	2	3	0	297	212	29	56
60 - 64	288	216	26	46	0	0	0	0	288	216	26	46
65 - 69	157	117	16	24	0	0	0	0	157	117	16	24
70 - 74	41	32	3	6	0	0	0	0	41	32	3	6
75 & Over	24	14	2	8	0	0	0	0	24	14	2	8

Age and Sex	Total				American Born				Foreign Born			
	Total	:Repat:	:Regis-:	:Other:	Total	:Repat:	:Regis-:	:Other:	Total	:Repat:	:Regis-:	:Other:
Female	3357	1757	484	1116	2449	1252	395	802	908	505	89	314
Under 17	1143	595	95	453	1137	590	95	452	6	5	0	1
17 - 19	249	137	46	66	248	137	45	66	1	0	1	0
20 - 24	522	254	114	154	512	249	111	152	10	5	3	2
25 - 29	39	196	104	96	389	192	103	94	7	4	1	2
30 - 34	120	57	35	28	105	48	34	23	16	9	1	5
35 - 39	157	102	13	42	44	27	6	11	113	75	7	31
40 - 44	229	118	24	87	9	6	1	2	220	112	23	85
45 - 49	252	137	30	85	4	3	0	1	248	134	30	84
50 - 54	139	70	10	59	1	0	0	1	138	70	10	58
55 - 59	71	45	5	21	0	0	0	0	71	45	5	21
60 - 64	42	26	5	11	0	0	0	0	42	26	5	11
65 - 69	27	14	3	10	0	0	0	0	27	14	3	10
70 - 74	8	5	0	3	0	0	0	0	8	5	0	3
75 & Over	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1

1/ For Jerome and Minidoka the route lists contained only one code for each family, opposite the name of the first person listed; if R was the code entered, all members of the family were tallied as repatriates; if X was the code entered all members of the family 17 years of age and older were tallied as registration segregees and members under 17 tallied as "Other"

2/ Gila River had 171 persons under 17 coded as registration segregees although one person 17 years or older could register.

Source: Route lists for train trips. These figures are preliminary and subject to revision; they were obtained by hand tallies of the segregation route lists compiled at the Central Utah Statistical Laboratory.

Already WRA was detaining, if only temporarily, tens of thousands of American citizens without guarantee that such detention was constitutionally valid. No habeas corpus case had yet reached the Supreme Court to test the validity of such detention. Segregation meant a further detention under greater restrictions, and again the problem was complicated by the presence of many American citizens among the segregants. Persons chosen for segregation were those who had indicated by work or action that their loyalties lie with Japan rather than the United States. Whether or not United States citizens may be detained on the basis of administrative investigation is a question that has not yet been answered. WRA's compromise with necessity has been to conduct painstaking hearings for every individual who for any reason failed to swear unqualified loyalty to the United States, or with respect to whom there is either evidence indicating potential danger to the national security, documenting each case, and arranging for a panel composed of persons detached from WRA and politics to serve as a board of appeal.

The administration of Tule Lake Center posed an even more baffling problem. If all the segregants were aliens and all proved guilty of subversive activity, they would not be at Tule Lake; they would be in an interment camp administered by the Department of Justice. Application for repatriation has been insufficient reason in itself, under the Department of Justice standards, for interment, and more than half the people at Tule Lake are in the category of repatriates or expatriates. If the population at Tule Lake Center were 100 per cent adult, whether alien or citizen, and all proved guilty of disloyalty, it would be defensible to pattern the administration of Tule Lake upon that of a genuine interment camp. However, by the most complete figures available, 71 per cent of the people at Tule Lake are American citizens, and 26.7 per cent of the total population are not only American citizens but also minor children, of whom many are Sansei, or third-generation Americans. Nominally these children are segregants, but it must be remembered that they live at Tule Lake only because their parents or guardians applied for repatriation or did not answer the loyalty question in the affirmative. Similarly it must be remembered that many adult residents of Tule Lake are there only because they are dependent upon an actual segregant who is head of a family unit.

The policy of keeping families together throughout evacuation was enunciated by Lieutenant General DeWitt before WRA came into the picture. (See page 77 of Final Report Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942, prepared under the direction of General DeWitt). This policy has been followed consistently by WRA. To have set it aside at the time of segregation would have been to depart from the humanitarian and democratic principles so clearly stipulated in this particular instance by General DeWitt and furthermore to add to WRA's problems the establishment and maintenance of a large orphanage to care for the thousands of children affected. As the children at Tule Lake reach the age of 17, they will register and be processed for leave clearance. Those who qualify for indefinite leave will be sent

to a regular center, from which point they will be free to resume normal American life as soon as suitable work can be found for them.

Thus WRA is confronted by the necessity of maintaining at Tule Lake a rule strict enough to cope with the positively disloyal and yet flexible enough to accommodate the many young Americans who are as yet innocent of blame and whom WRA wishes to keep that way. It has proved far from easy to conduct a vital Americanization program behind the single fence of barbed wire and under the eyes of a company of military guards in an ordinary center. It is infinitely more difficult to conduct one in a center enclosed by a double, man-proof fence, with a battalion of military guards patrolling it, and with a concentration of the heretofore scattered disloyal element within the center at Tule Lake.

WRA always has recognized the fact that administrative policy under which normal centers operate could not be utilized without alteration at the segregation center. Certain changes in policy were definitely set forth prior to the segregation movement; others were anticipated. First, no indefinite leave would be granted from Tule Lake Center. Second, since Tule Lake was set aside specifically for people who believe their future lies with Japan, attendance at the public schools maintained by WRA was made voluntary rather than compulsory, and Japanese parents were given the privilege of conducting Japanese language schools at their own expense. Third, internal security at the new center was recognized as another problem requiring deviation from existing policy. (External security has always been the concern of the Army, and it was a military decision that increased the military guard at Tule Lake to a battalion, erected a double, eight-foot, man-proof fence around the center, and installed turn-stiles to make it impossible for any unauthorized person to enter or leave the center). Internal security at Tule Lake and elsewhere is completely under WRA jurisdiction. At ordinary centers evacuee wardens supervised by not more than six Civil Service internal security officers perform the two-fold function of patrolling the residence area and handling minor infractions of WRA regulations on the one hand and protecting government property on the other. The Internal Security Staff is not, and never has been, responsible for the maintenance of order within the center in the event of any mass uprising. By an agreement of long standing between WRA and the War Department, WRA is privileged in the event of serious disorder to call upon the military troops stationed at the boundary of the center to come in and maintain order.

In view of the predominant character of the population at Tule Lake, it was recognized that the number of appointed personnel on the internal security force would need to be increased and that the function of protecting government property would devolve upon such appointed personnel. Immediately after the Denver conference of July 26 and 27, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was detailed to Tule Lake to be on hand throughout the mass movement so that he could observe the situation at first hand and make recommendations.

As a fourth deviation from over-all policy, it was generally

agreed that community government as it existed at the relocation centers would not be instituted at Tule Lake; in its place, as soon as the people had moved in and gotten settled, there would be a purely advisory council of evacuees. With the population in residence, the details of center management could be worked out on a reasonable and realistic basis. It was recognized that it was impractical to lay down any hard and fast policy for management of the segregation center before its members were actually in residence at Tule Lake. It was necessary to study the population and evaluate its temper before determining what kind of administration was required. Against the possibility that conditions might conceivably justify a rigid policy of management, was the probability that conditions would justify placing emphasis upon cooperation from the community in the problem of managing the center. If the effort to secure the cooperation of the community succeeded, it meant not only a more democratic type of administration but a smoother operation than could be hoped for under coercive tactics and also a material financial economy.

Before transfer operations began, a number of WRA staff members from the Washington office were sent out to Tule Lake to study the problem at the center and formulate recommendations. However, once the mass movement began, it was necessary to utilize all available staff, including the visitors from Washington, in the immediate and pressing matters of transfer, housing, and day-to-day maintenance operations in the disorganized center. During these weeks, there was little if any time for conscious and deliberate study of the community, but certain phenomena were noted, definite trends recognized. As of November 4th, one important recommendation had been carried almost to completion; had the construction work been completed by that date, it is not going too far to say that the incident which occurred that night could not have happened. This recommendation was for a new motor pool located in the administration area, adjacent to the military compound, and enclosed by a strong fence. Had this new motor pool been in use on November 4, the trucks which played a conspicuous part in the events of the evening could not have been obtained by the evacuees.

Toward the end of October, with the mass movement virtually completed and people getting settled in their new quarters, ideas on policy were beginning to emerge, recommendations were taking shape, and the visit of the National Director scheduled for the first of November was anticipated as an opportunity to work out with him a definite policy for the administration of the center.

BACKGROUND OF THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Struggle for Power

During the month of October it became apparent that an undercover movement to get control of the center was in progress. However, it was not until October 26 that the leaders openly declared themselves. The mass demonstration of November 1 was recognized at once as the culmination of this struggle for power; subsequent investigation produced infor-

mation and evidence which proved beyond a doubt that this was so.

The leaders were not old residents of Tule Lake, but men who had gained some prominence as minority leaders in the centers from which they were transferred to Tule Lake; chiefly they were from Jerome, Poston, and Heart Mountain. They were men who in pre-evacuation days had failed to achieve leadership in their communities, some of them having been repudiated as fanatics and cranks. Under the tensions and stresses of the evacuation, they had managed to win minority leaderships within the relocation centers, and there they had gained expert knowledge of center politics and evacuee psychology. The segregation center appealed to these men as a place where the minority groups of the ordinary center would doubtless constitute a majority and where their own desire for power and leadership could be more fully gratified. From the centers of their previous residence has come evidence that well before the transfer certain of these men developed detailed plans for seizing control at Tule Lake.

They were skilful in making capital of the discomforts and dissatisfactions common to the disorganized period when people were moving in and out of Tule Lake and every-day operations were maintained with difficulty and considerable irregularity. They were quick to recruit the rowdy element, many of whom were Hawaiian kibeis but some of whom were merely ordinary young American toughs who had been out of the United States Mainland, and use this group to intimidate and control the hesitant or antagonistic. They made appeals shrewdly calculated to win a following: one made on the basis of specific improvements in living conditions was far-reaching and as effective with the soberer element as with the hotheads. Appeals made on the basis of moral justice were potent with many: the protest against discriminatory aspects of evacuation and of segregation itself, and the stressing of the need for solidarity and loyalty to the group. They sponsored private language schools, distinct from the recognized Japanese language schools set up by an evacuee board of education. The purpose of the private schools was to indoctrinate the young with the most flamboyant Japanese militaristic propaganda, and pressure was brought upon Nisei who knew little if any Japanese to attend; the pressure was resented by the many young people who had gone to Tule Lake only for family reasons and felt that their future lay in America. The Americanized young especially resented what they characterized as "Gestapo" methods and referred to the agents of intimidation as "storm troops." Many older people were indignant at being forced into line by arrogant young strangers who behaved like gangsters. However, until a crisis brought leaders and strongarm squads into the open and resulted in their downfall, their intimidation of the opposition was effective.

At first the evidence of the movement toward political organization of the center was of an inconclusive nature. In the second week of October there was a minor labor dispute arising from the crew assigned to handling coal. Three men who were not members of the crew and who were recent arrivals from Topaz tried to inject themselves into the arbitration, insisting that they "represented the community." However,

which was presenting demands for the betterment of living conditions. Young men posted at each block directed the people coming out of mess halls to go to the administration building.

During the noon hour work was brought to the National Director and the Project Director that a crowd was gathering around the administration building. They and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco got in a car and made a reconnaissance of the colony area, a view to determining whether the situation warranted calling in military. They saw people walking from every block toward the administration area. Old and young, women with babies in arms or in baby carriages and children of all sizes were moving in a steady stream toward the administration building. The presence of these women and children and the aged in the crowd convinced the Directors that violence was not part of the plan. The three men went to the Project Director's office in the administration building to await developments.

By one-thirty about 5000 evacuees had congregated about the administration building. Young men at the edges of the crowd discouraged anyone from leaving. For more than three hours the crowd stood, silent or talking quietly, only children and half-grown boys displaying restlessness. Some of the latter clambered over parked cars and did some minor damage: they put dirt in a couple of gas tanks, bent a few radio aerials, and removed a few windshield wipers and radiator caps. Other than these instances, there was no destruction of property by any of the crowd gathered around the administration building. Groups of evacuee men requested appointed persons throughout the administration area to go to the main administration building. With the exception of a few staff members who combined loyalty with reasonable excuses for leaving, those who tried to leave the administration building were prevented from doing so. The restraint was courteously imposed except in a few instances where Caucasian men resisted instructions; these were pushed inside the building.

The organizers of the demonstration wanted to present grievances and requests to the National Director; furthermore, they wanted the bulk of the administrative staff accounted for during the conference with the Director, and they wanted the mass of the evacuee population assembled as evidence that the community was solidly behind the committee. As a result of their maneuvers, they succeeded in getting about two-thirds of the administrative staff inside the administration building during the demonstration and about one-third of the evacuee population outside the building.

A project official kept in close touch by telephone with the commanding officer of the Military Police, who stood by, ready to rush in soldiers at a moment's notice. Early in the afternoon tanks in the military area were warmed up to be in readiness for emergency. However, the announcers in the mess halls had instructed the people to take no weapons or anything that might be regarded as such and to do nothing that might bring the Army into the picture. The most conclusive evidence that the demonstration was to be a

ful one lay in the inclusion of elderly people, women, and small children in the crowd.

As soon as the crowd had assembled the negotiating committee of 17 men appeared (14 real members and three so-called "strong arm" representatives) and requested an audience with the Director. They were received in the Project Director's office by WRA officials for a meeting. Simultaneously an evacuee public address system was set up at the front of the building, and throughout the afternoon the crowd was instructed intermittently over the loud-speaker to be patient, as the committee was negotiating, and the Director of WRA would speak to them soon.

In the Project Director's office, the conference proceeded, with certain interruptions, which will be accounted for further on, for three hours. The chairman, formerly of Jerome, was spokesman for the committee. He presented the points brought up at the October 26 meeting, now enlarged and supplemented by further points. The committee attempted to get confirmation of its suspicions concerning the removal of staple foods from the warehouses, but was informed that the food was WRA property and need not be accounted for to the evacuees. An attempt was made to fix responsibility for the death of the farm worker upon the administration. The committee protested the termination of the Tule Lake farm workers, who had stopped work and failed to make use of the opportunity given them to negotiate with the administration. Protests were made in regard to food, sanitary facilities, center dust, and hospital administration. Criticism focused upon various project officials, including the Chief Steward, an Assistant Project Director, the Chief of Agriculture, the Junior Property Supply Officer, the Chief Medical Officer and his entire staff of appointed personnel, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security, and the Project Director himself. The final demand of the committee was for the removal from Tule Lake of all the personnel listed above.

The Director stated clearly that while the administration welcomed suggestions from any and all groups, it did not operate on a basis of demands; that no terminations of personnel would be made except on a basis of thorough investigation; and that the administration was not prepared to consider the present committee as being a genuinely representative body. The chairman of the committee then asked the Director to speak to the crowd. The Director did so, repeating in general what he had said to the committee. The Project Director also made a brief speech, after which an evacuee interpreter reproduced both speeches in Japanese. A WRA staff member who speaks fluent Japanese was present and vouched for the accuracy of the interpreter's version of the speeches. A committee member who is a Buddhist priest made a short speech in Japanese at the conclusion of which the evacuee who has served as announcer throughout the afternoon stepped forward and told the crowd to bow. The majority of the people obeyed, facing the entrance of the administration building where the speakers were assembled. Immediately after bowing, the crowd dispersed.

THE HOSPITAL INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 1

No single episode of the critical period of November 1 to 4 at Tule Lake suffered more general misunderstanding and exaggeration than the Hospital incident of the afternoon of November 1. Certain inevitable omissions in the transcript of the meeting in the Project Director's office proved misleading; rumor tangled with fact, and opinion in some instances was accepted as factual evidence; there was considerable disparity between what actually happened and what some eye witnesses thought was happening. At the time when hearings were being conducted by various investigating committees, the parts had not yet been fitted into a whole, and some important connecting links were missing. Since that time, by means of a careful checking and rechecking of affidavits, statements, and testimony and a further questioning of reliable eye-witnesses, it has been possible to supply the connecting links and fit the details into proper sequence.

From the Administration Building Standpoint

On the afternoon of November 1, just as the conference in the Project Director's office was about to begin and while the Project Director's secretary was getting the names of the committeemen for the record, the Project Director received a telephone message from a doctor in the hospital reporting the one instance of violence which occurred within the center on that day. The Project Director asked the chairman of the committee what was going on at the hospital. The chairman answered: "I don't know." The Project Director informed the group that the Chief Medical Officer had been beaten and property was being destroyed. At this point every WRA staff member in the room was aware of the surprise and consternation which the news produced in the committeemen: it was obvious that this episode in the hospital was no part of the committee's plan. Recovering himself, the chairman of the committee said: "We will stop it," and sent some of his men to the hospital. Discussion stopped until the men returned and reported that the Chief Medical Officer was being cared for and that all was quiet in the hospital. The conference continued. A few minutes later, a second telephone call from the hospital reported that evacuees were milling about in the wards. Again the committee sent some men over, and again the conferees waited until the report came back that everything was quiet at the hospital. The conference continued for twenty minutes or more until another interruption occurred in the form of a message from the Medical Social Consultant who had just arrived in the outer office; the message indicated that the hospital situation required further attention. The Director asked the National Acting Chief of Internal Security to go to the hospital. The latter hurried to the hospital, being joined outside by an evacuee who elected to accompany him. In a few moments he returned to the meeting to report that everything was under control at the hospital.

As It Actually Occurred at the Hospital

About an hour before the crowd congregated around the administration building, an evacuee employee in the hospital took the Chief Medical Officer aside and informed him that there was going to be a

demonstration that afternoon but that no trouble was expected at the hospital. The Chief Medical Officer soon observed that groups of five to five evacuees who were not hospital employees kept coming at intervals and circulating among the hospital employees presumably to get them to leave work and join in the demonstration. He told the intruders to leave, and they did so, but he noticed that fifteen or twenty were congregated on the steps outside. He commissioned another Caucasian doctor to guard the door and let no one in, and then went into his office, which is at the right of the entrance and entered by way of an outer office.

The young men on the steps pushed past the doctor at the door and began to crowd into the outer office used by the Chief Medical Officer's secretary. The secretary screamed; the Chief Medical Officer thrust his head out from his own office to see what was happening and had his glasses removed and laid on a shelf by one of the intruders. The Chief Medical Officer struck this man, whereupon the men moved up, pressing the doctor back into his office. Five of the group took an active part in the attack; the others stood on the sidelines. The assailants got the doctor down, kicked him twice, once on the side of the face and once in the body, and dragged him outside the building. The doctor's nurse rushed out to the rescue, the leader of the gang gave the order to stop the beating, and the gang took itself off. Other hospital attendants came out, carried the doctor inside and administered treatment for his injuries, which were painful rather than serious. In the course of the attack, a railing outside the doctor's office was knocked over. There was no destruction of property.

The fight was over, the injured doctor was receiving medical attention, and the assailants had vanished when the doctor who had been commissioned to guard the front door put his call through to the Project Director's office. Naturally there was nervous tension in the hospital. Few of the hospital attendants had witnessed the violent incident, but word of such an event spreads rapidly. Despite the nervous strain, all but two or three persons remained at their posts of duty until their regular hour of release. The second telephone call to the Project Director was made by a nurse who looked down the long corridor connecting the row of wards and saw evacuees coming in and out through a door midway along the corridor and opening toward the administration area. A steady stream of people entering the corridor and passing into a wing of the ward section of the building was, in view of the recent disturbance, alarming enough to make her call the Project Director. The second delegation sent by the evacuee committee investigated and reported correctly enough that there was no disorder in the hospital.

At about this time the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington office, a woman who speaks Japanese, had gone to the Out-Patient Clinic, located at one side of the main entrance where the attack on the Chief Medical Officer ended. She went to the clinic to stand by and reassure nurses and attendants who might be overwrought by the recent occurrence. From her position she observed a young evacuee man

stationed in front of the hospital entrance, but fifty feet or more from the door. She addressed him in Japanese, asking him what he was doing, and he replied that he was guarding the hospital. She signified that she thought little of his method of guarding it, as his distance from the door left it virtually unprotected, and other doors leading into the hospital were not guarded at all. The young evacuee moved closer to the door and agreed to set guards at other entries. The Medical Social Consultant then proceeded toward the Administration building in company with the doctor who had telephoned the first message concerning the attack in the hospital. On the way she stopped to recover the keys of a car for the wife of the Chief Medical Officer from an evacuee who had entered the car and started away with it. Her companion was escorted to the administration building by some evacuees, but she paused to inform the wife of the Chief Medical Officer of the attack on her husband and advise her to go to the hospital. She arrived at the administration building shortly after the doctor, who had been informing the assistant project director of conditions in the hospital and asking that the Army be called in. The time of her arrival was approximately half an hour later than the time of the original message concerning the hospital. Talking with the Assistant Project Director in an office adjoining the conference room, she could look through the glass panels across the conference room and see evacuees from the general crowd going in and out of a door in the middle of the long hospital corridor, and was troubled by the situation, pointing it out to the Assistant Project Director, whereupon he delivered the message that interrupted the conference for the third time and resulted in an investigation by the National Acting Chief of Internal Security.

In subsequent hearings a good deal of attention was given to the contradiction in reports from the hospital. Unfortunately the witnesses called were not in possession of the simple and entirely natural explanation of the conflict between reports. There was no disorder in the hospital once the assailants of the Chief Medical Officer took themselves off, but there was a fairly steady stream of evacuees from the crowd passing in and out of one door which led across the long corridor to a wing of the ward section which was not used for patients but which contained class rooms and what is highly significant in this instance rest rooms. The residents, herded from lunch to the Administration area and not allowed to leave the area for more than three hours, were understandably making use of the rest rooms available within the area.

EFFECTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION

Once the demonstration was over, the reaction set in, and rumors thrived among the appointed personnel, stimulated by exaggerated versions of what had happened appearing in the press. While a substantial number refused to become excited, continuing to regard the demonstration as a peaceful one, others gave way to nerves and began to think that they had seen indications of incendiary intentions and

an assortment of vicious weapons in the crowd. According to the testimony of the more stable personnel, some of whom were consciously looking for such evidence and were in a position to see for themselves, there was no sign of straw whether oil-soaked or pure of oil; substantial clubs diminished to the walking sticks habitually carried by many evacuees; villainous knives and swords degenerated into a few jack-knives in the hands of some half-grown boys who entertained themselves during the tedious period of waiting by playing mumbly-peg and whittling.

Fully aware that the atmosphere was tense, the administration representatives went directly from the mass meeting to confer with the commanding officer of the military police and make detailed arrangements for guaranteeing protection of life and property within the center in any emergency that might arise. The military stood in readiness to take immediate occupation of the center at need, and it was agreed that authority to summon military assistance should be given any Internal Security Officer, whereas previously only the Project Director--or the National Director himself--was authorized to call in the Army.

At the suggestion of the Chief Medical Officer, the Caucasian hospital staff was relieved from duty that night and sent home to get some rest. One nurse remained on duty until the evening rounds were made, and the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington Office remained on duty through the night. A few members of the appointed staff spent the night in Klamath Falls or Tulelake (the nearest town). The next day there was a series of staff meetings, culminating in one with the Director and Project Director, during which the demand for a fence between administration and evacuee communities--certain staff members had asked for such a fence during the segregation movement. The Project Director issued an order prohibiting public gatherings of evacuees in the administration, WRA residential, hospital and warehouse areas. Nightly patrols of these areas were maintained, beginning Monday, November 1, by four members of the Internal Security staff; two guards were assigned to a night watch at the high school area; the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was on general surveillance, and the Chief of Internal Security at Central Utah, temporarily detailed to Tule Lake, augmented the others. Patrol officers checked in hourly to the sergeant of the military guard and the officer of the day with the understanding that the military should investigate any check-in more than five minutes overdue. With these precautionary measures in operation, the National Director left the Tule Lake Center Tuesday evening, November 2, as per schedule.

In general the effect of the demonstration on the evacuees was to stimulate the radical element to more open exhibitions of pro-Japan sentiment, and to make the more thoughtful group uneasy. The leaders, having failed in their attempt to obtain a promise from the administration that no more food would be taken from the center to feed the harvest crew at the farm, were none the less determined to block further appropriation of center supplies if possible. Members of the goon squads were appeared to be keeping an eye on warehouses and the motor

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
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
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
VACUEE BARRACKS AREA



AUTOMOTIVE REPAIR SHOP.

HEAVY EQUIP. SHOP.


INDUSTRIAL AREA.



ER SHOP



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

PROJECT DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

POST OFFICE.

GARAGES
PACKING SHED
WAREHOUSE
DOD WAREHOUSE
MOTOR POOL AREA.

- ⑬ LOCATION OF FIGHT INVOLVING 3 INTERNAL SECURITY MEN. BORDECK WAS HURT.
- ⑭ MILITARY AREA
- ⑮ ENTRANCE IN USE.

WRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943



TULE LAKE PLOT PLAN

— PERIOD - NOVEMBER 1-4, 1943 —
ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY, POLICE, HOSPITAL, SCHOOL
WAREHOUSE AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS.

- ## LEGEND
- ① FRONT ENTRANCE AND STEPS OF HOSPITAL AND DR. PEDICORDS OFFICE.
 - ② PROJECT DIRECTORS OFFICE.
 - ③ ADMINISTRATION BUILDING.
 - ④ TELEPHONE OFFICE

The morning of November 3, young evacuee men rounded up workers and herded them to an unauthorized ceremony marking the birthday of the late Emperor Meiji Setsu, grandfather of the reigning Emperor of Japan. The workers returned to camp as soon as the ceremony ended. That afternoon the Acting Consul de Amat, Consul of the Spanish Embassy, in the presence of the representative of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department met with a group of 21 evacuee representatives, whose names are listed as the chairman of the Negotiating Committee and whose names included the leaders of the Monday demonstration. Aside from complaints about the food situation and the hospital, the main issue brought before the Spanish Consul was the clarification of the evacuees' status. They petitioned the Consul to take action with the Japanese Government the possibility of bestowing Japanese citizenship upon Tule Lake nisei. On November 3, the National Administration approved the construction of a fence between the Administration and the colony.

The night of November 3, the Acting Assistant Project Engineer while riding around the project on an observation tour, observed a large number of evacuees stationed in the vicinity of the warehouses and the motor pool. The next day, details having been cleared by the U.S. Engineers at San Francisco, work began on the fence between the Administration and evacuee areas.

THE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 4

The night of November 4, affairs at Tule Lake reached a crisis which resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. The situation, never entirely out of the picture after October 15, became prominently on this night. A contingent of evacuee volunteers from other centers was due to arrive by train at Tule Lake late that night, and three cargo trucks were removed from the motor pool to meet the train and transport the workers to the camp. The removal of these trucks produced the situation which gave rise to violence, for the "strong-arm" element assumed that the trucks were to be used for taking more food supplies from the center warehouses to the loyal evacuees at the farm.

The circumstances which culminated in military intervention were the result of a high temper and on the spur of the moment by young men acting on their own initiative. There is no reason to believe that the official leaders were in any way involved in the action taken by the young men; in fact, the members of the negotiating committee were present throughout the evening in a meeting in the mess hall in the colony; they had called this meeting of block leaders and representatives themselves for the purpose of electing a central committee. What precipitated the call for the Army happened in the dark, and at some distance from the colony. Not more than a dozen WRA staff members and the 200 or so young men and

boys involved in the performance knew that anything extraordinary was happening until the racket of light tanks and scout cars and the glare of floodlights announced the entry of the troops.

At about seven-thirty that evening, the Project Director had a brief conference with the Commanding Officer of the Military Guard and then spent an hour driving around the center, on the lookout for any signs of irregularity. He reached the warehouse area at about eight-thirty, and at that time there were no evacuees in sight. He returned to the administration area, parking his car near the administration building, and sitting in his car in the dark for a time to watch this area for signs of irregular activity. All was quiet. At about 9:15 he was joined by the Assistant Project Director, who reported that the three cargo trucks had gotten off to meet the train. At 9:30 the Assistant Project Director remarked that it was time for him to leave to meet the escort coming in on the train and that he had to drive past his house to pick up his overcoat. The Project Director went to the telephone office in the Administration building where housing records were kept at night, to check on the quarters assigned for the use of the people coming in on the train, and within a few minutes returned to his house. In about five minutes the Assistant Project Director came to the door to report that in driving past the motor pool he saw that men were hurriedly gathering in that area. The two men went outside and could see possibly fifty evacuees armed with clubs milling about in the motor pool area. The Assistant Project Director walked around the end of the Project Director's house and startled a number of men out from the shadows. The Project Director went into his house and telephoned the Commanding Officer of the military troops to come in and take over.

The actual, violent engagements of that night happened suddenly and practically simultaneously in a very short interval, roughly between the time when the Project Director telephoned for the Army to come in and the time when the Army arrived on the scene, possibly ten minutes.

To get a picture of what happened and how it happened, it is necessary to go back to 8:15 that evening when a staff member went to the motor pool to requisition the three trucks. He was refused service by the evacuees in the motor pool office. He left the motor pool and encountered the National Acting Chief of Internal Security and several other staff members. Together they returned to the motor pool. The man who had originally requested the trucks got the keys from the office and serviced the trucks himself, the evacuees looking on. Two Caucasian drivers joined him and at about 9:10 the three drove the trucks out of the motor pool and set off for Klamath Falls. No sooner had the other staff members turned away from the motor pool than an evacuee jumped in a truck and headed at full speed for the evacuee colony, unquestionably to carry word that the three trucks had been taken. The National Acting Chief of Internal Security, anticipating a reaction to the removal of the cargo trucks, stopped at the room of the

Internal Security Chief from Central Utah and assigned him to watch the broad, open space between evacuee colony and administration area for signs of action. He detailed another officer to stay with the switch-board operator at the telephone office to forestall any attempt to cut communications, and then went to the military compound to report the situation to the sergeant of the military guard and make sure that everything was in readiness for quick action. He proceeded to a building in the compound where two men from the Federal Communications Commission, San Francisco, were conducting an investigation (instigated by the National Acting Chief of Internal Security) of an illegal radio transmitter within the evacuee colony.

When word reached the colony that the trucks were taken, about 150 to 200 of the strong-arm squad rallied with the intent of preventing the trucks (already well away from the center) from being loaded with food and taken from the center. The messenger's truck and others similarly appropriated were used to carry men to the motor pool and warehouses to mount guard; auxiliaries set off for these areas on foot. Trucks darted about the center in pursuit of the missing trucks. Failure to find any trace of the three trucks baffled and enraged the young men. A number of them were armed with base ball bats, pick handles or short lengths of two-by-four lumber. Internal Security men on patrol or guard duty began to be aware of groups congregating in the shadows of the warehouses and around the motor pool. The guard at the high school called his chief to report that gangs of men were robbing the lumber pile. Two officers in a patrol car had their way blocked by a black pick-up whose evacuee driver announced that no produce trucks were going to get out of the center that night but who shortly drove away leaving the way clear. The officers headed back to the administration area to report.

In the Military Compound, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security noted that the Japanese music being broadcast over the illegal transmitter stopped abruptly at 9:25. He suspected that the cutting off of the music might be a signal. Stopping only to tell the sergeant of the guard that a request for the Army to move in would probably be made very soon, he drove into the center, stopping about 75 yards from the gates when a car approached him, shining a spot light in his face. Thinking it an Army radio patrol car, he got out and walked over to it, discovering it to be the black pick-up previously mentioned. There were evacuee men riding in the rear. One of these and the driver jumped down and tried judo on the Chief. After a brief interchange, the Chief got back into his car and headed for the Project Director's house. He parked his car across the road from the house and walked toward the house, suddenly perceiving 30 or 40 men with clubs in the shadows. Six of these attacked him, but he used the judo hold on two of these, wrenching an arm of each from its socket. In the lull following this feat, he got back to his car, hearing the men yell in English: "Get Best! Take Best!" (Best is the Project Director). He started in his car for the military area and out-maneuvered the driver of the pick-up who tried to cut him off,

reaching the military area to call in the Army, a few minutes after the Project Director had made the same request by telephone.

In the meantime the two men on patrol and the officer assigned to the area between colony and administration area reached the telephone office in the administration building intending to report by telephone to the National Acting Chief of Internal Security. The switch was open and they overheard the Project Director's call to bring in the Army. They started on foot for the Project Director's house, hearing the cries of "Get Best! Take Best!" Just outside the Administration building, the driver of the same black pick-up attempted to run them down, but they jumped out of the way and the driver had to stop to avoid hitting some posts. He and his men jumped out and a fight began, in which one of the officers was injured. The other two, re-inforced by several staff members from the administration building, fought off the others and took three prisoners in the few moments that remained before the Army arrived and took over.

In all, 18 prisoners were taken on that night, all of whom needed first aid for injuries received during their capture. They were hospitalized under guard after questioning, and were later removed to a stockade. Possibly six shots were fired (none by evacuees as no firearms have been in their possession in centers at any time) but no one was found to have been wounded by gunfire. At the entry of the Army, the strong-arm squads took to their heels. Most staff members as well as the majority of the evacuee residents were unaware that trouble was brewing until the noise of Army light tanks and scout cars indicated that something extraordinary was going on.

By agreement between WRA and the Army, once the Army is called into a center, it takes control until military decision removes the troops. As of December 31, 1943, the Army remained in control of the center, with WRA personnel cooperating with the Army in the details of center operation.

AFTERMATH OF THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Following November 1, the more responsible newspapers and wire services made an effort to verify the stories about Tule Lake, while the less reputable ones were publicizing all the rumors that were flying thick and fast. Those in the former category called the WRA by telephone, asking specific questions. The Director, on the basis of his own knowledge, was able to deny roughly half of the rumors; to the remaining questions, he replied for the most part that a check was being made but that the facts had not yet been established. Rumors multiplied rapidly while facts were established slowly, and the less responsible newspapers were quick to utilize the rumors and publish eye witness accounts which day by day displayed higher color and diminishing accuracy. For a week or so in early November, Tule Lake displaced the battle fronts in top news interest with the West Coast press.

The first version of the November 1 demonstration to reach the public was provided by the first person to leave the center after

the crowd in the Administration area dispersed. This was a rancher of the vicinity, who had at one time been employed by WRA to manage the butcher shop at the center. He had called at the center that Monday afternoon just in time to be ushered into the administration building by evacuees and remained there with staff members for the remainder of the afternoon. His not altogether objective account of the episode was soon embellished with details furnished by some of the staff members and their families who were too overwrought to remain on the center and so spent the nights in the town of Tulelake or Klamath Falls. The impressions and opinions of highly excited and frightened persons were seized upon and published as fact.

Until the Army occupied the center on the night of November 4, press representatives had their customary privilege of visiting the center for purposes of first-hand coverage if they chose to do so. By November 4, a few reporters were in the vicinity of the center, and one, a United Press man from San Francisco, was actually quartered in the center as the guest of the Project Director. From his room, one barrack away from the Project Director's house, he was in position to see such part of the action as took place within his range of vision and was not obscured by darkness. He was not permitted to wander around the area at random and was taken from the center to the town of Tulelake shortly after the Army moved in. Immediately upon occupying the center, the Army clamped down censorship on news. Again the press had little but rumor to work with, and again rumors abounded.

The facts of the November 1 episode, which had been gradually emerging and which were being released, were mild and colorless in comparison with the tales which had already been published and accepted as truth by most papers. When actual violence, justifying Army occupation, occurred on the night of November 4, the newspapers that had previously made a conscientious effort to get at the facts were left with the impression that WRA had been withholding information and that the more sensational accounts of the situation at Tule Lake Center were true.

Immediate results of the press stories were numerous resolutions and recommendations emanating from communities, organizations, state and city officials, and in some instances private citizens. These documents stressed the need for (1) further investigation of WRA; (2) permanent control of Tule Lake Center by the Army; (3) placing all the relocation centers as well as Tule Lake under the Army; (4) simply the immediate dissolution of WRA. The resolutions were effective insofar as producing investigations was concerned.

For a month or more, investigations of all kinds were made, some at Tule Lake Center, others in Washington, D. C. The Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the California Legislature sent a senatorial committee headed by Senator Hugh P. Donnelly to Tule Lake Center to conduct hearings. While these were going on, the Spanish Consul arrived to investigate on behalf of the alien evacuees. Representative Clair Engle of the Second District in California was on the pre-

mises when the Donnelly committee arrived, engaged in conducting a one-man investigation on his own initiative. He and an investigator sent out by the Dies sub-committee sat in on the Donnelly committee hearings and also talked to certain staff members and residents of the surrounding area. A little later Senator Sheridan Downey made a quick trip to Tule Lake from Washington, D. C., also on his own initiative. The FBI representatives spent some time at the center making an investigation. In Washington, D. C., the Director of WRA appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session, the West Coast Congressional Delegation, and the Dies Sub Committee. In the absence of the Director, the Acting Director appeared before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Just before Christmas when the Project Director of Tule Lake visited the Washington Office, the Dies Sub-Committee re-opened its hearings on Tule Lake for the purpose of questioning him.

With the exception of the FBI representatives, the investigators who went to Tule Lake were somewhat restricted in their activities by the refusal of the Army to allow them to subpoena evacuees. The Donnelly Committee, in session at Tule Lake on November 8 and 9, summoned a carefully selected group of witnesses, including three residents of the nearby town of Tulelake who had made occasional trips to the center, and certain former employees of WRA. The committee called on the Chief Medical Officer and questioned him, making a transcript of the interview, but not including it in the transcript of the hearings. The Project Director and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco were the only key staff members questioned at the hearings, and they were not summoned; they volunteered testimony.

Considerable time and attention were given by this committee to episodes of Tule Lake's early days as a relocation center, long before there was any thought of its becoming a segregation center and involving persons long since removed from Tule Lake. Statements unsupported by evidence were accepted and utilized by the committee in its subsequent report of findings. On the basis of these biased findings the committee telegraphed the President, the Secretary of War and the Chairman of the California Congressional Delegation, urging the continuation of Army control at Tule Lake Center and the continued exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast area for the duration of the war.

The Dies Sub-Committee, with Representative John M. Costello of California as Chairman, conducted intermittent hearings in Washington from the end of November to the 20th of December. These hearings, nominally concerned with the Tule Lake situation, appeared actually to be more in the nature of a continuation of the over-all investigation (so called) of WRA made by this committee earlier in the year, and re-opened a number of issues which had supposedly been settled during the summer hearings on WRA, the majority report and minority views on which were published in September of 1943.

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1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible date.

2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees individually for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers."

The minority views of Rep. Herman P. Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, express his conviction that "the report of the majority is misleading, and that most of its statements are not proven." He said: "After all the wind and the fury of a long report that gave the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a commendable job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by a feeble, meaningless recommendations." In summation, he has to say:

"It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its task and the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and urgency of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the wake of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority continue its work unhampered by unfair criticism."

The second series of hearings conducted by the Dies subcommittee began with the testimony of a physician who had been employed in the Lake Hospital for ten days at the time of the Hospital incident, who turned in his resignation the following day. The second and third days were given to the testimony of Representative Engle of California, who recommended that the Army remain in control of Tule Lake. With the exception of a short period devoted to statements by Representatives Lowell Stockman of Oregon and Norris Poulson of California, the fourth, fifth and six days were spent in questioning

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PROGRESS OF RELOCATION

At the beginning of the fiscal year 1943, the flow of evacuees from the centers to the mainstream of American life was continuing to gather momentum, but while it was steadily draining the centers of the young and unattached, it was leaving almost intact the substantial group of older people with family responsibilities. It was recognized that a re-evaluation and re-definition of WRA's relocation objectives were in order; and in the first week of July all relocation officers were summoned in from the field to attend a conference in the National Office to present for discussion such problems as they faced in carrying out this basic and functional obligation of WRA to restore to private life and participation in the war effort these tens of thousands of qualified adult workers of Japanese ancestry together with their families. The conference accomplished a double purpose: it clarified and unified thinking on the entire subject of relocation, and it produced practical, definite recommendations, implementation of which had, by the end of the year, carried the relocation program to the point where it was reaching a more complete cross-section of the population in the centers.

The Over-all Problem

The major and most pressing problem confronting the WRA was the basic one of how to get the people out of the centers and back into normal life. Previously the slow-moving machinery for establishing leave clearance had retarded the advance of relocation, but as of July 1, 1943 the large majority of evacuees had been processed and were eligible for indefinite leave. Allowing for the segregation of those ineligible for leave clearance and their dependents, it was apparent that WRA would be left with approximately 85,000 people still in the centers. Thus far the relocation program had resulted in the re-settlement in private life and work of fewer than 10,000 people. The great majority of the relocated were in their early twenties, either single persons or young married couples without family responsibilities. Although WRA had from the beginning anticipated the relocation of family groups, few families were

actually relocating. The need was to determine what was holding families back and then to remove such deterrents to relocation, whether the obstructions were actual and material or whether they existed only in the minds of the evacuees. It was realized that the overcoming of obstacles to relocation would involve a revitalized education program directed not only at the evacuees in the centers but also at the public, and it was agreed that greater evacuee participation in relocation planning was essential to the future success of the program.

Deterrents to Relocation

During the summer surveys were made at several centers to find out if possible precisely what was preventing families from relocating. The most complete of these surveys was made at Granada, where the questionnaire submitted produced 2587 replies. Evacuees were asked when they wanted to leave the center to relocate and what their reasons were for hesitancy about resettlement. Only 5.9 per cent were interested in leaving at once or within a few months; 27.1 per cent said they were willing to leave after the end of the war; 33.2 per cent were undecided as to whether they should attempt relocation. The principal reason for hesitation was "uncertainty of public sentiment." Other prevailing reasons were lack of funds against an emergency, lack of information about conditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents, and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.

There were other, sometimes related, factors contributing to a lag in general relocation. An important if not serious factor was found to be the lack of a clearly defined policy concerning the re-admission to the centers of persons who had relocated in the event that through no fault of their own they subsequently found themselves destitute. A very serious factor, and an outgrowth of the segregation plan, was the establishment of a "stop" list for all persons whose answers to the loyalty question during registration had been qualified or changed. The removal of a name from the stop list could be accomplished only on the basis of a painstaking hearing conducted for the purpose of testing the motive for the change and the sincerity of the evacuee. At the close of the year there were still some hundreds of cases on which a final decision as to eligibility for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the evacuees affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of their family groups, with the result that upon their own relocation was contingent the relocation of the entire family. A third factor discouraging relocation during this period was the difficulty of obtaining war plant clearance. A cumbersome and delaying procedure restricted employment in war plants to a very small number of evacuees, and for a time those citizens of Japanese ancestry already working in war plants were removed pending clarification of their status. However, in October it was arranged with the Office of the Provost Marshal General that evacuees employed in war plants prior to October 14 could continue with their employment pending investigation. New applicants were to be processed by the Provost Marshal General's Office before being put to work, but it was agreed that

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no Japanese American would be excluded from this work for reasons of ancestry alone, and under the new agreement, aliens as well as citizens were declared eligible for war plant clearance.

A deterrent to relocation of substantial minority of the male evacuees was the action taken by the Navy and State Departments to restrict seamen or fishermen of Japanese ancestry from sailing out of east coast harbors. The new ruling, requiring a passport in advance of sailing, barred a number of evacuees from resuming previous occupations and also beached a number of Japanese Americans who had served in the Merchant Marine for many months, some of whom had been torpedoed in line of duty.

Finally, a block to one other avenue of relocation was provided on June 23 by the Civil Service Commission's requirement of a special investigation by the Commission before it would confirm the appointment of American citizens of Japanese Ancestry to positions in Federal agencies. This additional investigation was one more deterrent to relocation, but by January 177 evacuees out of 197 had been certified as eligible for Civil Service appointments.

Steps Toward the Solution of the Problem

Evacuee Participation

Throughout the half-year period increasing emphasis was placed on evacuee participation in relocation planning. As early as July, several of the centers had Relocation Committees composed of residents. These were strengthened, in some cases by being brought within the authority of the evacuee Community Council or by being given a definite relationship to appointed staff committees on relocation. By the end of the year, two centers had functioning combined evacuee-staff relocation committees, while at all other centers the evacuees had formed their own relocation planning commissions which maintained relations with responsible members of the appointed staff. Issei were well represented in these groups. The committees have taken their responsibilities seriously, assembling the questions which needed to be answered before the greater relocation movement could get under way, and formulating practical recommendations.

In view of the fact that about 43 per cent of the evacuated people were farmers, it was to be expected that they would want opportunities to continue the work they knew best. Having sustained heavy financial losses in the course of the evacuation, they were, for the most part, in need of financial assistance if they were to start farming in a new region; or, those who could scrape together enough money to make the start, needed assurance that they might get loans at need later on. Many felt that the relocation of small groups of families in sparsely settled agricultural areas would encourage families to leave the centers and change the hazards of unfamiliar soil and climate in new farming enterprises. In relation to group farming ventures, it was considered imperative that a responsible number of the group be allowed to go out and

investigate the land before they committed themselves to working it.

Group Relocation

A letter of November 9 addressed to all projects went out from the National Office, indicating the following moves to assist group relocation:

- (1) stimulation of Credit Unions to provide resettlement loans;
- (2) aid to evacuees in securing loans from Federal and private financing agencies;
- (3) exploration of group relocation opportunities by Relocation Officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities.
- (4) arrangements for evacuees representing bona-fide groups to make exploratory visits.

Welfare Counseling

The surveys which had been made during the summer showed that greater emphasis needed to be placed on individual and family counseling, if families were to be relocated. It was never uncommon for persons or families planning relocation to consult the Welfare Section about personal problems, but it was at this time realized that to accomplish the relocation of families who were hesitant about relocating, it would be necessary to initiate discussions with them and help them to plan on an individual basis. At the close of the period plans were under way to establish a special counseling unit within the Welfare Section at each center, with a view both to breaking down the rationalizations of reluctant families and to gathering information which would enable WRA to plan realistically the course of its future program.

Leave Assistance Grants

To stimulate family relocation, a change in the schedule of leave assistance grants was made in October. Previously the ceiling per family unit of \$100 had proved an obstacle to the relocation of larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant per individual from \$50 to \$25, but removed the per family ceiling and was thus advantageous to families of five or more persons.

Social Security Agreement

The agreement with the Social Security Board by which relocated evacuees are eligible for service and assistance under the program for aliens and other persons affected by restrictive governmental action became operative in this period in all states except Colorado. While the number of evacuee applicants for service was not large, the designated state agencies cooperating with the Social Security Board provided assistance in a number of cases of emergency, illness, and other contingencies.

National Housing Administration Agreement

During the summer, an agreement was concluded with the National Housing Administration to assist the Relocation Officers in one of their

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Departures from Relocation Centers by Type of Departure
from July through December 1943

Month	Total	Seasonal Leave	Short Term Leave	Type of Indefinite Leave					Transfers		Interned	Death	Other
				General	Education	Volunteer Service	Selective	between Centers	between Centers	Interned			
Total	22746	7603	6611	7106	219	180	15	532	37	281	162		
July	4068	1316	1160	1344	17	72	0	97	6	44	12		
August	4850	1372	1471	1684	29	46	11	86	7	54	90		
September	4626	1622	1106	1575	124	37	0	89	6	38	29		
October	4672	2435	990	1034	29	11	0	112	0	50	11		
November	2725	587	1081	862	13	10	3	99	18	42	10		
December	1805	271	803	607	7	4	1	49	0	53	10		

¹/Includes all departures irrespective of age

²/Work Leave (including dependents)

Source: Form WRA-176 summary.

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION, STATISTICAL SECTION
Washington, D. C.

Reported Admissions to Relocation Centers by Type of Admission
from July through December 1943

Month	Total	Births	Transfers between Centers	Temporary Detention	Internment Camps	Institutions	Seasonal	Type of Leave			Other*
								Short Term	Indefinite		
Total	20008	1107	1103	24	366	71	9806	6358	1004		169
July	2225	177	98	8	79	12	652	1054	120		25
August	2932	199	80	1	18	6	1032	1413	165		18
September	2502	189	118	3	11	22	958	1048	147		6
October	2993	186	94	9	55	10	1519	982	117		21
November	6119	199	418	1	101	10	4145	971	201		73
December	3237	157	295	2	102	11	1500	890	254		26

*Other -- original inductions to WRA, etc.
Source: WRA-176

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Absences on Leave from Relocation Centers By Type of Leave
From July 1, 1943 through January 1, 1944 ^{1/} _{2/}

Date	Total	Seasonal	Short Term Leave	Indefinite Leave			
				General ^{3/}	Education	Volunteer	Sel. Service
July 1	15885	6004	553	7926	800	601	1
August 1	17834	6525	579	9248	815	666	1
September 1	20193	6856	550	11241	837	698	11
October 1	22430	7426	536	12789	936	733	10
November 1	24095	7996	505	13891	958	734	11
December 1	21263	4283	559	14702	971	736	12
January 1	20188	2825	433	15228	953	736	13

^{1/}Number who have left centers who have not returned. Includes all persons ir-
respective of age

^{2/}At end of day

^{3/}Work leave (including dependents)

Source: WRA-176

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WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Net Absences* / on Short Term, Seasonal, and Indefinite Leave by Relocation Center
As of December 31, 1943

Center	Total	Short Term	Seasonal	Indefinite
TOTAL	20188	441	2831	16916
Central Utah	1819	48	199	1572
Colorado River	3163	44	412	2707
Gila River	2020	17	79	1924
Granada	1899	79	288	1532
Heart Mountain	1983	95	347	1541
Jerome	1419	32	36	1351
Manzanar	1235	18	143	1074
Manidoka	2853	56	522	2275
Rowley	1414	36	58	1320
Tule Lake	2383	16	747	1620

* / Number who have left centers who have not returned

Source: WRA-176

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
 Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
 Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Population at Relocation Centers
 July 1, 1943 through January 1, 1944

Center	Total	1943					1944	
		July 1	August 1	September 1	October 1	November 1	December 1	January 1
Total	645509	96284	94461	92217	89648	88407	91546	92951
Central Utah	49724	7351	7092	6986	6936	6877	7178	7304
Colorado River	100761	15686	15353	14876	14540	13142	13432	13732
Gila River	77232	12357	12214	11902	11683	9619	9730	9727
Grenada	44916	6210	6161	5846	6597	6427	6745	6930
Heart Mountain	64404	9309	9186	8936	8509	9131	9547	9786
Jerome	49577	7816	7679	7526	6736	6601	68601	6617
Manzanar	59756	8686	8738	8695	8506	8179	8470	8482
Minidoka	54670	7666	7183	7164	8175	6923	8595	8964
Rohwer	48377	7662	7500	7122	6709	6406	6421	6557
Tule Lake	95732	13483	13286	13096	11198	15047	14770	14852

Source:--WRA-176

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION, STATISTICAL SECTION
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing From War Relocation Centers
On Seasonal Leave By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State <u>1/</u>	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	: Total <u>2/</u>	: 7/31	8/28	10/2 <u>3/</u>	10/30	11/27	1/13 <u>3/</u>	
Total	7608	1263	1207	2145	2116	566	311	
Pacific	611	107	28	65	187	172	52	
Oregon	243	71	21	31	111	7	2	
California <u>4/</u>	195	0	0	0	72	123	0	
Washington	173	36	7	34	4	42	50	
Mountain	6280	1048	1067	1916	1795	326	128	
Idaho	3030	340	228	899	1326	162	75	
Utah	1291	448	177	420	119	106	21	
Colorado	1053	87	445	248	221	42	10	
Wyoming	564	74	123	253	94	11	9	
Montana	331	99	94	95	31	3	9	
Nevada	6	0	0	0	1	1	4	
Arizona	5	0	0	1	3	1	0	
W.N. Central	332	74	84	31	73	59	11	
Missouri	149	46	38	13	16	34	2	
Kansas	88	27	32	0	6	23	0	
Nebraska	53	0	1	16	28	0	8	
South Dakota	32	0	9	0	23	0	0	
Iowa	10	1	4	2	0	2	1	
East N. Central	331	29	28	84	61	9	120	
Illinois	202	18	23	23	12	9	117	
Michigan	125	9	5	61	47	0	3	
Ohio	4	2	0	0	2	0	0	
West S. Central	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Oklahoma	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Unknown	52	5	0	47	0	0	0	

1/ Those to which no one departed not included

2/ Includes Dependents

3/ Five Week Period

4/ Under permit issued by Western Defense Command

Source: Special Report Received From Centers

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State <u>1/</u>	By Four Weeks			Period Ending			
	Total <u>2/</u>	7/31	8/28	10/2 <u>3/</u>	10/30	11/27	1/1 <u>5/</u>
Total	7715	1414	1569	2086	1056	840	750
Pacific	317	75	55	69	47	29	42
Washington	195	39	31	42	39	19	25
Oregon	96	27	21	25	3	3	17
California	26	9	3	2	5	7	0
Mountain	2160	451	470	577	237	212	213
Utah	763	155	212	201	70	65	60
Colorado	758	170	117	195	98	95	83
Idaho	308	82	86	65	25	15	35
Montana	121	8	15	49	13	18	18
Wyoming	118	27	29	32	17	4	9
Nevada	55	55	9	22	9	6	4
New Mexico	22	3	1	9	2	3	4
Arizona	15	1	1	4	3	6	0
W.N. Central	923	129	162	288	163	97	84
Minnesota	318	38	62	123	45	31	19
Missouri	269	54	48	66	51	20	30
Iowa	163	19	30	43	29	21	21
Nebraska	121	8	15	33	36	18	11
Kansas	38	8	4	16	2	7	1
South Dakota	10	0	1	7	0	0	2
North Dakota	4	2	2	0	0	0	0
E.N. Central	3759	712	760	979	515	434	359
Illinois	1866	347	359	456	265	217	222
Ohio	970	148	199	284	141	132	66
Michigan	752	187	162	182	88	69	64
Wisconsin	115	19	23	41	21	9	2
Indiana	56	11	17	16	0	7	5
W.S. Central	85	18	17	22	12	7	9
Arkansas	33	5	10	8	4	5	1
Texas	31	8	3	10	7	2	1

37 (Cont'd)

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State ^{1/}		By Four Weeks Period Ending						
		Total ^{2/}	7/31	8/28	10/2 ^{3/}	10/30	11/27	1/1 ^{3/}
W.S. Central (Cont'd)								
Oklahoma	20	5	4	4	0	0	7	
Louisiana	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
South Atlantic								
District of Col.	59	2	20	12	9	8	8	
Maryland	35	1	13	8	7	2	4	
North Carolina	16	0	5	2	1	5	3	
Virginia	3	0	2	1	0	0	0	
Georgia	3	1	0	1	0	1	0	
	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	
Middle Atlantic								
New York	299	14	52	106	55	41	31	
Pennsylvania	211	12	38	69	39	30	23	
New Jersey	78	1	14	33	13	11	6	
	10	1	0	4	3	0	2	
New England								
Massachusetts	61	2	23	13	9	12	2	
Connecticut	45	1	20	7	6	9	2	
Maine	13	1	3	5	1	3	0	
New Hampshire	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Vermont	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
East S. Central								
Mississippi	51	11	9	20	9	0	2	
Tennessee	26	8	4	7	5	0	2	
Kentucky	17	2	1	11	3	0	0	
	8	1	4	2	1	0	0	
Unknown	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	

^{1/} Those to which no one departed not included

^{2/} Includes dependents

^{3/} Five weeks period

Source: Special Report From Centers

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War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Parsons Leaving All Centers
On General Indefinite Leave ^{1/}by Dependents
And Workers by Citizenship, Sex and Type of Work
Number and Percentage Distribution By Months
July - December 1943

Month	: Total :No.of:		Number of Workers :							Type Work		: Type Work Reported		
	Lvs. :	Dep. :	:							: Not Reported :		:		
	1/ :	2/ :	Citizen		Alien			Hos.&						
	:	:	Total	M	F	M	F	Total	R.O. ^{3/}	Other	Total	Dom.	Agri.	Other
Total	7143	1817	5326	2452	2010	611	253	2552	1150	1402	2774	786	402	1586
July	1348	375	973	524	322	94	33	320	177	143	653	181	88	384
August	1719	477	1242	556	507	130	449	585	270	315	657	204	88	365
September	1569	434	1135	481	442	149	63	587	270	317	548	158	62	328
October	1050	269	781	324	310	113	34	361	175	186	420	118	72	230
November	854	194	660	290	254	254	39	391	147	244	269	77	47	145
December	603	68	535	277	175	48	35	308	111	197	227	48	45	134

(Percentage Distribution)

Total	100.0	25.4	100.0	46.0	37.7	11.5	4.8	47.9	21.6	26.3	52.1	14.8	7.5	29.8
July	100.0	27.8	100.0	53.8	33.1	9.7	3.4	32.9	18.2	14.7	67.1	18.6	9.0	39.5
August	100.0	27.7	100.0	44.8	40.8	10.5	3.9	47.1	21.7	25.4	52.9	16.4	7.1	29.4
September	100.0	27.7	100.0	42.4	38.9	19.1	5.6	51.7	23.8	27.9	48.3	13.9	5.5	28.9
October	100.0	25.6	100.0	41.4	39.7	14.5	4.4	46.2	22.4	23.8	53.8	15.1	9.2	29.5
November	100.0	22.7	100.0	43.9	38.5	11.7	5.9	59.2	22.3	36.9	40.8	11.7	7.1	22.0
December	100.0	11.3	100.0	51.8	32.7	9.0	6.5	57.6	20.7	36.9	42.4	9.0	8.4	25.0

- ^{1/} Does not include Indefinite Leave for Education or Entry into the Armed Forces.
^{2/} Persons under 16 years of age and all other dependents so specified.
^{3/} Persons leaving centers for Hostels and Relocation Offices without specific employment.

Source: WRA-178

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Evacuees on Indefinite Leave Returning To Centers
By Single Months and Six Month Periods
From Inception of Centers to Date

Year & Month	Cent	Colo	Gila	Gran	HtMt*	Jero	Manz	Mini	Rohw	Tule	Total*
1942											
May	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
June	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	
July	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	
Aug.	-	0	0	-	0	-	0	0	-	0	
Sept.	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	
Oct.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Nov.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Dec.	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
6 mo. Total	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
1943											
Jan.	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	2	6
Feb.	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	1	10
Mar.	4	0	0	0	6	3	0	1	0	0	14
Apr.	1	0	1	32	6	0	0	6	3	0	49
May.	10	5	3	40	19	7	2	9	1	1	97
June	7	4	2	38	31	2	3	32	2	1	122
6 mo. Total	24	9	6	113	67	12	6	50	6	5	298
July	5	13	3	29	34	9	4	17	4	1	119
Aug.	11	24	2	16	63	19	3	10	12	1	161
Sept.	15	4	6	16	81	4	2	7	10	0	145
Oct.	15	6	5	13	38	20	5	3	12	0	117
Nov.	12	20	10	62	39	15	7	26	11	0	202
Dec.	16	4	7	41	66	37	10	21	25	0	227
6 mo. Total	74	71	33	177	321	104	31	84	74	2	971
1944											
Jan.	10	10	8	19	13	8	0	14	10	0	
Feb.											
Mar.											
Apr.											
May											
June											
6 mo. Total											

* Letter from Heart Mountain as of 2-19-44 indicates that 316 persons previously reported as indefinite leave admissions were visitors. These figures will be revised.

Source: WRA 177 received in Washington office.

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War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Evacuees Returning to Centers Under "Other"
Leave Category By Single Months and Six Month Periods
From Inception of Centers to Date

Year & Month	Cent.	Colo.	Gila.	Gran.	Ht.Mt.	Jero.	Manz.	Mini.	Rohw.	Tule.	Total
1942											
May	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
June	-	0	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	0	1
July	-	0	0	-	-	-	31	-	-	26	57
Aug.	-	0	6	-	0	-	13	0	-	34	53
Sept.	0	0	0	0	1	-	8	19	0	2	30
Oct.	2	0	9	0	7	0	1	2	0	2	23
Nov.	9	0	12	15	11	0	1	69	0	10	127
Dec.	8	4	19	0	36	0	2	91	0	7	167
6 Mo. Total	19	4	46	15	55	0	57	181	0	81	458
1943											
Jan.	1	0	1	0	2	3	0	22	0	6	35
Feb.	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	4	1	14
Mar.	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	7	15
Apr.	1	1	0	1	0	2	4	1	2	100	112
May	4	1	1	0	1	5	1	2	1	3	19
June	11	3	6	1	3	3	1	3	0	2	33
6 Mo. Total	17	7	8	2	6	14	9	38	8	119	228
July	3	1	4	7	1	3	0	4	0	2	25
Aug.	1	5	2	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	18
Sept.	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	6
Oct.	1	4	4	2	1	2	0	4	3	0	21
Nov.	4	0	2	53	0	5	3	4	2	0	73
Dec.	7	0	1	1	0	6	2	4	4	1	26
6 Mo. Total	16	10	13	64	3	27	7	17	9	3	169
1944											
Jan.	6	1	2	0	1	4	0	3	2	0	19
Feb.											
Mar.											
Apr.											
May											
June											
6 Mo. Total											

Source: WRA 176

3-4-44

most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the Relocation Supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA Regional Representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In return, the NHA would "assist WRA in determining the acceptability of evacuees for housing in the locality", and also "be prepared to suggest the names of localities where the housing shortage is less serious and where the opportunities for housing evacuees are most promising."

Relocation Campaigns at the Centers

Pre-Segregation Program at Tule Lake

Prior to the mass movement of non-segregants from Tule Lake to other centers and the conversion of Tule Lake to a segregation center, a determined effort was made to encourage as many as possible of the eligible evacuees to avoid the move to another center by means of immediate relocation. As a preliminary step toward the accomplishment of this program, Relocation Officers in the field were asked to consult with all former residents of Tule Lake relocated in their districts concerning the relocation of relatives and friends from that center. In August a small contingent of staff workers, known as a Relocation Team, was detailed from Washington to Tule Lake to conduct meetings and interviews with the non-segregant group. An important feature of this work at Tule Lake was the first showing of a cycle of films entitled "This is America" which was booked and distributed by the Relocation Guidance Committee in Washington. Members of several divisions had participated in the previewing of possible films, the selection being made with two objects in view; (1) to give evacuees a picture of city life, agriculture, education, employment, and other features of communities in the middle west and east; and (2) to give evacuees some insight into living conditions in wartime America. The film cycle consisted of 8 program units, each of about one hour's duration. The immediate result of the promotional work at Tule Lake was the relocation of several hundred people who would otherwise have moved to another center; in addition, it created a definite interest in relocation among others not yet prepared to take the step. In the larger sense, however, this program was most beneficial in pioneering techniques for aiding center personnel with material and staff in their work of stimulating interest in relocation.

Dissemination of Relocation Information at Other Centers

In recognition of the fact that the movement of evacuees out of the center is in a sense dependent upon a steady flow into the centers of accurate information concerning job opportunities and living conditions on the outside, much attention has been given to the adequate dissemination of such information. Two ways of bringing such facts before the residents were stressed during the July to December period. First, listings of job openings and written accounts of the experiences of relocated people were sent regularly to the centers. Personal experiences were sometimes in letter form and sometimes in informal reports;

some were published in periodicals issued by the Area offices. Second, individuals thoroughly conversant with conditions in specific localities were detailed to the centers in order to give interested evacuees personal contact with persons able to answer questions. Relocation Officers visited the centers to supply this information. In November, arrangements were made for an experimental Relocation Team consisting of two Relocation Supervisors, a member of the Washington Relocation staff, and a member of the Washington Reports Division to visit the Rohwer Relocation Center. The team members addressed large general meetings and smaller meetings of specific project groups, and in addition, conducted numerous interviews with individual evacuees who sought further information. The effect of this visit and the reception of Relocation Officers at the centers resulted in plans to continue the practice of sending Relocation Officers to visit the centers and to have the Relocation Team make a tour of all the other centers during the early part of 1944.

SIGNIFICANT FIELD DEVELOPMENTS IN RELOCATION

During the latter half of 1943 the general trend of relocation was toward the Middle West and the East. Although the number of field offices showed only a slight net increase during the period, there was a substantial shift in their location. As offices in the Intermountain Region closed or were consolidated, new offices appeared in Grand Rapids, Indianapolis and Buffalo; and on the Eastern seaboard, the New England states were detached from the New York area and designated as an independent area with headquarters in Boston. The following table shows the increase in relocation during this period in the principal areas:

Number of Evacuees on Indefinite Leave who have reported Arrival or Change of Address by Relocation Areas as of June 30 and January 1,

	<u>June 30, 1943</u>	<u>January 1, 1944</u>
Total Reporting	8431	16,464
Salt Lake City	2213	3,483
Denver	1795	2,741
Kansas City	461	997
Chicago	2613	5,392
Cleveland	960	2,694
Little Rock	160	244
New York	229	770
Boston	*	143

* 29 included in the New York Office report were relocated in the Boston area at this time.

Salt Lake City Area

In this area, WRA curtailed relocation to six counties in northern Utah. This action was in accord with the Authority's policy of discouraging heavy concentration of the evacuated population in any location.

This area had a small Japanese American population prior to Pearl Harbor and received a new contingent during the period of voluntary evacuation from the West Coast. Later, evacuees from the center who had entered the region as seasonal workers tended to change over to indefinite leave and settle permanently.

Evacuee farmers have relocated in fairly large numbers to eastern Oregon and Western Idaho, where they began farming on a share-cropping or lease-hold basis. Spokane, in eastern Washington, attracted a number of the evacuees, though until late in the year when certain military installations were closed, a critical housing situation discouraged many of the evacuees from attempting to re-establish their lives in that city. In Montana, a considerable number of seasonal workers were employed during this period on railroads. The year-end total showed 7669 seasonal workers in the area during the six-month period, and approximately 3500 evacuees in residence on indefinite leave.

Denver Area

Between 2500 and 3000 evacuees found seasonal work in this area during the summer and fall of 1943, most of whom returned to the centers at the expiration of their contracts. However, 324 seasonal workers converted their leave to indefinite, raising the total of evacuees resident within the area to 2806 on December 31. An increasing number of families moved out of the laborer group into the independent farmer class, by way of share-cropping agreements, lease or purchase of land. Despite their lack of experience in this section of the country, higher labor costs, and difficult marketing conditions, very few of the farm group have given up and returned to the center. Those who were obliged to return to the centers were caught in emergency situations for which public assistance would have been available in other states. Colorado was the only state in which the Social Security agreement was not operative during this period. There was indication at the year's end that the agreement would be signed early in the new year.

After July further relocation to six counties bordering on Denver was prohibited by WRA except in the case of members of a family already settled within the area. There was evidence that these localities were nearing the saturation point as far as evacuee settlers were concerned. Emphasis was placed on improving the public relations situation.

Kansas City Area

The number of evacuees in this area about doubled during the latter half of 1943, with the newcomers distributed impartially among the St. Louis, Omaha, Detroit, and Kansas City districts. On the whole, community sentiment and press relations have been unusually favorable in these communities. As the year advanced, an increasing number of professional, technical and skilled workers were finding positions in this area.

Chicago Area

This area, too, reflected a change in the types of employment offered to evacuees, with an increasing number of employers seeking evacuee help in the more skilled fields. During the six-month period the number of evacuees coming into the city of Chicago rose from 1,466 to 3,244, and it required a major effort on the part of the WRA office and cooperating agencies to locate sufficient housing to meet the influx. The number of available jobs continued to be in excess of willing takers, and qualified people in the centers were encouraged to relocate to Chicago without a specific job in mind. One group of 50 persons went to the city on that basis and the majority of them were satisfactorily placed. Because of the slowness of special war industry clearance, the Chicago Area Office, through negotiation with the Sixth Service Command, was able to clear individual plants or buildings in large defense operations otherwise restricted, for evacuee employment. Placements were made in the federal agencies including the Home Owners Loan Corporation, Weather Bureau, and Indian Service.

On the whole, metropolitan relocation in the area was more successful than agricultural. There are three probable reasons for this fact: (1) Midwestern farming is quite different from the West Coast farming to which the evacuee group was accustomed; (2) evacuees were urged to postpone buying or leasing land until after they had spent a year as farm laborers or share-croppers in order to familiarize themselves with farming techniques in this region; (3) young nisei interested in urban employment were more numerous than agricultural workers in this relocation group.

Cleveland Area

Approximately 2000 evacuees, including seasonal workers, entered this area during the latter half of 1943. In-migration started slowly, reached its peak in September and October, and then dropped off as cold weather came on and the majority of seasonal workers returned to the centers. Permanent job opportunities in non-essential lines expanded considerably during this period. In Cleveland, furniture and cabinet-making industries, sign-painting, and beauty shops were employing an increasing number of evacuees. Detroit reported a tendency toward semi-skilled and highly skilled positions as opposed to domestic and unskilled work. More and more applicants were seeking jobs with "learning" possibilities. Housing facilities continued to be the major problem for relocating evacuees in most of the cities of this area, though living quarters were more readily available in Buffalo and Cincinnati than in other cities. Public reactions toward the relocation program and the evacuees have been favorable.

New York Area

The Number of evacuees in New York City increased from 75 to 450 during the last six months of the year. Although war plant clearance here as elsewhere proved to be a long and discouraging process,

the relocating people were able to find good jobs, and those with special talents found a market for them. Evacuees have found no difficulty in securing employment as clerks, stenographers, seamstresses, dressmakers, beauticians, nursery workers and gardeners, domestics, laboratory technicians, hotel and restaurant workers, laundry workers, nurse's aides and unskilled hospital workers. Placement was more of a problem for business owners or managers, those experienced in the silk industry or foreign trade, and for such professionals as architects and engineers.

Community sentiment was very favorable throughout this period, and the local office of WRA enjoyed good relations with various A.F. of L. and C.I.O. Unions, public and private social agencies, and other cooperating groups. Although the bulk of the relocated people at first settled around Columbia University on the West side, later arrivals tended to scatter through other parts of the city. In any event, the few hundred evacuees made little impression in a city of New York's magnitude. On a smaller scale relocation in Philadelphia got underway during this period, with community sentiment favorable and a variety of jobs available to the evacuees.

Boston Area

The number of evacuees in the Boston area rose from 33 to 167 during this period, a third or more of the total number being students and many of the others young nisei who worked during the day and continued their studies at night. Although wage scales were on the whole lower than in other parts of the country, there was compensation for this situation in the lower cost of living and in the fact that employers, to a greater extent than was true in many areas, made it clear that the positions they offered were permanent and not merely for the duration. The greater number of opportunities were in the field of personal and domestic service.

Planning for Community Adjustment

Prior to this period, the main emphasis of the program in the field was upon creating favorable community sentiment and locating specific job offers. This work was done so effectively that job offers piled up more rapidly than they could be filled. Job descriptions in volume tended to bewilder the center applicants. Those who accepted employment on the basis of these job listings and without personal contact with employers often found themselves unsatisfactorily placed, and there was a tendency to change jobs as soon as a better opening offered itself to the relocated person. On August 5, Project Directors were sent a memorandum directing them to encourage relocation on the basis of a community invitation in localities where evacuee workers were wanted. Hostels operated by church groups in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati and Des Moines offered living accommodations at a reasonable figure to evacuees while they looked for employment and by the fact of their existence offered the evacuees

assurance that the community was prepared to receive them.

On November 27, a memorandum from Washington instructed Relocation Supervisors and Officers to curtail the job listings sent out to the centers, as the volume of these was more bewildering than enlightening. It was recognized that the presentation of informational material about general work opportunities, living costs and conditions, and the experiences of evacuees who had already made an adjustment to life and work in a given area was a more effective approach to the problem of relocating the right evacuee in the right location. The creation of a Reports position in each area Relocation Office and the collaboration of the Reports Division in Washington contributed to the success of this phase of the program.

From the beginning of the Relocation program, the Committee for Japanese American Resettlement and other church groups had been active in creating a local interest in the WRA program and in many communities provided the Relocation Officer with local sponsors to whom he could turn for advice and assistance. As the program broadened and more persons relocated, it became evident that a broader cross-section of community cooperation was essential, not only to assist WRA in matters of employment, housing and public relations, but also to provide in the community a solid foundation for the acceptance of evacuees on the same basis as other residents. There was need to implement at the local level national agreements worked out by WRA and other public or private agencies and to co-ordinate the efforts of other groups so that the resources they possessed might be available for the use of evacuees. At the close of the period, in recognition of this need for more far-reaching planning in community adjustment, persons on the staff of two area offices were specializing in the organization of community resources for housing, welfare, education, and health.

There are two main objectives in this painstaking work with local committees and agencies: (1) to ease the transition of the evacuee from the isolated and socially artificial centers to life in a normal community by meeting the resettler with an understanding of his total situation; (2) to encourage relocated evacuees in assisting their family members and friends to relocate. The youth and inexperience of these very young people who have gone out from the centers, generally speaking alone, to adjust to life and work in a completely strange environment, have pointed more and more to the need of having their families join them. During the fall months, there was evidence that young people in Chicago, New York, and certain other localities were beginning to bring their parents out of the centers. Where this has happened, the infusion of the older generation together with the original pre-war resident American Japanese population, was making for a more stable and better integrated social situation among the newcomers.

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION FOR RELOCATION

A significant development during the six-month period was the

growing conviction that the relocation program is a cooperative one to which all divisions of the Authority have a contribution to make. Originally the handling of the relocation program, both in the National Office and at the centers, was the function of the Employment Division. It was not long before the conflict between project employment and relocation was apparent. As relocation progressed, the dual obligation of this division to maintain center operations and at the same time to urge all the efficient workers to leave center employment for relocation kept the division in a state of perpetual dilemma. It was understood that project employment must be subordinated to relocation. The fact remained that the Employment Division was being called upon to build up a community with one hand and tear it down with the other. Just before the July to January period began, a Relocation Committee consisting of representatives of the Employment, Reports and Community Management Divisions was set up in the Washington office and at the centers. The work of these committees in some measure relieved the Employment Division, but there was increasing awareness that relocation interests could best be served by a special division created to devote all its energies to relocation. On the basis of discussions held in the Washington Office and of suggestions received from the field, the Relocation Division was organized in November of 1943. With two exceptions this new division was assigned all functions previously performed by the Employment Division: at the project level, project employment was made a function of Personnel Management, and in the National Office, Leave Clearance was made the responsibility of the Administrative Management Division. The new division also took over the functions of the Relocation Assistance Division except those involving evacuee property which were assigned to the Administrative Management Division.

By the close of the year, the principal policy points of the new division had been outlined, and its major Manual statement of policy aims was being prepared. The Relocation Division was reviewing with other divisions their responsibility for the success of the relocation program, and was taking steps to achieve a closer working relationship with other federal agencies and private organizations at the national level. For 1944, it contemplated an increased emphasis on in-service training and field and project visits. It was planning to re-evaluate seasonal leave procedures and provide further assurances where possible in the program of indefinite leave. It was staffing relocation divisions at the centers, expanding the field program to give added emphasis to adjustment of evacuees in communities of relocation, and was giving closer attention to the exploration of suitable opportunities for family and group relocation.

STUDENT RELOCATION

According to information compiled by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, the total number of Japanese American students enrolled in colleges rose from 1555 on July 5 to 2263 on December 31, 1943. The Council estimated that during this period 636 evacuees left relocation centers to attend institutions of

higher learning. The group included recent graduates of the center high schools as well as students whose higher education had been interrupted by the evacuation. Included in the number were approximately 200 girls who began nurse's training, the majority of whom enlisted under the U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps program. Beginning in November, Relocation Officers supplemented the efforts of the Council by exploring opportunities in their districts for evacuees to study nursing in approved hospitals and nursing schools.

Until the middle of October the Army and Navy refused admission of students of Japanese ancestry to educational institutions carrying on classified activities for the armed services. However, on October 14, a directive issued by the War Department placed responsibility with the Provost Marshal General for security measures at educational institutions important to the war effort. The directive stated that before any person of Japanese ancestry would be allowed to attend or be employed by such an institution he should undergo an investigation similar to that required for work in war plants, and that he must secure approval from the Office of the Provost Marshal General in order to qualify. Those persons already employed or in attendance at these institutions were permitted to remain pending their investigation. While these additional investigations delay the date of admittance considerably, no student of Japanese ancestry will be barred for reasons of race alone.

Responsibility was placed upon each such institution for compliance with the terms of the directive. In order that an undue burden should not be placed on the educational institutions, arrangements were worked out to permit the assumption by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council of considerable responsibility for securing acceptance of students and obtaining the forms necessary for Provost Marshal General's Office clearance. Although the Council, in its September meeting, expressed the feeling that it had fulfilled its purpose and therefore should terminate its activities, in the light of this added function and the fact that the rate of student relocation had not decreased by the close of the year, it seemed probable that the Council would continue in business throughout 1944.

LEAVE CLEARANCE

During the latter half of 1943 substantial progress was made toward completing action on leave clearance for citizen evacuees. From the standpoint of relocation, final action on the large majority of leave clearance cases has been of fundamental importance since, despite the ruling which permitted Project Directors to issue indefinite leave prior to the issuance of leave clearance in certain prescribed cases, many evacuees have been reluctant to leave the center until notice of leave clearance has been received.

Notice of leave clearance was issued on one of three types of forms, each with special conditions attached. Form WRA 258 was drawn up to authorize indefinite leave but does not permit direct relocation

to the Eastern Defense Command or the coastal area of the Southern states; nor does it authorize employment in war plants. This type of indefinite leave was issued to persons who had not been passed on by the Japanese American Joint Board. The second type, issued on Form WRA 258-A was intended for persons whose cases have been reviewed by the Joint Board and whom the Joint Board has recommended for indefinite leave. Such recommendation constitutes Eastern Defense Command clearance, but does not clear for employment in war industries. The statement to this effect appearing on each Joint Board "Summary and Report" form returned to WRA, and intended only to convey that no special investigation to determine the individual's eligibility for war plant employment had been made was unfortunately misinterpreted on many occasions by such agencies as the Civil Service Commission and the Coast Guard to mean that the individual had been investigated and found ineligible. The third type of leave clearance, issued on Form WRA 258-B was designed for persons specially considered and investigated by the Joint Board, with a favorable recommendation, for work in war plants. Such persons of course have the right to relocate anywhere outside of the prescribed West Coast military areas. Only 491 clearances of the last type were issued, and for practical reasons the procedure was abandoned before the end of the year, leaving War plant clearance to the Provost Marshal General's Office.

The table shown below indicates the number of leave clearance grants issued to all projects since Forms 258, 258-A and 258-B were initiated. The majority of such clearances were issued after July 1, 1943.

Notifications to Projects on Leave Clearance
as of December 31, 1943

<u>Project</u>	<u>WRA 258</u>	<u>WRA 258-A</u>	<u>WRA 258-B</u>
Central Utah	490	1,688	45
Colorado River	332	4,363	78
Gila River	272	2,767	53
Granada	291	1,833	76
Heart Mountain	373	2,610	37
Jerome	646	1,746	30
Manzanar	220	1,389	29
Minidoka	311	2,353	44
Rohwer	491	1,930	54
Tule Lake	1,469	2,385	45
TOTALS	<u>4,895</u>	<u>23,064</u>	<u>491</u>

The Japanese American Joint Board

The Japanese-American Joint Board, established by a War Department directive dated January 20, 1943, is composed of one representative each from WRA, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The Board was created specifically to assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese

ancestry under the jurisdiction of WRA, to determine eligibility of applicants for war plant employment, and to assist in the selection of volunteers for the Army. Early in the year the Joint Board decided to consider the cases of all evacuee American citizens 17 years of age and over and to make recommendations to WRA on the granting of indefinite leave.

Recommendations of the Joint Board have not, according to the terms of the agreement, been binding on WRA. However, WRA has been guided by these recommendations to the extent of making further investigations in all cases where the Joint Board recommended denial of indefinite leave; and WRA agreed not to issue indefinite leave for direct relocation within the Eastern Defense Command to any individual whose case the Joint Board disapproved. Prior to December 14, 1943, WRA did not issue indefinite leave for direct entrance to the Eastern Defense Command for private employment unless notification of Joint Board clearance had been received. The length of time consumed by Joint Board clearance had in many instances cost eligible citizens desirable job offers in the eastern states. After the mass movement to Tule Lake of those evacuees whose loyalty does not lie with America, WRA withdrew from the agreement with the War Department by which all evacuee citizens would not be issued indefinite leave directly to eastern states until notice of Joint Board approval was received. Since December 14, citizens who have met all WRA loyalty tests have been allowed to relocate to the eastern states while Joint Board action is pending.

Joint Board Actions through December 31, 1943

Approved for EDC, but not investigated for War Plant Employment....	21,167
Approved for EDC and War Plant Employment.....	491
Approved for EDC but referred to WDC.....	2,485
Disapproved.....	11,728
Citizenship lost by marriage (no action).....	478
No action (mental cases, etc.).....	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	36,360
Total number of cases referred by WRA.....	37,425
Cases pending at Joint Board.....	1,065

* The cases represented by this total either have, or eventually will, appear in other totals of approvals or disapprovals. While these 2,485 individuals have EDC clearance, some will be disapproved upon receipt of the WDC check.

Project Investigations

As a result of Joint Board actions and adverse intelligence information on specific individuals it was necessary to refer 11,652 cases back to the projects for further investigation during the latter half of 1943. The purpose of such investigation has been to develop by an individ-

ual hearing at the center such factual information concerning the evacuee's attitude and loyalty as should resolve to a reasonable degree any questionable factors regarding the issuance of leave clearance or the denial of leave clearance. Leave clearance is never denied except on the basis of an individual hearing at the center, and it can be denied only by the Director of WRA. Persons denied leave clearance are transferred to Tule Lake. Those whose records appear satisfactory at the individual hearing become eligible for indefinite leave.

WRA Procedures for Determining Loyalty

The process of determining loyalties by administrative procedures has been unique in American history; no other agency of the United States Government has ever been confronted with a problem of this nature. In order to establish a procedure which would operate uniformly, it was necessary to promulgate appropriate administrative instructions to the relocation centers and field offices. The Project Directors established hearing boards, and in September, 1943, the Director set up the Review Committee in Washington with the Head of the Leave Section as Chairman. The function of this committee is to review objectively the project hearings and to make independent recommendations for or against leave clearance to the Director of WRA. As of December 31, there were 18 key staff members recruited from various divisions of the Authority who were serving in either full-time or part-time capacities.

Since July 1, 1943, preparation of transmittal letters and the assembling of material essential for the project hearings have engaged much of the time of the Leave Section. The Joint Board returned 11,652 cases upon which its action was unfavorable during the latter half of the year. The docket enclosed with letter of transmittal for each of these cases sent back to the projects for hearings consisted of the evacuee's original questionnaire, a summary of any pertinent intelligence information, copies of reference letters or any other material which had bearing on the case, and specific comments listing factors requiring special attention. Until a hearing is held and leave clearance has been approved by the National Director, the evacuee's name is placed on a stop-list and he may not be granted leave by the Project Director.

Security Records

In its many months of association with the evacuee population, WRA has accumulated a large amount of information about all evacuees 17 years of age or older. The Leave Section files contain information on such topics as education, previous employment records, relatives in Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language, investments in Japan, organizational and religious affiliations, and special aptitudes and hobbies. Reference letters are enlightening as to the evacuee's pre-evacuation history and his social and economic environment. Intelligence reports disclose contributions made to pro-Japanese organizations or affiliation with Japanese organizations considered inimical to the interests of the United States. Reports containing information on membership in Japanese

organizations have posed a difficult problem. There have been many and varied types of Japanese and Japanese-American organizations on the West Coast, many of which were completely innocuous. No equitable determination could be made in a particular case without very careful consideration being given to both the composition and the objectives of the organizations. This has been done by the Leave Section in Washington before a case involving an intelligence report has been returned to the project for a further investigation. After the hearing at the center, the case is returned with a transcript or summary of the hearing together with the Project Director's recommendation and any additional information or exhibits bearing on the case. The docket is then prepared for the Review Committee by the Leave Section.

The files of the Leave Section contained at the close of 1943 82,000 individual evacuee files. These files are used continuously for administrative purposes.

Progress of Review Committee Action.

The table below shows the number of cases reviewed by the Review Committee through December 31, 1943. Cases returned to the project for further information, or because the project hearing was considered inadequate, will be reviewed again when the essential information is returned with the docket.


Project	Hearings Received	Leave Clearance Approved	Leave Clearance Denied	Returned to Project	Total Reviewed
Central Utah	646	304	2	21	327
Colorado River	927	225	18	12	255
Gila River	439	232	25	8	265
Granada	409	203	12	26	241
Heart Mountain	584	278	20	29	327
Jerome	702	407	47	15	469
Manzanar	1,062	534	85	26	645
Minidoka	474	222	12	16	250
Rohwer	690	231	67	21	319
Tule Lake*	4	4	--	--	4
TOTAL	5,937	2,640	288	174	3,102

* Leave clearances from Tule Lake approved prior to segregation movement.


Miscellaneous Statistics

As of December 31, 1943 the Washington Office had issued a total of 1138 student leaves involving attendance at 215 different schools; 109 leaves had been granted after July 1. The FBI at the close of the year had completed and returned a total of 77,037 record checks since it began checking records for WRA, while 2,101 cases were pending at FBI. During the half-year period 1,000 persons had converted seasonal to indefinite leave.

Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Relocation Center
 Organization Chart
 May 13, 1943




Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Relocation Center
 Organization Chart
 May 13, 1943




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WRRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943

Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Washington Office
 Organization Chart
 November 1, 1943




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WRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943

Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Washington Office
 Organization Chart
 August 13, 1943

WASHINGTON OFFICE



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PERSONNEL PROGRAM

In the latter half of the year the Personnel Management Section of WRA underwent organizational changes to allow for an expansion of its functions and particularly for its assumption of responsibility for evacuee employment within the centers.

Until shortly before the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, the Personnel Management Section of WRA held final responsibility for the classification of field positions. Executive Order 9330, dated April 16, 1943, and a Memorandum of Understanding between WRA and the United States Civil Service Commission, dated June 6, 1943, transferred this responsibility to the Field Section of the Civil Service Commission. The terms of the agreement prescribed that descriptions of field positions should be submitted by WRA to the Civil Service Commission for advisory allocation. By the first of July, the majority of these descriptions for Relocation Center positions had been submitted, and the remainder were submitted by the end of August. At the close of the semi-annual period the majority of these positions had not yet been allocated by the Civil Service Commission.

Effective July 1, all relocation centers were reorganized to conform to a standard organization established for all centers according to the chart of May 13, 1943. All relocation center employees were rejournalized into the new standard positions conforming to this chart. In November the chart was revised to include changes in organizational relationships which had developed since July.

On July 3, 1943, the Personnel Operations Unit was established in the Personnel Management Section. Working with other units of the section, this unit was responsible for initiating or reviewing and coordinating all personnel procedures for Washington and the field, for directing the application of these procedures and their installation in the field, and for interpreting laws, rules, regulations and personnel policies as stated in procedures issued. It was made responsible for the processing of personnel actions in Washington and for the maintenance of the system of appointing employees under delegated authority in the field. A further function of the new unit was the compilation and maintenance in the Washington Office of all personnel records together with the proper installation of necessary personnel records in the field.

Progress of the Personnel Management Program

Major Objectives

The objectives of the Personnel Management Program for the half-year period were clearly defined. The following accomplishments were anticipated: (1) establishment of a sound promotional policy; (2) establishment of an effective standard pattern of organization for the operation of all centers; (3) development of improved personnel proce-

dures; (4) inauguration of an induction, orientation and in-service training program; (5) establishment of training programs in staff organization, utilization and management, work planning and supervision in relation to the operation of centers, relocation offices and the Washington Office; (6) selection and placement of personnel management staff at both national and center levels so that a more thorough job of recruitment, induction, promotion, employee relations and employee service could be done; (7) establishment of an employee relations and welfare program; (8) standardization of the above functions by release of handbook instructions, administrative notices, correspondence and field visits.

Accomplishment

The degree to which these aims and objectives were achieved during the half-year period was on the whole encouraging. A standardized promotional policy adopted September 17 and providing for the posting of all vacancies except those occurring in the very lowest and highest brackets and positions of a strictly temporary nature operated successfully. By the end of the year a standardized organization had been effected in all divisions at the centers except in the Operations Division. In Operations the frequency of deviations pointed to the need of a revision of the plan so that it would fit the needs of this division, and a survey was planned for the purpose of making such revision. Problems of maintaining employment standards, protection of the rights of workers, both evacuee and appointed, maintenance of a constant flow of trained workers to fill the vacancies that occurred through relocation, and encouragement of efficient work habits and worker morale were being worked out through experience gained by center and Washington staffs.

By the close of the period there was a noticeable improvement in understanding procedures, in processing of personnel actions and in accuracy of reports submitted by those centers visited. Additional help had been furnished to all centers in the form of a personnel handbook which brought up to date all personnel procedures previously issued and covered other topics, such as disciplinary and unsatisfactory service cases, and placement and termination interview procedures. Definite progress had been made, too, in the preparation of induction and orientation procedures.

In the Washington office, employee services were extended through increased financial assistance, and additional services on housing, transportation, education and recreation. Plans were shaping to give assistance to the centers in providing appointed personnel with adequate recreational facilities. While much had been done to improve such facilities for the evacuee residents, little had been done at most centers to provide for the leisure time of appointed staff members, most of whom have been unaccustomed as the evacuees to the bleakness and isolation of center life.

EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT AT THE CENTERS

December 31, 1943

Center	Population	Number Employed and paid by WRA	Per Cent of Total Population Employed
Central Utah	7,297	2,880	39 %
Colorado River	13,734	5,953	43 %
Gila River	9,724	4,068	42 %
Granada	6,930	2,779	40 %
Heart Mountain	9,781	3,343	34 %
Jerome	6,620	2,663	40 %
Manzanar	8,481	3,327	39 %
Minidoka	8,959	3,538	39 %
Rohwer	6,559	3,135	48 %
Tule Lake	14,852	3,047	21 %*
TOTALS	92,937	34,733	37.3 %

* Sub-normal employment due to November incident.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

The Solicitor's Office during the latter half of 1943, as in previous periods, dealt in one way or another with practically all problems handled by the WRA as a Federal agency. This has been true of problems considered not only at the Washington office, but also at the Principal Attorney's office in San Francisco and at the ten Project Attorneys' offices. This department of WRA performs what is essentially a service function, operating not for the furtherance of any specialized program or separable group of objectives, but rather as an aid to all the divisions and sections of the Authority. In fulfilling its obligations, the Office of the Solicitor has kept abreast of, and had a part in, all new developments in policy, program and procedure within the agency, and it has aided in the solution of disputes or controversies with which the agency has been concerned.

Special Assignments

Administrative Manual

The reissuance of all Administrative Instructions and related material in the form of an Administrative Manual with Handbooks dealing with specialized topics was accomplished during this period. Each section and division of the Authority was called upon to analyze and rewrite such portions of the Administrative Instructions as related to its work, bringing them up to date in terms of both policy and procedure.

Many portions of the Instructions had to be extensively rewritten, and in several instances this rewriting was done in the Solicitor's Office. In all cases, for the purposes of assuring uniformity and compliance with legal requirements, the Solicitor's Office reviewed the revised material before its authoritative issue.

Segregation

Early in the period, to facilitate the execution of the segregation program, an extensive "Manual of Evacuee Transfer Operations" was issued. This Manual included not only detailed provisions for the physical features of the transfer of segregants to Tule Lake, but also full descriptions of the tests to be employed in determining loyalty and the procedures to be used in interviewing evacuees and administratively determining which of them were to be segregated. Much of the original drafting of this Manual was done in the Solicitor's Office and the entire Manual was carefully reviewed by the legal staff. Throughout the entire segregation program the Solicitor's Office and its members at the center participated in the administrative processes whereby the persons to be segregated were designated.

Leave Clearance Hearings

In close relation to the segregation program, a complete review and overhauling of the leave clearance procedures were undertaken. After obtaining suggestions and valuable material from other interested private and Federal agencies, the Solicitor's Office made a complete analysis of the questioning employed in leave clearance hearings and prepared new instructions for members of the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards at the centers. This analysis was carried out partly in connection with the work of the Washington Office in reviewing leave clearance dockets sent in by the projects. The Solicitor's Office had reviewed a large number of these dockets and the Solicitor has passed on all cases involving denial of leave clearance. Ideas and information gained from this review of dockets have been organized and transmitted to the project directors for use by the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards at the projects.

Appeals Board for Segregants

The Solicitor's Office was instrumental in setting up an Appeals Board for handling cases in which persons denied leave clearance and transferred to the segregation center might feel that justice had miscarried. A panel of members for the Appeals Board, consisting of prominent citizens not otherwise connected with WRA, has been set up, and hearings before the Board will take place as soon as a sufficient number of appeals have been filed.

Repatriation

The Solicitor's Office assisted other Divisions of WRA and other agencies of the Federal Government in carrying out the exchange of nationals with Japan which took place through the sailing of the Gripsholm. During the half year numerous matters connected with repatriation and the

rights of repatriates, disposition of property, arrangements for shipment of property, liaison with the Alien Property Custodian, and arrangements for attending to the personal affairs of repatriates were handled by the staff of the Solicitor's Office.

Evacuee Property and Legal Problems

During the half-year, an analysis was made of the Authority's effectiveness in handling personal and real property owned by center residents and located within the evacuated areas on the West Coast. This study was to culminate in a joint meeting of the staffs of the Evacuee Property Office and the Solicitor's Office to be held early in the new year, at which meeting a thorough discussion of the work of both offices and of methods whereby the handling of evacuee property matters could be improved was to be undertaken. Also listed for discussion at this meeting were the efficiency of the attorney referral system and possibilities for its improvement. The system, initiated earlier, but carried into active operation during the latter half of 1943, made available to center residents who had need of such assistance the services of competent lawyers throughout the evacuated area and on the basis of a reasonable fee scale agreed to in advance.

Investigations of WRA

The Solicitor's Office was called upon frequently during this period to assist in the preparation of material for presentation by the Director of WRA to Congressional Committees and other official groups that were moved to investigate the past performance or future activities of the Authority.

Contacts with Other Federal Agencies.

Throughout the period the Solicitor's Office maintained its customary contacts with the major departments of the Federal Government, with emphasis upon the Justice, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments. Particularly close relations were maintained with the Alien Enemy Control Unit and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Provost Marshal General's Office in the War Department, the Foreign Funds Control Unit of the Treasury Department and other specialized sections and divisions whose work has particular bearing upon that of WRA.

Solicitor's Opinions

During the latter half of 1943, eight new additions were made to the series of formal opinions, dealing with matters of major legal significance in the War Relocation Authority:

<u>Opinion No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
71	Establishment of cemeteries at the relocation centers; interment laws of the States in which relocation centers are located.
72	Vital statistics for relocation centers.
73	Propriety of inserting in contracts for the rental of equipment a provision making the Government responsible for loss or damage.
74	Bonding WRA employees who handle property belonging to evacuees.
75	Availability of certain funds transferred to the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, for expenditure during the current fiscal year.
76	Title and possessory instruments on which are baded the War Relocation Authority's rights of possession to the various relocation centers.
77	Probate of evacuees' estates.
78	Liability of cooperatives at the centers for income tax on unclaimed patronage refunds which are donated to be used for community purposes; or which are used for the cooperatives' educational programs.

Project and Field Offices

Each Project Attorney's office continued to perform on a smaller scale such services for the Project Director and Administrative staff at the center as the Solicitor's Office performs in the National Office. At one or two of the centers where Evacuee Property Officers were not appointed until late in the year, the Project Attorney added to his own functions those of the evacuee property officer. Wherever Evacuee Property Officers were functioning, close collaboration has been maintained between the Evacuee Property Officers and the Project Attorneys. Project Attorneys have continued to assist evacuee Community Councils and Judicial Commissions in performing their governmental functions, particularly by giving advice concerning the drafting of proposed enactments and their validity, procedures to be followed in judicial hearings, and similar matters. For the business enterprises corporations and trusts functioning at the centers, the Project Attorneys do such work as would be done by an attorney retained by any large private business corporation. At most centers the Project Attorneys have served as chairman of the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards, in which capacity they have assisted in conducting hundreds of hearings, written summaries of the evidence and conclusions arising from these hearings, and advised Project Directors as to appropriate action on them.

The San Francisco Property Attorney's Office has worked on hundreds of cases covering every sort of legal problem that is likely to arise out of private property ownership when owner and management are of necessity separated.

Relationships between Offices

Close relationships and constant communication between the Washington Office, the San Francisco Office and the ten Project Attorneys' offices have been maintained by a weekly interchange of reports. In addition plans call for a visit of each Project Attorney to the Washington Office once each year, while members of the Washington staff have made a practice of visiting the centers, either to fill in for absent Project Attorneys or to advise them concerning their current problems. In the half-year period, collaboration between the different branches of the Solicitor's Office was furthered by a conference at Denver attended by all Project Attorneys, the Principal Attorney from the San Francisco Office and the principal members of the Washington staff.

Persomel

The closeness of relations between offices has been helpful in allowing smooth operation to continue in a period when sudden vacancies both at headquarters and in the field necessitated considerable shifting of persomel. An Assistant Solicitor in the Washington Office went into the United States Army; another Washington staff member from this office became an officer in the Navy; a second Assistant Solicitor resigned to go to another Federal post; and the Project Attorney at Manzanar resigned to become an officer in the United States Navy.

At the projects most of the evacuee lawyers assigned to the Project Attorneys' offices have been lost through relocation, as have almost all evacuee secretaries originally assigned to these offices. At most centers, non-lawyer assistants having experience in taxation matters, insurance or other fields of business have been employed to assist the Project Attorneys in advising the evacuees on their personal and property problems. New evacuee secretaries are being trained to replace those who have relocated.

Status of Litigation Affecting WRA

As of July 1, the conviction entered in the criminal prosecution against Fred T. Korematsu, for violation of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after being remanded thereto by the United States Supreme Court. During the period covered by the present report the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, the majority of the Court concluding that the reasons which were

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given for the decision in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, were applicable in the Korematsu case also. This, in effect, was a decision that the evacuation order was adequately sustained by the same reasons which sustained the curfew restrictions which alone were passed upon in the Hirabayashi case. One of the Judges in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Demman, while concurring with the view that the evacuation order was valid, disagreed with the conclusion of his colleagues that the issues had already been in effect disposed of by the Supreme Court in the curfew case. At the close of the year a petition for the writ of certiorari, addressed to the United States Supreme Court, was being prepared in the Korematsu case.

A second case with interesting bearing on the WRA is the Endo case. At the beginning of the period, Federal Court in California had denied a writ of habeas corpus in the case of Mitsuye Endo, who early in the evacuation sought to obtain release from detention at the Tule Lake Relocation Center. Within this period appeal from the denial was filed by Miss Endo and at the close of the period was pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Miss Endo's case has been complicated by the facts that leave clearance has been granted to her and that she has been transferred from Tule Lake to the Central Utah Relocation Center. In connection with this case, the Solicitor's Office prepared a thorough Memorandum on the Validity of Detention under the Leave Regulations of the War Relocation Authority and has made copies of it available to the Department of Justice and others interested in the Authority's program.

In Arizona, the General Assembly's statute restricting business dealings in which evacuees residing in that State might engage, was tested by a case brought before the Supreme Court of Arizona toward the close of the year. In this case of the State of Arizona, by Joe Conway, Attorney General v. Tsutomu Ikeda, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Johnson Pearce Commercial Company, Defendant, the Supreme Court held that the statute (H.B. 187) was invalid.

SUPPLY PROGRAM

In this semi-annual period, the principles of the Supply program which had previously been variously interpreted, were uniformly understood and became firmly entrenched. The goal in this program has been two-fold: to determine requirements well in advance of needs so that purchase of materials can be accomplished with allowance made for delayed deliveries, shortages and price variation and to avoid the accumulation of surpluses. Since the Authority is a temporary agency, it has been a matter of policy to stock no more than 3 months' supply of any item except fuel. All requisitions for food have been placed in advance of needs with the Quartermaster Depots and Market Centers, while coal and fuel oil requirements have been handled by the Washington Office on a yearly basis. Field Procurement Offices located in Chicago, Little Rock, Denver and Los Angeles were created to aid in carrying out the work of supplying the centers and have proved a valuable asset. Economic property utilization has been accomplished by the establishment of a

well defined salvage program and by education in the proper use and conservation of material and equipment.

Mess Operations

A continual problem confronting Mess Operations at the centers has been the determination of the maximum inventory to be maintained at each center. The source of supply has been adequate but the manner of transportation and time element have presented difficult problems since most centers are not close to or adjacent to main line railroads. It has been found expedient to place requisitions with the Quartermaster Depots sixty days in advance of delivery dates. Originally it was determined that centers should maintain a 90-day inventory of staple foods. In the early period of center-occupation, with demands on Quartermaster Depots changing and transportation not fully adjusted to the demands, staple requisitions were frequently delayed. Centers often had to correct their requirements, and often before readjustments could be made, they found themselves with excess inventories. With the advent of rationing, it was necessary for WRA centers to reduce their staple supplies from a 90- to a 45-day inventory.

The Washington Office and Chief Project Stewards worked together on the problem, the Quartermaster Depots cooperating. Between July 1 and December 31 of 1943, WRA's excess inventory with OPA was liquidated. Delivery services improved during these months, centers produced many more items of subsistence, and by the close application of directives issued from the National Office, the centers were able to balance their records with the OPA.

Throughout the semi-annual period, improvements were made in dietary standards at the centers. In part these improvements were the result of increasing experience on the part of mess hall chefs, but the increasing abundance of fresh vegetables from the project farms and close cooperation between Mess Operations and Agriculture Division were influential factors. A change in employment policy which reduced the number of workers in mess halls early in this reporting period in no way impaired the quality of mess service.

THE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

The period of July 1 to December 31, 1943 covered the main portion of the harvest season in eight of the ten centers. In the two Arizona centers, it was the planting season. For most centers, this was the first harvest, as much of the land had not been reclaimed and brought under irrigation until the spring of 1943. This was a period when many new crops were being tested under conditions where their production had not been proven, and it was also a season when labor requirements in center agricultural enterprises reached a peak at the same time that the greatest number of workers were away from the centers on seasonal leave. In these months most centers either started or continued the development of livestock and poultry enter-

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prises.

Vegetable Production

Plantings of vegetables during this period, primarily for harvest in the early months of 1944, amounted to slightly more than 1000 acres, while the total production harvested amounted to 36,941,000 pounds. The program was carried out with a variety of set-backs: approximately 1300 acres of planted ground had to be abandoned in Arkansas because of severe drought; freezing weather interrupted the harvest in Central Utah, Tule Lake, Jerome and Rohwer; in some regions there were losses from failure to secure stands and from the use of unadapted varieties; in some instances it was impossible to obtain strong plants for transplanting; there were insect infestations and crop diseases. However, in spite of these handicaps, it is estimated that at least 85 per cent of the total vegetable requirements of the centers for this period was produced on the project farms, with a substantial tonnage in storage or still to be harvested for use during the subsequent period. Tule Lake, despite the labor disturbance which occurred during the harvest season and necessitated the hiring of evacuees from other centers to bring in the crops, had the greatest surplus of any center. More than 6,000,000 pounds of fresh vegetables were shipped from Tule Lake to other centers, and the bulk of the 2,500,000 pounds of produce sold on the market was raised at Tule Lake.

Feed Crops

Feed crops for poultry, hogs and cattle were produced on 7300 acres of land in the amount of 15,000,000 pounds. Although it has been determined that primary emphasis should be placed on the production of food crops to supply center mess requirements, feed crop production will be increased as more land becomes available for cropping.

Hogs

Manzanar made its initial purchase of feeder hogs for center use during this period, while the other nine centers enlarged their hog feeding operations. Hogs are means of salvaging garbage from mess halls and refuse from the vegetable fields. The major portion of their diet is garbage, with grain being fed sparingly to hogs until they become accustomed to garbage, to those who have been thrown off feed and special care, and to brood sows. The general tendency is to purchase feeder pigs large enough to consume the garbage, and farrowing of pigs is resorted to only when feeder pig supplies are inadequate to the needs of the center. During this period a total of 3622 hogs were slaughtered, providing mess halls with 715,000 pounds of pork. The total hog population of the centers increased from 6017 on July 1 to 8622 on December 31.

Beef and Dairy Cattle

Beef production was carried on in four centers: Gila River, Central Utah, Granada, and Manzanar. As with hogs, the usual procedure is to buy feeder calves, feed them for several months and then slaughter them for center use. It is anticipated that Gila River, Granada and Central Utah will each be in a position to supply beef to one center other than their own when full production is attained. From July 1 to December 31, the number of beef cattle on the centers increased from 1015 to 2964. During this period 435,590 pounds of project-grown beef were delivered to mess halls.

Gila River is the only center where dairying has been undertaken by the evacuees. On December 31, 1943, there were 82 milch cows, 33 dry cows, 17 heifers, and 25 dairy calves. The average daily production of whole milk for December was approximately 800 quarts,--nearly one-third of the center's daily requirements.

Poultry

With the exception of the two Arkansas centers, all centers had poultry projects underway during this period. At Tule Lake, because of labor difficulties, it was necessary to sell the flock just as it was coming into full production. One of the limiting factors in achieving rapid expansion of poultry enterprises has been the difficulty in completing poultry houses for brooding chicks and laying flocks. However between July 1 and December 31 the number of stock increased from 55,420 to 60,902.

Looking Ahead

At the close of the year most centers had submitted their plans for 1944 production. These contemplated the production of an even larger proportion of the vegetable requirements on centers. Most of the pork to be consumed in the months to come will be produced on the centers. It is anticipated that at least 5 centers during the first half of 1944 will secure their full beef allotments, and that egg production will increase rapidly during the next few months as pullets come into laying.

As relocation proceeds and Selective Service calls more of the able-bodied men away from the centers, increasing reliance must be placed upon women and high-school children to carry out the agricultural program. Effort is being made to use center agricultural employment as a means of developing skills of workers to facilitate their return to normal life.

MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAINTENANCE

At the outset of the second half-year period in 1943, the condition of automotive, heavy construction and miscellaneous equipment in

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use at the centers was, generally speaking, poor. Most of this equipment, old when obtained by WRA and in need of considerable repair, had at this time been used for approximately a year at the centers. It has been a constant battle to keep enough of the old equipment in operation to meet the requirements of the administration and to carry on the construction, land improvements and development program. A good many units of equipment have been retired for long intervals because of inability to obtain parts and in some instances because of the unavailability of trained mechanics and supervisory personnel. Most centers have had inadequate space for housing maintenance and repair work. Shop buildings, during this period, were under construction and the work had to be carried on in warehouses or other temporary housing where shop equipment on hand could not be installed for lack of space.

In order to offset these handicaps, a more rigid control of automotive equipment use has been inaugurated at all centers. This has been effected by the enclosure of motor pools by fences, strict enforcement of a authorization procedures for the use of any piece of motor equipment, and an attempt to consolidate trips away from the center wherever possible to save mileage. The intensive campaign of training evacuee mechanics conducted by WRA since the centers opened has benefitted the relocation program rather than the center operations: there is a steady demand for skilled and semi-skilled mechanics outside the centers, and consequently as soon as an evacuee has a working knowledge of equipment maintenance he relocates to private life and work.

Despite the difficulties of obtaining parts, especially for heavy equipment, and keeping skilled workers, the Motor Transport and Maintenance Section accomplished the following repair jobs during the latter half of 1943:

<u>Type of Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type of Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tractors, crawler	124	Passenger Cars	337
Tractors, wheel.....	297	Pickups	206
Patrols.....	22	Panels	74
Pumps	13	Stake Trucks	674
Shovels	21	Dump Trucks	242
Air Compressors	4	Cargo Trucks	246
Portable Welders	3	Fire Trucks	25
Rock Crushers	1	Ambulances	33
Cement Mixers	15	Busses	15
Trailer wagons, 2-wheel ...	65	Refrigeration semis	4
Sheep Foot Rollers	1	Semi-trailers	42
Ditch Diggers	1	Commands	6
Grain Buster Bailers	1	Station Wagons	13
Log Trailers	1	Van, Winch and Tanks	16
Scrapers	8	Racks and Hearses	2
Tractors, Grader Hitch	8	Load Luggers	8
		TOTAL	<u>2528</u>

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During this report period an exchange of equipment was worked out with the War Department whereby 556 units of 1939 or older equipment no longer serviceable were exchanged for 550 units of equipment of the same age no longer required by the Army but still serviceable. As the period ended it was expected that WRA could continue to obtain tires, tubes, batteries and repair parts from the Army Depots and that a limited amount of repair work could be done at the U.S. Army Maintenance and Repair Shops.

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, a great many of the projects undertaken during the previous fiscal year remained unfinished. During this report period work continued on schools, housing projects, miscellaneous food storage and processing plants, irrigation and road projects, and the subjugation of raw agricultural land. At most of the centers no developed agricultural land was available at the time of occupation; land had to be reclaimed, cleared and leveled, and irrigation distribution laterals had to be constructed before crops could be planted. This work progressed through the July 1 to December 31, 1943 half-year, but in many cases could not be completed. A number of applications to the War Production Board for activity approval and priority assistance were pending at the end of the period, and many more were forwarded to the Board for consideration in the near future.

Maintenance and operation of the centers has become an increasing problem with the aging of buildings and plants. Most of the buildings were designed for temporary use, with an estimated life of 5 years, and as their second year of use advanced were showing wear and tear. While the temporary restrictions did not apply to the equipment used in wells, sewage disposal plants and hospital boilers, they did affect the method of installation. The wells, for instance, were hurriedly drilled and poorly equipped; many of the holes were crooked, causing excessive wear on the deep well pumping equipment. Approximately 2 years of usage has brought many of these defects to light.

It has been estimated that the cost of maintenance and repair to maintain the buildings and utilities in livable and workable condition will rise sharply each year. In some centers it will be necessary to replace most of the roofing originally used; in many cases the tar paper used on the outside of buildings has deteriorated to the point where most of it must be replaced during the present fiscal year. One of the big problems in carrying on the construction program during the semi-annual period has been that of obtaining sufficient labor. A substantial training program has been continued throughout the life of WRA, but the turnover has been rapid and at no time has there been an adequate supply of skilled workmen. The recruitment of supervisory personnel through Civil Service has been slow and difficult, as higher salaries and more agreeable living conditions offered in connection with work in industries directly connected with the war effort have limited recruitment for center employment. Another difficult problem has been the maintenance in workable

condition the construction equipment on hand. Most of this equipment was used when purchased and much of it was not in good working condition. It has proved increasingly difficult to obtain necessary parts and skilled workmen required to maintain and repair construction equipment.

SUMMARY OF WRA CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Center	Established Cost Total Construction to June 30, 1943	Established Cost Work Accomplished to December 31, 1943	Established Cost to Complete Present Program
Central Utah	382,497	249,556	132,931
Colorado River	2,922,298	1,926,448	995,850
Gila River	902,359	536,770	365,589
Granada	461,070	382,172	78,898
Heart Mountain	575,434	469,644	105,790
Jerome	526,312	297,687	228,625
Leupp	15,000	15,000	(Closed)
Manzanar-	261,976	219,181	42,795
Minidoka	529,035	304,500	224,535
Rohwer	427,973	224,674	203,299
Tule Lake	1,151,663	673,585	478,078
TOTALS	\$ 8,155,617	\$5,299,217	\$2,856,390


SUMMARY OF WRA MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
July 1 to December 31, 1944

	No. of Jobs Done	Average Total No. of Employees	Estimated value of Materials Used
On Buildings	27,878	520	\$216,154
On Utilities	16,033	200	27,622

INDUSTRIES


In the July 1 to December 31 period, the major objective of the industrial program of WRA has been the manufacture or process of articles needed for subsistence operation and maintenance of the centers. In addition, a contribution to the war effort has been made by the manufacture of articles for the use of the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The policy of the Authority, since relocation got underway, has prohibited establishment or development of any enterprise outside these two classifications.

At the beginning of this period, some industrial work was in progress at all centers except Minidoka and Rohwer. Four of the centers have produced in their cabinet or carpenter shops furniture for use in schools, offices, and messhalls. These shops are located at Colorado



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OVERALL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FOR
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1943



LEGEND

□ DOLLAR VALUE OF "PROPOSED" AND "UNDER CONSTRUCTION" PROJECTS.

▨ DOLLAR VALUE OF "COMPLETED" PROJECTS.

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SCHOOLS, OFFICES, and messhalls. These shops are located at...

River, Heart Mountain, Manzanar and Tule Lake. Cabinet work has been of very good quality and has effected a considerable saving in expenditure necessary for purchase of commercial furniture. At Heart Mountain and Manzanar, sewing shops were operated for the manufacture of uniforms and work clothing. Approximately 20 people have been employed in this work at Heart Mountain, while at Manzanar about 60 were employed in the garment factory and 17 in the repair department. A total of 15,000 garments were manufactured at Manzanar during this period. At four centers factories were in operation to process food products that are popular with the evacuees and in constant demand in the mess halls, such as bean sprouts, shoyu sauce, tofu and noodles. At Jerome and Heart Mountain sawmills, operated to saw and process rough lumber for use in necessary construction and maintenance on the projects, produced lumber valued at \$16,200 and \$33,500 respectively.

The ship model factory at Gila River, during this period, completed 550 models and shipped them to the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Approximately 50 people have been employed in this activity. Silk Screen Shops at Granada and Heart Mountain, aside from producing posters for the use of the Navy, processed other articles for center use. The Granada shop, employing 40 workers shipped out about 12,000 posters during the period, and the Heart Mountain shop, with 12 employees, provided the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel with about 4000 posters.

EVACUEE PROPERTY

The services rendered the evacuee population by the Evacuee Property office during the latter half of 1943 increased materially. Transport and storage facilities were heavily taxed, not only because of the transfer of many thousands of people in the course of the segregation movements but also because of the increasing number of persons relocating and having need of their household goods and other equipment. On August 1, a new Evacuee Property Field Office was opened at Sacramento to service most of the great Central Valley region previously serviced by the San Francisco Office, raising the number of Evacuee Property Field Offices to 5: San Francisco, Seattle, Portland, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. By the close of the year a land ownership field survey had been completed in 11 counties of Northern California and 5 in Washington and Oregon which had been selected as the areas containing the highest concentration of evacuee-owned real property. Altogether more than 3700 pieces of property have been identified, classified, cataloged, and mapped in the course of this survey.

Evacuee Property Movement

At the close of the period WRA maintained warehouses at San Francisco, Watsonville, Sacramento, Fresno, Stockton, and Los Angeles in California, Seattle in Washington, and Portland in Oregon. The total floor space provided by all warehouses was 297,165 square feet. New procedure allowed shipment in less than carload lots to a relocation

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of information and inspection but not involving a business deal.

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center from those warehouse districts where the volume of property either does not constitute a carload or where it is certain that a carload will not be available within a reasonable length of time. During the six-month period, a total of 1531 requests for storage and of 3227 requests for shipment were received from the centers and processed through the San Francisco headquarters of the Evacuee Property Field Offices. The Transportation Section of Evacuee Property was made responsible for the handling of all matters relating to segregation program freight shipments, with men detailed to the centers from the field offices to assist in the handling of the personal property to be transferred. The Tule Lake Center completed its out-bound shipment of freight in September by forwarding 51 carloads of household goods and 10 carloads of excess baggage which could not be moved in the baggage cars that accompanied the passenger trains. By the end of November, 59 cars of household goods and 5 carloads and one truck and trailer containing household goods and overflow baggage had been received at the segregation center from other centers. In all, more than 4,700,000 pounds of freight were moved.

Cooperation with U.S. D. A. War Boards

In July an informal understanding was reached between the Evacuee Property Office and the California State War Board regarding procedure for requisitioning idle farm machinery. By the terms of this agreement, the county war boards have furnished WRA with a copy of each letter conveying a purchase offer to an evacuee. The Evacuee Property Office has then communicated with the evacuee, cautioning him that he has but 10 days in which to reply to the offer or have his property requisitioned. The State War Board has withheld action until receiving word from the Evacuee Property Office. When this office has been able to certify that an evacuee has been granted leave and was negotiating a farm lease or purchase in a relocation area, the State War Board has granted a short extension of time in which the evacuee could apply for approval of the war board in the county of his relocation, recommending cancellation of the requisition. As of December 31, evacuee owned farm machinery had been requisitioned in only 38 instances.

Business Activities of the Field Offices

Of the total number of business transactions completed by field offices, farm property represented about 17 per cent of the total; farm and automotive equipment, 39 per cent; urban and commercial property, 48 per cent.

Activity Report of All Field Offices
July 1 - December 31, 1943

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Dollars</u>
Farm Property		
Sales	14	\$ 54,849.30
Leases		
Cash	23	18,764.38
Share	2	414.15
Collections		
Rent	45	7,526.13
Other	19	6,023.68
Debt Adjustments		
Mortgages and Contracts	8	6,693.42
Miscellaneous Obligations	8	1,125.94
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	<u>119</u>	\$ <u>95,397.00</u>
Farm and Automotive Equipment		
Sales		
Farm Machinery	69	23,644.27
Trucks	25	9,300.35
Automobiles	119	54,667.92
Other	23	5,060.85
Collections	34	6,916.67
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	<u>270</u>	\$ <u>99,590.06</u>
Urban and Commercial Property		
Sales		
Hotels and Apartments	9	12,730.00
Stores and Industrial Property	2	2,659.00
Residential Property	4	930.00
Industrial Equipment, Fixtures	20	12,802.26
Merchandise	20	21,180.80
Other	31	6,230.08
Leases or Other Type Management		
Hotels and Apartments	9	3,585.90
Stores, Industrial Property	4	9,352.50
Residential Property	3	8,410.00
Industrial Property	6	2,125.00
Other	8	6,392.00
Collections		
Rents	36	2,168.57
Other	112	13,491.88
Debt Adjustments		
Mortgages and Contracts	9	62,411.24
Miscellaneous Obligations	23	8,015.24
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	<u>296</u>	\$ <u>172,484.47</u>
Miscellaneous Activities*		
Miscellaneous Inquires Answered	3344	
Misc. Services Performed	5324	
Contraband Releases	15	
TOTAL NUMBER AND VALUE OF ALL TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS	<u>9,368</u>	\$ <u>367,471.53</u>

* These items represent cases in which property supervisors render services of information and inspection but not involving a business deal.

HEALTH AND SANITATION

One of the more significant points to emerge from Health statistics for the latter half of 1943 was the marked increase in hospital usage coincident with a decrease in center population and a shrinkage in hospital personnel. Daily average bed occupancy of the hospitals in December of 1943 showed a 25 per cent increase over figures for the first month of the year.

Several factors have produced this state of affairs: (1) an increasing number of tuberculosis cases have been discovered in the centers; (2) the relocation of large numbers of the young and able-bodied has emphasized the high percentage of elderly persons among the Japanese population, many of whom, though feeble or chronically ill, were able to sustain barrack life as long as some family member was at hand to look after them, but once deprived of family care, have required admittance to the center hospital; (3) the heavy toll relocation has taken of evacuee professional and semi-professional personnel in the hospitals and the fact that replacements made from civil service lists have been hard to procure.

While the problem of caring for the aged and infirm has been recognized from the beginning, it is now aggravated by the departure of younger family members on relocation and the increasing shortage of professional health personnel. Heretofore, with a number of these persons cared for in family barracks, the small number who lacked such family care could be cared for in the hospital. However, by the close of 1943, hospital facilities could neither be expanded to provide for additional patients of this type nor be considered adequate to retain such patients already hospitalized. Earlier in the program plans and blueprints for remodeling barrack buildings to meet the needs of this type of patient were submitted by the Health Section to all centers. These plans provided minimum sanitary facilities and small serving kitchens for groups of 20 to 30 patients. During the July to December period, Manzanar, Minidoka and Colorado River developed such facilities which operated under the name of "Convalescent Barracks", "Hostel" or "Custodial Barracks" near the hospitals and under the hospital's direction. The opening of similar accommodations in the other centers was anticipated.

During the semi-annual period, there were 7,997 hospital admissions and 156,908 out-patient visits exclusive of optometry and dental services. In 493 instances it was necessary to send patients outside the centers for medical care. There have been no major epidemics during the period, and the vital statistics have indicated a generally good health situation, with 1,978 births and 290 deaths.

The problem of administrative assistance for the chief medical officer and chief nurse at each center was recognized in establishing the budgets for the fiscal year of 1944. Hospital administrative officers were employed at all centers by the end of the half-year period, with the result that considerable improvement in hospital

administrative practice was observed and the chief medical officers and chief nurses were able to devote their full time to their proper duties.

With the employment of trained, appointed dieticians at all centers during this period, dietetic services improved considerably. Consultations between dieticians and project stewards on general diets and in specific guidance in all special diets served in center mess halls were generally beneficial, although the problem of special diets including the feeding of young children has not yet been satisfactorily solved in some centers.

The shortage of nurses has become the most critical health personnel problem and more than any other single factor narrows the scope of medical service at the centers. During the six-month period there were 29 resignations of appointed nurses, including 6 chief nurses. Of the 35 new appointments three incumbents resigned before the close of the period. The number of registered evacuee nurses dwindled from 51 in January of 1943 to 11 in December; of 55 student evacuee nurses, only 3 remained. At the close of the year the total number of hospital personnel was 944, with the ratio of one nurse to every 32 patients. The lowest ratio which is considered safe is one nurse to 21 patients.

With this condition existing, it has been necessary to give increasing responsibility for the care of patients to evacuee nurse aides. However, the more experienced aides have left the centers and few younger women have been available to replace those who relocated. Thus the issei women have been recruited for this work. Despite their willingness, they have proved far less satisfactory than the young nisei women because of their physical limitations and their general inability to speak or understand English.

A medical social program was instituted during this period at Heart Mountain, Gila River and the Arkansas centers, leaving only one center without such service. There have been many indications that the medical social program has been of real help to physicians and nurses and that it has been an effective coordinator between the health and social welfare units. The Medical Social Consultant from the Washington Office visited all centers during this period and was on long details for special service in 2 instances, staying 7 weeks at Tule Lake to assist with the many problems arising from the segregation movement and the transfer of many patients, and 4 weeks at Gila River to carry on the work after the resignation of the medical social worker there.

Sanitation and Sanitary Engineering.

As the beginning of this period coincided with warm weather, many centers had difficulties with milk safety, food handling, garbage and rubbish disposal and sewage disposal. Sanitation problems increased

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with the establishment of hog farms and slaughter houses, a few canneries and the one dairy and pasteurization unit. The early part of July found the Arkansas centers entering the most serious part of the malaria season.

In order to deal with these problems, the position of center sanitarian was established, a supervisor of malaria control and sanitation was designated to cover both Arkansas centers, and the sanitary engineer from the national office spent three-fourths of his time in the field. At 3 centers qualified evacuee sanitarians were employed, but by the end of September all of these had relocated. Lack of qualified applicants for the position of sanitarian resulted in vacancies at six centers at the end of the year. In spite of handicaps, most of these problems were solved and environmental health conditions were kept satisfactory. The milk supply situation at the Arkansas centers was improved so that it came within the requirements for milk of the Quartermaster General of the United States Army, and the malaria control program, aided by a dry summer in Arkansas, proved to be adequate. However, the need of closer supervision of sanitation by the centers themselves was clearly indicated, and at the close of the year a concentrated effort was being made to fill the six sanitarian vacancies with qualified persons.

COMMUNITY WELFARE

In the latter half of 1945 the scope of the Welfare Section's activities at the centers expanded considerably. In addition to the routine work of providing council in connection with family and social problems, arranging shifts in housing assignments, and handling the distribution of clothing allowances and public assistance grants, the Welfare Section shared heavily in the heavy and time-consuming work occasioned by the execution of the Segregation Policy, arranged for the transfer of another group of families to the family internment camp at Crystal City, Texas, and assisted with the work of getting designated evacuee repatriates aboard the Gripsholm at its September sailing.

During the segregation program, the Welfare Section at each center was given the responsibility of counseling with families and individuals to be transferred to Tule Lake. The counseling services were particularly helpful in assisting non-segregant members of the family to decide whether or not to accompany the family to the segregation center. The Housing Unit of Welfare at each center was in charge of housing assignments for those transferred from other centers. Although temporary additions to the appointed staff were authorized for each center during this period of stress, it was impossible to recruit qualified persons on a temporary basis and within the time allowed. As an emergency measure, staff members were borrowed from other sections, particularly from the Education Section to assist with this work.

In addition to these responsibilities which were related to the normal functions of the Welfare Section, at several centers Welfare was assigned other responsibilities connected with the segregation movement,

such as the preparation and construction of summary lists of persons to be segregated, analyses of family composition showing railroad fare requirements and preparation of train lists. Since the segregation program involved large-scale movements both in and out of Tule Lake, the greatest volume of work developed at that center. Temporary employees were procured for use at that center, and the head of the Washington Welfare Section spent two months there, directing the activities of the Welfare group.

Special Counseling for Relocation

Plans were completed during this period for the establishment in the Welfare Section at each center of a Special Counseling Unit to assist families and individuals in developing a plan for the future involving re-establishment in private life and work. While the main emphasis is on preparing families for relocation, the object of the counseling interviews is the assistance of all families in making long-term plans, whether or not immediate relocation is involved. This counseling is supplementary to the interviews held by relocation committees with evacuees, and not a substitution.

Statistical Data

Early in the period a reporting system to provide quantitative and qualitative data was set up in Welfare, and by the end of the period the centers had achieved sufficient accuracy and consistency in the submission of statistical reports on the work done to justify the analysis of some of the data contained. The following summary of public assistance grants authorized by 9 relocation centers covers only 5 months of the semi-annual period; procedures were not set up in time to include data for July.

NINE CENTER SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS

Month	Center Population	No. of Family Units	No. of Persons in Family	Average Size of Fam. Unit	Amount of Grant	Avg. Grant per Fam. Unit	% of Population receiving Grant
Aug.	81,108	3417	5263	1.65	37,572.81	\$10.99	6.9
Sep.	78,771	2927	5227	1.79	39,679.30	13.55	6.6
Oct.	77,772	3164	5802	1.83	34,902.94	11.03	7.5
Nov.	73,362	3173	5827	1.84	27,018.67	8.51	7.9
Dec.	76,782	3002	5388	1.79	21,945.53	7.31	7.0
Total	387,795	15683	27867	1.78*	\$161,119.27	\$10.27	7.2

* The low average size of the family unit receiving grants (1.78) indicates the high number of single, unattached individuals, who require assistance because of age or disability.

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EDUCATION AT THE CENTERS

The total enrollment in center schools at the close of the 1943 fiscal year was 25,072, with 11,066 pupils in the elementary and 14,006 in the secondary schools. At the end of December 1943 total enrollment had dropped to 19,838 pupils, with 8614 in elementary schools and 11,224 in secondary schools. This low total was explained by the fact that approximately 3125 children of school age at the Tule Lake Center were not yet enrolled. The opening of Tule Lake schools in January was expected to bring the total enrollment up to approximately 23,000. This figure still represented a decrease of about 2000, 500 being accounted for by the excess of the 1943 high school graduating class over the incoming first grade enrollment. Relocation explains the remaining decrease.

Personnel Problems

The turnover in the teaching personnel at some centers ran as high as 30 per cent during the latter half of 1943. There were three changes in school superintendents, four in high school principals, and several in other school administrative positions. At the close of the year there were employed on the centers 75 school administrative personnel hired through Civil Service and 540 certified evacuee teachers. At this time there were 45 elementary and 30 high school teaching position vacancies. The shortage of evacuee teachers was in part the result of relocation of certified people and in part the result of disinclination on the part of evacuees with some college training to qualify themselves for teaching in the centers in view of the fact that teaching opportunities for Japanese Americans are very infrequent outside the centers.

School Housing and Equipment

Changes in WRA policy regarding school buildings have made several drastic reductions in the proposed school program, which originally anticipated the provision of modern but inexpensive school buildings for both elementary and secondary units. Early in 1943, by arrangement with WPB, WRA agreed to omit elementary school buildings, erecting only high school buildings. Only in Unit I of Colorado River Relocation Center, where work on the elementary school had been started, was the original plan carried out. Later, because of shortage of materials and funds, the high school building projects were curtailed, and only those centers where contracts had been let, materials obtained and construction started were permitted to have complete buildings. In other centers it seemed advisable to erect only such service units as required special space areas: auditoriums, shop, home economics and science units. This modification of plans made it necessary to revise the whole construction and maintenance program in order that the barrack type buildings could be adapted to schoolroom use.

At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, Granada and Heart

Mountain had high school buildings completed and in use. At the close of the year the Tule Lake high school was ready to be used. During the period covered by this report, the auditorium, science and shop units at Central Utah and the science, home economics and shop units at Gila River were completed. At Colorado River, the elementary school in Unit I and several units of the high schools in Units II and III were completed by the close of the year. Rohwer had its auditorium and home economics buildings almost ready for use as the year ended, and at Jerome an auditorium was under construction and expected to be ready for the commencement exercises of the graduating class of 1944.

During the period a considerable amount of remodeling of barrack buildings was accomplished and more was contemplated. In a number of instances, school rooms were improved by painting walls and ceilings, adding more windows and electric lights, installing shelves and cupboards, and moving or removing partitions. It was planned that some of the floors should be resurfaced and stoves shielded, as part of the effort to contrive adequate class rooms out of barracks ill-suited to school room use.

During the fall semester of 1943, textbooks and other essential supplies had been obtained in quantities sufficient for a satisfactory type of operation. However, throughout the period there persisted a shortage of equipment for shop, science, home economics and commercial classes. There have been difficulties in obtaining priority releases and in finding necessary equipment, and delays in obtaining equipment from Government surplus stocks. Efforts to acquire equipment for farm and auto mechanics vocational shops were to be stressed during the early months of 1944. It was anticipated that supply costs would continue to be higher than under normal conditions.

Relocation and the Schools

The number of pupils lost through relocation during the period was not large. However, relocation played an important part in the whole school program. Class discussions, course contents and assembly programs were planned to provide the children, and through them, the parents, with specific and even detailed information on the possibilities of relocation and the problems involved. Experience gained by teachers who took part in leave clearance hearings has been valuable in that it has given them a broader understanding of the problems and conditions which affect the thinking and future planning of the evacuees and hence the school children.

School Program Improvements

All relocation centers started the fall semester with full accreditation by state accrediting agencies. In this half-year elementary and high school program patterns were pretty well established.

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Teachers and pupils were more familiar with the general aims of the program and had learned to adapt themselves to frequent modifications necessitated by the changing demands of the WRA program. Substantial gains were made in developing friendly relations with the schools of neighboring communities, and inter-school contests and visits fostered good will. Nursery Schools have progressed to the point where they render valuable aid to children in overcoming language difficulties and in preparing them for regular progress in the elementary grades. The adult education program has provided adults with an opportunity to gain or increase knowledge of the English language. It has also familiarized many of these adults with conditions existing in outside communities and has helped some of them to develop specific skills which may prove profitable to them in relocation.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

During the half-year period, considerable progress was made at most centers in developing the Community Government as an instrument of community organization. Four of the centers, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Minidoka and Jerome approved Charters during this reporting period, bringing the total of centers organized under Community Government policy to eight and leaving only one relocation center functioning as an exception to the policy. Manzanar continued to operate with the Block Managers' Assembly serving as its representative body. Generally speaking the Councils made commendable progress in securing the confidence of both resident population and administration.

At the Washington office, plans were made in July for the participation of Community Councils in the process of segregation and reception of transferees from Tule Lake. Agreement was reached that the policy for Community Government would not apply to Tule Lake but that provision would be made for the establishment of a representative Advisory Council. Communications were addressed to the center Councils requesting their cooperation in meeting problems of fire prevention and requesting their recommendations as to the restoration of licensing authority to the Councils. On the basis of these recommendations, WRA restored to the Councils authority to license Business Enterprises. The authority of the Judicial Commission to penalize violators of center regulations by suspension of work privileges and clothing allowances was withdrawn, but, on the other hand the Commission was granted authority to impose fines and jail sentences. In November a Community Government Handbook was issued, setting forth functions, organization, administration, Council relationships, objectives, and problems of the community.

In conjunction with the Relocation Division, a plan was developed for the organization of staff-evacuee relationships for the purpose of aiding the relocation program. This plan was submitted to the centers in November, and provided for the establishment of a Relocation Planning Commission, its members to be appointed by the Community Council and drawn from resident groups. A staff committee with the relocation program officer as the executive secretary was to be appointed by the Project Director. These two groups were to appoint three members to an executive

board which would operate under the leadership of the Project Director in developing programs, transmitting information, and facilitating relocation in all possible ways.

At the centers, problems surrounding the movement of people to Tule Lake and the reception of newcomers from Tule Lake, the enactment of regulations, definition of relations with block managers and relocation were common to all Councils. Other problems of considerable interest were those concerned with labor relations, employment reduction, production facilities, hospitals and schools, and general center improvement.

The one disruption (and temporary) of Community Government occurred in November at Central Utah with the mass resignation of the Community Council. The Chairman of the Council, having been questioned by the FBI concerning some remarks attributed to him, resigned, whereupon the Council, after passing a resolution to the effect that statements attributed to their Chairman were not made by him at a Council meeting, also resigned. However, when an election was held to complete the last few weeks of the session, most of the former members were reelected.

As relocation progressed, removing the most capable younger men from the centers, there was a perceptible tendency on the part of the center communities to elect to the Councils older men, issei or the older nisei who had no intention of relocating in the immediate future. While this increasing predominance of the older and more permanent residents in the Councils has in some instances resulted in a less positive attitude toward relocation, it has unquestionably stimulated the Councils to take a more energetic part in improving the communities and making them better places to live.

WORK OF THE NEW RECORDS MANAGEMENT SECTION

The Records Management Section of the Administrative Management Division of WRA was established October 1, 1943. The principal functions of the new section have been the physical consolidation of documentary material, decision as to disposition of records (whether they should remain in WRA files or be submitted to the National Archives), maintaining liaison with appropriate government agencies on the keeping and disposition of WRA records, and the exercise of general supervision over mail and files in the Washington Office, including teletype, telegraph and messenger service.

The immediate value of the work of the Records Section has been in the centralization of files so that eventually all material will be in one location and more easily available to all units of the organization. The bulk of the non-record material, such as information copies of correspondence, daily leave reports and sending copies of teletypes, has been disposed of, thereby creating a saving in floor space, personnel and file equipment.

At the close of the year, the records program was confined to

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the Washington Office, but it was planned to extend this program to the field by making a survey of field records including correspondence, reports, working papers, printed publications, card records, protests and petitions. This survey will include records accumulated in the past as well as records accumulating currently.

FINANCE

On July 1, 1943, fiscal services and accountings previously performed for WRA by the Central Administrative Services Division of the Office for Emergency Management were transferred to the Relocation Centers, with OEM maintaining only the Washington Office accounts. In the Washington Office, the Budget and Procedures Unit was established during the summer, and by the close of the year the new unit had revised approximately 95 per cent of the procedure for the Authority as a whole. Many of the positions set up on the personnel charts had been filled and the new employees trained on the job. A Field Examination and Investigation Unit was set up to perform the work of travelling auditors, to get at the facts and produce regularly full, objective reports on project administration, reports which indicate precisely the extent of deviations from procedures. The work of such auditors is of paramount importance to WRA, both as protection in time of official investigation and as a means of maintaining sound administration.

An evaluation made at the close of the year showed that finance policies and procedures had been about 90% adopted during the half-year period. It was anticipated that the early months of the new year would find prescribed procedures installed uniformly at all centers and operating satisfactorily.

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AT THE CENTERS

Status of Business Enterprises as of December 31, 1943

Center	No. of Shops & Services	Gross Sales (July 1-Dec. 31)	Net Earnings (July 1-Dec. 31)	Ratio of Assets to Liabilities
Central Utah	17	\$280,223.99	\$ 43,943.51	8.83
Colorado River	16	498,400.63	60,095.55	2.61
Gila River	18	424,500.94	63,048.84	3.51
Granada	12	223,778.85	25,221.94	2.86
Heart Mountain	18	396,927.31	54,612.08	3.22
Jerome	17	276,594.07	47,284.27	4.42
Manzanar	13	394,403.82	36,895.83	2.84
Minidoka	13	338,372.06	43,372.06	2.92
Rohwer	7	182,054.70	27,582.63	3.74
Tule Lake	27	727,517.20	82,599.13	2.09
TOTALS	158	\$3,742,773.57	\$484,655.84	

By the close of 1943, 9 of the 10 Enterprises had been incorporated as cooperatives. Heart Mountain was still operating as a trust. Gila River, already incorporated, was in the process of amending its articles of incorporation and by-laws to comply with the requirements of the Arizona Corporation Commission that its articles and by-laws restrict the activities of the corporation to the center. The total number of employees at the end of December was 1750. All the Enterprises were in fairly sound financial condition, and the general policy of maintaining prices at the competitive retail level to accumulate reserves was carried out at all centers

During this period an effort was made to reach a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 3 to 1. By the end of the year half the Enterprises had passed this ratio and the others were climbing steadily toward it. Several of the Enterprises had established such good cash positions that they were able to pay a cash rebate just before the Christmas season.

In September a meeting of Enterprises' representatives was held in Chicago and a Federation of Center Business Enterprises was formed with a view to pooling the efforts of all centers in working for advancement of the Enterprises. The Federation opened a buying office in New York and selected three buyers from the Business Enterprises to do the purchasing for all Centers. The actual buying was not begun until the latter part of October, from that time until the end of the year, 512 orders totalling \$120,000 were handled. In the face of the manpower shortage and scarcity of ready-made clothing, purchases of ready-to-wear items are discouraged, and the Projects are encouraged to buy materials and make use of the labor and sewing facilities on the centers to make up the needed garments. The Federation maintains a revolving fund to facilitate purchases, as goods have to be paid for in advance of shipment. The Federation pays for goods out of the pool, notifies the project for which the purchase is made, and has the sum expended replenished by the project.

It has always been the goal of WRA to have the evacuees run their own Enterprises eventually and to cut down the amount of supervision by WRA as conditions permit. During this period the evacuees assumed more and more responsibility, and it was possible to reduce appointed staff from two to one at each center. However, the numerous changes in evacuee personnel brought about by relocation make more remote the prospect of eliminating WRA supervision entirely. A program was initiated in all centers whereby each important employee has an understudy trained to take over when the original incumbent leaves the center. Segregation too affected personnel changes in Business Enterprises, the most acute situation arising at Tule Lake where approximately 85 per cent of the Enterprise employees were transferred to other centers.

In response to the need of evacuees for banking facilities including a loan agency, Business Enterprises undertook the establishment of Credit Unions. It was necessary to obtain a special license from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the formation of Credit Unions on the centers. By the close of the year Topaz Enterprises at

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Central Utah had received its charter and established a Credit Union, and 4 or 5 of the other centers were preparing to organize one.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

Prior to July 1, 1943, foundations had been laid at all centers except Rohwer for the carrying out of Community Analysis. At Colorado River the Department of Interior had sponsored social analysis since June of 1942. During the latter half of 1943 some analysts left, and replacements were made with difficulty. Jerome, Rohwer, Heart Mountain, Colorado River and Central Utah had analysts in residence during only portions of the period. Only 5 centers; Manzanar, Minidoka, Tule Lake, Granada and Gila River had community analysts functioning throughout the period.

The analysts have rendered valuable assistance to the administration in the formulation of policies of center management and general conduct of the WRA program. They have made surveys of center opinion on controversial matters, engaged in studies to increase the general knowledge of evacuee background, cultural patterns, and reactions. They have been in a position to discover motives governing resistance to the administration, to relocation, to various programs inaugurated by WRA. All analysts were put to work on the problem of segregating the non-loyal, and their suggestions were for the most part incorporated in the Segregation Manual, unquestionably contributing to the smooth execution of the program.

Reports from the center analysts have covered details of center life, background analysis, current problems and evacuee-staff relations, and provide the Senior Analyst in the Washington Office with information for distribution and guidance for the administration.

INFORMATION SERVICES

In general, during this semi-annual period, the informational facilities of WRA were concentrated on furthering the relocation program. However, the Reports staff was active at the time of the execution of the Segregation Policy in keeping the evacuees informed on all steps of the transfer program and in documenting this major episode in WRA history. Reports Officers attended the conference of Project Directors and Washington officials in Denver in July, when plans were made for segregation movements. At this conference the importance of keeping the evacuees thoroughly and accurately informed was stressed, and information pamphlets printed in both English and Japanese were issued to be distributed at the centers. Plans were developed for giving current information through such media as center papers, special bulletins, and block manager and community council meetings. The value of careful, advanced planning was reflected in the fact that the segregation program was carried out without serious difficulties or crises

arising. The most far-reaching enterprise of the Division of Reports, however, was the expansion and improvement of information service in the interests of relocation. Real achievements were accomplished in spite of the fact that key members of the Washington Reports Office were obliged to devote most of their time and ability for two months to the assembling and preparation of information demanded by the many investigations and hearings that interrupted WRA's routine and proper obligations during this half-year period.

Relocation Reports Officers Installed

During July, Relocation Supervisors were asked to keep the centers informed on prospects for relocation in their respective areas through mimeographed releases. The burden of keeping the centers informed, of handling public relations problems, and of reporting relocation activities to the National Office became so heavy that authorization was granted for the appointment of a Reports Officer to each Relocation Supervisor's office. In November the National Chief of Reports met with the new Reports Officers in Chicago to familiarize them with the background of the WRA program, the problems involved in resettlement of evacuees, and the specific activities for which they would be responsible. These Relocation Reports Officers have kept a flow of relocation information going to the centers: press releases, special news letters, cuts of relocated evacuees and unusual job opportunities, and human interest stories concerning successfully relocated evacuees and unusual job opportunities. They have been instructed to supplement the "Facts about America" series of state pamphlets prepared by the Reports staff of the Washington Office with local studies. In the field of public relations they have been sounding out community sentiment toward evacuees, issuing press releases in relation to relocation within their areas, making press and radio contacts, preparing speeches and broadcasts. They have also assumed responsibility for the preparation of area reports to the Washington Office. At the end of December, they were asked to add to their duties the reporting to Washington of any incidents in their area which might give rise to misinformation or rumors regarding relocation of evacuees.

Photographic Program

Moving Pictures

In the first month of the semi-annual period, plans for the production of moving picture color films with commentator sound track for non-theatrical distribution had advanced to the point where actual shooting could begin. In July approximately 1600 feet of film were taken of the Japanese American Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for scenes to be included in WRA films. Movie footage on relocated evacuees was made at Denver, Chicago and Cleveland; footage on phases of center life was made at Heart Mountain, Granada and Rohwer. These films taken by the Photographic Unit of the Reports Division, located in the Denver Field Office, were completed, cut, edited and organized into 2 16mm. films, "The Way Ahead" (16 minutes) on relocated evacuees, and "Go for Broke" (12 minutes)

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on the Combat team. They were shown by the Relocation Team at Rohwer early in December.

Documentary Activities of the Photographic Unit.

For still photos, the emphasis was upon evacuee relocation. Pictures were taken in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Kansas City, St. Louis, New York, and Bridgeport, and the areas surrounding these cities. Supplemental pictures of the relocation process at the centers were taken at Rohwer and Jerome. Other photographic documentation of WRA activities included one regular center picture coverage at Heart Mountain and a series of Christmas holiday season pictures at Granada. WRA photographers accompanied two transfer trains during the segregation movement to document this program. In response to the need for identification pictures for evacuee leave clearance dockets, the Photographic Unit developed a specially styled camera which was supplied to each center.

Photographic Production Figures for July 1 to December 31, 1943
Negatives added to documentary files:

By WRA Photographic Unit. . . .	549
By Project Reports Officer. . . .	451
TOTAL. . . .	<u>1000</u>

Total number of negatives on file December 31, 1943. . 4169

Prints made, including file-copy prints:

5" x 7"	4756
8" x 10"	3581
11" x 14"	<u>1341</u>
TOTAL	9678

Use Made of Photographs

All photographs of general WRA interest are sent to the National Office where permanent files are maintained by the Photographic Editor in the Office of Reports. Besides WRA photographs, pictures obtained from such sources as the Department of Agriculture, OWI, the Department of the Interior, and Chambers of Commerce have been incorporated into the collection to increase visual information on the midwestern and eastern regions of the United States. The Editor has planned and assembled visual material used by the Relocation Team and has selected photographs to be used for the illustration of publications.

One of the primary uses made of photographs has been as illustrations for official publications of the agency. In addition, exhibit prints of relocated evacuees were sent to Project Reports Officers for use in furthering interest in relocation. In August, the group of relocation advisers who went to Tule Lake to promote relocation in the interval before segregation movements took a substantial collection of photo-

graphs of relocated people and of general views of parts of the country suitable for relocation. Relocation Officers were provided with large collections of prints showing both center life and conditions of relocation to use in informing prospective employers and in public relations work. In July, 100 prints were made of the film strip. "The Wrong Ancestors", which was compiled from WRA pictures earlier in the summer. Slide projectors were supplied to Relocation Supervisors, Field Assistant Directors, and most of the centers. The film strip and accompanying mimeographed lecture were used extensively for both evacuee and public showing. Books of display prints of center life were made up during this period for the use of the Washington Personnel Section in conferences with prospective project personnel.

In addition to serving an important purpose in administrative use, the photographic collection continued throughout the period to assist outside groups and individuals interested in evacuee problems. Selections of pictures were supplied to lecturers and lay groups and committees, and 25 sets of pictures were made up for an Office of Education, Information Exchange, Loan Packet to accompany printed material on WRA and the evacuation. Pictures were supplied for publication in response to requests from newspapers, magazines, and organizations issuing pamphlets. AP and INS news stories have been illustrated with WRA photographs. The following table summarizes the distribution of exhibit prints over the six-month period:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Number of Prints</u>
Relocation Centers	Primarily Relocation	585
Relocation Offices	Public Information	2727
National Office	Publication, Relocation Team, Personnel Use, File Copies	1706
Newspapers	Publication	47
Magazines, Pamphlets		
Encyclopedias, etc.	Publication	205
Lectures	Illustration	88
Committees and Organizations	Miscellaneous	355
U.S. Office of Education	Loan Packets	400
	TOTAL	<u>6113</u>

Activities of Project Reports Offices

Aside from supervising the dissemination of information on segregation at the centers each Reports Officer documented carefully and fully the program as it developed at his center, submitting a report to Washington at the termination of evacuee transfers. The Reports Officers have been instrumental in setting up Relocation Libraries at most centers for the housing of material describing various areas and localities where conditions were favorable to relocation. Special attention was given to publicizing visits from field Relocation Officers and the showings of the movie series, "This is

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COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

During the second half of 1943, national organizations were increasingly well represented in the centers, National, state and local workers of many groups visited the centers, and center delegates attended religious, social and student conferences held in various parts of the United States. The following table shows the distribution of national organizations at the centers:

Organization:	Central: : Utah	Colorado: : River	Gila :River:	Granada:	Heart: : Mt.	Man- :zanar:	Mini- :doka :	Jerome:	Rohwer:	Tule*: :Lake :
Red Cross	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
Jr.Red Cross:	X	: X	:	:	: X	: X	:	: X	:	:
Boy Scouts	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
Girls Scouts:	X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X
Camp Fire G.:	:	: X	: X	:	: X	:	:	:	:	: X
YWCA	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
YMCA	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X	:
Hi-Y	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	:
Girl Reserves	X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
PTA	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
AAUW	:	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:	:	:
JACL	: X	:	:	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:
4-H Club	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:	:	:	:
USO	:	:	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:

*Community Activities at Tule Lake were completely disrupted by the mass segregation movement and the subsequent incident. At the close of the year only the Red Cross Chapter of all Tule Lake organizations had re-established itself.

Relatively few new associations were started on the centers during the half-year period--evidence that the recreational program had reached a stage of maturity where emphasis could be placed on strengthening organized groups already in existence. In this period the centers were beginning to assume financial responsibility for community activities. Several centers completed plans for establishment of cooperatives or trusts to handle funds and to secure a steady flow of income for financing operations. These funds

were also used to finance the attendance of center residents at national meetings.

Communities continued to be responsible for direction of the community library at most of the centers. There was a steady increase in accessions. The collection of books and material in the Japanese language for the benefit of those persons unable to read English was heavily used. The popularity of this department of library service is indicated by the fact that with a total of 8,760 volumes for all centers, the total circulation for the six-month period amounted to 49,747. The circulation of English books for all centers except Granada reached a total of 223,540. The total number of books owned by center libraries reached 76,209 by the close of the year. Rental libraries had an additional several thousand volumes and were freely used.

With the exception of Tule Lake after August, and Granada for most of the period because of an infantile paralysis epidemic at that center, the centers maintained energetic activities, sponsoring sports events with teams from neighboring communities, programs for holidays within the center, athletic and cultural projects within the center, building up U.S.O.s for visiting soldiers, and planning recreation and entertainment essential to the well-being of the communities. It was observed that with the accomplishment of the segregation program and the removal to Tule Lake of those persons most interested in strictly Japanese cultural activities, the general character of the recreational program at the relocation centers became more thoroughly American.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

July 1 to December 31, 1943

- July 1-2 -- Conference on Relocation Policy in Washington Office continued from June 29; seasonal leave procedures revised and decisions reached to stress relocation in smaller cities and rural areas and to establish office in Boston to handle relocation in New England area.
- July 3 ---- The Director of WRA testified before the Chandler subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in executive session and approved the Downey Resolution prior to its introduction in the Senate.
- July 6 ---- U.S. Senate adopted resolution introduced by Senator Downey, of California, asking the President to order immediate segregation of disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry and calling for a public statement on relocation plans and procedures.

Arizona Superior Court judge declared unconstitutional the Arizona law requiring advertisement and posting of notice with the Secretary of State before doing business with restricted persons (evacuees).

- July 6-7 -- The Director of WRA appeared before the Dies Subcommittee, composed of Representatives Costello, Eberharter and Mundt, and

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disclosed segregation plans.

July 8 ---- WRA appropriation of \$48,170,000, as approved by the Bureau of the Budget, passed by Congress.

July 12 --- Congress abolished funds permitting operation of OWI field offices, making it necessary for WRA to create its own channels and contacts in public relations and press distribution.

July 15 --- The Director of WRA spoke over NBC on facts about Japanese Americans and the WRA program.

Town Meeting of the Air, conducted in Santa Barbara, California, featured Representative John Costello and Carey McWilliams on the return of evacuees to the West Coast.

July 16 --- The Senate Military Affairs Committee released report and recommendations on S. 444 providing for the transfer of certain WRA functions to the War Department, and on S. Res. 101 and 111 authorizing investigation of the WRA centers by the Chandler Committee.

July 22---- WAC opened to girls of Japanese ancestry.

July 26-27- Denver conference of WRA officials to discuss segregation plans.

August 6 -- The Director of WRA addressed the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco.

September 2 The exchange ship Gripsholm sailed from New York, carrying 314 passengers from relocation centers, 149 of whom were American citizens.

September 13-Segregation transfer movements began.

October 8 - Death of Elmer Rowalt, Deputy Director of WRA.

October 11 -Last entrainment of evacuees in the major segregation movement.

October 15- Accidental death of a farm worker halted harvest work at Tule Lake.

November 1 -Relocation Division established in the Washington Office.

Mass demonstration at Tule Lake Center and attack on Chief Medical Officer.

November 4 -Violence at Tule Lake resulted in Army occupation of the center.

November 8-9-Investigation in progress at Tule Lake Center by the California Senatorial Fact-finding Committee, Congressman Engle, and

a Dies Committee Investigator.

- November 13-Director of WRA held press conference in Washington on the Tule Lake incident.
- November 16-Director of WRA addressed American Legion state commanders, state adjutants and national officers in Indianapolis.
- November 24-Director of WRA testified concerning the Tule Lake situation before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session.
- November 25-Secretary of War Stimson announced the casualty list of the Japanese-American 100th Infantry Battalion in action in Italy, listing decorations and mentioning high praise accorded them by their officers.
- November 29-Dies Subcommittee began hearings on the Tule Lake situation in Washington.
- December 1--The Director of WRA was featured speaker at the Annual Session of Massachusetts Conference of Social Workers in Boston, his subject: "A Test Case for Democracy--Japanese Resettlement."
- December 2--The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court in San Francisco upheld constitutionality of the evacuation order in the Korematsu Case.
- December 3- The Director of WRA held a conference with radio commentators and newspaper columnists in New York.
- Rohwer school children ended bond drive oversubscribed 300 per cent, having contributed the price of 3 army jeeps.
- December 4 -Leupp Center, maintained for the isolation of persistent troublemakers, was closed, its 52 inmates being transferred to Tule Lake.
- December 6 -Conference on WRA Administrative Management opened in Denver.
- December 6-9Dies Subcommittee continued hearings on Tule Lake.
- December 7-The 2d anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor passed uneventfully at all centers.
- December 13-Arizona anti-evacuee law mentioned under date of July 6 was declared unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court.
- The first evacuee girl to be inducted into the WAC, Miss Iris Watanabe of Granada, was sworn in at the office of the Governor of Colorado.
- December 18-20-Evacuee Property Conference held in San Francisco.

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December 20-The California State Board of Agriculture passed a resolution favoring ultimate restoration of employment privileges to persons of Japanese Ancestry and pledging its "influence to assure that race prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of the State" after military necessity for restrictions has passed. (Soon afterward the resolution was withdrawn and the Chairman who had sponsored it resigned from the Board)

The Dies Subcommittee re-opened its hearings on Tule Lake in order to question the Project Director of that center.

Rosamond B. Spill

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SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

July 1 to December 31

1943

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Washington, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT
July 1 - December 31, 1943

GENERAL SUMMARY

For the War Relocation Authority, the latter half of 1943 was dominated by the segregation program and the many problems implicit in its execution. In this period, the Tule Lake Relocation Center at Newell, California, was converted to use as a segregation center. The planning and execution of the major policy of segregation, which involved the mass movement of thousands of segregants from the 9 relocation centers to Tule Lake and thousands of non-segregants from Tule Lake to the other centers, absorbed the time and attention of the majority of the staff members at all 10 centers and affected in greater or lesser degree the activities of practically every division within the Authority. No sooner had the first, great mass movement been accomplished than an uprising of one faction among the segregants occurred at the Tule Lake Center and resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. Between the sensational publicity accorded this incident and the numerous official and unofficial investigations resulting from it, the segregation issue remained the focal point of attention throughout the entire six-months period and tended to overshadow the more routine and less spectacular developments of the WRA program.

Without the competition of the long awaited and widely publicized segregation movement and its somewhat sensational by-products, the progress of the relocation program would unquestionably have dominated any report on WRA for the latter half of the year. Relocation of the evacuated people to normal life and employment, always the primary objective of the Authority, had been given impetus by the speeding up of leave clearance machinery and the re-evaluation of WRA's relocation objectives in the first six months of 1943. In the second period, relocation continued to gain momentum and was further stimulated by the creation within the Authority of a special Relocation Division which could devote its entire attention to this increasingly vital function of WRA. Despite the distraction provided by the execution of the segregation program, 8,434 evacuees relocated during the July 1 to December 31 period, increasing the total number of relocated persons by 100 per cent.

SEGREGATION

Unquestionably the execution of the segregation program in the latter half of 1943 represented a milestone in WRA history. The only major policy of comparable significance in the existence of the agency was the mass registration program of the previous spring, which had accented the need of separating the pro-Japanese minority from the pro-American majority of the evacuees. The registration program had also furnished the information essential to any equitable selection of

segregants, and had provided WRA with a backlog of experience invaluable to the planning and conducting of subsequent major programs. The importance of having such a backlog was demonstrated by the impressive smoothness with which the segregation operations were carried out. Not one of the administrative difficulties encountered during the mass registration arose during the execution of the segregation program.

It was generally agreed that the confusion and misunderstanding which characterized the mass registration at most centers were due to the fact that insufficient time was allowed between conception and execution of the policy to present its purposes and processes adequately to either appointive staff or evacuees. Pre-execution planning for segregation was complete and practical: it set forth in a manual a uniform conception of objectives and procedures, outlining a flexible plan of organization of the work entailed at the projects and providing the means of uniformity in essential detail while allowing latitude in project organization to accommodate special circumstances existing at the individual centers. The procedures recognized the need of a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population.

At a conference held in Denver, on July 26 and 27, the Director and key members of the Washington staff met with Project Directors and their key staff members to clarify by discussion and unify interpretation of the segregation policy. Thoroughly conversant with the program, the Project Directors returned to their centers to meet with staff members and with representatives of the evacuee population to inform them fully of the work to be accomplished. Information was channeled steadily to the blocks through evacuee committees; project newspapers disseminated information and performed a valuable service in checking rumors.

Three categories of evacuees were designated for segregation; (1) all persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted their requests; (2) all persons who had answered the loyalty question on the registration form in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it, and who showed no disposition to change their answers or, having shown disposition to change their answers, failed to satisfy the Project Director that the change was made in good faith; (3) all persons who were found ineligible for leave clearance on the basis of individual hearings held because (a) they were the subject of adverse reports from a Federal intelligence agency, (b) they changed their answers from the negative or qualified to the affirmative on the loyalty question, (c) they retracted applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan, (d) they were not recommended for leave clearance by the Japanese-American Joint Board established in the Provost Marshal General's office, or (e) there were other factors bearing upon their potential danger to the national security which required investigation. In addition to these three groups was a fourth and considerable group composed of the families and dependent relatives of the actual segregants. The people of the first two groups with their dependents were

transferred in the mass movements of September and October. Those persons classified as Group III on the basis of subsequent hearings were scheduled for transfer as individuals or in small groups from time to time.

In August a special board of qualified staff members was set up at each center to hold individual hearings for those persons who had answered the loyalty question in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it. Only those persons who had filed applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted them were consigned to the segregation center at Tule Lake without individual hearing. Each person who had given a negative answer (or none at all) to the loyalty question was asked if he wished to change his answer. If he said he did not wish to change, the conversation was finished at that point. On the other hand, if he said that he wanted to change to an affirmative answer, he was questioned extensively as to his motives for changing, and at the close of the hearing the board made a recommendation to the Project Director for disposal of the case.

The Welfare Department conducted interviews with segregants concerning family matters and health problems. The Chief Medical Officer determined which transferees, by reason of age or infirmity, required pullman accommodations--the regulation accommodations being coach--and which cases, by reason of health conditions, justified deferment of transfer. Detailed plans for the packing and handling of checkable luggage and freight were worked out by the Evacuee Property Office and carried out with an exactness that permitted this phase of the operations to proceed without delay or confusion.

On August 19th a field station of WRA was set up at Fort Douglas, Utah, to act as liaison between the Ninth Service Command of the Army (which was handling the transportation) and WRA officials both in Washington and at the centers. Prior to the first entrainment, a two-day conference was held at Fort Douglas, during which all military personnel, train commanders, mess officers, medical officers and other staff members received detailed instruction regarding transportation operations. The efficiency and smoothness with which these operations were carried out were attributed to the adequacy of these instructions and to the excellent cooperation of military, WRA personnel and evacuees.

Between mid-September and mid-October, 33 train trips transported 14,825 persons, 6250 from Tule Lake to other centers and 8575 to Tule Lake from other centers. Each train trip of segregants was accompanied by a military detachment of 50 persons and a WRA staff member whose duty was to be alert to safety measures, take necessary health and sanitary precautions, answer questions, and delegate to evacuee train monitors and coach captains responsibilities of getting volunteers for work en route and for keeping the cars in a sanitary condition. Evacuee volunteers served the regular meals prepared by army cooks, operated the auxiliary diners which furnished meals for the ill and infirm in sleeping cars, and maintained a high standard of

sanitation and neatness in the coaches, kitchens, lavatories and diners; car mothers looked after children, and formula girls assisted the army nurses in the preparation of formulas and infant diets. Arrangements for meals en route were made by the Army, with WRA supplying perishables, fuel for the gasoline stoves, and ice for refrigeration. In the course of these movements, 129,846 meals were served. The Army showed every consideration in providing for the comfort and well-being of the aged, the sick, expectant mothers, and with small babies. Sickness en route was at a minimum. There were no deaths or births on any train. Six persons were removed from trains for hospitalization. No case of unrest, violence, disorderly conduct, or intentional resistance was observed by military personnel or WRA train rider on any trip. In view of wartime conditions, the service of the railroads was excellent in respect to both equipment and schedules. Although some trains were delayed in departure beyond scheduled time, only two arrived later than scheduled time.

At Tule Lake the mechanical details and coordination of necessary factors of transfer operations were worked out to a point where, at the end of the operation, departure trains were being loaded and evacuees counted in 30 minutes, while arrival trains accomplished the count and unloading in 21 minutes. Housing assignments and deliveries of baggage were made in record time.

With one exception the program was carried out according to plan; it was found that housing at Tule Lake could not accommodate the total number of segregants; consequently the transfer of approximately 1900 people from Manzanar was ordered postponed until additional housing units could be constructed. When it became apparent that the movement of the Manzanar people would be delayed until mid-winter, one trip was scheduled in early November to move 290 of the Manzanar segregants whose health required that they make the trip before the onslaught of severe winter weather.

Every step in the execution of this program demonstrated the value of adequate planning and effective dissemination of information, of having a well-informed community to work with and a well-informed staff to work with the community, and of utilizing evacuee leadership.

PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION AT TULE LAKE CENTER

Like the WRA program as a whole, segregation center administration had no precedent. In speeches, articles, reports and Congressional investigations, WRA has affirmed and reaffirmed that the management in the United States of America of a population in enforced evacuation, a population composed mostly of American citizens, poses a highly complex problem--and a problem with no proved answer. Attempts to simplify that problem have tended to boomerang. Segregation, which was regarded as a means of over-all simplification, offered two knotty problems in itself: first, the basis upon which to determine who should be segregated; second, how to administer the community of the segregated.

Type of Segregant By Nativity and Age By Nativity
 For 8561 Persons of Japanese Ancestry
 Moved from Nine Relocation Centers to Tule Lake ^{1/}
 September - October, 1943

Type of Segregant ^{2/} and Age	Number			Percent		
	: Total	: American : : Born	: Foreign : : Born	: Total	: American : : Born	: Foreign : : Born
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	100.0	100.0
Repatriate or Expatriate	4690	3050	1640	54.8	50.1	66.1
Registration	1790	1532	258	20.9	25.2	10.4
Other	2081	1499	582	24.3	24.7	23.5
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	71.0	29.0
Repatriate or Expatriate	4690	3050	1640	100.0	65.0	35.0
Registration	1790	1532	258	100.0	85.6	14.4
Other	2081	1499	582	100.0	72.0	28.0
Total	8561	6081	2480	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under 17	2290	2278	12	26.7	37.5	0.5
17 - 19	665	662	3	7.8	10.9	0.1
20 - 24	1538	1519	19	17.9	24.9	0.8
25 - 29	1051	1035	16	12.3	17.0	0.6
30 - 34	390	353	37	4.6	5.8	1.5
35 - 39	383	157	226	4.5	2.6	9.1
40 - 44	473	49	424	5.5	0.8	17.1
45.-49	439	12	427	5.1	0.2	17.2
50 - 54	370	11	359	4.3	0.2	14.5
55 - 59	373	5	368	4.4	0.1	14.9
60 - 64	330	0	330	3.9	0.0	13.3
65 - 69	184	0	184	2.1	0.0	7.4
70 - 74	49	0	49	0.6	0.0	2.0
75 & over	26	0	26	0.3	0.0	1.0

^{1/} Tule Lake is excluded; figures not available.

^{2/} For Jerome and Minidoka the route lists contained only one code for each family, opposite the name of the first person listed; if R was the code entered, all members of the family were tallied as repatriates; if X was the code entered, members of the family 17 years of age or older were tallied as registration Segregates, and members under 17 tallied as "Other."

Source: Route lists for train trips. These figures are preliminary and subject to revision; they were obtained by hand tallies of the Segregation route lists compiled at the Central Utah Statistical Laboratory.

SUMMARY ^{1/}
 Type of Segregant By Nativity, Sex, and Age
 For 8561 Persons of Japanese Ancestry
 Moved from Nine Relocation Centers to Tule Lake
 September - October, 1943

Age and Sex	Total				American Born				Foreign Born			
	Total	Repat	Expat	Other	Total	Expat	Regis	Other	Total	Repat	Regis	Other
Total	8561	4690	1790	2081	6081	3050	1532	1499	2480	1640	258	582
Under 17	2290	1205	171 ^{2/}	914	2278	1197	170	911	12	8	1	3
17 - 19	665	341	183	141	662	341	182	139	3	0	1	2
20 - 24	1538	732	540	266	1519	721	535	263	19	11	5	3
25 - 29	1051	507	407	137	1035	497	403	135	16	10	4	2
30 - 34	390	189	164	37	353	168	155	30	37	21	9	7
35 - 39	383	234	86	63	157	82	60	15	226	152	26	48
40 - 44	473	286	61	126	49	30	15	4	424	256	46	122
45 - 49	439	275	49	115	12	6	5	1	427	269	44	114
50 - 54	370	237	37	96	11	6	4	1	359	231	33	95
55 - 59	373	259	37	77	5	2	3	0	368	257	34	77
60 - 64	330	242	31	57	0	0	0	0	330	242	31	57
65 - 69	184	131	19	34	0	0	0	0	184	131	19	34
70 - 74	49	37	3	9	0	0	0	0	49	37	3	9
75 & Over	26	15	2	9	0	0	0	0	26	15	2	9
Male	5204	2933	1306	965	3632	1798	1137	697	1572	1135	169	268
Under 17	1147	610	76	461	1141	607	75	459	6	3	1	2
17 - 19	416	204	137	75	141	204	137	73	2	0	0	2
20 - 24	1016	478	426	112	1007	472	424	111	9	6	2	1
25 - 29	655	311	303	41	646	305	300	41	9	6	3	0
30 - 34	270	132	129	9	248	120	121	7	22	12	8	2
35 - 39	226	132	73	21	113	55	54	4	113	77	19	17
40 - 44	244	168	37	39	40	24	14	2	204	144	23	37
45 - 49	187	138	19	30	8	3	5	0	179	135	14	30
50 - 54	231	167	27	37	10	6	4	0	221	161	23	37
55 - 59	302	214	32	56	5	2	3	0	297	212	29	56
60 - 64	288	216	26	46	0	0	0	0	288	216	26	46
65 - 69	157	117	16	24	0	0	0	0	157	117	16	24
70 - 74	41	32	3	6	0	0	0	0	41	32	3	6
75 & Over	24	14	2	8	0	0	0	0	24	14	2	8

Age and Sex	Total				American Born				Foreign Born			
	:Total:	:Repat:	:Regis-:	:Other:	:Total:	:riate:	:tration:	:Other:	:Total:	:riate:	:tration:	:Other:
Female	3357	1757	484	1116	2449	1252	395	802	908	505	89	314
Under 17	1143	595	95	453	1137	590	95	452	6	5	0	1
17 - 19	249	137	46	66	248	137	45	66	1	0	1	0
20 - 24	522	254	114	154	512	249	111	152	10	5	3	2
25 - 29	39	196	104	96	389	192	103	94	7	4	1	2
30 - 34	120	57	35	28	105	48	34	23	15	9	1	5
35 - 39	157	102	13	42	44	27	6	11	113	75	7	31
40 - 44	229	118	24	87	9	6	1	2	220	112	23	85
45 - 49	252	137	30	85	4	3	0	1	248	134	30	84
50 - 54	139	70	10	59	1	0	0	1	138	70	10	58
55 - 59	71	45	5	21	0	0	0	0	71	45	6	21
60 - 64	42	26	5	11	0	0	0	0	42	26	5	11
65 - 69	27	14	3	10	0	0	0	0	27	14	3	10
70 - 74	8	5	0	3	0	0	0	0	8	5	0	3
75 & Over	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1

1/ For Jerome and Minidoka the route lists contained only one code for each family, opposite the name of the first person listed; if R was the code entered, all members of the family were tallied as repatriates; if X was the code entered all members of the family 17 years of age and older were tallied as registration segregees and members under 17 tallied as "Other"

2/ Gila River had 171 persons under 17 coded as registration segregees although one person 17 years or older could register.

Source: Route lists for train trips. These figures are preliminary and subject to revision; they were obtained by hand tallies of the segregation route lists compiled at the Central Utah Statistical Laboratory.

Already WRA was detaining, if only temporarily, tens of thousands of American citizens without guarantee that such detention was constitutionally valid. No habeas corpus case had yet reached the Supreme Court to test the validity of such detention. Segregation meant a further detention under greater restrictions, and again the problem was complicated by the presence of many American citizens among the segregants. Persons chosen for segregation were those who had indicated by work or action that their loyalties lie with Japan rather than the United States. Whether or not United States citizens may be detained on the basis of administrative investigation is a question that has not yet been answered. WRA's compromise with necessity has been to conduct painstaking hearings for every individual who for any reason failed to swear unqualified loyalty to the United States, or with respect to whom there is either evidence indicating potential danger to the national security, documenting each case, and arranging for a panel composed of persons detached from WRA and politics to serve as a board of appeal.

The administration of Tule Lake Center posed an even more baffling problem. If all the segregants were aliens and all proved guilty of subversive activity, they would not be at Tule Lake; they would be in an interment camp administered by the Department of Justice. Application for repatriation has been insufficient reason in itself, under the Department of Justice standards, for interment, and more than half the people at Tule Lake are in the category of repatriates or expatriates. If the population at Tule Lake Center were 100 per cent adult, whether alien or citizen, and all proved guilty of disloyalty, it would be defensible to pattern the administration of Tule Lake upon that of a genuine interment camp. However, by the most complete figures available, 71 per cent of the people at Tule Lake are American citizens, and 26.7 per cent of the total population are not only American citizens but also minor children, of whom many are Sansei, or third-generation Americans. Nominally these children are segregants, but it must be remembered that they live at Tule Lake only because their parents or guardians applied for repatriation or did not answer the loyalty question in the affirmative. Similarly it must be remembered that many adult residents of Tule Lake are there only because they are dependent upon an actual segregant who is head of a family unit.

The policy of keeping families together throughout evacuation was enunciated by Lieutenant General DeWitt before WRA came into the picture. (See page 77 of Final Report Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942, prepared under the direction of General DeWitt). This policy has been followed consistently by WRA. To have set it aside at the time of segregation would have been to depart from the humanitarian and democratic principles so clearly stipulated in this particular instance by General DeWitt and furthermore to add to WRA's problems the establishment and maintenance of a large orphanage to care for the thousands of children affected. As the children at Tule Lake reach the age of 17, they will register and be processed for leave clearance. Those who qualify for indefinite leave will be sent

to a regular center, from which point they will be free to resume normal American life as soon as suitable work can be found for them.

Thus WRA is confronted by the necessity of maintaining at Tule Lake a rule strict enough to cope with the positively disloyal and yet flexible enough to accommodate the many young Americans who are as yet innocent of blame and whom WRA wishes to keep that way. It has proved far from easy to conduct a vital Americanization program behind the single fence of barbed wire and under the eyes of a company of military guards in an ordinary center. It is infinitely more difficult to conduct one in a center enclosed by a double, man-proof fence, with a battalion of military guards patrolling it, and with a concentration of the heretofore scattered disloyal element within the center at Tule Lake.

WRA always has recognized the fact that administrative policy under which normal centers operate could not be utilized without alteration at the segregation center. Certain changes in policy were definitely set forth prior to the segregation movement; others were anticipated. First, no indefinite leave would be granted from Tule Lake Center. Second, since Tule Lake was set aside specifically for people who believe their future lies with Japan, attendance at the public schools maintained by WRA was made voluntary rather than compulsory, and Japanese parents were given the privilege of conducting Japanese language schools at their own expense. Third, internal security at the new center was recognized as another problem requiring deviation from existing policy. (External security has always been the concern of the Army, and it was a military decision that increased the military guard at Tule Lake to a battalion, erected a double, eight-foot, man-proof fence around the center, and installed turn-stiles to make it impossible for any unauthorized person to enter or leave the center). Internal security at Tule Lake and elsewhere is completely under WRA jurisdiction. At ordinary centers evacuee wardens supervised by not more than six Civil Service internal security officers perform the two-fold function of patrolling the residence area and handling minor infractions of WRA regulations on the one hand and protecting government property on the other. The Internal Security Staff is not, and never has been, responsible for the maintenance of order within the center in the event of any mass uprising. By an agreement of long standing between WRA and the War Department, WRA is privileged in the event of serious disorder to call upon the military troops stationed at the boundary of the center to come in and maintain order.

In view of the predominant character of the population at Tule Lake, it was recognized that the number of appointed personnel on the internal security force would need to be increased and that the function of protecting government property would devolve upon such appointed personnel. Immediately after the Denver conference of July 26 and 27, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was detailed to Tule Lake to be on hand throughout the mass movement so that he could observe the situation at first hand and make recommendations.

As a fourth deviation from over-all policy, it was generally

agreed that community government as it existed at the relocation centers would not be instituted at Tule Lake; in its place, as soon as the people had moved in and gotten settled, there would be a purely advisory council of evacuees. With the population in residence, the details of center management could be worked out on a reasonable and realistic basis. It was recognized that it was impractical to lay down any hard and fast policy for management of the segregation center before its members were actually in residence at Tule Lake. It was necessary to study the population and evaluate its temper before determining what kind of administration was required. Against the possibility that conditions might conceivably justify a rigid policy of management, was the probability that conditions would justify placing emphasis upon cooperation from the community in the problem of managing the center. If the effort to secure the cooperation of the community succeeded, it meant not only a more democratic type of administration but a smoother operation than could be hoped for under coercive tactics and also a material financial economy.

Before transfer operations began, a number of WRA staff members from the Washington office were sent out to Tule Lake to study the problem at the center and formulate recommendations. However, once the mass movement began, it was necessary to utilize all available staff, including the visitors from Washington, in the immediate and pressing matters of transfer, housing, and day-to-day maintenance operations in the disorganized center. During these weeks, there was little if any time for conscious and deliberate study of the community, but certain phenomena were noted, definite trends recognized. As of November 4th, one important recommendation had been carried almost to completion; had the construction work been completed by that date, it is not going too far to say that the incident which occurred that night could not have happened. This recommendation was for a new motor pool located in the administration area, adjacent to the military compound, and enclosed by a strong fence. Had this new motor pool been in use on November 4, the trucks which played a conspicuous part in the events of the evening could not have been obtained by the evacuees.

Toward the end of October, with the mass movement virtually completed and people getting settled in their new quarters, ideas on policy were beginning to emerge, recommendations were taking shape, and the visit of the National Director scheduled for the first of November was anticipated as an opportunity to work out with him a definite policy for the administration of the center.

BACKGROUND OF THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Struggle for Power

During the month of October it became apparent that an undercover movement to get control of the center was in progress. However, it was not until October 26 that the leaders openly declared themselves. The mass demonstration of November 1 was recognized at once as the culmination of this struggle for power; subsequent investigation produced infor-

mation and evidence which proved beyond a doubt that this was so.

The leaders were not old residents of Tule Lake, but men who had gained some prominence as minority leaders in the centers from which they were transferred to Tule Lake; chiefly they were from Jerome, Poston, and Heart Mountain. They were men who in pre-evacuation days had failed to achieve leadership in their communities, some of them having been repudiated as fanatics and cranks. Under the tensions and stresses of the evacuation, they had managed to win minority leaderships within the relocation centers, and there they had gained expert knowledge of center politics and evacuee psychology. The segregation center appealed to these men as a place where the minority groups of the ordinary center would doubtless constitute a majority and where their own desire for power and leadership could be more fully gratified. From the centers of their previous residence has come evidence that well before the transfer certain of these men developed detailed plans for seizing control at Tule Lake.

They were skilful in making capital of the discomforts and dissatisfactions common to the disorganized period when people were moving in and out of Tule Lake and every-day operations were maintained with difficulty and considerable irregularity. They were quick to recruit the rowdy element, many of whom were Hawaiian kibeis but some of whom were merely ordinary young American toughs who had been out of the United States Mainland, and use this group to intimidate and control the hesitant or antagonistic. They made appeals shrewdly calculated to win a following: one made on the basis of specific improvements in living conditions was far-reaching and as effective with the soberer element as with the hotheads. Appeals made on the basis of moral justice were potent with many: the protest against discriminatory aspects of evacuation and of segregation itself, and the stressing of the need for solidarity and loyalty to the group. They sponsored private language schools, distinct from the recognized Japanese language schools set up by an evacuee board of education. The purpose of the private schools was to indoctrinate the young with the most flamboyant Japanese militaristic propaganda, and pressure was brought upon Nisei who knew little if any Japanese to attend; the pressure was resented by the many young people who had gone to Tule Lake only for family reasons and felt that their future lay in America. The Americanized young especially resented what they characterized as "Gestapo" methods and referred to the agents of intimidation as "storm troops." Many older people were indignant at being forced into line by arrogant young strangers who behaved like gangsters. However, until a crisis brought leaders and strongarm squads into the open and resulted in their downfall, their intimidation of the opposition was effective.

At first the evidence of the movement toward political organization of the center was of an inconclusive nature. In the second week of October there was a minor labor dispute arising from the crew assigned to handling coal. Three men who were not members of the crew and who were recent arrivals from Topaz tried to inject themselves into the arbitration, insisting that they "represented the community." However,

their claims and their suggestions were ignored by the coal crew, and the dispute was settled without the would-be leaders having been allowed a part in proceedings.

On October 15 there occurred an accident which provided the aspiring politicians with a better opportunity to bring the community together and unify sentiment. An evacuee driver of a truck carrying workers to the farm attempted to overtake another truck and ran off the road, overturning his own truck and injuring a number of his passengers. One of the injured men, previously a resident of Topaz, died of his injuries a day or two later. After the accident no farm workers reported for duty. The evacuee leaders campaigned for a public funeral. Understanding that the widow preferred a private funeral, the administration discouraged (although it did not prohibit) a public ceremony. Facilities for making a large-scale public ceremony effective were denied by the administration, but finally, on October 23, the funeral was held in the largest firebreak, where a makeshift stage had been thrown together. There was an attendance of about 2000, and strong-arm squads patrolled the edges of the crowd, showing a surly temper toward the few members of the appointed staff who appeared on the scene.

In the meantime the administration's most pressing problem was to get the crops harvested before frost could spoil them. The Project Director issued a public request shortly after the accident, calling for representatives of the farm workers to discuss the matter and setting October 21 as the deadline for arbitration. No committee appeared, but it was informally suggested to the administration that the people were not interested in harvesting the crops. The administration promptly terminated the Tule Lake farm workers and recruited evacuee volunteers from the regular centers to save the crops. The recruitment was so successful that by October 26, the day set for a meeting with an evacuee committee which had belatedly appeared and asked for a meeting with the administration to discuss the farm situation, many recruits from other centers had all ready been recruited. The committee had lost its chance to effect a settlement of the current farm trouble, but the meeting was scheduled to discuss the issue in terms of future policy.

The center politicians had made full use of the interval between the death of the farm laborer and the day of the conference to organize the community. They achieved their status as negotiating committee by the force of their own determination rather than by orthodox community election. The mass of the residents remained unaware that a committee was being formed until after it materialized.

At the meeting with the Project Director on October 26, the committeemen were vague in their explanation of how their committee had come into existence. The Project Director refused to recognize them as representatives of the whole community, but stated his willingness to entertain suggestions from them and hear what they had to say. They presented five points for discussion: (1) the legal status of the segregants and a recommendation for a re-segregation at Tule Lake of those who really wished to return to Japan from those who did

not; (2) settlement of the farm situation on a basis of confining production exclusively to the needs of Tule Lake; (3) the establishment of an evacuee governing body, which they felt should be worked out among the evacuees themselves; (4) criticism of the food, with implications of mishandling in its distribution; (5) various physical improvements to be made within the center.

The committee was informed that segregant status was not a matter that the project administration could decide. It was agreed that farm production should henceforward be limited to the needs of Tule Lake Center. The administration suggested that the committee or any other group had the privilege of working out plans for a governing body and also for physical improvement of the center and submitting these plans to the administration for consideration. The committee was invited to conduct an investigation of the food situation and make a report.

In view of the attitude of this committee, the Project Director did not announce the fact that the harvest was being completed by volunteers from the relocation centers. That very night appointive staff members transferred 32,000 pounds of staple foods from the center warehouses to the farm camp for the maintenance of the volunteer harvesters. The next day evacuee warehouse workers observed that this food was missing. In San Francisco, at about the same time, the Field Assistant Director of WRA announced to the press that the Tule Lake crops were being harvested by loyal evacuees from other centers. Tule Lake politicians were not slow to connect the removal of food from the warehouses with the presence of outside workers at the farm. On October 30, an evacuee infant, playing in his mother's apartment and presence, fell into a bucket of scalding water and died after treatment in the hospital. A false report rapidly circulated among the residents of the center that the negligence of a Caucasian doctor was responsible for the child's death.

THE DEMONSTRATION OF NOVEMBER 1

At about ten o'clock in the morning of November 1 the National Director of WRA arrived at Tule Lake on a routine visit. He was accompanied by the Field Assistant Director from the San Francisco Office. No sooner had he arrived than members of the negotiating committee appeared to request a conference with him. They were received by one of the assistant project directors, who, after consulting with the National Director, scheduled a conference for 1:30 p.m. the following day. In a very short time the delegation returned to ask that the conference be held that afternoon instead of the next day; their request was denied.

At noon unauthorized announcements were made by satellites of the evacuee politicians in evacuee mess halls, urging all people to go to the administration building immediately after lunch. Some announcers said that the Director was going to make a speech to the community, others that the people should go to "back up the committee"

which was presenting demands for the betterment of living conditions. Young men posted at each block directed the people coming out of the mess halls to go to the administration building.

During the noon hour work was brought to the National Director and the Project Director that a crowd was gathering around the administration building. They and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco got in a car and made a reconnaissance of the colony area, with a view to determining whether the situation warranted calling in the military. They saw people walking from every block toward the administration area. Old and young, women with babies in arms or in baby carriages and children of all sizes were moving in a steady stream toward the administration building. The presence of these women and small children and the aged in the crowd convinced the Directors that violence was not part of the plan. The three men went to the Project Director's office in the administration building to await developments.

By one-thirty about 5000 evacuees had congregated about the administration building. Young men at the edges of the crowd discouraged anyone from leaving. For more than three hours the crowd stood, silent or talking quietly, only children and half-grown boys displaying restlessness. Some of the latter clambered over parked cars and did some minor damage: they put dirt in a couple of gas tanks, bent a few radio aeri-als, and removed a few windshield wipers and radiator caps. Other than these instances, there was no destruction of property by any of the crowd gathered around the administration building. Groups of evacuee men requested appointed personnel throughout the administration area to go to the main administration building. With the exception of a few staff members who combined diplomacy with reasonable excuses for leaving, those who tried to leave the administration building were prevented from doing so. The restraint was courteously imposed except in a few instances where Caucasian men resisted instructions; these were pushed inside the building.

The organizers of the demonstration wanted to present grievances and requests to the National Director; furthermore, they wanted the bulk of the administrative staff accounted for during the conference with the Director, and they wanted the mass of the evacuee population assembled as evidence that the community was solidly behind the committee. As a result of their maneuvers, they succeeded in getting about two-thirds of the administrative staff inside the administration building during the demonstration and about one-third of the evacuee population outside the building.

A project official kept in close touch by telephone with the commanding officer of the Military Police, who stood by, ready to rush in soldiers at a moment's notice. Early in the afternoon the tanks in the military area were warmed up to be in readiness for emergency. However, the announcers in the mess halls had instructed the people to take no weapons or anything that might be regarded as such and to do nothing that might bring the Army into the picture. The most conclusive evidence that the demonstration was to be a peace-

ful one lay in the inclusion of elderly people, women, and small children in the crowd.

As soon as the crowd had assembled the negotiating committee of 17 men appeared (14 real members and three so-called "strong arm" representatives) and requested an audience with the Director. They were received in the Project Director's office by WRA officials for a meeting. Simultaneously an evacuee public address system was set up at the front of the building, and throughout the afternoon the crowd was instructed intermittently over the loud-speaker to be patient, as the committee was negotiating, and the Director of WRA would speak to them soon.

In the Project Director's office, the conference proceeded, with certain interruptions, which will be accounted for further on, for three hours. The chairman, formerly of Jerome, was spokesman for the committee. He presented the points brought up at the October 26 meeting, now enlarged and supplemented by further points. The committee attempted to get confirmation of its suspicions concerning the removal of staple foods from the warehouses, but was informed that the food was WRA property and need not be accounted for to the evacuees. An attempt was made to fix responsibility for the death of the farm worker upon the administration. The committee protested the termination of the Tule Lake farm workers, who had stopped work and failed to make use of the opportunity given them to negotiate with the administration. Protests were made in regard to food, sanitary facilities, center dust, and hospital administration. Criticism focused upon various project officials, including the Chief Steward, an Assistant Project Director, the Chief of Agriculture, the Junior Property Supply Officer, the Chief Medical Officer and his entire staff of appointed personnel, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security, and the Project Director himself. The final demand of the committee was for the removal from Tule Lake of all the personnel listed above.

The Director stated clearly that while the administration welcomed suggestions from any and all groups, it did not operate on a basis of demands; that no terminations of personnel would be made except on a basis of thorough investigation; and that the administration was not prepared to consider the present committee as being a genuinely representative body. The chairman of the committee then asked the Director to speak to the crowd. The Director did so, repeating in general what he had said to the committee. The Project Director also made a brief speech, after which an evacuee interpreter reproduced both speeches in Japanese. A WRA staff member who speaks fluent Japanese was present and vouched for the accuracy of the interpreter's version of the speeches. A committee member who is a Buddhist priest made a short speech in Japanese at the conclusion of which the evacuee who has served as announcer throughout the afternoon stepped forward and told the crowd to bow. The majority of the people obeyed, facing the entrance of the administration building where the speakers were assembled. Immediately after bowing, the crowd dispersed.

THE HOSPITAL INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 1

No single episode of the critical period of November 1 to 4 at Tule Lake suffered more general misunderstanding and exaggeration than the Hospital incident of the afternoon of November 1. Certain inevitable omissions in the transcript of the meeting in the Project Director's office proved misleading; rumor tangled with fact, and opinion in some instances was accepted as factual evidence; there was considerable disparity between what actually happened and what some eye witnesses thought was happening. At the time when hearings were being conducted by various investigating committees, the parts had not yet been fitted into a whole, and some important connecting links were missing. Since that time, by means of a careful checking and rechecking of affidavits, statements, and testimony and a further questioning of reliable eye-witnesses, it has been possible to supply the connecting links and fit the details into proper sequence.

From the Administration Building Standpoint

On the afternoon of November 1, just as the conference in the Project Director's office was about to begin and while the Project Director's secretary was getting the names of the committeemen for the record, the Project Director received a telephone message from a doctor in the hospital reporting the one instance of violence which occurred within the center on that day. The Project Director asked the chairman of the committee what was going on at the hospital. The chairman answered: "I don't know." The Project Director informed the group that the Chief Medical Officer had been beaten and property was being destroyed. At this point every WRA staff member in the room was aware of the surprise and consternation which the news produced in the committeemen: it was obvious that this episode in the hospital was no part of the committee's plan. Recovering himself, the chairman of the committee said: "We will stop it," and sent some of his men to the hospital. Discussion stopped until the men returned and reported that the Chief Medical Officer was being cared for and that all was quiet in the hospital. The conference continued. A few minutes later, a second telephone call from the hospital reported that evacuees were milling about in the wards. Again the committee sent some men over, and again the conferees waited until the report came back that everything was quiet at the hospital. The conference continued for twenty minutes or more until another interruption occurred in the form of a message from the Medical Social Consultant who had just arrived in the outer office; the message indicated that the hospital situation required further attention. The Director asked the National Acting Chief of Internal Security to go to the hospital. The latter hurried to the hospital, being joined outside by an evacuee who elected to accompany him. In a few moments he returned to the meeting to report that everything was under control at the hospital.

As It Actually Occurred at the Hospital

About an hour before the crowd congregated around the administration building, an evacuee employee in the hospital took the Chief Medical Officer aside and informed him that there was going to be a

demonstration that afternoon but that no trouble was expected at the hospital. The Chief Medical Officer soon observed that groups of three to five evacuees who were not hospital employees kept coming in at intervals and circulating among the hospital employees presumably to get them to leave work and join in the demonstration. He told the intruders to leave, and they did so, but he noticed that fifteen or twenty were congregated on the steps outside. He commissioned another Caucasian doctor to guard the door and let no one in, and then went into his office, which is at the right of the entrance and entered by way of an outer office.

The young men on the steps pushed past the doctor at the door and began to crowd into the outer office used by the Chief Medical Officer's secretary. The secretary screamed; the Chief Medical Officer thrust his head out from his own office to see what was happening and had his glasses removed and laid on a shelf by one of the intruders. The Chief Medical Officer struck this man, whereupon the others moved up, pressing the doctor back into his office. Five of the group took an active part in the attack; the others stood on the sidelines. The assailants got the doctor down, kicked him twice, once in the side of the face and once in the body, and dragged him outside of the building. The doctor's nurse rushed out to the rescue, the leader of the gang gave the order to stop the beating, and the gang took itself off. Other hospital attendants came out, carried the doctor inside and administered treatment for his injuries, which were painful rather than serious. In the course of the attack, a railing outside the doctor's office was knocked over. There was no destruction of property.

The fight was over, the injured doctor was receiving medical attention, and the assailants had vanished when the doctor who had been commissioned to guard the front door put his call through to the Project Director's office. Naturally there was nervous tension in the hospital. Few of the hospital attendants had witnessed the violent incident, but word of such an event spreads rapidly. Despite the nervous strain, all but two or three persons remained at their posts of duty until their regular hour of release. The second telephone call to the Project Director was made by a nurse who looked down the long corridor connecting the row of wards and saw evacuees going in and out through a door midway along the corridor and opening toward the administration area. A steady stream of people entering the corridor and passing into a wing of the ward section of the building was, in view of the recent disturbance, alarming enough to make her call the Project Director. The second delegation sent by the evacuee committee investigated and reported correctly enough that there was no disorder in the hospital.

At about this time the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington office, a woman who speaks Japanese, had gone to the Out-Patient clinic, located at one side of the main entrance where the attack on the Chief Medical Officer ended. She went to the clinic to stand by and reassure nurses and attendants who might be overwrought by the recent occurrence. From her position she observed a young evacuee man

stationed in front of the hospital entrance, but fifty feet or more from the door. She addressed him in Japanese, asking him what he was doing, and he replied that he was guarding the hospital. She signified that she thought little of his method of guarding it, as his distance from the door left it virtually unprotected, and other doors leading into the hospital were not guarded at all. The young evacuee moved closer to the door and agreed to set guards at other entries. The Medical Social Consultant then proceeded toward the Administration building in company with the doctor who had telephoned the first message concerning the attack in the hospital. On the way she stopped to recover the keys of a car for the wife of the Chief Medical Officer from an evacuee who had entered the car and started away with it. Her companion was escorted to the administration building by some evacuees, but she paused to inform the wife of the Chief Medical Officer of the attack on her husband and advise her to go to the hospital. She arrived at the administration building shortly after the doctor, who had been informing the assistant project director of conditions in the hospital and asking that the Army be called in. The time of herearrival was approximately half an hour later than the time of the original message concerning the hospital. Talking with the Assistant Project Director in an office adjoining the conference room, she could look through the glass panels across the conferees and see evacuees from the general crowd going in and out of a door in the middle of the long hospital corridor, and was troubled by the situation, pointing it out to the Assistant Project Director, whereupon he delivered the message that interrupted the conference for the third time and resulted in an investigation by the National Acting Chief of Internal Security.

In subsequent hearings a good deal of attention was given to the contradiction in reports from the hospital. Unfortunately the witnesses called were not in possession of the simple and entirely natural explanation of the conflict between reports. There was no disorder in the hospital once the assailants of the Chief Medical Officer took themselves off, but there was a fairly steady stream of evacuees from the crowd passing in and out of one door which led across the long corridor to a wing of the ward section which was not used for patients but which contained class rooms and what is highly significant in this instance rest rooms. The residents, herded from lunch to the Administration area and not allowed to leave the area for more than three hours, were understandably making use of the rest rooms available within the area.

EFFECTS OF THE DEMONSTRATION

Once the demonstration was over, the reaction set in, and rumors throve among the appointed personnel, stimulated by exaggerated versions of what had happened appearing in the press. While a substantial number refused to become excited, continuing to regard the demonstration as a peaceful one, others gave way to nerves and began to think that they had seen indications of incendiary intentions and



an assortment of vicious weapons in the crowd. According to the testimony of the more stable personnel, some of whom were consciously looking for such evidence and were in a position to see for themselves, there was no sign of straw whether oil-soaked or pure of oil; substantial clubs diminished to the walking sticks habitually carried by many evacuees; villainous knives and swords degenerated into a few jack-knives in the hands of some half-grown boys who entertained themselves during the tedious period of waiting by playing mumbly-peg and whittling.

Fully aware that the atmosphere was tense, the administration representatives went directly from the mass meeting to confer with the commanding officer of the military police and make detailed arrangements for guaranteeing protection of life and property within the center in any emergency that might arise. The military stood in readiness to take immediate occupation of the center at need, and it was agreed that authority to summon military assistance should be given any Internal Security Officer, whereas previously only the Project Director--or the National Director himself--was authorized to call in the Army.

At the suggestion of the Chief Medical Officer, the Caucasian hospital staff was relieved from duty that night and sent home to get some rest. One nurse remained on duty until the evening rounds were made, and the Medical Social Consultant from the Washington Office remained on duty through the night. A few members of the appointed staff spent the night in Klamath Falls or Tulelake (the nearest town). The next day there was a series of staff meetings, culminating in one with the Director and Project Director, during which the demand for a fence between administration and evacuee communities--certain staff members had asked for such a fence during the segregation movement. The Project Director issued an order prohibiting public gatherings of evacuees in the administration, WRA residential, hospital and warehouse areas. Nightly patrols of these areas were maintained, beginning Monday, November 1, by four members of the Internal Security staff; two guards were assigned to a night watch at the high school area; the National Acting Chief of Internal Security was on general surveillance, and the Chief of Internal Security at Central Utah, temporarily detailed to Tule Lake, augmented the others. Patrol officers checked in hourly to the sergeant of the military guard and the officer of the day with the understanding that the military should investigate any check-in more than five minutes overdue. With these precautionary measures in operation, the National Director left the Tule Lake Center Tuesday evening, November 2, as per schedule.

In general the effect of the demonstration on the evacuees was to stimulate the radical element to more open exhibitions of pro-Japan sentiment, and to make the more thoughtful group uneasy. The leaders, having failed in their attempt to obtain a promise from the administration that no more food would be taken from the center to feed the harvest crew at the farm, were none the less determined to block further appropriation of center supplies if possible. Members of the goon squads were appeared to be keeping an eye on warehouses and the motor

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


TULE LAKE PLOT PLAN

— PERIOD - NOVEMBER 1 - 4, 1943 —
ADMINISTRATION, MILITARY, POLICE, HOSPITAL, SCHOOL
WAREHOUSE AND INDUSTRIAL AREAS.

LEGEND


- ① FRONT ENTRANCE AND STEPS OF HOSPITAL AND DR. PEDICORDS OFFICE.
- ② PROJECT DIRECTORS OFFICE.
- ③ ADMINISTRATION BUILDING.
- ④ TELEPHONE OFFICE



- ⑤ PROJECT DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
- ⑥ POST OFFICE.
- ⑦ ⑧ GARAGES
- ⑨ PACKING SHED
- ⑩ WAREHOUSE
- ⑪ FOOD WAREHOUSE
- ⑫ MOTOR POOL AREA.
- ⑬ LOCATION OF FIGHT INVOLVING 3 INTERNAL SECURITY MEN. BORDECK WAS HURT.
- ⑭ MILITARY AREA
- ⑮ ENTRANCE IN USE.

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W.H.: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1945



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pool.

On the morning of November 3, young evacuee men rounded up evacuee workers and herded them to an unauthorized ceremony commemorating the birthday of the late Emperor Meiji Setsu, grandfather of the reigning Emperor of Japan. The workers returned to their jobs as soon as the ceremony ended. That afternoon the Honorable F. de Amat, Consul of the Spanish Embassy, in the presence of a representative of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, met with a group of 21 evacuee representatives, whose chairman was the chairman of the Negotiating Committee and whose number included the leaders of the Monday demonstration. Aside from complaints about the food situation and the hospital, the major issue brought before the Spanish Consul was the clarification of the segregants' status. They petitioned the Consul to take up with the Japanese Government the possibility of bestowing Japanese citizenship upon Tule Lake nisei. On November 3, the National Director approved the construction of a fence between the Administration area and the colony.

On the night of November 3, the Acting Assistant Project Director, while riding around the project on an observation tour, saw groups of evacuees stationed in the vicinity of the warehouses and near the motor pool. The next day, details having been cleared with the U.S. Engineers at San Francisco, work began on the fence between administration and evacuee areas.

THE INCIDENT OF NOVEMBER 4

On the night of November 4, affairs at Tule Lake reached a climax which resulted in the occupation of the center by the Army. The farm situation, never entirely out of the picture after October 15, figured prominently on this night. A contingent of evacuee harvest volunteers from other centers was due to arrive by train at Klamath Falls late that night, and three cargo trucks were removed from the motor pool to meet the train and transport the workers to the harvest camp. The removal of these trucks produced the situation that gave rise to violence, for the "strong-arm" element assumed that the trucks were to be used for taking more food supplies from the center warehouses to the loyal evacuees at the farm.

The acts which culminated in military intervention were committed in high temper and on the spur of the moment by young men acting on their own initiative. There is no reason to believe that the political leaders were in any way involved in the action taken by the young men; in fact, the members of the negotiating committee were engaged throughout the evening in a meeting in the mess hall of Block 15 in the colony; they had called this meeting of block representatives themselves for the purpose of electing a central governing committee. What precipitated the call for the Army happened swiftly in the dark, and at some distance from the colony. Not more than a dozen WRA staff members and the 200 or so young men and

boys involved in the performance knew that anything extraordinary was happening until the racket of light tanks and scout cars and the glare of floodlights announced the entry of the troops.

At about seven-thirty that evening, the Project Director had a brief conference with the Commanding Officer of the Military Guard and then spent an hour driving around the center, on the lookout for any signs of irregularity. He reached the warehouse area at about eight-thirty, and at that time there were no evacuees in sight. He returned to the administration area, parking his car near the administration building, and sitting in his car in the dark for a time to watch this area for signs of irregular activity. All was quiet. At about 9:15 he was joined by the Assistant Project Director, who reported that the three cargo trucks had gotten off to meet the train. At 9:30 the Assistant Project Director remarked that it was time for him to leave to meet the escort coming in on the train and that he had to drive past his house to pick up his overcoat. The Project Director went to the telephone office in the Administration building where housing records were kept at night, to check on the quarters assigned for the use of the people coming in on the train, and within a few minutes returned to his house. In about five minutes the Assistant Project Director came to the door to report that in driving past the motor pool he saw that men were hurriedly gathering in that area. The two men went outside and could see possibly fifty evacuees armed with clubs milling about in the motor pool area. The Assistant Project Director walked around the end of the Project Director's house and startled a number of men out from the shadows. The Project Director went into his house and telephoned the Commanding Officer of the military troops to come in and take over.

The actual, violent engagements of that night happened suddenly and practically simultaneously in a very short interval, roughly between the time when the Project Director telephoned for the Army to come in and the time when the Army arrived on the scene, possibly ten minutes.

To get a picture of what happened and how it happened, it is necessary to go back to 8:15 that evening when a staff member went to the motor pool to requisition the three trucks. He was refused service by the evacuees in the motor pool office. He left the motor pool and encountered the National Acting Chief of Internal Security and several other staff members. Together they returned to the motor pool. The man who had originally requested the trucks got the keys from the office and serviced the trucks himself, the evacuees looking on. Two Caucasian drivers joined him and at about 9:10 the three drove the trucks out of the motor pool and set off for Klamath Falls. No sooner had the other staff members turned away from the motor pool than an evacuee jumped in a truck and headed at full speed for the evacuee colony, unquestionably to carry word that the three trucks had been taken. The National Acting Chief of Internal Security, anticipating a reaction to the removal of the cargo trucks, stopped at the room of the

Internal Security Chief from Central Utah and assigned him to watch the broad, open space between evacuee colony and administration area for signs of action. He detailed another officer to stay with the switch-board operator at the telephone office to forestall any attempt to cut communications, and then went to the military compound to report the situation to the sergeant of the military guard and make sure that everything was in readiness for quick action. He proceeded to a building in the compound where two men from the Federal Communications Commission, San Francisco, were conducting an investigation (instigated by the National Acting Chief of Internal Security) of an illegal radio transmitter within the evacuee colony.

When word reached the colony that the trucks were taken, about 150 to 200 of the strong-arm squad rallied with the intent of preventing the trucks (already well away from the center) from being loaded with food and taken from the center. The messenger's truck and others similarly appropriated were used to carry men to the motor pool and warehouses to mount guard; auxiliaries set off for these areas on foot. Trucks darted about the center in pursuit of the missing trucks. Failure to find any trace of the three trucks baffled and enraged the young men. A number of them were armed with base ball bats, pick handles or short lengths of two-by-four lumber. Internal Security men on patrol or guard duty began to be aware of groups congregating in the shadows of the warehouses and around the motor pool. The guard at the high school called his chief to report that gangs of men were robbing the lumber pile. Two officers in a patrol car had their way blocked by a black pick-up whose evacuee driver announced that no produce trucks were going to get out of the center that night but who shortly drove away leaving the way clear. The officers headed back to the administration area to report.

In the Military Compound, the National Acting Chief of Internal Security noted that the Japanese music being broadcast over the illegal transmitter stopped abruptly at 9:25. He suspected that the cutting off of the music might be a signal. Stopping only to tell the sergeant of the guard that a request for the Army to move in would probably be made very soon, he drove into the center, stopping about 75 yards from the gates when a car approached him, shining a spot light in his face. Thinking it an Army radio patrol car, he got out and walked over to it, discovering it to be the black pick-up previously mentioned. There were evacuee men riding in the rear. One of these and the driver jumped down and tried judo on the Chief. After a brief interchange, the Chief got back into his car and headed for the Project Director's house. He parked his car across the road from the house and walked toward the house, suddenly perceiving 30 or 40 men with clubs in the shadows. Six of these attacked him, but he used the judo hold on two of these, wrenching an arm of each from its socket. In the lull following this feat, he got back to his car, hearing the men yell in English: "Get Best! Take Best!" (Best is the Project Director). He started in his car for the military area and out-maneuvered the driver of the pick-up who tried to cut him off,

reaching the military area to call in the Army, a few minutes after the Project Director had made the same request by telephone.

In the meantime the two men on patrol and the officer assigned to the area between colony and administration area reached the telephone office in the administration building intending to report by telephone to the National Acting Chief of Internal Security. The switch was open and they overheard the Project Director's call to bring in the Army. They started on foot for the Project Director's house, hearing the cries of "Get Best! Take Best!" Just outside the Administration building, the driver of the same black pick-up attempted to run them down, but they jumped out of the way and the driver had to stop to avoid hitting some posts. He and his men jumped out and a fight began, in which one of the officers was injured. The other two, re-inforced by several staff members from the administration building, fought off the others and took three prisoners in the few moments that remained before the Army arrived and took over.

In all, 18 prisoners were taken on that night, all of whom needed first aid for injuries received during their capture. They were hospitalized under guard after questioning, and were later removed to a stockade. Possibly six shots were fired (none by evacuees as no firearms have been in their possession in centers at any time) but no one was found to have been wounded by gunfire. At the entry of the Army, the strong-arm squads took to their heels. Most staff members as well as the majority of the evacuee residents were unaware that trouble was brewing until the noise of Army light tanks and scout cars indicated that something extraordinary was going on.

By agreement between WRA and the Army, once the Army is called into a center, it takes control until military decision removes the troops. As of December 31, 1943, the Army remained in control of the center, with WRA personnel cooperating with the Army in the details of center operation.

AFTERMATH OF THE TULE LAKE INCIDENT

Following November 1, the more responsible newspapers and wire services made an effort to verify the stories about Tule Lake, while the less reputable ones were publicizing all the rumors that were flying thick and fast. Those in the former category called the WRA by telephone, asking specific questions. The Director, on the basis of his own knowledge, was able to deny roughly half of the rumors; to the remaining questions, he replied for the most part that a check was being made but that the facts had not yet been established. Rumors multiplied rapidly while facts were established slowly, and the less responsible newspapers were quick to utilize the rumors and publish eye witness accounts which day by day displayed higher color and diminishing accuracy. For a week or so in early November, Tule Lake displaced the battle fronts in top news interest with the West Coast press.

The first version of the November 1 demonstration to reach the public was provided by the first person to leave the center after

the crowd in the Administration area dispersed. This was a rancher of the vicinity, who had at one time been employed by WRA to manage the butcher shop at the center. He had called at the center that Monday afternoon just in time to be ushered into the administration building by evacuees and remained there with staff members for the remainder of the afternoon. His not altogether objective account of the episode was soon embellished with details furnished by some of the staff members and their families who were too overwrought to remain on the center and so spent the nights in the town of Tulelake or Klamath Falls. The impressions and opinions of highly excited and frightened persons were seized upon and published as fact.

Until the Army occupied the center on the night of November 4, press representatives had their customary privilege of visiting the center for purposes of first-hand coverage if they chose to do so. By November 4, a few reporters were in the vicinity of the center, and one, a United Press man from San Francisco, was actually quartered in the center as the guest of the Project Director. From his room, one barrack away from the Project Director's house, he was in position to see such part of the action as took place within his range of vision and was not obscured by darkness. He was not permitted to wander around the area at random and was taken from the center to the town of Tulelake shortly after the Army moved in. Immediately upon occupying the center, the Army clamped down censorship on news. Again the press had little but rumor to work with, and again rumors abounded.

The facts of the November 1 episode, which had been gradually emerging and which were being released, were mild and colorless in comparison with the tales which had already been published and accepted as truth by most papers. When actual violence, justifying Army occupation, occurred on the night of November 4, the newspapers that had previously made a conscientious effort to get at the facts were left with the impression that WRA had been withholding information and that the more sensational accounts of the situation at Tule Lake Center were true.

Immediate results of the press stories were numerous resolutions and recommendations emanating from communities, organizations, state and city officials, and in some instances private citizens. These documents stressed the need for (1) further investigation of WRA; (2) permanent control of Tule Lake Center by the Army; (3) placing all the relocation centers as well as Tule Lake under the Army; (4) simply the immediate dissolution of WRA. The resolutions were effective insofar as producing investigations was concerned.

For a month or more, investigations of all kinds were made, some at Tule Lake Center, others in Washington, D. C. The Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the California Legislature sent a senatorial committee headed by Senator Hugh P. Donnelly to Tule Lake Center to conduct hearings. While these were going on, the Spanish Consul arrived to investigate on behalf of the alien evacuees. Representative Clair Engle of the Second District in California was on the pre-

mises when the Donnelly committee arrived, engaged in conducting a one-man investigation on his own initiative. He and an investigator sent out by the Dies sub-committee sat in on the Donnelly committee hearings and also talked to certain staff members and residents of the surrounding area. A little later Senator Sheridan Downey made a quick trip to Tule Lake from Washington, D. C., also on his own initiative. The FBI representatives spent some time at the center making an investigation. In Washington, D. C., the Director of WRA appeared before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session, the West Coast Congressional Delegation, and the Dies Sub Committee. In the absence of the Director, the Acting Director appeared before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization. Just before Christmas when the Project Director of Tule Lake visited the Washington Office, the Dies Sub-Committee re-opened its hearings on Tule Lake for the purpose of questioning him.

With the exception of the FBI representatives, the investigators who went to Tule Lake were somewhat restricted in their activities by the refusal of the Army to allow them to subpoena evacuees. The Donnelly Committee, in session at Tule Lake on November 8 and 9, summoned a carefully selected group of witnesses, including three residents of the nearby town of Tulelake who had made occasional trips to the center, and certain former employees of WRA. The committee called on the Chief Medical Officer and questioned him, making a transcript of the interview, but not including it in the transcript of the hearings. The Project Director and the Field Assistant Director from San Francisco were the only key staff members questioned at the hearings, and they were not summoned; they volunteered testimony.

Considerable time and attention were given by this committee to episodes of Tule Lake's early days as a relocation center, long before there was any thought of its becoming a segregation center and involving persons long since removed from Tule Lake. Statements unsupported by evidence were accepted and utilized by the committee in its subsequent report of findings. On the basis of these biased findings the committee telegraphed the President, the Secretary of War and the Chairman of the California Congressional Delegation, urging the continuation of Army control at Tule Lake Center and the continued exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast area for the duration of the war.

The Dies Sub-Committee, with Representative John M. Costello of California as Chairman, conducted intermittent hearings in Washington from the end of November to the 20th of December. These hearings, nominally concerned with the Tule Lake situation, appeared actually to be more in the nature of a continuation of the over-all investigation (so called) of WRA made by this committee earlier in the year, and re-opened a number of issues which had supposedly been settled during the summer hearings on WRA, the majority report and minority views on which were published in September of 1943.

The earlier investigation (covered in WRA's semi-annual report

for the period ending 6/30/43) was made on a basis of complaints which charged WRA with general incompetence, laxity in discipline within the centers, "pampering" the evacuees, specifically by providing them with food of a higher quality than was available to the average citizen, with failure to segregate the disloyal from the loyal evacuees, and with inadequate screening of those evacuees allowed to resume normal life outside the centers. The recommendations which concluded the majority report were three in number:

"1. That the War Relocation Authority's belated announcement of its intention of segregating the disloyal from the loyal Japanese in the relocation centers be put into effect at the earliest possible moment.

"2. That a board composed of representatives of the War Relocation Authority and the various intelligence agencies of the Federal Government be constituted with full powers to investigate evacuees who apply for release from the centers and to pass finally upon their applications.

"3. That the War Relocation Authority inaugurate a thorough-going program of Americanization for those Japanese who remain in the centers."

The minority views of Rep. Herman P. Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, express his conviction that "the report of the majority is prejudiced, and that most of its statements are not proven." He comments: "After all the wind and the fury of a long report that creates the impression that War Relocation Authority is doing a very bad job, the comments of the majority members are climaxed by three feeble, meaningless recommendations." In summation, he has this to say:

"It is my conclusion that, considering the magnitude of its job, the difficulty of the legal issues involved, and the complexity and delicacy of the problem of resettling a large group of people in the midst of a war, the War Relocation Authority has acted, by and large, efficiently and capably, and has carried out the spirit and intent of the President's Executive order under which it was established. I think it is better to let the War Relocation Authority carry on unhampered by unfair criticism."

The second series of hearings conducted by the Dies sub-committee opened with the testimony of a physician who had been employed in the Tule Lake Hospital for ten days at the time of the Hospital incident and who turned in his resignation the following day. The second and third days were given to the testimony of Representative Engle of California, who recommended that the Army remain in control of Tule Lake Center. With the exception of a short period devoted to statements made by Representatives Lowell Stockman of Oregon and Norris Poulson of California, the fourth, fifth and six days were spent in questioning

the National Director of WRA. On the seventh day, the United States Attorney-General appeared before the committee, and after stating that the Department of Justice did not want jurisdiction over the evacuees, explained the nature of the problem WRA was created to cope with, specifically pointing out the doubtful constitutionality of detention of American citizens, a matter which, he stated, was soon coming before the Supreme Court of the United States. On the 20th of December the sub-committee went into a final session on the Tule Lake situation, in order to question the Project Director of Tule Lake Center. Majority report and minority views were expected to appear early in 1944.

PROGRESS OF RELOCATION

At the beginning of the fiscal year 1943, the flow of evacuees from the centers to the mainstream of American life was continuing to gather momentum, but while it was steadily draining the centers of the young and unattached, it was leaving almost intact the substantial group of older people with family responsibilities. It was recognized that a re-evaluation and re-definition of WRA's relocation objectives were in order; and in the first week of July all relocation officers were summoned in from the field to attend a conference in the National Office to present for discussion such problems as they faced in carrying out this basic and functional obligation of WRA to restore to private life and participation in the war effort these tens of thousands of qualified adult workers of Japanese ancestry together with their families. The conference accomplished a double purpose: it clarified and unified thinking on the entire subject of relocation, and it produced practical, definite recommendations, implementation of which had, by the end of the year, carried the relocation program to the point where it was reaching a more complete cross-section of the population in the centers.

The Over-all Problem

The major and most pressing problem confronting the WRA was the basic one of how to get the people out of the centers and back into normal life. Previously the slow-moving machinery for establishing leave clearance had retarded the advance of relocation, but as of July 1, 1943 the large majority of evacuees had been processed and were eligible for indefinite leave. Allowing for the segregation of those ineligible for leave clearance and their dependents, it was apparent that WRA would be left with approximately 85,000 people still in the centers. Thus far the relocation program had resulted in the re-settlement in private life and work of fewer than 10,000 people. The great majority of the relocated were in only twenties, either single persons or young married couples with family responsibilities. Although WRA had from the beginning planned the relocation of family groups, few families were

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Deterrents to Relocation

During the summer surveys were made at several centers to find possible precisely what was preventing families from relocating. Most complete of these surveys was made at Granada, where the questionnaire submitted produced 2587 replies. Evacuees were asked they wanted to leave the center to relocate and what their reasons were for hesitancy about resettlement. Only 5.9 per cent were interested in leaving at once or within a few months; 27.1 per cent said they were willing to leave after the end of the war; 33.2 per cent were undecided as to whether they should attempt relocation. The principal reason for hesitation was "uncertainty of public sentiment." Other prevailing reasons were lack of funds against an emergency, lack of information about conditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents, and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.

There were other, sometimes related, factors contributing to a lag in general relocation. An important if not serious factor was found to be the lack of a clearly defined policy concerning the readmission to the centers of persons who had relocated in the event that through no fault of their own they subsequently found themselves destitute. A very serious factor, and an outgrowth of the segregation plan, was the establishment of a "stop" list for all persons whose answers to the loyalty question during registration had been qualified or changed. The removal of a name from the stop list could be accomplished only on the basis of a painstaking hearing conducted for the purpose of testing the motive for the change and the sincerity of the evacuee. At the close of the year there were still some hundreds of cases on which a final decision as to eligibility for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the evacuees affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of their family groups, with the result that upon their own relocation was contingent the relocation of the entire family. A third factor discouraging relocation during this period was the difficulty of obtaining war plant clearance. A cumbersome and delaying procedure restricted employment in war plants to a very small number of evacuees, and for a time those citizens of Japanese ancestry already working in war plants were removed pending clarification of their status. However, in October it was arranged with the Office of the Provost Marshal General that evacuees employed in war plants prior to October 14 could continue with their employment pending investigation. New applicants were to be processed by the Provost Marshal General's Office before being put to work, but it was agreed th

no Japanese American would be excluded from this work for reasons of ancestry alone, and under the new agreement, aliens as well as citizens were declared eligible for war plant clearance.

A deterrent to relocation of substantial minority of the male evacuees was the action taken by the Navy and State Departments to restrict seamen or fishermen of Japanese ancestry from sailing out of east coast harbors. The new ruling, requiring a passport in advance of sailing, barred a number of evacuees from resuming previous occupations and also beached a number of Japanese Americans who had served in the Merchant Marine for many months, some of whom had been torpedoed in line of duty.

Finally, a block to one other avenue of relocation was provided on June 23 by the Civil Service Commission's requirement of a special investigation by the Commission before it would confirm the appointment of American citizens of Japanese Ancestry to positions in Federal agencies. This additional investigation was one more deterrent to relocation, but by January 177 evacuees out of 197 had been certified as eligible for Civil Service appointments.

Steps Toward the Solution of the Problem

Evacuee Participation

Throughout the half-year period increasing emphasis was placed on evacuee participation in relocation planning. As early as July, several of the centers had Relocation Committees composed of residents. These were strengthened, in some cases by being brought within the authority of the evacuee Community Council or by being given a definite relationship to appointed staff committees on relocation. By the end of the year, two centers had functioning combined evacuee-staff relocation committees, while at all other centers the evacuees had formed their own relocation planning commissions which maintained relations with responsible members of the appointed staff. Issei were well represented in these groups. The committees have taken their responsibilities seriously, assembling the questions which needed to be answered before the greater relocation movement could get under way, and formulating practical recommendations.

In view of the fact that about 43 per cent of the evacuated people were farmers, it was to be expected that they would want opportunities to continue the work they knew best. Having sustained heavy financial losses in the course of the evacuation, they were, for the most part, in need of financial assistance if they were to start farming in a new region; or, those who could scrape together enough money to make the start, needed assurance that they might get loans at need later on. Many felt that the relocation of small groups of families in sparsely settled agricultural areas would encourage families to leave the centers and change the hazards of unfamiliar soil and climate in new farming enterprises. In relation to group farming ventures, it was considered imperative that a responsible number of the group be allowed to go out and

investigate the land before they committed themselves to working it.

Group Relocation

A letter of November 9 addressed to all projects went out from the National Office, indicating the following moves to assist group relocation:

- (1) stimulation of Credit Unions to provide resettlement loans;
- (2) aid to evacuees in securing loans from Federal and private financing agencies;
- (3) exploration of group relocation opportunities by Relocation Officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities.
- (4) arrangements for evacuees representing bona-fide groups to make exploratory visits.

Welfare Counseling

The surveys which had been made during the summer showed that greater emphasis needed to be placed on individual and family counseling, if families were to be relocated. It was never uncommon for persons or families planning relocation to consult the Welfare Section about personal problems, but it was at this time realized that to accomplish the relocation of families who were hesitant about relocating, it would be necessary to initiate discussions with them and help them to plan on an individual basis. At the close of the period plans were under way to establish a special counseling unit within the Welfare Section at each center, with a view both to breaking down the rationalizations of reluctant families and to gathering information which would enable WRA to plan realistically the course of its future program.

Leave Assistance Grants

To stimulate family relocation, a change in the schedule of leave assistance grants was made in October. Previously the ceiling per family unit of \$100 had proved an obstacle to the relocation of larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant per individual from \$50 to \$25, but removed the per family ceiling and was thus advantageous to families of five or more persons.

Social Security Agreement

The agreement with the Social Security Board by which relocated evacuees are eligible for service and assistance under the program for aliens and other persons affected by restrictive governmental action became operative in this period in all states except Colorado. While the number of evacuee applicants for service was not large, the designated state agencies cooperating with the Social Security Board provided assistance in a number of cases of emergency, illness, and other contingencies.

National Housing Administration Agreement

During the summer, an agreement was concluded with the National Housing Administration to assist the Relocation Officers in one of their

the National Director of WRA. On the seventh day, the United States Attorney-General appeared before the committee, and after stating that the Department of Justice did not want jurisdiction over the evacuees, explained the nature of the problem WRA was created to cope with, specifically pointing out the doubtful constitutionality of detention of American citizens, a matter which, he stated, was soon coming before the Supreme Court of the United States. On the 20th of December the sub-committee went into a final session on the Tule Lake situation, in order to question the Project Director of Tule Lake Center. Majority report and minority views were expected to appear early in 1944.

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actually relocating. The need was to determine what was holding families back and then to remove such deterrents to relocation, whether the obstructions were actual and material or whether they existed only in the minds of the evacuees. It was realized that the overcoming of obstacles to relocation would involve a revitalized education program directed not only at the evacuees in the centers but also at the public, and it was agreed that greater evacuee participation in relocation planning was essential to the future success of the program.

Deterrents to Relocation

During the summer surveys were made at several centers to find out if possible precisely what was preventing families from relocating. The most complete of these surveys was made at Granada, where the questionnaire submitted produced 2587 replies. Evacuees were asked when they wanted to leave the center to relocate and what their reasons were for hesitancy about resettlement. Only 5.9 per cent were interested in leaving at once or within a few months; 27.1 per cent said they were willing to leave after the end of the war; 33.2 per cent were undecided as to whether they should attempt relocation. The principal reason for hesitation was "uncertainty of public sentiment." Other prevailing reasons were lack of funds against an emergency, lack of information about conditions outside the center, fear of being unable to support dependents, and fear of being unable to find proper living quarters.

There were other, sometimes related, factors contributing to a lag in general relocation. An important if not serious factor was found to be the lack of a clearly defined policy concerning the re-admission to the centers of persons who had relocated in the event that through no fault of their own they subsequently found themselves destitute. A very serious factor, and an outgrowth of the segregation plan, was the establishment of a "stop" list for all persons whose answers to the loyalty question during registration had been qualified or changed. The removal of a name from the stop list could be accomplished only on the basis of a painstaking hearing conducted for the purpose of testing the motive for the change and the sincerity of the evacuee. At the close of the year there were still some hundreds of cases on which a final decision as to eligibility for leave clearance had not been reached. Some of the evacuees affected were not only eager to relocate but also were heads of their family groups, with the result that upon their own relocation was contingent the relocation of the entire family. A third factor discouraging relocation during this period was the difficulty of obtaining war plant clearance. A cumbersome and delaying procedure restricted employment in war plants to a very small number of evacuees, and for a time those citizens of Japanese ancestry already working in war plants were removed pending clarification of their status. However, in October it was arranged with the Office of the Provost Marshal General that evacuees employed in war plants prior to October 14 could continue with their employment pending investigation. New applicants were to be processed by the Provost Marshal General's Office before being put to work, but it was agreed that

no Japanese American would be excluded from this work for reasons of ancestry alone, and under the new agreement, aliens as well as citizens were declared eligible for war plant clearance.

A deterrent to relocation of substantial minority of the male evacuees was the action taken by the Navy and State Departments to restrict seamen or fishermen of Japanese ancestry from sailing out of east coast harbors. The new ruling, requiring a passport in advance of sailing, barred a number of evacuees from resuming previous occupations and also beached a number of Japanese Americans who had served in the Merchant Marine for many months, some of whom had been torpedoed in line of duty.

Finally, a block to one other avenue of relocation was provided on June 23 by the Civil Service Commission's requirement of a special investigation by the Commission before it would confirm the appointment of American citizens of Japanese Ancestry to positions in Federal agencies. This additional investigation was one more deterrent to relocation, but by January 177 evacuees out of 197 had been certified as eligible for Civil Service appointments.

Steps Toward the Solution of the Problem

Evacuee Participation

Throughout the half-year period increasing emphasis was placed on evacuee participation in relocation planning. As early as July, several of the centers had Relocation Committees composed of residents. These were strengthened, in some cases by being brought within the authority of the evacuee Community Council or by being given a definite relationship to appointed staff committees on relocation. By the end of the year, two centers had functioning combined evacuee-staff relocation committees, while at all other centers the evacuees had formed their own relocation planning commissions which maintained relations with responsible members of the appointed staff. Issei were well represented in these groups. The committees have taken their responsibilities seriously, assembling the questions which needed to be answered before the greater relocation movement could get under way, and formulating practical recommendations.

In view of the fact that about 43 per cent of the evacuated people were farmers, it was to be expected that they would want opportunities to continue the work they knew best. Having sustained heavy financial losses in the course of the evacuation, they were, for the most part, in need of financial assistance if they were to start farming in a new region; or, those who could scrape together enough money to make the start, needed assurance that they might get loans at need later on. Many felt that the relocation of small groups of families in sparsely settled agricultural areas would encourage families to leave the centers and change the hazards of unfamiliar soil and climate in new farming enterprises. In relation to group farming ventures, it was considered imperative that a responsible number of the group be allowed to go out and

investigate the land before they committed themselves to working it.

Group Relocation

A letter of November 9 addressed to all projects went out from the National Office, indicating the following moves to assist group relocation:

- (1) stimulation of Credit Unions to provide resettlement loans;
- (2) aid to evacuees in securing loans from Federal and private financing agencies;
- (3) exploration of group relocation opportunities by Relocation Officers, with particular regard to agricultural possibilities.
- (4) arrangements for evacuees representing bona-fide groups to make exploratory visits.

Welfare Counseling

The surveys which had been made during the summer showed that greater emphasis needed to be placed on individual and family counseling, if families were to be relocated. It was never uncommon for persons or families planning relocation to consult the Welfare Section about personal problems, but it was at this time realized that to accomplish the relocation of families who were hesitant about relocating, it would be necessary to initiate discussions with them and help them to plan on an individual basis. At the close of the period plans were under way to establish a special counseling unit within the Welfare Section at each center, with a view both to breaking down the rationalizations of reluctant families and to gathering information which would enable WRA to plan realistically the course of its future program.

Leave Assistance Grants

To stimulate family relocation, a change in the schedule of leave assistance grants was made in October. Previously the ceiling per family unit of \$100 had proved an obstacle to the relocation of larger families. The new ruling reduced the grant per individual from \$50 to \$25, but removed the per family ceiling and was thus advantageous to families of five or more persons.

Social Security Agreement

The agreement with the Social Security Board by which relocated evacuees are eligible for service and assistance under the program for aliens and other persons affected by restrictive governmental action became operative in this period in all states except Colorado. While the number of evacuee applicants for service was not large, the designated state agencies cooperating with the Social Security Board provided assistance in a number of cases of emergency, illness, and other contingencies.

National Housing Administration Agreement

During the summer, an agreement was concluded with the National Housing Administration to assist the Relocation Officers in one of their

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Departures from Relocation Centers by Type of Departure
From July through December 1943

Month	Total	Short Term Leave		Type of Indefinite Leave					Transfers		Death	Other
		Seasonal Leave	General	Education	Volunteer Service	Selective	between Centers	Interned				
Total	22746	7603	6611	7106	219	180	15	532	37	281	162	
July	4068	1316	1160	1344	17	72	0	97	6	44	12	
August	4850	1372	1471	1684	29	46	11	86	7	54	90	
September	4626	1622	1106	1575	124	37	0	89	6	38	29	
October	4672	2435	990	1034	29	11	0	112	0	50	11	
November	2725	587	1081	862	13	10	3	99	18	42	10	
December	1805	271	803	607	7	4	1	49	0	53	10	

¹/Includes all departures irrespective of age

²/Work Leave (including dependents)

Source: Form WRA-176 summary.

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION, STATISTICAL SECTION
Washington, D. C.

Reported Admissions to Relocation Centers by Type of Admission
from July through December 1943

Month	Total	Births	Transfers between Centers	Temporary Detention	Internment Camps	Institutions	Type of Leave			
							Seasonal	Short Term	Indefinite	Other*
Total	20008	1107	1103	24	366	71	9806	6358	1004	169
July	2225	177	98	8	79	12	652	1054	120	25
August	2932	199	80	1	18	6	1032	1413	165	18
September	2502	189	118	3	11	22	958	1048	147	6
October	2993	186	94	9	55	10	1519	982	117	21
November	6119	199	418	1	101	10	4145	971	201	73
December	3237	157	295	2	102	11	1500	890	254	26

*Other -- original inductions to WRA, etc.
Source: WRA-176

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Absences on Leave from Relocation Centers By Type of Leave
From July 1, 1943 through January 1, 1944 ^{1/}_{2/}

Date	Total	Seasonal	Short Term Leave	Indefinite Leave			
				General ^{3/}	Education	Volunteer	Sel. Service
July 1	15885	6004	553	7926	800	601	1
August 1	17834	6525	579	9248	815	666	1
September 1	20193	6856	550	11241	837	698	11
October 1	22430	7426	536	12789	936	733	10
November 1	24095	7996	505	13891	958	734	11
December 1	21263	4283	559	14702	971	736	12
January 1	20188	2825	433	15228	953	736	13

^{1/}Number who have left centers who have not returned. Includes all persons ir-
respective of age

^{2/}At end of day

^{3/}Work leave (including dependents)

Source: WRA-176

3-1-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Net Absences* / on Short Term, Seasonal, and Indefinite Leave by Relocation Center
As of December 31, 1943

Center	Total	Short Term	Seasonal	Indefinite
TOTAL	20188	441	2831	16916
Central Utah	1819	48	199	1572
Colorado River	3163	44	412	2707
Gila River	2020	17	79	1924
Granada	1899	79	288	1532
Heart Mountain	1983	95	347	1541
Jerome	1419	32	36	1351
Manzanar	1235	18	143	1074
Minidoka	2853	56	522	2275
Rohwer	1414	36	58	1320
Tule Lake	2383	16	747	1620

* / Number who have left centers who have not returned

Source: WRA-176

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
 Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
 Washington, D. C.

Reported Monthly Population at Relocation Centers
 July 1, 1943 through January 1, 1944

Center	Total	1943					1944	
		July 1	August 1	September 1	October 1	November 1	December 1	January 1
Total	645509	96284	94461	92217	89648	88407	91546	92951
Central Utah	49724	7351	7092	6986	6936	6877	7178	7304
Colorado River	100761	15686	15353	14876	14540	13142	13432	13732
Gila River	77232	12357	12214	11902	11683	9619	9730	9727
Granada	44916	6210	6161	5846	6597	6427	6745	6930
Heart Mountain	64404	9309	9186	8936	8509	9131	9547	9786
Jerome	49577	7816	7679	7526	6736	6601	68601	6617
Manzanar	59756	8686	8738	8695	8506	8179	8470	8482
Mindoka	54670	7666	7183	7164	8175	6923	8595	8964
Rohwer	48377	7662	7600	7122	6709	6406	6421	6557
Tule Lake	95732	13483	13286	13096	11198	15047	14770	14852

Sources--WRA-176

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION, STATISTICAL SECTION
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing From War Relocation Centers
On Seasonal Leave By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region	:	:						
and	:	:						
State <u>1/</u>	:	:						
	:	:						
	:	:						
	:	:						
	:	:						
	:	:						
	:	:						
	:	:						
: Total <u>2/</u>	:	:	7/31	8/28	10/2 <u>3/</u>	10/30	11/27	1/13 <u>3/</u>

Total	7608	1263	1207	2145	2116	566	311
Pacific	611	107	28	65	187	172	52
Oregon	243	71	21	31	111	7	2
California <u>4/</u>	195	0	0	0	72	123	0
Washington	173	36	7	34	4	42	50
Mountain	6280	1048	1067	1916	1795	326	128
Idaho	3030	340	228	899	1326	162	75
Utah	1291	448	177	420	119	106	21
Colorado	1053	87	445	248	221	42	10
Wyoming	564	74	123	253	94	11	9
Montana	331	99	94	95	31	3	9
Nevada	6	0	0	0	1	1	4
Arizona	5	0	0	1	3	1	0
W.N. Central	332	74	84	31	73	59	11
Missouri	149	46	38	13	16	34	2
Kansas	88	27	32	0	6	23	0
Nebraska	53	0	1	16	28	0	8
South Dakota	32	0	9	0	23	0	0
Iowa	10	1	4	2	0	2	1
East N. Central	331	29	28	84	61	9	120
Illinois	202	18	23	23	12	9	117
Michigan	125	9	5	61	47	0	3
Ohio	4	2	0	0	2	0	0
West S. Central	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
Oklahoma	2	0	0	2	0	0	0
Unknown	52	5	0	47	0	0	0

1/ Those to which no one departed not included

2/ Includes Dependents

3/ Five Week Period

4/ Under permit issued by Western Defense Command

Source: Special Report Received From Centers

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State <u>1/</u>	By Four Weeks			Period Ending			
	Total <u>2/</u>	7/31	8/28	10/2 <u>3/</u>	10/30	11/27	1/1 <u>5/</u>
Total	7715	1414	1569	2086	1056	840	750
Pacific	317	75	55	69	47	29	42
Washington	195	39	31	42	39	19	25
Oregon	96	27	21	25	3	3	17
California	26	9	3	2	5	7	0
Mountain	2160	451	470	577	237	212	213
Utah	763	155	212	201	70	65	60
Colorado	758	170	117	195	98	95	83
Idaho	308	82	86	65	25	15	35
Montana	121	8	15	49	13	18	18
Wyoming	118	27	29	32	17	4	9
Nevada	55	55	9	22	9	6	4
New Mexico	22	3	1	9	2	3	4
Arizona	15	1	1	4	3	6	0
W.N. Central	923	129	162	288	163	97	84
Minnesota	318	38	62	123	45	31	19
Missouri	269	54	48	66	51	20	30
Iowa	163	19	30	43	29	21	21
Nebraska	121	8	15	33	36	18	11
Kansas	38	8	4	16	2	7	1
South Dakota	10	0	1	7	0	0	2
North Dakota	4	2	2	0	0	0	0
E.N. Central	3759	712	760	979	515	434	359
Illinois	1866	347	359	456	265	217	222
Ohio	970	148	199	284	141	132	66
Michigan	752	187	162	182	88	69	64
Wisconsin	115	19	23	41	21	9	2
Indiana	56	11	17	16	0	7	5
W.S. Central	85	18	17	22	12	7	9
Arkansas	33	5	10	8	4	5	1
Texas	31	8	3	10	7	2	1

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State ^{1/}		By Four Weeks Period Ending						
		Total ^{2/}	7/31	8/28	10/2 ^{3/}	10/30	11/27	1/1 ^{3/}
W.S. Central (Cont'd)								
Oklahoma	20	5	4	4	0	0	7	
Louisiana	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
South Atlantic								
District of Col.	59	2	20	12	9	8	8	
Maryland	35	1	13	8	7	2	4	
North Carolina	16	0	5	2	1	5	3	
Virginia	3	0	2	1	0	0	0	
Georgia	3	1	0	1	0	1	0	
	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	
Middle Atlantic								
New York	299	14	52	106	55	41	31	
Pennsylvania	211	12	38	69	39	30	23	
New Jersey	78	1	14	33	13	11	6	
	10	1	0	4	3	0	2	
New England								
Massachusetts	61	2	23	13	9	12	2	
Connecticut	45	1	20	7	6	9	2	
Maine	13	1	3	5	1	3	0	
New Hampshire	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
Vermont	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	
East S. Central								
Mississippi	51	11	9	20	9	0	2	
Tennessee	26	8	4	7	5	0	2	
Kentucky	17	2	1	11	3	0	0	
	8	1	4	2	1	0	0	
Unknown	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	

^{1/} Those to which no one departed not included

^{2/} Includes dependents

^{3/} Five weeks period

Source: Speical Report From Centers

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State 1/	By Four Weeks Period Ending						
	Total 2/	7/31	8/28	10/2 3/	10/30	11/27	1/1 5/
Total	7715	1414	1569	2086	1056	840	750
Pacific	317	75	55	69	47	29	42
Washington	195	39	31	42	39	19	25
Oregon	96	27	21	25	3	3	17
California	26	9	3	2	5	7	0
Mountain	2160	451	470	577	237	212	213
Utah	763	155	212	201	70	65	60
Colorado	758	170	117	195	98	95	83
Idaho	308	82	86	65	25	15	35
Montana	121	8	15	49	13	18	18
Wyoming	118	27	29	32	17	4	9
Nevada	55	55	9	22	9	6	4
New Mexico	22	3	1	9	2	3	4
Arizona	15	1	1	4	3	6	0
W.N. Central	923	129	162	288	163	97	84
Minnesota	318	38	62	123	45	31	19
Missouri	269	54	48	66	51	20	30
Iowa	163	19	30	43	29	21	21
Nebraska	121	8	15	33	36	18	11
Kansas	38	8	4	16	2	7	1
South Dakota	10	0	1	7	0	0	2
North Dakota	4	2	2	0	0	0	0
E.N. Central	3759	712	760	979	515	434	359
Illinois	1866	347	359	456	265	217	222
Ohio	970	148	199	284	141	132	66
Michigan	752	187	162	182	88	69	64
Wisconsin	115	19	23	41	21	9	2
Indiana	56	11	17	16	0	7	5
W.S. Central	85	18	17	22	12	7	9
Arkansas	33	5	10	8	4	5	1
Texas	31	8	3	10	7	2	1

Reported Number of Persons of Japanese Ancestry
Departing from War Relocation Centers on Indefinite Leave
By Region and State
July 4, 1943 - January 1, 1944

Region and State ^{1/}	By Four Weeks						
	Total ^{2/}	7/31	8/28	10/2 ^{3/}	10/30	11/27	1/1 ^{3/}
W.S. Central (Cont'd)							
Oklahoma	20	5	4	4	0	0	7
Louisiana	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
South Atlantic	59	2	20	12	9	8	8
District of Col.	35	1	13	8	7	2	4
Maryland	16	0	5	2	1	5	3
North Carolina	3	0	2	1	0	0	0
Virginia	3	1	0	1	0	1	0
Georgia	2	0	0	0	1	0	1
Middle Atlantic	299	14	52	106	55	41	31
New York	211	12	38	69	39	30	23
Pennsylvania	78	1	14	33	13	11	6
New Jersey	10	1	0	4	3	0	2
New England	61	2	23	13	9	12	2
Massachusetts	45	1	20	7	6	9	2
Connecticut	13	1	3	5	1	3	0
Maine	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
New Hampshire	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Vermont	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
East S. Central	51	11	9	20	9	0	2
Mississippi	26	8	4	7	5	0	2
Tennessee	17	2	1	11	3	0	0
Kentucky	8	1	4	2	1	0	0
Unknown	1	0	1	0	0	0	0

^{1/} Those to which no one departed not included

^{2/} Includes dependents

^{3/} Five weeks period

Source: Special Report From Centers

3-4-44

War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Persons Leaving All Centers
On General Indefinite Leave ^{1/}by Dependents
And Workers by Citizenship, Sex and Type of Work
Number and Percentage Distribution By Months
July - December 1943

Month	: Total :No.of:		Number of Workers :				Type Work :				Type Work Reported :			
	Lvs.	Dep.	Citizen		Alien		Not Reported		Hos.&		Total		Dom. Agri. Other	
	1/	2/	Total	M	F	M	F	Total	R.O. ^{3/}	Other	Total	Dom.	Agri.	Other
Total	7143	1817	5326	2452	2010	611	253	2552	1150	1402	2774	786	402	1586
July	1348	375	973	524	322	94	33	320	177	143	653	181	88	384
August	1719	477	1242	556	507	130	449	585	270	315	657	204	88	365
September	1569	434	1135	481	442	149	63	587	270	317	548	158	62	328
October	1050	269	781	324	310	113	34	361	175	186	420	118	72	230
November	854	194	660	290	254	254	39	391	147	244	269	77	47	145
December	603	68	535	277	175	48	35	308	111	197	227	48	45	134

(Percentage Distribution)

Total	100.0	25.4	100.0	46.0	37.7	11.5	4.8	47.9	21.6	26.3	52.1	14.8	7.5	29.8
July	100.0	27.8	100.0	53.8	33.1	9.7	3.4	32.9	18.2	14.7	67.1	18.6	9.0	39.5
August	100.0	27.7	100.0	44.8	40.8	10.5	3.9	47.1	21.7	25.4	52.9	16.4	7.1	29.4
September	100.0	27.7	100.0	42.4	38.9	19.1	5.6	51.7	23.8	27.9	48.3	13.9	5.5	28.9
October	100.0	25.6	100.0	41.4	39.7	14.5	4.4	46.2	22.4	23.8	53.8	15.1	9.2	29.5
November	100.0	22.7	100.0	43.9	38.5	11.7	5.9	59.2	22.3	36.9	40.8	11.7	7.1	22.0
December	100.0	11.3	100.0	51.8	32.7	9.0	6.5	57.6	20.7	36.9	42.4	9.0	8.4	25.0

- ^{1/} Does not include Indefinite Leave for Education or Entry into the Armed Forces.
^{2/} Persons under 16 years of age and all other dependents so specified.
^{3/} Persons leaving centers for Hostels and Relocation Offices without specific employment.

Source: WRA-178

3-4-44

WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY
Relocation Planning Division, Statistics Section
Washington, D. C.
Reported Number of Evacuees on Indefinite Leave Returning To Centers
By Single Months and Six Month Periods
From Inception of Centers to Date

Year & Month	Cent	Colo	Gila	Gran	HtMt*	Jero	Manz	Mini	Rohw	Tule	Total*
1942											
May	-	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
June	-	0	-	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	
July	-	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	0	
Aug.	-	0	0	-	0	-	0	0	-	0	
Sept.	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	
Oct.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Nov.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Dec.	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
6 mo. Total	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
1943											
Jan.	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	2	6
Feb.	2	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	0	1	10
Mar.	4	0	0	0	6	3	0	1	0	0	14
Apr.	1	0	1	32	6	0	0	6	3	0	49
May.	10	5	3	40	19	7	2	9	1	1	97
June	7	4	2	38	31	2	3	32	2	1	122
6 mo. Total	24	9	6	113	67	12	6	50	6	5	298
July	5	13	3	29	34	9	4	17	4	1	119
Aug.	11	24	2	16	63	19	3	10	12	1	161
Sept.	15	4	6	16	81	4	2	7	10	0	145
Oct.	15	6	5	13	38	20	5	3	12	0	117
Nov.	12	20	10	62	39	15	7	26	11	0	202
Dec.	16	4	7	41	66	37	10	21	25	0	227
6 mo. Total	74	71	33	177	321	104	31	84	74	2	971
1944											
Jan.	10	10	8	19	13	8	0	14	10	0	
Feb.											
Mar.											
Apr.											
May											
June											
6 mo. Total											

* Letter from Heart Mountain as of 2-19-44 indicates that 316 persons previously reported as indefinite leave admissions were visitors. These figures will be revised.

Source: WRA 177 received in Washington office.

War Relocation Authority
Relocation Planning Division, Statistical Section
Washington, D. C.

Reported Number of Evacuees Returning to Centers Under "Other"
Leave Category By Single Months and Six Month Periods
From Inception of Centers to Date

Year & Month	Cent.	Colo.	Gila.	Gran.	Ht.Mt.	Jero.	Manz.	Mini.	Rohw.	Tule.	Total
1942											
May	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
June	-	0	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	0	1
July	-	0	0	-	-	-	31	-	-	26	57
Aug.	-	0	6	-	0	-	13	0	-	34	53
Sept.	0	0	0	0	1	-	8	19	0	2	30
Oct.	2	0	9	0	7	0	1	2	0	2	23
Nov.	9	0	12	15	11	0	1	69	0	10	127
Dec.	9	4	19	0	36	0	2	91	0	7	167
6 Mo. Total	19	4	46	15	55	0	57	181	0	81	458
1943											
Jan.	1	0	1	0	2	3	0	22	0	6	35
Feb.	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	7	4	1	14
Mar.	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	3	1	7	15
Apr.	1	1	0	1	0	2	4	1	2	100	112
May	4	1	1	0	1	5	1	2	1	3	19
June	11	3	6	1	3	3	1	3	0	2	33
6 Mo. Total	17	7	8	2	6	14	9	38	8	119	228
July	3	1	4	7	1	3	0	4	0	2	25
Aug.	1	5	2	0	1	9	0	0	0	0	18
Sept.	0	0	0	1	0	2	2	1	0	0	6
Oct.	1	4	4	2	1	2	0	4	3	0	21
Nov.	4	0	2	53	0	5	3	4	2	0	73
Dec.	7	0	1	1	0	6	2	4	4	1	26
6 Mo. Total	16	10	13	64	3	27	7	17	9	3	169
1944											
Jan.	6	1	2	0	1	4	0	3	2	0	19
Feb.											
Mar.											
Apr.											
May											
June											
6 Mo. Total											

Source: WRA 176

3-4-44

most critical problems. By the terms of this agreement, the Relocation Supervisor of a specific area was to advise the NHA Regional Representative of current and anticipated in-migration trends. In return, the NHA would "assist WRA in determining the acceptability of evacuees for housing in the locality", and also "be prepared to suggest the names of localities where the housing shortage is less serious and where the opportunities for housing evacuees are most promising."

Relocation Campaigns at the Centers

Pre-Segregation Program at Tule Lake

Prior to the mass movement of non-segregants from Tule Lake to other centers and the conversion of Tule Lake to a segregation center, a determined effort was made to encourage as many as possible of the eligible evacuees to avoid the move to another center by means of immediate relocation. As a preliminary step toward the accomplishment of this program, Relocation Officers in the field were asked to consult with all former residents of Tule Lake relocated in their districts concerning the relocation of relatives and friends from that center. In August a small contingent of staff workers, known as a Relocation Team, was detailed from Washington to Tule Lake to conduct meetings and interviews with the non-segregant group. An important feature of this work at Tule Lake was the first showing of a cycle of films entitled "This is America" which was booked and distributed by the Relocation Guidance Committee in Washington. Members of several divisions had participated in the previewing of possible films, the selection being made with two objects in view; (1) to give evacuees a picture of city life, agriculture, education, employment, and other features of communities in the middle west and east; and (2) to give evacuees some insight into living conditions in wartime America. The film cycle consisted of 8 program units, each of about one hour's duration. The immediate result of the promotional work at Tule Lake was the relocation of several hundred people who would otherwise have moved to another center; in addition, it created a definite interest in relocation among others not yet prepared to take the step. In the larger sense, however, this program was most beneficial in pioneering techniques for aiding center personnel with material and staff in their work of stimulating interest in relocation.

Dissemination of Relocation Information at Other Centers

In recognition of the fact that the movement of evacuees out of the center is in a sense dependent upon a steady flow into the centers of accurate information concerning job opportunities and living conditions on the outside, much attention has been given to the adequate dissemination of such information. Two ways of bringing such facts before the residents were stressed during the July to December period. First, listings of job officers and written accounts of the experiences of relocated people were sent regularly to the centers. Personal experiences were sometimes in letter form and sometimes in informal reports;

some were published in periodicals issued by the Area offices. Second, individuals thoroughly conversant with conditions in specific localities were detailed to the centers in order to give interested evacuees personal contact with persons able to answer questions. Relocation Officers visited the centers to supply this information. In November, arrangements were made for an experimental Relocation Team consisting of two Relocation Supervisors, a member of the Washington Relocation staff, and a member of the Washington Reports Division to visit the Rohwer Relocation Center. The team members addressed large general meetings and smaller meetings of specific project groups, and in addition, conducted numerous interviews with individual evacuees who sought further information. The effect of this visit and the reception of Relocation Officers at the centers resulted in plans to continue the practice of sending Relocation Officers to visit the centers and to have the Relocation Team make a tour of all the other centers during the early part of 1944.

SIGNIFICANT FIELD DEVELOPMENTS IN RELOCATION

During the latter half of 1943 the general trend of relocation was toward the Middle West and the East. Although the number of field offices showed only a slight net increase during the period, there was a substantial shift in their location. As offices in the Intermountain Region closed or were consolidated, new offices appeared in Grand Rapids, Indianapolis and Buffalo; and on the Eastern seaboard, the New England states were detached from the New York area and designated as an independent area with headquarters in Boston. The following table shows the increase in relocation during this period in the principal areas:

Number of Evacuees on Indefinite Leave who have reported Arrival or Change of Address by Relocation Areas as of June 30 and January 1,

	<u>June 30, 1943</u>	<u>January 1, 1944</u>
Total Reporting	8431	16,464
Salt Lake City	2213	3,483
Denver	1795	2,741
Kansas City	461	997
Chicago	2613	5,392
Cleveland	960	2,694
Little Rock	160	244
New York	229	770
Boston	*	143

* 29 included in the New York Office report were relocated in the Boston area at this time.

Salt Lake City Area

In this area, WRA curtailed relocation to six counties in northern Utah. This action was in accord with the Authority's policy of discouraging heavy concentration of the evacuated population in any location.

This area had a small Japanese American population prior to Pearl Harbor and received a new contingent during the period of voluntary evacuation from the West Coast. Later, evacuees from the center who had entered the region as seasonal workers tended to change over to indefinite leave and settle permanently.

Evacuee farmers have relocated in fairly large numbers to eastern Oregon and Western Idaho, where they began farming on a share-cropping or lease-hold basis. Spokane, in eastern Washington, attracted a number of the evacuees, though until late in the year when certain military installations were closed, a critical housing situation discouraged many of the evacuees from attempting to re-establish their lives in that city. In Montana, a considerable number of seasonal workers were employed during this period on railroads. The year-end total showed 7669 seasonal workers in the area during the six-month period, and approximately 3500 evacuees in residence on indefinite leave.

Denver Area

Between 2500 and 3000 evacuees found seasonal work in this area during the summer and fall of 1943, most of whom returned to the centers at the expiration of their contracts. However, 324 seasonal workers converted their leave to indefinite, raising the total of evacuees resident within the area to 2806 on December 31. An increasing number of families moved out of the laborer group into the independent farmer class, by way of share-cropping agreements, lease or purchase of land. Despite their lack of experience in this section of the country, higher labor costs, and difficult marketing conditions, very few of the farm group have given up and returned to the center. Those who were obliged to return to the centers were caught in emergency situations for which public assistance would have been available in other states. Colorado was the only state in which the Social Security agreement was not operative during this period. There was indication at the year's end that the agreement would be signed early in the new year.

After July further relocation to six counties bordering on Denver was prohibited by WRA except in the case of members of a family already settled within the area. There was evidence that these localities were nearing the saturation point as far as evacuee settlers were concerned. Emphasis was placed on improving the public relations situation.

Kansas City Area

The number of evacuees in this area about doubled during the latter half of 1943, with the newcomers distributed impartially among the St. Louis, Omaha, Detroit, and Kansas City districts. On the whole, community sentiment and press relations have been unusually favorable in these communities. As the year advanced, an increasing number of professional, technical and skilled workers were finding positions in this area.

Chicago Area

This area, too, reflected a change in the types of employment offered to evacuees, with an increasing number of employers seeking evacuee help in the more skilled fields. During the six-month period the number of evacuees coming into the city of Chicago rose from 1,466 to 3,244, and it required a major effort on the part of the WRA office and cooperating agencies to locate sufficient housing to meet the influx. The number of available jobs continued to be in excess of willing takers, and qualified people in the centers were encouraged to relocate to Chicago without a specific job in mind. One group of 50 persons went to the city on that basis and the majority of them were satisfactorily placed. Because of the slowness of special war industry clearance, the Chicago Area Office, through negotiation with the Sixth Service Command, was able to clear individual plants or buildings in large defense operations otherwise restricted, for evacuee employment. Placements were made in the federal agencies including the Home Owners Loan Corporation, Weather Bureau, and Indian Service.

On the whole, metropolitan relocation in the area was more successful than agricultural. There are three probable reasons for this fact: (1) Midwestern farming is quite different from the West Coast farming to which the evacuee group was accustomed; (2) evacuees were urged to postpone buying or leasing land until after they had spent a year as farm laborers or share-croppers in order to familiarize themselves with farming techniques in this region; (3) young nisei interested in urban employment were more numerous than agricultural workers in this relocation group.

Cleveland Area

Approximately 2000 evacuees, including seasonal workers, entered this area during the latter half of 1943. In-migration started slowly, reached its peak in September and October, and then dropped off as cold weather came on and the majority of seasonal workers returned to the centers. Permanent job opportunities in non-essential lines expanded considerably during this period. In Cleveland, furniture and cabinet-making industries, sign-painting, and beauty shops were employing an increasing number of evacuees. Detroit reported a tendency toward semi-skilled and highly skilled positions as opposed to domestic and unskilled work. More and more applicants were seeking jobs with "learning" possibilities. Housing facilities continued to be the major problem for relocating evacuees in most of the cities of this area, though living quarters were more readily available in Buffalo and Cincinnati than in other cities. Public reactions toward the relocation program and the evacuees have been favorable.

New York Area

The Number of evacuees in New York City increased from 75 to 450 during the last six months of the year. Although war plant clearance here as elsewhere proved to be a long and discouraging process,

the relocating people were able to find good jobs, and those with special talents found a market for them. Evacuees have found no difficulty in securing employment as clerks, stenographers, seamstresses, dressmakers, beauticians, nursery workers and gardeners, domestics, laboratory technicians, hotel and restaurant workers, laundry workers, nurse's aides and unskilled hospital workers. Placement was more of a problem for business owners or managers, those experienced in the silk industry or foreign trade, and for such professionals as architects and engineers.

Community sentiment was very favorable throughout this period, and the local office of WRA enjoyed good relations with various A.F. of L. and C.I.O. Unions, public and private social agencies, and other cooperating groups. Although the bulk of the relocated people at first settled around Columbia University on the West side, later arrivals tended to scatter through other parts of the city. In any event, the few hundred evacuees made little impression in a city of New York's magnitude. On a smaller scale relocation in Philadelphia got underway during this period, with community sentiment favorable and a variety of jobs available to the evacuees.

Boston Area

The number of evacuees in the Boston area rose from 33 to 167 during this period, a third or more of the total number being students and many of the others young nisei who worked during the day and continued their studies at night. Although wage scales were on the whole lower than in other parts of the country, there was compensation for this situation in the lower cost of living and in the fact that employers, to a greater extent than was true in many areas, made it clear that the positions they offered were permanent and not merely for the duration. The greater number of opportunities were in the field of personal and domestic service.

Planning for Community Adjustment

Prior to this period, the main emphasis of the program in the field was upon creating favorable community sentiment and locating specific job offers. This work was done so effectively that job offers piled up more rapidly than they could be filled. Job descriptions in volume tended to bewilder the center applicants. Those who accepted employment on the basis of these job listings and without personal contact with employers often found themselves unsatisfactorily placed, and there was a tendency to change jobs as soon as a better opening offered itself to the relocated person. On August 5, Project Directors were sent a memorandum directing them to encourage relocation on the basis of a community invitation in localities where evacuee workers were wanted. Hostels operated by church groups in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati and Des Moines offered living accommodations at a reasonable figure to evacuees while they looked for employment and by the fact of their existence offered the evacuees

assurance that the community was prepared to receive them.

On November 27, a memorandum from Washington instructed Relocation Supervisors and Officers to curtail the job listings sent out to the centers, as the volume of these was more bewildering than enlightening. It was recognized that the presentation of informational material about general work opportunities, living costs and conditions, and the experiences of evacuees who had already made an adjustment to life and work in a given area was a more effective approach to the problem of relocating the right evacuee in the right location. The creation of a Reports position in each area Relocation Office and the collaboration of the Reports Division in Washington contributed to the success of this phase of the program.

From the beginning of the Relocation program, the Committee for Japanese American Resettlement and other church groups had been active in creating a local interest in the WRA program and in many communities provided the Relocation Officer with local sponsors to whom he could turn for advice and assistance. As the program broadened and more persons relocated, it became evident that a broader cross-section of community cooperation was essential, not only to assist WRA in matters of employment, housing and public relations, but also to provide in the community a solid foundation for the acceptance of evacuees on the same basis as other residents. There was need to implement at the local level national agreements worked out by WRA and other public or private agencies and to co-ordinate the efforts of other groups so that the resources they possessed might be available for the use of evacuees. At the close of the period, in recognition of this need for more far-reaching planning in community adjustment, persons on the staff of two area offices were specializing in the organization of community resources for housing, welfare, education, and health.

There are two main objectives in this painstaking work with local committees and agencies: (1) to ease the transition of the evacuee from the isolated and socially artificial centers to life in a normal community by meeting the resettler with an understanding of his total situation; (2) to encourage relocated evacuees in assisting their family members and friends to relocate. The youth and inexperience of these very young people who have gone out from the centers, generally speaking alone, to adjust to life and work in a completely strange environment, have pointed more and more to the need of having their families join them. During the fall months, there was evidence that young people in Chicago, New York, and certain other localities were beginning to bring their parents out of the centers. Where this has happened, the infusion of the older generation together with the original pre-war resident American Japanese population, was making for a more stable and better integrated social situation among the newcomers.

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION FOR RELOCATION

A significant development during the six-month period was the

growing conviction that the relocation program is a cooperative one to which all divisions of the Authority have a contribution to make. Originally the handling of the relocation program, both in the National Office and at the centers, was the function of the Employment Division. It was not long before the conflict between project employment and relocation was apparent. As relocation progressed, the dual obligation of this division to maintain center operations and at the same time to urge all the efficient workers to leave center employment for relocation kept the division in a state of perpetual dilemma. It was understood that project employment must be subordinated to relocation. The fact remained that the Employment Division was being called upon to build up a community with one hand and tear it down with the other. Just before the July to January period began, a Relocation Committee consisting of representatives of the Employment, Reports and Community Management Divisions was set up in the Washington office and at the centers. The work of these committees in some measure relieved the Employment Division, but there was increasing awareness that relocation interests could best be served by a special division created to devote all its energies to relocation. On the basis of discussions held in the Washington Office and of suggestions received from the field, the Relocation Division was organized in November of 1943. With two exceptions this new division was assigned all functions previously performed by the Employment Division: at the project level, project employment was made a function of Personnel Management, and in the National Office, Leave Clearance was made the responsibility of the Administrative Management Division. The new division also took over the functions of the Relocation Assistance Division except those involving evacuee property which were assigned to the Administrative Management Division.

By the close of the year, the principal policy points of the new division had been outlined, and its major Manual statement of policy aims was being prepared. The Relocation Division was reviewing with other divisions their responsibility for the success of the relocation program, and was taking steps to achieve a closer working relationship with other federal agencies and private organizations at the national level. For 1944, it contemplated an increased emphasis on in-service training and field and project visits. It was planning to re-evaluate seasonal leave procedures and provide further assurances where possible in the program of indefinite leave. It was staffing relocation divisions at the centers, expanding the field program to give added emphasis to adjustment of evacuees in communities of relocation, and was giving closer attention to the exploration of suitable opportunities for family and group relocation.

STUDENT RELOCATION

According to information compiled by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council, the total number of Japanese American students enrolled in colleges rose from 1555 on July 5 to 2263 on December 31, 1943. The Council estimated that during this period 636 evacuees left relocation centers to attend institutions of

higher learning. The group included recent graduates of the center high schools as well as students whose higher education had been interrupted by the evacuation. Included in the number were approximately 200 girls who began nurse's training, the majority of whom enlisted under the U.S. Cadet Nurse Corps program. Beginning in November, Relocation Officers supplemented the efforts of the Council by exploring opportunities in their districts for evacuees to study nursing in approved hospitals and nursing schools.

Until the middle of October the Army and Navy refused admission of students of Japanese ancestry to educational institutions carrying on classified activities for the armed services. However, on October 14, a directive issued by the War Department placed responsibility with the Provost Marshal General for security measures at educational institutions important to the war effort. The directive stated that before any person of Japanese ancestry would be allowed to attend or be employed by such an institution he should undergo an investigation similar to that required for work in war plants, and that he must secure approval from the Office of the Provost Marshal General in order to qualify. Those persons already employed or in attendance at these institutions were permitted to remain pending their investigation. While these additional investigations delay the date of admittance considerably, no student of Japanese ancestry will be barred for reasons of race alone.

Responsibility was placed upon each such institution for compliance with the terms of the directive. In order that an undue burden should not be placed on the educational institutions, arrangements were worked out to permit the assumption by the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council of considerable responsibility for securing acceptance of students and obtaining the forms necessary for Provost Marshal General's Office clearance. Although the Council, in its September meeting, expressed the feeling that it had fulfilled its purpose and therefore should terminate its activities, in the light of this added function and the fact that the rate of student relocation had not decreased by the close of the year, it seemed probable that the Council would continue in business throughout 1944.

LEAVE CLEARANCE

During the latter half of 1943 substantial progress was made toward completing action on leave clearance for citizen evacuees. From the standpoint of relocation, final action on the large majority of leave clearance cases has been of fundamental importance since, despite the ruling which permitted Project Directors to issue indefinite leave prior to the issuance of leave clearance in certain prescribed cases, many evacuees have been reluctant to leave the center until notice of leave clearance has been received.

Notice of leave clearance was issued on one of three types of forms, each with special conditions attached. Form WRA 258 was drawn up to authorize indefinite leave but does not permit direct relocation

to the Eastern Defense Command or the coastal area of the Southern states; nor does it authorize employment in war plants. This type of indefinite leave was issued to persons who had not been passed on by the Japanese American Joint Board. The second type, issued on Form WRA 258-A was intended for persons whose cases have been reviewed by the Joint Board and whom the Joint Board has recommended for indefinite leave. Such recommendation constitutes Eastern Defense Command clearance, but does not clear for employment in war industries. The statement to this effect appearing on each Joint Board "Summary and Report" form returned to WRA, and intended only to convey that no special investigation to determine the individual's eligibility for war plant employment had been made was unfortunately misinterpreted on many occasions by such agencies as the Civil Service Commission and the Coast Guard to mean that the individual had been investigated and found ineligible. The third type of leave clearance, issued on Form WRA 258-B was designed for persons specially considered and investigated by the Joint Board, with a favorable recommendation, for work in war plants. Such persons of course have the right to relocate anywhere outside of the prescribed West Coast military areas. Only 491 clearances of the last type were issued, and for practical reasons the procedure was abandoned before the end of the year, leaving War plant clearance to the Provost Marshal General's Office.

The table shown below indicates the number of leave clearance grants issued to all projects since Forms 258, 258-A and 258-B were initiated. The majority of such clearances were issued after July 1, 1943.

Notifications to Projects on Leave Clearance
as of December 31, 1943

<u>Project</u>	<u>WRA 258</u>	<u>WRA 258-A</u>	<u>WRA 258-B</u>
Central Utah	490	1,688	45
Colorado River	332	4,363	78
Gila River	272	2,767	53
Granada	291	1,833	76
Heart Mountain	373	2,610	37
Jerome	646	1,746	30
Manzanar	220	1,389	29
Minidoka	311	2,353	44
Rohwer	491	1,930	54
Tule Lake	1,469	2,385	45
TOTALS	<u>4,895</u>	<u>23,064</u>	<u>491</u>

The Japanese American Joint Board

The Japanese-American Joint Board, established by a War Department directive dated January 20, 1943, is composed of one representative each from WRA, Office of Naval Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the Provost Marshal General's Office. The Board was created specifically to assist in determining the loyalty of American citizens of Japanese

ancestry under the jurisdiction of WRA, to determine eligibility of applicants for war plant employment, and to assist in the selection of volunteers for the Army. Early in the year the Joint Board decided to consider the cases of all evacuee American citizens 17 years of age and over and to make recommendations to WRA on the granting of indefinite leave.

Recommendations of the Joint Board have not, according to the terms of the agreement, been binding on WRA. However, WRA has been guided by these recommendations to the extent of making further investigations in all cases where the Joint Board recommended denial of indefinite leave; and WRA agreed not to issue indefinite leave for direct relocation within the Eastern Defense Command to any individual whose case the Joint Board disapproved. Prior to December 14, 1943, WRA did not issue indefinite leave for direct entrance to the Eastern Defense Command for private employment unless notification of Joint Board clearance had been received. The length of time consumed by Joint Board clearance had in many instances cost eligible citizens desirable job offers in the eastern states. After the mass movement to Tule Lake of those evacuees whose loyalty does not lie with America, WRA withdrew from the agreement with the War Department by which all evacuee citizens would not be issued indefinite leave directly to eastern states until notice of Joint Board approval was received. Since December 14, citizens who have met all WRA loyalty tests have been allowed to relocate to the eastern states while Joint Board action is pending.

Joint Board Actions through December 31, 1943

Approved for EDC, but not investigated for War Plant Employment....	21,167
Approved for EDC and War Plant Employment.....	491
Approved for EDC but referred to WDC.....	2,485
Disapproved.....	11,728
Citizenship lost by marriage (no action).....	478
No action (mental cases, etc.).....	<u>11</u>
TOTAL	36,360
 Total number of cases referred by WRA.....	 37,425
Cases pending at Joint Board.....	1,065

* The cases represented by this total either have, or eventually will, appear in other totals of approvals or disapprovals. While these 2,485 individuals have EDC clearance, some will be disapproved upon receipt of the WDC check.

Project Investigations

As a result of Joint Board actions and adverse intelligence information on specific individuals it was necessary to refer 11,652 cases back to the projects for further investigation during the latter half of 1943. The purpose of such investigation has been to develop by an individ-

ual hearing at the center such factual information concerning the evacuee's attitude and loyalty as should resolve to a reasonable degree any questionable factors regarding the issuance of leave clearance or the denial of leave clearance. Leave clearance is never denied except on the basis of an individual hearing at the center, and it can be denied only by the Director of WRA. Persons denied leave clearance are transferred to Tule Lake. Those whose records appear satisfactory at the individual hearing become eligible for indefinite leave.

WRA Procedures for Determining Loyalty

The process of determining loyalties by administrative procedures has been unique in American history; no other agency of the United States Government has ever been confronted with a problem of this nature. In order to establish a procedure which would operate uniformly, it was necessary to promulgate appropriate administrative instructions to the relocation centers and field offices. The Project Directors established hearing boards, and in September, 1943, the Director set up the Review Committee in Washington with the Head of the Leave Section as Chairman. The function of this committee is to review objectively the project hearings and to make independent recommendations for or against leave clearance to the Director of WRA. As of December 31, there were 18 key staff members recruited from various divisions of the Authority who were serving in either full-time or part-time capacities.

Since July 1, 1943, preparation of transmittal letters and the assembling of material essential for the project hearings have engaged much of the time of the Leave Section. The Joint Board returned 11,652 cases upon which its action was unfavorable during the latter half of the year. The docket enclosed with letter of transmittal for each of these cases sent back to the projects for hearings consisted of the evacuee's original questionnaire, a summary of any pertinent intelligence information, copies of reference letters or any other material which had bearing on the case, and specific comments listing factors requiring special attention. Until a hearing is held and leave clearance has been approved by the National Director, the evacuee's name is placed on a stop-list and he may not be granted leave by the Project Director.

Security Records

In its many months of association with the evacuee population, WRA has accumulated a large amount of information about all evacuees 17 years of age or older. The Leave Section files contain information on such topics as education, previous employment records, relatives in Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language, investments in Japan, organizational and religious affiliations, and special aptitudes and hobbies. Reference letters are enlightening as to the evacuee's pre-evacuation history and his social and economic environment. Intelligence reports disclose contributions made to pro-Japanese organizations or affiliation with Japanese organizations considered inimical to the interests of the United States. Reports containing information on membership in Japanese

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WRA Procedures for Determining Loyalty

The process of determining loyalties by administrative procedures has been unique in American history; no other agency of the United States Government has ever been confronted with a problem of this nature. In order to establish a procedure which would operate uniformly, it was necessary to promulgate appropriate administrative instructions to the relocation centers and field offices. The Project Directors established hearing boards, and in September, 1943, the Director set up the Review Committee in Washington with the Head of the Leave Section as Chairman. The function of this committee is to review objectively the project hearings and to make independent recommendations for or against leave clearance to the Director of WRA. As of December 31, there were 18 key staff members recruited from various divisions of the Authority who were serving in either full-time or part-time capacities.

Since July 1, 1943, preparation of transmittal letters and the assembling of material essential for the project hearings have engaged much of the time of the Leave Section. The Joint Board returned 11,652 cases upon which its action was unfavorable during the latter half of the year. The docket enclosed with letter of transmittal for each of these cases sent back to the projects for hearings consisted of the evacuee's original questionnaire, a summary of any pertinent intelligence information, copies of reference letters or any other material which had bearing on the case, and specific comments listing factors requiring special attention. Until a hearing is held and leave clearance has been approved by the National Director, the evacuee's name is placed on a stop-list and he may not be granted leave by the Project Director.

Security Records

In its many months of association with the evacuee population, WRA has accumulated a large amount of information about all evacuees 17 years of age or older. The Leave Section files contain information on such topics as education, previous employment records, relatives in Japan, knowledge of the Japanese language, investments in Japan, organizational and religious affiliations, and special aptitudes and hobbies. Reference letters are enlightening as to the evacuee's pre-evacuation history and his social and economic environment. Intelligence reports disclose contributions made to pro-Japanese organizations or affiliation with Japanese organizations considered inimical to the interests of the United States. Reports containing information on membership in Japanese

organizations have posed a difficult problem. There have been many and varied types of Japanese and Japanese-American organizations on the West Coast, many of which were completely innocuous. No equitable determination could be made in a particular case without very careful consideration being given to both the composition and the objectives of the organizations. This has been done by the Leave Section in Washington before a case involving an intelligence report has been returned to the project for a further investigation. After the hearing at the center, the case is returned with a transcript or summary of the hearing together with the Project Director's recommendation and any additional information or exhibits bearing on the case. The docket is then prepared for the Review Committee by the Leave Section.

The files of the Leave Section contained at the close of 1943 82,000 individual evacuee files. These files are used continuously for administrative purposes.

Progress of Review Committee Action.

The table below shows the number of cases reviewed by the Review Committee through December 31, 1943. Cases returned to the project for further information, or because the project hearing was considered inadequate, will be reviewed again when the essential information is returned with the docket.


Project	Hearings Received	Leave Clearance Approved	Leave Clearance Denied	Returned to Project	Total Reviewed
Central Utah	646	304	2	21	327
Colorado River	927	225	18	12	255
Gila River	439	232	25	8	265
Granada	409	203	12	26	241
Heart Mountain	584	278	20	29	327
Jerome	702	407	47	15	469
Manzanar	1,062	534	85	26	645
Minidoka	474	222	12	16	250
Rohwer	690	231	67	21	319
Tule Lake*	4	4	--	--	4
TOTAL	5,937	2,640	288	174	3,102

* Leave clearances from Tule Lake approved prior to segregation movement.

Miscellaneous Statistics

As of December 31, 1943 the Washington Office had issued a total of 1138 student leaves involving attendance at 215 different schools; 109 leaves had been granted after July 1. The FBI at the close of the year had completed and returned a total of 77,037 record checks since it began checking records for WRA, while 2,101 cases were pending at FBI. During the half-year period 1,000 persons had converted seasonal to indefinite leave.

Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Relocation Center
 Organization Chart
 May 13, 1943



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
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
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Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Relocation Center
 Organization Chart
 May 13, 1943





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
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WRRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943


Office for Emergency Management
War Relocation Authority
Relocation Center
Organization Chart
October 20, 1943



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WRRA: Quarterly, semi-annual, annual reports, 1942-1943


Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Washington Office
 Organization Chart
 November 1, 1943



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Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Washington Office
 Organization Chart
 November 1, 1943



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Office for Emergency Management
 War Relocation Authority
 Washington Office
 Organization Chart
 August 13, 1943

WASHINGTON OFFICE

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
 Dillon S. Myer, Director
 Elmer M. Rowalt, Deputy Director
 Leland Barrows, Assistant Director

OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
 Philip M. Glick

REPORTS DIVISION
 John C. Baker

RELOCATION ASSISTANCE DIVISION
 Edwin G. Arnold

INFORMATION SECTION
 Morrill M. Tozier
*Chas. Cooper
 Fern Reeder
 Emily Brown
 Shirley Barclay
 Madeline Perry*

*Photo.
 Gretchen
 Tavel*

DOCUMENTATION AND RESEARCH SECTION
 Eleanor P. Moore (Acting)
*Miss Florence
 Rachel Meeker + Rini Jumbo
 Edith Humphreys + Marnie Crawford
 Rest on Mochida + Thomas Takashita*

FIELD CONTACT SECTION
 Frank C. Cross
*(Ben Brodinsky
 Russel Paulson)*

*Dist. + Secy
 Lorna Jansen
 Lillian
 Jimmy Steyer*

RELOCATION PLANNING DIVISION
 B. Ralph Stauber

EMPLOYMENT DIVISION
 Thomas W. Holland

STATISTICAL SECTION
 Fern E. French

LIAISON SECTION
 B. Ralph Stauber

RURAL EMPLOYMENT SECTION
 Donald R. Sabin

LEAVE SECTION
 Robert K. Thurber (Acting)

URBAN EMPLOYMENT SECTION
 Robert W. Frase

COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT DIVISION
 John H. Provine

OPERATIONS DIVISION
 Ervin J. Utz

EDUCATION SECTION
 Lester K. Ade

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION
 Willard E. Schmidt (Acting)

WELFARE SECTION
 Selene Gifford

HEALTH SECTION
 G. D. Carlyle Thompson

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE SECTION
 C. H. Powers

AGRICULTURE SECTION
 Ernest H. Reed

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES SECTION
 W. Gerald Richardson

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES SECTION
 Solon T. Kimball

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS SECTION
*Ed Spica
 John P. Embree*

INDUSTRY SECTION
 Ervin J. Utz

MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAINTENANCE SECTION
 Col. Lue E. Fiero

FIRE PROTECTION SECTION
 William E. Hoffman

ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT DIVISION
 Leland Barrows

PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SECTION
 Duncan Mills

FINANCE SECTION
 John W. Clear

PROJECT EMPLOYMENT SECTION
 Duncan Mills

SUPPLY SECTION
 John W. Clear (Acting)

OFFICE SERVICES SECTION
 Helen F. Collins

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PERSONNEL PROGRAM

In the latter half of the year the Personnel Management Section of WRA underwent organizational changes to allow for an expansion of its functions and particularly for its assumption of responsibility for evacuee employment within the centers.

Until shortly before the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, the Personnel Management Section of WRA held final responsibility for the classification of field positions. Executive Order 9330, dated April 16, 1943, and a Memorandum of Understanding between WRA and the United States Civil Service Commission, dated June 6, 1943, transferred this responsibility to the Field Section of the Civil Service Commission. The terms of the agreement prescribed that descriptions of field positions should be submitted by WRA to the Civil Service Commission for advisory allocation. By the first of July, the majority of these descriptions for Relocation Center positions had been submitted, and the remainder were submitted by the end of August. At the close of the semi-annual period the majority of these positions had not yet been allocated by the Civil Service Commission.

Effective July 1, all relocation centers were reorganized to conform to a standard organization established for all centers according to the chart of May 13, 1943. All relocation center employees were rejournalized into the new standard positions conforming to this chart. In November the chart was revised to include changes in organizational relationships which had developed since July.

On July 3, 1943, the Personnel Operations Unit was established in the Personnel Management Section. Working with other units of the section, this unit was responsible for initiating or reviewing and coordinating all personnel procedures for Washington and the field, for directing the application of these procedures and their installation in the field, and for interpreting laws, rules, regulations and personnel policies as stated in procedures issued. It was made responsible for the processing of personnel actions in Washington and for the maintenance of the system of appointing employees under delegated authority in the field. A further function of the new unit was the compilation and maintenance in the Washington Office of all personnel records together with the proper installation of necessary personnel records in the field.

Progress of the Personnel Management Program

Major Objectives

The objectives of the Personnel Management Program for the half-year period were clearly defined. The following accomplishments were anticipated: (1) establishment of a sound promotional policy; (2) establishment of an effective standard pattern of organization for the operation of all centers; (3) development of improved personnel proce-

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dures; (4) inauguration of an induction, orientation and in-service training program; (5) establishment of training programs in staff organization, utilization and management, work planning and supervision in relation to the operation of centers, relocation offices and the Washington Office; (6) selection and placement of personnel management staff at both national and center levels so that a more thorough job of recruitment, induction, promotion, employee relations and employee service could be done; (7) establishment of an employee relations and welfare program; (8) standardization of the above functions by release of handbook instructions, administrative notices, correspondence and field visits.

Accomplishment

The degree to which these aims and objectives were achieved during the half-year period was on the whole encouraging. A standardized promotional policy adopted September 17 and providing for the posting of all vacancies except those occurring in the very lowest and highest brackets and positions of a strictly temporary nature operated successfully. By the end of the year a standardized organization had been effected in all divisions at the centers except in the Operations Division. In Operations the frequency of deviations pointed to the need of a revision of the plan so that it would fit the needs of this division, and a survey was planned for the purpose of making such revision. Problems of maintaining employment standards, protection of the rights of workers, both evacuee and appointed, maintenance of a constant flow of trained workers to fill the vacancies that occurred through relocation, and encouragement of efficient work habits and worker morale were being worked out through experience gained by center and Washington staffs.

By the close of the period there was a noticeable improvement in understanding procedures, in processing of personnel actions and in accuracy of reports submitted by those centers visited. Additional help had been furnished to all centers in the form of a personnel handbook which brought up to date all personnel procedures previously issued and covered other topics, such as disciplinary and unsatisfactory service cases, and placement and termination interview procedures. Definite progress had been made, too, in the preparation of induction and orientation procedures.

In the Washington office, employee services were extended through increased financial assistance, and additional services on housing, transportation, education and recreation. Plans were shaping to give assistance to the centers in providing appointed personnel with adequate recreational facilities. While much had been done to improve such facilities for the evacuee residents, little had been done at most centers to provide for the leisure time of appointed staff members, most of whom have been unaccustomed as the evacuees to the bleakness and isolation of center life.

EVACUEE EMPLOYMENT AT THE CENTERS

December 31, 1943

Center	Population	Number Employed and paid by WRA	Per Cent of Total Population Employed
Central Utah	7,297	2,880	39 %
Colorado River	13,734	5,953	43 %
Gila River	9,724	4,068	42 %
Granada	6,930	2,779	40 %
Heart Mountain	9,781	3,343	34 %
Jerome	6,620	2,663	40 %
Manzanar	8,481	3,327	39 %
Minidoka	8,959	3,538	39 %
Rohwer	6,559	3,135	48 %
Tule Lake	14,852	3,047	21 %*
TOTALS	92,937	34,733	37.3 %

* Sub-normal employment due to November incident.

THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR

The Solicitor's Office during the latter half of 1943, an in previous periods, dealt in one way or another with practically all problems handled by the WRA as a Federal agency. This has been true of problems considered not only at the Washington office, but also at the Principal Attorney's office in San Francisco and at the ten Project Attorneys' offices. This department of WRA performs what is essentially a service function, operating not for the furtherance of any specialized program or separable group of objectives, but rather as an aid to all the divisions and sections of the Authority. In fulfilling its obligations, the Office of the Solicitor has kept abreast of, and had a part in, all new developments in policy, program and procedure within the agency, and it has aided in the solution of disputes or controversies with which the agency has been concerned.

Special Assignments

Administrative Manual

The reissuance of all Administrative Instructions and related material in the form of an Administrative Manual with Handbooks dealing with specialized topics was accomplished during this period. Each section and division of the Authority was called upon to analyze and rewrite such portions of the Administrative Instructions as related to its work, bringing them up to date in terms of both policy and procedure.

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Many portions of the Instructions had to be extensively rewritten, and in several instances this rewriting was done in the Solicitor's Office. In all cases, for the purposes of assuring uniformity and compliance with legal requirements, the Solicitor's Office reviewed the revised material before its authoritative issue.

Segregation

Early in the period, to facilitate the execution of the segregation program, an extensive "Manual of Evacuee Transfer Operations" was issued. This Manual included not only detailed provisions for the physical features of the transfer of segregants to Tule Lake, but also full descriptions of the tests to be employed in determining loyalty and the procedures to be used in interviewing evacuees and administratively determining which of them were to be segregated. Much of the original drafting of this Manual was done in the Solicitor's Office and the entire Manual was carefully reviewed by the legal staff. Throughout the entire segregation program the Solicitor's Office and its members at the center participated in the administrative processes whereby the persons to be segregated were designated.

Leave Clearance Hearings

In close relation to the segregation program, a complete review and overhauling of the leave clearance procedures were undertaken. After obtaining suggestions and valuable material from other interested private and Federal agencies, the Solicitor's Office made a complete analysis of the questioning employed in leave clearance hearings and prepared new instructions for members of the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards at the centers. This analysis was carried out partly in connection with the work of the Washington Office in reviewing leave clearance dockets sent in by the projects. The Solicitor's Office had reviewed a large number of these dockets and the Solicitor has passed on all cases involving denial of leave clearance. Ideas and information gained from this review of dockets have been organized and transmitted to the project directors for use by the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards at the projects.

Appeals Board for Segregants

The Solicitor's Office was instrumental in setting up an Appeals Board for handling cases in which persons denied leave clearance and transferred to the segregation center might feel that justice had miscarried. A panel of members for the Appeals Board, consisting of prominent citizens not otherwise connected with WRA, has been set up, and hearings before the Board will take place as soon as a sufficient number of appeals have been filed.

Repatriation

The Solicitor's Office assisted other Divisions of WRA and other agencies of the Federal Government in carrying out the exchange of nationals with Japan which took place through the sailing of the Gripsholm. During the half year numerous matters connected with repatriation and the

rights of repatriates, disposition of property, arrangements for shipment of property, liaison with the Alien Property Custodian, and arrangements for attending to the personal affairs of repatriates were handled by the staff of the Solicitor's Office.

Evacuee Property and Legal Problems

During the half-year, an analysis was made of the Authority's effectiveness in handling personal and real property owned by center residents and located within the evacuated areas on the West Coast. This study was to culminate in a joint meeting of the staffs of the Evacuee Property Office and the Solicitor's Office to be held early in the new year, at which meeting a thorough discussion of the work of both offices and of methods whereby the handling of evacuee property matters could be improved was to be undertaken. Also listed for discussion at this meeting were the efficiency of the attorney referral system and possibilities for its improvement. The system, initiated earlier, but carried into active operation during the latter half of 1943, made available to center residents who had need of such assistance the services of competent lawyers throughout the evacuated area and on the basis of a reasonable fee scale agreed to in advance.

Investigations of WRA

The Solicitor's Office was called upon frequently during this period to assist in the preparation of material for presentation by the Director of WRA to Congressional Committees and other official groups that were moved to investigate the past performance or future activities of the Authority.

Contacts with Other Federal Agencies.

Throughout the period the Solicitor's Office maintained its customary contacts with the major departments of the Federal Government, with emphasis upon the Justice, War, Navy, and Treasury Departments. Particularly close relations were maintained with the Alien Enemy Control Unit and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, the Provost Marshal General's Office in the War Department, the Foreign Funds Control Unit of the Treasury Department and other specialized sections and divisions whose work has particular bearing upon that of WRA.

Solicitor's Opinions

During the latter half of 1943, eight new additions were made to the series of formal opinions, dealing with matters of major legal significance in the War Relocation Authority:

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<u>Opinion No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>
71	Establishment of cemeteries at the relocation centers; interment laws of the States in which relocation centers are located.
72	Vital statistics for relocation centers.
73	Propriety of inserting in contracts for the rental of equipment a provision making the Government responsible for loss or damage.
74	Bonding WRA employees who handle property belonging to evacuees.
75	Availability of certain funds transferred to the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the Interior, for expenditure during the current fiscal year.
76	Title and possessory instruments on which are based the War Relocation Authority's rights of possession to the various relocation centers.
77	Probate of evacuees' estates.
78	Liability of cooperatives at the centers for income tax on unclaimed patronage refunds which are donated to be used for community purposes; or which are used for the cooperatives' educational programs.

Project and Field Offices

Each Project Attorney's office continued to perform on a smaller scale such services for the Project Director and Administrative staff at the center as the Solicitor's Office performs in the National Office. At one or two of the centers where Evacuee Property Officers were not appointed until late in the year, the Project Attorney added to his own functions those of the evacuee property officer. Wherever Evacuee Property Officers were functioning, close collaboration has been maintained between the Evacuee Property Officers and the Project Attorneys. Project Attorneys have continued to assist evacuee Community Councils and Judicial Commissions in performing their governmental functions, particularly by giving advice concerning the drafting of proposed enactments and their validity, procedures to be followed in judicial hearings, and similar matters. For the business enterprises corporations and trusts functioning at the centers, the Project Attorneys do such work as would be done by an attorney retained by any large private business corporation. At most centers the Project Attorneys have served as chairman of the Leave Clearance Hearing Boards, in which capacity they have assisted in conducting hundreds of hearings, written summaries of the evidence and conclusions arising from these hearings, and advised Project Directors as to appropriate action on them.

The San Francisco Property Attorney's Office has worked on hundreds of cases covering every sort of legal problem that is likely to arise out of private property ownership when owner and management are of necessity separated.

Relationships between Offices

Close relationships and constant communication between the Washington Office, the San Francisco Office and the ten Project Attorneys' offices have been maintained by a weekly interchange of reports. In addition plans call for a visit of each Project Attorney to the Washington Office once each year, while members of the Washington staff have made a practice of visiting the centers, either to fill in for absent Project Attorneys or to advise them concerning their current problems. In the half-year period, collaboration between the different branches of the Solicitor's Office was furthered by a conference at Denver attended by all Project Attorneys, the Principal Attorney from the San Francisco Office and the principal members of the Washington staff.

Persomel

The closeness of relations between offices has been helpful in allowing smooth operation to continue in a period when sudden vacancies both at headquarters and in the field necessitated considerable shifting of persomel. An Assistant Solicitor in the Washington Office went into the United States Army; another Washington staff member from this office became an officer in the Navy; a second Assistant Solicitor resigned to go to another Federal post; and the Project Attorney at Manzanar resigned to become an officer in the United States Navy.

At the projects most of the evacuee lawyers assigned to the Project Attorneys' offices have been lost through relocation, as have almost all evacuee secretaries originally assigned to these offices. At most centers, non-lawyer assistants having experience in taxation matters, insurance or other fields of business have been employed to assist the Project Attorneys in advising the evacuees on their personal and property problems. New evacuee secretaries are being trained to replace those who have relocated.

Status of Litigation Affecting WRA

As of July 1, the conviction entered in the criminal prosecution against Fred T. Korematsu, for violation of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, was pending in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after being remanded thereto by the United States Supreme Court. During the period covered by the present report the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, the majority of the Court concluding that the reasons which were

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given for the decision in Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) 320 U.S. 81, were applicable in the Korematsu case also. This, in effect, was a decision that the evacuation order was adequately sustained by the same reasons which sustained the curfew restrictions which alone were passed upon in the Hirabayashi case. One of the Judges in the Circuit Court of Appeals, Denman, while concurring with the view that the evacuation order was valid, disagreed with the conclusion of his colleagues that the issues had already been in effect disposed of by the Supreme Court in the curfew case. At the close of the year a petition for the writ of certiorari, addressed to the United States Supreme Court, was being prepared in the Korematsu case.

A second case with interesting bearing on the WRA is the Endo case. At the beginning of the period, Federal Court in California had denied a writ of habeas corpus in the case of Mitsuye Endo, who early in the evacuation sought to obtain release from detention at the Tule Lake Relocation Center. Within this period appeal from the denial was filed by Miss Endo and at the close of the period was pending before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Miss Endo's case has been complicated by the facts that leave clearance has been granted to her and that she has been transferred from Tule Lake to the Central Utah Relocation Center. In connection with this case, the Solicitor's Office prepared a thorough Memorandum on the Validity of Detention under the Leave Regulations of the War Relocation Authority and has made copies of it available to the Department of Justice and others interested in the Authority's program.

In Arizona, the General Assembly's statute restricting business dealings in which evacuees residing in that State might engage, was tested by a case brought before the Supreme Court of Arizona toward the close of the year. In this case of the State of Arizona, by Joe Conway, Attorney General v. Tsutomu Ikeda, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Johnson Pearce Commercial Company, Defendant, the Supreme Court held that the statute (H.B. 187) was invalid.

SUPPLY PROGRAM

In this semi-annual period, the principles of the Supply program which had previously been variously interpreted, were uniformly understood and became firmly entrenched. The goal in this program has been two-fold: to determine requirements well in advance of needs so that purchase of materials can be accomplished with allowance made for delayed deliveries, shortages and price variation and to avoid the accumulation of surpluses. Since the Authority is a temporary agency, it has been a matter of policy to stock no more than 3 months' supply of any item except fuel. All requisitions for food have been placed in advance of needs with the Quartermaster Depots and Market Centers, while coal and fuel oil requirements have been handled by the Washington Office on a yearly basis. Field Procurement Offices located in Chicago, Little Rock, Denver and Los Angeles were created to aid in carrying out the work of supplying the centers and have proved a valuable asset. Economic property utilization has been accomplished by the establishment of a

well defined salvage program and by education in the proper use and conservation of material and equipment.

Mess Operations

A continual problem confronting Mess Operations at the centers has been the determination of the maximum inventory to be maintained at each center. The source of supply has been adequate but the manner of transportation and time element have presented difficult problems since most centers are not close to or adjacent to main line railroads. It has been found expedient to place requisitions with the Quartermaster Depots sixty days in advance of delivery dates. Originally it was determined that centers should maintain a 90-day inventory of staple foods. In the early period of center-occupation, with demands on Quartermaster Depots changing and transportation not fully adjusted to the demands, staple requisitions were frequently delayed. Centers often had to correct their requirements, and often before readjustments could be made, they found themselves with excess inventories. With the advent of rationing, it was necessary for WRA centers to reduce their staple supplies from a 90- to a 45-day inventory.

The Washington Office and Chief Project Stewards worked together on the problem, the Quartermaster Depots cooperating. Between July 1 and December 31 of 1943, WRA's excess inventory with OPA was liquidated. Delivery services improved during these months, centers produced many more items of subsistence, and by the close application of directives issued from the National Office, the centers were able to balance their records with the OPA.

Throughout the semi-annual period, improvements were made in dietary standards at the centers. In part these improvements were the result of increasing experience on the part of mess hall chefs, but the increasing abundance of fresh vegetables from the project farms and close cooperation between Mess Operations and Agriculture Division were influential factors. A change in employment policy which reduced the number of workers in mess halls early in this reporting period in no way impaired the quality of mess service.

THE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM

The period of July 1 to December 31, 1943 covered the main portion of the harvest season in eight of the ten centers. In the two Arizona centers, it was the planting season. For most centers, this was the first harvest, as much of the land had not been reclaimed and brought under irrigation until the spring of 1943. This was a period when many new crops were being tested under conditions where their production had not been proven, and it was also a season when labor requirements in center agricultural enterprises reached a peak at the same time that the greatest number of workers were away from the centers on seasonal leave. In these months most centers either started or continued the development of livestock and poultry enter-

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prises.

Vegetable Production

Plantings of vegetables during this period, primarily for harvest in the early months of 1944, amounted to slightly more than 1000 acres, while the total production harvested amounted to 36,941,000 pounds. The program was carried out with a variety of set-backs: approximately 1300 acres of planted ground had to be abandoned in Arkansas because of severe drought; freezing weather interrupted the harvest in Central Utah, Tule Lake, Jerome and Rohwer; in some regions there were losses from failure to secure stands and from the use of unadapted varieties; in some instances it was impossible to obtain strong plants for transplanting; there were insect infestations and crop diseases. However, in spite of these handicaps, it is estimated that at least 85 per cent of the total vegetable requirements of the centers for this period was produced on the project farms, with a substantial tonnage in storage or still to be harvested for use during the subsequent period. Tule Lake, despite the labor disturbance which occurred during the harvest season and necessitated the hiring of evacuees from other centers to bring in the crops, had the greatest surplus of any center. More than 6,000,000 pounds of fresh vegetables were shipped from Tule Lake to other centers, and the bulk of the 2,500,000 pounds of produce sold on the market was raised at Tule Lake.

Feed Crops

Feed crops for poultry, hogs and cattle were produced on 7300 acres of land in the amount of 15,000,000 pounds. Although it has been determined that primary emphasis should be placed on the production of food crops to supply center mess requirements, feed crop production will be increased as more land becomes available for cropping.

Hogs

Manzanar made its initial purchase of feeder hogs for center use during this period, while the other nine centers enlarged their hog feeding operations. Hogs are means of salvaging garbage from mess halls and refuse from the vegetable fields. The major portion of their diet is garbage, with grain being fed sparingly to hogs until they become accustomed to garbage, to those who have been thrown off feed and special care, and to brood sows. The general tendency is to purchase feeder pigs large enough to consume the garbage, and farrowing of pigs is resorted to only when feeder pig supplies are inadequate to the needs of the center. During this period a total of 3622 hogs were slaughtered, providing mess halls with 715,000 pounds of pork. The total hog population of the centers increased from 6017 on July 1 to 8622 on December 31.

Beef and Dairy Cattle

Beef production was carried on in four centers: Gila River, Central Utah, Granada, and Manzanar. As with hogs, the usual procedure is to buy feeder calves, feed them for several months and then slaughter them for center use. It is anticipated that Gila River, Granada and Central Utah will each be in a position to supply beef to one center other than their own when full production is attained. From July 1 to December 31, the number of beef cattle on the centers increased from 1015 to 2964. During this period 435,590 pounds of project-grown beef were delivered to mess halls.

Gila River is the only center where dairying has been undertaken by the evacuees. On December 31, 1943, there were 82 milch cows, 33 dry cows, 17 heifers, and 25 dairy calves. The average daily production of whole milk for December was approximately 800 quarts, --nearly one-third of the center's daily requirements.

Poultry

With the exception of the two Arkansas centers, all centers had poultry projects underway during this period. At Tule Lake, because of labor difficulties, it was necessary to sell the flock just as it was coming into full production. One of the limiting factors in achieving rapid expansion of poultry enterprises has been the difficulty in completing poultry houses for brooding chicks and laying flocks. However between July 1 and December 31 the number of stock increased from 55,420 to 60,902.

Looking Ahead

At the close of the year most centers had submitted their plans for 1944 production. These contemplated the production of an even larger proportion of the vegetable requirements on centers. Most of the pork to be consumed in the months to come will be produced on the centers. It is anticipated that at least 5 centers during the first half of 1944 will secure their full beef allotments, and that egg production will increase rapidly during the next few months as pullets come into laying.

As relocation proceeds and Selective Service calls more of the able-bodied men away from the centers, increasing reliance must be placed upon women and high-school children to carry out the agricultural program. Effort is being made to use center agricultural employment as a means of developing skills of workers to facilitate their return to normal life.

MOTOR TRANSPORT AND MAINTENANCE

At the outset of the second half-year period in 1943, the condition of automotive, heavy construction and miscellaneous equipment in

use at the centers was, generally speaking, poor. Most of this equipment, old when obtained by WRA and in need of considerable repair, had at this time been used for approximately a year at the centers. It has been a constant battle to keep enough of the old equipment in operation to meet the requirements of the administration and to carry on the construction, land improvements and development program. A good many units of equipment have been retired for long intervals because of inability to obtain parts and in some instances because of the unavailability of trained mechanics and supervisory personnel. Most centers have had inadequate space for housing maintenance and repair work. Shop buildings, during this period, were under construction and the work had to be carried on in warehouses or other temporary housing where shop equipment on hand could not be installed for lack of space.

In order to offset these handicaps, a more rigid control of automotive equipment use has been inaugurated at all centers. This has been effected by the enclosure of motor pools by fences, strict enforcement of authorization procedures for the use of any piece of motor equipment, and an attempt to consolidate trips away from the center wherever possible to save mileage. The intensive campaign of training evacuee mechanics conducted by WRA since the centers opened has benefited the relocation program rather than the center operations: there is a steady demand for skilled and semi-skilled mechanics outside the centers, and consequently as soon as an evacuee has a working knowledge of equipment maintenance he relocates to private life and work.

Despite the difficulties of obtaining parts, especially for heavy equipment, and keeping skilled workers, the Motor Transport and Maintenance Section accomplished the following repair jobs during the latter half of 1943:

<u>Type of Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Type of Equipment</u>	<u>Number</u>
Tractors, crawler	124	Passenger Cars	337
Tractors, wheel.....	297	Pickups	206
Patrols.....	22	Panels	74
Pumps	13	Stake Trucks	674
Shovels	21	Dump Trucks	242
Air Compressors	4	Cargo Trucks	246
Portable Welders	3	Fire Trucks	25
Rock Crushers	1	Ambulances	33
Cement Mixers	15	Busses	15
Trailer wagons, 2-wheel ...	65	Refrigeration semis	4
Sheep Foot Rollers	1	Semi-trailers	42
Ditch Diggers	1	Commands	6
Grain Buster Bailers	1	Station Wagons	13
Log Trailers	1	Van, Winch and Tanks	16
Scrapers	8	Racks and Hearses	2
Tractors, Grader Hitch	8	Load Luggers	8
		TOTAL	<u>2528</u>

During this report period an exchange of equipment was worked out with the War Department whereby 556 units of 1939 or older equipment no longer serviceable were exchanged for 550 units of equipment of the same age no longer required by the Army but still serviceable. As the period ended it was expected that WRA could continue to obtain tires, tubes, batteries and repair parts from the Army Depots and that a limited amount of repair work could be done at the U.S. Army Maintenance and Repair Shops.

CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM

At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, a great many of the projects undertaken during the previous fiscal year remained unfinished. During this report period work continued on schools, housing projects, miscellaneous food storage and processing plants, irrigation and road projects, and the subjugation of raw agricultural land. At most of the centers no developed agricultural land was available at the time of occupation; land had to be reclaimed, cleared and leveled, and irrigation distribution laterals had to be constructed before crops could be planted. This work progressed through the July 1 to December 31, 1943 half-year, but in many cases could not be completed. A number of applications to the War Production Board for activity approval and priority assistance were pending at the end of the period, and many more were forwarded to the Board for consideration in the near future.

Maintenance and operation of the centers has become an increasing problem with the aging of buildings and plants. Most of the buildings were designed for temporary use, with an estimated life of 5 years, and as their second year of use advanced were showing wear and tear. While the temporary restrictions did not apply to the equipment used in wells, sewage disposal plants and hospital boilers, they did affect the method of installation. The wells, for instance, were hurriedly drilled and poorly equipped; many of the holes were crooked, causing excessive wear on the deep well pumping equipment. Approximately 2 years of usage has brought many of these defects to light.

It has been estimated that the cost of maintenance and repair to maintain the buildings and utilities in livable and workable condition will rise sharply each year. In some centers it will be necessary to replace most of the roofing originally used; in many cases the tar paper used on the outside of buildings has deteriorated to the point where most of it must be replaced during the present fiscal year. One of the big problems in carrying on the construction program during the semi-annual period has been that of obtaining sufficient labor. A substantial training program has been continued throughout the life of WRA, but the turnover has been rapid and at no time has there been an adequate supply of skilled workmen. The recruitment of supervisory personnel through Civil Service has been slow and difficult, as higher salaries and more agreeable living conditions offered in connection with work in industries directly connected with the war effort have limited recruitment for center employment. Another difficult problem has been the maintenance in workable

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condition the construction equipment on hand. Most of this equipment was used when purchased and much of it was not in good working condition. It has proved increasingly difficult to obtain necessary parts and skilled workmen required to maintain and repair construction equipment.

SUMMARY OF WRA CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Center	Established Cost Total Construction to June 30, 1943	Established Cost Work Accomplished to December 31, 1943	Established Cost to Complete Present Program
Central Utah	382,497	249,556	132,931
Colorado River	2,922,298	1,926,448	995,850
Gila River	902,359	536,770	365,589
Granada	461,070	382,172	78,898
Heart Mountain	575,434	469,644	105,790
Jerome	526,312	297,687	228,625
Leupp	15,000	15,000	(Closed)
Manzanar-	261,976	219,181	42,795
Minidoka	529,035	304,500	224,535
Rohwer	427,973	224,674	203,299
Tule Lake	1,151,663	673,585	478,078
TOTALS	\$ 8,155,617	\$5,299,217	\$2,856,390


SUMMARY OF WRA MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
July 1 to December 31, 1944

	No. of Jobs Done	Average Total No. of Employees	Estimated value of Materials Used
On Buildings	27,878	520	\$216,154
On Utilities	16,033	200	27,622

INDUSTRIES


In the July 1 to December 31 period, the major objective of the industrial program of WRA has been the manufacture or process of articles needed for subsistence operation and maintenance of the centers. In addition, a contribution to the war effort has been made by the manufacture of articles for the use of the Training Aids Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel. The policy of the Authority, since relocation got underway, has prohibited establishment or development of any enterprise outside these two classifications.

At the beginning of this period, some industrial work was in progress at all centers except Minidoka and Rohwer. Four of the centers have produced in their cabinet or carpenter shops furniture for use in schools, offices, and messhalls. These shops are located at Colorado



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OVERALL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
FOR
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1943



LEGEND

- DOLLAR VALUE OF "PROPOSED" AND "UNDER CONSTRUCTION" PROJECTS.
- DOLLAR VALUE OF "COMPLETED" PROJECTS.

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Activity Report of All Field Offices
July 1 - December 31, 1943

<u>Type of Activity</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Dollars</u>
Farm Property		
Sales	14	\$ 54,849.30
Leases		
Cash	23	18,764.38
Share	2	414.15
Collections		
Rent	45	7,526.13
Other	19	6,023.68
Debt Adjustments		
Mortgages and Contracts	8	6,693.42
Miscellaneous Obligations	8	1,125.94
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	<u>119</u>	\$ <u>95,397.00</u>
Farm and Automotive Equipment		
Sales		
Farm Machinery	69	23,644.27
Trucks	25	9,300.35
Automobiles	119	54,667.92
Other	23	5,060.85
Collections	34	6,916.67
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	<u>270</u>	\$ <u>99,590.06</u>
Urban and Commercial Property		
Sales		
Hotels and Apartments	9	12,730.00
Stores and Industrial Property	2	2,659.00
Residential Property	4	930.00
Industrial Equipment, Fixtures	20	12,802.26
Merchandise	20	21,180.80
Other	31	6,230.08
Leases or Other Type Management		
Hotels and Apartments	9	3,585.90
Stores, Industrial Property	4	9,352.50
Residential Property	3	8,410.00
Industrial Property	6	2,125.00
Other	8	6,392.00
Collections		
Rents	36	2,168.57
Other	112	13,491.88
Debt Adjustments		
Mortgages and Contracts	9	62,411.24
Miscellaneous Obligations	23	8,015.24
TOTAL NUMBER TRANSACTIONS	<u>296</u>	\$ <u>172,484.47</u>
Miscellaneous Activities*		
Miscellaneous Inquires Answered	3344	
Misc. Services Performed	5324	
Contraband Releases	15	
TOTAL NUMBER AND VALUE OF ALL TYPES OF TRANSACTIONS	<u>9,368</u>	\$ <u>367,471.53</u>

* These items represent cases in which property supervisors render services of information and inspection but not involving a business deal.

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HEALTH AND SANITATION

One of the more significant points to emerge from Health statistics for the latter half of 1943 was the marked increase in hospital usage coincident with a decrease in center population and a shrinkage in hospital personnel. Daily average bed occupancy of the hospitals in December of 1943 showed a 25 per cent increase over figures for the first month of the year.

Several factors have produced this state of affairs: (1) an increasing number of tuberculosis cases have been discovered in the centers; (2) the relocation of large numbers of the young and able-bodied has emphasized the high percentage of elderly persons among the Japanese population, many of whom, though feeble or chronically ill, were able to sustain barrack life as long as some family member was at hand to look after them, but once deprived of family care, have required admittance to the center hospital; (3) the heavy toll relocation has taken of evacuee professional and semi-professional personnel in the hospitals and the fact that replacements made from civil service lists have been hard to procure.

While the problem of caring for the aged and infirm has been recognized from the beginning, it is now aggravated by the departure of younger family members on relocation and the increasing shortage of professional health personnel. Heretofore, with a number of these persons cared for in family barracks, the small number who lacked such family care could be cared for in the hospital. However, by the close of 1943, hospital facilities could neither be expanded to provide for additional patients of this type nor be considered adequate to retain such patients already hospitalized. Earlier in the program plans and blueprints for remodeling barrack buildings to meet the needs of this type of patient were submitted by the Health Section to all centers. These plans provided minimum sanitary facilities and small serving kitchens for groups of 20 to 30 patients. During the July to December period, Manzanar, Minidoka and Colorado River developed such facilities which operated under the name of "Convalescent Barracks", "Hostel" or "Custodial Barracks" near the hospitals and under the hospital's direction. The opening of similar accommodations in the other centers was anticipated.

During the semi-annual period, there were 7,997 hospital admissions and 156,908 out-patient visits exclusive of optometry and dental services. In 493 instances it was necessary to send patients outside the centers for medical care. There have been no major epidemics during the period, and the vital statistics have indicated a generally good health situation, with 1,978 births and 290 deaths.

The problem of administrative assistance for the chief medical officer and chief nurse at each center was recognized in establishing the budgets for the fiscal year of 1944. Hospital administrative officers were employed at all centers by the end of the half-year period, with the result that considerable improvement in hospital

administrative practice was observed and the chief medical officers and chief nurses were able to devote their full time to their proper duties.

With the employment of trained, appointed dieticians at all centers during this period, dietetic services improved considerably. Consultations between dieticians and project stewards on general diets and in specific guidance in all special diets served in center mess halls were generally beneficial, although the problem of special diets including the feeding of young children has not yet been satisfactorily solved in some centers.

The shortage of nurses has become the most critical health personnel problem and more than any other single factor narrows the scope of medical service at the centers. During the six-month period there were 29 resignations of appointed nurses, including 6 chief nurses. Of the 35 new appointments three incumbents resigned before the close of the period. The number of registered evacuee nurses dwindled from 51 in January of 1943 to 11 in December; of 55 student evacuee nurses, only 3 remained. At the close of the year the total number of hospital personnel was 944, with the ratio of one nurse to every 32 patients. The lowest ratio which is considered safe is one nurse to 21 patients.

With this condition existing, it has been necessary to give increasing responsibility for the care of patients to evacuee nurse aides. However, the more experienced aides have left the centers and few younger women have been available to replace those who relocated. Thus the issei women have been recruited for this work. Despite their willingness, they have proved far less satisfactory than the young nisei women because of their physical limitations and their general inability to speak or understand English.

A medical social program was instituted during this period at Heart Mountain, Gila River and the Arkansas centers, leaving only one center without such service. There have been many indications that the medical social program has been of real help to physicians and nurses and that it has been an effective coordinator between the health and social welfare units. The Medical Social Consultant from the Washington Office visited all centers during this period and was on long details for special service in 2 instances, staying 7 weeks at Tule Lake to assist with the many problems arising from the segregation movement and the transfer of many patients, and 4 weeks at Gila River to carry on the work after the resignation of the medical social worker there.

Sanitation and Sanitary Engineering.

As the beginning of this period coincided with warm weather, many centers had difficulties with milk safety, food handling, garbage and rubbish disposal and sewage disposal. Sanitation problems increased

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with the establishment of hog farms and slaughter houses, a few canneries and the one dairy and pasteurization unit. The early part of July found the Arkansas centers entering the most serious part of the malaria season.

In order to deal with these problems, the position of center sanitarian was established, a supervisor of malaria control and sanitation was designated to cover both Arkansas centers, and the sanitary engineer from the national office spent three-fourths of his time in the field. At 3 centers qualified evacuee sanitarians were employed, but by the end of September all of these had relocated. Lack of qualified applicants for the position of sanitarian resulted in vacancies at six centers at the end of the year. In spite of handicaps, most of these problems were solved and environmental health conditions were kept satisfactory. The milk supply situation at the Arkansas centers was improved so that it came within the requirements for milk of the Quartermaster General of the United States Army, and the malaria control program, aided by a dry summer in Arkansas, proved to be adequate. However, the need of closer supervision of sanitation by the centers themselves was clearly indicated, and at the close of the year a concentrated effort was being made to fill the six sanitarian vacancies with qualified persons.

COMMUNITY WELFARE

In the latter half of 1943 the scope of the Welfare Section's activities at the centers expanded considerably. In addition to the routine work of providing council in connection with family and social problems, arranging shifts in housing assignments, and handling the distribution of clothing allowances and public assistance grants, the Welfare Section shared heavily in the heavy and time-consuming work occasioned by the execution of the Segregation Policy, arranged for the transfer of another group of families to the family internment camp at Crystal City, Texas, and assisted with the work of getting designated evacuee repatriates aboard the Gripsholm at its September sailing.

During the segregation program, the Welfare Section at each center was given the responsibility of counseling with families and individuals to be transferred to Tule Lake. The counseling services were particularly helpful in assisting non-segregant members of the family to decide whether or not to accompany the family to the segregation center. The Housing Unit of Welfare at each center was in charge of housing assignments for those transferred from other centers. Although temporary additions to the appointed staff were authorized for each center during this period of stress, it was impossible to recruit qualified persons on a temporary basis and within the time allowed. As an emergency measure, staff members were borrowed from other sections, particularly from the Education Section to assist with this work.

In addition to these responsibilities which were related to the normal functions of the Welfare Section, at several centers Welfare was assigned other responsibilities connected with the segregation movement,

such as the preparation and construction of summary lists of persons to be segregated, analyses of family composition showing railroad fare requirements and preparation of train lists. Since the segregation program involved large-scale movements both in and out of Tule Lake, the greatest volume of work developed at that center. Temporary employees were procured for use at that center, and the head of the Washington Welfare Section spent two months there, directing the activities of the Welfare group.

Special Counseling for Relocation

Plans were completed during this period for the establishment in the Welfare Section at each center of a Special Counseling Unit to assist families and individuals in developing a plan for the future involving re-establishment in private life and work. While the main emphasis is on preparing families for relocation, the object of the counseling interviews is the assistance of all families in making long-term plans, whether or not immediate relocation is involved. This counseling is supplementary to the interviews held by relocation committees with evacuees, and not a substitution.

Statistical Data

Early in the period a reporting system to provide quantitative and qualitative data was set up in Welfare, and by the end of the period the centers had achieved sufficient accuracy and consistency in the submission of statistical reports on the work done to justify the analysis of some of the data contained. The following summary of public assistance grants authorized by 9 relocation centers covers only 5 months of the semi-annual period; procedures were not set up in time to include data for July.

NINE CENTER SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE GRANTS

Month:	Center Population	No. of Family Units	No. of Persons in Family Units	Average Size of Family Unit	Amount of Grant	Avg. Grant per Fam. Unit	% of Population receiving Grant
Aug.	81,108	3417	5263	1.65	37,572.81	\$10.99	6.9
Sep.	78,771	2927	5227	1.79	39,679.30	13.55	6.6
Oct.	77,772	3164	5802	1.83	34,902.94	11.03	7.5
Nov.	73,362	3173	5827	1.84	27,018.67	8.51	7.9
Dec.	76,782	3002	5388	1.79	21,945.53	7.31	7.0
Total	387,795	15683	27867	1.78*	\$161,119.27	\$10.27	7.2

* The low average size of the family unit receiving grants (1.78) indicates the high number of single, unattached individuals, who require assistance because of age or disability.

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EDUCATION AT THE CENTERS

The total enrollment in center schools at the close of the 1943 fiscal year was 25,072, with 11,066 pupils in the elementary and 14,006 in the secondary schools. At the end of December 1943 total enrollment had dropped to 19,838 pupils, with 8614 in elementary schools and 11,224 in secondary schools. This low total was explained by the fact that approximately 3125 children of school age at the Tule Lake Center were not yet enrolled. The opening of Tule Lake schools in January was expected to bring the total enrollment up to approximately 23,000. This figure still represented a decrease of about 2000, 500 being accounted for by the excess of the 1943 high school graduating class over the incoming first grade enrollment. Relocation explains the remaining decrease.

Personnel Problems

The turnover in the teaching personnel at some centers ran as high as 30 per cent during the latter half of 1943. There were three changes in school superintendents, four in high school principals, and several in other school administrative positions. At the close of the year there were employed on the centers 75 school administrative personnel hired through Civil Service and 540 certified evacuee teachers. At this time there were 45 elementary and 30 high school teaching position vacancies. The shortage of evacuee teachers was in part the result of relocation of certified people and in part the result of disinclination on the part of evacuees with some college training to qualify themselves for teaching in the centers in view of the fact that teaching opportunities for Japanese Americans are very infrequent outside the centers.

School Housing and Equipment

Changes in WRA policy regarding school buildings have made several drastic reductions in the proposed school program, which originally anticipated the provision of modern but inexpensive school buildings for both elementary and secondary units. Early in 1943, by arrangement with WPB, WRA agreed to omit elementary school buildings, erecting only high school buildings. Only in Unit I of Colorado River Relocation Center, where work on the elementary school had been started, was the original plan carried out. Later, because of shortage of materials and funds, the high school building projects were curtailed, and only those centers where contracts had been let, materials obtained and construction started were permitted to have complete buildings. In other centers it seemed advisable to erect only such service units as required special space areas: auditoriums, shop, home economics and science units. This modification of plans made it necessary to revise the whole construction and maintenance program in order that the barrack type buildings could be adapted to schoolroom use.

At the beginning of the 1944 fiscal year, Granada and Heart

Mountain had high school buildings completed and in use. At the close of the year the Tule Lake high school was ready to be used. During the period covered by this report, the auditorium, science and shop units at Central Utah and the science, home economics and shop units at Gila River were completed. At Colorado River, the elementary school in Unit I and several units of the high schools in Units II and III were completed by the close of the year. Rohwer had its auditorium and home economics buildings almost ready for use as the year ended, and at Jerome an auditorium was under construction and expected to be ready for the commencement exercises of the graduating class of 1944.

During the period a considerable amount of remodeling of barrack buildings was accomplished and more was contemplated. In a number of instances, school rooms were improved by painting walls and ceilings, adding more windows and electric lights, installing shelves and cupboards, and moving or removing partitions. It was planned that some of the floors should be resurfaced and stoves shielded, as part of the effort to contrive adequate class rooms out of barracks ill-suited to school room use.

During the fall semester of 1943, textbooks and other essential supplies had been obtained in quantities sufficient for a satisfactory type of operation. However, throughout the period there persisted a shortage of equipment for shop, science, home economics and commercial classes. There have been difficulties in obtaining priority releases and in finding necessary equipment, and delays in obtaining equipment from Government surplus stocks. Efforts to acquire equipment for farm and auto mechanics vocational shops were to be stressed during the early months of 1944. It was anticipated that supply costs would continue to be higher than under normal conditions.

Relocation and the Schools

The number of pupils lost through relocation during the period was not large. However, relocation played an important part in the whole school program. Class discussions, course contents and assembly programs were planned to provide the children, and through them, the parents, with specific and even detailed information on the possibilities of relocation and the problems involved. Experience gained by teachers who took part in leave clearance hearings has been valuable in that it has given them a broader understanding of the problems and conditions which affect the thinking and future planning of the evacuees and hence the school children.

School Program Improvements

All relocation centers started the fall semester with full accreditation by state accrediting agencies. In this half-year elementary and high school program patterns were pretty well established.

Teachers and pupils were more familiar with the general aims of the program and had learned to adapt themselves to frequent modifications necessitated by the changing demands of the WRA program. Substantial gains were made in developing friendly relations with the schools of neighboring communities, and inter-school contests and visits fostered good will. Nursery Schools have progressed to the point where they render valuable aid to children in overcoming language difficulties and in preparing them for regular progress in the elementary grades. The adult education program has provided adults with an opportunity to gain or increase knowledge of the English language. It has also familiarized many of these adults with conditions existing in outside communities and has helped some of them to develop specific skills which may prove profitable to them in relocation.

COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT

During the half-year period, considerable progress was made at most centers in developing the Community Government as an instrument of community organization. Four of the centers, Gila River, Heart Mountain, Minidoka and Jerome approved Charters during this reporting period, bringing the total of centers organized under Community Government policy to eight and leaving only one relocation center functioning as an exception to the policy. Manzanar continued to operate with the Block Managers' Assembly serving as its representative body. Generally speaking the Councils made commendable progress in securing the confidence of both resident population and administration.

At the Washington office, plans were made in July for the participation of Community Councils in the process of segregation and reception of transferees from Tule Lake. Agreement was reached that the policy for Community Government would not apply to Tule Lake but that provision would be made for the establishment of a representative Advisory Council. Communications were addressed to the center Councils requesting their cooperation in meeting problems of fire prevention and requesting their recommendations as to the restoration of licensing authority to the Councils. On the basis of these recommendations, WRA restored to the Councils authority to license Business Enterprises. The authority of the Judicial Commission to penalize violators of center regulations by suspension of work privileges and clothing allowances was withdrawn, but, on the other hand the Commission was granted authority to impose fines and jail sentences. In November a Community Government Handbook was issued, setting forth functions, organization, administration, Council relationships, objectives, and problems of the community.

In conjunction with the Relocation Division, a plan was developed for the organization of staff-evacuee relationships for the purpose of aiding the relocation program. This plan was submitted to the centers in November, and provided for the establishment of a Relocation Planning Commission, its members to be appointed by the Community Council and drawn from resident groups. A staff committee with the relocation program officer as the executive secretary was to be appointed by the Project Director. These two groups were to appoint three members to an executive

board which would operate under the leadership of the Project Director in developing programs, transmitting information, and facilitating relocation in all possible ways.

At the centers, problems surrounding the movement of people to Tule Lake and the reception of newcomers from Tule Lake, the enactment of regulations, definition of relations with block managers and relocation were common to all Councils. Other problems of considerable interest were those concerned with labor relations, employment reduction, production facilities, hospitals and schools, and general center improvement.

The one disruption (and temporary) of Community Government occurred in November at Central Utah with the mass resignation of the Community Council. The Chairman of the Council, having been questioned by the FBI concerning some remarks attributed to him, resigned, whereupon the Council, after passing a resolution to the effect that statements attributed to their Chairman were not made by him at a Council meeting, also resigned. However, when an election was held to complete the last few weeks of the session, most of the former members were reelected.

As relocation progressed, removing the most capable younger men from the centers, there was a perceptible tendency on the part of the center communities to elect to the Councils older men, issei or the older nisei who had no intention of relocating in the immediate future. While this increasing predominance of the older and more permanent residents in the Councils has in some instances resulted in a less positive attitude toward relocation, it has unquestionably stimulated the Councils to take a more energetic part in improving the communities and making them better places to live.

WORK OF THE NEW RECORDS MANAGEMENT SECTION

The Records Management Section of the Administrative Management Division of WRA was established October 1, 1943. The principal functions of the new section have been the physical consolidation of documentary material, decision as to disposition of records (whether they should remain in WRA files or be submitted to the National Archives), maintaining liaison with appropriate government agencies on the keeping and disposition of WRA records, and the exercise of general supervision over mail and files in the Washington Office, including teletype, telegraph and messenger service.

The immediate value of the work of the Records Section has been in the centralization of files so that eventually all material will be in one location and more easily available to all units of the organization. The bulk of the non-record material, such as information copies of correspondence, daily leave reports and sending copies of teletypes, has been disposed of, thereby creating a saving in floor space, personnel and file equipment.

At the close of the year, the records program was confined to

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the Washington Office, but it was planned to extend this program to the field by making a survey of field records including correspondence, reports, working papers, printed publications, card records, protests and petitions. This survey will include records accumulated in the past as well as records accumulating currently.

FINANCE

On July 1, 1943, fiscal services and accountings previously performed for WRA by the Central Administrative Services Division of the Office for Emergency Management were transferred to the Relocation Centers, with OEM maintaining only the Washington Office accounts. In the Washington Office, the Budget and Procedures Unit was established during the summer, and by the close of the year the new unit had revised approximately 95 per cent of the procedure for the Authority as a whole. Many of the positions set up on the personnel charts had been filled and the new employees trained on the job. A Field Examination and Investigation Unit was set up to perform the work of travelling auditors, to get at the facts and produce regularly full, objective reports on project administration, reports which indicate precisely the extent of deviations from procedures. The work of such auditors is of paramount importance to WRA, both as protection in time of official investigation and as a means of maintaining sound administration.

An evaluation made at the close of the year showed that finance policies and procedures had been about 90% adopted during the half-year period. It was anticipated that the early months of the new year would find prescribed procedures installed uniformly at all centers and operating satisfactorily.

BUSINESS ENTERPRISES AT THE CENTERS

Status of Business Enterprises as of December 31, 1943

Center	No. of Shops & Services	Gross Sales (July 1-Dec. 31)	Net Earnings (July 1-Dec. 31)	Ratio of Assets to Liabilities
Central Utah	17	\$280,223.99	\$ 43,943.51	8.83
Colorado River	16	498,400.63	60,095.55	2.61
Gila River	18	424,500.94	63,048.84	3.51
Granada	12	223,778.85	25,221.94	2.86
Heart Mountain	18	396,927.31	54,612.08	3.22
Jerome	17	276,594.07	47,284.27	4.42
Manzanar	13	394,403.82	36,895.83	2.84
Minidoka	13	338,372.06	43,372.06	2.92
Rohwer	7	182,054.70	27,582.63	3.74
Tule Lake	27	727,517.20	82,599.13	2.09
TOTALS	158	\$3,742,773.57	\$484,655.84	

By the close of 1943, 9 of the 10 Enterprises had been incorporated as cooperatives. Heart Mountain was still operating as a trust. Gila River, already incorporated, was in the process of amending its articles of incorporation and by-laws to comply with the requirements of the Arizona Corporation Commission that its articles and by-laws restrict the activities of the corporation to the center. The total number of employees at the end of December was 1750. All the Enterprises were in fairly sound financial condition, and the general policy of maintaining prices at the competitive retail level to accumulate reserves was carried out at all centers

During this period an effort was made to reach a ratio of current assets to current liabilities of 3 to 1. By the end of the year half the Enterprises had passed this ratio and the others were climbing steadily toward it. Several of the Enterprises had established such good cash positions that they were able to pay a cash rebate just before the Christmas season.

In September a meeting of Enterprises' representatives was held in Chicago and a Federation of Center Business Enterprises was formed with a view to pooling the efforts of all centers in working for advancement of the Enterprises. The Federation opened a buying office in New York and selected three buyers from the Business Enterprises to do the purchasing for all Centers. The actual buying was not begun until the latter part of October, from that time until the end of the year, 512 orders totalling \$120,000 were handled. In the face of the manpower shortage and scarcity of ready-made clothing, purchases of ready-to-wear items are discouraged, and the Projects are encouraged to buy materials and make use of the labor and sewing facilities on the centers to make up the needed garments. The Federation maintains a revolving fund to facilitate purchases, as goods have to be paid for in advance of shipment. The Federation pays for goods out of the pool, notifies the project for which the purchase is made, and has the sum expended replenished by the project.

It has always been the goal of WRA to have the evacuees run their own Enterprises eventually and to cut down the amount of supervision by WRA as conditions permit. During this period the evacuees assumed more and more responsibility, and it was possible to reduce appointed staff from two to one at each center. However, the numerous changes in evacuee personnel brought about by relocation make more remote the prospect of eliminating WRA supervision entirely. A program was initiated in all centers whereby each important employee has an understudy trained to take over when the original incumbent leaves the center. Segregation too affected personnel changes in Business Enterprises, the most acute situation arising at Tule Lake where approximately 85 per cent of the Enterprise employees were transferred to other centers.

In response to the need of evacuees for banking facilities including a loan agency, Business Enterprises undertook the establishment of Credit Unions. It was necessary to obtain a special license from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the formation of Credit Unions on the centers. By the close of the year Topaz Enterprises at

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Central Utah had received its charter and established a Credit Union, and 4 or 5 of the other centers were preparing to organize one.

COMMUNITY ANALYSIS

Prior to July 1, 1943, foundations had been laid at all centers except Rohwer for the carrying out of Community Analysis. At Colorado River the Department of Interior had sponsored social analysis since June of 1942. During the latter half of 1943 some analysts left, and replacements were made with difficulty. Jerome, Rohwer, Heart Mountain, Colorado River and Central Utah had analysts in residence during only portions of the period. Only 5 centers; Manzanar, Minidoka, Tule Lake, Granada and Gila River had community analysts functioning throughout the period.

The analysts have rendered valuable assistance to the administration in the formulation of policies of center management and general conduct of the WRA program. They have made surveys of center opinion on controversial matters, engaged in studies to increase the general knowledge of evacuee background, cultural patterns, and reactions. They have been in a position to discover motives governing resistance to the administration, to relocation, to various programs inaugurated by WRA. All analysts were put to work on the problem of segregating the non-loyal, and their suggestions were for the most part incorporated in the Segregation Manual, unquestionably contributing to the smooth execution of the program.

Reports from the center analysts have covered details of center life, background analysis, current problems and evacuee-staff relations, and provide the Senior Analyst in the Washington Office with information for distribution and guidance for the administration.

INFORMATION SERVICES

In general, during this semi-annual period, the informational facilities of WRA were concentrated on furthering the relocation program. However, the Reports staff was active at the time of the execution of the Segregation Policy in keeping the evacuees informed on all steps of the transfer program and in documenting this major episode in WRA history. Reports Officers attended the conference of Project Directors and Washington officials in Denver in July, when plans were made for segregation movements. At this conference the importance of keeping the evacuees thoroughly and accurately informed was stressed, and information pamphlets printed in both English and Japanese were issued to be distributed at the centers. Plans were developed for giving current information through such media as center papers, special bulletins, and block manager and community council meetings. The value of careful, advanced planning was reflected in the fact that the segregation program was carried out without serious difficulties or crises

arising. The most far-reaching enterprise of the Division of Reports, however, was the expansion and improvement of information service in the interests of relocation. Real achievements were accomplished in spite of the fact that key members of the Washington Reports Office were obliged to devote most of their time and ability for two months to the assembling and preparation of information demanded by the many investigations and hearings that interrupted WRA's routine and proper obligations during this half-year period.

Relocation Reports Officers Installed

During July, Relocation Supervisors were asked to keep the centers informed on prospects for relocation in their respective areas through mimeographed releases. The burden of keeping the centers informed, of handling public relations problems, and of reporting relocation activities to the National Office became so heavy that authorization was granted for the appointment of a Reports Officer to each Relocation Supervisor's office. In November the National Chief of Reports met with the new Reports Officers in Chicago to familiarize them with the background of the WRA program, the problems involved in resettlement of evacuees, and the specific activities for which they would be responsible. These Relocation Reports Officers have kept a flow of relocation information going to the centers: press releases, special news letters, cuts of relocated evacuees and unusual job opportunities, and human interest stories concerning successfully relocated evacuees and unusual job opportunities. They have been instructed to supplement the "Facts about America" series of state pamphlets prepared by the Reports staff of the Washington Office with local studies. In the field of public relations they have been sounding out community sentiment toward evacuees, issuing press releases in relation to relocation within their areas, making press and radio contacts, preparing speeches and broadcasts. They have also assumed responsibility for the preparation of area reports to the Washington Office. At the end of December, they were asked to add to their duties the reporting to Washington of any incidents in their area which might give rise to misinformation or rumors regarding relocation of evacuees.

Photographic Program

Moving Pictures

In the first month of the semi-annual period, plans for the production of moving picture color films with commentator sound track for non-theatrical distribution had advanced to the point where actual shooting could begin. In July approximately 1600 feet of film were taken of the Japanese American Combat Team at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, for scenes to be included in WRA films. Movie footage on relocated evacuees was made at Denver, Chicago and Cleveland; footage on phases of center life was made at Heart Mountain, Granada and Rohwer. These films taken by the Photographic Unit of the Reports Division, located in the Denver Field Office, were completed, cut, edited and organized into 2 16mm. films, "The Way Ahead" (16 minutes) on relocated evacuees, and "Go for Broke" (12 minutes)

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on the Combat team. They were shown by the Relocation Team at Rohwer early in December.

Documentary Activities of the Photographic Unit.

For still photos, the emphasis was upon evacuee relocation. Pictures were taken in Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Kansas City, St. Louis, New York, and Bridgeport, and the areas surrounding these cities. Supplemental pictures of the relocation process at the centers were taken at Rohwer and Jerome. Other photographic documentation of WRA activities included one regular center picture coverage at Heart Mountain and a series of Christmas holiday season pictures at Granada. WRA photographers accompanied two transfer trains during the segregation movement to document this program. In response to the need for identification pictures for evacuee leave clearance dockets, the Photographic Unit developed a specially styled camera which was supplied to each center.

Photographic Production Figures for July 1 to December 31, 1943
Negatives added to documentary files:

By WRA Photographic Unit. . . .	549
By Project Reports Officer. . . .	451
TOTAL. . . .	1000

Total number of negatives on file December 31, 1943. . 4169

Prints made, including file-copy prints:

5" x 7"	4756
8" x 10"	3581
11" x 14"	1341
TOTAL	9678

Use Made of Photographs

All photographs of general WRA interest are sent to the National Office where permanent files are maintained by the Photographic Editor in the Office of Reports. Besides WRA photographs, pictures obtained from such sources as the Department of Agriculture, OWI, the Department of the Interior, and Chambers of Commerce have been incorporated into the collection to increase visual information on the midwestern and eastern regions of the United States. The Editor has planned and assembled visual material used by the Relocation Team and has selected photographs to be used for the illustration of publications.

One of the primary uses made of photographs has been as illustrations for official publications of the agency. In addition, exhibit prints of relocated evacuees were sent to Project Reports Officers for use in furthering interest in relocation. In August, the group of relocation advisers who went to Tule Lake to promote relocation in the interval before segregation movements took a substantial collection of photo-

graphs of relocated people and of general views of parts of the country suitable for relocation. Relocation Officers were provided with large collections of prints showing both center life and conditions of relocation to use in informing prospective employers and in public relations work. In July, 100 prints were made of the film strip. "The Wrong Ancestors", which was compiled from WRA pictures earlier in the summer. Slide projectors were supplied to Relocation Supervisors, Field Assistant Directors, and most of the centers. The film strip and accompanying mimeographed lecture were used extensively for both evacuee and public showing. Books of display prints of center life were made up during this period for the use of the Washington Personnel Section in conferences with prospective project personnel.

In addition to serving an important purpose in administrative use, the photographic collection continued throughout the period to assist outside groups and individuals interested in evacuee problems. Selections of pictures were supplied to lecturers and lay groups and committees, and 25 sets of pictures were made up for an Office of Education, Information Exchange, Loan Packet to accompany printed material on WRA and the evacuation. Pictures were supplied for publication in response to requests from newspapers, magazines, and organizations issuing pamphlets. AP and INS news stories have been illustrated with WRA photographs. The following table summarizes the distribution of exhibit prints over the six-month period:

<u>Destination</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Number of Prints</u>
Relocation Centers	Primarily Relocation	585
Relocation Offices	Public Information	2727
National Office	Publication, Relocation Team, Personnel Use, File Copies	1706
Newspapers	Publication	47
Magazines, Pamphlets		
Encyclopedias, etc.	Publication	205
Lectures	Illustration	88
Committees and Organizations	Miscellaneous	355
U.S. Office of Education	Loan Packets	400
	TOTAL	6113

Activities of Project Reports Offices

Aside from supervising the dissemination of information on segregation at the centers each Reports Officer documented carefully and fully the program as it developed at his center, submitting a report to Washington at the termination of evacuee transfers. The Reports Officers have been instrumental in setting up Relocation Libraries at most centers for the housing of material describing various areas and localities where conditions were favorable to relocation. Special attention was given to publicizing visits from field Relocation Officers and the showings of the movie series, "This is

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America." Recruitment campaigns for both the WAC and the language school at Camp Savage were well advertised at the centers.

With emphasis concentrated upon segregation and relocation, it became increasingly important to keep the issei well informed. As a result of the more rapid relocation of younger nisei, consideration had to be given to the proportionately larger Japanese speaking and reading group remaining at the centers. Suggestions were made for the expansion of the Japanese language sections of the project newspapers, and for translation of evacuee information material.

Public Relations responsibilities of the Project Reports Officers were increased in July with the closing of OWI field offices, which had previously handled WRA local publicity. Several centers initiated the policy of supplying local newspapers, radio and wire services with releases on current project activities. Many of the centers held "open house" for representatives of the press in their areas. The press visitors were introduced to the Project Director and Reports Officer, given some essential information and answers to any questions they might have, and then encouraged to wander at will through the center, eating at evacuee messhalls, visiting schools, industries and farms, talking with evacuees and seeing the centers for themselves and in their own way. These visits and inspections increased friendly relations with the press and stimulated articles and radio talks that gave a fair picture of the WRA program.

In the line of administrative reporting from the projects, there were weekly narrative reports, monthly statistical report forms and narrative summaries of these forms. Evacuee members of project Reports Offices at most centers produced surveys of the first year of life in their communities, and at Central Utah a Historical Section staffed by competent young evacuees did a complete job of documentary reporting in the form of 24 special reports.

Project Newspapers

In the course of the semi-annual period, most center newspapers introduced a page or section devoted to relocation, and some outstanding editorials and "Letters to the Editor" appeared in support of the relocation program. All center newspapers suffered a considerable turnover in editorial staff, with an increasing number of the experienced writers relocating. With the responsibility for the papers gradually shifting to a very youthful group, most of whom had only highschool or junior college journalism classes as preparation, it has been remarkable that standards have been maintained so well. At Tule Lake, the Tulean Dispatch ceased publication on November 4 when the Army assumed control of the center. At the close of the year there were plans to establish a substitute for the former news sheet early in the new year.

The following table summarizes pertinent data on the ten center newspapers:

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CENTER NEWSPAPER DATA

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Center	Paper	Operated by	Process: Printed (P) Mimographed (M)	Issues per week	Average no. pages	Circulation			
						Center	Outside		
						July	December		
Central Utah	Topaz Times	WRA	M	3	6 ¹	2957	2871	550	521
Colorado River	Poston Chronicle	Evac. Jy., Aug. WRA, Sep.-Dec.	M M	6 3	2-4 ¹ 6-8 ¹	2800 3811	4400 3136	225 350	100 351
Gila River	News Courier	WRA	M	3					
Granada	Pioneer	WRA	M	2	10-12 ¹	2433	2900	550	600
Heart Mountain	Sentinel	Evac.	P	1 ²	8 ³	5000	4500	830	1120
Jerome	Denson Tribune	WRA	M	2	8 ¹	2760	3250	125	300
Manzanar	Free Press	Evac.	P	2	4-6 ³	2443	2464	357	336
Minidoka	Irrigator	Evac.	P	1	4 ³	2700	2750	700	700
Rohwer	Outpost	WRA	M	2	8 ¹	3000	2700	173	143
Tule Lake	Tulean Dispatch ⁴	WRA	M	6 Jy., Aug. 4-6 ¹ 3 Sep. 6-8 ¹ Nov. 4		4500	4300	140	150

- 1 - Including Japanese section.
- 2 - Issues mimeographed; supplement when necessary.
- 3 - Mimeographed Japanese section in addition.
- 4 - Discontinued publication November 4.

COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES

During the second half of 1943, national organizations were increasingly well represented in the centers, National, state and local workers of many groups visited the centers, and center delegates attended religious, social and student conferences held in various parts of the United States. The following table shows the distribution of national organizations at the centers:

Organization:	Central: : Utah	Colorado: : River	Gila : River:	Granada: :	Heart: : Mt.	Man- :zanar:	Mini- :doka :	Jerome: :	Rohwer: :	Tule*: :Lake :
Red Cross	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
Jr.Red Cross:	X	: X	:	:	: X	: X	:	: X	:	:
Boy Scouts	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
Girls Scouts:	X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X
Camp Fire G.:	:	: X	: X	:	: X	:	:	:	:	: X
YWCA	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
YMCA	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X	:
Hi-Y	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	:
Girl Reserves	X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
PTA	: X	: X	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X
AAUW	:	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:	:	:
JACL	: X	:	:	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:
4-H Club	:	:	:	: X	:	:	:	:	:	:
USO	:	:	: X	:	: X	: X	: X	: X	: X	:

*Community Activities at Tule Lake were completely disrupted by the mass segregation movement and the subsequent incident. At the close of the year only the Red Cross Chapter of all Tule Lake organizations had re-established itself.

Relatively few new associations were started on the centers during the half-year period--evidence that the recreational program had reached a stage of maturity where emphasis could be placed on strengthening organized groups already in existence. In this period the centers were beginning to assume financial responsibility for community activities. Several centers completed plans for establishment of cooperatives or trusts to handle funds and to secure a steady flow of income for financing operations. These funds

were also used to finance the attendance of center residents at national meetings.

Communities continued to be responsible for direction of the community library at most of the centers. There was a steady increase in accessions. The collection of books and material in the Japanese language for the benefit of those persons unable to read English was heavily used. The popularity of this department of library service is indicated by the fact that with a total of 8,760 volumes for all centers, the total circulation for the six-month period amounted to 49,747. The circulation of English books for all centers except Granada reached a total of 223,540. The total number of books owned by center libraries reached 76,209 by the close of the year. Rental libraries had an additional several thousand volumes and were freely used.

With the exception of Tule Lake after August, and Granada for most of the period because of an infantile paralysis epidemic at that center, the centers maintained energetic activities, sponsoring sports events with teams from neighboring communities, programs for holidays within the center, athletic and cultural projects within the center, building up U.S.O.s for visiting soldiers, and planning recreation and entertainment essential to the well-being of the communities. It was observed that with the accomplishment of the segregation program and the removal to Tule Lake of those persons most interested in strictly Japanese cultural activities, the general character of the recreational program at the relocation centers became more thoroughly American.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

July 1 to December 31, 1943

- July 1-2 -- Conference on Relocation Policy in Washington Office continued from June 29; seasonal leave procedures revised and decisions reached to stress relocation in smaller cities and rural areas and to establish office in Boston to handle relocation in New England area.
- July 3 ---- The Director of WRA testified before the Chandler subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in executive session and approved the Downey Resolution prior to its introduction in the Senate.
- July 6 ---- U.S. Senate adopted resolution introduced by Senator Downey, of California, asking the President to order immediate segregation of disloyal persons of Japanese ancestry and calling for a public statement on relocation plans and procedures.
- Arizona Superior Court judge declared unconstitutional the Arizona law requiring advertisement and posting of notice with the Secretary of State before doing business with restricted persons (evacuees).
- July 6-7 -- The Director of WRA appeared before the Dies Subcommittee, composed of Representatives Costello, Eberharter and Mundt, and

disclosed segregation plans.

July 8 ---- WRA appropriation of \$48,170,000, as approved by the Bureau of the Budget, passed by Congress.

July 12 --- Congress abolished funds permitting operation of OWI field offices, making it necessary for WRA to create its own channels and contacts in public relations and press distribution.

July 15 --- The Director of WRA spoke over NBC on facts about Japanese Americans and the WRA program.

Town Meeting of the Air, conducted in Santa Barbara, California, featured Representative John Costello and Carey McWilliams on the return of evacuees to the West Coast.

July 16 --- The Senate Military Affairs Committee released report and recommendations on S. 444 providing for the transfer of certain WRA functions to the War Department, and on S. Res. 101 and 111 authorizing investigation of the WRA centers by the Chandler Committee.

July 22----- WAC opened to girls of Japanese ancestry.

July 26-27- Denver conference of WRA officials to discuss segregation plans.

August 6 -- The Director of WRA addressed the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco.

September 2 The exchange ship Gripsholm sailed from New York, carrying 314 passengers from relocation centers, 149 of whom were American citizens.

September 13-Segregation transfer movements began.

October 8 - Death of Elmer Rowalt, Deputy Director of WRA.

October 11 -Last entrainment of evacuees in the major segregation movement.

October 15- Accidental death of a farm worker halted harvest work at Tule Lake.

November 1 -Relocation Division established in the Washington Office.

Mass demonstration at Tule Lake Center and attack on Chief Medical Officer.

November 4 -Violence at Tule Lake resulted in Army occupation of the center.

November 8-9-Investigation in progress at Tule Lake Center by the California Senatorial Fact-finding Committee, Congressman Engle, and

a Dies Committee Investigator.

- November 13-Director of WRA held press conference in Washington on the Tule Lake incident.
- November 16-Director of WRA addressed American Legion state commanders, state adjutants and national officers in Indianapolis.
- November 24-Director of WRA testified concerning the Tule Lake situation before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in executive session.
- November 25-Secretary of War Stimson announced the casualty list of the Japanese-American 100th Infantry Battalion in action in Italy, listing decorations and mentioning high praise accorded them by their officers.
- November 29-Dies Subcommittee began hearings on the Tule Lake situation in Washington.
- December 1--The Director of WRA was featured speaker at the Annual Session of Massachusetts Conference of Social Workers in Boston, his subject: "A Test Case for Democracy--Japanese Resettlement."
- December 2--The Ninth U.S. Circuit Court in San Francisco upheld constitutionality of the evacuation order in the Korematsu Case.
- December 3- The Director of WRA held a conference with radio commentators and newspaper columnists in New York.
- Rohwer school children ended bond drive oversubscribed 300 per cent, having contributed the price of 3 army jeeps.
- December 4 -Leupp Center, maintained for the isolation of persistent troublemakers, was closed, its 52 inmates being transferred to Tule Lake.
- December 6 -Conference on WRA Administrative Management opened in Denver.
- December 6-9Dies Subcommittee continued hearings on Tule Lake.
- December 7-The 2d anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor passed uneventfully at all centers.
- December 13-Arizona anti-evacuee law mentioned under date of July 6 was declared unconstitutional by the state Supreme Court.
- The first evacuee girl to be inducted into the WAC, Miss Iris Watanabe of Granada, was sworn in at the office of the Governor of Colorado.
- December 18-20-Evacuee Property Conference held in San Francisco.

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December 20-The California State Board of Agriculture passed a resolution favoring ultimate restoration of employment privileges to persons of Japanese Ancestry and pledging its "influence to assure that race prejudice shall not jeopardize the lawful participation of this or any other group in the agricultural life and industry of the State" after military necessity for restrictions has passed. (Soon afterward the resolution was withdrawn and the Chairman who had sponsored it resigned from the Board)

The Dies Subcommittee re-opened its hearings on Tule Lake in order to question the Project Director of that center.