The main goal of the War Relocation Authority is to aid in the preservation of the internal security of the United States of America. At the same time, we wish to preserve and protect the rights and liberties of Japanese-American citizens and nationals, as much as this is possible during this state of war.

In order to accomplish this, all persons of Japanese ancestry presently under the authority of of the W.R.A. shall be moved to protective camps for the duration of the war. Non-Japanese husbands or wives of persons of Japanese ancestry shall have the choice of accompanying their spouses or not.

The camps shall be located on federal land, away from strategic installations, industries and services. They should contain as much arable land as is necessary to provide for the attainment of self-sufficiency on the part of the interned population. This should be considered of prime importance, as the labor of the internees should be directed towards their own self-support.

As regards the internal organization and government of the individual camps, we propose that the internees be given autonomy in the running of the internal affairs of the camps. This includes maintaining internal order, maintaining the physical arrangements of the camps, selecting a desirable form of government for themselves, and coordinating educational and recreation activities. These provisions shall not be construed as impinging on the authority of the individual camp directors to maintain security.

Security should be set up so as to guarantee the safety of the internees and the surrounding areas. The Department of Defense should provide sufficient security personnel. This Authority shall provide the individual camp directors, who shall have the power to effect this policy, and other nonsecurity personnel that he may require.

The population size of the camps should vary between 3,000 and 15,000, in accordance with local conditions. The variables to be considered here are: one, agricultural productivity of the land; two, receptiveness of neighboring communities; and three, possible availability of public or private employment oppurtunities for the internees.

The evacuees, themselves, should be used to constuct the permanent camps, i.e. actual dwelling sites, administrative offices, cooking and laundry facilities, etc.. During the construction of the permanent camps, the internees should be

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housed in tents and other temporary quarters within the actual camp site. Adequate security measures should be taken before the arrival of the internees. Appropriate government agencies will supply the materials needed for the construction and maintenance of the camps.

Dwellings shall be of the dormitory or multi-family types. The living quarters should be furnished simply, but comfortably. The internees should be allowed to add to the furnishings of their quarters through their own labor and or expense. The decision of private vs. communal cooking and sanitary facilities will be left up to the individual camp directors, who should keep in mind the construction materials at their disposal and the preferences of the internees. Buildings shall also be provided for health, educational, recreation, and religous activities. Where the interned population lacks adequate medical personnel, they shall be provided by appropriate government agencies.

Remuneration, sufficient to provide incentives, shall be provided to the internees for labor in the construction and maintenance of the camps. Integration, through employment, into surrounding communities should be encouraged. The internees home, however, will be the camp.

This policy is subject to revision by this Authority. War Relocation Authority.

March 19, 1942.

Budget required for 1st year: \$10,000,000

#### FILE 798

#### W. R. A. POLICY REVISION

Because of the potential danger of Japanese in the United States t committing espionage and other subversive activities, it will be necessary to increase security measures at all WRA Centers. It is imperative that the Center Directors implement a program that insures increased security within all sectors of camp operations. This should specifically include community government, and outside employment and movement.

This policy revision supersedes all previous statements concerning camp security.

#### W. R. A. POLICY REVISION IMPLEMENTATION

The following adjustments are to be made to the initial implementation statement in order to be in compliance with the revised policy statement. Security Provisions:

- 1. No evacuees are to be employed outside the camp. L
- 2. All evacuees will be accompanied by WRA stall and/or military camp personnel while engaged in activities outside the fenced area.

3. Military camp personnel will be expanded to 3 platoons.

Camp Organization

Organization Chart Revision: (4)

	Director	
Genral Services	Administrative Services	Community Services
(same)	(same)	-Health & Community Welfare Advisory Council
		-Communications
		-Internal Security Consumer Services

Numbers in parenthesis refer to the page numbers in the first implementation statement.

Administrative Services: Employment. and Housing Department. (7)

Change Assistant in Charge of Outside Employment to Leave Officer. He will be in charge of leave requests.

General Services: Agriculture. (12)


Because job opportunities outside the camp have been eliminated additional jobs should be created within the camp. One area that can be expanded during the first year is animal husbandry. The number of expanded personnel will be determined after the evacuees arrive. To expand programs an additional allocation of \$50,000. will be needed.

General Services: Industry. (13)

Additional opportunities are to be created in small industries. Government two personnel will have to be increased by Assistant Officers at a cost of \$2,000 per individual. In order to expand the activities an additional \$20,000 will be needed.

- Community Services: Community Government. (14) change to Community Advisory Section.
  - Purpose: To act as the communications link between WRA staff and interned residents.
  - Temporary Community Advisory Council (CAC): One represenative is to be the elected from each tent block. It will meet weekly with Assistant Director for Community Services and biweekly with the Director until a permanent CAC is formed.

Organizational Chart: Community Advisory Section.



Elections:

1. Date for the election to fill permanent positions are to be set when evacuees are in permant housing. PRILIA PP

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2. All terms for elected officials will be for one year. The Executive Advisory Board appointees will serve for one year. Judicial Board appointments will be for 6 months.

3. All residents 18 years or older will be eligible to vote.

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Executive Advisory Board.

- Will meet biweekly with the Director to discuss camp programs and problems. The Director may request certain departmental officials at these meetings.
- 2. Set up agenda for CAC meetings.

Community Advisory Council.

- 1. Biweekly meetings with the Assistant Director.
- 2. Comment upon oral reports by the heads of Community Services departments.
- . Provide feedback to own block on previous reports.
- 3. Each representative responsible for reporting minutes of CAC meetings to Block Council.
- 4. Organize religious activities including setting schedules and locations for services.

Judical Board: Judge cases that are referred to them by Internal Security concerning minor disputes between internees or damages of \$50 or less to non-government property.

Block Councils:

- 1. Hold biweekly meetings open to all block residents.
- 2. Poll reactions and opinions of block residents for CAC member to relate at CAC meetings.
- Organize and implement plan for upkeep and beautification of block.
  Organize and schedule recreational activities and use of recreation hall.

Community Services: Education. (17)

The Education Director is responsible for all planning of educational programs.

Community Services: Communications. (18)

The Communications Advisor is to plan and implement communications program and community newsletter. He will be responsible for screening all material included in the newsletter.

Community Services: Internal Security. (18)

Purpose: To protect property and keep the peace. Internal Security personnel will investigate all complaints and disturbances.

- 1. Cases concerning subversive activities will be reported to the Director who will notify the F. B. I..
- Cases Involving minor disputes and non-government property of less than \$50 value will be referred to the Judicial Board and a report to the Director will be made.

3. All other cases are to be referred to the Director for decisions. Staff: To insure more effective internal security 3 Security Officers are to be hired at a salary of \$2,000 each and 6 Assitant Security Officers are to be hired from the evacuee population at a salary of \$200 each. Also 2 evacuee Clerk -Typists are to be hired at a salary of \$150.

Community Services: Consumer Section. (20)

Purpose: To provide goods and services through evacuee enterprise. To be set up on a cooperative basis.

Staff: Advisor. To assest the needs and resources (in terms of evacuee experience) of the community and organize cooperatives. To determine with the Legal Section, the Fiscal Section, and the Assistant Director for

Community Services means of financing the projects.

Staff: Additions.	Number	Salary
Assistant Advisor.	1	2,500

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	Number	Salary
Auditor.	1	2,000
Secretaries. (evacuees)	2	400
Clerk - Typists (evacuees)	3	450

Note: Evacuees employed in enterprises will be paid by means of percentage mark-up. Salaries are to be consistent with the evacuee pay scale.

Procedures. (21)

Addition: All Community Service department heads are to prepare monthly reports which they will present orally at the CAC meetings. A copy of the report will be sent in advance to the Director.

Calendar. (24)

CANADA NUMBER OF STREET

Delete all references to outside employment.

Supplemental Budget. (26)

	Staff: Government	Staff: Evacuees	Equipment
General Services: Agriculture. Industry.	4,000		50,000 20,000
Community Services: Internal Security. Consumer Section.	6,000 4,500	1,500 850	
TOTALS: Staff: Government. Staff: Evacuees. Employment Benifits. Equipment. TOTAL	-	14,500 2,350 1,700 70,000 88,550	

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#### BACKGROUND STATEMENT

### 1. Before Pearl Harbor

Japanese are relative latecomers to the United States. Due to the self-exclusion policy which early Tokugawa Shoguns adopted in 1638, Japan retired from the world for nearly two centuries until forced to open by Commodore Perry in 1854. Emigration to the United States was but a trickle until about 1891 when the annual number exceeded 1000. Migration peaked during the first years of the 1900's. About 10,000 arrived on the mainland in 1907, but the number was drastically reduced to 1,552 in 1910 - the effect of the Gentlemen's Agreement which curtailed the emigration of Japanese laborers to America. The total population in continental United States in that year was 72,157, of whom 4,502 were American citizens.

Because our first immigration law, passed in 1790, prevented anyone but "free whites" from naturalization, only those born here could be citizens.

## Prejudice in California and other West Coast states

The first anit-Oriental campaign (1860's,1870's) in California was directed toward the Chinese, who had arrived earlier. Pressures from these groups influenced the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882. The trade unions of San Francisco were the most active of these groups between 1870 and 1920. When the Chinese labor force declined after 1882, Japanese immigrants were welcomed as laborers, partly because they were considered to be "more docile." They worked mainly in the agricultural industry in California, Washington, and Oregon. In particular, the California sugar-beet growers, the railroads, and the hop growers of northern California and Oregon employed Japanese laborers. From there the Japanese went into seasonal work and truck farming. As they began to lease or purchase land or go into business, West Coast farmers came to resent their economic competition and the racists envisioned a threat to white supremacy.

The anti-Oriental campaign was stepped up during the first decade of the 20th Century, this time with Japanese targets. Some of these influential groups were the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League (started in 1905), the Native Sons of the Golden West (started in 1875 and very influential through: the World War II period), and the Oriental Exclusion League (1908): They were influential in getting the Gentlemen's Agreement Act of 1908 and 1913 California Alien Land Act preventing aliens ineligible for citizenship to buy agricultural land or lease it beyond three years. The hue and cry against Japanese quieted during World War I, but as soon as the war ended it began afresh. The first convention of the American Legion, 1919, recommended Japanese exclusion.

Some of these groups combined their efforts in the early 1920's as the Joint Immigration Committee under the direction of V.S. McClatchey, publisher of the <u>Sacramento Bee</u>. Other members represented the California American Legion, State Federation of Labor, California State Grange, Native Sons of the Golden West, Associated Farmers, and the state attorney general. Together they were politically powerful. In 1921 McClatchy filed a case with the U.S. Senate for an exlusion act. The act was passed

in 1924 denying admission to the United States of all immigrants ineligible for American citizenship (everyone except whites). It was not until 1952 that the exclusion act affecting Japanese was repealed and the right to become naturalized citizens conferred.

Part of the fear of the Japanese was due to economic competition in agriculture, business, and the labor market; part due to the emergence of Japan as a major power; and part due to the myths espoused by racists, for example: it was only a matter of time before the Japanese population would be a majority because they "bred like rabbits;" or that the Nisei owed their allegiance to Japan because of their dual citizenship.

In the years between 1924 and 1941 relations improved. After the Exclusion Act the problems of the anti-Japanese groups were resolved and they turned their attention to Filipinos. For the first time, some groups became interested in the absorption of the Japanese and were against total exclusion.

It is important to note the regionality of the antipathy toward Japanese-Americans. ". . . long before Pearl Harbor the results of California action threatened to bring the nation to war with Japan. On several occasions the United States as a whole has been at odds with the West Coast" (Grodzins 1949, p.6).

In summary, since about 1900 a wide-spread and deep-seated antipathy toward the Japanese-Americans characterized the West Coast states. Eased on emotional racial and economic beliefs, it was put to both economic and political ends. It was of potent influence on national and international levels.

## 2. Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941

A sudden Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.was followed by enemy successes in the Pacific. An attack on the mainland<sup>10</sup>/<sub>1</sub> possibility.

# Removal Campaign

Immediately following Pearl Harbor, there was surprisingly a quiet period with respect to resident Japanese. After the turn of the year 1942, however, the latent anti-Japanese hostility was released and garnered in a campaign for evacuation, even incarceration, of the Japanese. It was a well-planned, concerted barrage of pressure on Congress and of criticism against the departments of War and Justice, peaking about February 13, 1942.

The most active groups advocating mass evacuation were certain agricultural and business groups, chambers of commerce, the American Legion, the California Joint Immigration Committee, and the Native Sons and Daughters of the Golden West. Their efforts combined with those of national legislators, state and local officials. When their exhortations were spewed out through the steady clamor of radio braodcasting, West Coast newspaper editorials, columns, and slanted reports, public fears were aroused and policy-making officials were pressured.

In the steadily growing emotionalism and panic, voices of moderation and opposition to mass evacuation were overridden. This resulted in authority being placed with the military. Under the justification of "military necessity," General DeWitt designated the western half of the Pacific Coast and the southern third of Arizona as a military area of exclusion.

Obviously, the desire to protect the West Coast from sabotage and espionage was not the only factor in demands for evacuation. Economic, racial, and political considerations could effectively merge with patriotism in this situation.

## 3. The Japanese-Americans

One hundred ten thousand Japanese, two-thirds of whom were American citizens, were by reason of race to be removed from their homes on the West Coast. Other groups in the United States descended from European countries with which we were at war were not included in the roundup. The Justice Department's position was, until deferring to the military, that there should be no mass evacuation. The assumption was to deal with enemy suspects on an individual basis and that adequate steps had been taken to do so.

When the evacuation order came from the military on March 2, many Japanese voluntarily relocated to eastern California or to neighboring western states. They met violent resistance to their settlement.

On March 11 the Wartime Civil Control Administration was established with a military director to oversee rapid mass evacuation. It has been estimated that there  $h_{\Lambda}^{(4)}$  200,000,000 worth of Japanese owned property at the time of removal. In the initial confusion inadequate safeguards for dealing with this property prevailed and material losses were great.

Several factors contributed to these problems: 1) absence of any safeguards for several weeks after evacuation, 2) delay of West Coast military authorities in providing such protection, 3) inadequate measures when they were instituted, 4) division of responsibility led to differing policies, none adequate, and 5) wartime hate, prejudice, and greed thwarted recognition of minority rights and led to indifference of West Coast law enforcement to prevent destruction and theft. (Maper, GAL).

This is the background up to the date of the establishment of the War Relocation Authority by Executive Order 9102, March 18, 1942.

Sources: Grodzins, Morton <u>Americans Betrayed</u> 1949 Meyer, Dillon <u>Uprooted Americans</u> 1971 ENWARD H SPICER